People who calculate only according to the fire delivered, according

to the destructive power of infantry, would have it fight deployed

against cavalry. They do not consider that although supported and

maintained, although such a formation seem to prevent flight, the very

impetus of the charge, if led resolutely, will break the deployment

before the shock arrives. It is clear that if the charge is badly

conducted, whether the infantry be solid or not, it will never reach

its objective. Why? Moral reasons and no others make the soldier in a

square feel himself stronger than when in line. He feels himself

watched from behind and has nowhere to flee.

3. Firing

It is easy to misuse breech-loading weapons, such as the rifle. The

fashion to-day is to use small intrenchments, covering battalions. As

old as powder. Such shelter is an excellent device on the condition,

however, that behind it, a useful fire can be delivered.

Look at these two ranks crouched under the cover of a small trench.

Follow the direction of the shots. Even note the trajectory shown by

the burst of flame. You will be convinced that, under such conditions,

even simple horizontal firing is a fiction. In a second, there will be

wild firing on account of the noise, the crowding, the interference of

the two ranks. Next everybody tries to get under the best possible

cover. Good-by firing.

It is essential to save ammunition, to get all possible efficiency

from the arm. Yet the official adoption of fire by rank insures

relapsing into useless firing at random. Good shots are wasted, placed

where it is impossible for them to fire well.

Since we have a weapon that fires six times more rapidly than the

ancient weapon, why not profit by it to cover a given space with six

times fewer riflemen than formerly? Riflemen placed at greater

intervals, will be less bewildered, will see more clearly, will be

better watched (which may seem strange to you), and will consequently

deliver a better fire than formerly. Besides, they will expend six

times less ammunition. That is the vital point. You must always have

ammunition available, that is to say, troops which have not been

engaged. Reserves must be held out. This is hard to manage perhaps. It

is not so hard to manage, however, as fire by command.

What is the use of fire by rank? By command? It is impracticable

against the enemy, except in extraordinary cases. Any attempt at

supervision of it is a joke! File firing? The first rank can shoot

horizontally, the only thing required; the second rank can fire only

into the air. It is useless to fire with our bulky knapsacks

interfering so that our men raise the elbow higher than the shoulder.

Learn what the field pack can be from the English, Prussians,

Austrians, etc.... Could the pack not be thicker and less wide? Have

the first rank open; let the second be checkerwise; and let firing

against cavalry be the only firing to be executed in line.

One line will be better than two, because it will not be hindered by

the one behind it. One kind of fire is practicable and efficient, that

of one rank. This is the fire of skirmishers in close formation.

The king's order of June 1st, 1776, reads (p. 28): "Experience in war

having proved that three ranks fire standing, and the intention of his

majesty being to prescribe only what can be executed in front of the

enemy, he orders that in firing, the first man is never to put his

knee on the ground, and that the three ranks fire standing at the same

time." This same order includes instructions on target practice, etc.

Marshal de Gouvion-Saint Cyr says that conservatively one-fourth of

the men who are wounded in an affair are put out of commission by the

third rank. This estimate is not high enough if it concerns a unit

composed of recruits like those who fought at Luetzen and Bautzen. The

marshal mentions the astonishment of Napoleon when he saw the great

number of men wounded in the hand and forearm. This astonishment of

Napoleon's is singular. What ignorance in his marshals not to have

explained such wounds! Chief Surgeon Larrey, by observation of the

wounds, alone exonerated our soldiers of the accusation of

self-inflicted wounds. The observation would have been made sooner,

had the wounds heretofore been numerous. That they had not been can be

explained only by the fact that while the young soldiers of 1813 kept

instinctively close in ranks, up to that time the men must have spaced

themselves instinctively, in order to be able to shoot. Or perhaps in

1813, these young men might have been allowed to fire a longer time in

order to distract them and keep them in ranks, and not often allowed

to act as skirmishers for fear of losing them. Whilst formerly, the

fire by rank must have been much rarer and fire action must have given

way almost entirely to the use of skirmishers.

Fire by command presupposes an impossible coolness. Had any troops

ever possessed it they would have mowed down battalions as one mows

down corn stalks. Yet it has been known for a long time, since

Frederick, since before Frederick, since the first rifle. Let troops

get the range calmly, let them take aim together so that no one

disturbs or hinders the other. Have each one see clearly, then, at a

signal, let them all fire at once. Who is going to stand against such

people? But did they aim in those days? Not so accurately, possibly,

but they knew how to shoot waist-high, to shoot at the feet. They knew

how to do it. I do not say they did it. If they had done so, there

would not have been any need of reminding them of it so often. Note

Cromwell's favorite saying, "Aim at their shoe-laces;" that of the

officers of the empire, "Aim at the height of the waist." Study of

battles, of the expenditure of bullets, show us no such immediate

terrible results. If such a means of destruction was so easy to

obtain, why did not our illustrious forbears use it and recommend it

to us? (Words of de Gouvion-Saint-Cyr.)

Security alone creates calmness under fire.

In minor operations of war, how many captains are capable of

tranquilly commanding their fire and maneuvering with calmness?

Here is a singular thing. You hear fire by rank against cavalry

seriously recommended in military lectures. Yet not a colonel, not a

battalion commander, not a captain, requires this fire to be executed

in maneuvers. It is always the soldier who forces the firing. He is

ordered to shoot almost before he aims for fear he will shoot without

command. Yet he ought to feel that when he is aiming, his finger on

the trigger, his shot does not belong to him, but rather to the

officer who ought to be able to let him aim for five minutes, if

advisable, examining, correcting the positions, etc. He ought, when

aiming, always be ready to fire upon the object designated, without

ever knowing when it will please his commander to order him to fire.

Fire at command is not practicable in the face of the enemy. If it

were, the perfection of its execution would depend on the coolness of

the commander and the obedience of the soldier. The soldier is the

more easily trained.

The Austrians had fire by command in Italy against cavalry. Did they

use it? They fired before the command, an irregular fire, a fire by

file, with defective results.

Fire by command is impossible. But why is firing by rank at will

impossible, illusory, under the fire of the enemy? Because of the

reasons already given and, for this reason: that closed ranks are

incompatible with fire-arms, on account of the wounding caused by the

latter in ranks. In closed ranks, the two lines touching elbows, a man

who falls throws ten men into complete confusion. There is no room for

those who drop and, however few fall, the resulting disorder

immediately makes of the two ranks a series of small milling groups.

If the troops are young, they become a disordered flock before any

demonstration. (Caldiero, Duhesme.) If the troops have some

steadiness, they of themselves will make space: they will try to make

way for the bullets: they will scatter as skirmishers with small

intervals. (Note the Grenadier Guards at Magenta.)[42]

With very open ranks, men a pace apart, whoever falls has room, he is

noticed by a lesser number, he drags down no one in his fall. The

moral impression on his comrades is less. Their courage is less

impaired. Besides, with rapid fire everywhere, spaced ranks with no

man in front of another, at least permit horizontal fire. Closed ranks

permit it hardly in the first rank, whose ears are troubled by the

shots from the men behind. When a man has to fire four or five shots a

minute, one line is certainly more solid than two, because, while the

firing is less by half, it is more than twice as likely to be

horizontal fire as in the two-rank formation. Well-sustained fire,

even with blank cartridges, would be sufficient to prevent a

successful charge. With slow fire, two ranks alone were able to keep

up a sufficiently continuous fusillade. With rapid fire, a single line

delivers more shots than two with ancient weapons. Such fire,

therefore, suffices as a fusillade.

Close ranks, while suitable for marching, do not lend themselves to

firing at the halt. Marching, a man likes a comrade at his side.

Firing, as if he felt the flesh attracting the lead, he prefers being

relatively isolated, with space around him. Breech-loading rifles

breed queer ideas. Generals are found who say that rapid firing will

bring back fire at command, as if there ever were such a thing. They

say it will bring back salvo firing, thus permitting clear vision. As

if such a thing were possible! These men have not an atom of common

sense.

It is singular to see a man like Guibert, with practical ideas on most

things, give a long dissertation to demonstrate that the officers of

his time were wrong in aiming at the middle of the body, that is, in

firing low. He claims this is ridiculous to one who understands the

trajectory of the rifle. These officers were right. They revived the

recommendations of Cromwell, because they knew that in combat the

soldier naturally fires too high because he does not aim, and because

the shape of the rifle, when it is brought to the shoulder, tends to

keep the muzzle higher than the breech. Whether that is the reason or

something else, the fact is indisputable. It is said that in Prussian

drills all the bullets hit the ground at fifty paces. With the arms of

that time and the manner of fighting, results would have been

magnificent in battle if the bullets had struck fifty paces before the

enemy instead of passing over his head.

Yet at Mollwitz, where the Austrians had five thousand men disabled,

the Prussians had over four thousand.

Firing with a horizontal sector, if the muzzle be heavy, is more

deadly than firing with a vertical sector.

4. Marches. Camps. Night Attacks.

From the fact that infantry ought always to fight in thin formation,

scattered, it does not follow that it ought to be kept in that order.

Only in column is it possible to maintain the battle order. It is

necessary to keep one's men in hand as long as possible, because once

engaged, they no longer belong to you.

The disposition in closed mass is not a suitable marching formation,

even in a battalion for a short distance. On account of heat, the

closed column is intolerable, like an unventilated room. Formation

with half-distances is better. (Why? Air, view, etc.)

Such a formation prevents ready entry of the column into battle in

case of necessity or surprise. The half-divisions not in the first line

are brought up, the arms at the order, and they can furnish either

skirmishers or a reserve for the first line which has been deployed as

skirmishers.

At Leuctra, Epaminondas diminished, by one-half, the depth of his men;

he formed square phalanxes of fifty men to a side. He could have very

well dispensed with it, for the Lacedaemonian right was at once thrown

into disorder by its own cavalry which was placed in front of that

wing. The superior cavalry of Epaminondas overran not only the cavalry

but the infantry that was behind it. The infantry of Epaminondas,

coming in the wake of his cavalry finished the work. Turning to the

right, the left of Epaminondas then took in the flank the

Lacedaemonian line. Menaced also in front by the approaching echelons

of Epaminondas, this line became demoralized and took to flight.

Perhaps this fifty by fifty formation was adopted in order to give,

without maneuver, a front of fifty capable of acting in any direction.

At Leuctra, it simply acted to the right and took the enemy in the

flank and in reverse.

Thick woods are generally passed through in close column. There is

never any opening up, with subsequent closing on the far side. The

resulting formation is as confused as a flock of sheep.

In a march through mountains, difficult country, a bugler should be on

the left, at the orders of an intelligent officer who indicates when

the halt seems necessary for discipline in the line. The right

responds and if the place has been judged correctly an orderly

formation is maintained. Keep in ranks. If one man steps out, others

follow. Do not permit men to leave ranks without requiring them to

rejoin.

In the rear-guard it is always necessary to have pack mules in an

emergency; without this precaution, considerable time may be lost. In

certain difficult places time is thus lost every day.

In camp, organize your fatigue parties in advance; send them out in

formation and escorted.

Definite and detailed orders ought to be given to the convoy, and the

chief baggage-master ought to supervise it, which is rarely the case.

It is a mistake to furnish mules to officers and replace them in case

of loss or sickness. The officer overloads the mule and the Government

loses more thereby than is generally understood. Convoys are endless

owing to overloaded mules and stragglers. If furnished money to buy a

mule the officer uses it economically because it is his. If mules are

individually furnished to officers instead of money, the officer will

care for his beast for the same reason. But it is better to give money

only, and the officer, if he is not well cared for on the march has no

claim against the Government.

Always, always, take Draconian measures to prevent pillage from

commencing. If it begins, it is difficult ever to stop it. A body of

infantry is never left alone. There is no reason for calling officers

of that arm inapt, when battalions although established in position

are not absolutely on the same line, with absolutely equal intervals.

Ten moves are made to achieve the exact alignment which the

instructions on camp movements prescribe. Yet designating a guiding

battalion might answer well enough and still be according to the

regulations.

Why are not night attacks more employed to-day, at least on a grand

scale? The great front which armies occupy renders their employment

more difficult, and exacts of the troops an extreme aptitude in this

kind of surprise tactics (found in the Arabs, Turcos, Spahis), or

absolute reliability. There are some men whose knowledge of terrain is

wonderful, with an unerring eye for distance, who can find their way

through places at night which they have visited only in the day time.

Utilizing such material for a system of guides it would be possible to

move with certainty. These are simple means, rarely employed, for

conducting a body of troops into position on the darkest night. There

is, even, a means of assuring at night the fire of a gun upon a given

point with as much precision as in plain day.

CHAPTER III

CAVALRY

1. Cavalry and Modern Appliances

They say that cavalry is obsolete; that it can be of no use in battles

waged with the weapons of today. Is not infantry affected in the same

way?

Examples drawn from the last two wars are not conclusive. In a siege,

in a country which is cut off, one does not dare to commit the

cavalry, and therefore takes from it its boldness, which is almost its

only weapon.

The utility of cavalry has always been doubted. That is because its

cost is high. It is little used, just because it does cost. The

question of economy is vital in peace times. When we set a high value

upon certain men, they are not slow to follow suit, and to guard

themselves against being broken. Look at staff officers who are almost

never broken (reduced), even when their general himself is.

With new weapons the role of cavalry has certainly changed less than

any other, although it is the one which is most worried about.

However, cavalry always has the same doctrine: Charge! To start with,

cavalry action against cavalry is always the same. Also against

infantry. Cavalry knows well enough today, as it has always known,

that it can act only against infantry which has been broken. We must

leave aside epic legends that are always false, whether they relate to

cavalry or infantry. Infantry cannot say as much of its own action

against infantry. In this respect there is a complete anarchy of

ideas. There is no infantry doctrine.

With the power of modern weapons, which forces you to slow down if it

does not stop you, the advance under fire becomes almost impossible.

The advantage is with the defensive. This is so evident that only a

madman could dispute it. What then is to be done? Halt, to shoot at

random and cannonade at long range until ammunition is exhausted?

Perhaps. But what is sure, is that such a state of affairs makes

maneuver necessary. There is more need than ever for maneuver at a

long distance in an attempt to force the enemy to shift, to quit his

position. What maneuver is swifter than that of cavalry? Therein is

its role.

The extreme perfection of weapons permits only individual action in

combat, that is action by scattered forces. At the same time it

permits the effective employment of mass action out of range, of

maneuvers on the flank or in the rear of the enemy in force imposing

enough to frighten him.

Can the cavalry maneuver on the battle field? Why not? It can maneuver

rapidly, and above all beyond the range of infantry fire, if not of

artillery fire. Maneuver being a threat, of great moral effect, the

cavalry general who knows how to use it, can contribute largely to

success. He arrests the enemy in movement, doubtful as to what the

cavalry is going to attempt. He makes the enemy take some formation

that keeps him under artillery fire for a while, above all that of

light artillery if the general knows how to use it. He increases the

enemy's demoralization and thus is able to rejoin his command.

Rifled cannon and accurate rifles do not change cavalry tactics at

all. These weapons of precision, as the word precision indicates, are

effective only when all battle conditions, all conditions of aiming,

are ideal. If the necessary condition of suitable range is lacking,

effect is lacking. Accuracy of fire at a distance is impossible

against a troop in movement, and movement is the essence of cavalry

action. Rifled weapons fire on them of course, but they fire on

everybody.

In short, cavalry is in the same situation as anybody else.

What response is there to this argument? Since weapons have been

improved, does not the infantryman have to march under fire to attack

a position? Is the cavalryman not of the same flesh? Has he less heart

than the infantryman? If one can march under fire, cannot the other

gallop under it?

When the cavalryman cannot gallop under fire, the infantryman cannot

march under it. Battles will consist of exchanges of rifle shots by

concealed men, at long range. The battle will end only when the

ammunition is exhausted.

The cavalryman gallops through danger, the infantryman walks. That is

why, if he learns, as it is probable he will, to keep at the proper

distance, the cavalryman will never see his battle role diminished by

the perfection of long range fire. An infantryman will never succeed

by himself. The cavalryman will threaten, create diversions, worry,

scatter the enemy's fire, often even get to close quarters if he is

properly supported. The infantryman will act as usual. But more than

ever will he need the aid of cavalry in the attack. He who knows how

to use his cavalry with audacity will inevitably be the victor. Even

though the cavalryman offers a larger target, long range weapons will

paralyze him no more than another.

The most probable effect of artillery of today, will be to increase

the scattering in the infantry, and even in the cavalry. The latter

can start in skirmisher formation at a distance and close in while

advancing, near its objective. It will be more difficult to lead; but

this is to the advantage of the Frenchman.

The result of improving the ballistics of the weapon, for the cavalry

as for the infantry (there is no reason why it should be otherwise for

the cavalry), will be that a man will flee at a greater distance from

it, and nothing more.

Since the Empire, the opinion of European armies is that the cavalry

has not given the results expected of it.

It has not given great results, for the reason that we and others

lacked real cavalry generals. He is, it seems, a phenomenon that is

produced only every thousand years, more rarely than a real general of

infantry. To be a good general, whether of infantry or cavalry, is an

infinitely rare thing, like the good in everything. The profession of

a good infantry general is as difficult as, perhaps more difficult

than, that of a good cavalry general. Both require calmness. It comes

more easily to the cavalryman than to the foot soldier who is much

more engaged. Both require a like precision, a judgment of the moral

and physical forces of the soldier; and the morale of the infantryman,

his constitution, is more tried than is the case with the horseman.

The cavalry general, of necessity, sees less clearly; his vision has

its limits. Great cavalry generals are rare. Doubtless Seidlitz could

not, in the face of the development of cannon and rifle, repeat his

wonders. But there is always room for improvement. I believe there is

much room for improvement.

We did not have under the Empire a great cavalry general who knew how

to handle masses. The cavalry was used like a blind hammer that

strikes heavily and not always accurately. It had immense losses. Like

the Gauls, we have a little too much confidence in the "forward,

forward, not so many methods." Methods do not hinder the forward

movement. They prepare the effect and render it surer and at the same

time less costly to the assailant. We have all the Gallic brutality.

(Note Marignano, where the force of artillery and the possibility of a

turning movement around a village was neglected). What rare things

infantry and cavalry generals are!

A leader must combine resolute bravery and impetuosity with prudence

and calmness; a difficult matter!

The broken terrain of European fields no longer permits, we are told,

the operation of long lines, of great masses of cavalry. I do not

regret it. I am struck more with the picturesque effect of these

hurricanes of cavalry in the accounts of the Empire than with the

results obtained. It does not seem to me that these results were in

proportion to the apparent force of the effort and to the real

grandeur of the sacrifices. And indeed, these enormous hammers (a

usual figure), are hard to handle. They have not the sure direction of

a weapon well in hand. If the blow is not true, recovery is

impossible, etc. However, the terrain does not to-day permit the

assembling of cavalry in great masses. This compelling reason for new

methods renders any other reason superfluous.

Nevertheless, the other reasons given in the ministerial observations

of 1868, on the cavalry service, seems to me excellent. The

improvement of appliances, the extension of battle fields, the

confidence to the infantry and the audacity to the artillery that the

immediate support of the cavalry gives, demand that this arm be in

every division in sufficient force for efficient action.

I, therefore, think it desirable for a cavalry regiment to be at the

disposal of a general commanding a division. Whatever the experiences

of instruction centers, they can not change in the least my conviction

of the merit of this measure in the field.

2. Cavalry Against Cavalry

Cavalry action, more than that of infantry, is an affair of morale.

Let us study first the morale of the cavalry engagement in single

combat. Two riders rush at each other. Are they going to direct their

horses front against front? Their horses would collide, both would be

forced to their feet, while running the chance of being crushed in the

clash or in the fall of their mounts. Each one in the combat counts on

his strength, on his skill, on the suppleness of his mount, on his

personal courage; he does not want a blind encounter, and he is right.

They halt face to face, abreast, to fight man to man; or each passes

the other, thrusting with the sabre or lance; or each tries to wound

the knee of the adversary and dismount him in this way. But as each is

trying to strike the other, he thinks of keeping out of the way

himself, he does not want a blind encounter that does away with the

combat. The ancient battles, the cavalry engagements, the rare cavalry

combats of our days, show us nothing else.

Discipline, while keeping the cavalrymen in the ranks, has not been

able to change the instinct of the rider. No more than the isolated

man is the rider in the line willing to meet the shock of a clash with

the enemy. There is a terrible moral effect in a mass moving forward.

If there is no way to escape to the right or to the left, men and

horses will avoid the clash by stopping face to face. But only

preeminently brave troops, equally seasoned in morale, alike well led

and swept along, animated alike, will meet face to face. All these

conditions are never found united on either side, so the thing is

never seen. Forty-nine times out of fifty, one of the cavalry forces

will hesitate, bolt, get into disorder, flee before the fixed purpose

of the other. Three quarters of the time this will happen at a

distance, before they can see each other's eyes. Often they will get

closer. But always, always, the stop, the backward movement, the

swerving of horses, the confusion, bring about fear or hesitation.

They lessen the shock and turn it into instant flight. The resolute

assailant does not have to slacken. He has not been able to overcome

or turn the obstacles of horses not yet in flight, in this uproar of

an impossible about face executed by routed troops, without being in

disorder himself. But this disorder is that of victory, of the

advance, and a good cavalry does not trouble itself about it. It

rallies in advancing, while the vanquished one has fear at its heels.

On the whole, there are few losses. The engagement, if there is one,

is an affair of a second. The proof is that in this action of cavalry

against cavalry, the conquered alone loses men, and he loses generally

few. The battle against infantry is alone the really deadly struggle.

Like numbers of little chasseurs have routed heavy cuirassiers. How

could they have done so if the others had not given way before their

determination? The essential factor was, and always is, determination.

The cavalry's casualties are always much less than those of the

infantry both from fire and from disease. Is it because the cavalry is

the aristocratic arm? This explains why in long wars it improves much

more than the infantry.

As there are few losses between cavalry and cavalry, so there is

little fighting.

Hannibal's Numidians, like the Russian Cossacks, inspired a veritable

terror by the incessant alarms they caused. They tired out without

fighting and killed by surprise.

Why is the cavalry handled so badly?--It is true that infantry is not

used better.--Because its role is one of movement, of morale, of

morale and movement so united, that movement alone, often without a

charge or shock action of any sort can drive the enemy into retreat,

and, if followed closely, into rout. That is a result of the quickness

of cavalry. One who knows how to make use of this quickness alone can

obtain such results.

All writers on cavalry will tell you that the charge pushed home of

two cavalry bodies and the shock at top speed do not exist. Always

before the encounter, the weaker runs away, if there is not a face to

face check. What becomes then of the MV squared? If this famous

MV squared is an empty word, why then crush your horses under giants,

forgetting that in the formula besides M there is V squared. In a

charge, there is M, there is V squared, there is this and that. There

is resolution, and I believe, nothing else that counts!

Cohesion and unity give force to the charge. Alignment is impossible

at a fast gait where the most rapid pass the others. Only when the

moral effect has been produced should the gait be increased to take

advantage of it by falling upon an enemy already in disorder, in the

act of fleeing. The cuirassiers charge at a trot. This calm steadiness

frightens the enemy into an about face. Then they charge at his back,

at a gallop.

They say that at Eckmuehl, for every French cuirassier down, fourteen

Austrians were struck in the back. Was it because they had no

back-plate? It is evident that it was because they offered their backs

to the blows.

Jomini speaks of charges at a trot against cavalry at a gallop. He

cites Lasalle who used the trot and who, seeing cavalry approach at a

gallop, would say: "There are lost men." Jomini insists on the effect

of shock. The trot permits that compactness which the gallop breaks

up. That may be true. But the effect is moral above all. A troop at

the gallop sees a massed squadron coming towards it at a trot. It is

surprised at first at such coolness. The material impulse of the

gallop is superior; but there are no intervals, no gaps through which

to penetrate the line in order to avoid the shock, the shock that

overcomes men and horses. These men must be very resolute, as their

close ranks do not permit them to escape by about facing. If they move

at such a steady gait, it is because their resolution is also firm and

they do not feel the need of running away, of diverting themselves by

the unchecked speed of the unrestrained gallop, etc. [43]

Galloping men do not reason these things out, but they know them

instinctively. They understand that they have before them a moral

impulse superior to theirs. They become uneasy, hesitate. Their hands

instinctively turn their horses aside. There is no longer freedom in

the attack at a gallop. Some go on to the end, but three-fourths have

already tried to avoid the shock. There is complete disorder,

demoralization, flight. Then begins the pursuit at a gallop by the men

who attacked at the trot.

The charge at a trot exacts of leaders and men complete confidence and

steadfastness. It is the experience of battle only that can give this

temper to all. But this charge, depending on a moral effect, will not

always succeed. It is a question of surprise. Xenophon [44] recommended,

in his work on cavalry operations, the use of surprise, the use of the

gallop when the trot is customary, and vice-versa. "Because," he says,

"agreeable or terrible, the less a thing is foreseen, the more

pleasure or fright does it cause. This is nowhere seen better than in

war, where every surprise strikes terror even to the strongest."

As a general rule, the gallop is and should be necessary in the

charge; it is the winning, intoxicating gait, for men and horses. It

is taken up at such a distance as may be necessary to insure its

success, whatever it may cost in men and horses. The regulations are

correct in prescribing that the charge be started close up. If the

troopers waited until the charge was ordered, they would always

succeed. I say that strong men, moved by pride or fear, by taking up

too soon the charge against a firm enemy, have caused more charges to

fail than to succeed. Keeping men in hand until the command "charge,"

seizing the precise instant for this command, are both difficult. They

exact of the energetic leader domination over his men and a keen eye,

at a moment when three out of four men no longer see anything, so that

good cavalry leaders, squadron leaders in general are very rare. Real

charges are just as rare.

Actual shock no longer exists. The moral impulse of one of the

adversaries nearly always upsets the other, perhaps far off, perhaps a

little nearer. Were this "a little nearer," face to face, one of the

two troops would be already defeated before the first saber cut and

would disentangle itself for flight. With actual shock, all would be

thrown into confusion. A real charge on the one part or the other

would cause mutual extermination. In practice the victor scarcely

loses any one.

Observation demonstrates that cavalry does not close with cavalry; its

deadly combats are those against infantry alone.

Even if a cavalryman waits without flinching, his horse will wish to

escape, to shrink before the collision. If man anticipates, so does

the horse. Why did Frederick like to see his center closed in for the

assault? As the best guarantee against the instincts of man and horse.

The cavalry of Frederick had ordinarily only insignificant losses: a

result of determination.

The men want to be distracted from the advancing danger by movement.

The cavalrymen who go at the enemy, if left to themselves, would start

at a gallop, for fear of not arriving, or of arriving exhausted and

material for carnage. The same is true of the Arabs. Note what

happened in 1864 to the cavalry of General Martineau. The rapid move

relieves anxiety. It is natural to wish to lessen it. But the leaders

are there, whom experience, whom regulations order to go slowly, then

to accelerate progressively, so as to arrive with the maximum of

speed. The procedure should be the walk, then the trot, after that the

gallop, then the charge. But it takes a trained eye to estimate

distance and the character of the terrain, and, if the enemy

approaches, to pick the point where one should meet him. The nearer

one approaches, the greater among the troops is the question of

morale. The necessity of arriving at the greatest speed is not alone a

mechanical question, since indeed one never clashes, it is a moral

necessity. It is necessary to seize the moment at which the uneasiness

of one's men requires the intoxication of the headlong charging

gallop. An instant too late, and a too great anxiety has taken the

upper hand and caused the hands of the riders to act on the horses;

the start is not free; a number hide by remaining behind. An instant

too soon: before arrival the speed has slowed down; the animation, the

intoxication of the run, fleeting things, are exhausted. Anxiety takes

the upper hand again, the hands act instinctively, and even if the

start were unhampered, the arrival is not.

Frederick and Seidlitz were content when they saw the center of the

charging squadron three and four ranks deep. It was as if they

understood that with this compact center, as the first lines could not

escape to the right or left, they were forced to continue straight

ahead.

In order to rush like battering-rams, even against infantry, men and

horses ought to be watered and fresh (Ponsomby's cavalry at Waterloo).

If there is ever contact between cavalry, the shock is so weakened by

the hands of the men, the rearing of the horses, the swinging of

heads, that both sides come to a halt.

Only the necessity for carrying along the man and the horse at the

supreme moment, for distracting them, necessitates the full gallop

before attacking the enemy, before having put him to flight.

Charges at the gallop of three or four kilometers, suppose horses of

bronze.

Because morale is not studied and because historical accounts are

taken too literally, each epoch complains that cavalry forces are no

longer seen charging and fighting with the sword, that too much

prudence dictates running away instead of clashing with the enemy.

These plaints have been made ever since the Empire, both by the

allies, and by us. But this has always been true. Man was never

invulnerable. The charging gait has almost always been the trot. Man

does not change. Even the combats of cavalry against cavalry today are

deadlier than they were in the lamented days of chivalry.

The retreat of the infantry is always more difficult than that of the

cavalry; the latter is simple. A cavalry repulsed and coming back in

disorder is a foreseen, an ordinary happening; it is going to rally at

a distance. It often reappears with advantage. One can almost say, in

view of experience, that such is its role. An infantry that is

repelled, especially if the action has been a hot one and the cavalry

rushes in, is often disorganized for the rest of the day.

Even authors who tell you that two squadrons never collide, tell you

continually: "The force of cavalry is in the shock." In the terror of

the shock, Yes. In the shock, No! It lies only in determination. It is

a mental and not a mechanical condition.

Never give officers and men of the cavalry mathematical demonstrations

of the charge. They are good only to shake confidence. Mathematical

reasoning shows a mutual collapse that never takes place. Show them

the truth. Lasalle with his always victorious charge at a trot guarded

against similar reasonings, which might have demonstrated to him

mathematically that a charge of cuirassiers at a trot ought to be

routed by a charge of hussars at a gallop. He simply told them: "Go

resolutely and be sure that you will never find a daredevil determined

enough to come to grips with you." It is necessary to be a daredevil

in order to go to the end. The Frenchman is one above all. Because he

is a good trooper in battle, when his commanders themselves are

daredevils he is the best in Europe. (Note the days of the Empire, the

remarks of Wellington, a good judge). If moreover, his leaders use a

little head work, that never harms anything. The formula of the

cavalry is R (Resolution) and R, and always R, and R is greater than

all the MV squared in the world.

There is this important element in the pursuit of cavalry by cavalry.

The pursued cannot halt without delivering himself up to the pursuer.

The pursuer can always see the pursued. If the latter halts and starts

to face about the pursuer can fall upon him before he is faced, and

take him by surprise. But the pursued does not know how many are

pursuing him. If he alone halts two pursuers may rush on him, for they

see ahead of them and they naturally attack whoever tries to face

about. For with the about face danger again confronts them. The

pursuit is often instigated by the fear that the enemy will turn. The

material fact that once in flight all together cannot turn again

without risking being surprised and overthrown, makes the flight

continuous. Even the bravest flee, until sufficient distance between

them and the enemy, or some other circumstances such as cover or

supporting troops, permits of a rally and a return to the offensive.

In this case the pursuit may turn into flight in its turn.

Cavalry is insistent on attacking on an equal front. Because, if with

a broader front, the enemy gives way before it, his wings may attack

it and make it the pursued instead of the pursuer. The moral effect of

resolution is so great that cavalry, breaking and pursuing a more

numerous cavalry, is never pursued by the enemy wings. However the

idea that one may be taken in rear by forces whom one has left on the

flanks in a position to do so, has such an effect that the resolution

necessary for an attack under these circumstances is rare.

Why is it that Colonel A---- does not want a depth formation for

cavalry, he who believes in pressure of the rear ranks on the first?

It is because at heart he is convinced that only the first rank can

act in a cavalry charge, and that this rank can receive no impression,

no speeding up, from those behind it.

There is debate as to the advantage of one or two ranks for the

cavalry. This again is a matter of morale. Leave liberty of choice,

and under varying conditions of confidence and morale one or the other

will be adopted. There are enough officers for either formation.

It is characteristic of cavalry to advance further than infantry and

consequently it exposes its flanks more. It then needs more reserves

to cover its flanks and rear than does infantry. It needs reserves to

protect and to support the pursuers who are almost always pursued when

they return. With cavalry even more than infantry victory belongs to

the last reserves held intact. The one with the reserves is always the

one who can take the offensive. Tie to that, and no one can stand

before you.

With room to maneuver cavalry rallies quickly. In deep columns it

cannot.

The engagement of cavalry lasts only a moment. It must be reformed

immediately. With a roll call at each reforming, it gets out of hand

less than the infantry, which, once engaged, has little respite. There

should be a roll call for cavalry, and for infantry after an advance,

at each lull. There should be roll calls at drill and in field

maneuvers, not that they are necessary but in order to become

habituated to them. Then the roll call will not be forgotten on the

day of action, when very few think of what ought to be done.

In the confusion and speed of cavalry action, man escapes more easily

from surveillance. In our battles his action is increasingly

individual and rapid. The cavalryman should not be left too free; that

would be dangerous. Frequently in action troops should be reformed and

the roll called. It would be an error not to do so. There might be ten

to twenty roll calls in a day. The officers, the soldiers, would then

have a chance to demand an accounting from each man, and might demand

it the next day.

Once in action, and that action lasts, the infantryman of today

escapes from the control of his officers. This is due to the disorder

inherent in battle, to deployment, to the absence of roll calls, which

cannot be held in action. Control, then, can only be in the hands of

his comrades. Of modern arms infantry is the one in which there is the

greatest need for cohesion.

Cavalry always fights very poorly and very little. This has been true

from antiquity, when the cavalryman was of a superior caste to the

infantryman, and ought to have been braver.

Anybody advancing, cavalry or infantry, ought to scout and reconnoiter

as soon as possible the terrain on which it acts. Conde forgot this at

Neerwinden. The 55th forgot it at Solferino. [45] Everybody forgets it.

And from the failure to use skirmishers and scouts, come mistakes and

disasters.

The cavalry has a rifle for exceptional use. Look out that this

exception does not become the rule. Such a tendency has been seen. At

the battle of Sicka, the first clash was marred by the lack of dash on

the part of a regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, which after being sent

off at the gallop, halted to shoot. At the second clash General

Bugeaud charged at their head to show them how to charge.

A young Colonel of light cavalry, asked carbines for his cavalry.

"Why? So that if I want to reconnoiter a village I can sound it from a

distance of seven or eight hundred meters without losing anybody."

What can you say to a man advancing such ideas? Certainly the carbine

makes everybody lose common sense.

The work of light cavalry makes it inevitable that they be captured

sometimes. It is impossible to get news of the enemy without

approaching him. If one man escapes in a patrol, that is enough. If no

one comes back, even that fact is instructive. The cavalry is a

priceless object that no leader wants to break. However it is only by

breaking it that results can be obtained.

Some authors think of using cavalry as skirmishers, mounted or

dismounted. I suppose they advance holding the horse by the bridle?

This appears to be an absurdity. If the cavalryman fires he will

not charge. The African incident cited proves that. It would be better

to give the cavalryman two pistols than a carbine.

The Americans in their vast country where there is unlimited room,

used cavalry wisely in sending it off on distant forays to cut

communications, make levies, etc. What their cavalry did as an arm in

battle is unknown. The cavalry raids in the American war were part of

a war directed against wealth, against public works, against

resources. It was war of destruction of riches, not of men. The

raiding cavalry had few losses, and inflicted few losses. The cavalry

is always the aristocratic arm which loses very lightly, even if it

risks all. At least it has the air of risking all, which is something

at any rate. It has to have daring and daring is not so common. But

the merest infantry engagements in equal numbers costs more than the

most brilliant cavalry raid.

3. Cavalry Against Infantry

Cavalry knows how to fight cavalry. But how it fights infantry not one

cavalry officer in a thousand knows. Perhaps not one of them knows. Go

to it then gaily, with general uncertainty!

A military man, a participant in our great wars, recommends as

infallible against infantry in line the charge from the flank, horse

following horse. He would have cavalry coming up on the enemy's left,

pass along his front and change direction so as to use its arms to the

right. This cavalryman is right. Such charges should give excellent

results, the only deadly results. The cavalryman can only strike to

his right, and in this way each one strikes. Against ancient infantry

such charges would have been as valuable as against modern infantry.

This officer saw with his own eyes excellent examples of this attack

in the wars of the Empire. I do not doubt either the facts he cites or

the deductions he makes. But for such charges there must be officers

who inspire absolute confidence in their men and dependable and

experienced soldiers. There is necessary, in short, an excellent

cavalry, seasoned by long wars, and officers and men of very firm

resolution. So it is not astonishing that examples of this mode of

action are rare. They always will be. They always require a head for

the charge, an isolated head, and when he is actually about to strike,

he will fall back into the formation. It seems to him that lost in the

mass he risks less than when alone. Everybody is willing to charge,

but only if all charge together. It is a case of belling the cat.

The attack in column on infantry has a greater moral action than the

charge in line. If the first and second squadrons are repulsed, but

the infantry sees a third charging through the dust, it will say "When

is this going to stop?" And it will be shaken.

An extract from Folard: "Only a capable officer is needed to get the

best results from a cavalry which has confidence in its movement,

which is known to be good and vigorous, and also is equipped with

excellent weapons. Such cavalry will break the strongest battalions,

if its leader has sense enough to know its power and courage enough to

use this power."

Breaking is not enough, and is a feat that costs more than it is worth

if the whole battalion is not killed or taken prisoner, or at least if

the cavalry is not immediately followed by other troops, charged with

this task.

At Waterloo our cavalry was exhausted fruitlessly, because it acted

without artillery or infantry support.

At Krasno, August 14, 1812, Murat, at the head of his cavalry could

not break an isolated body of ten thousand Russian infantry which

continually held him off by its fire, and retired tranquilly across

the plain.

The 72nd was upset by cavalry at Solferino.

From ancient days the lone infantryman has always had the advantage

over the lone cavalryman. There is no shadow of a doubt about this in

ancient narrations. The cavalryman only fought the cavalryman. He

threatened, harassed, troubled the infantryman in the rear, but he did

not fight him. He slaughtered him when put to flight by other

infantry, or at least he scattered him and the light infantry

slaughtered him.

Cavalry is a terrible weapon in the hands of one who knows how to use

it. Who can say that Epaminondas could have defeated the Spartans

twice without his Thessalonian cavalry.

Eventually rifle and artillery fire deafen the soldier; fatigue

overpowers him; he becomes inert; he hears commands no longer. If

cavalry unexpectedly appears, he is lost. Cavalry conquers merely by

its appearance. (Bismarck or Decker).

Modern cavalry, like ancient cavalry, has a real effect only on troops

already broken, on infantry engaged with infantry, on cavalry

disorganized by artillery fire or by a frontal demonstration. But

against such troops its action is decisive. In such cases its action

is certain and gives enormous results. You might fight all day and

lose ten thousand men, the enemy might lose as many, but if your

cavalry pursues him, it will take thirty thousand prisoners. Its role

is less knightly than its reputation and appearance, less so than the

role of infantry. It always loses much less than infantry. Its

greatest effect is the effect of surprise, and it is thereby that it

gets such astonishing results.

What formation should infantry, armed with modern weapons, take to

guard against flank attacks by cavalry? If one fires four times as

fast, if the fire is better sustained, one needs only a quarter as

many men to guard a point against cavalry. Protection might be secured

by using small groups, placed the range of a rifle shot apart and

flanking each other, left on the flank of the advance. But they must

be dependable troops, who will not be worried by what goes on behind

them.

4. Armor and Armament

An armored cavalry is clearly required for moral reasons.

Note this with reference to the influence of cuirassiers (armored

cavalrymen) on morale. At the battle of Renty, in 1554, Tavannes, a

marshal, had with him his company armored in steel. It was the first

time that such armor had been seen. Supported by some hundreds of

fugitives who had rallied, he threw himself at the head of his

company, on a column of two thousand German cavalry who had just

thrown both infantry and cavalry into disorder. He chose his time so

well that he broke and carried away these two thousand Germans, who

fell back and broke the twelve hundred light horsemen who were

supporting them. There followed a general flight, and the battle was

won.

General Renard says "The decadence of cavalry caused the disappearance

of their square formations in battle, which were characteristic in the

seventeenth century." It was not the decadence of the cavalry but the

abandonment of the cuirass and the perfecting of the infantry weapon

to give more rapid fire. When cuirassiers break through they serve as

examples, and emulation extends to others, who another time try to

break through as they did.

Why cuirassiers? Because they alone, in all history, have charged and

do charge to the end.

To charge to the end the cuirassiers need only half the courage of the

dragoons, as their armor raises their morale one half. But since the

cuirassiers have as much natural courage as the dragoons, for they are

all the same men, it is proper to count the more on their action.

Shall we have only one kind of cavalry? Which? If all our cavalry

could wear the cuirass and at the same time do the fatiguing work of

light cavalry, if all our horses could in addition carry the cuirass

through such work, I say that there should be only cuirassiers. But I

do not understand why the morale given by the cuirass should be

lightly done away with, merely to have one cavalry without the

cuirass.

A cavalryman armored completely and his horse partially, can charge

only at a trot.

On the appearance of fire arms, cavalry, according to General Ambert,

an author of the past, covered itself with masses of armor resembling

anvils rather than with cuirasses. It was at that time the essential

arm. Later as infantry progressed the tactics changed, it needed more

mobility. Permanent armies began to be organized by the State. The

State thought less of the skin of the individual than of economy and

mobility and almost did away with cuirassiers. The cuirass has always

given, and today more than ever it will give, confidence to the

cavalryman. Courage, dash, and speed have a value beyond that of mere

mass. I leave aside mathematical discussions which seem to me to have

nothing in common with battle conditions. I would pick to wear the

cuirass the best men in the army, big chested, red-blooded, strong

limbed, the foot chasseurs. I would organize a regiment of light

cuirassiers for each of our divisions. Men and horses, such a cavalry

would be much more robust and active than our present cuirassiers. If

our armored cavalry is worth more than any other arm by its dash in

battle, this cavalry would be worth twice as much. But how would these

men of small stature get into the saddle? To this serious objection I

answer, "They will arrange it." And this objection, which I do not

admit, is the only one that can be made against the organization of a

light armored cavalry, an organization that is made imperative by the

improvement in weapons. The remainder of those chasseur battalions

which furnish cuirassiers, should return to the infantry, which has

long demanded them, and hussars and dragoons, dismounted in the

necessary number will also be welcomed by the infantry.

As for the thrust, the thrust is deadlier than the cut. You do not

have to worry about lifting your arm; you thrust. But it is necessary

that the cavalryman be convinced that to parry a vertical cut is

folly. This can be done by his officers, by those who have had

experience, if there are any such in peace times. This is not easy.

But in this respect, as in all others, the advantage lies with the

brave. A cavalry charge is a matter of morale above all. It is

identical in its methods, its effects, with the infantry charge. All

the conditions to be fulfilled in the charge (walk, trot, gallop,

charge, etc.) have a reason bearing on morale. These reasons have

already been touched on.

Roman discipline and character demand tenacity. The hardening of the

men to fatigue, and a good organization, giving mutual support,

produced that tenacity, against which the bravest could not stand. The

exhausting method of powerful strokes used by the Gauls could not last

long against the skillful, terrible and less fatiguing method of

fighting by the thrust.

The Sikh cavalrymen of M. Nolan armed with dragoon sabers sharpened by

themselves, liked the cut. They knew nothing about methods of

swordsmanship; they did not practice. They said "A good saber and a

willingness to use it are enough." True, True!

There is always discussion as to the lance or the saber. The lance

requires skillful vigorous cavalrymen, good horsemen, very well

drilled, very adroit, for the use of the lance is more difficult than

that of the straight sword, especially if the sword is not too heavy.

Is not this an answer to the question? No matter what is done, no

matter what methods are adopted, it must always be remembered that our

recruits in war time are sent into squadrons as into battalions, with

a hasty and incomplete training. If you give them lances, most of them

will just have sticks in their hands, while a straight sword at the

end of a strong arm is at the same time simple and terrible. A short

trident spear, with three short points just long enough to kill but

not only enough to go through the body, would remain in the body of

the man and carry him along. It would recoil on the cavalryman who

delivered the blow, he would be upset by the blow himself. But the

dragoon must be supported by the saddle, and as he had kept hold of

the shaft he would be able to disengage the fork which had pierced the

body some six inches. No cavalry of equal morale could stand against a

cavalry armed with such forked spears.

As between forks and lances, the fork would replace the lance. That

is, of course, for beginners in mounted fencing. But the fork! It

would be ridiculous, not military!

With the lance one always figures without the horse, whose slightest

movement diverts the lance so much. The lance is a weapon frightful

even to the mounted man who uses it properly. If he sticks an enemy at

the gallop, he is dismounted, torn off by the arm attached to the

lance which remains in the body of his enemy.

Cavalry officers and others who seek examples in "Victories and

Conquests," in official reports, in "Bazancourt" are too naive. It is

hard to get at the truth. In war, in all things, we take the last

example which we have witnessed. And now we want lances, which we do

not know how to use, which frighten the cavalryman himself and pluck

him from the saddle if he sticks anybody. We want no more cuirasses;

we want this and that. We forget that the last example gives only a

restricted number of instances relating to the matter in question.

It appears, according to Xenophon, that it was not easy to throw the

dart from horseback. He constantly recommends obtaining as many men as

possible who know how to throw the dart. He recommends leaning well

back to avoid falling from the horse in the charge. In reading

Xenophon it is evident that there was much falling from the horse.

It appears that in battle there is as great difficulty in handling the

saber as in handling the bayonet. Another difficulty for the

cavalryman lies in the handling of the musket. This is seen in the

handling of the regulation weapon of the Spahis. There is only one

important thing for the cavalryman, to be well seated. Men should be

on horseback for hours at a time, every day, from their arrival in the

organization. If the selection of those who know something about

horses was not neglected in the draft, and if such men were, made

cavalrymen, the practical training of the greater number would be much

more rapidly concluded. I do not speak of the routine of the stable.

Between mounted drills, foot drills might be gone through with in a

snappy, free fashion, without rigidity, with daily increasing speed.

Such drills would instruct cavalrymen more rapidly than the restricted

method employed.

A dragoon horse carries in campaign with one day's food three hundred

and eight pounds, without food or forage two hundred and seventy seven

pounds. How can such horses carry this and have speed?

Seek the end always, not the means! Make a quarter of your cavalrymen

into muleteers, a quarter of your horses into pack animals. You will

thus secure, for the remaining three quarters unquestioned vigor. But

how will you make up these pack trains? You will have plenty of

wounded horses after a week of campaign.

CHAPTER IV

ARTILLERY

If artillery did not have a greater range than the rifle, we could not

risk separating it far from its support, as it would have to wait

until the enemy was but four or five hundred paces away to fire on

him. But the more its range is increased, the further away it can be

placed from its support.

The greater the range of artillery, the greater freedom of action from

the different arms, which no longer have to be side by side to give

mutual support.

The greater the range of artillery, the easier it is to concentrate

its fire. Two batteries fifteen hundred meters apart can concentrate

on a point twelve hundred meters in front of and between them. Before

the range was so long they had to be close together, and the terrain

did not always lend itself to this.

Furthermore, do not support a piece by placing infantry just behind or

alongside of it, as is done three-quarters of the time at maneuvers.

On the contrary hide the infantry to the right or left and far behind,

cover it without worrying too much about distance and let the

artillery call for help if they think that the piece is in danger of

being lost. Why should infantry be placed too close, and consequently

have its advance demoralized? This will throw away the greatest

advantage that we Frenchmen have in defense, that of defending

ourselves by advancing, with morale unimpaired, because we have not

suffered heavy losses at a halt. There is always time to run to the

defense of artillery. To increase the moral effect advance your

supports in formation. Skirmishers can also be swiftly scattered among

the batteries. These skirmishers, in the midst of the guns will not

have to fear cavalry. Even if they are assailed by infantry it will

not be such a terrible thing. The engagement will merely be one

between skirmishers, and they will be able to take cover behind the

pieces, firing against the enemy who is coming up in the open.

Guibert, I believe, held that artillery should not worry whether it

was supported or not; that it should fire up to the last minute, and

finally abandon the pieces, which supporting troops might or might not

recapture. These supporting troops should not be too close. It is

easier to defend pieces, to take them back even, by advancing on an

enemy dispersed among them, than to defend them by standing fast after

having participated in the losses suffered by the artillery under

fire. (Note the English in Spain. The system of having artillery

followed by infantry platoons is absurd.)

Artillery in battle has its men grouped around the pieces, stationary

assembly points, broadly distributed, each one having its commander

and its cannoneers, who are always the same. Thus there is in effect a

roll call each time artillery is put into battery. Artillery carries

its men with it; they cannot be lost nor can they hide. If the officer

is brave, his men rarely desert him. Certainly, in all armies, it is

in the artillery that the soldier can best perform his duty.

As General Leboeuf tells us, four batteries of artillery can be

maneuvered, not more. That is all right. Here is the thing in a

nut-shell. Four battalions is a big enough command for a colonel. A

general has eight battalions. He gets orders, "General, do so and so."

He orders, "Colonel, do so and so." So that without any maneuvers

being laid down for more than four battalions, as many battalions as

you like can be maneuvered and drilled.

CHAPTER V

COMMAND, GENERAL STAFF, AND ADMINISTRATION

There are plenty of carefree generals, who are never worried nor

harassed. They do not bother about anything. They say, "I advance.

Follow me." The result is an incredible disorder in the advance of

columns. If ten raiders should fall on the column with a shout, this

disorder would become a rout, a disaster. But these gentlemen never

bother with such an eventuality. They are the great men of the day,

until the moment that some disaster overwhelms them.

Cavalry is no more difficult to work with than infantry. According to

some military authors, a cavalry general ought to have the wisdom of

the phoenix. The perfect one should have. So should the perfect

infantry general. Man on horseback and man afoot is always the same

man. Only, the infantry general rarely has to account for the losses

in his command, which may have been due to faulty or improper

handling. The cavalry general does have to do this. (We shall lay

aside the reasons why.) The infantry general has six chances for real

battle to one for the cavalry general. These are the two reasons why,

from the beginning of a war, more initiative is found in infantry than

in cavalry generals. General Bugeaud might have made a better cavalry

general than an infantry general. Why? Because he had immediate

decision and firm resolution. There is more need for resolution in the

infantryman than in the cavalryman. Why? There are many reasons, which

are matters of opinion.

In short, the infantryman is always more tired than the cavalryman.

His morale is therefore harder to keep up. I believe therefore that a

good infantry general is rarer than one of cavalry. Also, the

resolution of an infantry general does not have to last for a moment

only; it has to endure for a long, long time.

Good artillery generals are common. They are less concerned with

morale than with other things, such as material results. They have

less need to bother about the morale of their troops, as combat

discipline is always better with them than with the other arms. This

is shown elsewhere.

Brigadier generals ought to be in their prescribed places. Very well,

but the most of them are not and never have been. They were required

to be in place at the battle of Moscow, but, as they were so ordered

there, it is evident that they were not habitually in place. They are

men; and their rank, it seems to them, ought to diminish rather than

increase the risks they have to run. And, then, in actual engagement,

where is their prescribed place?

When one occupies a high command there are many things which he

does not see. The general-in-chief, even a division commander, can

only escape this failing by great activity, moved by strict

conscientiousness and aided by clairvoyance. This failing extends to

those about him, to his heads of services. These men live well, sleep

well; the same must be true of all! They have picked, well-conditioned

horses; the roads are excellent! They are never sick; the doctors must

be exaggerating sickness! They have attendants and doctors; everybody

must be well looked after! Something happens which shows abominable

negligence, common enough in war. With a good heart and a full belly

they say, "But this is infamous, unheard of! It could not have

happened! It is impossible! etc."

To-day there is a tendency, whose cause should be sought, on the part

of superiors to infringe on the authority of inferiors. This is

general. It goes very high and is furthered by the mania for command,

inherent in the French character. It results in lessening the

authority of subordinate officers in the minds of their soldiers. This

is a grave matter, as only the firm authority and prestige of

subordinate officers can maintain discipline. The tendency is to

oppress subordinates; to want to impose on them, in all things, the

views of the superior; not to admit of honest mistakes, and to reprove

them as faults; to make everybody, even down to the private, feel that

there is only one infallible authority. A colonel, for instance, sets

himself up as the sole authority with judgment and intelligence. He

thus takes all initiative from subordinate officers, and reduces them

to a state of inertia, coming from their lack of confidence in

themselves and from fear of being severely reproved. How many

generals, before a regiment, think only of showing how much they know!

They lessen the authority of the colonel. That is nothing to them.

They have asserted their superiority, true or false; that is the

essential. With cheeks puffed out, they leave, proud of having

attacked discipline.

This firm hand which directs so many things is absent for a moment.

All subordinate officers up to this moment have been held with too

strong a hand, which has kept them in a position not natural to them.

Immediately they are like a horse, always kept on a tight rein, whose

rein is loosened or missing. They cannot in an instant recover that

confidence in themselves, that has been painstakingly taken away from

them without their wishing it. Thus, in such a moment conditions

become unsatisfactory, the soldier very quickly feels that the hand

that holds him vacillates.

"Ask much, in order to obtain a little," is a false saying, a source

of errors, an attack on discipline. One ought to obtain what one asks.

It is only necessary to be moderately reasonable and practical.

In following out this matter, one is astonished at the lack of

foresight found in three out of four officers. Why? Is there anything

so difficult about looking forward a little? Are three-quarters of the

officers so stupid? No! It is because their egoism, generally frankly

acknowledged, allow them to think only of who is looking at them. They

think of their troops by chance perhaps, or because they have to.

Their troops are never their preoccupation, consequently they do not

think about them at all. A major in command of an organization in

Mexico, on his first march in a hot country, started without full

canteens, perhaps without canteens at all, without any provision for

water, as he might march in France. No officer in his battalion called

his attention to the omission, nor was more foresighted than he. In

this first march, by an entire lack of foresight in everything, he

lost, in dead, half of his command. Was he reduced? No! He was made a

lieutenant-colonel.

Officers of the general staff learn to order, not to command. "Sir, I

order," a popular phrase, applies to them.

The misfortune is not that there is a general staff, but that it has

achieved command. For it always has commanded, in the name of its

commanders it is true, and never obeyed, which is its duty. It

commands in fact. So be it! But just the same it is not supposed to.

Is it the good quality of staffs or that of combatants that makes the

strength of armies? If you want good fighting men, do everything to

excite their ambition, to spare them, so that people of intelligence

and with a future will not despise the line but will elect to serve in

it. It is the line that gives you your high command, the line only,

and very rarely the staff. The staff, however, dies infrequently,

which is something. Do they say that military science can only be

learned in the general staff schools? If you really want to learn to

do your work, go to the line.

To-day, nobody knows anything unless he knows how to argue and

chatter. A peasant knows nothing, he is a being unskilled even in

cultivating the soil. But the agriculturist of the office is a farmer

emeritus, etc. Is it then believed that there is ability only in the

general staff? There is the assurance of the scholar there, of the

pedagogue who has never practiced what he preaches. There is book

learning, false learning when it treats of military matters. But

knowledge of the real trade of a soldier, knowledge of what is

possible, knowledge of blows given and received, all these are

conspicuously absent.

Slowness of promotion in the general staff as compared to its rapidity

in the line might make many men of intelligence, of head and heart,

pass the general staff by and enter the line to make their own way. To

be in the line would not then be a brevet of imbecility. But to-day

when general staff officers rank the best of the line, the latter are

discouraged and rather than submit to this situation, all who feel

themselves fitted for advancement want to be on the general staff. So

much the better? So much the worse. Selection is only warranted by

battle.

How administrative deceits, in politics or elsewhere, falsify the

conclusions drawn from a fact!

In the Crimea one hundred per cent. of the French operated upon

succumbed, while only twenty-seven per cent. of the English operated

upon died. That was attributed to the difference in temperament! The

great cause of this discrepancy was the difference in care. Our

newspapers followed the self-satisfied and rosy statements given out

by our own supply department. They pictured our sick in the Crimea

lying in beds and cared for by sisters of charity. The fact is that

our soldiers never had sheets, nor mattresses, nor the necessary

changes of clothes in the hospitals; that half, three-quarters, lay on

mouldy straw, on the ground, under canvass. The fact is, that such

were the conditions under which typhus claimed twenty-five to thirty

thousand of our sick after the siege; that thousands of pieces of

hospital equipment were offered by the English to our Quartermaster

General, and that he refused them! Everybody ought to have known that

he would! To accept such equipment was to acknowledge that he did not

have it. And he ought to have had it. Indeed he did according to the

newspapers and the Quartermaster reports. There were twenty-five beds

per hospital so that it could be said, "We have beds!" Each hospital

had at this time five hundred or more sick.

These people are annoyed if they are called hypocrites. While our

soldiers were in hospitals, without anything, so to speak, the English

had big, well-ventilated tents, cots, sheets, even night stands with

urinals. And our men had not even a cup to drink from! Sick men were

cared for in the English hospitals. They might have been in ours,

before they died, which they almost always did.

It is true that we had the typhus and the English had not. That was

because our men in tents had the same care as in our hospitals, and

the English the same care as in their hospitals.

Read the war reports of supply departments and then go unexpectedly to

verify them in the hospitals and storehouses. Have them verified by

calling up and questioning the heads of departments, but question them

conscientiously, without dictating the answers. In the Crimea, in May

of the first year, we were no better off than the English who

complained so much, Who has dared to say, however, that from the time

they entered the hospital to the time that they left it, dead,

evacuated, or cured, through fifteen or twenty days of cholera or

typhus, our men lay on the same plank, in the same shoes, drawers,

shirts and clothing that they brought in with them? They were in a

state of living putrefaction that would by itself have killed well

men! The newspapers chanted the praises of the admirable French

administration. The second winter the English had no sick, a smaller

percentage than in London. But to the eternal shame of the French

command and administration we lost in peace time, twenty-five to

thirty thousand of typhus and more than one thousand frozen to death.

Nevertheless, it appeared that we had the most perfect administration

in the world, and that our generals, no less than our administration,

were full of devoted solicitude to provide all the needs of the

soldier. That is an infamous lie, and is known as such, let us hope.

The Americans have given us a good example. The good citizens have

gone themselves to see how their soldiers were treated and have

provided for them themselves. When, in France, will good citizens lose

faith in this best of administrations which is theirs? When will they,

confident in themselves, do spontaneously, freely, what their

administration cannot and never will be able to do?

The first thing disorganized in an army is the administration. The

simplest foresight, the least signs even of order disappear in a

retreat. (Note Russia-Vilna).

In the Crimea, and everywhere more or less, the doctor's visit was

without benefit to the patient. It was made to keep up his spirits,

but could not be followed by care, due to lack of personnel and

material. After two or three hours of work, the doctor was exhausted.

In a sane country the field and permanent hospitals ought to be able

to handle one-fifth of the strength at least. The hospital personnel

of to-day should be doubled. It is quickly cut down, and it ought to

have time, not only to visit the sick, but to care for them, feed

them, dose and dress them, etc.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS.

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

Man's admiration for the great spectacles of nature is the admiration

for force. In the mountains it is mass, a force, that impresses him,

strikes him, makes him admire. In the calm sea it is the mysterious

and terrible force that he divines, that he feels in that enormous

liquid mass; in the angry sea, force again. In the wind, in the storm,

in the vast depth of the sky, it is still force that he admires.

All these things astounded man when he was young. He has become old,

and he knows them. Astonishment has turned to admiration, but always

it is the feeling of a formidable force which compels his admiration.

This explains his admiration for the warrior.

The warrior is the ideal of the primitive man, of the savage, of the

barbarian. The more people rise in moral civilization, the lower this

ideal falls. But with the masses everywhere the warrior still is and

for a long time will be the height of their ideals. This is because

man loves to admire the force and bravery that are his own attributes.

When that force and bravery find other means to assert themselves, or

at least when the crowd is shown that war does not furnish the best

examples of them, that there are truer and more exalted examples, this

ideal will give way to a higher one.

Nations have an equal sovereignty based on their existence as states.

They recognize no superior jurisdiction and call on force to decide

their differences. Force decides. Whether or not might was right, the

weaker bows to necessity until a more successful effort can be made.

(Prud'homme). It is easy to understand Gregory VII's ideas on the

subject.

In peace, armies are playthings in the hands of princes. If the

princes do not know anything about them, which is usually the case,

they disorganize them. If they understand them, like the Prince of

Prussia, they make their armies strong for war.

The King of Prussia and the Prussian nobility, threatened by

democracy, have had to change the passion for equality in their people

into a passion for domination over foreign nations. This is easily

done, when domination is crowned with success, for man, who is merely

the friend of equality is the lover of domination. So that he is

easily made to take the shadow for the substance. They have succeeded.

They are forced to continue with their system. Otherwise their status

as useful members of society would be questioned and they would perish

as leaders in war. Peace spells death to a nobility. Consequently

nobles do not desire it, and stir up rivalries among peoples,

rivalries which alone can justify their existence as leaders in war,

and consequently as leaders in peace. This is why the military spirit

is dead in France. The past does not live again. In the spiritual as

in the physical world, what is dead is dead. Death comes only with the

exhaustion of the elements, the conditions which are necessary for

life. For these reasons revolutionary wars continued into the war with

Prussia. For these reasons if we had been victorious we would have

found against us the countries dominated by nobilities, Austria,

Russia, England. But with us vanquished, democracy takes up her work

in all European countries, protected in the security which victory

always gives to victors. This work is slower but surer than the rapid

work of war, which, exalting rivalries, halts for a moment the work of

democracy within the nations themselves. Democracy then takes up her

work with less chance of being deterred by rivalry against us. Thus we

are closer to the triumph of democracy than if we had been victors.

French democracy rightfully desires to live, and she does not desire

to do so at the expense of a sacrifice of national pride. Then, since

she will still be surrounded for a long time by societies dominated by

the military element, by the nobility, she must have a dependable

army. And, as the military spirit is on the wane in France, it must be

replaced by having noncommissioned officers and officers well paid.

Good pay establishes position in a democracy, and to-day none turn to

the army, because it is too poorly paid. Let us have well paid

mercenaries. By giving good pay, good material can be secured, thanks

to the old warrior strain in the race. This is the price that must be

paid for security.

The soldier of our day is a merchant. So much of my flesh, of my

blood, is worth so much. So much of my time, of my affections, etc. It

is a noble trade, however, perhaps because man's blood is noble

merchandise, the finest that can be dealt in.

M. Guizot says "Get rich!" That may seem cynical to prudes, but it is

truly said. Those who deny the sentiment, and talk to-day so loftily,

what do they advise? If not by words, then by example they counsel the

same thing; and example is more contagious. Is not private wealth,

wealth in general, the avowed ambition sought by all, democrats and

others? Let us be rich, that is to say, let us be slaves of the needs

that wealth creates.

The Invalides in France, the institutions for pensioners, are superb

exhibits of pomp and ostentation. I wish that their founding had been

based on ideas of justice and Christianity and not purely on

military-political considerations. But the results are disastrous to

morality. This collection of weaklings is a school of depravity, where

the invalided soldier loses in vice his right to respect.

Some officers want to transform regiments into permanent schools for

officers of all ranks, with a two-hour course each day in law,

military art, etc. There is little taste for military life in France;

such a procedure would lessen it. The leisure of army life attracts

three out of four officers, laziness, if you like. But such is the

fact. If you make an officer a school-boy all his life he will send

his profession to the devil, if he can. And those who are able to do

so, will in general be those who have received the best education. An

army is an extraordinary thing, but since it is necessary, there

should be no astonishment that extraordinary means must be taken to

keep it up; such as offering in peace time little work and a great

deal of leisure. An officer is a sort of aristocrat, and in France we

have no finer ideal of aristocratic life than one of leisure. This is

not a proof of the highest ideals, nor of firmness of character. But

what is to be done about it?

From the fact that military spirit is lacking in our nation (and

officers are with greater difficulty than ever recruited in France) it

does not follow that we shall not have to engage in war. Perhaps the

contrary is true.

It is not patriotic to say that the military spirit is dead in France?

The truth is always patriotic. The military spirit died with the

French nobility, perished because it had to perish, because it was

exhausted, at the end of its life. That only dies which has no longer

the sap of life, and can no longer live. If a thing is merely sick it

can return to health. But who can say that of the French nobility? An

aristocracy, a nobility that dies, dies always by its own fault;

because it no longer performs its duties; because it fails in its

task; because its functions are of no more value to the state; because

there is no longer any reason for its existence in a society, whose

final tendency is to suppress its functions.

After 1789 had threatened our patriotism, the natural desire for

self-protection revived the military spirit in the nation and in the

army. The Empire developed this movement, changed the defensive

military spirit to the offensive, and used it with increasing effect

up to 1814 or 1815. The military spirit of the July Restoration was a

reminiscence, a relic of the Empire, a form of opposition to

government by liberalism instead of democracy. It was really the

spirit of opposition and not the military spirit, which is essentially

conservative.

There is no military spirit in a democratic society, where there is no

aristocracy, no military nobility. A democratic society is

antagonistic to the military spirit.

The military spirit was unknown to the Romans. They made no

distinction between military and civil duties. I think that the

military air dates from the time that the profession of arms became a

private profession, from the time of the bravos, the Italian

condottieri, who were more terrifying to civilians than to the enemy.

When the Romans said "cedant arma togae," they did not refer to civil

officials and soldiers; the civil officials were then soldiers in

their turn; professional soldiers did not exist. They meant "might

gives way to right."

Machiavelli quotes a proverb, "War makes thieves and peace has them

hanged" The Spaniards in Mexico, which has been in rebellion for forty

years, are more or less thieves. They want to continue to ply the

trade. Civil authority exists no longer with them, and they would look

on obedience to such an authority as shameful. It is easy to

understand the difficulty of organizing a peaceful government in such

a country. Half the population would have to hang the other half. The

other half does not want to be hanged.

We are a democratic society; we become less and less military. The

Prussian, Russian, Austrian aristocracies which alone make the

military spirit of those states, feel in our democratic society an

example which threatens their existence, as nobility, as aristocracy.

They are our enemies and will be until they are wiped, out, until the

Russian, Austrian and Prussian states become democratic societies,

like ours. It is a matter of time.

The Prussian aristocracy is young. It has not been degenerated by

wealth, luxury and servility of the court. The Prussian court is not a

court in the luxurious sense of the word. There is the danger.

Meanwhile Machiavellian doctrines not being forbidden to

aristocracies, these people appeal to German Jingoism, to German

patriotism, to all the passions which move one people who are jealous

of another. All this is meant to hide under a patriotic exterior their

concern for their own existence as an aristocracy, as a nobility.

The real menace of the day is czarism, stronger than the czars

themselves, which calls for a crusade to drive back Russia and the

uncultured Slav race.

It is time that we understood the lack of power in mob armies; that we

recall to mind the first armies of the revolution that were saved from

instant destruction only by the lack of vigor and decision in European

cabinets and armies. Look at the examples of revolutionaries of all

times, who have all to gain and cannot hope for mercy. Since

Spartacus, have they not always been defeated? An army is not really

strong unless it is developed from a social institution. Spartacus and

his men were certainly terrible individual fighters. They were

gladiators used to struggle and death. They were prisoners, barbarian

slaves enraged by their loss of liberty, or escaped serfs, all men who

could not hope for mercy. What more terrible fighters could be

imagined? But discipline, leadership, all was improvised and could not

have the firm discipline coming down from the centuries and drawn from

the social institutions of the Romans. They were conquered. Time, a

long time, is needed to give to leaders the habit of command and

confidence in their authority--to the soldiers confidence in their

leaders and in their fellows. It is not enough to order discipline.

The officers must have the will to enforce it, and its vigorous

enforcement must instill subordination in the soldiers. It must make

them fear it more than they fear the enemy's blows.

How did Montluc fight, in an aristocratic society? Montluc shows us,

tells us. He advanced in the van of the assault, but in bad places he

pushed in front of him a soldier whose skin was not worth as much as

was his. He had not the slightest doubt or shame about doing this. The

soldier did not protest, the propriety of the act was so well

established. But you, officers, try that in a democratic army, such as

we have commenced to have, such as we shall later have!

In danger the officer is no better than the soldier. The soldier is

willing enough to advance, but behind his officer. Also, his comrades'

skin is no more precious than is his, they must advance too. This very

real concern about equality in danger, which seeks equality only,

brings on hesitation and not resolution. Some fools may break their

heads in closing in, but the remainder will fire from a distance. Not

that this will cause fewer losses, far from it.

Italy will never have a really firm army. The Italians are too

civilized, too fine, too democratic in a certain sense of the word.

The Spaniards are the same. This may cause laughter, but it is true.

The French are indeed worthy sons of their fathers, the Gauls. War,

the most solemn act in the life of a nation, the gravest of acts, is a

light thing to them. The good Frenchman lets himself be carried away,

inflamed by the most ridiculous feats of arms into the wildest

enthusiasm. Moreover he interprets the word "honor" in a fashion all

his own. An expedition is commenced without sufficient reason, and

good Frenchmen, who do not know why the thing is done, disapprove. But

presently blood is spilled. Good sense and justice dictate that this

spilled blood should taint those responsible for an unjust enterprise.

But jingoism says "French blood has been spilled: Honor is at stake!"

And millions of gold, which is the unit of labor, millions of men, are

sacrificed to a ridiculous high-sounding phrase.

Whence comes this tendency toward war which characterizes above all

the good citizen, the populace, who are not called upon personally to

participate? The military man is not so easily swayed. Some hope for

promotion or pension, but even they are sobered by their sense of

duty. It comes from the romance that clothes war and battle, and that

has with us ten times more than elsewhere, the power of exciting

enthusiasm in the people. It would be a service to humanity and to

one's people to dispell this illusion, and to show what battles are.

They are buffooneries, and none the less buffooneries because they are

made terrible by the spilling of blood. The actors, heroes in the eyes

of the crowd, are only poor folk torn between fear, discipline and

pride. They play some hours at a game of advance and retreat, without

ever meeting, closing with, even seeing closely, the other poor folks,

the enemy, who are as fearful as they but who are caught in the same

web of circumstance.

What should be considered is how to organize an army in a country in

which there is at the same time national and provincial feeling. Such

a country is France, where there is no longer any necessity for

uniting national and provincial feeling by mixing up the soldiers. In

France, will the powerful motif of pride, which comes from the

organization of units from particular provinces, be useful? From the

fusion of varying elements comes the character of our troops, which is

something to be considered. The make-up of the heavy cavalry should be

noted. It has perhaps too many Germans and men from the northern

provinces.

French sociability creates cohesion in French troops more quickly than

could be secured in troops in other nations. Organization and

discipline have the same purpose. With a proud people like the French,

a rational organization aided by French sociability can often secure

desired results without it being necessary to use the coercion of

discipline.

Marshal de Gouvion-Saint Cyr said, "Experienced soldiers know and

others ought to know that French soldiers once committed to the

pursuit of the enemy will not return to their organization that day

until forced back into it by the enemy. During this time they must be

considered as lost to the rest of the army."

At the beginning of the Empire, officers, trained in the wars of the

Revolution by incessant fighting, possessed great firmness. No one

would wish to purchase such firmness again at the same price. But in

our modern wars the victor often loses more than the vanquished, apart

from the temporary loss in prisoners. The losses exceed the resources

in good men, and discourage the exhausted, who appear to be very

numerous, and those who are skilled in removing themselves from

danger. Thus we fall into disorder. The Duke of Fezensac, testifying

of other times, shows us the same thing that happens to-day. Also

to-day we depend only on mass action, and at that game, despite the

cleverest strategic handling, we must lose all, and do.

French officers lack firmness but have pride. In the face of danger

they lack composure, they are disconcerted, breathless, hesitant,

forgetful, unable to think of a way out. They call, "Forward,

forward." This is one of the reasons why handling a formation in line

is difficult, especially since the African campaigns where much is

left to the soldier.

The formation in rank is then an ideal, unobtainable in modern war,

but toward which we should strive. But we are getting further away

from it. And then, when habit loses its hold, natural instinct resumes

its empire. The remedy lies in an organization which will establish

cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of all. This will make

possible mutual surveillance, which has such power over French pride.

It might be said that there are two kinds of war, that in open

country, and in the plain, and that of posts garrisoning positions in

broken country. In a great war, with no one occupying positions, we

should be lost immediately. Marshal Saxe knew us well when he said

that the French were best for a war of position. He recognized the

lack of stability in the ranks.

On getting within rifle range the rank formation tends to disappear.

You hear officers who have been under fire say "When you get near the

enemy, the men deploy as skirmishers despite you. The Russians group

under fire. Their holding together is the huddling of sheep moved by

fear of discipline and of danger." There are then two modes of conduct

under fire, the French and the Russian.

The Gauls, seeing the firmness of the Roman formation, chained

themselves together, making the first rank unbreakable and tying

living to dead. This forbade the virtue they had not divined in the

Roman formation, the replacement of wounded and exhausted by fresh

men. From this replacement came the firmness which seemed so striking

to the Gauls. The rank continually renewed itself.

Why does the Frenchman of to-day, in singular contrast to the Gaul,

scatter under fire? His natural intelligence, his instinct under the

pressure of danger causes him to deploy.

His method must be adopted. In view of the impossibility to-day of the

Roman Draconian discipline which put the fear of death behind the

soldier, we must adopt the soldier's method and try to put some order

into it. How? By French discipline and an organization that permits of

it.

Broken, covered country is adapted to our methods. The Zouaves at

Magenta could not have done so well on another kind of ground. [46]

Above all, with modern weapons, the terrain to be advanced over must

be limited in depth.

How much better modern tactics fit the impatient French character! But

also how necessary it is to guard against this impatience and to keep

supports and reserves under control.

It should be noted that German or Gallic cavalry was always better

than Roman cavalry, which could not hold against it, even though

certainly better armed. Why was this? Because decision, impetuosity,

even blind courage, have more chance with cavalry than with infantry.

The defeated cavalry is the least brave cavalry. (A note for our

cavalry here!) It was easier for the Gauls to have good cavalry than

it is for us, as fire did not bother them in the charge.

The Frenchman has more qualities of the cavalryman than of the

infantryman. Yet French infantry appears to be of greater value. Why?

Because the use of cavalry on the battlefield requires rare decision

and the seizing of the crucial opportunity. If the cavalryman has not

been able to show his worth, it is the fault of his leaders. French

infantry has always been defeated by English infantry. In cavalry

combat the English cavalry has always fled before the French in those

terrible cavalry battles that are always flights. Is this because in

war man lasts longer in the cavalry and because our cavalrymen were

older and more seasoned soldiers than our infantry? This does not

apply to us only. If it is true for our cavalrymen, it is also true

for the English cavalrymen. The reason is that on the field of battle

the role of the infantryman against a firm adversary requires more

coolness and nerve than does the role of the cavalryman. It requires

the use of tactics based on an understanding of the national

characteristics of ourselves and of our enemies. Against the English

the confidence in the charge that is implanted in our brains, was

completely betrayed. The role of cavalry against cavalry is simpler.

The French confidence in the charge makes good fighting cavalry, and

the Frenchman is better fitted than any other for this role. Our

cavalry charge better than any other. That is the whole thing, on the

battle field it is understood. As they move faster than infantry,

their dash, which has its limits, is better preserved when they get up

to the enemy.

The English have always fled before our cavalry. This proves that,

strong enough to hold before the moral impulse of our infantry, they

were not strong enough to hold before the stronger impulse of cavalry.

We ought to be much better cavalrymen than infantrymen, because the

essential in a cavalryman is a fearless impetuosity. That is for the

soldier. The cavalry leader ought to use this trait without

hesitation, at the same time taking measures to support it and to

guard against its failings. The attack is always, even on the

defensive, an evidence of resolution, and gives a moral ascendancy.

Its effect is more immediate with cavalry, because the movements of

cavalry are more rapid and the moral effect has less time to be

modified by reflection. To insure that the French cavalry be the best

in Europe, and a really good cavalry, it needs but one thing, to

conform to the national temperament, to dare, to dare, and to advance.

One of the singular features of French discipline is that on the road,

especially in campaign the methods of punishment for derelictions

become illusory, impractical. In 1859 there were twenty-five thousand

skulkers in the Army in Italy. The soldier sees this immediately and

lack of discipline ensues. If our customs do not permit of Draconian

discipline, let us replace that moral coercion by another. Let us

insure cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of men and officers;

let us call French sociability to our aid.

With the Romans discipline was severest and most rigidly enforced in

the presence of the enemy. It was enforced by the soldiers themselves.

To-day, why should not the men in our companies watch discipline and

punish themselves. They alone know each other, and the maintenance of

discipline is so much to their interest as to encourage them to stop

skulking. The twenty-five thousand men who skulked in Italy, all wear

the Italian medal. They were discharged with certificates of good

conduct. This certificate, in campaign should be awarded by the squad

only. In place of that, discipline must be obtained somehow, and it is

placed as an additional burden on the officer. He above all has to

uphold it. He is treated without regard for his dignity. He is made to

do the work of the non-commissioned officer. He is used as fancy

dictates.

This cohesion which we hope for in units from squad to company, need

not be feared in other armies. It cannot develop to the same point and

by the same methods with them as with us. Their make-up is not ours,

their character is different. This individuality of squads and

companies comes from the make-up of our army and from French

sociability.

Is it true that the rations of men and horses are actually

insufficient in campaign? This is strange economy! To neglect to

increase the soldier's pay five centimes! It would better his fare and

prevent making of an officer a trader in vegetables in order to

properly feed his men. Yet millions are squandered each year for

uniforms, geegaws, shakos, etc!

If a big army is needed, it ought to cost as little as possible.

Simplicity in all things! Down with all sorts of plumes! Less

amateurs! If superfluous trimmings are not cut down it will be

unfortunate! What is the matter with the sailor's uniform?

Insignificant and annoying details abound while vital details of

proper footgear and instruction, are neglected. The question of

clothing for campaign is solved by adopting smocks and greatcoats and

by doing away with headquarters companies! This is the height of

folly. I suppose it is because our present uniforms need specialists

to keep them in condition, and smocks and greatcoats do not!

APPENDIX I

MEMORANDUM ON INFANTRY FIRE

[Written in 1869 (Editor's note)]

1. Introduction

It may be said that the history of the development of infantry fire is

none too plain, even though fire action to-day, in Europe, is almost

the sole means of destruction used by that arm.

Napoleon said, "The only method of fire to be used in war is fire at

will." Yet after such a plain statement by one who knew, there is a

tendency to-day to make fire at command the basis of infantry battle

tactics.

Is this correct? Experience only can determine. Experience is gained;

but nothing, especially in the trade of war, is sooner forgotten than

experience. So many fine things can be done, beautiful maneuvers

executed, ingenious combat methods invented in the confines of an

office or on the maneuver ground. Nevertheless let us try to hold to

facts.

Let us consider, in the study of any kind of fire, a succinct history

of small arms; let us see what kind of fire is used with each weapon,

attempting at the same time to separate that which has actually

happened from the written account.

2. Succinct History of the Development of Small Arms, from the

Arquebus to Our Rifle

The arquebus in use before the invention of powder gave the general

design to fire arms. The arquebus marks then the transition from the

mechanically thrown missile to the bullet.

The tube was kept to direct the projectile, and the bow and string

were replaced by a powder chamber and ignition apparatus.

This made a weapon, very simple, light and easy to charge; but the

small caliber ball thrown from a very short barrel, gave penetration

only at short distances.

The barrel was lengthened, the caliber increased, and a more

efficient, but a less convenient arm resulted. It was indeed

impossible to hold the weapon in aiming position and withstand the

recoil at the moment of firing.

To lessen recoil there was attached to the bottom of the barrel a hook

to catch on a fixed object at the moment of discharge. This was called

a hook arquebus.

But the hook could only be used under certain circumstances. To give

the arm a point of support on the body, the stock was lengthened and

inclined to permit sighting. This was the petrinal or poitrinal. The

soldier had in addition a forked support for the barrel.

In the musket, which followed, the stock was again modified and held

against the shoulder. Further the firing mechanism was improved.

The arm had been fired by a lighted match; but with the musket, the

arm becoming lighter and more portable, there came the serpentine

lock, the match-lock, then the wheel-lock, finally the Spanish lock

and the flint-lock.

The adoption of the flint-lock and the bayonet produced the rifle,

which Napoleon regarded as the most powerful weapon that man

possesses.

But the rifle in its primitive state had defects. Loading was slow; it

was inaccurate, and under some circumstances it could not be fired.

How were these defects remedied?

As to the loading weakness, Gustavus Adolphus, understanding the

influence on morale of rapid loading and the greater destruction

caused by the more rapid fire, invented the cartridge for muskets.

Frederick, or some one of his time, the name marks the period, replaced

wooden by cylindrical iron ramrods. To prime more quickly a conical

funnel allowed the powder to pass from the barrel into the firing-pan.

These two last improvements saved time in two ways, in priming and in

loading. But it was the adoption of the breech-loader that brought the

greatest increase in rapidity of fire.

These successive improvements of the weapon, all tending to increase

the rapidity of fire, mark the most remarkable military periods of

modern times:

cartridges--Gustavus Adolphus

iron ramrod--Frederick

improved vent (adopted by the soldiers if not prescribed by

competent orders)--wars of the Republic and of the Empire

breech-loading--Sadowa.

Accuracy was sacrificed to rapidity of fire. This will be explained

later. Only in our day has the general use of rifling and of elongated

projectiles brought accuracy to the highest point. In our times, also,

the use of fulminate has assured fire under all conditions.

We have noted briefly the successive improvements in fire arms, from

the arquebus to the rifle.