the lowest of a sequence, notwithstanding that it heads your suit,
when you want him to win your card if he can. For this reason you lead
ten from king, queen, knave, ten; ace, knave from ace, queen, knave,
and at least two small cards; and so on. In this last case, if your
partner has king, whether he should put it on your knave, or not,
depends on how many small cards of the suit he holds. If, when you lead
knave, he remains with king and one small one, he should win the knave
with the king; but if he has king and two small ones remaining, he
should pass the knave, for precisely the same reasons as those given in
the previous examples. Again, suppose you are left with knave, ten, and
others of a suit, of which your partner can only have king and another
(ace and queen being out), though it is uncertain whether he does hold
the king. You would cause him to get rid of the king by leading the
ten; whereas, if you led the knave, he probably would not part with the
king.
Experienced players frequently endeavour to steal a trick, or to
obtain the entire command of a suit (_i.e._, to keep a sufficient
number of winning or commanding cards in it to make every trick), by
_underplaying_. Underplay is keeping up the winning card, generally in
the second round of a suit, by leading a low card, though holding the
best.
Thus, suppose a small trump is led, and you (fourth player) hold ace,
knave, and two small ones, and you win with one of the small ones. If,
at a later period of the hand, you return a small trump, you will very
likely cause your left-hand adversary to believe that your partner has
the ace; consequently, if your left-hand adversary has the king, he may
not put it on; your partner will win the second round with the queen,
and you will retain the command of the trump suit.
Underplay is an extempore stratagem depending on observation of the
previous fall of the cards, and, therefore, best capable of explanation
by examples. Thus: A, finding his partner strong in trumps, leads the
seven. The king is put on by Y (second hand), which B (third hand)
wins, holding ace, queen, ten, nine, eight. It is evident to B that A's
seven was his highest trump, as the only higher one in is the knave,
and A would never lead the seven from knave, seven. The king having
been put on second hand, B concludes that Y, in all probability, holds
at most one small trump more. The knave is, to a moral certainty, in
Z's hand. B, by leading the eight in the second round, will probably
win the trick, and unless Z had four trumps originally, will catch the
knave with the queen in the third round. (Further examples of underplay
occur in the hands.)
Players should be on their guard against this manœuvre, particularly
when second hand, in the second round of a suit, they hold the second
best card guarded, and the adversary has been playing a strong game (as
by leading trumps), and is left with the long trump, or is certain to
be able to obtain the lead again. Then it is often right for the second
hand to stick on a singly-guarded second best card, especially if that
is the only chance of making it. In the case stated in the previous
paragraph, Z's only chance of making the knave, if singly guarded, is
to put it on second hand. For, if the queen with small ones is in A's
hand, A is sure to finesse on the return of the suit by his partner.
Again, take this case: A leads the six of diamonds; Y, with knave, ten,
and a small one, puts on the ten; B plays the king, and Z wins it with
the ace. Presently, A obtains the lead again, and leads the eight of
diamonds. A, having led the lowest of his suit in the first round, it
may be inferred that he has led from a strong suit--headed in this case
by the queen--and that he is underplaying with, probably, queen and
nine in his hand. Y should observe this, and in the second round should
win the eight with the knave.
Refusing to play the winning card in the first and second rounds
of a suit--commonly called _holding up_--is, in fact, a species of
underplay. For example:--1. Trumps are led by the player to your left;
the third player wins with the ace, and returns the suit through your
hand. If you are left with king and one or more small ones, you should
play a small one, unless the circumstances of the hand are such that
you deem it advantageous to stop the trump lead. The original trump
leader, not knowing but that the king is in your partner's hand, will
probably finesse, and your partner thus has a chance of making the
third best trump, even though unguarded. If your partner has neither
second nor third best trump, no harm is done, as you will then probably
make but one trick in the suit, however you play. 2. Again, ten tricks
are played, and each player is left with three cards of a suit not
opened. If the second player puts on the queen (from which it may
be inferred that he holds the king also), the third hand should not
cover with the ace. For, by winning the trick, he must lead up to king
guarded; but, by passing it, he leaves the lead with the second player,
and takes the best chance of making two tricks. 3. One more example
will suffice: A has the last trump, and ace, ten, and three small cards
of a suit not led. The adversary now leads the king, and follows with
the queen of that suit. A should pass them both; by so doing he will
probably make three tricks in the suit if the cards are equally divided.
DISCARDING.
When you cannot follow suit, you should
11. DISCARD FROM YOUR WEAKEST SUIT.
You weaken a suit by discarding from it, and lessen the number of long
cards you might otherwise establish and bring in (_i.e._, make tricks
with if trumps are out, and you obtain the lead after the establishment
of your suit). On the other hand, you do but little harm by throwing
from a suit in which you are already weak. Your partner should
understand that your first or _original discard_ is from your _weakest
suit_, just as he understands that your original lead is from your
strongest suit.
But, as in the case of leads, you are sometimes obliged to lead from
a weak suit, or to make a forced lead, so sometimes you have to
make a _forced discard_. Forced discards require much more careful
consideration than they generally receive.
It is clear that if the opponents declare great strength in trumps
(by leading trumps or asking for them, as will be fully explained in
Section 13), that your chance of bringing in a suit is practically
_nil_. You should therefore, in such cases, abandon the tactics
you would otherwise adopt, and play to guard your weaker suits, by
discarding from your best protected suit, which is generally your
longest suit. You must, in fact, play a defensive game.
If this system of discarding is comprehended by the two players who
are partners, it follows, as a matter of course, that _when trumps are
not declared against you, your partner will assume you are weak in the
suit you first discard_; but, _when trumps are declared against you, he
will give you credit for strength in the suit from which you originally
throw away_. This is most important, as it affects his subsequent
leads. In the first case, he will refrain from leading the suit from
which you have discarded; in the second, he will, unless he has a very
strong suit of his own, select for his lead the suit in which you have
shown strength by your discard.
It is commonly said, "Discard from your strong suit when the adversary
leads or calls for trumps." But this is a very imperfect and
misleading aphorism. If you have no indications from the play, and
are obliged to discard to an adverse trump lead or call, you should
discard from your best protected suit. But, if you have, or if the
fall of the cards shows that your partner has, sufficient strength in
trumps to outlast the adversary, the discard should be from the weak
suit. Thus: Y, second player, calls for trumps (_see_ p. 125), and B,
third player, also calls. The discards of A and Z should be from their
weak suits. For though, on the one hand, great strength in trumps
is declared against them, on the other hand great strength is also
declared with them. Again: Z deals and turns up nine of clubs. A (the
original leader) leads a small club; Y follows suit; B puts on ace;
Z plays king. This shows that Z has a sequence of queen, knave, ten,
nine of trumps; and therefore that, though A has led a trump, he has
anything but the command of the suit. B returns the trump; Z wins; Y
has no more trumps. His discard should be from his weakest suit. The
following case is less easy:--The adversary (A) leads a tierce major in
trumps, eleven trumps come out, and your partner (Y) must have knave of
trumps to save the game. You now credit your partner with the command
of trumps, though the adversary has led them; and if either you (Y) or
your partner (Z) has to discard, the discard should be from the weakest
suit (_see_ Hand XII.) Similar remarks apply if a strengthening trump
is led by an adversary from weak trumps and good cards in plain suits.
It must be borne in mind that it is only your original discard which
is directive. Having once discarded, you cannot undo your work by any
number of discards from another suit. Also, having once led a suit, you
have declared strength in it; and subsequent discards from that suit do
not alter the fact that it was originally your strongest suit.
It is dangerous to unguard an honour, or to blank an ace; and, also,
to discard a single card when the game is in an undeveloped stage,
as it exposes your weakness almost as soon as the suit is led. But,
when you see that there is a probability of strength in trumps on your
side, direct your partner to your strong suit by all the means in your
power, and unhesitatingly unguard an honour, or throw a single card. Of
course, if strength in trumps is against you, these are the very last
cards you should think of throwing away.
When your left-hand adversary will have the lead next round, if you
discard from a suit in which you hold a tenace, you may possibly induce
him to lead that suit up to you. You must be on your guard against this
ruse, and not necessarily lead up to the discard of your right-hand
opponent.
The same principle applies to trumping as to discarding. The weaker
you are in trumps, the better it is for you to make a little one by
trumping, as will be further explained in Section 14.
THE CONVERSATION OF THE GAME.
12. AFFORD INFORMATION BY YOUR PLAY.
It has several times been assumed in the preceding pages that you
should convey information by your play. The question naturally arises,
_How is it that a player gains any advantage by publishing information
to the table?_ It is often argued, and with much show of reason, that
as almost every revelation concerning your hand must be given to the
whole table, and that as you have two adversaries and only one partner,
you publish information at a disadvantage. No doubt this argument would
have considerable force if you were compelled to expose the whole of
your hand. But you possess the power, to a great extent, of selecting
what facts shall be announced and what concealed.
Experienced players are unanimous in admitting that it is an advantage
to inform your partner of strength in your own suits, though some
advise concealment of strength in suits in which the adversaries have
shown strength. Thus, with ace, king, second hand, the usual play is
to put on the king. The third hand does not win the king, and hence
the leader is able to infer that the ace of his strong suit is against
him. But, if you put on the ace second hand, you prevent the leader
from discovering where the king of his suit lies. It is, however, found
that two honours in the adversary's suit constitute sufficient strength
to make it advantageous in the long run to proclaim your force;
while, with less strength, it is not easy to mystify the opponents
prejudicially; so that, on the whole, it seldom happens that a balance
of gain results from the adoption of deceptive play.
Occasionally, however, a false card may be played with a special
object. For instance: ace is turned up to your right, and, when the
dealer gets in, he leads a small trump. If you, second hand, have king,
queen only, you would be justified in playing the king, in hopes of
inducing the trump leader to finesse on the return of the suit. Or,
take this case: your left-hand adversary leads originally the five of
his strong suit, from king, ten, seven, five. Your partner plays the
six; third hand plays ace. You, holding queen, knave, nine, eight,
four, three, play the three. Your right-hand opponent now leads trumps;
all the trumps come out. The player to your right next returns the
deuce of his partner's suit. The original lead being from a four-card
suit, king, ten, seven, remain in the leader's hand. If you play knave,
the original leader will place queen in your hand, and will hesitate
to go on with the suit. But, if you play queen, he will put knave and
at least one small one in his partner's hand. Then if, under this
impression, he continues the suit, you bring it in.
It is in most cases unquestionably disadvantageous to you that the
whole table should be aware of your being very weak in a particular
suit, and, consequently, information of weakness should be withheld as
long as possible. If you are led up to fourth hand in such a suit,
or if your partner opens the suit with a small card, of course the
disclosure is inevitable; but until one of these events happens your
poverty can generally be kept out of sight. It may happen that you are
occasionally forced to lead a weak suit yourself; and in this event
the least disadvantage, on the whole, is to tell the truth at once, by
first leading the highest of it. Your partner apprised of the state of
your hand, by the fall of your smaller card in the subsequent round,
will probably deem it prudent to strive by defensive tactics to avert
total defeat in that suit, rather than to contend single-handed against
the combined strength of the opponents. But, at critical points of the
game, it is often right to conceal weakness. Thus, towards the end of a
hand, it is necessary that your partner should make a couple of tricks
in an unopened suit, of which you hold two or three little cards. You
should lead the lowest. If you lead the highest, the adversaries will
suspect your weakness at once, and will be sure of it on the second
round. Their efforts will then be directed to preventing your partner
from making the required tricks in that suit. Your left-hand adversary
will not finesse; and if your partner is led through, your right-hand
adversary merely covers, or plays the lowest card he has, higher than
the one you first led.
When your partner has exhibited weakness in one or more suits, you
would frequently be justified in playing a false card. You are driven
to rely solely on yourself, and are entitled to adopt every artifice
your ingenuity can suggest in order to perplex the other side.
The consideration that you may mislead your partner will no longer
influence you, as you know him to be powerless for good or for evil.
You inform your partner by following the recognised practice of the
game, as by leading from your strong suit originally, by leading the
highest of a sequence, by following suit with the lowest of a sequence,
and so forth. If you adhere to this you will soon acquire a reputation
for playing a straightforward intelligible game; and this character
alone will counterbalance the disadvantage which will sometimes attach
to the fact that you have enabled the adversaries to read your hand. If
your partner knows that you play at random and without method, he will
be in a state of constant uncertainty; and you almost preclude him from
executing any of the finer strokes of play, the opportunities for which
generally arise from being able to infer with confidence the position
of particular cards. The extreme case of two skilled players against
two unskilled ones amounts almost to this, that towards the close of a
hand the former have the same advantage as though they had seen each
other's cards, while the latter have not.
It follows that when you are unfortunately tied to an untaught partner,
especially if at the same time you are pitted against observant
adversaries, you should expose your hand as little as possible,
particularly in respect of minor details.
It will become apparent, on consideration, that the question of the
advisability of affording information is more or less intimately
connected with every card that is played. It is, therefore, of extreme
importance to ascertain whether the practice is advantageous or the
reverse. The arguments just adduced are doubtless in favour of the
practice of affording information by the play; but it must be admitted
that by far the strongest authority for it is that experienced players,
by their settled opinions, reject the opposite course.
The instructed player frequently selects one card in preference to
another with the _sole_ object of affording information. When the
principle is carried thus far, the play becomes purely conventional.
For example: you naturally win a trick as cheaply as possible; if,
fourth hand, you could win with a ten, you would not waste an ace.
But suppose you hold knave and ten, which card should then be played?
The knave and ten in one hand are of equal value, and therefore to
win with the knave would be no unnecessary sacrifice of strength.
Nevertheless, you extend to such cases the rule of winning as cheaply
as possible, and you play the ten for the mere purpose of conveying
information. This is a simple instance of pure convention. Again: the
system of returning the higher of two losing cards (_see_ p. 80) when
they are both small cards, is purely conventional. To take another
case: after two rounds of your four-card suit, you are left with two
losing cards, say the six and the seven, and you, having the lead, are
about to continue the suit; you should lead the six, not the seven,
in accordance with the rule that you lead the lowest card of a suit,
except with commanding strength. This being the convention, if you lead
the seven, your partner will infer that you cannot hold the six, and
will suppose that you led from a three-card suit, in consequence of
exceptional circumstances; if he is a good player he will miscount all
the hands, probably to your mutual discomfiture.
Whist conventions, it will be observed, are in accordance with, and are
suggested by, principle. Indeed, all the established conventions of the
game are so chosen as to harmonise with play that would naturally be
adopted independently of convention. The aggregation of the recognised
rules of play, including the established conventions, constitute what
in practice is called the Conversation of the Game of Whist.
It must not be overlooked that unsound players often deceive
unintentionally, and all players sometimes with intention. It is,
therefore, necessary to be on your guard against drawing inferences too
rigidly.
There are some ways of conveying information which have not been
explained. For example: if you have the complete command of a suit, you
can publish the fact by discarding the highest of it; the presumption
being that you would never throw away a winning card with a losing one
in your hand. If you discard a second-best card of a suit of which
your partner does not know you to hold a long sequence, you ought to
have no more of the suit, for with the best also you would discard
that, and with a smaller one you would discard that. By winning with
the highest, and returning the lowest of a sequence (more especially
fourth hand), you show that you have the intermediate cards. Thus, with
ace, king, queen, fourth hand, if you desire to continue the suit,
and at the same time to show that you still remain with the winning
card, you would win with the ace and return the queen. Again, as long
as you keep the turn-up card in hand, your partner knows where it is;
so, having turned up a nine and holding the ten, trump with the ten
in preference. This rule, however, is liable to exceptions. With very
small trumps, of equal value, trumping with the higher card may be
mistaken for an exhibition of four or five trumps; also, if you are
weak in trumps, and the adversaries have shown strength in them, it is
not advisable to keep the turn-up card; for, if the adversaries know
you have it in your hand, they will draw it, whereas, if you play it,
they may be uncertain as to your holding another. If you open a suit
of ace, king only, it must be a forced lead. You then adopt the rule
of leading the highest of a numerically weak suit, and first lead the
ace. This shows your partner (unless you have already been forced, when
you lead the ace before king for other reasons), that you have no more
of the suit. Also, by leading the lowest of a head sequence of winning
trumps (subject, if an American Leader, to a selection of card in order
to show number), you convey information. Thus, you lead a small trump,
partner plays queen, won with king. You remain with ace, knave, ten. On
obtaining the lead, you continue with the ten, and, when it wins, you
have shown two by honours (unless ace is held up, which is unlikely).
If you continue with ace, as in plain suits, your partner can tell
nothing about the knave and ten. You may pursue the same method in
plain suits when your partner has no more trumps, and with any head
sequence when you want him to win the trick, or are sure he cannot, and
also when the fourth hand has already renounced in the suit led.
A most valuable mode of conveying very precise information of strength
is within the reach of players who think fit to adopt _American Leads_
(_see_ Appendix A). As the propriety of these leads is questioned by
some players, it may be stated that they form a beautiful system which
is in full harmony with the established principles of whist play.
With regard to the American system when leading a high card of your
strong suit after a high card, no one disputes the propriety of leading
ace, then queen, from ace, queen, knave, and one small card; and of
leading ace, then knave, from ace, queen, knave, and more than one
small card. In the case of the four-card suit, you select the higher
card to tell your partner not to play the king, as you have not
sufficient numerical power to defend the suit single-handed. In the
case of a suit of more than four cards, you select the lower card that
your partner may not retain the command of your suit, and may play the
king, should he happen to have held king and two small ones originally.
For a similar reason, it is obvious that with queen, knave, ten, and
one small card, you should follow queen with knave; with queen, knave,
ten, and more than one small card, you should follow queen with ten.
Now, here is a germ of a principle of play. Holding two high
indifferent cards, and only four of your suit, your second lead is the
higher card; holding more than four, your second lead is the lower card.
For the sake of uniformity, you should pursue the same plan in
all cases where, after your first lead, you remain with two high
indifferent cards. Thus, your original lead is a ten, from king, knave,
ten, and one or more small cards. The queen is played to your ten.
You have the lead again, and it is immaterial, so far as establishing
the suit is concerned, whether you proceed with the king or with the
knave. But, if your practice is uniform, and in accordance with the
practice which obtains in the case of ace, queen, knave, and of queen,
knave, ten, you can inform your partner whether you led from a suit of
four cards or of more than four cards. If you continue with the king,
the higher of two indifferent cards, you led from king, knave, ten,
and one small card; if you continue with the knave, the lower of two
indifferent cards, you led from king, knave, ten, and more than one
small card.
With regard to the American system, when opening your strong suit with
a low card, those who have already adopted the _penultimate lead_ from
suits of five cards, will have no difficulty in again discovering the
germ of a principle of play. The fourth-best card of your suit is led
from suits of four cards, and from suits of five cards.
You have only to apply the same rule to suits of more than five cards,
and to lead your fourth-best card. You then pursue a uniform practice,
and at the same time convey valuable information. (_See_ Appendix A).
As an illustration, take this suit--queen, ten, nine, eight. You lead
the eight. Now suppose your suit to be queen, ten, nine, eight, three.
You still lead the eight. Now add one more card. Your suit is queen,
ten, nine, eight, three, two. You should still lead the eight. No
doubt, a careful player would lead the eight, as a card of protection,
even if American leads had never been thought of. With lower cards,
such as queen, nine, eight, seven, three, two, it is possible a careful
player might lead the seven; and with still lower cards, where is he to
stop? The knot is cut by the very simple and uniform rule of leading
the fourth-best, without reference to the possibility of its being a
card of protection.
With regard to the lead of a high card followed by a low card, when
the American system is followed, the low card selected should be the
original fourth-best. (_See_ Appendix A).
The more the American system is examined, the more thorough and perfect
it will be found. Care, however, must be taken, with leads late in
a hand, not to confuse a fourth-best lead with a forced lead of the
highest card of a weak suit. The American rule only applies, in its
integrity to the original lead,--or after one or more tricks have
been played, to the original lead of the player's own choice, (_See_
Appendix A). Also, it may be, that the leader, with very strong cards
in all plain suits, starts by leading a strengthening trump. The
uncertainty of the real character of the lead, in this case, is no
doubt unfavourable; but, the advantage of frequently being able to give
information of great numerical strength far outweighs this occasional
danger.
Information as to the number of trumps you hold can be similarly
communicated when you have more than four trumps, by trumping with
the fourth-best and then leading the fourth-best of those remaining.
This rule, however, is subject to rather a large exception. When your
fourth-best trump is a medium card, such as an eight, trumping with the
eight may imperil a trick later on. For instance: with such cards as
king, knave, nine, eight, three, a careful player would rightly trump
with the three and lead the eight. For the time, you do not inform
your partner as to number, because the eight is too valuable a card to
get rid of, and the information might be purchased too dearly. Also,
when about to lead high trumps after a force, there is no occasion to
run any risk by trumping with any but the lowest, as the high cards
led will of themselves indicate how many trumps you now hold (not how
many you held originally). If you take a force with any trump but the
lowest, and do not lead a trump, when your lowest is afterwards played
it only signifies that you had at least five trumps originally, and
your play does not constitute a call for trumps. (_See_ p. 125.)
TRUMPS.
THE MANAGEMENT OF TRUMPS.
The Management of Trumps is, perhaps, the most difficult of the
problems presented to the Whist-player. Before discussing the special
uses of trumps, it may be observed that in some few hands trumps are
led like plain suits, because they are your strongest suit, and you
prefer leading them to opening a weak suit. The principles already
discussed, which guide us to the most favourable chances for making
tricks in a suit, apply to trumps equally with other suits. The
privilege, however, enjoyed by the trump suit of winning every other,
causes some modifications of detail (noticed at pp. 64-71, and at pp.
85-88); for, since the winning trumps _must_ make tricks, you play a
more backward game in the trump suit. Thus, with ace, king, and small
trumps, you lead a small one, by which you obtain an increased chance
of making tricks in the suit, and you keep the command of it, and must
have the lead after the third round, the advantage of which will be
presently explained. Even if your partner is so weak in trumps that the
opponent wins the first trick very cheaply, but little (if any) harm
accrues; for the opponent then has to open a suit up to you or your
partner.
In the great majority of hands, trumps are applied to their special
uses, viz.: 1. To disarm the opponents, and to prevent their trumping
your winning-cards; and 2. To trump the winning cards of the
adversaries. In order to comprehend when trumps may be most profitably
applied to the first, and when to the second, of these uses, we must
first clearly perceive the objects aimed at throughout the hand, viz.:
to establish a suit, to exhaust the adversaries' trumps, and to retain
the long trump, or a certain winning card with which to get the lead
again, for the purpose of bringing in the suit; also to endeavour to
obstruct similar designs of the opponents. It follows that you should
13. LEAD TRUMPS WHEN VERY STRONG IN THEM.
It cannot be too strongly impressed that _the primary use of strength
in trumps is to draw the adversaries' trumps for the bringing in of
your own or your partner's long suit_. With great strength in trumps
(five or more), you may proceed at once to disarm the opponents, and
lead trumps without waiting to establish a suit. For, with five trumps
or more, the chance of your succeeding in drawing the other trumps,
and of being left with the long trumps is so considerable, that you
may then almost always lead trumps, whatever your other cards. The
exceptional hands are principally those which contain five trumps
without an honour, and five small cards of a plain suit; or five trumps
without an honour, and four middling cards of one plain suit together
with four bad cards of another plain suit. But if the adversaries are
at the score of three, you should lead a trump with these hands, as
your partner must have two honours, or very good cards out of trumps,
for you to save the game.
If you are at the score of three, the adversaries being love, one, or
two, you should not lead a trump merely because you have five trumps
with two honours, if they are unaccompanied by a very strong suit, or
by good cards in each suit. For here, if your partner has an honour,
you probably win the game in any case; and if he has no honour you open
the trump suit to a disadvantage. Some good players, however, do not
allow this to be an exceptional case. The turn-up card may sometimes
cause you to refrain from leading trumps from five. Thus: you have
king, ten, nine, six, and four of spades (trumps); ace, queen, and
three small diamonds; and three small hearts. You are four, and the
ace of spades is turned up. In the opinion of most players, the ace of
diamonds is the best original lead; but, if an ace were not turned up,
you should lead a trump.
It is often said, even by pretty good players, "Strength in trumps is
no reason for leading them, unless you have a good suit as well." If
both you and your partner are devoid of good cards you cannot make
tricks; but should your partner hold one good suit out of the three,
you will very likely bring it in for him by leading from strength in
trumps. For, even if you have a poor hand out of trumps, you will
discover in the course of play (_i.e._, by the suits led or discarded
by the other players), what your partner's suit is, and will be able
to lead it to him each time you get the lead with your long trumps.
Besides, if your hand is weak out of trumps, you are placed in the
disadvantageous position of leading from a weak suit unless you lead
trumps.
You should not be deterred from leading trumps because an honour is
turned up to your right, nor necessarily lead them because the same
happens to your left; either is proper if the circumstances of the hand
require it, but neither otherwise. To illustrate this proposition, take
this hand: ace, queen, and three small spades (trumps), three small
hearts, three small clubs, and two small diamonds. The king of spades
is turned up fourth hand. The best lead is disputed; but the author has
no hesitation in advising the lead of a small trump, notwithstanding
that there is a certain finesse over the king. A little consideration
will render this apparent. By leading the trump suit originally, you
obtain the advantages just enumerated, and make the dealer open a suit
up to your partner. Your partner, as soon as he gets the lead, will
return the trump, and you thus obtain the command of trumps whether the
king was forced out in the first round or not.
Bearing in mind the severe consequences of leaving the adversary with
the long trump, you must be cautious in leading trumps from less than
five; four trumps and a moderate hand not justifying an original trump
lead. You should, instead, lead your strong plain suit, and if you
establish it, and the adversaries do not meantime show any great
strength, as by leading or calling for trumps (pp. 125-127), you may
then, with four trumps, mostly venture a trump lead. With strength
in trumps you may generally finesse more freely in the second and
third rounds of trumps than you would in plain suits. In plain suits
an unsuccessful finesse may result in the best card being afterwards
trumped, which cannot happen in trumps. Moreover, by finessing, you
keep the winning trump, and so obtain the lead after the third round.
This is especially important when you have a suit established and but
four trumps. Here you should, generally, not merely finesse in the
second round, but hold up the winning trump, and sometimes at this
juncture refuse to part with it even if the trump lead comes from the
adversary.
An example will render this more clear. The leader (A) has ace, and
three small trumps, a strong suit, headed by ace, king, queen, and a
probable trick, say king and another, in a third suit. A should, in
the writer's judgment, lead a trump. If B (A's partner) wins the first
trick in trumps, and returns a strengthening trump, A, as a rule,
should not part with his ace. When A or B obtain the lead again they
play a third round of trumps, which, being won by the ace, enables A,
by leading his tierce major, to get a force (_i.e._, to compel one of
his adversaries to trump in order to win the trick), in which case
nothing short of five trumps in one hand against him can prevent A's
bringing in his suit. You must be prepared for similar tactics on the
part of the adversaries, and not conclude that they have not the best
trump because they suffer you to win the first or second round.
With a well protected hand containing four trumps, two being honours,
a trump may be led originally. For here the chance of gaining by the
trump lead may be taken as greater than the chance of losing. Thus with
queen, knave, and two small trumps, a four suit with an honour, say
for example, knave, ten, nine, and a small one, king guarded in the
third suit, and queen guarded in the fourth, a small trump if it finds
partner with an honour is by no means unlikely to win the game. If
partner turns out very weak in trumps the leader must alter his plan,
and, instead of continuing the trump lead, play to make three, five or
seven tricks according to the fall of the cards in plain suits.
Trump leads, without strength in trumps, can only be right in
consequence of some special circumstance in the state of the game, or
of the score. For instance, great commanding strength in all the plain
suits may call for a trump lead; or it may be necessitated to stop a
_cross-ruff_ (_i.e._, the alternate trumping by partners of different
suits, each leading the suit in which the other renounces), in which
case it is generally advisable to take out two rounds if possible;
so with the winning trump you play it out, whatever your others are.
Again, if you have a wretched hand and you are love to three or four,
you assume that the game is lost, unless your partner is very strong;
and if he _is_ very strong, the trump is the best lead for him. This
doctrine is frequently carried to excess, as, by concealing your
weakness, you often stand a better chance of saving a point, if not
the game, than by at once exposing it. If, therefore, you have one four
suit, headed by an honour, you would generally do better to choose that.
The trump lead is so much more important than any other that you should
almost always return your partner's lead of trumps _immediately_,
except he has led from weakness, when you are not bound to return it
unless it suits your hand.
If you find one of the adversaries without a trump, you should mostly
proceed to establish your long suit, and abstain from drawing two
trumps for one; to say nothing of the probability that the adversary
who has not renounced is unusually strong in trumps. Besides, when he
has the lead, he will very likely lead trumps in order to draw two for
one; and it is more advantageous to you that the lead should come from
him. On the other hand, if your partner has no trump, it is often right
to endeavour to weaken the adversaries by continuing even their trump
lead.
It is a common artifice, if you wish a trump to be led, to drop a high
card to the adversary's lead, to induce him to believe that you will
trump it next round, whereupon the leader will very likely change the
suit, and perhaps lead trumps. Thus, if he leads king (from ace, king,
and others), and you hold queen and one other, it is evident that you
cannot make the queen. If you throw the queen to his king, he may lead
a trump to prevent your trumping his ace; but if he goes on with the
suit, and you drop your small card, it may fairly be inferred that you
have been endeavouring to get him to lead a trump. Your partner should
now take the hint, and, if he gets the lead, lead trumps; for if you
want them led, it is of little consequence from whom the lead comes. By
a conventional extension of this system to lower cards it is understood
that, whenever you throw away an _unnecessarily_ high card, it is a
sign (after the smaller card drops) that you want trumps led. This is
called _asking for trumps_ or _calling for trumps_.
When you ask for trumps, you command your partner to abandon his own
game, and to lead a trump; and you promise him, in return, if he has
reasonably good cards, either to win the game or to make a considerable
score. It has been laid down, that the minimum strength in trumps which
justifies you in issuing such an order to your partner is four trumps,
two being honours, or five trumps, one being an honour, accompanied by
such cards in your own or your partner's suits that you are reasonably
secure of not having a suit brought in against you. This rule, however,
only applies to an _original_ ask. If you have had the lead, and have
not led a trump, or if you have had an opportunity of asking and have
not asked, and you then ask for trumps at a later period of the hand,
the ask is not a command, like an original one, nor does it necessarily
imply the possession of the minimum strength above stated. It merely
means that, from the fall of the cards, you consider a trump lead would
be very advantageous. For example: you hold ace and a small spade;
king, ten, and two small hearts (trumps); queen and two small clubs;
and knave, ten and two other diamonds. You lead a small diamond; your
partner plays the queen; the fourth hand plays the ace. A small club is
now led through you. You should ask for trumps.
When your partner asks for trumps, and you have four or more at the
time you obtain the lead, lead the smallest, unless you have the ace,
or three honours, or queen, knave, ten; if you have only two or three
trumps when you obtain the lead, lead from the highest downwards,
whatever they are.
Before answering the ask, be sure that the higher card, previously
dropped, is _unnecessarily_ high. For instance a higher card is often
played before a lower, to show that you command the suit, or that you
hold the intermediate cards, or to get out of your partner's way. It
is very important to distinguish between covering second hand and
discarding an unnecessarily high card. For example: with knave, ten,
and one other (say the three), it is usual to play the ten second
hand on a small card. When your three comes down in the next round,
it is not an ask for trumps, unless your partner can infer that you
do not hold the knave. Moderate players, who know of the ask, never
consider this; so with them the choice of the least evil is generally
not to cover, for you otherwise run the terrible risk of having a
strengthening trump led to you with a weak hand. To ask for trumps,
second hand, with knave, ten, and one other, you must play the knave.
When your partner leads a trump, or asks for trumps, if you have
numerical strength in trumps, you should ask at the first opportunity.
This is called the _echo of the call_, though it is made use of also in
response to a lead.
The advantages of the echo are manifold. Your partner being strong in
trumps may hesitate to take a force, but your echo enables him to do so
without fear, and to persevere with the trump lead. Or, your partner
may be in doubt after the second round of trumps as to the policy of
playing a third. But if he can count two more trumps in your hand he
will be directed. Thus: eight are out, your partner has three more; you
have echoed. He will know that the other two are in your hand, and will
not draw two for none, as without the echo, he might do.
The negative advantage of the echo should not be overlooked. Thus:
to take the same case of eight trumps being out, and the leader with
three more trumps. You (his partner) have had the chance of sounding an
echo, but have not done so. The leader knows that you have not both the
remaining trumps, and he will regulate his game accordingly.
To your partner's trump lead you echo in the trump suit; the same if
partner calls, and you are forced. Thus: you have eight, seven, five,
two of trumps; your left-hand adversary leads king, ace of a suit of
which you only hold one. Your partner calls. You echo, by trumping with
the five, and you then lead the eight. On the second round of trumps,
when your deuce falls, the echo is completed. Your partner knows that
you have one more trump, either the six or the seven. If you had not
echoed, he might not be able to tell for certain whether you hold
another trump or not. (_See_ Hands XXXIV., XXXV.)
If you have four trumps and are forced, and your partner then leads or
asks for trumps, you should echo, notwithstanding that you no longer
have numerical strength. This case can best be illustrated by an
example. (_See_ Hand XXXVI.)
* * * * *
The use of strength in trumps being to disarm the opponents, it follows
that you should as much as possible husband your strength for that
purpose. Therefore when second player,
14. DO NOT TRUMP A DOUBTFUL CARD IF STRONG IN TRUMPS.
By a doubtful card is meant a card of a suit of which your partner
_may_ have the best.
Whether you should trump or refuse to trump a doubtful card depends
almost entirely on your strength in trumps. It has already been
mentioned that it is an advantage to trump when you are weak, for you
thus make a little trump, which is not available for the other uses of
trumps, and which, if not used for trumping, will presently be drawn by
the strong hand. It is conversely a disadvantage to trump a doubtful
card when you are strong in trumps, for by trumping you weaken your
numerical power, and diminish the probability of your bringing in a
suit. If, instead of trumping, you throw away a losing card, you inform
your partner that you have strength in trumps, and also, by your
discard, what your strong suit is; and if your partner has any strength
in the suit led, you leave him in a favourable position.
If you refuse to overtrump, or to trump a certain winning card, your
partner should conclude either that you have no trump, or more probably
four trumps and a powerful hand besides. If he concludes that you are
reserving your trumps to bring in a suit, he should assist you by
leading trumps as soon as he can. A refusal to be thus forced is seldom
requisite if you have more than four trumps; with six you are mostly
strong enough to trump and to lead trumps; with five you may do the
same, if your suit is established; but if not, it is generally best to
take the force, and to lead your suit.
The situations in which it is most necessary to refuse to overtrump
your right-hand adversary, or to refuse to trump a winning card, occur
when you have four trumps and a very strong suit, or a suit established
early in a hand. For then, by trumping, you prejudice your chance of
bringing in the suit in order to secure one trick. By refusing to part
with a trump in these cases, you obtain the advantages just enumerated,
at the time when they are most likely to become of service; and, where
you refuse to overtrump, your adversary is left with one trump less, by
which your hand is strengthened.
Many players run into the extreme of always refusing to be forced by a
winning card when they are strong in trumps. The situations, however,
just indicated, are almost the only ones in which it answers to hold
up; and these even are liable to several exceptions. For instance:--1.
You should not persist in refusing to be forced if you find that the
adversary has the entire command of his suit. 2. You should not refuse
if your partner evidently intends to force you; and, 3. You should not
refuse to overtrump if you have reason to believe that your left-hand
adversary is strong in trumps.
With an untaught partner it is useless to refuse to trump; he will not
understand it, but will continue to force you. With such, the best
course is rather to make tricks when you can than to play for a great
game.
* * * * *
From what has just been said, it is evidently an advantage to
15. FORCE A STRONG TRUMP HAND OF THE ADVERSARY.
For you thereby take the best chance of preventing his making use of
his trumps for bringing in a suit. If he refuses to take a force, keep
on giving it to him.
For instance, if he passes your king (led from king, queen, &c.), and
the king wins, continue the suit, and so on. Some players can never be
brought to understand this; they do not like to see their winning cards
trumped, and therefore frequently change their suit or even lead trumps
when an adversary refuses to be forced.
It now hardly requires to be stated that it is bad play intentionally
to force a weak adversary, and still worse to lead a suit to which
both adversaries renounce, as the weak will trump and the strong get
rid of a losing card.
* * * * *
If you have numerical strength in trumps, you are justified in forcing
your partner, relying on your own strength to disarm the opponents. But
16. DO NOT FORCE YOUR PARTNER IF YOU ARE WEAK IN TRUMPS.
For you thus weaken him, and leave it in the power of the antagonists
to draw all the trumps, and bring in their suit. If, then, a good
partner refrains from forcing you, you may be sure he is weak; on the
other hand, if he evidently _intends_ to force you (as by leading a
losing card of a suit he knows you must trump), you may assume that
he is strong in trumps, and you should take the force willingly, even
though you do not want to be forced, depending on his strength to
exhaust the adversaries' trumps.
You may, however, though weak, force your partner under these
circumstances. 1. When he has already shown a desire to be forced, or
weakness in trumps, as by trumping a doubtful card, or by refraining
from forcing you. 2. When you have a cross-ruff, which secures several
tricks at once, and is therefore often more advantageous than trying
to establish a suit. 3. Sometimes when you are playing a close game,
as for the odd trick, and often when one trick saves or wins the game
or a point. And 4. Sometimes when great strength in trumps has been
declared against you.
If your partner leads a thirteenth card, or a card of a suit in which
he knows that both you and the fourth player renounce, your play must
depend on your partner's strength in trumps. If he is strong, he wants
you to put on your best trump, either to make the trumps separately, or
to force out one or two high ones, to leave himself with the command.
If he is weak in trumps, he wants you to pass the card, that the fourth
player may obtain the lead, and lead up to your hand. No general rule
can be given as to the course to be pursued with regard to thirteenth
cards. You must judge of the leader's intention by the score and the
previous fall of the cards.
[Illustration]
PLAYING TO THE BOARD.
17. PLAY TO THE SCORE;
AND
18. WATCH THE FALL OF THE CARDS, AND DRAW YOUR INFERENCES AT THE TIME.
These two all-important principles have already been mentioned as
causing differences in the play. The commonest form in which the former
is presented to us is this: at the score of Love-all five tricks save
the game against two by honours. It is often right, therefore, when two
by honours have been declared against you, to go for the fifth trick by
leading off a winning card, or by putting one on second or third hand.
To explain further what is meant by playing to the score, put yourself
in this situation. Four trumps remain in, the adversaries have two
winning trumps, it being uncertain whether they are in one hand or
divided; you have the two losing trumps, two forcing cards, and the
lead; you can only play correctly by referring to the score. Thus, if
the adversary is at four, and you have won five, or even six tricks,
your game would be to secure two tricks by forcing; for if you play a
trump and the two against you are in the same hand, you lose the game.
But suppose you are at the point of two, and the adversaries are not
at four, and you have won six tricks, your game would be to risk the
trump; for if you bring down the other trumps you win the game; but
by playing to force you make certain of scoring only four. By applying
this mode of reasoning you will often be directed as to a finesse late
in a hand. (Further illustrations of playing to the score occur in the
hands.)
For simple examples of drawing inferences at the time of the fall of
the cards take the following:--1. You lead a small card from ace,
knave, &c.; your partner wins with the queen; you should _immediately_
(_i.e._, before another card is led) infer that the king cannot be with
your right-hand adversary. Hence, on the return of the suit, you would
not finesse the knave. 2. You are second player, and a suit is led in
which you have king, ten, and one small one. You play the small one.
The third hand plays the queen, which is won with the ace. You should
_at once_ infer that the third hand cannot have the knave, and that you
may safely finesse the ten next round.
You will greatly assist your memory by systematically recording
inferences in the above manner. In addition to this you should apply
your knowledge of the principles to noting important points, not
attempting too much at first. Begin by counting the trumps as they
fall, and notice, at all events, the honours, and remember the turn-up
card. By degrees you will find yourself able to recollect the ten
and nine, and then the smaller trumps. Next attend to the suit led
originally by each player, and watch in the second round whether the
lead was from strength or weakness. Try also to remember the fall
of the cards in your own strong suit, that you may know when it is
established. Beyond this, experience will enable you to judge what to
retain and what to reject in each hand; so that, with practice, you
will acquire what may be termed _whist memory_ which will enable you,
without any great effort, to recollect the principal features of every
hand.
The fall of the cards may, one time or another, modify nearly every
rule of play. A player who simply follows rule, and fails to grasp the
situations in which rule should be departed from, is a mere machine
without intelligence. General principles only apply to the general
case; to apply them to particular cases, observation, inference, and
judgment are essential. Thus, in the Analysis of Leads, it appears that
the card which should be led in trumps often differs from the card
which should be led in plain suits. The reason is given at p. 119. But
it will be clear to any one who reads between the lines, that plain
suits should be led like trumps, if all the remaining trumps are in the
leader's or his partner's hands; or, if all the trumps are out, and the
leader or his partner has certain cards of re-entry in other suits.
As another example, take the case of returned leads. A leads a small
card; the second hand plays a small card; B (third hand) puts on the
eight; the fourth hand wins with the queen. When B gets the lead he
returns the knave. It is evident that B must have the ten and the
nine. Here two principles appear to conflict. One rule is, with four
originally return the smallest; the other rule is convey information
to your partner. When a player has thus to choose between two rules,
he must use his intelligence, in order to decide under which rule his
greater advantage lies. In the example given, the return of the knave
cannot deceive partner as to the number of cards held in the suit;
if he takes the trouble to think, he will at once perceive that the
rule as to returned leads has been departed from, in order to convey
information.
* * * * *
The three following Examples further illustrate cases where playing to
the board is involved.
CASE I.
[Illustration:
A 9♣, 4♣, 3♣, 2♣
Y A♣, Qn♣, Knv♣, 5♣
B 8♠, Kg♣, 8♣, 7♣
Z 9♠, 7♠, 6♣, 9♢]
Score: AB, three; YZ, four. Spades trumps.
AB have six tricks and have played two by honours. It is known from
the fall of the cards that A has no trump; also that Z has the long
diamond. A to lead.
* * * * *
THE PLAY AND REMARKS.--A leads a small club. Y puts on the ace second
hand. In order to save (and win) the game, Y and his partner must win
every trick (see statement of score and of fall of the cards). Y sees
that to do this Z must have two of the three remaining trumps. This
being so, Z can have but one club, and Y therefore puts on the ace of
clubs second hand.
For other illustrations _see_ Hands VIII and XV.
CASE II.
[Illustration:
A Qn♠, 8♠, 2♡
Y 7♠, 7♡, 10♢
B 9♠, Knv♢, 7♢
Z Knv♠, 10♠, 3♠]
Score: AB want two tricks to save the game. Hearts trumps. A to lead.
A knows Y to have the best heart; also B to have the best diamond and
weak spades.
* * * * *
THE PLAY AND REMARKS.--A leads the queen of spades, and then the losing
trump. A takes the only chance of winning two tricks. To accomplish
this Y must hold one spade and one diamond, as will appear by placing
the unknown cards in any other way. A therefore plays on the assumption
that Y holds a spade and a diamond in addition to the trump which is
declared in his hand.
* * * * *
For another illustration of leading a losing trump to place the lead
_see_ Hand XXXV.
CASE III.
It is the duty of a player to make the game as easy to his partner
as he can. The play often depends on the sort of partner. For
example:--you lead the ten from king, queen, knave, ten, only, or
from king, knave, ten, &c. Suppose the lead to be from the former
combination, and that your ten forces the ace from the fourth hand.
You obtain the lead again. The proper lead now is the queen. (_See_
Analysis of Leads, p. 67). But, with an indifferent partner, the better
lead is the king, as he may not have drawn the correct inference from
the first lead, and knowing the queen is not the best, he may trump it.
However good your partner may be, you should not put him into
unnecessary difficulties. For example:--
[Illustration:
B Knv♣, Knv♢, 10♢, 4♢
Z 6♠, 7♣, 5♢, 2♢
A Qn♠, 10♠, Knv♡, 7♡
Y Knv♠, 3♠, Kg♡, 9♡]
Spades trumps. Y can count two hearts, and queen, ten of spades in A's
hand, and a small spade in Z's hand. A to lead.
THE PLAY AND REMARKS.--A leads the seven of hearts. Y should put on
the king, though certain of being able to win with the nine. For, if
Y wins with the nine, he compels Z to play a coup, viz., to trump the
best heart, in order to get the lead through the queen, ten of spades;
but, if Y wins with the king and leads the losing heart, it requires no
ingenuity on Z's part to trump it.
COUPS.
There is no Whist principle which should not be occasionally violated,
owing to the knowledge of the hands derived from inference during the
play. Some of the more frequent of the cases, _where a general rule
can be given for departing from rule_, may advantageously close this
Section.
LEADING FROM WEAKEST SUIT.
It is advisable in most cases where the game is desperate, and where it
is clear that your partner must be strong in your weak suit to save the
game, to lead your weakest suit, notwithstanding Principle 1 (p. 56).
Your partner should finesse deeply in the suit you lead him, and should
not return it, but, actuated by motives similar to yours, should lead
his weakest suit, in which you should finesse deeply, and continue your
weak suit, and so on.
For example: AB (partners) lead trumps. They win the first three
tricks, and show four by honours, and three more trumps remain in A's
hand. Consequently, if AB win another trick, they win the game. Y or
Z now has the lead for the first time. _His lead should be from his
weakest suit_, on this principle: if his partner has not the command of
it, or a successful finesse in it, the game is lost. Say Y leads, and Z
wins the trick. Z should not return Y's lead, but should similarly lead
his weakest suit.
* * * * *
For an illustration of this coup, _see_ Hand XXVII.
TREATING LONG SUITS LIKE SHORT ONES, AND VICE VERSÂ.
It often happens towards the end of a hand, that an unplayed suit,
of which the leader holds (say) four cards, can only go round twice,
_e.g._, there may be two trumps left in in one of the opponents' hands.
In such a case, if your suit is headed by queen or knave, you should
treat it as a suit of two cards only, and lead your highest, as this
gives the best chance of making two tricks in the suit.
* * * * *
In the reverse case, where a suit can only go round once, it is obvious
that a small card should be led, so as not to tempt partner to finesse.
Thus, holding queen and one small card of an unplayed suit, which you
are about to lead, all the opponents' cards but one being winning
cards, the proper lead is the small card.
* * * * *
For an illustration _see_ Hand XXII.
* * * * *
There is another case, known as _Deschapelles' coup_, where the proper
card to lead is not determined by the leader's numerical power in
the suit. It is this: all the adversaries' and partner's trumps are
exhausted, and the leader's partner remains with an established suit.
If the leader (not having any of his partner's suit left) is obliged
to open a fresh suit headed by king, queen, or knave, he should lead
the highest card, irrespective of the number of cards he holds in the
suit, that being the best chance of subsequently procuring the lead
for his partner in case his only card of entry in that suit should be
an honour, not the ace.
* * * * *
For an illustration of this coup, _see_ Hand XXVIII.
* * * * *
Deschapelles' coup often succeeds in practice, but it may generally
be defeated by an attentive player. When the above-described position
of the cards occurs, the adversary, if he has the ace of the fresh
suit led, should not put it on first round. The suit will, in all
probability, be continued with a low card, when the third player will
most likely be compelled to play his highest, which will be taken by
the ace; and, having lost the card of re-entry, he never brings in his
suit, unless he gets the lead in some other way.
REFUSING TO WIN THE SECOND ROUND OF A SUIT.
This is a case of by no means infrequent occurrence. For example: one
of the adversaries has a long suit declared in his favour, which is led
a second time. Only one trump remains in, which is in the hand of the
second or fourth player. As a rule, the second round of the suit should
not be trumped. The third round will probably exhaust the adverse hand,
which is numerically weak in the suit. If it so happens that the player
who is numerically strong in it has no card of re-entry in any other
suit, he will then never bring in his long suit, as his partner, whose
hand is exhausted, cannot lead it again, should he get the lead after
the third round. If there is a card of re-entry in the hand of the
player who has numerical strength, he must bring in the suit, whether
the second round is trumped or not.
_See_ Hand XXIX for an illustration of this position.
A similar rule applies, but less frequently, when one adversary has the
long trumps, and his partner a long suit nearly established.
For an illustration of this position, _see_ Hand XXX.
DECLINING TO DRAW THE LOSING TRUMP.
When all the trumps are out but two, and the leader remains with the
best trump, the losing trump being in the hand of his adversary, the
natural and obvious play is to draw the last trump.
But there is a class of cases in which the trump should not be drawn as
a matter of course, viz., if one adversary has a long suit established,
and his partner has a card of that suit to lead.
The case usually happens in this way: YZ (partners) lead a suit, and
after two rounds establish it. They then lead trumps from a suit
of four trumps (_see_ p. 123). Eleven trumps come out, and A (YZ's
adversary) has the lead and the best trump, one of the opponents having
the losing trump. The question then arises, Should A draw the trump?
A should draw the trump if he has also an established suit; or, if B
(A's partner) has an established suit, and A can put the lead into B's
hand. For, in these two cases, A or B cannot do better than bring in
their suit. Again, A should draw the trump, if the adversary who has
a suit established (say Z) has also the losing trump, for then, if
either Y or Z has a card of re-entry in either of the other two suits,
Z cannot be prevented from bringing in his established suit. Lastly, A
should draw the trump if Y (Z's partner) has the losing trump, and Z
has, declared in his hand, two cards of re-entry. The last case may be
dismissed as of but little practical use, as, at the time when A has to
decide whether he will draw the trump, he will seldom know enough about
the remaining cards to be positive that Z has two cards of re-entry.
In the above cases, A, by not drawing the trump, makes his adversaries
a present of a trick.
On the other hand, A should not draw the trump if one opponent (Z) has
an established suit, which Y (Z's partner) can lead, the losing trump
being in Y's hand. And, it is especially incumbent on A not to draw
the trump, if either he or his partner has a suit which will probably
be established by leading it, and if A can infer from the fall of the
cards that Y has _only one card_ of his partner's established suit in
his hand, subject, of course, to the qualifications already noted.
The point aimed at in not drawing the trump, is, first to get the
commanding card of A's or B's long suit out of the adverse hand. Y or
Z thus obtains the lead, and continues the established suit, which A
trumps with the winning trump. If, now, Z has no card of re-entry in
the fourth--or unopened--suit, he never brings in his established suit,
Y not having another card of it to lead.
The case is difficult to carry when stated thus generally; for an
illustration, _see_ Hand XXXI.
REFUSING TO OVERTRUMP.
Cases often happen where it is not advisable to overtrump. Most of
these depend on the fall of the cards and on inferences from the play
(_see_ Hands XXIII, XXIV), and cannot be generalised. But there is one
case in which it is _never right_ to overtrump, viz., when three cards
remain in each hand, and one player holds the second and third best
trumps, with one of which he trumps the card led. If the player to his
left has the best and fourth best trumps, he can never gain anything by
overtrumping, and may lose a trick, as the following example shows:--
[Illustration:
Y 9♢, 4♢, 10♡
B 9♠, 8♠, Knv♣
Z Kg♠, 6♠, A♢
A 3♠, 8♡, 7♡]
The position of the trumps (spades) is known. A leads a heart, B trumps
it. If Z overtrumps he loses the other two tricks, but if he throws the
ace of diamonds he wins the other two tricks.
This rule for not overtrumping cannot be laid down absolutely when
there are more than three cards in hand; but when only four trumps
remain in, second and third best against best and fourth, it is so
frequently advisable not to overtrump, that the player should consider
well the position of the remaining cards before overtrumping.
* * * * *
For an illustration of this case, _see_ Hand XXV.
* * * * *
Since it is so often right not to overtrump under these circumstances,
it follows that when the case arises the player who holds second and
third best should, as a rule, attempt to defeat the coup by playing a
false card--_i.e._, he should trump with the higher card in hopes of
deceiving his left hand opponent as to the position of the third best
trump.
THROWING HIGH CARDS TO PLACE THE LEAD.
This coup presents itself in a variety of forms; the following are
selected as likely to be of use.
Whenever you are left at the end of a hand with the tenace in trumps
(either best and third best, or second best guarded) over the player to
your right, and two other cards, both being cards of the suit led by
him, you, second hand, should _always_ throw the highest card of his
lead to that trick. You can never lose by so doing, and may win. For
example: you have nine and five of the suit led. Throw the nine. For,
in the second round of the suit, it may so happen that you get the lead
with the nine. If the cards lie thus, for instance:--
[Illustration:
Y 9♣, 5♣, A♡, 10♡
B Knv♣, Qn♢, 8♢, 6♢
Z Kg♣, Qn♣, 8♣, 3♣
A A♣, 6♣, Kg♡, 7♡]
Y has the tenace in hearts (trumps) over A. A leads ace of clubs. If Y
does not throw the nine, and Z plays carelessly and fails to win Y's
nine in the next round, YZ lose a trick. Of course, Z ought to win the
second round, but it is Y's duty to render it impossible for Z not to
do so (_see_ Remarks on making it easy to Partner, p. 139).
The typical example of this coup is the case where the leader plays
the ace, and the second player has king guarded, as in the following
example:--
[Illustration:
Y A♠, Knv♠, Kg♢, 2♢
B
Z
A Kg♠, 10♠, A♢, 4♢]
Spades trumps. There are only four spades in, and Y knows that A has
the king, ten. B's and Z's cards are immaterial.
A leads the ace of diamonds. If Y plays the two of diamonds he can only
make two tricks; but, if he throws the king to the ace, he still makes
two tricks, and, if his partner has the queen of diamonds, he makes
three tricks.
* * * * *
This coup may be similarly played in plain suits. For an illustration
_see_ Hand XXXII.
The following fine coup (which occurred in actual play) exemplifies a
similar, but more complicated, case:--
[Illustration:
Y Kg♣, 5♣, 3♣, 2♣
B 9♣, 6♣, 10♡, 8♡
Z A♣, Qn♣, Qn♡, 9♡
A Knv♣, 10♣, 8♣, 7♣]
Score: YZ require every trick. Hearts trumps. It is known that the
trumps lie between B and Z.
A leads a club; Y and B play small clubs. Z, knowing that B holds the
second best trump guarded, takes the only chance of saving the game,
by winning the first trick in clubs with the ace, and returning the
queen. Y, seeing his partner's anxiety to get rid of the lead, rightly
conjectures him to hold the major tenace in trumps. He, therefore, wins
his partner's queen of clubs with the king, and saves the game.
It being known that the remaining trumps lie between B and Z, Y would
be right to win the second round of clubs under all circumstances of
the score.
For another illustration of this coup, _see_ Hand XXXIII.
On a similar principle, the leader not infrequently leads a losing
plain card, or a losing trump, at the end of a hand, in order to place
the lead. For illustrations, _see_ Case II, p. 138, and Hands XVI,
XVII, and XXXV.
THE GRAND COUP.
The _Grand Coup_ consists in throwing away a superfluous trump. At the
first glance it appears impossible to have a superabundance of trumps;
but cases sometimes happen where a player has _a trump too many_. To
get rid of this trump--as by undertrumping a trick already trumped by
your partner, or by trumping a trick which he has won, or which you
know he may win--is to play the _grand coup_.
The opportunity for playing the _grand coup_ generally happens in this
way. Two rounds of trumps come out, leaving five trumps in, two in the
hand of (say) B, and three in the hand of Z (the player to his left).
If B has the best and third best trumps, or the second best guarded,
and trumps are not led again, nor used for trumping, it is clear that
at the eleventh trick Z must obtain the lead, and must lead up to the
tenace in trumps. If, before the eleventh trick, Z trumps a trick of
his partner's (or, in the case of only seven trumps coming out in two
rounds, undertrumps a trick already trumped by his partner), and
the lead at the eleventh trick can thus be kept in--or put into--Z's
partner's hand, the _grand coup_ comes off, as in the following
example:--
[Illustration:
Y Qn♠, 5♡, 3♡, 6♣
B 10♣, 7♣, 5♢, 3♢
Z Knv♡, Knv♣, 9♣, 5♣
A 8♠, 6♠, 10♢, 9♢]
Clubs trumps. Z knows that B has ten and another trump. A leads the ten
of diamonds; Y trumps with the six of clubs; Z undertrumps with the
five. If he retains his three trumps, and B refuses to trump the queen
of spades next led by Y, Z loses a trick in clubs.
The opportunity for playing the _grand coup_ is often missed. A player
should always be on the look-out for it when he has five trumps,
especially if a trump is led to his right. It should be added also,
that if the player who attempts it retains a high card in his hand, he
may be just as badly off as though he remained with three trumps. Thus,
holding three trumps against two, and ace and another card of another
suit, it is not sufficient that he disposes of one of his trumps; he
should also get rid of his ace (_see_ Remarks on Throwing High Cards to
place the Lead, pp. 147-151). The following example will render this
more clear:--
[Illustration:
Y Knv♡, 5♡, 5♣, Knv♢
B Qn♡, 6♡, A♢, 5♢
Z Qn♢, 10♢, 9♢, 8♢
A 8♣, Kg♢, 7♢, 6♢]
Hearts trumps. B has already got rid of his superfluous trump. A leads
the eight of clubs. B should throw the ace of diamonds to it. For,
if B has the lead after the next trick, he might just as well have
kept his third trump. If A has the king of diamonds, B wins a trick
by discarding the ace; and, if A has not the king, B loses nothing by
throwing the ace.
An exception to this rule is when A has winning cards to go on with.
Thus, if A had another club, B need not discard the ace of diamonds.
This is too obvious to require working out.
* * * * *
The following is another aspect under which the _grand coup_ may
present itself:--
[Illustration:
Y 7♣, 9♢, 6♢, 5♢
B 8♠, Kg♡, Qn♡, Knv♡
Z Qn♠, 5♡, 4♡, Qn♣
A Knv♢, 10♢, 8♢, 7♢]
Hearts trumps. It is known that B has king, queen, knave of trumps, and
a losing spade or club--but uncertain which.
A leads the knave of diamonds. B trumps it.
Z should throw away a small trump, undertrumping B in order to keep two
winning queens. If he discards a queen, he must do so at random, and
perhaps throw away the suit of which B has the small one. By discarding
his useless trump (which B would proceed to draw) he defers parting
with either queen till after the next round, when the fall of the cards
may assist him. B now leads a trump, and Y discards the losing club.
B then leads another trump, and Z now knows that he ought to keep the
spade. This case actually occurred in the presence of the writer, but
Z, instead of undertrumping, discarded the wrong queen at random, and
eventually lost the rubber in consequence.
* * * * *
For further illustrations of the _Grand Coup_, _see_ Hands XXXVIII and
XXXIX.
* * * * *
If the foregoing principles are reflectively perused, it will be seen
that they mould the Theory of Whist into a harmonious whole. The Theory
of Whist tells you how to play your own hand to the greatest advantage,
how to assist your partner, and how to weaken and to obstruct your
opponents; in short, it teaches how to take the best chance of making
the greatest number of tricks. This knowledge constitutes a _sound_
player. If to theoretical perfection you add the power of accurate
observation, and of acute perception, together with a thorough
comprehension of the whist capacities of partners and of opponents, you
have all the elements necessary to form a Master of the Science.