BATTLES OF EMUCKFAU AND ENOTACHOPCO--HOW THE CREEKS "WHIPPED CAPTAIN
JACKSON."
In an earlier chapter of this book the author expressed the opinion that
if the Creeks could have had an equal share with their enemies in
writing the history of the war their story would have given us very
different impressions from those that we now have with respect to many
of the events of the struggle. Perhaps no better illustration of the
truth of this assumption could be given than that which is furnished by
the story of Jackson's short campaign with his two and three months'
men. The Creek chiefs who fought this force in the battles of Emuckfau
and Enotachopco always declared, in talking of the matter after the war,
that they "whipped Captain Jackson and ran him to the Coosa River," and
while neither Jackson's report of the campaign nor any other of the
written accounts of it, admit the truth of this Indian version of the
story, they furnish a good many details which strongly suggest that the
Creek chiefs may not have been altogether wrong in their interpretation
of events.
But as they had no historians to put their account upon record, except
by reporting their verbal assertion which we have quoted, the writer is
compelled to rely upon the testimony of the other side exclusively for
all information about matters of detail.
The force which had come from Tennessee consisted of about nine hundred
men in all, of whom eight hundred and fifty were fit for duty. They were
in two regiments, one commanded by Colonel Perkins, the other by Colonel
Higgins.
With this small force Jackson at once began his march. Crossing the
Coosa River on the day after their arrival, he pushed forward to
Talladega, where he was reinforced by a body of friendly Indians
consisting of sixty-five Cherokees and about two hundred Creeks. He had
with him an artillery detachment with a single iron six pounder cannon;
a company of spies under Captain Russell, and another under Captain
Gordon; and one company composed exclusively of officers. These were
officers of various grades whose men had gone home. General Coffee,
whose troops also had left him, had gathered these officers together and
commanded them in person. General Jackson said in his report that his
force numbered exactly nine hundred and thirty men, exclusive of the
friendly Indians who accompanied him. These Indians are said to have
been somewhat alarmed when they saw how small a force Jackson had with
him, but there is nothing to show that they in the least faltered in
their duty or hesitated to march when ordered to do so.
General Floyd was already moving to strike the Creeks again, having
recovered from his wound. Of this movement and of the nature of Floyd's
plans Jackson was advised, in order that he might as far as possible
arrange his own in accordance with them.
At Talladega General Jackson received a despatch from Colonel Snodgrass,
commanding at Fort Armstrong, that a force of Creeks had assembled at
Emuckfau, in a bend of the Tallapoosa River, near the mouth of Emuckfau
Creek, in what is now Tallapoosa County, Alabama, and that these
Indians, now about nine hundred strong, were preparing to attack Fort
Armstrong. Jackson resolved to find and fight this Creek force at once.
His men, as he tells us in his report, were both undrilled and
insubordinate, and their officers were without skill or experience; but
the troops were really anxious to fight a battle, and in this particular
their general was disposed to gratify them as speedily as possible.
Luckily he had a few good men upon whom he could depend, and his company
of brave and experienced officers who were serving as private soldiers
with General Coffee for their captain were his special staff of
reliance.
Pushing forward as rapidly as possible, the army arrived at
Enotachopco, about a dozen miles from Emuckfau, on the afternoon of
January 20th. The march was resumed the next morning, and early in the
day signs were discovered of the proximity of a large Creek force.
Well-beaten trails were found, and a few Indians seen.
It was necessary now to reconnoitre before proceeding further, in order
to avoid a surprise in some unfavorable spot. Jackson selected a
halting-place and ordered the men to encamp in the form of a hollow
square, taking great pains to surround the camp with a line of
well-placed picket-guards. Then he sent out his spies to discover the
whereabouts and the strength of the Indian force.
Before midnight the spies reported that a large Indian encampment lay
within about three miles of Jackson's position, and that the Indians
were removing their women and evidently preparing for battle. It was
probable that they did not intend to await Jackson's attack, but
intended to fall upon his camp during the night, but the careful
commander, having already taken every precaution against surprise,
contented himself with warning the pickets against neglect of vigilance
and the men against panic in the event of a night attack.
The Indians advanced as morning approached, and at six o'clock, while
it was not yet light, fell upon Jackson's left flank with great fury.
The men, raw as they were, behaved well and met the assault with spirit.
General Coffee rode at once to the point at which the firing was
heaviest, and both by his presence and his words animated the men; but
the struggle was a severe one, and for a time the left flank was so hard
pressed that their ability to hold their position was a matter of some
doubt. As soon as it was light enough to see, and hence light enough to
move troops from one part of the line to another without danger of
producing confusion and panic, a fresh company of infantry was ordered
to reinforce the left; and Coffee, who with the adjutant-general,
Colonel Sitler, and the inspector-general, Colonel Carroll, for his
aids, had assumed the immediate command, ordered the whole line forward,
leading the men to one of the most gallant and determined charges of the
war. Thus assaulted the Creeks gave way, and after a few moments of
irregular resistance fled precipitately, closely pressed both by the
troops and by the friendly Indians. Coffee with his usual vigor followed
the broken and retreating savages for two miles, inflicting considerable
damage upon them.
Then Jackson ordered Coffee to take four hundred men and march to the
Indian encampment, about three miles away, and, if it should be
practicable, to destroy it. He cautioned the gallant, and perhaps too
daring general--who was said by one of his contemporaries to have been
"a great soldier without knowing it"--to avoid unnecessary risk, and not
to attack the place if it should prove upon inspection to be strong.
Coffee marched at once, taking the single piece of artillery with him;
but upon arriving at Emuckfau he found the place so well fortified and
the force there so strong that he deemed it important not only to
withdraw without attacking, but to hasten his return to the camp lest
the army thus divided should be attacked and beaten in detail. It was
soon made plain that the attack of the morning had been not much more
than a beginning of the Indian attempt to overwhelm Jackson.
Half an hour after Coffee returned the Creeks renewed the battle. A
considerable force began the action by making an assault upon Jackson's
right flank. As soon as their line was developed Coffee asked permission
to turn their left flank--moving from the rear of Jackson's right--with
two hundred men. Through some misunderstanding only fifty-four men
accompanied Coffee, but that particularly enterprising officer, not to
be balked of his purpose or delayed in executing it, dashed on though
the woods with his little force, which consisted chiefly of his own
officer company, and fell upon the flank of the savages fiercely.
Jackson, seeing with how small a force Coffee was making this critical
movement, moved two hundred friendly Indians to the right to assist the
flanking party by attacking that part of the Indian line in front.
Had the Indian attack been what it appeared to be, the battle would have
been decided by the results of this combined blow upon the Indian
left--from Jackson's right and Coffee's position beyond; but it was
presently apparent that the attack upon the right of Jackson's line was
merely a feint designed to distract attention from the real object of
the savage leader, and to lead Jackson to strengthen his right at the
expense of his left, upon which the savages intended then to fall with
crushing force.
In this scheme the Indians were baffled. Jackson, anticipating something
of the sort, not only avoided weakening his left, but specially
commanded the officers there to expect an attack in force and prepare to
meet it.
As soon as the right was fully engaged, the main body of the Indians
advanced with spirit and confidence against the left. The assault was
well made, the shock falling upon the whole front of the left flank at
once; but it was equally well received. For a time the firing was very
heavy and at short range; then, knowing that raw troops can stand any
amount of active work better than a strain which must be borne
passively, Jackson, who had ridden to this part of the field as soon as
the alarm was given, ordered his men to cease firing, fix bayonets,
charge, and sweep the field. The men behaved, Jackson tells us, with
"astonishing intrepidity," and quickly cleared their front, Colonel
Carroll leading the charge. The Indians wavered, gave way, and then
broke and fled in confusion, under a destructive fire, and with their
pursuers close upon their heels.
The friendly Indians did good work whenever actual fighting was going on
in their front, but being without that habit of unquestioning obedience
which more than any thing else makes the difference between a good
soldier and a raw recruit, they could never be depended upon to execute
an order the ulterior purpose of which they could not see. In this
battle of Emuckfau their habit of acting for the good of the cause upon
their own judgment and without regard to orders came near involving
Coffee and his company of officers in serious disaster. When Jackson
ordered them to the right to co-operate with Coffee, they went gladly
and fought well, enabling Coffee to drive the savages in his immediate
front into the swamps; but when the firing began on the left they
quickly withdrew from the position they had been ordered to occupy, and
went to join in the _melee_ at the other end of the line, without
pausing to think of what might befall Coffee in consequence.
No sooner had they gone than the Creeks rallied and attacked Coffee
again, well-nigh overwhelming his small force with their greater
numbers. Luckily, Coffee was both an able and an experienced officer,
and it was equally a fortunate circumstance that his followers, the
ex-officers, were the very best troops in the army, else the whole of
the little band, including Coffee, an officer whom Jackson could ill
have spared, must have been destroyed. The little band fought with
desperate determination, holding their ground and keeping the Indians at
bay, but having to fight on every side at once. Coffee fell severely
wounded, but continued to direct the operations of his men. His
aide-de-camp and three others of his followers were killed.
Jackson, hearing the firing on that flank, recalled the friendly Indians
from the pursuit at the left as soon as he could, and sent them at
double-quick to rescue Coffee. They came up at a run and with a yell,
headed by their chief, Jim Fife. As soon as Coffee was thus reinforced
he ordered a charge, before which the foe gave way and fled, followed
for miles by the relentless Jim Fife and his Indians.
Thus ended the battle of Emuckfau. Whether or not it ended in victory
for Jackson is a question with two sides to it, even when the evidence
comes to us altogether from one side. Jackson held the field, it is
true, but he did not think it prudent to advance a few miles and destroy
the Indian encampment. He determined, on the contrary, to retreat
without delay to Fort Strother, and even for the single night that he
was to remain on the battle-field he deemed it necessary to fortify his
camp. Certainly he did not regard the Indians as very badly beaten on
this occasion. They were still so dangerously strong that the American
commander thought it necessary to provide camp defences, which he had
not thought of on the preceding night. In view of these things and of
the retreat and pursuit which followed, we may fairly acquit the Indians
of the charge of unduly boasting when they said, as already quoted, "We
whipped Captain Jackson and ran him to the Coosa River."
In his official report of the affair, Jackson explained his
determination to retreat by saying: "Having brought in and buried the
dead and dressed the wounded, I ordered my camp to be fortified, to be
the better prepared to repel any attack which might be made in the
night, determining to make a return march to Fort Strother the following
day. Many causes concurred to make such a measure necessary. As I had
not set out prepared or with a view to make a permanent establishment, I
considered it worse than useless to advance and destroy an empty
encampment. I had, indeed, hoped to have met the enemy there; but having
met and beaten them a little sooner, I did not think it necessary or
prudent to proceed any further--not necessary, because I had
accomplished all I could expect to effect by marching to their
encampment, and because, if it was proper to contend with and weaken
their forces still farther, this object would be more certainly attained
by commencing a return, which having to them the appearance of a
retreat, would inspirit them to pursue me: not prudent, because of the
number of my wounded; of the reinforcements from below, which the enemy
might be expected to receive; of the starving condition of my horses,
they having had neither corn nor cane for two days and nights; of the
scarcity of supplies for my men, the Indians who joined me at Talladega
having drawn none and being wholly destitute; and because if the enemy
pursued me, as it was likely they would, the diversion in favor of
General Floyd would be the more complete and effectual."
The retreat began the next morning, and was conducted with all the
caution and care possible. Jackson knew very well that the fight of the
day before had been really little better than a drawn battle. He knew
that he had not broken the strength of the Indian force which he had
been fighting, and that their running away was the running away of
Indians, not of regular soldiers; that it indicated no demoralization or
loss of readiness to renew the fight, but merely their conviction that
for the moment they had better run away. This distinction is an
important one to be made. When a disciplined army breaks before the
enemy and runs away, the fact proves their utter discomfiture; it shows
that they have lost spirit and abandoned their standards in panic, and
in such a case it is certain that they are in no fit condition to renew
the battle either offensively or defensively. But, in the case of
Indians, running away indicates nothing of the kind. Indians fight in a
desultory way, advancing and retiring equally without regard to regular
principles. They run away if they think that to be the best thing to do
for the moment, whether they are frightened or not; and the moment they
see an opportunity to strike their foes successfully, they are as ready
to turn and fight as they were to run.
Jackson knew this, and hence he made his retreat with all points guarded
against surprise. Before nightfall he had reached Enotachopco, and there
he selected a camp with reference to its defensive capabilities, and
strongly fortified it before permitting his men to go to rest for the
night. The Indians were discovered to be in the neighborhood, having
dogged the retreating army's footsteps through the day, but the
precautions taken to strengthen the camp deterred them from attacking
during the night.
The next morning, January 24th, Jackson had even greater reason than on
the preceding day to anticipate an attack. His pursuers had shown
themselves rather boldly during the night, and were evidently
contemplating an assault upon his column during the day's march. Knowing
that the deep Enotachopco Creek between two hills lay just ahead of him,
and that the road by which he was retreating crossed this creek in a
defile which offered his pursuers every opportunity to attack him with
advantage, Jackson ordered his guides to seek a more favorable place of
crossing, and they chose a place where the banks were clear of reeds and
underbrush, and where, if attacked, the army could defend itself better
than at the regular place of crossing. When the guides reported Jackson
moved out of his camp in the order of a harassed general in retreat. He
moved in three columns, with strong front and rear guards out, the
wounded men in the centre, and light companies on the flanks. He had
even taken the precaution, so confident was he that his enemy would
attack him that morning, of making his dispositions for battle, issuing
a general order instructing the men in what order to form in the event
of an attack in front, in rear, or on either flank.
Can we wonder that the Indians who saw all these precautions taken
believed that they had "whipped Captain Jackson" and were "driving him
to the Coosa River"?
The army moved forward in this cautious way and arrived at the creek.
The advance-guard crossed first, and after them the wounded were carried
to the opposite shore. Having cared for the helpless wounded men, the
solitary gun in the army's possession became the next most important
object of solicitude, and the artillery company advanced to cross. Just
as they were entering the water a shot in the rear announced that the
enemy was pressing Colonel Carroll, who had command there. According to
Jackson's orders for the formation of a line of battle in the event of
an attack from the rear, Carroll, with the centre column of the
rear-guard, was to face about and maintain his position with his front
to the rear of the line of march; Colonel Perkins, commanding the right
column of the rear-guard, was to face to the right and wheel to the
right, using Carroll's flank as a pivot; while Colonel Stump, with the
left column of the rear-guard, was to execute a corresponding movement,
thus inclosing the enemy's force within three sides of a hollow square,
and attacking him simultaneously in front and on both flanks.
Colonel Carroll executed his part of the manoeuvre perfectly. The
moment that the savages attacked the rear company in the column, he
faced his men about, deployed them in line, and received the shock of
the onset manfully; but the right and left columns behaved badly,
breaking and fleeing precipitately without firing a gun. The worst of it
was that their flight bred a panic among the troops of the centre, and
nearly the whole force fled like a mob, Colonel Stump actually leading
the retreat, riding frantically into and across the creek. As he passed
by Jackson, the infuriated general, who had chosen the ground in the
hope that he might crush the enemy here by attacking him on all sides,
made an effort to cut the coward down with his sword, but without
success.
The flight had effectually dissipated all hopes of winning a victory,
and it had done more--it had left the worthy men of the army, very
nearly all of them who were worth having in an army at all, exposed to
destruction. Colonel Carroll had only twenty-five men left, with Captain
Quarles in direct command, but he stood firm and held his ground like a
soldier. Jackson says, in his elaborate report:
"There was then left to repulse the enemy the few who remained of the
rear-guard, the artillery company, and Captain Russell's company of
spies. They, however, realized and exceeded my highest expectations.
Lieutenant Armstrong, who commanded the artillery company in the absence
of Captain Deadcrick (confined by sickness), ordered them to form and
advance to the top of the hill, whilst he and a few others dragged up
the six-pounder. Never was more bravery displayed than on this occasion.
Amidst the most galling fire from the enemy, more than ten times their
number, they ascended the hill, and maintained their position until
their piece was hauled up, when having levelled it they poured upon the
enemy a fire of grape, reloaded and fired again, charged and repulsed
them. The most deliberate bravery was displayed by Constantine Perkins
and Craven Jackson, of the artillery, acting as gunners. In the hurry of
the moment, in separating the gun from the limbers, the rammer and
picker of the cannon were left tied to the limber. No sooner was this
discovered than Jackson, amidst the galling fire of the enemy, pulled
out the ramrod of his musket and used it as a picker, primed with a
cartridge, and fired the cannon. Perkins, having pulled off his bayonet,
used his musket as a rammer and drove down the cartridge; and Jackson,
using his former plan, again discharged her. The brave Lieutenant
Armstrong, just after the first fire of the cannon, with Captain
Hamilton of East Tennessee, Bradford, and McGavock, all fell, the
lieutenant exclaiming as he lay, 'My brave fellows, some of you may
fall, but you must save the cannon!'"
The charge made by the artillery company was seconded by Captain
Gordon's spies, who, marching at the head of the column, had crossed the
creek when the action began, but who quickly turned and recrossed,
striking the enemy in the left flank. A number of other men had now
rallied and regained their positions in the line, and as soon as a
determined assault was made the enemy gave way and the field was
cleared, leaving Jackson free to resume his retreat toward the Coosa
River.
In the two battles of Emuckfau and Enotachopco the Indian loss was
heavy, one hundred and eighty-nine bodies being found on the field.
Jackson's loss was twenty men killed and seventy-five wounded, some of
them mortally. Among the killed was Captain Quarles, who fell at the
head of his brave twenty-five rear-guardsmen, who checked the enemy and
prevented utter disaster from overtaking the army by their courage and
coolness.
General Coffee was moving forward on a litter when the battle at
Enotachopco began, suffering from the wound he had received at Emuckfau;
but when the army broke into a confused and flying mass he mounted his
horse in spite of his condition, and to his exertions chiefly Major
Eaton attributes the rallying of the men and the ultimate repulse of the
enemy.
It became Coffee's duty to write a letter breaking the news of Captain
Donelson's death to his friends, and in that letter, the manuscript of
which is preserved in the archives of the Tennessee Historical Society,
he says of the ill-luck of the expedition:
"Our great loss has been occasioned by our troops being raw and
undisciplined, commanded by officers of the same description. Had I had
my old regiment of cavalry I could have driven the enemy wherever I met
them, without loss. But speculation had taken them out of the field, and
thus we have suffered for them. Their advisers ought to suffer death for
their unwarrantable conduct, and I hope our injured citizens will treat
them with the contempt they so justly merit."
Jackson had no sooner reached his camp at Fort Strother, than he called
Colonels Perkins and Stump to account for their conduct at Enotachopco,
preferring charges against them and sending them before a court-martial
for trial. The court, upon the evidence submitted, acquitted Colonel
Perkins, but found Colonel Stump guilty of the charge of cowardice, and
sentenced him to be cashiered.