Aristoboulos nor Ptolemy, the authorities whom I chiefly follow, have
given any account; nor can I decide for certain whether the passage was
bridged with boats, as was the Hellespont by Xerxes and as were the
Bosporos and the Istros by Darius,[91] or whether the bridge he made over
the river was one continuous piece of work. I incline, however, to think
that the bridge must have been made of boats,[92] for neither would the
depth of the river have admitted the construction of an ordinary kind of
bridge, nor could a work so vast and difficult have been executed in so
short a time. But if the passage was bridged with boats I cannot decide
whether the vessels being fastened together with cables and anchored in
a row sufficed to form a bridge as did those by which, as Herodotos the
Halikarnassian says, the Hellespont was joined, or whether the method was
that which is used by the Romans in bridging the Istros and the Keltic
Rhine,[93] and by which they bridged the Euphrates and the Tigris as
often as necessity required. Since, however, the Romans, as far as my
knowledge goes, have found that the bridging of rivers by boats is the
most expeditious method of crossing them, I think it worth a description
here. The vessels at a preconcerted signal are let go from their moorings
and rowed down stream not prow but stern foremost. The current of course
carries them downward, but a small pinnace furnished with oars holds
them back till they settle into their appointed place. Then baskets of
wicker work, pyramid-shaped and filled with rough stones, are lowered
into the river from the prow of each vessel to make it hold fast against
the force of the current. As soon as one of those vessels has been held
fast another is in the same way anchored with its prow against the stream
as far from the first as is commensurate with their bearing the strain
of what is put upon them. On both of them beams of wood are rapidly laid
lengthwise, and on these again planks are placed crosswise to bind them
together. In this manner the work proceeds through all the vessels which
are required for bridging the passage. At each end of the structure
firmly fixed railed gangways are thrown forward to the shore so that
horses and beasts of burden may with the greater safety enter upon it.
These gangways serve at the same time to bind the bridge to the shore. In
a short time the whole is completed amid great noise and bustle, though
discipline is by no means lost sight of as the work proceeds. In each
vessel the occasional exhortations of the overseers and their rebukes
of negligence neither prevent orders from being heard nor the work from
being quickly executed.
_Chapter VIII.—Alexander arrives at Taxila—Receives an embassy from
Abisares and advances to the Hydaspês_
This method has been practised by the Romans from of old, but how
Alexander bridged the river Indus I cannot say, for even those who served
in his army are silent on the matter. But the bridge was made, I should
think, as nearly as possible in the way described, or if it was otherwise
contrived let it be so.
When Alexander had crossed to the other side of the Indus he again
offered sacrifice according to his custom. Then marching away from
the Indus he arrived at Taxila,[94] a great and flourishing city, the
greatest indeed of all the cities which lay between the river Indus and
the Hydaspês. Taxilês, the governor of the city, and the Indians who
belonged to it received him in a friendly manner, and he therefore added
as much of the adjacent country to their territory as they requested.
While he was there Abisarês, the king of the Indians of the hill-country,
sent him an embassy which included his own brother and other grandees
of his court. Envoys came also from Doxarês, the chief of the province,
and those like the others brought presents. Here again in Taxila
Alexander offered his customary sacrifices and celebrated a gymnastic
and equestrian contest. Having appointed Philip, the son of Makhatas,
satrap of the Indians of that district, he left a garrison in Taxila and
those soldiers who were invalided, and then moved on towards the river
Hydaspês—for he had learned that Pôros with the whole of his army lay on
the other side of that river resolved either to prevent him from making
the passage or to attack him when crossing.[95] Upon learning this
Alexander sent back Koinos, the son of Polemokratês, to the river Indus
with orders to cut in pieces all the boats that had been constructed for
the passage of the Indus and to bring them to the river Hydaspês. In
accordance with these orders the smaller boats were cut each into two
sections and the thirty-oared galleys into three, and the sections were
then transported on waggons to the banks of the Hydaspês. There the boats
were reconstructed, and appeared as a flotilla upon that river. Alexander
then taking the forces which he had with him when he arrived at Taxila
and 5000 of the Indians commanded by Taxilês and the chiefs of that
country advanced towards the Hydaspês.[96]
_Chapter IX.—Alexander on reaching the Hydaspês finds Pôros prepared to
dispute its passage_
Alexander encamped on the banks of the river,[97] and Pôros was seen on
the opposite side, with all his army and his array of elephants around
him.[98] Against the place where he saw Alexander had encamped, he
remained himself to guard the passage, but he sent detachments of his
men, each commanded by a captain, to guard all parts of the river where
it could be easily forded, as he was resolved to prevent the Macedonians
from effecting a landing. When Alexander saw this, he thought it
expedient to move his army from place to place, so that Pôros might be at
a loss to discover his real intentions. For this purpose he divided his
army into many parts, and some of the troops he led himself in different
directions, sometimes to ravage the enemy’s country, and sometimes to
find out where he could most easily ford the river. He placed various
commanders at various times over different divisions of his army, and
despatched them also in different directions. At the same time he caused
provisions to be conveyed to the camp from all parts of the country on
this side of the river, to impress Pôros with the conviction that he
intended to remain where he was near the bank, till the waters of the
river subsided in winter, and afforded him a large choice of passages.
As the boats were constantly plying up and down the stream, and the
skins were being filled with hay, while all the bank was lined, here with
horse and there with foot, all this prevented Pôros from resting and
concentrating his preparations at any one point selected in preference
to any other as the best for defending the passage. At this time of the
year besides, all the Indian rivers were swollen and flowing with turbid
and rapid currents, for the sun is then wont to turn towards the summer
tropic.[99] At this season incessant rains deluge the soil of India, and
the snows of the Kaukasos then melting flood the numerous rivers to which
they give birth. In winter they again subside and become small and clear,
and in many places fordable, with the exception of the Indus and the
Ganges, and perhaps some one or two others. The Hydaspês at all events
does become fordable.
_Chapter X.—Alexander’s devices to deceive Pôros and steal the passage of
the river_
Alexander therefore publicly announced that he would remain where he was
throughout that season of the year if his passage was for the present
to be obstructed, but he continued as before waiting in ambush to see
whether he could anywhere rapidly steal a passage to the other side
without being observed. He clearly saw that it was impossible for him to
cross where Pôros himself had encamped near the bank of the Hydaspês, not
only because he had so many elephants, but also because his large army
arrayed for battle, and splendidly accoutred, was ready to attack his
troops the moment they landed. He foresaw besides that his horses would
refuse to mount the opposite bank, where the elephants would at once
encounter them, and by their very aspect and their roaring would terrify
them outright; nor did he think that even before they gained the shore
they would remain upon the inflated hides during the passage; but that on
seeing the elephants even at a distance off, they would become frantic
and leap into the water. He resolved therefore to steal the passage, and
to do this in the following way. Leading out by night the greater part
of his cavalry along the river bank in different directions, he ordered
them to set up a loud clamour, raise the war-shout,[100] and fill the
shores with every kind of noise, as if they were really preparing to
attempt the passage. Pôros marched meanwhile along the opposite bank, in
the direction of the noise, having his elephants with him, and Alexander
gradually accustomed him to lead out his men in this way in opposition.
When this had been done repeatedly, and the men did nothing more than
make a great noise and shout the war-cry, Pôros no longer made any
counter-movement when the cavalry issued out from the camp, but remained
within his own lines, his spies being, however, posted at numerous points
along the bank. When Alexander had thus quieted the suspicions of Pôros
about his nocturnal attempts, he devised the following stratagem.
_Chapter XI.—Arrangements made by Alexander for crossing the Hydaspês
unobserved_
There was a bluff ascending from the bank of the Hydaspês at a point
where the river made a remarkable bend, and this was densely covered
with all sorts of trees. Over against it lay an island in the river
overspread with jungle, an untrodden and solitary place. Perceiving that
this island directly faced the bluff, and that both places were wooded
and adapted to screen his attempt to cross the river, he decided to take
his army over this way. Now the bluff and the island were 150 stadia
distant from the great camp.[101] But along the whole of the bank he
had posted running sentries[102] at a proper distance for keeping each
other in sight, and readily transmitting along the line any orders that
might be received from any quarter. In every direction, moreover, shouts
were raised by night, and fires were burnt for many nights together. But
when he had made up his mind to attempt the passage, the preparations
for crossing were made in the camp without any concealment. In the camp
Krateros had been left with his own division of the cavalry, and the
Arakhosian and Parapamisadan horsemen, together with the brigades of
the Macedonian phalanx commanded by Alketas and Polysperchon and the
contingent of 5000 men under the chiefs of the hither Indians. He had
ordered Krateros not to attempt to cross the river before Pôros moved off
against them, or before learning that he was flying from the field, and
that they were victorious. “If, however,” said he, “Pôros with one part
of his army advances against me while he leaves the other part and his
elephants in his camp, then please to remain where you are; but if Pôros
takes all his elephants with him, and a portion of the rest of his army
is left behind in the camp, then do you cross the river with all possible
speed; for,” added he, “it is the elephants only which make it impossible
for the horses to land on the other bank. The rest of the army can cross
over without difficulty.”
_Chapter XII.—Alexander crosses the Hydaspês_
Such were the instructions given to Krateros; but half-way between the
island and the main camp in which he had been left, there were posted
Meleager, Attalos and Gorgias, with the mercenary cavalry and infantry,
who had received orders to cross to the other side in detachments, into
which their ranks were to be separated as soon as they saw the Indians
fairly engaged in battle. He then selected to be taken under his own
command the corps of body-guards called Companions, the regiments of
cavalry under Hêphaistiôn, Perdikkas and Dêmêtrios, also the Baktrian,
Sogdian, and Skythian cavalry, and the Daan horse-archers, and from the
phalanx of infantry the hypaspists, the brigade of Kleitos and Koinos,
and the archers and the Agrianians, and with these troops he marched with
secrecy, keeping at a considerable distance from the bank that he might
not be seen to be moving towards the island and the bluff, from which he
intended to cross over to the other side. There in the night the skins,
which had long before been provided for the purpose, were stuffed with
hay, and securely stitched up. During the night a violent storm of rain
came on, whereby his preparations and the attempt at crossing were not
betrayed to the enemy by the rattle of arms and the shouting of orders,
since the thunder and rain drowned all other sounds. Most of the boats
which he had ordered to be cut into sections had been conveyed to this
place, and when secretly pieced together again were hidden away in the
woods along with the thirty-oared galleys. Towards daybreak the wind had
died down and the rain ceased. The rest of the army then crossed over
in the direction of the island, the cavalry mounted on the skin pontoon
rafts, and as many of the foot-soldiers as the boats could hold embarked
in them. They so proceeded, that they were not seen by the sentries
posted by Pôros till they had passed beyond the island, and were not far
from the bank.
_Chapter XIII.—Incidents of the passage of the river_
Alexander himself embarked on a thirty-oared galley, and went over
accompanied by Ptolemy, Perdikkas, and Lysimachos, his body-guards, and
by Seleukos, one of the companions, who was afterwards king, and by
one half of the hypaspists, the other half being on board of the other
galleys of like size. As soon as the soldiers had passed beyond the
island, they steered for the bank, being now full in view of the enemy,
whose sentinels on seeing their approach galloped off at the utmost speed
of each man’s horse to carry the tidings to Pôros. Meanwhile Alexander
was himself the first to disembark, and taking the horsemen who had been
conveyed over in his own and the other thirty-oared galleys, he at once
formed them into line as they kept landing, for the cavalry had orders
to be the first to disembark. At the head of these duly marshalled he
moved forward. Owing, however, to his ignorance of the locality he had
unawares landed not on the mainland, but upon an island, the great size
of which prevented it all the more from being recognised as an island.
It was separated from the mainland by a branch of the river in which the
water was shallow; but the violent storm of rain which had lasted the
most of the night had so swollen the stream that the horsemen could not
find the ford, and he feared that the latter part of the passage would
be as laborious as the first. When at last the ford was found he led
his men through it with difficulty; for the water where deepest reached
higher than the breasts of the foot soldiers, and as for the horses their
heads only were above the river. When he had crossed this piece of water
also, he selected the mounted corps of body-guards, and the best men from
the other squadrons of cavalry, and brought them from column into line
upon the right wing.[103] Then in front of all the cavalry he posted the
horse archers, and next in line to the cavalry and in front of all the
infantry the royal hypaspists commanded by Seleukos. Next to these again
he placed the royal foot guards, and then the other hypaspists, each in
what happened to be the order of his precedence for the time being. At
each extremity of the phalanx were posted the archers and the Agrianians
and the javelin men.
_Chapter XIV.—Skirmish with the son of Pôros at the landing-place_
Alexander having made these dispositions, ordered the infantry, which
numbered nearly 6000 men, to follow him at the ordinary marching pace and
in regular order, for when he saw that he was superior in cavalry, he
took with himself only the horsemen, about 5000 in number, and led them
forward at a rapid pace. Taurôn, the captain of the archers, he ordered
to hasten forward with his men to give support to the cavalry. He had
come to the conclusion that if Pôros engaged him with all his troops he
would either, without difficulty, overpower him by charging with his
cavalry, or would remain on the defensive till the infantry came up
during the action, or that if the Indians, terrified by the marvellous
audacity of his passage of the river, should take to flight, he would be
able to pursue them closely, and the slaughter being thus all the greater
there would not be left much more work for him to do.
Aristoboulos says that the son of Pôros arrived with about 60 chariots
before Alexander made the final passage from the large island, and that
he could have hindered Alexander from landing (for he made the passage
with difficulty even when no one opposed him), if the Indians had but
leaped down from their chariots and fallen upon those who first stepped
on shore. The prince, however, passed by with his chariots, and allowed
Alexander to accomplish the passage in complete safety. Against these
Indians Alexander, he says, despatched his horse archers, who easily
put them to a rout which was by no means bloodless. Other writers say
that while the troops were landing an encounter took place between the
Indians who had come with the son of Pôros and Alexander at the head
of his cavalry, and that as the son of Pôros had come with a superior
force Alexander himself was wounded by the Indian prince, and that his
favourite horse Boukephalas was killed, having been wounded, like his
master, by the son of Pôros. But Ptolemy, the son of Lagos, with whom I
agree, gives a different account, for he states, like the others, that
Pôros sent off his son, but not in command of merely 60 chariots; and
indeed it is not at all likely that Pôros, on learning from the scouts
that either Alexander himself, or, at all events, a part of his army,
had made the passage of the Hydaspês, would have sent his own son with
no more than 60 chariots, which, considered as a reconnoitring party,
would have been too numerous, and not rapid in retreat, but considered as
meant to repel such of the enemy as had not yet crossed the river, and
to attack those who had already landed, an altogether inadequate force.
He says that the son of Pôros arrived at the head of 2000 men and 120
chariots, and that Alexander had made even the final passage from the
island before the prince appeared upon the scene.
_Chapter XV.—The arrangements made by Pôros for the conflict_
Ptolemy states further that Alexander at first despatched against the
prince the horse archers, and led the cavalry himself, under the belief
that Pôros was advancing against him with the whole of his army, and
that this was a body of advanced cavalry thrown forward by Pôros. But
when he discovered what the real strength of the Indians was he then
briskly charged them with what cavalry he had with him. When they noticed
that Alexander himself and his body of cavalry did not charge them in
an extended line, but by squadrons, their ranks gave way, and 400 of
their horsemen fell, and among them the son of Pôros. Their chariots,
moreover, were captured, horses and all, for they proved heavy in the
retreat and useless in the action itself, by having stuck fast in the
clay. When the horsemen who had escaped from this rout reported one after
another to Pôros that Alexander himself had crossed the river with the
strongest division of his army, and that his son had been slain in the
fight, he was still at a loss what to determine, for the division which
had been left with Krateros in the great camp right opposite to his own
position appeared to be undertaking the passage, but he at last decided
to march with all his forces against Alexander and fight it out with
the strongest division of the Macedonians led by the king in person. He
nevertheless left there in his camp a few of the elephants and a small
force to deter the cavalry under the command of Krateros from landing. He
then took all his cavalry, 4000 strong, all his chariots, 300 in number,
200 of his elephants, and 30,000 efficient infantry, and marched against
Alexander. When he found a place where he saw there was no clay, but
that the ground from its sandy nature was all flat and firm, and suited
for the movements of cavalry whether charging or falling back, he then
drew up his army in order of battle,[104] posting his elephants in the
front line at intervals of at least 100 feet, so as to have his elephants
ranged in front before the whole body of his infantry, and so to spread
terror at all points among Alexander’s cavalry. He took it for certain
besides that none of the enemy would have the audacity to push in at
the intervals between the elephants—not the cavalry, since their horses
would be terrified by these animals, and much less the infantry, since
they would be checked in front by his heavy-armed foot soldiers falling
upon them, and trampled down when the elephants wheeled round upon them.
Behind these he drew up his infantry, which did not close up in one line
with the elephants, but formed a second line in their rear, so that the
regiments were only partly pushed forward into the intervals. He had also
troops of infantry posted on the wings beyond the elephants, and on both
sides of the infantry the cavalry had been drawn up, and in front of it
the chariots.
_Chapter XVI.—The plan of attack adopted by Alexander_
In this manner had Pôros arranged his troops. As soon as Alexander
perceived that the Indians had been drawn up in battle order he made his
cavalry halt, that he might get in hand each regiment of the infantry
as it came up; and even when the phalanx by a rapid march had effected
a junction with the cavalry he still did not at once marshal its ranks
and lead it into action, and thus expose the men, while tired and out
of breath, to the barbarians, who were quite fresh, but he gave them
time, while he rode round their ranks, to rest until they could recover
themselves. When he had observed how the Indians were arranged he
made up his mind not to advance against the centre, in front of which
the elephants had been posted, while the intervals between them had
been filled with compact masses of infantry, for he feared lest Pôros
should reap the advantage which he had calculated on deriving from that
arrangement. But as he was superior in cavalry he took the greater part
of that force, and marched along towards the left wing of the enemy to
make his attack in this quarter.[105] Koinos he sent at the head of his
own regiment of horse and that of Dêmêtrios to the right, and ordered
him, when the barbarians on seeing what a dense mass of cavalry was
opposed to them, should be riding along to encounter it, to hang close
upon their rear.[106] The command of the phalanx of infantry he committed
to Seleukos, Antigenês, and Taurôn, who received orders not to take part
in the action till they saw that the phalanx of infantry and the cavalry
of the enemy were thrown into disorder by the cavalry under his own
command.
When the Indians were now within reach of his missiles he despatched
against their left wing the horse archers, who were 1000 strong, to throw
the enemy in that part of the field into confusion with storms of arrows
and charges of their horses. He marched rapidly forward himself with the
companion cavalry against the left wing of the barbarians, making haste
to attack their cavalry in a state of disorder while they were still in
column, and before they could deploy into line.
_Chapter XVII.—Description of the battle of the Hydaspês—Defeat of Pôros_