Have the methods of employment made the same progress?

3. Progressive Introduction of Fire-Arms Into the Armament of the

Infantryman

The revolution brought about by powder, not in the art of war but in

that of combat, came gradually. It developed along with the

improvement of fire arms. Those arms gradually became those of the

infantryman.

Thus, under Francis I, the proportion of infantrymen carrying fire

arms to those armed with pikes was one to three or four.

At the time of the wars of religion arquebusiers and pikemen were

about equal in number.

Under Louis XIII, in 1643, there were two fire-arms to one pike; in

the war of 1688, four to one; finally pikes disappeared.

At first men with fire-arms were independent of other combatants, and

functioned like light troops in earlier days.

Later the pikes and the muskets were united in constituent elements of

army corps.

The most usual formation was pikes in the center, muskets on the

wings.

Sometimes the pikemen were in the center of their respective

companies, which were abreast.

Or, half the musketeers might be in front of the pikemen, half behind.

Or again, all the musketeers might be behind the kneeling pikemen. In

these last two cases fire covered the whole front.

Finally pike and musket might alternate.

These combinations are found in treatises on tactics. But we do not

know, by actual examples, how they worked in battle, nor even whether

all were actually employed.

4. The Classes of Fire Employed With Each Weapon

When originally some of the infantry were armed with the long and

heavy arquebus in its primitive state, the feebleness of their fire

caused Montaigne to say, certainly on military authority, "The arms

have so little effect, except on the ears, that their use will be

discontinued." Research is necessary to find any mention of their use

in the battles of that period. [47]

However we find a valuable piece of information in Brantome, writing

of the battle of Pavia.

"The Marquis de Pescani won the battle of Pavia with Spanish

arquebusiers, in an irregular defiance of all regulation and tradition

by employing a new formation. Fifteen hundred arquebusiers, the

ablest, the most experienced, the cleverest, above all the most agile

and devoted, were selected by the Marquis de Pescani, instructed by

him on new lines, and practiced for a long time. They scattered by

squads over the battlefield, turning, leaping from one place to

another with great speed, and thus escaped the cavalry charge. By this

new method of fighting, unusual, astonishing, cruel and unworthy,

these arquebusiers greatly hampered the operations of the French

cavalry, who were completely lost. For they, joined together and in

mass, were brought to earth by these few brave and able arquebusiers.

This irregular and new method of fighting is more easily imagined than

described. Any one who can try it out will find it is good and useful;

but it is necessary that the arquebusiers be good troops, very much on

the jump (as the saying is) and above all reliable."

It should be borne in mind, in noting the preceding, that there is

always a great difference between what actually occurred, and the

description thereof (made often by men who were not there, and God

knows on what authority). Nevertheless, there appears in these lines

of Brantome a first example of the most destructive use of the rifle,

in the hands of skirmishers.

During the religious wars, which consisted of skirmishes and taking

and retaking garrisoned posts, the fire of arquebusiers was executed

without order and individually, as above.

The soldier carried the powder charges in little metal boxes hung from

a bandoleer. A finer, priming, powder was contained in a powder horn;

the balls were carried in a pouch. At the onset the soldier had to

load his piece. It was thus that he had to fight with the match

arquebus. This was still far from fire at command.

However this presently appeared. Gustavus Adolphus was the first who

tried to introduce method and cooerdination into infantry fire. Others,

eager for innovations, followed in his path. There appeared

successively, fire by rank, in two ranks, by subdivision, section,

platoon, company, battalion, file fire, parapet fire, a formal fire at

will, and so many others that we can be sure that all combinations

were tried at this time.

Fire by ranks was undoubtedly the first of these; it will give us a

line on the others.

Infantry was formed six deep. To execute fire by rank all ranks except

the last knelt. The last rank fired and reloaded. The rank in front of

it then rose and did the same thing, as did all other ranks

successively. The whole operation was then recommenced.

Thus the first group firing was executed successively by ranks.

Montecuculli said, "The musketeers are ranged six deep, so that the

last rank has reloaded by the time the first has fired, and takes up

the fire again, so that the enemy has to face continuous fire."

However, under Conde and Turenne, we see the French army use only fire

at will.

It is true that at this time fire was regarded only as an accessory.

The infantry of the line which, since the exploit of the Flemish, the

Swiss and the Spaniards, had seen their influence grow daily, was

required for the charge and the advance and consequently was armed

with pikes.

In the most celebrated battles of these times, Rocroi, Nordlingen,

Lens, Rethel and the Dunes, we see the infantry work in this way. The

two armies, in straight lines, commenced by bombarding each other,

charged with their cavalry wings, and advanced with their infantry in

the center. The bravest or best disciplined infantry drove back the

other, and often, if one of its wings was victorious, finished by

routing it. No marked influence of fire is found at this time. The

tradition of Pescani was lost.

Nevertheless fire-arms improved; they became more effective and tended

to replace the pike. The use of the pike obliged the soldier to remain

in ranks, to fight only in certain cases, and exposed him to injury

without being able to return blow for blow. And, this is exceedingly

instructive, the soldier had by this time an instinctive dislike of

this arm, which often condemned him to a passive role. This dislike

necessitated giving high pay and privilege to obtain pikemen. And in

spite of all at the first chance the soldier threw away his pike for a

musket.

The pikes themselves gradually disappeared before firearms; the ranks

thinned to permit the use of the latter. Four rank formation was used,

and fire tried in that order, by rank, by two ranks, upright,

kneeling, etc.

In spite of these attempts, we see the French army in combat, notably

at Fontenoy, still using fire at will, the soldier leaving ranks to

fire and returning to load.

It can be stated, in spite of numerous attempts at adoption, that no

fire at command was used in battle up to the days of Frederick.

Already, under William, the Prussian infantry was noted for the

rapidity and continuity of its fire. Frederick further increased the

ability of his battalions to fire by decreasing their depth. This

fire, tripled by speed in loading, became so heavy that it gave

Prussian battalions a superiority over others of three to one.

The Prussians recognized three kinds of fire, at a halt, in advancing,

and in retreat. We know the mechanics of fire at a halt, the first

rank kneeling. Of fire in advancing Guibert says: "What I call

marching fire, and which anybody who thinks about it must find as ill

advised as I do, is a fire I have seen used by some troops. The

soldiers, in two ranks, fire in marching, but they march of course at

a snail's pace. This is what Prussian troops call fire in advancing.

It consists in combined and alternating volleys from platoons,

companies, half battalions or battalions. The parts of the line which

have fired advance at the double, the others at the half step."

In other methods of fire, as we have said, the Prussian battalion was

in three ranks; the first kneeling. The line delivered salvos, only at

command.

However, the theory of executing fire by salvo in three ranks did not

bother Frederick's old soldiers. We will see presently how they

executed it on the field of battle.

Be that as it may, Europe was impressed with these methods and tended

to adopt them. D'Argenson provided for them in the French army and

introduced fire at command. Two regulations prescribing this appeared,

in 1753 and 1755. But in the war which followed, Marshal de Broglie,

who undoubtedly had experience and as much common sense as M.

D'Argenson, prescribed fire at will. All infantry in his army was

practiced in it during the winter of 1761-1762.

Two new regulations succeeded the preceding, in 1764 and 1776. The

last prescribed fire in three ranks at command, all ranks upright. [48]

Thus we come to the wars of the Revolution, with regulations calling

for fire at command, which was not executed in battle.

Since these wars, our armies have always fought as skirmishers. In

speaking of our campaigns, fire at command is never mentioned. It was

the same under the Empire, in spite of numerous essays from the

Boulogne school and elsewhere. At the Boulogne school, fire at command

by ranks was first tried by order of Napoleon. This fire, to be

particularly employed against cavalry--in theory it is superb--does

not seem to have been employed Napoleon says so himself, and the

regulations of 1832, in which some influence of soldiers of the Empire

should be found, orders fire in two ranks or at will, by bodies of

men, to the exclusion of all others.

According to our military authority, on the authority of our old

officers, fire at command did not suit our infantry; yet it lived in

the regulations. General Fririon (1822) and de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr

(1829) attacked this method. Nothing was done. It remained in the

regulations of 1832, but without being ordered in any particular

circumstances. It appeared there for show purposes, perhaps.

On the creation of the chasseurs d'Orleans, fire by rank was revived.

But neither in our African campaigns nor in our last two wars in the

Crimea and Italy can a single example of fire at command be found. In

practice it was believed to be impracticable. It was known to be

entirely ineffective and fell into disrepute.

But to-day, with the breech-loading rifle, there is a tendency to

believe it practicable and to take it up with new interest. Is this

more reasonable than in the past? Let us see.

5. Methods of Fire Used in the Presence of the Enemy;

Methods Recommended or Ordered But Impractical.

Use and Efficacy of Fire at Command

Undoubtedly at the Potsdam maneuvers the Prussian infantry used only

salvos executed admirably. An unbelievable discipline kept the soldier

in place and in line. Barbaric punishments were incorporated in the

military code. Blows, the whip, executions, punished the slightest

derelictions. Even N.C.O.'s were subjected to blows with the flat of

the sword. Yet all this was not enough on the field of battle; a

complete rank of non-commissioned officer file closers was also needed

to hold the men to their duty.

M. Carion-Nisas said, "These file-closers hook their halberds together

and form a line that cannot be broken." In spite of all this, after

two or three volleys, so says General Renard, whom we believe more

than charitable, there is no power of discipline which can prevent

regular fire from breaking into fire at will.

But let us look further, into Frederick's battles. Let us take the

battle of Mollwitz, in which success was specifically laid to fire at

command, half lost, then won by the Prussian salvos.

"The Austrian infantry had opened fire on the lines of the Prussians,

whose cavalry had been routed. It was necessary to shake them to

insure victory. The Austrians still used wooden ramrods. Their fire

came slowly, while the Prussian fire was thunderous, five or six shots

to the rifle per minute. The Imperial troops, surprised and

disconcerted by this massed fire, tried to hurry. In their hurry many

broke their fragile ramrods. Confusion spread through the ranks, and

the battle was lost."

But, if we study actual conditions of the period, we see that things

did not happen in such an orderly sequence.

Firing started, and it is said that it was long and deadly. The

Prussians iron ramrods gave them the advantage 'over an enemy whose

ramrods were wooden, harder to manipulate and easily broken. However,

when the order to advance was given to the Prussians, whole battalions

stood fast; it was impossible to budge them. The soldiers tried to

escape the fire and got behind each other, so that they were thirty to

forty deep.

Here are men who exhibit under fire an admirable, calm, an immovable

steadiness. Each instant they hear the dead heavy sound of a bullet

striking. They see, they feel, around them, above them, between their

legs, their comrades fall and writhe, for the fire is deadly. They

have the power in their hands to return blow for blow, to send back to

the enemy the death that hisses and strikes about them. They do not

take a false step; their hands do not close instinctively on the

trigger. They wait, imperturbably, the order of their chiefs--and what

chiefs! These are the men who at the command "forward," lack bowels,

who huddle like sheep one behind the other. Are we to believe this?

Let us get to the truth of the matter. Frederick's veterans, in spite

of their discipline and drill, are unable to follow the methods taught

and ordered. They are no more able to execute fire at command than

they are to execute the ordered advance of the Potsdam maneuver field.

They use fire at will. They fire fast from instinct--stronger than

their discipline--which bids them send two shots for one. Their fire

becomes indeed, a thunderous roll, not of salvos, but of rapid fire at

will. Who fires most, hits most, so the soldier figures. So indeed did

Frederick, for he encouraged fire in this same battle of Mollwitz; he

thereafter doubled the number of cartridges given the soldier, giving

him sixty instead of thirty.

Furthermore, if fire at command had been possible, who knows what

Frederick's soldiers would have been capable of? They would have cut

down battalions like standing grain. Allowed to aim quietly, no man

interfering with another, each seeing clearly--then at the signal all

firing together. Could anything hold against them? At the first volley

the enemy would have broken and fled, under the penalty of

annihilation in case they stayed. However, if we look at the final

result at Mollwitz, we see that the number of killed is about the same

on the side that used fire at command as on the side that did not. The

Prussians lost 960 dead, the Austrians 966.

But they say that if fire was not more deadly, it was because

sight-setting was then unknown. What if it was? There was no

adjustment of fire perhaps, but there were firing regulations; aiming

was known. Aiming is old. We do not say it was practiced; but it was

known, and often mentioned. Cromwell often said, "Put your confidence

in God, my children, and fire at their shoe-laces."

Do we set our sights better to-day? It is doubtful. If the able

soldiers of Cromwell, of Frederick, of the Republic and of Napoleon

could not set their sights--can we?

Thus this fire at command, which was only possible rarely and to

commence action, was entirely ineffective.

Hardy spirits, seeing the slight effect of long range firing in

battle, counselled waiting till the enemy was at twenty paces and

driving him back with a volley. You do not have to sight carefully at

twenty paces. What would be the result?

"At the battle of Castiglione," says Marshal Saxe, "the Imperial

troops let the French approach to twenty paces, hoping to destroy them

by a volley. At that distance they fired coolly and with all

precautions, but they were broken before the smoke cleared. At the

battle of Belgrade (1717) I saw two battalions who at thirty paces,

aimed and fired at a mass of Turks. The Turks cut them up, only two or

three escaping. The Turkish loss in dead was only thirty-two."

No matter what the Marshal says, we doubt that these men were cool.

For men who could hold their fire up to such a near approach of the

enemy, and fire into masses, would have killed the front rank, thrown

the others into confusion, and would never have been cut up as they

were. To make these men await, without firing, an enemy at twenty or

thirty paces, needed great moral pressure. Controlled by discipline

they waited, but as one waits for the roof to fall, for a bomb to

explode, full of anxiety and suppressed emotion. When the order is

given to raise the arms and fire the crisis is reached. The roof

falls, the bomb explodes, one flinches and the bullets are fired into

the air. If anybody is killed it is an accident.

This is what happened before the use of skirmishers. Salvos were

tried. In action they became fire at will. Directed against troops

advancing without firing they were ineffective. They did not halt the

dash of the assault, and the troops who had so counted on them fled

demoralized. But when skirmishers were used, salvos became impossible.

Armies who held to old methods learned this to their cost.

In the first days of the Revolution our troops, undrilled and not

strictly disciplined, could not fight in line. To advance on the

enemy, a part of the battalion was detached as skirmishers. The

remainder marched into battle and was engaged without keeping ranks.

The combat was sustained by groups fighting without formal order. The

art was to support by reserves the troops advanced as skirmishers. The

skirmishers always began the action, when indeed they did not complete

it.

To oppose fire by rank to skirmishers was fools' play.

Skirmishers necessarily opposed each other. Once this method was

adopted, they were supported, reinforced by troops in formation. In

the midst of general firing fire at command became impossible and was

replaced by fire at will.

Dumouriez, at the battle of Jemmapes, threw out whole battalions as

skirmishers, and supporting them by light cavalry, did wonders with

them. They surrounded the Austrian redoubts and rained on the

cannoneers a hail of bullets so violent that they abandoned their

pieces.

The Austrians, astounded by this novel combat method, vainly

reinforced their light troops by detachments of heavy infantry. Their

skirmishers could not resist our numbers and impetuosity, and

presently their line, beaten by a storm of bullets, was forced back.

The noise of battle, the firing, increased; the defeated troops,

hearing commands no longer, threw down their arms and fled in

disorder.

So fire in line, heavy as it may be, cannot prevail against the power

of numerous detachments of skirmishers. A rain of bullets directed

aimlessly is impotent against isolated men profiting by the slightest

cover to escape the fire of their adversaries, while the deployed

battalions offer to their rifles a huge and relatively harmless

target. The dense line, apparently so strong, withers under the deadly

effect of the fire of isolated groups, so feeble in appearance.

(General Renard.)

The Prussians suffered in the same way at Jena. Their lines tried fire

at command against our skirmishers. You might as well fire on a

handful of fleas.

They tell us of the English salvos at Sainte-Euphemie, in Calabria,

and later in Spain. In these particular cases they could be used,

because our troops charged without first sending out skirmishers.

The battle of Sainte-Euphemie only lasted half an hour; it was badly

conceived and executed, "And if," says General Duhesme, "the advancing

battalions had been preceded by detachments of skirmishers who had

already made holes in enemy ranks, and, on close approach, the heads

of columns had been launched in a charge, the English line would not

have conserved that coolness which made their fire so effective and

accurate. Certainly it would not have waited so long to loose its

fire, if it had been vigorously harassed by skirmishers."

An English author, treating of the history of weapons, speaks of the

rolling fire, well directed, of the English troops. He makes no

mention of salvos. Perhaps we were mistaken, and in our accounts have

taken the fire of a battalion for the formal battalion fire at command

of our regulations.

The same tendency appears more clearly in the work on infantry of the

Marquis de Chambray, who knew the English army well. He says that the

English in Spain used almost entirely fire in two ranks. They employed

battalion fire only when attacked by our troops without skirmishers,

firing on the flanks of our columns. And he says "The fire by

battalion, by half battalion and by platoon is limited to the target

range. The fire actually most used in war is that in two ranks, the

only one used by the French." Later he adds "Experience proves fire in

two ranks the only one to be used against the enemy." Before him

Marshal Saxe wrote "Avoid dangerous maneuvers, such as fire by

platoon, which have often caused shameful defeats." These statements

are as true now as then.

Fire at command, by platoon, by battalion, etc., is used in case the

enemy having repulsed skirmishers and arrived at a reasonable range

either charges or opens fire for effect himself. If the latter, fire

is reciprocal and lasts until one or the other gives way or charges.

If the enemy charges, what happens? He advances preceded by

skirmishers who deliver a hail of bullets. You wish to open fire, but

the voices of your officers are lost. The noise of artillery, of small

arms, the confusion of battle, the shrieks of the wounded, distract

the soldiers' attention. Before you have delivered your command the

line is ablaze. Then try to stop your soldiers. While there is a

cartridge left, they will fire. The enemy may find a fold of ground

that protects him; he may adopt in place of his deployed order columns

with wide intervals between, or otherwise change his dispositions. The

changing incidents of battle are hidden by smoke and the troops in

front, from the view of the officers behind. The soldiers will

continue to fire and the officers can do nothing about it.

All this has been said already, has been gone into, and fire at

command has been abandoned. Why take it up again? It comes to us

probably from the Prussians. Indeed the reports of their general staff

on their last campaign, of 1866, say that it was very effectively

employed, and cite many examples.

But a Prussian officer who went through the campaign in the ranks and

saw things close up, says, "In examining the battles of 1866 for

characteristics, one is struck by a feature common to all, the

extraordinary extension of front at the expense of depth. Either the

front is spun out into a single long thin line, or it is broken into

various parts that fight by themselves. Above all the tendency is

evident to envelop the enemy by extending the wings. There is no

longer any question of keeping the original order of battle. Different

units are confused, by battle, or even before battle. Detachments and

large units of any corps are composed of diverse and heterogeneous

elements. The battle is fought almost exclusively by columns of

companies, rarely of half-battalions. The tactics of these columns

consists in throwing out strong detachments of skirmishers. Gradually

the supports are engaged and deployed. The line is broken, scattered,

like a horde of irregular cavalry. The second line which has held

close order tries to get up to the first promptly, first to engage in

the fight, also because they suffer losses from the high shots

directed at the first line. It suffers losses that are heavy as it is

compact and supports them with impatience as it does not yet feel the

fever of battle. The most of the second line then forces entry into

the first, and, as there is more room on the wings, it gravitates to

the wings. Very often even the reserve is drawn in, entirely, or so

largely that it cannot fulfill its mission. In fact, the fighting of

the first two lines is a series of combats between company commands

and the enemy each command faces. Superior officers cannot follow on

horseback all the units, which push ahead over all sorts of ground.

They have to dismount and attach themselves to the first unit of their

command met. Unable to manipulate their whole command, in order to do

something, they command the smaller unit. It is not always better

commanded at that. Even generals find themselves in this situation."

Here is something we understand better. It is certainly what occurs.

As for the instances cited in the general staff reports, they deal

with companies or half-battalions at most. Not withstanding the

complacency with which they are cited, they must have been rare, and

the exception should not be taken as establishing a rule.

6. Fire at Will--Its Efficacy

Thus fire at command, to-day as in the past, is impractical and

consequently not actually used in battle. The only means employed are

fire at will and the fire of skirmishers. Let us look into their

efficacy.

Competent authorities have compiled statistics on this point.

Guibert thinks that not over two thousand men are killed or wounded by

each million cartridges used in battle.

Gassendi assures us that of three thousand shots only one is a hit.

Piobert says that the estimate, based on the result of long wars, is

that three to ten thousand cartridges are expended for each man hit.

To-day, with accurate and long range weapons, have things changed

much? We do not think so. The number of bullets fired must be compared

with the number of men dropped, with a deduction made for the action

of artillery, which must be considered.

A German author has advanced the opinion that with the Prussian needle

rifle the hits are 60% of the shots fired. But then how explain the

disappointment of M. Dreyse, the happy inventor of the needle rifle,

when he compared Prussian and Austrian losses. This good old gentleman

was disagreeably astonished at seeing that his rifle had not come up

to his expectations.

Fire at will, as we shall presently show, is a fire to occupy the men

in the ranks but its effect is not great. We could give many examples;

we only cite one, but it is conclusive.

"Has it not been remarked," says General Duhesme, "that, before a

firing line there is raised a veil of smoke which on one side or the

other hides the troops from view, and makes the fire of the best

placed troops uncertain and practically without effect? I proved it

conclusively at the battle of Caldiero, in one of the successive

advances that occurred on my left wing. I saw some battalions, which I

had rallied, halted and using an individual fire which they could not

keep up for long. I went there. I saw through the smoke cloud nothing

but flashes, the glint of bayonets and the tops of grenadier's caps.

We were not far from the enemy however, perhaps sixty paces. A ravine

separated us, but it could not be seen. I went into the ranks, which

were neither closed nor aligned, throwing up with my hand the

soldiers' rifles to get them to cease firing and to advance. I was

mounted, followed by a dozen orderlies. None of us were wounded, nor

did I see an infantryman fall. Well then! Hardly had our line started

when the Austrians, heedless of the obstacle that separated us,

retreated."

It is probable that had the Austrians started to move first, the

French would have given way. It was veterans of the Empire, who

certainly were as reliable as our men, who gave this example of lack

of coolness.

In ranks, fire at will is the only possible one for our officers and

men. But with the excitement, the smoke, the annoying incidents, one

is lucky to get even horizontal fire, to say nothing of aimed fire.

In fire at will, without taking count of any trembling, men interfere

with each other. Whoever advances or who gives way to the recoil of

his weapon deranges the shot of his neighbor. With full pack, the

second rank has no loophole; it fires in the air. On the range,

spacing men to the extremity of the limits of formation, firing very

slowly, men are found who are cool and not too much bothered by the

crack of discharge in their ears, who let the smoke pass and seize a

loophole of pretty good visibility, who try, in a word, not to lose

their shots. And the percentage results show much more regularity than

with fire at command.

But in front of the enemy fire at will becomes in an instant haphazard

fire. Each man fires as much as possible, that is to say, as badly as

possible. There are physical and mental reasons why this is so.

Even at close range, in battle, the cannon can fire well. The gunner,

protected in part by his piece, has an instant of coolness in which to

lay accurately. That his pulse is racing does not derange his line of

sight, if he has will power. The eye trembles little, and the piece

once laid, remains so until fired.

The rifleman, like the gunner, only by will-power keeps his ability to

aim. But the excitement in the blood, of the nervous system, opposes

the immobility of the weapon in his hands. No matter how supported, a

part of the weapon always shares the agitation of the man. He is

instinctively in haste to fire his shot, which may stop the departure

of the bullet destined for him. However lively the fire is, this vague

reasoning, unformed as it is in his mind, controls with all the force

of the instinct of self preservation. Even the bravest and most

reliable soldiers then fire madly.

The greater number fire from the hip.

The theory of the range is that with continual pressure on the trigger

the shot surprises the firer. But who practices it under fire?

However, the tendency in France to-day is to seek only accuracy. What

good will it do when smoke, fog, darkness, long range, excitement, the

lack of coolness, forbid clear sight?

It is hard to say, after the feats of fire at Sebastopol, in Italy,

that accurate weapons have given us no more valuable service than a

simple rifle. Just the same, to one who has seen, facts are facts.

But--see how history is written. It has been set down that the

Russians were beaten at Inkermann by the range and accuracy of weapons

of the French troops. But the battle was fought in thickets and wooded

country, in a dense fog. And when the weather cleared, our soldiers,

our chasseurs were out of ammunition and borrowed from the Russian

cartridge boxes, amply provided with cartridges for round, small

calibered bullets. In either case there could have been no accurate

fire. The facts are that the Russians were beaten by superior morale;

that unaimed fire, at random, there perhaps more than elsewhere, had

the only material effect.

When one fires and can only fire at random, who fires most hits most.

Or perhaps it is better said that who fires least expects to be hit

most.

Frederick was impressed with this, for he did not believe in the

Potsdam maneuvers. The wily Fritz looked on fire as a means to quiet

and occupy the undependable soldiers and it proved his ability that he

could put into practice that which might have been a mistake on the

part of any other general officer. He knew very well how to count on

the effect of his fire, how many thousand cartridges it took to kill

or wound an enemy. At first his soldiers had only thirty cartridges.

He found the number insufficient, and after Mollwitz gave them sixty.

To-day as in Frederick's day, it is rapid random fire, the only one

practicable, which has given prestige to the Prussians. This idea of

rapid fire was lost after Frederick, but the Prussians have recovered

it to-day by exercising common sense. However our veterans of the

Empire had preserved this idea, which comes from instinct. They

enlarged their vents, scornful of flare backs, to avoid having to open

the chamber and prime. The bullet having a good deal of clearance when

the cartridge was torn and put in the gun, with a blow of the butt on

the ground they had their arms charged and primed.

But to-day as then, in spite of skill acquired in individual fire, men

stop aiming and fire badly as soon as they are grouped into platoons

to fire.

Prussian officers, who are practical men, know that adjustment of

sights is impracticable in the heat of action, and that in fire by

volleys troops tend to use the full sight. So in the war of 1866 they

ordered their men to fire very low, almost without sighting, in order

to profit by ricochets.

7. Fire by Rank Is a Fire to Occupy the Men in Ranks

But if fire at will is not effective, what is its use? As we have

already said its use is to occupy the men in the ranks.

In ordinary fire the act of breathing alone, by the movement it

communicates to the body greatly annoys men in firing. How then can it

be claimed that on the field of battle, in rank, men can fire even

moderately well when they fire only to soothe themselves and forget

danger?

Napoleon said "The instinct of man is not to let himself be killed

without defending himself." And indeed man in combat is a being in

whom the instinct of self preservation dominates at times all other

sentiments. The object of discipline is to dominate this instinct by a

greater terror of shame or of punishment. But it is never able

entirely to attain this object; there is a point beyond which it is

not effectual. This point reached, the soldier must fire or he will go

either forward or back. Fire is then, let us say, a safety vent for

excitement.

In serious affairs it is then difficult, if not impossible, to control

fire. Here is an example given by Marshal Saxe:

"Charles XII, King of Sweden, wished to introduce into his infantry

the method of charging with the bayonet. He spoke of it often, and it

was known in the army that this was his idea. Finally at the battle

of ---- against the Russians, when the fighting started he went to his

regiment of infantry, made it a fine speech, dismounted before the

colors, and himself led the regiment to the charge. When he was thirty

paces from the enemy the whole regiment fired, in spite of his orders

and his presence. Otherwise, it did very well and broke the enemy. The

king was so annoyed that all he did was pass through the ranks,

remount his horse, and go away without saying a word."

So that, if the soldier is not made to fire, he will fire anyway to

distract himself and forget danger. The fire of Frederick's Prussians

had no other purpose. Marshal Saxe saw this. "The speed with which the

Prussians load their rifles," he tells us, "is advantageous in that it

occupies the soldier and forbids reflection while he is in the

presence of the enemy. It is an error to believe that the five last

victories gained by the nation in its last war were due to fire. It

has been noted that in most of these actions there were more Prussians

killed by rifle fire than there were of their enemies."

It would be sad to think the soldier in line a firing machine. Firing

has been and always will be his principal object, to fire as many

shots in as short a time as possible. But the victor is not always the

one who kills the most; he is fortunate who best knows how to overcome

the morale of his enemy.

The coolness of men cannot be counted on. And as it is necessary above

all to keep up their morale one ought to try above all to occupy and

soothe them. This can best be done by frequent discharges. There will

be little effect, and it would be absurd to expect them to be calm

enough to fire slowly, adjust their ranges and above all sight

carefully.

8. The Deadly Fire Is the Fire of Skirmishers

In group firing, when the men are grouped into platoons or battalions,

all weapons have the same value, and if it is assumed to-day that fire

must decide engagements, the method of fighting must be adopted which

gives most effect to the weapon. This is the employment of

skirmishers.

It is this class of fire, indeed, which is deadliest in war. We could

give many examples but we shall be content with the two following

instances, taken from General Duhesme.

"A French officer who served with the Austrians in one of the recent

wars," says General Duhesme, "told me that from the fire of a French

battalion one hundred paces from them, his company lost only three or

four men, while in the same time they had had more than thirty killed

or wounded by the fire of a group of skirmishers in a little wood on

their flank three hundred paces away."

"At the passage of the Minico, in 1801, the 2nd battalion of the 91st

received the fire of a battalion of Bussi's regiment without losing a

man; the skirmishers of that same organization killed more than thirty

men in a few minutes while protecting the retreat of their

organization."

The fire of skirmishers is then the most deadly used in war, because

the few men who remain cool enough to aim are not otherwise annoyed

while employed as skirmishers. They will perform better as they are

better hidden, and better trained in firing.

The accuracy of fire giving advantages only in isolated fire, we may

consider that accurate weapons will tend to make fighting by

skirmishers more frequent and more decisive.

For the rest, experience authorizes the statement that the use of

skirmishers is compulsory in war. To-day all troops seriously engaged

become in an instant groups of skirmishers and the only possible

precise fire is from hidden snipers.

However, the military education which we have received, the spirit of

the times, clouds with doubt our mind regarding this method of

fighting by skirmishers. We accept it regretfully. Our personal

experience being incomplete, insufficient, we content ourselves with

the supposition that gives us satisfaction. The war of skirmishers, no

matter how thoroughly it has been proven out, is accepted by

constraint, because we are forced by circumstance to engage our troops

by degrees, in spite of ourselves, often unconsciously. But, be it

understood, to-day a successive engagement is necessary in war.

However, let us not have illusions as to the efficacy of the fire of

skirmishers. In spite of the use of accurate and long range weapons,

in spite of all training that can be given the soldier, this fire

never has more than a relative effect, which should not be

exaggerated.

The fire of skirmishers is generally against skirmishers. A body of

troops indeed does not let itself be fired on by skirmishers without

returning a similar fire. And it is absurd to expect skirmishers to

direct their fire on a body protected by skirmishers. To demand of

troops firing individually, almost abandoned to themselves, that they

do not answer the shots directed at them, by near skirmishers, but aim

at a distant body, which is not harming them, is to ask an impossible

unselfishness.

As skirmishers men are very scattered. To watch the adjustment of

ranges is difficult. Men are practically left alone. Those who remain

cool may try to adjust their range, but it is first necessary to see

where your shots fall, then, if the terrain permits this and it will

rarely do so, to distinguish them from shots fired at the same time by

your neighbors. Also these men will be more disturbed, will fire

faster and less accurately, as the fight is more bitter, the enemy

stauncher; and perturbation is more contagious than coolness.

The target is a line of skirmishers, a target offering so little

breadth and above all depth, that outside of point blank fire, an

exact knowledge of the range is necessary to secure effect. This is

impossible, for the range varies at each instant with the movements of

the skirmishers. [49]

Thus, with skirmishers against skirmishers, there are scattered shots

at scattered targets. Our fire of skirmishers, marching, on the target

range, proves this, although each man knows exactly the range and has

time and the coolness to set his sights. It is impossible for

skirmishers in movement to set sights beyond four hundred meters, and

this is pretty extreme, even though the weapon is actually accurate

beyond this.

Also, a shot is born. There are men, above all in officer instructors

at firing schools, who from poor shots become excellent shots after

years of practice. But it is impossible to give all the soldiers such

an education without an enormous consumption of ammunition and without

abandoning all other work. And then there would be no results with

half of them.

To sum up, we find that fire is effective only at point blank. Even in

our last wars there have been very few circumstances in which men who

were favored with coolness and under able leadership have furnished

exceptions. With these exceptions noted, we can say that accurate and

long range weapons have not given any real effect at a range greater

than point blank.

There has been put forward, as proof of the efficacy of accurate

weapons the terrible and decisive results obtained by the British in

India, with the Enfield rifle. But these results have been obtained

because the British faced comparatively poorly armed enemies. They had

then the security, the confidence, the ensuing coolness necessary for

the use of accurate weapons. These conditions are completely changed

when one faces an enemy equally well armed, who consequently, gives as

good as he gets.

9. Absolute Impossibility of Fire at Command

Let us return to fire at command, which there is a tendency to-day to

have troops execute in line.

Can regular and efficient fire be hoped for from troops in line? Ought

it to be hoped for?

No, for man cannot be made over, and neither can the line.

Even on the range or on the maneuver field what does this fire amount

to?

In fire at command, on the range, all the men in the two ranks come to

the firing position simultaneously, everybody is perfectly quiet. Men

in the front rank consequently are not deranged by their neighbors.

Men in the second rank are in the same situation. The first rank being

set and motionless they can aim through the openings without more

annoyance than those in the first rank.

Fire being executed at command, simultaneously, no weapon is deranged

at the moment of firing by the movements of the men. All conditions

are entirely favorable to this kind of fire. Also as the fire is

ordered with skill and coolness by an officer who has perfectly

aligned his men (a thing rare even on the drill ground) it gives

percentage results greater than that of fire at will executed with the

minutest precautions, results that are sometimes astonishing.

But fire at command, from the extreme coolness that it demands of all,

of the officer certainly more than of the soldier, is impracticable

before the enemy except under exceptional circumstances of picked

officers, picked men, ground, distance, safety, etc. Even in maneuvers

its execution is farcical. There is not an organization in which the

soldiers do not hurry the command to fire in that the officers are so

afraid that their men will anticipate the command that they give it as

rapidly as possible, while the pieces are hardly in firing position,

often while they are still in motion.

The prescription that the command to fire be not given until about

three seconds after coming to the firing position may give good

results in the face of range targets. But it is not wise to believe

that men will wait thus for long in the face of the enemy.

It is useless to speak of the use of the sight-leaf before the enemy,

in fire attempted by the same officers and men who are so utterly

lacking, even on the maneuver ground. We have seen a firing

instructor, an officer of coolness and assurance, who on the range had

fired trial shots every day for a month, after this month of daily

practice fire four trial shots at a six hundred meter range with the

sight leaf at point blank.

Let us not pay too much attention to those who in military matters

base everything on the weapon and unhesitating assume that the man

serving it will adopt the usage provided and ordered in their

regulations. The fighting man is flesh and blood. He is both body and

soul; and strong as the soul may often be it cannot so dominate the

body that there is no revolt of the flesh, no mental disturbance, in

the face of destruction. Let us learn to distrust mathematics and

material dynamics as applied to battle principles. We shall learn to

beware of the illusions drawn from the range and the maneuver field.

There experience is with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive,

obedient soldier, with an intelligent and tractable man instrument in

short. And not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled,

distrait, excited, restless being, not even under self-control, who is

the fighting man from general to private. There are strong men,

exceptions, but they are rare.

These illusions nevertheless, stubborn and persistent, always repair

the next day the most damaging injuries inflicted on them by reality.

Their least dangerous effect is to lead to prescribing the

impracticable, as if ordering the impracticable were not really an

attack on discipline, and did not result in disconcerting officers and

men by the unexpected and by surprise at the contrast between battle

and the theories of peace-time training.

Battle of course always furnishes surprises. But it furnishes less in

proportion as good sense and the recognition of the truth have had

their effect on the training of the fighting man.

Man in the mass, in a disciplined body organized for combat, is

invincible before an undisciplined body. But against a similarly

disciplined body he reverts to the primitive man who flees before a

force that is proved stronger, or that he feels stronger. The heart of

the soldier is always the human heart. Discipline holds enemies face

to face a little longer, but the instinct of self-preservation

maintains its empire and with it the sense of fear.

Fear!

There are chiefs, there are soldiers who know no fear, but they are of

rare temper. The mass trembles, for the flesh cannot be suppressed.

And this trembling must be taken into account in all organization,

discipline, formation, maneuver, movement, methods of action. For in

all of these the soldier tends to be upset, to be deceived, to

under-rate himself and to exaggerate the offensive spirit of the

enemy.

On the field of battle death is in the air, blind and invisible,

making his presence known by fearful whistlings that make heads duck.

During this strain the recruit hunches up, closes in, seeking aid by

an instinctive unformulated reasoning. He figures that the more there

are to face a danger the greater each one's chances of escaping. But

he soon sees that flesh attracts lead. Then, possessed by terror,

inevitably he retreats before the fire, or "he escapes by advancing,"

in the picturesque and profound words of General Burbaki.

The soldier escapes from his officer, we say. Yes, he escapes! But is

it not evident that he escapes because up to this moment nobody has

bothered about his character, his temperament, the impressionable and

exciteable nature of man? In prescribed methods of fighting he has

always been held to impossibilities. The same thing is done to-day.

To-morrow, as yesterday, he will escape.

There is of course a time when all the soldiers escape, either

forward, or to the rear. But the organization, the combat methods

should have no other object than to delay as long as possible this

crisis. Yet they hasten it.

All our officers fear, quite justifiably from their experience, that

the soldier will too rapidly use his cartridges in the face of the

enemy. This serious matter is certainly worthy of attention. How to

stop this useless and dangerous waste of ammunition is the question.

Our soldiers show little coolness. Once in danger they fire, fire to

calm themselves, to pass the time; they cannot be stopped.

There are some people you cannot embarrass. With the best faith in the

world they say, "What is this? You are troubled about stopping the

fire of your soldiers? That is not difficult. You find that they show

little coolness, and shoot despite their officers, in spite even of

themselves? All right, require of them and their officers methods of

fire that demand extremes of coolness, calm and assurance, even in

maneuver. They cannot give a little? Ask a lot and you will get it.

There you have a combat method nobody has ever heard of, simple,

beautiful, and terrible."

This is indeed a fine theory. It would make the wily Frederick who

surely did not believe in these maneuvers, laugh until he cried. [50]

This is to escape from a difficulty by a means always recognized as

impossible, and more impossible than ever to-day.

Fearing that the soldier will escape from command, can not better

means be found to hold him than to require of him and his officer,

impracticable fire? This, ordered and not executed by the soldiers,

and even by the officers, is an attack on the discipline of the unit.

"Never order the impossible," says discipline, "for the impossible

becomes then a disobedience."

How many requisites there are to make fire at command possible,

conditions among the soldiers, among their officers. Perfect these

conditions, they say. All right, perfect their training, their

discipline, etc.; but to obtain fire at command it is necessary to

perfect their nerves, their physical force, their moral force, to make

bronze images of them, to do away with excitement, with the trembling

of the flesh. Can any one do this?

Frederick's soldiers were brought, by blows of the baton, to a

terrible state of discipline. Yet their fire was fire at will.

Discipline had reached its limits.

Man in battle, let us repeat again, is a being to whom the instinct of

self-preservation at times dominates everything else. Discipline,

whose purpose is to dominate this instinct by a feeling of greater

terror, can not wholly achieve it. Discipline goes so far and no

farther.

We cannot deny the existence of extraordinary instances when

discipline and devotion have raised man above himself. But these

examples are extraordinary, rare. They are admired as exceptions, and

the exception proves the rule.

As to perfection, consider the Spartans. If man was ever perfected for

war it was he; and yet he has been beaten, and fled.

In spite of training, moral and physical force has limits. The

Spartans, who should have stayed to the last man on the battle field,

fled.

The British with their phlegmatic coolness and their terrible rolling

fire, the Russians, with that inertia that is called their tenacity,

have given way before attack. The German has given way, he who on

account of his subordination and stability has been called excellent

war material.

Again an objection is raised. Perhaps with recruits the method may be

impracticable. But with veterans--But with whom is war commenced?

Methods are devised precisely for young and inexperienced troops.

They ask, also, if the Prussians used this method of fire successfully

in the last war, why should not we do as well? Supposing that the

Prussians actually did use it, and this is far from being proved, it

does not follow that it is practicable for us. This mania for

borrowing German tactics is not new, although it has always been

properly protested against. Marshal Luchner said, "No matter how much

they torment their men, fortunately they will never make them

Prussians." Later de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr said, "The men are drilled in

various exercises believed necessary to fit them for war, but there is

no question of adopting exercises to suit the French military genius,

the French character and temperament. It has not been thought

necessary to take this into account; it has been easier to borrow

German methods."

To follow preconceived tactics is more the part of the phlegmatic

German than it is ours. The Germans obey well enough, but the point is

that they try to follow tactics which are contrary to nature. The

Frenchman cannot. More spontaneous, more exciteable and

impressionable, less calm and obedient, he has in our last wars

promptly and completely violated both the letter and the spirit of the

regulations. "The German," said a Prussian officer, "has sentiments of

duty and obedience. He submits to severe discipline. He is full of

devotion, although not animated by a lively mind. Easy by nature,

rather heavy than active, intellectually calm, reflective, without

dash or divine fire, wishing but not mad to conquer, obeying calmly

and conscientiously, but mechanically and without enthusiasm, fighting

with a resigned valor, with heroism, he may let himself be sacrificed

uselessly, but he sells his life dearly. Without warlike tendencies,

not bellicose, unambitious, he is yet excellent war material on

account of his subordination and stability. What must be inculcated in

him is a will of his own, a personal impulse to send him forward."

According to this unflattering portrait, which we believe a little

extreme, even if by a compatriot, it is possible that the Germans can

be handled in tactics impossible with French. However, did they

actually use these tactics? Remember the urgent warning of Bluecher to

his brigade commanders, not to let bayonet attacks break down into

fusillades. Note the article in the present Prussian firing

regulations, which prescribes trial shots before each fire delivered,

"so as to dissipate the kind of excitement that possesses the soldier

when his drill has been interrupted for some time."

In conclusion, if fire at command was impossible with the ancient

rifle, it is more so to-day, for the simple reason that trembling

increases as the destructive power increases. Under Turenne, lines

held longer than to-day, because the musket was in use and the battle

developed more slowly. To-day when every one has the rapid fire rifle,

are things easier? Alas no! Relations between weapons and the man are

the same. You give me a musket, I fire at sixty paces, a rifle, at two

hundred; a chessepot, at four hundred. But I have perhaps less

coolness and steadiness than at the old sixty paces, for with the

rapidity of fire the new weapon is more terrible at four hundred

paces, for me as well as for the enemy, than was the musket at sixty

paces. And is there even more fire accuracy? No. Rifles were used

before the French revolution, and yet this perfectly well known weapon

was very rarely seen in war, and its efficacy, as shown in those rare

cases, was unsatisfactory. Accurate fire with it at combat distances

of from two hundred to four hundred meters was illusory, and it was

abandoned in favor of the old rifle. Did the foot chasseurs know fire

at command? Picked troops, dependable, did they use it? Yet it would

have been a fine method of employing their weapons. To-day we have

weapons that are accurate at six hundred to seven hundred meters. Does

that mean that accurate fire at seven hundred meters is possible? No.

If your enemy is armed as we are, fire at seven hundred meters will

show the same results that have been shown for four hundred meters.

The same losses will be suffered, and the coolness shown will be the

same--that is, it will be absent. If one fire three times as fast,

three times as many men will fall, and it will be three times as

difficult to preserve coolness. Just as formerly it was impossible to

execute fire at command, so it is to-day. Formerly no sight-setting

was possible; it is no better to-day.

But if this fire is impossible, why attempt it? Let us remain always

in the realm of the possible or we shall make sad mistakes. "In our

art," said General Daine, "theorists abound; practical men are very

rare. Also when the moment of action arrives, principles are often

found to be confused, application impossible, and the most erudite

officers remain inactive, unable to use the scientific treasures that

they have amassed."

Let us then, practical men, seek for possible methods. Let us gather

carefully the lessons of their experience, remembering Bacon's saying,

"Experience excels science."

Appendix II

HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

1. Cavalry

An Extract from Xenophon.

"The unexpectedness of an event accentuates it, be it pleasant or

terrible. This is nowhere seen better than in war, where surprise

terrorizes even the strongest.

"When two armies are in touch or merely separated by the field of

battle, there are first, on the part of the cavalry, skirmishes,

thrusts, wheels to stop or pursue the enemy, after which usually each

goes cautiously and does not put forth its greatest effort until the

critical part of the conflict. Or, having commenced as usual, the

opposite is done and one moves swiftly, after the wheel, either to

flee or to pursue. This is the method by which one can, with the least

possible risk, most harm the enemy, charging at top speed when

supported, or fleeing at the same speed to escape the enemy. If it is

possible in these skirmishes to leave behind, formed in column and

unobserved four or five of the bravest and best mounted men in each

troop they may be very well employed to fall on the enemy at the

moment of the wheel."

2. Marius Against the Cimbrians

Extract from Plutarch's "Life of Marius."

"Boiorix, king of the Cimbrians, at the head of a small troop of

cavalry, approached Marius' camp and challenged him to fix a day and

place to decide who would rule the country. Marius answered that

Romans did not ask their enemies when to fight, but that he was

willing to satisfy the Cimbrians. They agreed then to give battle in

three days on the plain of Verceil, a convenient place for the Romans

to deploy their cavalry and for the barbarians to extend their large

army. The two opponents on the day set were in battle formation.

Catulus had twenty thousand three hundred men. Marius had thirty-two

thousand, placed on the wings and consequently on either side of those

of Catulus, in the center. So writes Sylla, who was there. They say

that Marius gave this disposition to the two parts of his army because

he hoped to fall with his two wings on the barbarian phalanxes and

wished the victory to come only to his command, without Catulus taking

any part or even meeting with the enemy. Indeed, as the front of

battle was very broad, the wings were separated from the center, which

was broken through. They add that Catulus reported this disposition in

the explanation that he had to make and complained bitterly of Marius'

bad faith. The Cimbrian infantry came out of its positions in good

order and in battle array formed a solid phalanx as broad as it was

wide, thirty stades or about eighteen thousand feet. Their fifteen

thousand horsemen were magnificently equipped. Their helmets were

crowned by the gaping mouths of savage beasts, above which were high

plumes which looked like wings. This accentuated their height. They

were protected by iron cuirasses and had shields of an astonishing

whiteness. Each had two javelins to throw from a distance, and in

close fighting they used a long heavy sword.

"In this battle the cavalry did not attack the Romans in front, but,

turning to the right they gradually extended with the idea of

enclosing the Romans before their infantry and themselves. The Roman

generals instantly perceived the ruse. But they were not able to

restrain their men, one of whom, shouting that the enemy was flying,

led all the others to pursue. Meanwhile the barbarian infantry

advanced like the waves of a great sea.

"Marius washed his hands, raised them to heaven, and vowed to offer a

hecatomb to the gods. Catulus for his part, also raised his hands to

heaven and promised to consecrate the fortune of the day. Marius also

made a sacrifice, and, when the priest showed him the victim's

entrails, cried, 'Victory is mine.' But, as the two armies were set in

motion, something happened, which, according to Sylla, seemed divine

vengeance on Marius. The movements of such a prodigious multitude

raised such a cloud of dust that the two armies could not see each

other. Marius, who had advanced first with his troops to fall on the

enemy's formation, missed it in the dust, and having passed beyond it,

wandered for a long time in the plain. Meanwhile fortune turned the

barbarians toward Catulus who had to meet their whole attack with his

soldiers, among whom was Sylla. The heat of the day and the burning

rays of the sun, which was in the eyes of the Cimbrians, helped the

Romans. The barbarians, reared in cold wooded places, hardened to

extreme cold, could not stand the heat. Sweating, panting, they shaded

their faces from the sun with their shields. The battle occurred after

the summer solstice, three days before the new moon of the month of

August, then called Sextilis. The cloud of dust sustained the Romans'

courage by concealing the number of the enemy. Each battalion

advancing against the enemy in front of them were engaged, before the

sight of such a great horde of barbarians could shake them.

Furthermore, hardship and hard work had so toughened them that in

spite of the heat and impetuousness with which they attacked, no Roman

was seen to sweat or pant. This, it is said, is testified to by

Catulus himself in eulogizing the conduct of his troops.

"Most of the enemy, above all the bravest, were cut to pieces, for, to

keep the front ranks from breaking, they were tied together by long

chains attached to their belts. The victors pursued the fugitives to

their entrenched camp.

"The Romans took more than sixty thousand Cimbrians prisoners, and

killed twice as many."

3. The Battle of the Alma

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. A letter

sent from Huy, February 9, 1869, by Captain de V----, a company

officer in the attack division.

"My company, with the 3rd, commanded by Captain D---- was designated to

cover the battalion.

"At eight or nine hundred meters from the Alma, we saw a sort of wall,

crowned with white, whose use we could not understand. Then, at not

more than three hundred meters, this wall delivered against us a

lively battalion fire and deployed at the run. It was a Russian

battalion whose uniform, partridge-gray or chestnut-gray color, with

white helmet, had, with the help of a bright sun, produced the

illusion. This, parenthetically, showed me that this color is

certainly the most sensible, as it can cause such errors. [51] We replied

actively, but there was effect on neither side because the men fired

too fast and too high.... The advance was then taken up, and I don't

know from whom the order can have come.... We went on the run, crossing

the river easily enough, and while we were assembling to scramble up

the hill we saw the rest of the battalion attacking, without order,

companies mixed up, crying, 'Forward,' singing, etc. We did the same,

again took up the attack, and were lucky enough to reach the summit of

the plateau first. The Russians, astounded, massed in a square. Why? I

suppose that, turned on the left, attacked in the center, they thought

themselves surrounded, and took this strange formation. At this moment

a most inopportune bugle call was sounded by order of Major

De M---- commanding temporarily a battalion of foot chasseurs. This

officer had perceived the Russian cavalry in motion and believed that

its object was to charge us, while, on the contrary it was maneuvering

to escape the shells fired into it while in squadron formation by the

Megere, a vessel of the fleet. This order given by bugle signal was

executed as rapidly as had been the attack, such is the instinct of

self-preservation which urges man to flee danger, above all when ordered

to flee. Happily a level-headed officer, Captain Daguerre, seeing the

gross mistake, commanded 'Forward' in a stentorian tone. This halted the

retreat and caused us again to take up the attack. The attack made us

masters of the telegraph-line, and the battle was won. At this second

charge the Russians gave, turned, and hardly any of them were wounded

with the bayonet. So then a major commanding a battalion, without

orders, sounds a bugle call and endangers success. A simple Captain

commands 'Forward,' and decides the victory. This is the history of

yesterday, which may be useful tomorrow."

It appears from this that, apart from the able conception of the

commander-in-chief, the detail of execution was abominable, and that

to base on successes new rules of battle would lead to lamentable

errors. Let us sum up:

First: A private chasseur d'Afrique gave the order to attack;

Second: The troops went to the attack mixed up with each other. We

needed nearly an hour merely to reform the brigade. This one called,

that one congratulated himself, the superior officers cried out, etc.,

etc.; there was confusion that would have meant disaster if the

cavalry charge which was believed to threaten us, had been executed.

Disorder broke out in the companies at the first shot. Once engaged,

commanders of organizations no longer had them in hand, and they

intermingled, so that it was not easy to locate oneself;

Third: There was no silence in ranks. Officers, non-commissioned

officers and soldiers commanded, shouted, etc.; the bugles sounded the

commands they heard coming from nobody knew where;

Fourth: There was no maneuvering from the first shot to the last. I do

not remember being among my own men; it was only at the end that we

found each other. Zouaves, chasseurs, soldiers of the 20th line formed

an attack group--that was all. About four o'clock there was a first

roll call. About a third of the battalion was missing at nine at night

there was a second roll call. Only about fifty men were missing,

thirty of whom were wounded. Where the rest were I do not know.

Fifth: To lighten the men, packs had been left on the plain at the

moment fire opened, and as the operation had not been worked out in

advance, no measures were taken to guard them. In the evening most of

the men found their packs incomplete, lacking all the little

indispensables that one cannot get in the position in which we were.

It is evidently a vital necessity to restrain the individual

initiative of subordinates and leave command to the chiefs, and above

all to watch the training of the soldiers who are always ready, as

they approach, to run on the enemy with the bayonet. I have always

noted that if a body which is charged does not hold firm, it breaks

and takes flight, but that if it holds well, the charging body halts

some paces away before it strikes. I shall tell you something notable

that I saw at Castel-Fidardo. They talk a lot of the bayonet. For my

part I only saw it used once, in the night, in a trench. Also it is

noted that in the hospital, practically all the wounds treated were

from fire, rarely from the bayonet.

4. The Battle of the Alma

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel A. du Picq. Letters dated

in November, 1868, and February, 1869, sent from Rennes by Captain

P---- of the 17th battalion of foot chasseurs, with remarks by the

colonel and responses of Captain P----.

First letter from Captain P----

"... It is there that I had time to admire the coolness of my brave

Captain Daguerre, advancing on a mare under the enemy's eyes, and

observing imperturbable, like a tourist, all the movements of our

opponents.

"I will always pay homage to his calm and collected bravery...."

Remarks by the colonel.

"Did not Captain Daguerre change the bugle call 'Retreat,' ordered

by ---- to the bugle call 'Forward?'"

Answer of Captain P----

"In fact, when protected in the wood by pieces of wall we were firing

on the Russians, we heard behind us the bugle sounding 'Retreat' at

the order of ----. At this moment my captain, indignant, ordered

'Forward' sounded to reestablish confidence which had been shaken by

the distraction or by the inadvertance of ----."

5. The Battle of Inkermann

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq.

First: Letter sent from Lyon, March 21, 1869, by Major de G----, 17th

Line Regiment.

"... The 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment had hardly arrived

close to the telegraph when it received a new order to rush to the

help of the English army, which, too weak to hold such a large army,

had been broken in the center of its line and driven back on its

camps.

"The 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment, Major Vaissier, had the

honor to arrive first in the presence of the Russians, after moving

three kilometers on the run. Received by the enthusiastic cheers of

the English, it formed for battle, then carried away by burning cries

of 'Forward, with the bayonet' from its brave major it threw itself

headlong, on the Russian columns, which broke.

"For two hours the 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment, a

battalion of the 6th Line Regiment, four companies of the 3rd

Battalion of foot chasseurs, five companies of Algerian chasseurs held

the head of the Russian army which continued to debouch in massed

columns from the ravine and plateau of Inkermann.

"Three times the battalion of the 7th Light Regiment was obliged to

fall back some paces to rally. Three times it charged with the

bayonet, with the same ardor and success.

"At four in the afternoon the Russians were in rout, and were pursued

into the valley of Inkermann.

"On this memorable day all the officers, non-commissioned officers and

soldiers of the 7th Light Regiment performed their duty nobly,

rivalling each other in bravery and self-sacrifice."

Second: Notes on Inkermann, which Colonel A. du Picq indicates come

from the letters of Captain B---- (these letters are missing).

"In what formation were the Russians? In column, of which the head

fired, and whose platoons tried to get from behind the mead to enter

into action?

"When Major Vaissier advanced was he followed by every one? At what

distance? In what formation were the attackers? in disordered masses?

in one rank? in two? in mass? Did the Russians immediately turn tail,

receiving shots and the bayonet in the back? did they fall back on the

mass which itself was coming up? What was the duration of this attack

against a mass, whose depth prevented its falling back?

"Did we receive bayonet wounds?

"Did we fall back before the active reaction of the mass or merely

because, after the first shock, the isolated soldiers fell back to

find companions and with them a new confidence?

"Was the second charge made like the first one? Was the 6th Line

Regiment engaged as the first support of the 7th Light Regiment? How

were the Zouaves engaged?"

6. The Battle of Magenta

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters

from Captain C----, dated August 23, 1868.

"At Magenta I was in Espinasse's division, of Marshal MacMahon's

corps. This division was on the extreme left of the troops that had

passed the Ticino at Turbigo and was moving on Magenta by the left

bank. Close to the village a fusillade at close range apprised us that

the enemy was before us. The country, covered with trees, hedges, and

vines, had hidden them.

"Our 1st Battalion and the 2nd Foreign Regiment drove the Austrians

into Magenta.

"Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Zouaves, with which I was,

remained in reserve, arms stacked, under control of the division

commander. Apparently quite an interval had been left between

Espinasse's division and la Motterouge's, the 1st of the corps, and,

at the moment of engagement, at least an Austrian brigade had entered

the gap, and had taken in flank and rear the elements of our division

engaged before Magenta. Happily the wooded country concealed the

situation or I doubt whether our troops engaged would have held on as

they did. At any rate the two reserve battalions had not moved. The

fusillade extended to our right and left as if to surround us; bullets

already came from our right flank. The General had put five guns in

front of us, to fire on the village, and at the same time I received

the order to move my section to the right, to drive off the invisible

enemy who was firing on us. I remember that I had quit the column with

my section when I saw a frightened artillery captain run toward us,

crying 'General, General, we are losing a piece!' The general

answered, 'Come! Zouaves, packs off.' At these words, the two

battalions leaped forward like a flock of sheep, dropping packs

everywhere. The Austrians were not seen at first. It was only after

advancing for an instant that they were seen. They were already

dragging off the piece that they had taken. At the sight of them our

men gave a yell and fell on them. Surprise and terror so possessed the

Austrians, who did not know that we were so near, that they ran

without using their arms. The piece was retaken; the regimental

standard was captured by a man in my company. About two hundred

prisoners were taken, and the Austrian regiment--Hartmann's 9th

Infantry--was dispersed like sheep in flight, five battalions of them.

I believe that had the country not been thick the result might have

been different. The incident lasted perhaps ten minutes.

"The two battalions took up their first position. They had had no

losses, and their morale was in the clouds. After about an hour

General Espinasse put himself at the head of the two battalions and

marched us on the village. We were in column of platoons with section

intervals. The advance was made by echelon, the 2nd Battalion in

front, the 3rd a little in rear, and a company in front deployed as

skirmishers.

"At one hundred and fifty paces from the Austrians, wavering was

evident in their lines; the first ranks threw themselves back on those

in rear. At that instant the general ordered again, 'Come! Packs off.

At the double!' Everybody ran forward, shedding his pack where he was.

"The Austrians did not wait for us. We entered the village mixed up

with them. The fighting in houses lasted quite a while. Most of the

Austrians retired. Those who remained in the houses had to surrender.

I found myself, with some fifty officers and men, in a big house from

which we took four hundred men and five officers, Colonel Hauser for

one.

"My opinion is that we were very lucky at Magenta. The thick country

in which we fought, favored us in hiding our inferior number from the

Austrians. I do not believe we would have succeeded so well in open

country. In the gun episode the Austrians were surprised, stunned.

Those whom we took kept their arms in their hands, without either

abandoning them or using them. It was a typical Zouave attack, which,

when it succeeds, has astonishing results; but if one is not lucky it

sometimes costs dearly. Note the 3rd Zouaves at Palestro, the 1st

Zouaves at Marignano. General Espinasse's advance on the village, at

the head of two battalions, was the finest and most imposing sight I

have ever seen. Apart from that advance, the fighting was always by

skirmishers and in large groups."

7. The Battle of Solferino

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters

from Captain C----.

"The 55th infantry was part of the 3rd division of the 4th corps.

"Coming out of Medole, the regiment was halted on the right of the

road and formed, as each company arrived, in close column. Fascines

were made.

"An aide-de-camp came up and gave an order to the Colonel.

"The regiment was then put on the road, marched some yards and formed

in battalion masses on the right of the line of battle. This movement

was executed very regularly although bullets commenced to find us.

Arms were rested, and we stayed there, exposed to fire, without doing

anything, not even sending out a skirmisher. For that matter, during

the whole campaign, it seemed to me that the skirmisher school might

never have existed.

"Then up came a Major of Engineers, from General Niel, to get a

battalion from the regiment. The 3rd battalion being on the left

received the order to march. The major commanding ordered 'by the left

flank,' and we marched by the flank, in close column, in the face of

the enemy, up to Casa-Nova Farm, I believe, where General Niel was.

"The battalion halted a moment, faced to the front, and closed a

little.

"'Stay here,' said General Niel; 'you are my only reserve!'

"Then the general, glancing in front of the farm, said to the major,

after one or two minutes, 'Major, fix bayonets, sound the charge, and

forward!'

"This last movement was still properly executed at the start, and for

about one hundred yards of advance.

"Shrapnel annoyed the battalion, and the men shouldered arms to march

better.

"At about one hundred yards from the farm, the cry 'Packs down,' came

from I do not know where. The cry was instantly repeated in the

battalion. Packs were thrown down, anywhere, and with wild yells the

advance was renewed, in the wildest disorder.

"From that moment, and for the rest of the day, the 3rd Battalion as a

unit disappeared.

"Toward the end of the day, after an attempt had been made to get the

regiment together, and at the end of half an hour of backing and

filling, there was a roll-call.

"The third company of grenadiers had on starting off in the morning

one hundred and thirty-two to one hundred and thirty-five present. At

this first roll-call, forty-seven answered, a number I can swear to,

but many of the men were still hunting packs and rations. The next day

at reveille roll-call, ninety-three or four answered. Many came back

in the night.

"This was the strength for many days I still remember, for I was

charged with company supply from June 25th.

"As additional bit of information--it was generally known a few days

later that at least twenty men of the 4th company of grenadiers were

never on the field of battle. Wounded of the company, returned for

transport to Medole, said later that they had seen some twenty of the

company together close to Medole, lying in the grass while their

comrades fought. They even gave some names, but could not name them

all. The company had only been formed for the war on April 19th, and

had received that same day forty-nine new grenadiers and twenty-nine

at Milan, which made seventy-eight recruits in two months. None of

these men were tried or punished. Their comrades rode them hard, that

was all."

8. Mentana

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters

from Captain C----, dated August 23, 1868.

"November 3, at two in the morning, we took up arms to go to

Monte-Rotondo. We did not yet know that we would meet the Garibaldians

at Mentana.

"The Papal army had about three thousand men, we about two thousand

five hundred. At one o'clock the Papal forces met their enemies. The

Zouaves attacked vigorously, but the first engagements were without

great losses on either side. There is nothing particular in this first

episode. The usual thing happened, a force advances and is not halted

by the fire of its adversary who ends by showing his heels. The papal

Zouaves are marked by no ordinary spirit. In comparing them with the

soldiers of the Antibes legion, one is forced to the conclusion that

the man who fights for an idea fights better than one who fights for

money. At each advance of the papal forces, we advanced also. We were

not greatly concerned about the fight, we hardly thought that we would

have to participate, not dreaming that we could be held by the

volunteers. However, that did not happen.

"It was about three o'clock. At that time three companies of the

battalion were employed in protecting the artillery--three or four

pieces placed about the battle-field. The head of the French column

was then formed by the last three companies of the battalion, one of

the 1st Line Regiment; the other regiments were immediately behind.

Colonel Fremont of the 1st Line Regiment, after having studied the

battle-field, took two chasseur companies, followed by a battalion of

his regiment and bore to the right to turn the village.

"Meanwhile the 1st Line Regiment moved further to the right in the

direction of Monte-Rotondo, against which at two different times it

opened a fire at will which seemed a veritable hurricane. Due to the

distance or to the terrain the material result of the fire seemed to

be negligible. The moral result must have been considerable, it

precipitated a flood of fugitives on the road from Mentana to

Monte-Rotondo, dominated by our sharpshooters, who opened on the

fugitives a fire more deadly than that of the chassepots. We stayed in

the same position until night, when we retired to a position near

Mentana, where we bivouacked.

"My company was one of the two chasseur companies which attacked on

the right with the 1st Line Regiment. My company had ninety-eight

rifles (we had not yet received the chassepots). It forced the

volunteers from solidly held positions where they left a gun and a

considerable number of rifles. In addition, it put nearly seventy men

out of action, judging by those who remained on the field. It had one

man slightly wounded, a belt and a carbine broken by bullets.

"There remained with the general, after our movement to the right,

three companies of chasseurs, a battalion of the 29th, and three of

the 59th. I do not include many elements of the Papal army which had

not been engaged. Some of my comrades told me of having been engaged

with a chasseur company of the 59th in a sunken road, whose sides had

not been occupied; the general was with this column. Having arrived

close to the village, some shots either from the houses or from enemy

sharpshooters, who might easily have gotten on the undefended flanks,

provoked a terrible fusillade in the column. In spite of the orders

and efforts of the officers, everybody fired, at the risk of killing

each other, and this probably happened. It was only when some men, led

by officers, were able to climb the sides of the road that this firing

ceased. I do not think that this was a well understood use of new

arms.

"The fusillade of the 1st Line Regiment against Monte-Rotondo was not

very effective, I believe negligible. I do not refer to the moral

result, which was great.

"The Garibaldians were numerous about Monte-Rotondo. But the terrain

like all that around Italian villages was covered with trees, hedges,

etc. Under these conditions, I believe that the fire of sharpshooters

would have been more effective than volleys, where the men estimate

distances badly and do not aim."

NOTES

[Footnote 1: General Daumas (Manners and Customs of Algeria). Nocturnal

Surprise and Extermination of a Camp.]

[Footnote 2: Among the Romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united,

that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.]

[Footnote 3: The Romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like

Tyrtaeus. They did not despise any effective means. But they knew the

value of each.]

[Footnote 4: Also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and

appropriate arms better than their own.]

[Footnote 5: This is an excuse. The maniple was of perfect nobility and, without

the least difficulty, could face in any direction.]

[Footnote 6: This was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups.

The Roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides

of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. That very day the

maniple presented more depth than front.]

[Footnote 7: They had been sent to attack Hannibal's camp; they were repulsed

and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.]

[Footnote 8: This extract is taken from the translation of Dom Thuillier. Livy

does not state the precise number of Roman combatants. He says nothing

had been neglected in order to render the Roman army the strongest

possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven

thousand two hundred men. That is the figure of Polybius. His account

has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action,

nineteen thousand. Total sixty-four thousand. What can have become of

the twenty-three thousand remaining?]

[Footnote 9: The Numidian horsemen were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for

skirmishing, harassing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and

their unbridled gallop. They were not able to hold out against a regular

disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. They were

but a swarm of flies that always harasses and kills at the least

mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the massacre of

the vanquished to whom the Numidians gave neither rest nor truce. They

were like Arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently

armed for butchering, as results show. The Arabian knife, the Kabyle

knife, the Indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the

barbarian or savage, must play its part.]

[Footnote 10: They formed the third Roman line according to the order of battle

of the Legion. The contraction of the first line into a point would

naturally hem them in.]

[Footnote 11: Brought back by Hannibal who had reserved to himself the command

of the center.]

[Footnote 12: The triarians, the third Roman line.]

[Footnote 13: What effect this might have, was shown in the battle of Alisia,

where Caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by

war-whoops behind them. The din of battle in rear has always demoralized

troops.]

[Footnote 14: His cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five

hundred were Gauls or Germans, the best horsemen of that time, nine

hundred Galicians, five hundred Thracians, and Thessalians, Macedonians

and Italians in various numbers.]

[Footnote 15: Caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts

in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. In this

way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts

of the same legion.]

[Footnote 16: Caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of

his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men,

from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise

had them accustomed to fighting between his horsemen. He had in this

way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field,

to cope with Pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened

at their number.]

[Footnote 17: Any one who wishes to read in extenso is referred to the fight

of the ten thousand against Pharnabazus in Bithynia, Xenophon, par. 34,

page 569, Lisken & Sauvan edition.--In Polybius, the battle of the

Tecinus, Chapt. XIII, of Book III.--In Caesar or those who followed

him the battles against Scipio, Labienus, and Afranius, the Getae and

the Numidians, par. 61, page 282, and par. 69, 70, 71 and 72, pp. 283,

285, and 286, in the African war, Lisken & Sauvan edition.]

[Footnote 18: In ancient combat, there was almost only, dead or lightly wounded.

In action, a severe wound or one that incapacitated a man was

immediately followed by the finishing stroke.]

[Footnote 19: Hand-to-hand, sword-to-sword, serious fighting at short distances,

was rare then. Likewise in the duels of our day blades are rarely

crossed in actual practice.]

[Footnote 20: To-day, it is the riflemen who do nearly all the work of

destruction.]

[Footnote 21: Considering Caesar's narrative what becomes of the mathematical

theory of masses, which is still discussed? If that theory had the

least use, how could Marius ever have held out against the tide of the

armies of the Cimbri and Teutons? In the battle of Pharsalus, the advice

given by Triarius to Pompey's army, a counsel which was followed and

which was from a man of experience, who had seen things close at hand,

shows that the shock, the physical impulse of the mass was a by-word.

They knew what to think of it.]

[Footnote 22: The individual advance, in modern battle, in the midst of blind

projectiles that do not choose, is much less dangerous than in ancient

times, because it seldom goes up to the enemy.

At Pharsalus, the volunteer Crastinius, an old centurion, moved ahead

with about a hundred men, saying to Caesar: "I am going to act,

general, in such a way that, living or dead, to-day you may have cause

to be proud of me."

Caesar, to whom these examples of blind devotion to his person were

not displeasing, and whose troops had shown him that they were too

mature, too experienced, to fear the contagion of this example, let

Crastinius and his companions go out to be killed.

Such blind courage influences the action of the mass that follows.

Probably for that reason, Caesar permitted it. But against reliable

troops, as the example of Crastinius proves, to move ahead in this

way, against the enemy, is to go to certain death.]

[Footnote 23: The men of the maniple, of the Roman company, mutually gave

their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a

comrade (a Roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (Livy).]

[Footnote 24: A small body of troops falling into a trap might present a sort

of melee, for a second, the time necessary for its slaughter. In a

rout it might be possible at some moment of the butchery to have

conflict, a struggle of some men with courage, who want to sell

their lives dearly. But this is not a real melee. Men are hemmed in,

overwhelmed, but not thrown into confusion.]

[Footnote 25: The Greek phalanx.]

[Footnote 26: The Romans lost no one as their companies entered the openings

in the phalanx.]

[Footnote 27: The Roman velites, light-armed soldiers, of the primitive legion

before Marius, were required to stand for an instant in the intervals

of the maniples, while awaiting the onset. They maintained, but only

for an instant, the continuity of support.]

[Footnote 28: A result forced by the improvement of war appliances.]

[Footnote 29: In troops without cohesion, this movement begins at fifty leagues

from the enemy. Numbers enter the hospitals without any other complaint

than the lack of morale, which very quickly becomes a real disease. A

Draconian discipline no longer exists; cohesion alone can replace it.]

[Footnote 30: It is a troublesome matter to attack men who shoot six to eight

shots a minute, no matter how badly aimed. Will he have the last word

then, who has the last cartridge, who knows best how to make the enemy

use his cartridges without using his own?

The reasoning is always the same. With arrows: Let us use up their

arrows. With the club: Let us break their clubs. But how? That is

always the question. In matters of war, above all, precept is easy;

accomplishment is difficult.]

[Footnote 31: The more one imagines he is isolated, the more has he need of

morale.]

[Footnote 32: Are not naval battles above all the battles of captains? All

captains endeavor to promote a feeling of solidarity which will cause

them all to fight unitedly on the day of action. Trafalgar--Lissa.

In 1588, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, preparing for a naval engagement,

sent three commanders on light vessels to the advance-guard and three

to the rearguard, with executioners, and ordered them to have every

captain hanged who abandoned the post that had been assigned to him

for the battle.

In 1702, the English Admiral Benbow, a courageous man, was left almost

alone by his captains during three days of fighting. With an amputated

leg and arm, before dying, he had four brought to trial. One was

acquitted, three were hanged; and from that instant dates the

inflexible English severity towards commanders of fleets and vessels,

a severity necessary in order to force them to fight effectively.

Our commanders of battalions, our captains, our men, once under fire,

are more at sea than these commanders of vessels.]

[Footnote 33: The effect of surprise would certainly not last long to-day.

However, to-day wars are quickly decided.]

[Footnote 34: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

[Footnote 35: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

[Footnote 36: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

[Footnote 37: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

[Footnote 38: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

[Footnote 39: It is true that such measures are recommended in camps of

instruction and in publications. But in maneuvers they are neglected

in the mania for alignment, and in that other mad desire of generals

to mix in details which do not concern them.]

[Footnote 40: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

[Footnote 41: See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

[Footnote 42: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

[Footnote 43: A propos of gaps: At the battle of Sempach thirteen hundred badly

armed Swiss opposed three thousand Lorraine knights in phalanxes. The

attack of the Swiss in a formation was ineffective, and they were

threatened with envelopment. But Arnold von Winkelried created a gap;

the Swiss penetrated and the massacre followed.]

[Footnote 44: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

[Footnote 45: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

[Footnote 46: See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

[Footnote 47: It is hard to determine what method of fire, at command or at

will, was used. But what we find in the works of the best military

authorities, from Montecuculli to Marshal Saxe, is general opposition

to the replacement of the pike by the rifle. All predicted the

abandonment of the rifle for the pike, and the future always proved

them wrong. They ignored experience. They could not understand that

stronger than all logic is the instinct of man, who prefers long

range to close fighting, and who, having the rifle would not let it

go, but continually improved it.]

[Footnote 48: The danger arising from this kind of fire, led to proposals

to put the smallest men in the front rank, the tallest in the rear

rank.]

[Footnote 49: Nothing is more difficult than to estimate range; in nothing is

the eye more easily deceived. Practice and the use of instruments

cannot make a man infallible. At Sebastopol, for two months, a

distance of one thousand to twelve hundred meters could not be

determined by the rifle, due to inability to see the shots. For

three months it was impossible to measure by ranging shots, although

all ranges were followed through, the distance to a certain battery

which was only five hundred meters away, but higher and separated from

us by a ravine. One day, after three months, two shots at five hundred

meters were observed in the target. This distance was estimated by

everybody as over one thousand meters; it was only five hundred. The

village taken and the point of observation changed, the truth became

evident.]

[Footnote 50: His war instructions prove this. His best generals, Zieten,

Warnery, knew of such methods, saw nothing practicable in them and

guarded against them in war as indeed he did himself. But Europe

believed him, tried to imitate his maneuvers on the field of battle,

and aligned her troops to be beaten by him. This is what he was after.

He even deceived the Prussians. But they came back to sound methods

after 1808, in 1813 and afterwards.]

[Footnote 51: It is noted here that French uniforms are of an absurd color,

serving only to take the eye at a review. So the chasseurs, in black,

are seen much further than a rifleman of the line in his gray coat.

The red trousers are seen further than the gray--thus gray ought

to be the basic color of the infantry uniform, above all that of

skirmishers.

At night fall the Russians came up to our trenches without being seen

by any one, thanks to their partridge-gray coats.]