CHAPTER I

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BATTLE STUDIES

ANCIENT AND MODERN BATTLE

By Colonel Ardant Du Picq

French Army

Translated From The Eighth Edition In The French

By Colonel John N. Greely

Field Artillery, U.S. Army

And Major Robert C. Cotton

General Staff (Infantry), U.S. Army

Joint Author of "Military Field Notebook"

1921

[Transcriber's note: Footnotes have been moved to the end of the book.]

[Illustration: COLONEL ARDANT DU PICQ]

[Illustration:

Letter from Marshal Foch to Major General A. W. Greely

Dated Malsherbe, October 23, 1920]

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM MARSHAL FOCH TO MAJOR GENERAL A. W.

GREELY, DATED MALSHERBE, OCTOBER 23, 1920

MY DEAR GENERAL:

Colonel Ardant du Picq was the exponent of _moral force_, the

most powerful element in the strength of armies. He has shown it to

be the preponderating influence in the outcome of battles.

Your son has accomplished a very valuable work in translating his

writings. One finds his conclusions amply verified in the

experience of the American Army during the last war, notably in the

campaign of 1918.

Accept, my dear General, my best regards.

F. FOCH.

PREFACE

BY FRANK H. SIMONDS

Author of "History of the World War," "'They Shall Not Pass'--Verdun,"

Etc.

In presenting to the American reading public a translation of a volume

written by an obscure French colonel, belonging to a defeated army, who

fell on the eve of a battle which not alone gave France over to the

enemy but disclosed a leadership so inapt as to awaken the suspicion

of treason, one is faced by the inevitable interrogation--"Why?"

Yet the answer is simple. The value of the book of Ardant du Picq lies

precisely in the fact that it contains not alone the unmistakable

forecast of the defeat, itself, but a luminous statement of those

fundamental principles, the neglect of which led to Gravelotte and

Sedan.

Napoleon has said that in war the moral element is to all others as

three is to one. Moreover, as du Picq impressively demonstrates, while

all other circumstances change with time, the human element remains

the same, capable of just so much endurance, sacrifice, effort, and no

more. Thus, from Caesar to Foch, the essential factor in war endures

unmodified.

And it is not the value of du Picq's book, as an explanation of the

disasters of 1870, but of the triumphs of 1914-18, which gives it

present and permanent interest. It is not as the forecast of why

Bazaine, a type of all French commanders of the Franco-Prussian War,

will fail, but why Foch, Joffre, Petain will succeed, that the volume

invites reading to-day.

Beyond all else, the arresting circumstances in the fragmentary pages,

perfect in themselves but incomplete in the conception of their

author, is the intellectual and the moral kinship they reveal between

the soldier who fell just before the crowning humiliation of

Gravelotte and the victor of Fere Champenoise, the Yser and the

colossal conflict of 1918 to which historians have already applied the

name of the Battle of France, rightly to suggest its magnitude.

Read the hastily compiled lectures of Foch, the teacher of the Ecole

de Guerre, recall the fugitive but impressive words of Foch, the

soldier, uttered on the spur of the moment, filled with homely phrase,

and piquant figure and underlying all, one encounters the same

integral conception of war and of the relation of the moral to the

physical, which fills the all too scanty pages of du Picq.

"For me as a soldier," writes du Picq, "the smallest detail caught on

the spot and in the heat of action is more instructive than all the

Thiers and the Jominis in the world." Compare this with Foch

explaining to his friend Andre de Mariecourt, his own emotions at the

critical hour at Fere Champenoise, when he had to invent something new

to beguile soldiers who had retreated for weeks and been beaten for

days. His tactical problem remained unchanged, but he must give his

soldiers, tired with being beaten to the "old tune" a new air, which

would appeal to them as new, something to which they had not been

beaten, and the same philosophy appears.

Du Picq's contemporaries neglected his warning, they saw only the

outward circumstances of the Napoleonic and Frederican successes. In

vain du Picq warned them that the victories of Frederick were not the

logical outgrowth of the minutiae of the Potsdam parades. But du Picq

dead, the Third Empire fallen, France prostrated but not annihilated

by the defeats of 1870, a new generation emerged, of which Foch was

but the last and most shining example. And this generation went back,

powerfully aided by the words of du Picq, to that older tradition, to

the immutable principles of war.

With surprising exactness du Picq, speaking in the abstract, foretold

an engagement in which the mistakes of the enemy would be

counterbalanced by their energy in the face of French passivity, lack

of any control conception. Forty years later in the Ecole de Guerre,

Foch explained the reasons why the strategy of Moltke, mistaken in all

respects, failed to meet the ruin it deserved, only because at

Gravelotte Bazaine could not make up his mind, solely because of the

absence in French High Command of precisely that "Creed of Combat" the

lack of which du Picq deplored.

Of the value of du Picq's work to the professional soldier, I

naturally cannot speak, but even for the civilian, the student of

military events, of war and of the larger as well as the smaller

circumstances of battle, its usefulness can hardly be exaggerated.

Reading it one understands something, at least of the soul as well as

the science of combat, the great defeats and the great victories of

history seem more intelligible in simple terms of human beings. Beyond

this lies the contemporaneous value due to the fact that nowhere can

one better understand Foch than through the reading of du Picq.

By translating this volume of du Picq and thus making it available for

an American audience whose interest has been inevitably stirred by

recent events, the translators have done a public as well as a

professional service. Both officers enjoyed exceptional opportunities

and experiences on the Western front. Col. Greely from Cantigny to the

close of the battle of the Meuse-Argonne was not only frequently

associated with the French army, but as Chief of Staff of our own

First Division, gained a direct knowledge of the facts of battle,

equal to that of du Picq, himself.

On the professional side the service is obvious, since before the last

war the weakness of the American like the British Army, a weakness

inevitable, given our isolation, lay in the absence of adequate study

of the higher branches of military science and thus the absence of

such a body of highly skilled professional soldiers, as constituted

the French or German General Staff. The present volume is a clear

evidence that American officers themselves have voluntarily undertaken

to make good this lack.

On the non-professional side and for the general reader, the service

is hardly less considerable, since it supplies the least technically

informed with a simply comprehensible explanation of things which

almost every one has struggled to grasp and visualize during the last

six years extending from the battle of Marne in 1914 to that of the

Vistula in 1920.

Of the truth of this latter assertion, a single example will perhaps

suffice. Every forthcoming military study of the campaign of 1914

emphasizes with renewed energy the fact that underlying all the German

conceptions of the opening operations was the purpose to repeat the

achievement of Hannibal at Cannae, by bringing the French to battle

under conditions which should, on a colossal scale, reproduce those of

Hannibal's greatest victory. But nowhere better than in du Picq's

volume, are set forth the essential circumstances of the combat which,

after two thousand years gave to Field Marshal von Schlieffen the root

ideas for the strategy expressed in the first six weeks of 1914. And,

as a final observation, nowhere better than in du Picq's account, can

one find the explanation of why the younger Moltke failed in executing

those plans which gave Hannibal one of the most shining triumphs in

all antiquity.

Thus, although he died in 1870, du Picq lives, through his book, as

one of the most useful guides to a proper understanding of a war

fought nearly half a century later.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

Snowville, New Hampshire,

October 15, 1920.

TRANSLATORS' NOTE

Colonel Ardant du Picq's "Battle Studies" is a French military

classic. It is known to every French army officer; it is referred to

as an established authority in such works as Marshal Foch's "The

Principles of War." It has been eagerly read in the original by such

American army officers as have chanced upon it; probably only the

scarcity of thinking men with military training has precluded the

earlier appearance of an American edition.

The translators feel that the war with Germany which brought with it

some military training for all the best brains of the country has

prepared the field for an American edition of this book. They are sure

that every American reader who has had actual battle experience in any

capacity will at some point say to himself, "That is absolutely

true...." or, "That reminds me of the day...."

Appendices II, III, IV, and V, appearing in the edition from which

this translation is made, deal with issues and military questions

entirely French and not of general application. They are therefore not

considered as being of sufficient interest to be reproduced herein.

Appendix VI of the original appears herein as Appendix II.

The translation is unpretentious. The translators are content to

exhibit such a work to the American military public without changing

its poignancy and originality. They hope that readers will enjoy it as

much as they have themselves.

J. N. G.

R. C. C.

INTRODUCTION

We present to the public the complete works of Colonel Ardant du Picq,

arranged according to the plan of the author, enlarged by unpublished

fragments and documents.

These unpublished documents are partially known by those who have read

"Studies on Combat" (Hachette & Dumaine, 1880). A second edition was

called for after a considerable time. It has left ineffaceable traces

in the minds of thinking men with experience. By its beauty and the

vigor of its teachings, it has created in a faithful school of

disciples a tradition of correct ideas.

For those familiar with the work, there is no need for emphasizing the

importance and usefulness of this rejuvenated publication. In it they

will find new sources of interest, which will confirm their admiration

for the author.

They will also rejoice in the popularity of their teacher, already

highly regarded in the eyes of his profession on account of his

presentation of conclusions, the truth of which grows with years. His

work merits widespread attention. It would be an error to leave it in

the exclusive possession of special writers and military technicians.

In language which is equal in power and pathetic beauty, it should

carry its light much further and address itself to all readers who

enjoy solid thought. Their ideas broadened, they will, without fail,

join those already initiated.

No one can glance over these pages with indifference. No one can fail

to be moved by the strong and substantial intellect they reveal. No

one can fail to feel their profound depths. To facilitate treatment of

a subject which presents certain difficulties, we shall confine

ourselves to a succinct explanation of its essential elements, the

general conception that unites them, and the purpose of the author.

But we must not forget the dramatic mutilation of the work

unfortunately never completed because of the glorious death of Ardant

du Picq.

When Colonel Ardant du Picq was killed near Metz in 1870 by a Prussian

shell, he left works that divide themselves into two well-defined

categories:

(1) Completed works:

Pamphlet (printed in 1868 but not intended for sale), which forms

the first part of the present edition: Ancient Battle.

A series of memoirs and studies written in 1865. These are partly

reproduced in Appendices I and II herein.

(2) Notes jotted down on paper, sometimes developed into complete

chapters not requiring additions or revision, but sometimes

abridged and drawn up in haste. They reveal a brain completely

filled with its subject, perpetually working, noting a trait in a

rapid phrase, in a vibrating paragraph, in observations and

recollections that a future revision was to compile, unite and

complete.

The collection of these notes forms the second part: Modern Battle.

These notes were inspired by certain studies or memoirs which are

presented in Appendices I-V, and a Study on Combat, with which the

Colonel was occupied, and of which we gave a sketch at the end of

the pamphlet of 1868. He himself started research among the

officers of his acquaintance, superiors, equals or subordinates,

who had served in war. This occupied a great part of his life.

In order to collect from these officers, without change or

misrepresentation, statements of their experiences while leading their

men in battle or in their divers contacts with the enemy, he sent to

each one a questionnaire, in the form of a circular. The reproduction

herein is from the copy which was intended for General Lafont de

Villiers, commanding the 21st Division at Limoges. It is impossible to

over-emphasize the great value of this document which gives the key to

the constant meditations of Ardant du Picq, the key to the reforms

which his methodical and logical mind foresaw. It expounds a principle

founded upon exact facts faithfully stated. His entire work, in

embryo, can be seen between the lines of the questionnaire. This was

his first attempt at reaction against the universal routine

surrounding him.

From among the replies which he received and which his family

carefully preserved, we have extracted the most conclusive. They will

be found in Appendix II--Historical Documents. Brought to light, at

the urgent request of the author, they complete the book,

corroborating statements by examples. They illuminate his doctrines by

authentic historical depositions.

In arranging this edition we are guided solely by the absolute respect

which we have for the genius of Ardant du Picq. We have endeavored to

reproduce his papers in their entirety, without removing or adding

anything. Certain disconnected portions have an inspired and fiery

touch which would be lessened by the superfluous finish of an attempt

at editing. Some repetitions are to be found; they show that the

appendices were the basis for the second part of the volume, Modern

Battle. It may be stated that the work, suddenly halted in 1870,

contains criticisms, on the staff for instance, which aim at radical

reforms.

ERNEST JUDET.

CONTENTS

FRONTISPIECE--PORTRAIT OF COLONEL ARDANT DU PICQ

FOREWORD

PREFACE

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

INTRODUCTION

A MILITARY THINKER

RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE OF COLONEL ARDANT DU PICQ

EXTRACT FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

PART ONE: ANCIENT BATTLE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER

I MAN IN PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT COMBAT

II KNOWLEDGE OF MAN MADE ROMAN TACTICS; THE SUCCESSES OF HANNIBAL;

THOSE OF CAESAR

III ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF CANNAE

IV ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF PHARSALUS AND SOME CHARACTERISTIC

EXAMPLES

V MORALE IN ANCIENT BATTLE

VI HOW REAL COMBATANTS ARE OBTAINED AND HOW THE FIGHTING OF TO-DAY

REQUIRES THEM TO BE MORE DEPENDABLE THAN IN ANCIENT BATTLE

VII PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY AND WHAT IS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE IT

PART TWO: MODERN BATTLE

I GENERAL DISCUSSION

1. Ancient and Modern Battle

2. Moral Elements in Battle

3. Material and Moral Effect

4. The Theory of Strong Battalions

5. Combat Methods

II INFANTRY

1. Masses--Deep Columns

2. Skirmishers--Supports--Reserves--Squares

3. Firing

4. Marches--Camps--Night Attacks

III CAVALRY

1. Cavalry and Modern Appliances

2. Cavalry Against Cavalry

3. Cavalry Against Infantry

4. Armor and Armament

IV ARTILLERY

V COMMAND, GENERAL STAFF AND ADMINISTRATION

VI SOCIAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS; NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

APPENDICES

I MEMORANDUM ON INFANTRY FIRE

1. Introduction

2. Succinct History of the Development of Small Arms, from

the Arquebus to Our Rifle

3. Progressive Introduction of Fire-Arms Into the Armament

of the Infantryman

4. The Classes of Fire Employed with Each Weapon

5. Methods of Fire Used in the Presence of the Enemy;

Methods Recommended or Ordered but Impractical

6. Fire at Will--Its Efficacy

7. Fire by Rank Is a Fire to Occupy the Men in Ranks

8. The Deadly Fire Is the Fire of Skirmishers

9. The Absolute Impossibility of Fire at Command

II HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS

1. Cavalry (An Extract from Xenophon)

2. Marius Against the Cimbrians (Extract from Plutarch's

"Life of Marius")

3. The Battle of The Alma (Extract from the Correspondence

of Colonel Ardant du Picq)

4. The Battle of the Alma (Extract from the Correspondence

of Colonel Ardant du Picq)

5. The Battle of Inkermann (Extract from the Correspondence

of Colonel Ardant du Picq)

6. The Battle of Magenta (Extract from the Correspondence of

Colonel Ardant du Picq)

7. The Battle of Solferino (Extract from the Correspondence

of Colonel Ardant du Picq)

8. Mentana (Extract from the Correspondence of Colonel Ardant

du Picq)

BATTLE STUDIES

A MILITARY THINKER

Near Longeville-les-Metz on the morning of August 15, 1870, a stray

projectile from a Prussian gun mortally wounded the Colonel of the

10th Regiment of the Line. The obscure gunner never knew that he had

done away with one of the most intelligent officers of our army, one

of the most forceful writers, one of the most clear-sighted

philosophers whom sovereign genius had ever created.

Ardant du Picq, according to the Annual Register, commanded but a

regiment. He was fitted for the first rank of the most exalted. He

fell at the hour when France was thrown into frightful chaos, when all

that he had foreseen, predicted and dreaded, was being terribly

fulfilled. New ideas, of which he was the unknown trustee and

unacknowledged prophet, triumphed then at our expense. The disaster

that carried with it his sincere and revivifying spirit, left in the

tomb of our decimated divisions an evidence of the necessity for

reform. When our warlike institutions were perishing from the lack of

thought, he represented in all its greatness the true type of military

thinker. The virile thought of a military thinker alone brings forth

successes and maintains victorious nations. Fatal indolence brought

about the invasion, the loss of two provinces, the bog of moral

miseries and social evils which beset vanquished States.

The heart and brain of Ardant du Picq guarded faithfully a worthy but

discredited cult. Too frequently in the course of our history virtues

are forsaken during long periods, when it seems that the entire race

is hopelessly abased. The mass perceives too late in rare individuals

certain wasted talents--treasures of sagacity, spiritual vigor, heroic

and almost supernatural comprehension. Such men are prodigious

exceptions in times of material decadence and mental laxness. They

inherit all the qualities that have long since ceased to be current.

They serve as examples and rallying points for other generations, more

clear-sighted and less degenerate. On reading over the extraordinary

work of Ardant du Picq, that brilliant star in the eclipse of our

military faculties, I think of the fatal shot that carried him off

before full use had been found for him, and I am struck by melancholy.

Our fall appears more poignant. His premature end seems a punishment

for his contemporaries, a bitter but just reproach.

Fortunately, more honored and believed in by his successors, his once

unappreciated teaching contributes largely to the uplift and to the

education of our officers. They will be inspired by his original views

and the permanent virtue contained therein. They will learn therefrom

the art of leading and training our young soldiers and can hope to

retrieve the cruel losses of their predecessors.

Ardant du Picq amazes one by his tenacity and will power which,

without the least support from the outside, animate him under the

trying conditions of his period of isolated effort.

In an army in which most of the seniors disdained the future and

neglected their responsibilities, rested satisfied on the laurels of

former campaigns and relied on superannuated theories and the

exercises of a poor parade, scorned foreign organizations and believed

in an acquired and constant superiority that dispenses with all work,

and did not suspect even the radical transformations which the

development of rifles and rapid-fire artillery entail; Ardant du Picq

worked for the common good. In his modest retreat, far from the

pinnacles of glory, he tended a solitary shrine of unceasing activity

and noble effort. He burned with the passions which ought to have

moved the staff and higher commanders. He watched while his

contemporaries slept.

Toward the existing system of instruction and preparation which the

first blow shattered, his incorruptible honesty prevented him from

being indulgent. While terrified leaders passed from arrogance or

thoughtlessness to dejection and confusion, the blow was being struck.

Served by his marvelous historical gifts, he studied the laws of

ancient combat in the poorly interpreted but innumerable documents of

the past. Then, guided by the immortal light which never failed, the

feverish curiosity of this soldier's mind turned towards the research

of the laws of modern combat, the subject of his preference. In this

study he developed to perfection his psychological attainments. By the

use of these attainments he simplified the theory of the conduct of

war. By dissecting the motor nerves of the human heart, he released

basic data on the essential principles of combat. He discovered the

secret of combat, the way to victory.

Never for a second did Ardant du Picq forget that combat is the

object, the cause of being, the supreme manifestation of armies. Every

measure which departs therefrom, which relegates it to the middle

ground is deceitful, chimerical, fatal. All the resources accumulated

in time of peace, all the tactical evolutions, all the strategical

calculations are but conveniences, drills, reference marks to lead up

to it. His obsession was so overpowering that his presentation of it

will last as long as history. This obsession is the role of man in

combat. Man is the incomparable instrument whose elements, character,

energies, sentiments, fears, desires, and instincts are stronger than

all abstract rules, than all bookish theories. War is still more of an

art than a science. The inspirations which reveal and mark the great

strategists, the leaders of men, form the unforeseen element, the

divine part. Generals of genius draw from the human heart ability to

execute a surprising variety of movements which vary the routine; the

mediocre ones, who have no eyes to read readily therein, are doomed to

the worst errors.

Ardant du Picq, haunted by the need of a doctrine which would correct

existing evils and disorders, was continually returning to the

fountain-head. Anxious to instruct promising officers, to temper them

by irrefutable lessons, to mature them more rapidly, to inspire them

with his zeal for historical incidents, he resolved to carry on and

add to his personal studies while aiding them. Daring to take a

courageous offensive against the general inertia of the period, he

translated the problem of his whole life into a series of basic

questions. He presented in their most diverse aspects, the basic

questions which perplex all military men, those of which knowledge in

a varying degree of perfection distinguish and classify military men.

The nervous grasp of an incomparable style models each of them, carves

them with a certain harshness, communicates to them a fascinating yet

unknown authority which crystallizes them in the mind, at the same

time giving to them a positive form that remains true for all armies,

for all past, present and future centuries. Herewith is the text of

the concise and pressing questions which have not ceased to be as

important to-day (1902) as they were in 1870:

"_General_,

"In the last century, after the improvements of the rifle and field

artillery by Frederick, and the Prussian successes in war--to-day,

after the improvement of the new rifle and cannon to which in part the

recent victories are due--we find all thinking men in the army asking

themselves the question: 'How shall we fight to-morrow?' We have no

creed on the subject of combat. And the most opposing methods confuse

the intelligence of military men.

"Why? A common error at the starting point. One might say that no one

is willing to acknowledge that it is necessary to understand yesterday

in order to know to-morrow, for the things of yesterday are nowhere

plainly written. The lessons of yesterday exist solely in the memory

of those who know how to remember because they have known how to see,

and those individuals have never spoken. I make an appeal to one of

those.

"The smallest detail, taken from an actual incident in war, is more

instructive for me, a soldier, than all the Thiers and Jominis in the

world. They speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies but

they never show me what I wish to know--a battalion, a company, a

squad, in action.

"Concerning a regiment, a battalion, a company, a squad, it is

interesting to know: The disposition taken to meet the enemy or the

order for the march toward them. What becomes of this disposition or

this march order under the isolated or combined influences of

accidents of the terrain and the approach of danger?

"Is this order changed or is it continued in force when approaching

the enemy?

"What becomes of it upon arriving within the range of the guns, within

the range of bullets?

"At what distance is a voluntary or an ordered disposition taken

before starting operations for commencing fire, for charging, or both?

"How did the fight start? How about the firing? How did the men adapt

themselves? (This may be learned from the results: So many bullets

fired, so many men shot down--when such data are available.) How was

the charge made? At what distance did the enemy flee before it? At

what distance did the charge fall back before the fire or the good

order and good dispositions of the enemy, or before such and such a

movement of the enemy? What did it cost? What can be said about all

these with reference to the enemy?

"The behavior, i.e., the order, the disorder, the shouts, the

silence, the confusion, the calmness of the officers and men whether

with us or with the enemy, before, during, and after the combat?

"How has the soldier been controlled and directed during the action?

At what instant has he had a tendency to quit the line in order to

remain behind or to rush ahead?

"At what moment, if the control were escaping from the leader's hands,

has it no longer been possible to exercise it?

"At what instant has this control escaped from the battalion

commander? When from the captain, the section leader, the squad

leader? At what time, in short, if such a thing did take place, was

there but a disordered impulse, whether to the front or to the rear

carrying along pell-mell with it both the leaders and men?

"Where and when did the halt take place?

"Where and when were the leaders able to resume control of the men?

"At what moments before, during, or after the day, was the battalion

roll-call, the company roll-call made? The results of these

roll-calls?

"How many dead, how many wounded on the one side and on the other; the

kind of wounds of the officers, non-commissioned officers, corporals,

privates, etc., etc.?

"All these details, in a word, enlighten either the material or the

moral side of the action, or enable it to be visualized. Possibly, a

closer examination might show that they are matters infinitely more

instructive to us as soldiers than all the discussions imaginable on

the plans and general conduct of the campaigns of the greatest captain

in the great movements of the battle field. From colonel to private we

are soldiers, not generals, and it is therefore our trade that we

desire to know.

"Certainly one cannot obtain all the details of the same incident. But

from a series of true accounts there should emanate an ensemble of

characteristic details which in themselves are very apt to show in a

striking, irrefutable way what was necessarily and forcibly taking

place at such and such a moment of an action in war. Take the estimate

of the soldier obtained in this manner to serve as a base for what

might possibly be a rational method of fighting. It will put us on

guard against _a priori_ and pedantic school methods.

"Whoever has seen, turns to a method based on his knowledge, his

personal experience as a soldier. But experience is long and life is

short. The experiences of each cannot therefore be completed except by

those of others.

"And that is why, General, I venture to address myself to you for your

experiences.

"Proofs have weight.

"As for the rest, whether it please you to aid or not, General, kindly

accept the assurance of most respectful devotion from your obedient

servant."

* * * * *

The reading of this unique document is sufficient to explain the glory

that Ardant du Picq deserved. In no other career has a professional

ever reflected more clearly the means of pushing his profession to

perfection; in no profession has a deeper penetration of the resources

been made.

It pleases me particularly to associate the two words 'penseur' and

'militaire,' which, at the present time, the ignorance of preconceived

opinion too frequently separates. Because such opinion is on the verge

of believing them to be incompatible and contradictory.

Yet no calling other than the true military profession is so fitted to

excite brain activity. It is preeminently the calling of action, at

the same time diverse in its combinations and changing according to

the time and locality wherein it is put to practice. No other

profession is more complex nor more difficult, since it has for its

aim and reason the instruction of men to overcome by training and

endurance the fatigue and perils against which the voice of

self-preservation is raised in fear; in other words, to draw from

nature what is most opposed and most antipathic to this nature.

There is, however, much of routine in the customs of military life,

and, abuse of it may bring about gross satires which in turn bring it

into derision. To be sure, the career has two phases because it must

fulfill simultaneously two exigencies. From this persons of moderate

capacity draw back and are horrified. They solve the question by the

sacrifice of the one or the other. If one considers only the lower and

somewhat vulgar aspect of military life it is found to be composed of

monotonous obligations clothed in a mechanical procedure of

indispensable repetition. If one learns to grasp it in its ensemble

and large perspective, it will be found that the days of extreme trial

demand prodigies of vigor, spirit, intelligence, and decision!

Regarded from this angle and supported in this light, the commonplace

things of wearisome garrison life have as counterweights certain

sublime compensations. These compensations preclude the false and

contemptible results which come from intellectual idleness and the

habit of absolute submission. If it yields to their narcotic charms,

the best brain grows rusty and atrophies in the long run. Incapable of

virile labor, it rebels at a renewal of its processes in sane

initiative. An army in which vigilance is not perpetual is sick until

the enemy demonstrates it to be dead.

Far, then, from attaching routine as an indispensable companion to

military discipline it must be shown continually that in it lies

destruction and loss. Military discipline does not degenerate except

when it has not known the cult of its vitality and the secret of its

grandeur. The teachers of war have all placed this truth as a preface

to their triumphs and we find the most illustrious teachers to be the

most severe. Listen to this critique of Frederick the Great on the

maneuvers which he conducted in Silesia:

"The great mistake in inspections is that you officers amuse

yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the

least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would

become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict. Take shoe-makers

and tailors and make generals of them and they will not commit worse

follies! These blunders are made on a small as well as on a large

scale. Consequently, in the greatest number of regiments, the private

is not well trained; in Zaramba's regiment he is the worst; in

Thadden's he amounts to nothing; and to no more in Keller's, Erlach's,

and Haager's. Why? Because the officers are lazy and try to get out of

a difficulty by giving themselves the least trouble possible."

* * * * *

In default of exceptional generals who remold in some campaigns, with

a superb stroke, the damaged or untempered military metal, it is of

importance to supply it with the ideals of Ardant du Picq. Those who

are formed by his image, by his book, will never fall into error. His

book has not been written to please aesthetic preciseness, but with a

sincerity which knows no limit. It therefore contains irrefutable

facts and theories.

The solidity of these fragmentary pages defies time; the work

interrupted by the German shell is none the less erected for eternity.

The work has muscles, nerves and a soul. It has the transparent

concentration of reality. A thought may be expressed by a single word.

The terseness of the calcined phrase explains the interior fire of it

all, the magnificent conviction of the author. The distinctness of

outline, the most astounding brevity of touch, is such that the vision

of the future bursts forth from the resurrection of the past. The work

contains, indeed, substance and marrow of a prophetic experience.

Amidst the praise rendered to the scintillating beauties of this book,

there is perhaps, none more impressive than that of Barbey

d'Aurevilly, an illustrious literary man of a long and generous

patrician lineage. His comment, kindled with lyric enthusiasm, is

illuminating. It far surpasses the usual narrow conception of

technical subjects. Confessing his professional ignorance in matters

of war, his sincere eulogy of the eloquent amateur is therefore only

the more irresistible.

"Never," writes Barbey d'Aurevilly, "has a man of action--of brutal

action in the eyes of universal prejudice--more magnificently

glorified the spirituality of war. Mechanics--abominable

mechanics--takes possession of the world, crushing it under its stupid

and irresistible wheels. By the action of newly discovered and

improved appliances the science of war assumes vast proportions as a

means of destruction. Yet here, amid the din of this upset modern

world we find a brain sufficiently master of its own thoughts as not

to permit itself to be dominated by these horrible discoveries which,

we are told, would make impossible Fredericks of Prussia and Napoleons

and lower them to the level of the private soldier! Colonel Ardant du

Picq tells us somewhere that he has never had entire faith in the huge

battalions which these two great men, themselves alone worth more than

the largest battalions, believed in. Well, to-day, this vigorous brain

believes no more in the mechanical or mathematical force which is

going to abolish these great battalions. A calculator without the

least emotion, who considers the mind of man the essential in

war--because it is this mind that makes war--he surely sees better

than anybody else a profound change in the exterior conditions of war

which he must consider. But the spiritual conditions which are

produced in war have not changed. Such, is the eternal mind of man

raised to its highest power by discipline. Such, is the Roman cement

of this discipline that makes of men indestructible walls. Such, is

the cohesion, the solidarity between men and their leaders. Such, is

the moral influence of the impulse which gives the certainty of

victory.

"'To conquer is to advance,' de Maistre said one day, puzzled at this

phenomenon of victory. The author of "Etudes sur le Combat" says more

simply: 'To conquer is to be sure to overcome.' In fine, it is the

mind that wins battles, that will always win them, that always has won

them throughout the world's history. The spirituality, the moral

quality of war, has not changed since those times. Mechanics, modern

arms, all the artillery invented by man and his science, will not make

an end to this thing, so lightly considered at the moment and called

the human soul. Books like that of Ardant du Picq prevent it from

being disdained. If no other effect should be produced by this sublime

book, this one thing would justify it. But there will be others--do

not doubt it--I wish merely to point out the sublimity of this

didactic book which, for me, has wings like celestial poetry and which

has carried me above and far away from the materialistic abjectness of

my time. The technique of tactics and the science of war are beyond my

province. I am not, like the author, erudite on maneuvers and the

battle field. But despite my ignorance of things exclusively military,

I have felt the truth of the imperious demonstrations with which it is

replete, as one feels the presence of the sun behind a cloud. His book

has over the reader that moral ascendancy which is everything in war

and which determines success, according to the author. This

ascendancy, like truth itself, is the sort which cannot be questioned.

Coming from the superior mind of a leader who inspires faith it

imposes obedience by its very strength. Colonel Ardant du Picq was a

military writer only, with a style of his own. He has the Latin

brevity and concentration. He retains his thought, assembles it and

always puts it out in a compact phrase like a cartridge. His style has

the rapidity and precision of the long-range arms which have dethroned

the bayonet. He would have been a writer anywhere. He was a writer by

nature. He was of that sacred phalanx of those who have a style all to

themselves."

Barbey d'Aurevilly rebels against tedious technicalities. Carried away

by the author's historical and philosophical faculties, he soars

without difficulty to the plane of Ardant du Picq. In like manner, du

Picq ranges easily from the most mediocre military operations to the

analysis of the great functions of policy of government and the

evolution of nations.

Who could have unraveled with greater finesse the causes of the

insatiable desires of conquest by the new power which was so desirous

of occupying the leading role on the world's stage? If our diplomats,

our ministers and our generals had seized the warning of 1866, the

date of the defeat of Austria, it is possible that we might have been

spared our own defeats.

"Has an aristocracy any excuse for existing if it is not military? No.

The Prussian aristocracy is essentially military. In its ranks it does

accept officers of plebeian extraction, but only under condition that

they permit themselves to be absorbed therein.

"Is not an aristocracy essentially proud? If it were not proud it

would lack confidence. The Prussian aristocracy is, therefore,

haughty; it desires domination by force and its desire to rule, to

dominate more and more, is the essence of its existence. It rules by

war; it wishes war; it must have war at the proper time. Its leaders

have the good judgment to choose the right moment. This love of war is

in the very fiber, the very makeup of its life as an aristocracy.

"Every nation that has an aristocracy, a military nobility, is

organized in a military way. The Prussian officer is an accomplished

gentleman and nobleman; by instruction or examination he is most

capable; by education, most worthy. He is an officer and commands from

two motives, the French officer from one alone.

"Prussia, in spite of all the veils concealing reality, is a military

organization conducted by a military corporation. A nation,

democratically constituted, is not organized from a military point of

view. It is, therefore, as against the other, in a state of

unpreparedness for war.

"A military nation and a warlike nation are not necessarily the same.

The French are warlike from organization and instinct. They are every

day becoming less and less military.

"In being the neighbor of a military nation, there is no security for

a democratic nation; the two are born enemies; the one continually

menaces the good influences, if not the very existence of the other.

As long as Prussia is not democratic she is a menace to us.

"The future seems to belong to democracy, but, before this future is

attained by Europe, who will say that victory and domination will not

belong for a time to military organization? It will presently perish

for the lack of sustenance of life, when having no more foreign

enemies to vanquish, to watch, to fight for control, it will have no

reason for existence."

In tracing a portrait so much resembling bellicose and conquering

Prussia, the sharp eye of Ardant du Picq had recognized clearly the

danger which immediately threatened us and which his deluded and

trifling fellow citizens did not even suspect. The morning after

Sadowa, not a single statesman or publicist had yet divined what the

Colonel of the 10th Regiment of the Line had, at first sight,

understood. Written before the catastrophes of Froeschwiller, Metz and

Sedan, the fragment seems, in a retrospective way, an implacable

accusation against those who deceived themselves about the

Hohenzollern country by false liberalism or a softening of the brain.

Unswerved by popular ideas, by the artificial, by the trifles

of treaties, by the chimera of theories, by the charlatanism

of bulletins, by the nonsense of romantic fiction, by the

sentimentalities of vain chivalry, Ardant du Picq, triumphant in

history, is even more the incomparable master in the field of his

laborious days and nights, the field of war itself. Never has a

clearer vision fathomed the bloody mysteries of the formidable test of

war. Here man appears as his naked self. He is a poor thing when he

succumbs to unworthy deeds and panics. He is great under the impulse

of voluntary sacrifice which transforms him under fire and for honor

or the salvation of others makes him face death.

The sound and complete discussions of Ardant du Picq take up, in a

poignant way, the setting of every military drama. They envelop in a

circle of invariable phenomena the apparent irregularity of combat,

determining the critical point in the outcome of the battle. Whatever

be the conditions, time or people, he gives a code of rules which will

not perish. With the enthusiasm of Pascal, who should have been a

soldier, Ardant du Picq has the preeminent gift of expressing the

infinite in magic words. He unceasingly opens an abyss under the feet

of the reader. The whole metaphysics of war is contained therein and

is grasped at a single glance.

He shows, weighed in the scales of an amazing exactitude, the normal

efficiency of an army; a multitude of beings shaken by the most

contradictory passions, first desiring to save their own skins and yet

resigned to any risk for the sake of a principle. He shows the

quantity and quality of possible efforts, the aggregate of losses, the

effects of training and impulse, the intrinsic value of the troops

engaged. This value is the sum of all that the leader can extract from

any and every combination of physical preparation, confidence, fear of

punishment, emulation, enthusiasm, inclination, the promise of

success, administration of camps, fire discipline, the influence of

ability and superiority, etc. He shows the tragic depths, so somber

below, so luminous above, which appear in the heart of the combatant

torn between fear and duty. In the private soldier the sense of duty

may spring from blind obedience; in the non-commissioned officer,

responsible for his detachment, from devotion to his trade; in the

commanding officer, from supreme responsibility! It is in battle that

a military organization justifies its existence. Money spent by the

billions, men trained by the millions, are gambled on one irrevocable

moment. Organization decides the terrible contest which means the

triumph or the downfall of the nation! The harsh rays of glory beam

above the field of carnage, destroying the vanquished without

scorching the victor.

Such are the basic elements of strategy and tactics!

There is danger in theoretical speculation of battle, in prejudice, in

false reasoning, in pride, in braggadocio. There is one safe resource,

the return to nature.

The strategy that moves in elevated spheres is in danger of being lost

in the clouds. It becomes ridiculous as soon as it ceases to conform

to actual working tactics. In his classical work on the decisive

battle of August 18, 1870, Captain Fritz Hoenig has reached a sound

conclusion. After his biting criticism of the many gross errors of

Steinmetz and Zastrow, after his description of the triple panic of

the German troops opposite the French left in the valley and the

ravine of the Mance, he ends by a reflection which serves as a

striking ending to the book. He says, "The grandest illustration of

Moltke's strategy was the battle of Gravelotte-Saint Privat; but the

battle of Gravelotte has taught us one thing, and that is, the best

strategy cannot produce good results if tactics is at fault."

The right kind of tactics is not improvised. It asserts itself in the

presence of the enemy but it is learned before meeting the enemy.

"There are men," says Ardant du Picq, "such as Marshal Bugeaud, who

are born military in character, mind, intelligence and temperament.

Not all leaders are of this stamp. There is, then, need for standard

or regulation tactics appropriate to the national character which

should be the guide for the ordinary commander and which do not exact

of him the exceptional qualities of a Bugeaud."

"Tactics is an art based on the knowledge of how to make men fight

with their maximum energy against fear, a maximum which organization

alone can give."

"And here confidence appears. It is not the enthusiastic and

thoughtless confidence of tumultuous or improvised armies that gives

way on the approach of danger to a contrary sentiment which sees

treason everywhere; but the intimate, firm, conscious confidence which

alone makes true soldiers and does not disappear at the moment of

action."

"We now have an army. It is not difficult for us to see that people

animated by passions, even people who know how to die without

flinching, strong in the face of death, but without discipline and

solid organization, are conquered by others who are individually less

valiant but firmly organized, all together and one for all."

"Solidarity and confidence cannot be improvised. They can be born only

of mutual acquaintanceship which establishes pride and makes unity.

And, from unity comes in turn the feeling of force, that force which

gives to the attack the courage and confidence of victory. Courage,

that is to say, the domination of the will over instinct even in the

greatest danger, leads finally to victory or defeat."

In asking for a doctrine in combat and in seeking to base it on the

moral element, Ardant du Picq was ahead of his generation. He has had

a very great influence. But, the doctrine is not yet established.

How to approach the adversary? How to pass from the defensive to the

offensive? How to regulate the shock? How to give orders that can be

executed? How to transmit them surely? How to execute them by

economizing precious lives? Such are the distressing problems that

beset generals and others in authority. The result is that presidents,

kings and emperors hesitate, tremble, interrogate, pile reports upon

reports, maneuvers upon maneuvers, retard the improvement of their

military material, their organization, their equipment.

The only leaders who are equal to the difficulties of future war, come

to conclusions expressed in almost the same terms. Recently General de

Negrier, after having insisted that physical exhaustion determined by

the nervous tension of the soldier, increased in surprising

proportions according to the invisibility of the adversary, expressed

himself as follows:

"The tide of battle is in the hands of each fighter, and never, at any

time, has the individual bravery of the soldier had more importance.

"Whatever the science of the superior commander, the genius of his

strategic combinations, the precision of his concentrations, whatever

numerical superiority he may have, victory will escape him if the

soldier does not conduct himself without being watched, and if he is

not personally animated by the resolution to conquer or to perish. He

needs much greater energy than formerly.

"He no longer has the intoxication of ancient attacks in mass to

sustain him. Formerly, the terrible anxiety of waiting made him wish

for the violent blow, dangerous, but soon passed. Now, all his normal

and physical powers are tried for long hours and, in such a test, he

will have but the resoluteness of his own heart to sustain him.

"Armies of to-day gain decisions by action in open order, where each

soldier must act individually with will and initiative to attack the

enemy and destroy him.

"The Frenchman has always been an excellent rifleman, intelligent,

adroit and bold. He is naturally brave. The metal is good; the problem

is to temper it. It must be recognized that to-day this task is not

easy. The desire for physical comfort, the international theories

which come therefrom, preferring economic slavery and work for the

profit of the stranger to the struggle, do not incite the Frenchman to

give his life in order to save that of his brother.

"The new arms are almost valueless in the hands of weakhearted

soldiers, no matter what their number may be. On the contrary, the

demoralizing power of rapid and smokeless firing, which certain armies

still persist in not acknowledging, manifests itself with so much the

more force as each soldier possesses greater valor and cool energy.

"It is then essential to work for the development of the moral forces

of the nation. They alone will sustain the soldier in the distressing

test of battle where death comes unseen.

"That is the most important of the lessons of the South African war.

Small nations will find therein the proof that, in preparing their

youth for their duties as soldiers and creating in the hearts of all

the wish for sacrifice, they are certain to live free; but only at

this price."

This profession of faith contradicts the imbecile sophisms foolishly

put into circulation by high authority and a thoughtless press, on the

efficiency of the mass, which is nothing but numbers, on the fantastic

value of new arms, which are declared sufficient for gaining a victory

by simple mechanical perfection, on the suppression of individual

courage. It is almost as though courage had become a superfluous and

embarrassing factor. Nothing is more likely to poison the army. Ardant

du Picq is the best specific against the heresies and the follies of

ignorance or of pedantry. Here are some phrases of unerring truth.

They ought to be impressed upon all memories, inscribed upon the walls

of our military schools. They ought to be learned as lessons by our

officers and they ought to rule them as regulations and pass into

their blood:

"Man is capable of but a given quantity of fear. To-day one must

swallow in five minutes the dose that one took in an hour in Turenne's

day."

"To-day there is greater need than ever for rigid formation."

"Who can say that he never felt fear in battle? And with modern

appliances, with their terrible effect on the nervous system,

discipline is all the more necessary because one fights only in open

formation."

"Combat exacts a moral cohesion, a solidarity more compact that ever

before."

"Since the invention of fire arms, the musket, rifle, cannon, the

distances of mutual aid and support are increased between the various

arms. The more men think themselves isolated, the more need they have

of high morale."

"We are brought by dispersion to the need of a cohesion greater than

ever before."

"It is a truth, so clear as to be almost naive, that if one does not

wish bonds broken, he should make them elastic and thereby strengthen

them."

"It is not wise to lead eighty thousand men upon the battle field, of

whom but fifty thousand will fight. It would be better to have fifty

thousand all of whom would fight. These fifty thousand would have

their hearts in the work more than the others, who should have

confidence in their comrades but cannot when one-third of them shirk

their work."

"The role of the skirmisher becomes more and more predominant. It is

more necessary to watch over and direct him as he is used against

deadlier weapons and as he is consequently more prone to try to escape

from them at all costs in any direction."

"The thing is then to find a method that partially regulates the

action of our soldiers who advance by fleeing or escape by advancing,

as you like, and if something unexpected surprises them, escape as

quickly by falling back."

"Esprit de corps improves with experience in wars. War becomes shorter

and shorter, and more and more violent; therefore, create in advance

an esprit de corps."

These truths are eternal. This whole volume is but their masterful

development. They prove that together with audacious sincerity in the

cooerdination of facts and an infallible judgment, Ardant du Picq

possessed prescience in the highest degree. His prophetic eye

distinguished sixty years ago the constituent principles of a good

army. These are the principles which lead to victory. They are

radically opposed to those which enchant our parliamentarians or

military politicians, which are based on a fatal favoritism and which

precipitate wars.

Ardant du Picq is not alone a superior doctrinaire. He will be

consulted with profit in practical warlike organization. No one has

better depicted the character of modern armies. No one knew better the

value of what Clausewitz called, "The product of armed force and the

country's force ... the heart and soul of a nation."

No more let us forget that he launched, before the famous prediction

of von der Goltz, this optimistic view well calculated to rekindle the

zeal of generals who struggle under the weight of enormous tasks

incident to obligatory service.

"Extremes meet in many things. In the ancient times of conflict with

pike and sword, armies were seen to conquer other solid armies even

though one against two. Who knows if the perfection of long-range arms

might not bring back these heroic victories? Who knows whether a

smaller number by some combination of good sense or genius, or morale,

and of appliances will not overcome a greater number equally well

armed?"

After the abandonment of the law of 1872, and the repeal of the law of

1889, and before the introduction of numerous and disquieting reforms

in recruitment and consequently, in the education of our regiments,

would it not be opportune to study Ardant du Picq and look for the

secret of force in his ideas rather than in the deceptive illusions of

military automatism and materialism?

The martial mission of France is no more ended than war itself. The

severities of war may be deplored, but the precarious justice of

arbitration tribunals, still weak and divested of sanction, has not

done away with its intervention in earthly quarrels. I do not suppose

that my country is willing to submit to the mean estate, scourged with

superb contempt by Donoso Cortes, who says:--

"When a nation shows a civilized horror of war, it receives directly

the punishment of its mistake. God changes its sex, despoils it of its

common mark of virility, changes it into a feminine nation and sends

conquerors to ravish it of its honor."

France submits sometimes to the yoke of subtle dialecticians who

preach total disarmament, who spread insanely disastrous doctrine of

capitulation, glorify disgrace and humiliation, and stupidly drive us

on to suicide. The manly counsels of Ardant du Picq are admirable

lessons for a nation awakening. Since she must, sooner or later, take

up her idle sword again, may France learn from him to fight well, for

herself and for humanity!

ERNEST JUDET.

PARIS, October 10, 1902.

* * * * *

Ardant du Picq has said little about himself in his writings. He veils

with care his personality. His life and career, little known, are the

more worthy of the reader's interest, because the man is as original

as the writer. To satisfy a natural curiosity, I asked the Colonel's

family for the details of his life, enshrined in their memory. His

brother has kindly furnished them in a letter to me. It contains many

unpublished details and shows traits of character which confirm our

estimate of the man, Ardant du Picq. It completes very happily the

impression made by his book.

"PARIS, October 12, 1903.

"_Sir,_

"Herewith are some random biographical notes on the author of 'Etudes

sur le Combat' which you requested of me.

"My brother entered Saint-Cyr quite late, at twenty-one years, which

was I believe the age limit at that time. This was not his initial

preference. He had a marked preference for a naval career, in which

adventure seemed to offer an opportunity for his activity, and which

he would have entered if the circumstances had so permitted. His

childhood was turbulent and somewhat intractable; but, attaining

adolescence, he retained from his former violence a very pronounced

taste for physical exercise, especially for gymnastics, little

practiced then, to which he was naturally inclined by his agility and

muscular strength.

"He was successful in his classes, very much so in studies which were

to his taste, principally French composition. In this he rose above

the usual level of schoolboy exercises when the subject interested

him. Certain other branches that were uninteresting or distasteful to

him, as for instance Latin Grammar, he neglected. I do not remember

ever having seen him attend a distribution of prizes, although he was

highly interested, perhaps because he was too interested. On these

occasions, he would disappear generally after breakfast and not be

seen until evening. His bent was toward mechanical notions and

handiwork. He was not uninterested in mathematics but his interest in

this was ordinary. He was nearly refused entrance to Saint-Cyr. He

became confused before the examiners and the results of the first part

of the tests were almost negligible. He consoled himself with his

favorite maxim as a young man: 'Onward philosophy.' Considering the

first test as over and done with, he faced the second test with

perfect indifference. This attitude gave him another opportunity and

he came out with honors. As he had done well with the written test on

'Hannibal's Campaigns,' he was given a passing grade.

"At school he was liked by all his comrades for his good humor and

frank and sympathetic character. Later, in the regiment, he gained

naturally and without effort the affection of his equals and the

respect of his subordinates. The latter were grateful to him for the

real, cordial and inspiring interest he showed in their welfare, for

he was familiar with the details of the service and with the soldier's

equipment. He would not compromise on such matters and prevaricators

who had to do with him did not emerge creditably.

"It can be said that after reaching manhood he never lied. The

absolute frankness from which he never departed under any

circumstances gave him prestige superior to his rank. A mere

Lieutenant, he voted 'No' to the Coup d'Etat of December 2, and was

admonished by his colonel who was sorry to see him compromise thus his

future. He replied with his usual rectitude: 'Colonel, since my

opinion was asked for, I must suppose that it was wanted.'

"On the eve of the Crimean war, his regiment, (67th) not seeming

destined to take the field, he asked for and obtained a transfer to

the light infantry (9th Battalion). It was with this battalion that he

served in the campaign. When it commenced, he made his first

appearance in the fatal Dobrutscha expedition. This was undertaken in

a most unhealthy region, on the chance of finding there Cossacks who

would have furnished matter for a communique. No Cossacks were found,

but the cholera was. It cut down in a few hours, so as to speak, a

large portion of the total strength. My brother, left with the rear

guard to bury the dead, burn their effects and bring up the sick, was

in his turn infected. The attack was very violent and he recovered

only because he would not give in to the illness. Evacuated to the

Varna hospital, he was driven out the first night by the burning of

the town and was obliged to take refuge in the surrounding fields

where the healthfulness of the air gave him unexpected relief.

Returned to France as a convalescent, he remained there until the

month of December (1854). He then rejoined his regiment and withstood

to the end the rigors of the winter and the slowness of the siege.

"Salle's division to which the Trochu brigade belonged, and in which

my brother served, was charged with the attack on the central bastion.

This operation was considered a simple diversion without a chance of

success. My brother, commanding the storming column of his battalion,

had the good fortune to come out safe and sound from the deadly fire

to which he was exposed and which deprived the battalion of several

good officers. He entered the bastion with a dozen men. All were

naturally made prisoners after a resistance which would have cost my

brother his life if the bugler at his side had not warded off a saber

blow at his head. Upon his return from captivity, in the first months

of 1856, he was immediately made major in the 100th Regiment of the

Line, at the instance of General Trochu who regarded him highly. He

was called the following year to the command of the 16th Battalion of

Foot Chasseurs. He served with this battalion during the Syrian

campaign where there was but little serious action.

"Back again in France, his promotion to the grade of

lieutenant-colonel, notwithstanding his excellent ratings and his

place on the promotion list, was long retarded by the ill-will of

Marshal Randon, the Minister of War. Marshal Randon complained of his

independent character and bore him malice from an incident relative to

the furnishing of shoes intended for his battalion. My brother,

questioned by Marshal Niel about the quality of the lot of shoes, had

frankly declared it bad.

"Promoted finally to lieutenant-colonel in the 55th in Algeria, he

took the field there in two campaigns, I believe. Appointed colonel of

the 10th of the Line in February, 1869, he was stationed at Lorient

and at Limoges during the eighteen months before the war with Germany.

He busied himself during this period with the preparation of his work,

soliciting from all sides first-hand information. It was slow in

coming in, due certainly to indifference rather than ill-will. He made

several trips to Paris for the purpose of opening the eyes of those in

authority to the defective state of the army and the perils of the

situation. Vain attempts! 'They take all that philosophically,' he

used to say.

"Please accept, Sir, with renewed acknowledgements of gratitude, the

expression of my most distinguished sentiments.

"C. ARDANT DU PICQ.

"P. S. As to the question of atavism in which you showed some interest

in our first conversation, I may say that our paternal line does not

in my knowledge include any military man. The oldest ancestor I know

of, according to an album of engravings by Albert Duerer, recovered in

a garret, was a gold and silversmith at Limoges towards the end of the

sixteenth century. His descendants have always been traders down to my

grandfather who, from what I have heard said, did not in the least

attend to his trade. The case is different with my mother's family

which came from Lorraine. Our great-grandfather was a soldier, our

grandfather also, and two, at least, of my mother's brothers gave

their lives on the battlefields of the First Empire. At present, the

family has two representatives in the army, the one a son of my

brother's, the other a first cousin, once removed, both bearing our

name.

"C. A. DU P."

RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE OF COLONEL ARDANT DU PICQ

Ardant du Picq (Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph), was born October 19,

1821 at Perigueux (Dordogne). Entered the service as a student of the

Special Military School, November 15, 1842.

Sub-Lieutenant in the 67th Regiment of the Line, October 1, 1844.

Lieutenant, May 15, 1848.

Captain, August 15, 1852.

Transferred to the 9th Battalion of Foot Chasseurs, December 25, 1853.

Major of the 100th Regiment of the Line, February 15, 1856.

Transferred to the 16th Battalion of Chasseurs, March 17, 1856.

Transferred to the 37th Regiment of the Line, January 23, 1863.

Lieutenant Colonel of the 55th Regiment of the Line, January 16, 1864.

Colonel of the 10th Regiment of Infantry of the Line, February 27,

1869.

Died from wounds at the military hospital in Metz, August 18, 1870.

CAMPAIGNS AND WOUNDS

Orient, March 29, 1854 to May 27, 1856. Was taken prisoner of war at

the storming of the central bastion (Sebastopol) September 8, 1855;

returned from enemy's prisons December 13, 1855.

Served in the Syrian campaign from August 6, 1860 to June 18, 1861; in

Africa from February 24, 1864 to April 14, 1866; in Franco-German war,

from July 15, 1870 to August 18, 1870.

Wounded--a comminute fracture of the right thigh, a torn gash in the

left thigh, contusion of the abdomen--by the bursting of a projectile,

August 15, 1870, Longeville-les-Metz (Moselle).

DECORATIONS

Chevalier of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, Dec. 29, 1860.

Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honor, September 10,

1868.

Received the medal of H. M. the Queen of England.

Received the medal for bravery in Sardinia.

Authorized to wear the decoration of the fourth class of the Ottoman

Medjidie order.

EXTRACT FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 10TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

CAMPAIGN OF 1870

On the 22nd of July, the three active battalions of the 10th Regiment

of Infantry of the Line left Limoges and Angouleme by rail arriving on

the 23rd at the camp at Chalons, where the 6th Corps of the Rhine Army

was concentrating and organizing, under the command of Marshal

Canrobert. The regiment, within this army corps, belonged to the 1st

Brigade (Pechot) of the 1st Division (Tixier).

The organization on a war footing of the 10th Regiment of Infantry of

the Line, begun at Limoges, was completed at the Chalons camp.

The battalions were brought up to seven hundred and twenty men, and

the regiment counted twenty-two hundred and ten present, not including

the band, the sappers and the headquarters section, which raised the

effectives to twenty-three hundred men.

The troops of the 6th Corps were soon organized and Marshal Canrobert

reviewed them on the 31st of July.

On August 5th, the division received orders to move to Nancy. It was

placed on nine trains, of which the first left at 6 A. M. Arriving in

the evening at its destination, the 1st brigade camped on the Leopold

Racetrack, and the 10th Regiment established itself on the Place de la

Greve.

The defeats of Forbach and Reichshofen soon caused these first plans

to be modified. The 6th Corps was ordered to return to the Chalons

camp. The last troops of the 2d Brigade, held up at Toul and Commercy,

were returned on the same trains.

The 1st Brigade entrained at Nancy, on the night of August 8th,

arriving at the Chalons camp on the afternoon of August 8th.

The 6th Corps, however, was to remain but a few days in camp. On the

10th it received orders to go to Metz. On the morning of the 11th the

regiment was again placed on three successive trains. The first train

carrying the staff and the 1st Battalion, arrived at Metz without

incident. The second train, transporting the 2d Battalion and four

companies of the 3d was stopped at about 11 P.M. near the Frouard

branch.

The telegraph line was cut by a Prussian party near Dieulouard, for a

length of two kilometers, and it was feared the road was damaged.

In order not to delay his arrival at Metz, nor the progress of the

trains following, Major Morin at the head of the column, directed his

commands to detrain and continue to Metz.

He caused the company at the head of the train to alight (6th Company,

2d Battalion, commanded by Captain Valpajola) and sent it

reconnoitering on the road, about three hundred meters in advance of

the train. All precautions were taken to assure the security of the

train, which regulated its progress on that of the scouts.

After a run of about eight kilometers in this way, at Marbache

station, all danger having disappeared and communication with Metz

having been established, the train resumed its regulation speed. In

consequence of the slowing up of the second column, the third followed

at a short distance until it also arrived. On the afternoon of the

12th, the regiment was entirely united.

The division of which it was a part was sent beyond Montigny and it

camped there as follows:

The 9th Chasseurs and 4th Regiment of the Line, ahead of the

Thionville railroad, the right on the Moselle, the left on the

Pont-a-Mousson highway; the 10th Regiment of the Line, the right

supported at the branch of the Thionville and Nancy lines, the left in

the direction of Saint-Privat, in front of the Montigny repair shops

of the Eastern Railroad lines.

The regiment was thus placed in the rear of a redoubt under

construction. The company of engineers was placed at the left of the

10th near the earth-works on which it was to work.

Along the ridge of the plateau, toward the Seille, was the 2d Brigade,

which rested its left on the river and its right perpendicular to the

Saint-Privat road, in rear of the field-work of this name. The

divisional batteries were behind it.

The division kept this position August 13th and during the morning of

the 14th. In the afternoon, an alarm made the division take arms,

during the engagement that took place on the side of Vallieres and

Saint-Julien (battle of Borny). The regiment immediately occupied

positions on the left of the village of Montigny.

At nightfall, the division retired to the rear of the railroad cut,

and received orders to hold itself in readiness to leave during the

night.

The regiment remained thus under arms, the 3d Battalion (Major

Deschesnes), passing the night on grand guard in front of the Montigny

redoubt.

Before daybreak, the division marched over the bank of the Thionville

railroad, crossed the Moselle, and, marching towards Gravelotte,

descended into the plain south of Longeville-les-Metz, where the

principal halt was made and coffee prepared.

Scarcely had stacks been made, and the men set to making fires, about

7 A.M. when shells exploded in the midst of the troops. The shots came

from the Bradin farm, situated on the heights of Montigny, which the

division had just left the same morning, and which a German cavalry

reconnaissance patrol supported by two pieces had suddenly occupied.

The Colonel had arms taken at once and disposed the regiment north of

the road which, being elevated, provided sufficient cover for

defilading the men.

He himself, stood in the road to put heart into his troops by his

attitude, they having been a little startled by this surprise and the

baptism of fire which they received under such disadvantageous

circumstances.

Suddenly, a shell burst over the road, a few feet from the Colonel,

and mutilated his legs in a frightful manner.

The same shell caused other ravages in the ranks of the 10th. The

commander of the 3d Battalion, Major Deschesnes, was mortally wounded,

Captain Reboulet was killed, Lieutenant Pone (3d Battalion, 1st

Company), and eight men of the regiment were wounded. The Colonel was

immediately taken to the other side of the highway into the midst of

his soldiers and a surgeon called, those of the regiment being already

engaged in caring for the other victims of the terrible shot.

In the meantime, Colonel Ardant du Picq asked for Lieut.-Colonel

Doleac, delivered to him his saddlebags containing important papers

concerning the regiment and gave him his field glasses. Then, without

uttering the least sound of pain, notwithstanding the frightful injury

from which he must have suffered horribly, he said with calmness: "My

regret is to be struck in this way, without having been able to lead

my regiment on the enemy."

They wanted him to take a little brandy, he refused and accepted some

water which a soldier offered him.

A surgeon arrived finally. The Colonel, showing him his right leg open

in two places, made with his hand the sign of amputating at the thigh,

saying: "Doctor, it is necessary to amputate my leg here."

At this moment, a soldier wounded in the shoulder, and placed near the

Colonel, groaned aloud. Forgetting his own condition, the Colonel said

immediately to the surgeon: "See first, doctor, what is the matter

with this brave man; I can wait."

Because of the lack of instruments it was not possible to perform the

amputation on the ground, as the Colonel desired, so this much

deplored commander was transported to the Metz hospital.

Four days later (19th of August), Colonel Ardant du Picq died like a

hero of old, without uttering the least complaint. Far from his

regiment, far from his family, he uttered several times the words

which summed up his affections: "My wife, my children, my regiment,

adieu!"

PART ONE

ANCIENT BATTLE

INTRODUCTION

Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental

instrument in battle. Nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army--its

personnel, organization, discipline and tactics, things which are

connected like the fingers of a hand--without exact knowledge of the

fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the

instant of combat.

It often happens that those who discuss war, taking the weapon for the

starting point, assume unhesitatingly that the man called to serve it

will always use it as contemplated and ordered by the regulations. But

such a being, throwing off his variable nature to become an impassive

pawn, an abstract unit in the combinations of battle, is a creature

born of the musings of the library, and not a real man. Man is flesh

and blood; he is body and soul. And, strong as the soul often is, it

can not dominate the body to the point where there will not be a

revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of

destruction.

The human heart, to quote Marshal de Saxe, is then the starting point

in all matters pertaining to war.

Let us study the heart, not in modern battle, complicated and not

readily grasped, but in ancient battle. For, although nowhere

explained in detail, ancient battle was simple and clear.

Centuries have not changed human nature. Passions, instincts, among

them the most powerful one of self-preservation, may be manifested in

various ways according to the time, the place, the character and

temperament of the race. Thus in our times we can admire, under the

same conditions of danger, emotion and anguish, the calmness of the

English, the dash of the French, and that inertia of the Russians

which is called tenacity. But at bottom there is always found the same

man. It is this man that we see disposed of by the experts, by the

masters, when they organize and discipline, when they order detailed

combat methods and take general dispositions for action. The best

masters are those who know man best, the man of today and the man of

history. This knowledge naturally comes from a study of formations and

achievements in ancient war.

The development of this work leads us to make such an analysis, and

from a study of combat we may learn to know man.

Let us go even back of ancient battle, to primeval struggle. In

progressing from the savage to our times we shall get a better grasp

of life.

And shall we then know as much as the masters? No more than one is a

painter by having seen the methods of painting. But we shall better

understand these able men and the great examples they have left behind

them.

We shall learn from them to distrust mathematics and material dynamics

as applied to battle principles. We shall learn to beware of the

illusions drawn from the range and the maneuver field.

There, experience is with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive,

obedient soldier, with an intelligent and tractable man-instrument in

short, and not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled,

distrait, excited, restless being, not even under self-control, who is

the fighting man from general to private. There are strong men,

exceptions, but they are rare.

These illusions, nevertheless, stubborn and persistent, always repair

the very next day the most damaging injuries inflicted on them by

experience. Their least dangerous effect is to lead to prescribing the

impractical, as if ordering the impractical were not really an attack

on discipline, and did not result in disconcerting officers and men by

the unexpected and by surprise at the contrast between battle and the

theories of peacetime training.

Battle, of course, always furnishes surprises. But it furnishes less

in proportion as good sense and the recognition of truth have had

their effect on the training of the fighting man, and are disseminated

in the ranks. Let us then study man in battle, for it is he who really

fights.

CHAPTER I

MAN IN PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT COMBAT

Man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does

everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second.

War between savage tribes, between Arabs, even today, [1] is a war of

ambush by small groups of men of which each one, at the moment of

surprise, chooses, not his adversary, but his victim, and is an

assassin. Because the arms are similar on both sides, the only way of

giving the advantage to one side is by surprise. A man surprised,

needs an instant to collect his thoughts and defend himself; during

this instant he is killed if he does not run away.

The surprised adversary does not defend himself, he tries to flee.

Face to face or body to body combat with primitive arms, ax or dagger,

so terrible among enemies without defensive arms, is very rare. It can

take place only between enemies mutually surprised and without a

chance of safety for any one except in victory. And still ... in case

of mutual surprise, there is another chance of safety; that of falling

back, of flight on the part of one or the other; and that chance is

often seized. Here is an example, and if it does not concern savages

at all, but soldiers of our days, the fact is none the less

significant. It was observed by a man of warlike temperament who has

related what he saw with his own eyes, although he was a forced

spectator, held to the spot by a wound.

During the Crimean War, on a day of heavy fighting, two detachments of

soldiers, A and B, coming around one of the mounds of earth that

covered the country and meeting unexpectedly face to face, at ten

paces, stopped thunderstruck. Then, forgetting their rifles, they

threw stones and withdrew. Neither of the two groups had a decided

leader to lead it to the front, and neither of the two dared to shoot

first for fear that the other would at the same time bring his own arm

to his shoulder. They were too near to hope to escape, or so they

thought at least, although in reality, reciprocal firing, at such

short ranges, is almost always too high. The man who would fire sees

himself already killed by the return fire. He throws stones, and not

with great force, to avoid using his rifle, to distract the enemy, to

occupy the time, until flight offers him some chance of escaping at

point-blank range.

This agreeable state of affairs did not last long, a minute perhaps.

The appearance of a troop B on one flank determined the flight of A,

and then the opposing group fired.

Surely, the affair is ridiculous and laughable.

Let us see, however. In a thick forest, a lion and a tiger meet face

to face at a turn in the trail. They stop at once, rearing and ready

to spring. They measure each other with their eyes, there is a

rumbling in their throats. The claws move convulsively, the hair

stands up. With tails lashing the ground, and necks stretched, ears

flattened, lips turned up, they show their formidable fangs in that

terrible threatening grimace of fear characteristic of felines.

Unseen, I shudder.

The situation is disagreeable for both: movement ahead means the death

of a beast. Of which? Of both perhaps.

Slowly, quite slowly, one leg, bent for the leap, bending still, moves

a few inches to the rear. Gently, quite gently, a fore paw follows the

movement. After a stop, slowly, quite slowly, the other legs do the

same, and both beasts, insensibly, little by little, and always

facing, withdraw, up to the moment where their mutual withdrawal has

created between them an interval greater than can be traversed in a

bound. Lion and tiger turn their backs slowly and, without ceasing to

observe, walk freely. They resume without haste their natural gaits,

with that sovereign dignity characteristic of great seigneurs. I have

ceased to shudder, but I do not laugh.

There is no more to laugh at in man in battle, because he has in his

hands a weapon more terrible than the fangs and claws of lion or

tiger, the rifle, which instantly, without possible defense, sends one

from life into death. It is evident that no one close to his enemy is

in a hurry to arm himself, to put into action a force which may kill

him. He is not anxious to light the fuse that is to blow up the enemy,

and himself at the same time.

Who has not observed like instances between dogs, between dog and cat,

cat and cat?

In the Polish War of 1831, two Russian and two Polish regiments of

cavalry charged each other. They went with the same dash to meet one

another. When close enough to recognize faces, these cavalrymen

slackened their gait and both turned their backs. The Russians and

Poles, at this terrible moment, recognized each other as brothers, and

rather than spill fraternal blood, they extricated themselves from a

combat as if it were a crime. That is the version of an eyewitness and

narrator, a Polish officer.

What do you think of cavalry troops so moved by brotherly love?

But let us resume:

When people become more numerous, and when the surprise of an entire

population occupying a vast space is no longer possible, when a sort

of public conscience has been cultivated within society, one is warned

beforehand. War is formally declared. Surprise is no longer the whole

of war, but it remains one of the means in war, the best means, even

to-day. Man can no longer kill his enemy without defense. He has

forewarned him. He must expect to find him standing and in numbers. He

must fight; but he wishes to conquer with as little risk as possible.

He employs the iron shod mace against the staff, arrows against the

mace, the shield against arrows, the shield and cuirass against the

shield alone, the long lance against the short lance, the tempered

sword against the iron sword, the armed chariot against man on foot,

and so on.

Man taxes his ingenuity to be able to kill without running the risk of

being killed. His bravery is born of his strength and it is not

absolute. Before a stronger he flees without shame. The instinct of

self-preservation is so powerful that he does not feel disgraced in

obeying it, although, thanks to the defensive power of arms and armor

he can fight at close quarters. Can you expect him to act in any other

way? Man must test himself before acknowledging a stronger. But once

the stronger is recognized, no one will face him.

Individual strength and valor were supreme in primitive combats, so

much so that when its heroes were killed, the nation was conquered. As

a result of a mutual and tacit understanding, combatants often stopped

fighting to watch with awe and anxiety two champions struggling. Whole

peoples often placed their fate in the hands of the champions who took

up the task and who alone fought. This was perfectly natural. They

counted their champion a superman, and no man can stand against the

superman.

But intelligence rebels against the dominance of force. No one can

stand against an Achilles, but no Achilles can withstand ten enemies

who, uniting their efforts, act in concert. This is the reason for

tactics, which prescribe beforehand proper means of organization and

action to give unanimity to effort, and for discipline which insures

united efforts in spite of the innate weakness of combatants.

In the beginning man battled against man, each one for himself, like a

beast that hunts to kill, yet flees from that which would kill him.

But now prescriptions of discipline and tactics insure unity between

leader and soldier, between the men themselves. Besides the

intellectual progress, is there a moral progress? To secure unity in

combat, to make tactical dispositions in order to render it

practically possible, we must be able to count on the devotion of all.

This elevates all combatants to the level of the champions of

primitive combat. Esprit appears, flight is a disgrace, for one is no

longer alone in combat. There is a legion, and he who gives way quits

his commanders and his companions. In all respects the combatant is

worth more.

So reason shows us the strength of wisely united effort; discipline

makes it possible.

Will the result be terrible fights, conflicts of extermination? No!

Collective man, a disciplined body of troops formed in tactical battle

order, is invincible against an undisciplined body of troops. But

against a similarly disciplined body, he becomes again primitive man.

He flees before a greater force of destruction when he recognizes it

or when he foresees it. Nothing is changed in the heart of man.

Discipline keeps enemies face to face a little longer, but cannot

supplant the instinct of self-preservation and the sense of fear that

goes with it.

Fear!...

There are officers and soldiers who do not know it, but they are

people of rare grit. The mass shudders; because you cannot suppress

the flesh. This trembling must be taken into account in all

organization, discipline, arrangements, movements, maneuvers, mode of

action. All these are affected by the human weakness of the soldier

which causes him to magnify the strength of the enemy.

This faltering is studied in ancient combat. It is seen that of

nations apt in war, the strongest have been those who, not only best

have understood the general conduct of war, but who have taken human

weakness into greatest account and taken the best guarantees against

it. It is notable that the most warlike peoples are not always those

in which military institutions and combat methods are the best or the

most rational.

And indeed, in warlike nations there is a good dose of vanity. They

only take into account courage in their tactics. One might say that

they do not desire to acknowledge weakness.

The Gaul, a fool in war, used barbarian tactics. After the first

surprise, he was always beaten by the Greeks and Romans.

The Greek, a warrior, but also a politician, had tactics far superior

to those of the Gauls and the Asiatics.

The Roman, a politician above all, with whom war was only a means,

wanted perfect means. He had no illusions. He took into account human

weakness and he discovered the legion.

But this is merely affirming what should be demonstrated.