+I. In what cases our anger may be innocently indulged.+--1. On the
approach of any injurious aggressor threatening our destruction, or
using any act of violence that may endanger our safety. 2. How far
soever the harsh gratings of anger may seem to be removed from the
soft motions of benevolence, yet these sometimes, as oil does to
steel, give an edge to our resentment; where it will be found not
only innocent and excusable, but even commendable and generous. As in
the natural system of the world there are some repelling qualities,
which yet must conspire to aid the grand power of attraction; so even
those passions which, considered in a simple view, have but an
unfriendly and unsociable aspect, are yet, in their general
comprehension, aiding and assisting to preserve inviolable the bonds
of the great community. 3. Our anger is apt to kindle at the
apprehension of a slight or an affront, a contempt or reproach thrown
upon us; on which occasions, if the apprehension be well grounded,
our resentment, to a certain degree, must be allowed to be excusable,
and so not sinful. Our tameness in these instances would be construed
into stupidity, and be treated as such by the pert and petulant.
4. We may not only be angry without sinning in the instances alleged,
as we sometimes may sin in not being angry. God, who designed human
society, designed the good of it; and that good to be promoted by
every individual to the utmost of his power. Hereby there is tacitly
committed to every man a kind of trust and guardianship of virtue
whose rights he is obliged to support and maintain in proportion to
his abilities; not only by example, by advice and exhortation, but
even by reproof and resentment, suitable to the circumstances of the
offender and the offence.
+II. When our anger becomes intemperate and unlawful.+--1. When it
breaks out into outrageous actions; for then, like a boisterous wind,
it quite puts out that light which should guide our feet in the way
of peace; it dethrones our reason, and suspends its exercise. An
extravagance of this kind is the more dangerous, and therefore the
more sinful, because, though the impulse of passion should meet with
no opposition to inflame it--which, however, is generally the
case--yet, when it has worked the blood into so violent a ferment, it
is apt of itself to redouble its force. And no one can tell what
fury, wound up to the highest pitch, may produce. 2. Anger becomes
unlawful when it vents itself in unseemly and reviling language. It
were to be wished that those who have such a peculiar delicacy of
feeling when they are affronted would abstain from all appearance of
an affrontive and disrespectful behaviour to others; that they who
are so quick to receive would be as slow to give an affront. On the
contrary it often happens that they only feel for themselves; they
are not the least sensible of the indignities offered to others. How
frequently do those who are highly enraged pass a general and
undistinguishing censure upon a man's character? 3. We are not always
to judge of the sinfulness of anger from the open and undignified
appearance of it, either in our words or actions; it may be concealed
and treasured up in our thoughts, and yet retain as much malignity as
when it immediately breaks out and discovers itself in contumelious
language or acts of violence. For by brooding in the mind it becomes
the parent of a very untoward issue, malice, and hatred. Malice is a
cool and deliberate resentment; but sometimes more keen and
malevolent than that which is rash and precipitate. It is like a
massive stone, slowly raised, but threatening the greater danger to
him on whom it shall fall. Anger is yet sinful when encouraged in our
thoughts to the degree of hatred.
+III. Consider its opposite virtue, meekness.+--Meekness, is, as
Aristotle long ago defined it, a due mean between tameness and
stupidity on the one hand, and rage and fury on the other. It is not
absolute freedom from passion, but such a command over it as to
prevent our being transported beyond the bounds of humanity and good
sense. It is this virtue which, if it does not give a man such a
glaring and shining figure as some other good qualities, yet
constitutes the most lovely, beautiful, and agreeable character, and
gains unenvied praise. 1. A meek man will have sense enough to know
when he is injured, and spirit enough to resent it; but then he will
consider whether he can do more good by openly resenting the offence
and punishing the offender than by overlooking it and passing it by.
2. A man of meek temper will distinguish between a man's general
standing sentiments when he is perfectly calm and undisturbed and his
occasional sentiments when his spirits are ruffled and overheated.
3. A meek man will never be angry with a person for telling him what
he imagines to be a fault in him, provided it be done in a private
manner, and the advice be conveyed in the most palatable vehicle.
4. A man of a meek spirit is glad to be reconciled to the person who
has offended or injured him, and therefore is ready to hearken to all
overtures of accommodation. A meek man will show such an inclination
and readiness to forgive the offences of others as if he had
perpetual need of the same indulgence, but will so carefully avoid
giving the least offence as if it might be thought he would forgive
nobody.
+Lessons.+--1. Let us endeavour to acquire a greatness of mind: by
this I do not mean arrogance, for that bespeaks a little mind--a mind
that can reflect on nothing within itself that looks great except
arrogance; but a true greatness of mind arises from a true judgment
of things, and a noble ascendency of the soul inclining us to act
above what is barely our duty. It is rising to the sublime in virtue.
This will create a reverence for ourselves, and will set us as far
above the mean gratification of giving any real occasion of passion
to others, as of being susceptible of it when an occasion may be
given to us. 2. One of the ancients said that he had gained one
advantage from philosophy: that it had brought him to wonder at
nothing. But it looks as if we, the generality of us, were strangers
in the world; we are ever expressing our surprise and wonder at
everything; and thus surprise prepares the way for passion. We wonder
that we should meet with such a behaviour, such a treatment, such an
affront; whereas the greatest wonder is that we should wonder at it.
3. Nothing can have so prevalent a power to still all the undue
agitations of passion so apt to arise from the various connections we
have with the prejudices and passions of others, nothing so fit to
induce a smooth and easy flow of temper, as a frequent application to
the throne of grace, to beseech Him, who is the God of Peace, that
His peace may rule in our heats, that it may be the fixed and
predominant principle there.--_Jeremiah Seed._