[Sidenote: _Republic X._ Socrates, Glaucon.]
*595A* Of the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State,
there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about
poetry.
To what do you refer?
To the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be
received; as I see far more clearly now that *595B* the parts of the soul
have been distinguished.
What do you mean?
[Sidenote: Poetical imitations are ruinous to the mind of the hearer.]
Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to
the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe--but I do not mind
saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the
understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature
is the only antidote to them.
Explain the purport of your remark.
Well, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had
an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my
lips, for he is the great *595C* captain and teacher of the whole of that
charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced more than the
truth, and therefore I will speak out.
Very good, he said.
Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.
Put your question.
[Sidenote: The nature of imitation.]
Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.
A likely thing, then, that I should know.
*596A* Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the
keener.
Very true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any (308} faint
notion, I could not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?
Well then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a
number of individuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a
corresponding idea or form:--do you understand me?
I do.
[Sidenote: The idea is one, but the objects comprehended under it are
many.]
Let us take any common instance; there are beds and *596B* tables in the
world--plenty of them, are there not?
Yes.
But there are only two ideas or forms of them--one the idea of a bed, the
other of a table.
True.
And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our
use, in accordance with the idea--that is our way of speaking in this and
similar instances--but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could
he?
Impossible.
And there is another artist,--I should like to know what you would say of
him.
*596C* Who is he?
[Sidenote: The universal creator an extraordinary person. But note also
that everybody is a creator in a sense. For all things may be made by the
reflection of them in a mirror.]
One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.
What an extraordinary man!
Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this
is he who is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and
animals, himself and all other things--the earth and heaven, and the
things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.
*596D* He must be a wizard and no mistake.
Oh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker
or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these
things but in another not? Do you see that there is a way in which you
could make them all yourself?
What way?
An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might
be quickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a
mirror round and round--you *596E* would soon enough make the sun and the
heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and
{309} all the other things of which we were just now speaking, in the
mirror.
Yes, he said; but they would be appearances only.
[Sidenote: But this is an appearance only: and the painter too is a maker
of appearances.]
Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too
is, as I conceive, just such another--a creator of appearances, is he not?
Of course.
But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet
there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?
Yes, he said, but not a real bed.
*597A* And what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too
makes, not the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the
bed, but only a particular bed?
Yes, I did.
Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence,
but only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the
work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence,
he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.
At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking
the truth.
No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.
*597B* No wonder.
Suppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who
this imitator is?
If you please.
[Sidenote: Three beds and three makers of beds.]
Well then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by
God, as I think that we may say--for no one else can be the maker?
No.
There is another which is the work of the carpenter?
Yes.
And the work of the painter is a third?
Yes.
Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who
superintend them: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?
Yes, there are three of them. {310}
*597C* God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature
and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever
will be made by God.
Why is that?
[Sidenote: (1) The creator. God could only make one bed; if he made two, a
third would still appear behind them.]
Because even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind
them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the
ideal bed and not the two others.
Very true, he said.
*597D* God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed,
not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed
which is essentially and by nature one only.
So we believe.
Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?
Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the
author of this and of all other things.
[Sidenote: (2) The human maker.]
And what shall we say of the carpenter--is not he also the maker of the
bed?
Yes.
But would you call the painter a creator and maker?
Certainly not.
Yet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?
[Sidenote: (3) The imitator, i.e. the painter or poet,]
*597E* I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator
of that which the others make.
Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an
imitator?
Certainly, he said.
And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other
imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?
That appears to be so.
Then about the imitator we are agreed. And what about *598A* the painter?
--I would like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which
originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?
The latter.
As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this. {311}
What do you mean?
[Sidenote: whose art is one of imitation or appearance and a long way
removed from the truth.]
I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view,
obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and the bed will
appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of
all things.
Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.
*598B* Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting
designed to be--an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear--of
appearance or of reality?
Of appearance.
[Sidenote: Any one who does all things does only a very small part of
them.]
Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all
things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part
an image. For example: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any
other artist, though he *598C* knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is
a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows
them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that
they are looking at a real carpenter.
Certainly.
[Sidenote: Any one who pretends to know all things is ignorant of the very
nature of knowledge.]
And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the
arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with
a higher degree of accuracy *598D* than any other man--whoever tells us
this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is
likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom
he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the
nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.
Most true.
[Sidenote: And he who attributes such universal knowledge to the poets is
similarly deceived.]
And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is
at their head, know all the arts and all *598E* things human, virtue as
well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose
well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge
can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there may not
be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and
been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their
works that *599A* these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth,
and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, {312} because
they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after all, they may be in
the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to
the many to speak so well?
The question, he said, should by all means be considered.
[Sidenote: He who could make the original would not make the image.]
Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well
as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making
branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life,
as if he had *599B* nothing higher in him?
I should say not.
The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in
realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of
himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of
encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.
Yes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and
profit.
[Sidenote: If Homer had been a legislator, or general, or inventor,]
Then, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about *599C* medicine,
or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not
going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like
Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads
were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at
second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics,
politics, education, which are the chiefest *599D* and noblest subjects of
his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we
say to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you
say of virtue, and not in the third--not an image maker or imitator--and
if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in
private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by
your help? The good *599E* order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and
many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others;
but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done
them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is Solon who
is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' Is
there any city which he might name?
I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that
he was a legislator. {313}
*600A* Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on
successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?
There is not.
Or is there any invention[1] of his, applicable to the arts or to human
life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other
ingenious men have conceived, which is attributed to him?
[Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ei)s].]
There is absolutely nothing of the kind.
But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or
teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends *600B* who loved to
associate with him, and who handed down to posterity an Homeric way of
life, such as was established by Pythagoras who was so greatly beloved for
his wisdom, and whose followers are to this day quite celebrated for the
order which was named after him?
Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus,
the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us
laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said,
Homer was *600C* greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when
he was alive?
[Sidenote: or had done anything else for the improvement of mankind, he
would not have been allowed to starve.]
Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that
if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind--if he had
possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator--can you imagine, I say,
that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by
them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others,
have only to whisper to their contemporaries: *600D* 'You will never be
able to manage either your own house or your own State until you appoint
us to be your ministers of education'--and this ingenious device of theirs
has such an effect in making men love them that their companions all but
carry them about on their shoulders. And is it conceivable that the
contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of
them to go about as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to make
mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them
as with gold, and have compelled them to stay {314} *600E* at home with
them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have
followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?
Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.
[Sidenote: The poets, like the painters, are but imitators;]
Then must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with
Homer, are only imitators; they copy images *601A* of virtue and the like,
but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have
already observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands
nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no
more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures.
Quite so.
In like manner the poet with his words and phrases[2] may be said to lay
on the colours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature
only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he
is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling,
or of military tactics, or of anything else, in metre and harmony *601B*
and rhythm, he speaks very well--such is the sweet influence which melody
and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must have observed again
and again what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of
the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in simple prose.
[Footnote 2: Or, 'with his nouns and verbs.']
Yes, he said.
They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming;
and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?
Exactly.
[Sidenote: they know nothing of true existence.]
Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of
true existence; he knows appearances only. *601C* Am I not right?
Yes.
Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an
explanation.
Proceed.
Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?
Yes. {315}
And the worker in leather and brass will make them?
Certainly.
[Sidenote: The maker has more knowledge than the imitator, but less than
the user. Three arts, using, making, imitating.]
But does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly
even the workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who
knows how to use them--he knows their right form.
Most true.
And may we not say the same of all things?
What?
*601D* That there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one
which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?
Yes.
[Sidenote: Goodness of things relative to use; hence the maker of them is
instructed by the user.]
And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or
inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which
nature or the artist has intended them.
True.
Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he
must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop
themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker
which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how
he ought *601E* to make them, and the other will attend to his
instructions?
Of course.
The one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and
badness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is
told by him?
True.
[Sidenote: The maker has belief and not knowledge, the imitator neither.]
The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the
maker will only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him
who knows, by talking to him *602A* and being compelled to hear what he
has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?
True.
But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his
drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being
compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions
about what he should draw? {316}
Neither.
Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about
the goodness or badness of his imitations?
I suppose not.
The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about
his own creations?
Nay, very much the reverse.
*602B* And still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a
thing good or bad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that
which appears to be good to the ignorant multitude?
Just so.
Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge
worth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or
sport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic
verse, are imitators in the highest degree?
Very true.
[Sidenote: Imitation has been proved to be thrice removed from the truth.]
*602C* And now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us
to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?
Certainly.
And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?
What do you mean?
I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when
seen at a distance?
True.
And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and
crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the
illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of
confusion is revealed within us; *602D* and this is that weakness of the
human mind on which the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and
shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like
magic.
True.
[Sidenote: The art of measuring given to man that he may correct the
variety of appearances.]
And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of
the human understanding--there {317} is the beauty of them--and the
apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery
over us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?
Most true.
*602E* And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational
principle in the soul?
To be sure.
And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal,
or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent
contradiction?
True.
But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible--the same
faculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same
thing?
Very true.
*603A* Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure
is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?
True.
And the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to
measure and calculation?
Certainly.
And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the
soul?
No doubt.
This was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that
painting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper
work, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and
associates of *603B* a principle within us which is equally removed from
reason, and that they have no true or healthy aim.
Exactly.
[Sidenote: The productions of the imitative arts are bastard and
illegitimate.]
The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior
offspring.
Very true.
And is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing
also, relating in fact to what we term poetry?
Probably the same would be true of poetry.
Do not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of
painting; but let us examine further and see {318} *603C* whether the
faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.
By all means.
We may state the question thus:--Imitation imitates the actions of men,
whether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad
result has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there
anything more?
No, there is nothing else.
[Sidenote: They imitate opposites;]
But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity *603D* with
himself--or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and
opposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there
not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the
question again, for I remember that all this has been already admitted;
and the soul has been acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten
thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment?
And we were right, he said.
Yes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an *603E* omission
which must now be supplied.
What was the omission?
Were we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son
or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more
equanimity than another?
Yes.
[Sidenote: they encourage weakness;]
But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help
sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?
The latter, he said, is the truer statement.
*604A* Tell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against
his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?
It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.
When he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which
he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?
True.
There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as
well as a feeling of his misfortune which is *604B* forcing him to indulge
his sorrow? {319}
True.
But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same
object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in
him?
Certainly.
One of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?
How do you mean?
[Sidenote: they are at variance with the exhortations of philosophy;]
The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we
should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such
things are good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also,
because no human *604C* thing is of serious importance, and grief stands
in the way of that which at the moment is most required.
What is most required? he asked.
That we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice
have been thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best;
not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck
and wasting time in setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul
forthwith *604D* to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and
fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by the healing art.
Yes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.
Yes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion
of reason?
Clearly.
[Sidenote: they recall trouble and sorrow;]
And the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles
and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call
irrational, useless, and cowardly?
Indeed, we may.
*604E* And does not the latter--I mean the rebellious principle--furnish a
great variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm
temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to
appreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a
promiscuous crowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented
is one to which they are strangers.
*605A* Certainly.
Then the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not {320} by nature
made, nor is his art intended, to please or to affect the rational
principle in the soul; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful
temper, which is easily imitated?
Clearly.
[Sidenote: they minister in an inferior manner to an inferior principle in
the soul.]
And now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter,
for he is like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an
inferior degree of truth--in this, *605B* I say, he is like him; and he is
also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and
therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered
State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and
impairs the reason. As in a city when the evil are permitted to have
authority and the good are put out of the way, so in the soul of man, as
we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he
indulges the *605C* irrational nature which has no discernment of greater
and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another
small--he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the
truth[3].
[Footnote 3: Reading [Greek: ei)dôlopoiou=nta ... a)phestô=ta].]
Exactly.
But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our
accusation:--the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and
there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?
Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.
[Sidenote: How can we be right in sympathizing with the sorrows of poetry
when we would fain restrain those of real life?]
Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage
of Homer, or one of the tragedians, in *605D* which he represents some
pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or
weeping, and smiting his breast--the best of us, you know, delight in
giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet
who stirs our feelings most.
Yes, of course I know.
But when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we
pride ourselves on the opposite quality--we would fain be quiet and
patient; this is the manly part, *605E* and the other which delighted us
in the recitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.
Very true, he said. {321}
Now can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that
which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?
No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.
*606A* Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.
What point of view?
[Sidenote: We fail to observe that a sentimental pity soon creates a real
weakness.]
If you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger
and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this
feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and
delighted by the poets;--the better nature in each of us, not having been
sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic *606B*
element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator
fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying
any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss
about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should
he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever
reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of
evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has
gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with
difficulty repressed in our own.
*606C* How very true!
[Sidenote: In like manner the love of comedy may turn a man into a
buffoon.]
And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which
you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or
indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and
are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;--the case of pity is
repeated;--there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise
a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were
afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having
stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed
unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home.
Quite true, he said.
*606D* And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other
affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be
inseparable from every action--in all of them {322} poetry feeds and
waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule,
although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in
happiness and virtue.
I cannot deny it.
[Sidenote: We are lovers of Homer, but we must expel him from our State.]
*606E* Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the
eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and
that he is profitable for education and for the ordering of human things,
and that you should *607A* take him up again and again and get to know him
and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour
those who say these things--they are excellent people, as far as their
lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest
of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our
conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only
poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond
this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse,
not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been
deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.
That is most true, he said.
[Sidenote: Apology to the poets.]
*607B* And now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this
our defence serve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in
sending away out of our State an art having the tendencies which we have
described; for reason constrained us. But that she may not impute to us
any harshness or want of politeness, let us tell her that there is an
ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many
proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or
of one 'mighty in *607C* the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages
circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all';
and there are innumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them.
Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts
of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a
well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her--we are very
conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth.
{323} I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her *607D* as
I am, especially when she appears in Homer?
Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.
Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon
this condition only--that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some
other metre?
Certainly.
And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of
poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf:
let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and
to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be
proved *607E* we shall surely be the gainers--I mean, if there is a use in
poetry as well as a delight?
Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.
[Sidenote: Poetry is attractive but not true.]
If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are
enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they
think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after
the manner of lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too
are inspired by that love of poetry which the education *608A* of noble
States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her
best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence,
this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to
ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into
the childish love of her which captivates the many. At all events we are
well aware[4] that poetry being such as we have described is not to be
regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her,
fearing for the safety of the *608B* city which is within him, should be
on his guard against her seductions and make our words his law.
[Footnote 4: Or, if we accept Madvig's ingenious but unnecessary
emendation [Greek: a)|so/metha], 'At all events we will sing, that' &c.]
Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.
Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater
than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be
profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under
the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue? {324}
Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any
one else would have been.
*608C* And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards
which await virtue.
What, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an
inconceivable greatness.
[Sidenote: The rewards of virtue extend not only to this little space of
human life but to the whole of existence.]
Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of
three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with
eternity?
Say rather 'nothing,' he replied.
And should an immortal being seriously think of this little *608D* space
rather than of the whole?
Of the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?
Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and
imperishable?
He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you
really prepared to maintain this?
Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too--there is no difficulty in proving
it.
I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this
argument of which you make so light.
Listen then.
I am attending.
There is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?
Yes, he replied.
*608E* Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and
destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the
good?
Yes.
[Sidenote: Everything has a good and an evil, and if not destroyed by its
own evil, will not be destroyed by that of another.]
And you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; *609A* as
ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as
mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in
everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and
disease?
Yes, he said.
And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at
last wholly dissolves and dies?
True.
The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction {325} of
each; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will;
*609B* for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is
neither good nor evil.
Certainly not.
If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot
be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there
is no destruction?
That may be assumed.
Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?
Yes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now *609C*
passing in review: unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.
[Sidenote: Therefore, if the soul cannot be destroyed by moral evil, she
certainly will not be destroyed by physical evil.]
But does any of these dissolve or destroy her?--and here do not let us
fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he
is detected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the
soul. Take the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease
which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of
which we were just now speaking come to annihilation *609D* through their
own corruption attaching to them and inhering in them and so destroying
them. Is not this true?
Yes.
Consider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which
exists in the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul
and inhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from
the body?
Certainly not.
And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish
from without through affection of external evil which could not be
destroyed from within by a corruption of its own?
It is, he replied.
*609E* Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether
staleness, decomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the
actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness
of food communicates corruption to the body, then we should say that the
body *610A* has been destroyed by a corruption of itself, which is
disease, brought on by this; but that the body, being one thing, can be
destroyed by the badness of food, which {326} is another, and which does
not engender any natural infection--this we shall absolutely deny?
Very true.
[Sidenote: Evil means the contagion of evil, and the evil of the body does
not infect the soul.]
And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of
the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be
dissolved by any merely external evil which belongs to another?
Yes, he said, there is reason in that.
Either, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it *610B* remains
unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife
put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the
minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until she herself is proved to
become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being
done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else if not destroyed
*610C* by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to
be affirmed by any man.
And surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men
become more unjust in consequence of death.
But if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul
boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and
unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like
disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who
take *610D* this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction
which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another
way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands
of others as the penalty of their deeds?
Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be
so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather
suspect the opposite to be the truth, *610E* and that injustice which, if
it have the power, will murder others, keeps the murderer alive--aye, and
well awake too; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of
death.
True, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable
to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the
destruction of some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except
that of which it was appointed to be the destruction. {327}
Yes, that can hardly be.
But the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether *611A* inherent
or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be
immortal?
Certainly.
[Sidenote: If the soul is indestructible, the number of souls can never
increase or diminish.]
That is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls
must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish
in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal
natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in
immortality.
Very true.
*611B* But this we cannot believe--reason will not allow us--any more than
we can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and
difference and dissimilarity.
What do you mean? he said.
The soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest
of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?
Certainly not.
[Sidenote: The soul, if she is to be seen truly, should be stripped of the
accidents of earth.]
Her immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are
many other proofs; but to see her as she *611C* really is, not as we now
behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you must
contemplate her with the eye of reason, in her original purity; and then
her beauty will be revealed, and justice and injustice and all the things
which we have described will be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have
spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must
remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be
compared *611D* to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can
hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed
and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and incrustations have
grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is more like
some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul which we
behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not
there, Glaucon, not there must we look.
Where then?
[Sidenote: Her true conversation is with the eternal.]
*611E* At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and {328} what
society and converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the
immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if
wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse
out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and
shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety spring up *612A*
around her because she feeds upon earth, and is overgrown by the good
things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is,
and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what her nature is.
Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this present life I
think that we have now said enough.
True, he replied.
[Sidenote: Having put aside for argument's sake the rewards of virtue, we
may now claim to have them restored.]
And thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument[5];
*612B* we have not introduced the rewards and glories of justice, which,
as you were saying, are to be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in
her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her own nature.
Let a man do what is just, whether he have the ring of Gyges or not, and
even if in addition to the ring of Gyges he put on the helmet of Hades.
[Footnote 5: Reading [Greek: a)pelusa/metha].]
Very true.
And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many
and how great are the rewards which *612C* justice and the other virtues
procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death.
Certainly not, he said.
Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?
What did I borrow?
The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just:
for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not
possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be
made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be
*612D* weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?
I should be much to blame if I had forgotten.
Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the
estimation in which she is held by gods and {329} men and which we
acknowledge to be her due should now be restored to her by us[6]; since
she has been shown to confer reality, and not to deceive those who truly
possess her, let what has been taken from her be given back, that so she
may win that palm of appearance which is hers also, and which she gives to
her own.
[Footnote 6: Reading [Greek: ê(mô=n].]
*612E* The demand, he said, is just.
In the first place, I said--and this is the first thing which you will
have to give back--the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known
to the gods.
Granted.
[Sidenote: The just man is the friend of the gods, and all things work
together for his good.]
And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other
the enemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?
True.
*613A* And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all
things at their best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary
consequence of former sins?
Certainly.
Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in
poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in
the end work together for good to him in life and death: for the gods have
a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as
far as *613B* man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of
virtue?
Yes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.
[Sidenote: The unjust is the opposite.]
And of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?
Certainly.
Such, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?
That is my conviction.
[Sidenote: He may be compared to a runner who is only good at the start.]
And what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and
you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run
well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal:
they go off at a great pace, *613C* but in the end only look foolish,
slinking away with their ears draggling on their shoulders, and without a
crown; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the {330}
prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just; he who endures to
the end of every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report
and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.
True.
[Sidenote: [Sidenote: Recapitulation of things unfit for ears polite which
had been described by Glaucon in Book II.]]
And now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you
were attributing to the fortunate unjust. *613D* I shall say of them, what
you were saying of the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers
in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give
in marriage to whom they will; all that you said of the others I now say
of these. And, on the other hand, of the unjust I say that the greater
number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and
look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and
miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and
*613E* then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term
them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you were
saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your
tale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that
these things are true?
Certainly, he said, what you say is true.
*614A* These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are
bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition
to the other good things which justice of herself provides.
Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.
And yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in
comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust
after death. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust
will have received from us a full payment of the debt which the argument
owes to them.
*614B* Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly
hear.
[Sidenote: Socrates.]
[Sidenote: The vision of Er.]
[Sidenote: The judgement.]
[Sidenote: The two openings in heaven and the two in earth through which
passed those who were beginning and those who had completed their
pilgrimage.]
[Sidenote: The meeting in the meadow.]
[Sidenote: The punishment tenfold the sin.]
[Sidenote: 'Unbaptized infants.']
[Sidenote: Ardiaeus the tyrant.]
[Sidenote: Incurable sinners.]
Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus
tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son
of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days
afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state
of corruption, his body was found unaffected by decay, and {331} carried
away home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the
funeral pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the
other world. He said that when his soul left the body he went on a journey
with a great company, *614C* and that they came to a mysterious place at
which there were two openings in the earth; they were near together, and
over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In the
intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after
they had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of
them, to ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner
the unjust were bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left
hand; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their
backs. He drew near, *614D* and they told him that he was to be the
messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they
bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place.
Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either opening
of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two
other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn
with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And *614E*
arriving ever and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and
they went forth with gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a
festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls
which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the
souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one
another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and
sorrowing *615A* at the remembrance of the things which they had endured
and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a
thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights
and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon, would take too
long to tell; but the sum was this:--He said that for every wrong which
they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a hundred
years--such being reckoned to be the length *615B* of man's life, and the
penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example,
there were any who had been {332} the cause of many deaths, or had
betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil
behaviour, for each and all of their offences they received punishment ten
times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and *615C* holiness
were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning
young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and
impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers[7], there were retributions
other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present
when one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now
this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been
the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and
his elder brother, *615D* and was said to have committed many other
abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: 'He comes not
hither and will never come. And this,' said he, 'was one of the dreadful
sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the cavern,
and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when of
a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants;
and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals *615E* who had
been great criminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return
into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a
roar, whenever any of these incurable sinners or some one who had not been
sufficiently punished tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect,
who were standing by and heard the sound, *616A* seized and carried them
off; and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw
them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road
at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the
passers-by what were their crimes, and that[8] they were being taken away
to be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which they had endured,
he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at
that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence,
one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These, said Er, were the
penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great. {333}
[Footnote 7: Reading [Greek: au)to/cheiras].]
[Footnote 8: Reading [Greek: kai\ o(/ti].]
[Sidenote: The whorls representing the spheres of the heavenly bodies.]
*616B* Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven
days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on
the fourth day after, he said that they came to a place where they could
see from above a line of light, straight as a column, extending right
through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the
rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to
the place, and there, in the *616C* midst of the light, they saw the ends
of the chains of heaven let down from above: for this light is the belt of
heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the
under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of
Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this
spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also
partly of other materials. *616D* Now the whorl is in form like the whorl
used on earth; and the description of it implied that there is one large
hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another
lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in
all, like vessels which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges
on the upper side, and on their *616E* lower side all together form one
continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home
through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the
rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following
proportions--the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to
the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is
sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest
[or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the
eighth [or moon] *617A* coloured by the reflected light of the seventh;
the second and fifth [Saturn and Mercury] are in colour like one another,
and yellower than the preceding; the third [Venus] has the whitest light;
the fourth [Mars] is reddish; the sixth [Jupiter] is in whiteness second.
Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in
one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of
these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the *617B*
seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness
appeared to move according to the law of this {334} reversed motion the
fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns
on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a
siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The eight
together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, *617C*
there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne:
these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white
robes and have chaplets upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos,
who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens--Lachesis
singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho
from time to time assisting with a touch of her right hand the revolution
of the outer circle of the whorl or spindle, and Atropos with her left
hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying *617D* hold
of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.
[Sidenote: The proclamation of the free choice.]
[Sidenote: The complexity of circumstances,]
[Sidenote: and their relation to the human soul.]
When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis;
but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he
took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having
mounted a high pulpit, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the
daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and
mortality. Your genius will not be allotted to you, *617E* but you will
choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first
choice, and the life which he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is
free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of
her; the responsibility is with the chooser--God is justified.' When the
Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots indifferently among them
all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er
himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the
number which he had obtained. *618A* Then the Interpreter placed on the
ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives
than the souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of
every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among
them, some lasting out the tyrant's life, others which broke off in the
middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were
{335} lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty
as well as for their strength and success in games, *618B* or, again, for
their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the
reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there
was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul, when
choosing a new life, must of necessity become different. But there was
every other quality, and the all mingled with one another, and also with
elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health; and there were
mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our
human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. *618C* Let
each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one
thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one
who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so
to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He
should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned
severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of
beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a *618D* particular
soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble
birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of
cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the
soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the
nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all these qualities he
will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and
so he will choose, giving the name *618E* of evil to the life which will
make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul
more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this
is *619A* the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take
with him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that
there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other
allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies,
he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let
him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as
far as possible, not only in this life but {336} in all *619B* that which
is to come. For this is the way of happiness.
[Sidenote: Habit not enough without philosophy when circumstances change.]
[Sidenote: The spectacle of the election.]
And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was
what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses
wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not
undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let
not the last despair.' And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice
came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having
been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole
matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he *619C*
was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had
time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast
and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet;
for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he
accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he
was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a
well-ordered State, but his virtue *619D* was a matter of habit only, and
he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly
overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore
they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from
earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a
hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also
because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny
for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival
in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, *619E*
and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as
the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another
life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be
smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle--sad and
laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls *620A* was in most
cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul
which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to
the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had {337}
been his murderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life
of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other
musicians, wanting to be men. The *620B* soul which obtained the
twentieth[9] lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax
the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice
which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon,
who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature
by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta;
she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the
temptation: and after her *620C* there followed the soul of Epeus the son
of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and
far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was
putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus
having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them
all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of
ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life
of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this,
which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; *620D* and
when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been
first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only
did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals
tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human
natures--the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all
sorts of combinations.
[Footnote 9: Reading [Greek: ei)kostê/n].]
All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of
their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had
severally chosen, to be the guardian *620E* of their lives and the
fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and
drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus
ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this,
carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made *621A* them
irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne
of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching
heat to the plain of {338} Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste
destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by
the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they
were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved
by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot
all things. *621B* Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of
the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant
they were driven upwards in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars
shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what
manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in
the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.
And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, *621C*
and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass
safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled.
Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and
follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is
immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil.
Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while
remaining here and when, like *621D* conquerors in the games who go round
to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both
in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been
describing.
INDEX.
A.
ABDERA, Protagoras of, 10. 600 C.
Abortion, allowed in certain cases, 5. 461 C.
Absolute beauty, 5. 476, 479; 6. 494 A, 501 B, 507 B;--absolute good, 6.
507 B; 7. 540 A;--absolute justice, 5. 479; 6. 501 B; 7. 517 E;--absolute
swiftness and slowness, 7. 529 D;--absolute temperance, 6. 501 B;
--absolute unity, 7. 524 E, 525 E;--the absolute and the many, 6. 507.
Abstract ideas, origin of, 7. 523. Cp. Idea.
Achaeans, 3. 389 E, 390 E, 393 A, D, 394 A.
Achilles, the son of Peleus, third in descent from Zeus, 3. 391 C; his
grief, _ib._ 388 A; his avarice, cruelty, and insolence, _ib._ 390 E,
391 A, B; his master Phoenix, _ib._ 390 E.
Active life, age for, 7. 539, 540.
Actors, cannot perform both tragic and comic parts, 3. 395 A.
Adeimantus, son of Ariston, a person in the dialogue, 1. 327 C; his
genius, 2. 368 A; distinguished at the battle of Megara, _ibid._; takes up
the discourse, _ib._ 362 D, 368 E, 376 D; 4. 419 A; 6. 487 A; 8. 548 E;
urges Socrates to speak in detail about the community of women and
children, 5. 449.
Adrasteia, prayed to, 5. 451 A.
Adultery, 5. 461 A.
Aeschylus, quoted:--
S. c. T. 451, 8. 550 C;
" 592, 2. 361 B, E;
" 593 _ib._ 362 A;
Niobe, fr. 146, 3. 391 E;
" fr. 151, 2. 380 A;
Xanthians, fr. 159, _ib._ 381 D;
Fab. incert. 266, _ib._ 383 B;
" " 326, 8. 563 C.
Aesculapius, _see_ Asclepius.
Affinity, degrees of, 5. 461.
Agamemnon, his dream, 2. 383 A; his gifts to Achilles, 3. 390 E; his anger
against Chryses, _ib._ 392 E foll.; shown by Palamedes in the play to be a
ridiculous general, 7. 522 D; his soul becomes an eagle, 10. 620 B.
Age, for active life, 7. 539, 540;--for marriage, 5. 460;--for philosophy,
7. 539.
Agent and patient have the same qualities, 4. 437.
Aglaion, father of Leontius, 4. 439 E.
Agriculture, tools required for, 2. 370 C.
Ajax, the son of Telamon, 10. 620 B; the reward of his bravery, 5. 468 D;
his soul turns into a lion, 10. 620 B.
Alcinous, 'tales of,' 10. 614 B.
Allegory, cannot be understood by the young, 2. 378 E.
Ambition, disgraceful, 1. 347 B (_cp._ 7. 520 D); characteristic of the
timocratic state and man, 8. 545, 548, 550 B, 553 E; easily passes into
avarice, _ib._ 553 E; assigned {340} to the passionate element of the
soul, 9. 581 A;--ambitious men, 5. 475 A; 6. 485 B.
Ameles, the river ( = Lethe), 10. 621 A, C.
Amusement, a means of education, 4. 425 A; 7. 537 A.
Anacharsis, the Scythian, his inventions, 10. 600 A.
Analogy of the arts applied to rulers, 1. 341; of the arts and justice,
_ib._ 349; of men and animals, 2. 375; 5. 459.
Anapaestic rhythms, 3. 400 B.
Anarchy, begins in music, 4. 424 E [_cp._ Laws 3. 701 B]; in democracies,
8. 562 D.
Anger, stirred by injustice, 4. 440.
Animals, liberty enjoyed by, in a democracy, 8. 562 E, 563 C; choose their
destiny in the next world, 10. 620 D [_cp._ Phaedr. 249 B].
Anticipations of pleasure and pain, 9. 584 D.
Aphroditè, bound by Hephaestus, 3. 390 C.
Apollo, song of, at the nuptials of Thetis, 2. 383 A; Apollo and Achilles,
3. 391 A; Chryses' prayer to, _ib._ 394 A; lord of the lyre, _ib._ 399 E;
father of Asclepius, _ib._ 408 C; the God of Delphi, 4. 427 A.
Appearance, power of, 2. 365 B, 366 C.
Appetite, good and bad, 5. 475 C.
Appetites, the, 8. 559; 9. 571 (_cp._ 4. 439).
Appetitive element of the soul, 4. 439 [_cp._ Tim. 70 E]; must be
subordinate to reason and passion, 4. 442 A; 9. 571 D; may be described as
the love of gain, 9. 581 A.
Arcadia, temple of Lycaean Zeus in, 8. 565 D.
Archilochus, quoted, 2. 365 C.
Architecture, 4. 438 C; necessity of pure taste in, 3. 401.
Ardiaeus, tyrant of Pamphylia, his eternal punishment, 10. 615 C, E.
Ares and Aphroditè, 3. 390 C.
Argos, Agamemnon, king of, 3. 393 E.
Argument, the longer and the shorter method of, 4. 435; 6. 504; misleading
nature of (Adeimantus), 6. 487; youthful love of, 7. 539 [_cp._ Phil.
15 E]. For the personification of the argument, _see_ Personification.
Arion, 5. 453 E.
Aristocracy (i.e. the ideal state or government of the best), 4. 445 C
(_cp._ 8. 544 E, 545 D, _and see_ State); mode of its decline, 8. 546;
--the aristocratical man, 7. 541 B; 8. 544 E (_see_ Guardians,
Philosopher, Ruler):--(in the ordinary sense of the word), 1. 338 D. Cp.
Constitution.
Ariston, father of Glaucon, 1. 327 A (_cp._ 2. 368 A).
Aristonymus, father of Cleitophon, 1. 328 B.
Arithmetic, must be learnt by the rulers, 7. 522-526; use of, in forming
ideas, _ib._ 524 foll. (_cp._ 10. 602); spirit in which it should be
pursued, 7. 525 D; common notions about, mistaken, _ib._ E; an excellent
instrument of education, _ib._ 526 [_cp._ Laws 5. 747]; employed in order
to express the interval between the king and the tyrant, 9. 587. Cp.
Mathematics.
Armenius, father of Er, the Pamphylian, 10. 614 B.
Arms, throwing away of, disgraceful, 5. 468 A; arms of Hellenes not to be
offered as trophies in the temples, _ib._ 470 A.
Army needed in a state, 2. 374.
Art, influence of, on character, 3. 400 foll.;--art of building, _ib._
401 A; 4. 438 C; carpentry, 4. 428 C; calculation, 7. 524, 526 B; 10. {341}
602; cookery, 1. 332 C; dyeing, 4. 429 D; embroidery, 3. 401 A; exchange,
2. 369 C; measurement, 10. 602; money-making, 1. 330; 8. 556; payment, 1.
346; tactics, 7. 522 E, 525 B; weaving, 3. 401 A; 5. 455 D; weighing, 10.
602 D;--the arts exercised for the good of their subject, 1. 342, 345-347
[_cp._ Euthyph. 13]; interested in their own perfection, 1. 342; differ
according to their functions, _ib._ 346; full of grace, 3. 401 A; must be
subject to a censorship, _ib._ B; causes of the deterioration of, 4. 421;
employment of children in, 5. 467 A; ideals in, _ib._ 472 D; chiefly
useful for practical purposes, 7. 533 A;--the arts and philosophy, 6.
495 E, 496 C (cp. _supra_ 5. 475 D, 476 A);--the handicraft arts a
reproach, 9. 590 C;--the lesser arts ([Greek: technu/dria]), 5. 475 D;
([Greek: te/chnia]), 6. 495 D;--three arts concerned with all things,
10. 601.
Art. [_Art, according to the conception of Plato, is not a collection of
canons of criticism, but a subtle influence which pervades all things
animate as well as inanimate_ (3. 400, 401). _He knows nothing of
'schools' or of the history of art, nor does he select any building or
statue for condemnation or admiration._ [_Cp._ Protag. 311 C, _where
Pheidias is casually mentioned as the typical sculptor, and_ Meno 91 D,
_where Socrates says that Pheidias, 'although he wrought such exceedingly
noble works,' did not make nearly so much money by them as Protagoras did
by his wisdom._] _Plato judges art by one test, 'simplicity,' but under
this he includes moderation, purity, and harmony of proportion; and he
would extend to sculpture and architecture the same rigid censorship which
he has already applied to poetry and music_ (3. 401 A). _He dislikes the
'illusions' of painting_ (10. 602) _and the 'false proportions' given by
sculptors to their subjects_ (Soph. 234 E), _both of which he classes as a
species of magic. With more justice he points out the danger of an
excessive devotion to art;_ (cp. _the ludicrous pictures of the unmanly
musician_ (3. 411), _and of the dilettanti who run about to every chorus_
(5. 475)). _But he hopes to save his guardians from effeminacy by the
severe discipline and training of their early years. Sparta and Athens are
to be combined_ [_cp._ Introduction, p. clxx]: _the citizens will live, as
Adeimantus complains, 'like a garrison of mercenaries'_ (4. 419); _but
they will be surrounded by an atmosphere of grace and beauty, which will
insensibly instil noble and true ideas into their minds._]
Artisans, necessary in the state, 2. 370; have no time to be ill,
3. 406 D.
Artist, the Great, 10. 596 [_cp._ Laws 10. 902 E];--the true artist does
not work for his own benefit, 1. 346, 347;--artists must imitate the good
only, 3. 401 C.
Asclepiadae, 3. 405 D, 408 B; 10. 599 C.
Asclepius, son of Apollo, 3. 408 C; not ignorant of the lingering
treatment, _ib._ 406 D; a statesman, _ib._ 407 E; said by the poets to
have been bribed to restore a rich man to life, _ib._ 408 B; left
disciples, 10. 599 C;--descendants of, 3. 406 A;--his sons at Troy,
_ibid._
Assaults, trials for, will be unknown in the best state, 5. 464 E.
Astronomy, must be studied by the rulers, 7. 527-530; spirit in which it
should be pursued, _ib._ 529, 530. {342}
Atalanta, chose the life of an athlete, 10. 620 B.
Athené, not to be considered author of the strife between Trojans and
Achaeans, 2. 379 E.
Athenian confectionery, 3. 404 E.
Athens, corpses exposed outside the northern wall of, 4. 439 E.
Athlete, Atalanta chooses the soul of an, 10. 620 B; athletes, obliged to
pay excessive attention to diet, 3. 404 A; sleep away their lives,
_ibid._; are apt to become brutalized, _ib._ 410, 411 (cp. 7. 535 D);--the
guardians athletes of war, 3. 403 E, 404 B; 4. 422; 7. 521 E; 8. 543
[_cp._ Laws 8. 830].
Atridae, 3. 393 A.
Atropos (one of the Fates), her song, 10. 617 C; spins the threads of
destiny, and makes them irreversible, _ib._ 620 E.
Attic confections, 3. 404 E.
Audience, _see_ Spectator.
Autolycus, praised by Homer, 1. 334 A.
Auxiliaries, the young warriors of the state, 3. 414; compared to dogs,
2. 376; 4. 440 D; 5. 451 D; have silver mingled in their veins, 3. 415 A.
Cp. Guardians.
Avarice, disgraceful, 1. 347 B; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 390 E;
falsely imputed to Achilles and Asclepius by the poets, _ib._ 391 B,
408 C; characteristic of timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548 A, 553.
B.
Barbarians, regard nakedness as improper, 5. 452; the natural enemies of
the Hellenes, _ib._ 469 D, 470 C [_cp._ Pol. 262 D]; peculiar forms of
government among, 8. 544 D.
Beast, the great, 6. 493; the many-headed, 9. 588, 589; 'the wild beast
within us,' _ib._ 571, 572.
Beautiful, the, and the good are one, 5. 452;--the many beautiful
contrasted with absolute beauty, 6. 507 B.
Beauty as a means of education, 3. 401 foll.; absolute beauty, 5. 476,
479; 6. 494 A, 501 B, 507 B [_cp._ Laws 2. 655 C].
Becoming, the passage from, to being, 7. 518 D, 521 D, 525 D.
Beds, the figure of the three, 10. 596.
Bee-masters, 8. 564 C.
Being and not being, 5. 477; true being the object of the philosopher's
desire, 6. 484, 485, 486 E, 490, 500 C; 7. 521, 537 D; 9. 581, 582 C (cp.
5. 475 E; 7. 520 B, 525; _and_ Phaedo 82; Phaedr. 249; Theaet. 173 E;
Soph. 249 D, 254); concerned with the invariable, 9. 585 C.
Belief, _see_ Faith.
Bendidea, a feast of Artemis, 1. 354 A (cp. 327 A, B).
Bendis, a title of Artemis, 1. 327 A.
Bias of Priene, 1. 335 E.
Birds, breeding of, at Athens, 5. 459.
Blest, Islands of the, 7. 519 C, 540 B.
Body, the, not self-sufficing, 1. 341 E; excessive care of, inimical to
virtue, 3. 407 (cp. 9. 591 D); has less truth and essence than the soul,
9. 585 D;--harmony of body and soul, 3. 402 D.
Body, the, and the members, comparison of the state to, 5. 462 D, 464 B.
Boxing, 4. 422.
Brass (and iron) mingled by the God in the husbandmen and craftsmen,
3. 415 A (cp. 8. 547 A).
Breeding of animals, 5. 459.
Building, art of, 3. 401 A; 4. 438 C.
Burial of the guardians, 3. 414 A; 5. 465 E, 469 A; 7. 540 B [_cp._ Laws
12. 947]. {343}
C.
Calculation, art of, corrects the illusions of sight, 10. 602 (cp.
7. 524); the talent for, accompanied by general quickness, 7. 526 B.
Cp. Arithmetic.
Captain, parable of the deaf, 6. 488.
Carpentry, 4. 428 C.
Causes, final, argument from, applied to justice, 1. 352: 6. 491 E,
495 B;--of crimes, 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A.
Cave, the image of the, 7. 514 foll., 532 (cp. 539 E).
Censorship of fiction, 2. 377; 3. 386-391, 401 A, 408 C; 10. 595 foll.
[_cp._ Laws 7. 801, 811]; of the arts, 3. 401.
Ceos, Prodicus of, 10. 600 C.
Cephalus, father of Polemarchus, 1. 327 B; offers sacrifice, _ib._ 328 B,
331 D; his views on old age, _ib._ 328 E; his views on wealth, _ib._ 330 A
foll.
Cephalus [of Clazomenae], 1. 330 B.
Cerberus, two natures in one, 9. 588 C.
Chance in war, 5. 467 E; blamed by men for their misfortunes, 10. 619 C.
Change in music, not to be allowed, 4. 424 [_cp._ Laws 7. 799].
Character, differences of, in men, 1. 329 D [_cp._ Pol. 307]; in women,
5. 456;--affected by the imitation of unworthy objects, 3. 395;--national
character, 4. 435 [_cp._ Laws 5. 747]:--great characters may be ruined by
bad education, 6. 491 E, 495 B; 7. 519:--faults of character, 6. 503
[_cp._ Theaet. 144 B].
Charmantides, the Paeanian, present at the dialogue, 1. 328 B.
Charondas, lawgiver of Italy and Sicily, 10. 599 E.
Cheese, 2. 372 C; 3. 405 E.
Cheiron, teacher of Achilles, 3. 391 C.
Children have spirit, but not reason, 4. 441 A; why under authority, 9.
590 E;--in the state, 3. 415; 5. 450 E, 457 foll.; 8. 543; must not hear
improper stories, 2. 377; 3. 391 C; must be reared amid fair sights and
sounds, 3. 401; must receive education even in their plays, 4. 425 A; 7.
537 A [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B]; must learn to ride, 5. 467 [_cp._ Laws 7.
804 C]; must go with their fathers and mothers into war, 5. 467; 7.
537 A:--transfer of children from one class to another, 3. 415;
4. 423 D:--exposure of children allowed, 5. 460 C, 461 C:--illegitimate
children, _ib._ 461 A.
Chimaera, two natures in one, 9. 588 C.
Chines, presented to the brave warrior, 5. 468 D.
Chryses, the priest of Apollo (Iliad i. 11 foll.), 3. 392 E foll.
Cithara, _see_ Harp.
Citizens, the, of the best state, compared to a garrison of mercenaries
(Adeimantus), 4. 419 (cp. 8. 543); will form one family, 5. 462 foll.
_See_ Guardians.
City, situation of the, 3. 415:--the 'city of pigs,' 2. 372:--the heavenly
city, 9. 592:--Cities, most, divided between rich and poor, 4. 422 E; 8.
551 E [_cp._ Laws 12. 945 E]:--the game of cities, 4. 422 E. Cp.
Constitution, State.
Classes, in the state, should be kept distinct, 2. 374; 3. 397 E, 415 A;
4. 421, 433 A, 434, 441 E, 443; 5. 453 (cp. 8. 552 A, _and_ Laws
8. 846 E).
Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus, present at the dialogue, 1. 328 B;
interposes on behalf of Thrasymachus, _ib._ 340 A.
Cleverness, no match for honesty, 3. 409 C (cp. 10. 613 C); not often
united with a steady character, 6. {344} 503 [_cp._ Theaet. 144 B]; needs
an ideal direction, 7. 519 [_cp._ Laws 7. 819 A].
Clotho, second of the fates, 10. 617 C, 620 E; sings of the present, _ib._
617 C; the souls brought to her, _ib._ 620 E.
Colours, comparison of, 9. 585 A; contrast of, _ib._ 586 C;--indelible
colours, 4. 429:--'colours' of poetry, 10. 601 A.
Comedy, cannot be allowed in the state, 3. 394 [_cp._ Laws 7. 816 D];
accustoms the mind to vulgarity, 10. 606;--same actors cannot act both
tragedy and comedy, 3. 395.
Common life in the state, 5. 458, 464 foll.;--common meals of the
guardians, 3. 416; common meals for women, 5. 458 D [_cp._ Laws 6. 781; 7.
806 E; 8. 839 D];--common property among the guardians, 3. 416 E;
4. 420 A, 422 D; 5. 464; 8. 543.
Community of women and children, 3. 416; 5. 450 E, 457 foll., 462, 464;
8. 543 A [_cp._ Laws 5. 739 C];--of property, 3. 416 E; 4. 420 A, 422 D;
5. 464; 8. 543;--of feeling, 5. 464.
Community. [_The communism of the Republic seems to have been suggested by
Plato's desire for the unity of the state_ (cp. 5. 462 foll.). _If those
'two small pestilent words, "meum" and "tuum," which have engendered so
much strife among men and created so much mischief in the world,' could be
banished from the lips and thoughts of mankind, the ideal state would soon
be realized. The citizens would have parents, wives, children, and
property in common; they would rejoice in each other's prosperity, and
sorrow at each other's misfortune; they would call their rulers not
'lords' and 'masters,' but 'friends' and 'saviours.' Plato is aware that
such a conception could hardly be carried out in this world; and he evades
or adjourns, rather than solves, the difficulty by the famous assertion
that only when the philosopher rules in the city will the ills of human
life find an end_ [_cp._ Introduction, p. clxxiii]. _In the Critias, where
the ideal state, as Plato himself hints to us_ (110 D), _is to some extent
reproduced in an imaginary description of ancient Attica, property is
common, but there is no mention of a community of wives and children.
Finally in the Laws_ (5. 739), _Plato while still maintaining the
blessings of communism, recognizes the impossibility of its realization,
and sets about the construction of a 'second-best state' in which the
rights of property are conceded; although, according to Aristotle_ (Pol.
ii. 6, § 4), _he gradually reverts to the ideal polity in all except a few
unimportant particulars._]
Conception, the, of truth by the philosopher, 6. 490 A.
Confidence and courage, 4. 430 B.
Confiscation of the property of the rich in democracies, 8. 565.
Constitution, the aristocratic, is the ideal state sketched in bk. iv (cp.
8. 544 E, 545 D);--defective forms of constitution, 4. 445 B; 8. 544
[_cp._ Pol. 291 E foll.]; aristocracy (in the ordinary sense), 1. 338 D;
timocracy or 'Spartan polity,' 8. 545 foll.; oligarchy, _ib._ 550 foll.,
554 E; democracy, _ib._ 555 foll., 557 D; tyranny, _ib._ 544 C, 562. Cp.
Government, State.
Contentiousness, a characteristic of timocracy, 8. 548.
Contracts, in some states not protected by law, 8. 556 A.
Contradiction, nature of, 4. 436; 10. 602 E; power of, 5. 454 A. {345}
Convention, justice a matter of, 2. 359 A.
Conversation, should not be personal, 6. 500 B.
Conversion of the soul, 7. 518, 521, 525 [_cp._ Laws 12. 957 E].
Cookery, art of, employed in the definition of justice, 1. 332 C.
Corinthian courtesans, 3. 404 D.
Corpses, not to be spoiled, 5. 469.
Correlative and relative, qualifications of, 4. 437 foll. [_cp._ Gorg.
476]; how corrected, 7. 524.
_Corruptio optimi pessima_, 6. 491.
Corruption, the, of youth, not to be attributed to the Sophists, but to
public opinion, 6. 492 A.
Courage, required in the guardians, 2. 375; 3. 386, 413 E, 416 E; 4. 429;
6. 503 E; inconsistent with the fear of death, 3. 386; 6. 486 A; = the
preservation of a right opinion about objects of fear, 4. 429, 442 B (cp.
2. 376, _and_ Laches 193, 195); distinguished from fearlessness, 4. 430 B;
one of the philosopher's virtues, 6. 486 A, 490 E, 494 A:--the courageous
temper averse to intellectual toil, _ib._ 503 D [_cp._ Pol. 306, 307].
Courtesans, 3. 404 D.
Covetousness, not found in the philosopher, 6. 485 E; characteristic of
timocracy and oligarchy, 8. 548, 553; = the appetitive element of the
soul, 9. 581 A.
Cowardice in war, to be punished, 5. 468 A; not found in the philosopher,
6. 486 B.
Creophylus, 'the child of flesh,' companion of Homer, 10. 600 B.
Crete, government of, generally applauded, 8. 544 C; a timocracy, _ib._
545 B;--Cretans, naked exercises among, 5. 452 C; call their country
'mother-land,' 9. 575 E;--Cretic rhythm, 3. 400 B.
Crimes, great and small, differently estimated by mankind, 1. 344
(cp. 348 D); causes of, 6. 491 E, 495 B; 8. 552 D; 9. 575 A.
Criminals, are usually men of great character spoiled by bad education,
6. 491 E, 495 B; numerous in oligarchies, 8. 552 D.
Croesus, 2. 359 C; 'as the oracle said to Croesus,' 8. 566 C.
Cronos, ill treated by Zeus, 2. 377 E; his behaviour to Uranus, _ibid._
Cunning man, the, no match for the virtuous, 3. 409 D.
Cycles, recurrence of, in nature, 8. 546 A [_cp._ Tim. 22 C; Crit. 109 D;
Pol. 269 foll.; Laws 3. 677].
D.
Dactylic metre, 3. 400 C.
Daedalus, beauty of his works, 7. 529 E.
Damon, an authority on rhythm, 3. 400 B (cp. 4. 424 C).
Dancing (in education), 3. 412 B.
Day-dreams, 5. 458 A, 476 C.
Dead (in battle) not to be stripped, 5. 469; judgment of the dead,
10. 615.
Death, the approach of, brings no terror to the aged, 1. 330 E; the
guardians must have no fear of, 3. 386, 387 (cp. 6. 486 C); preferable to
slavery, 3. 387 A.
Debts, abolition of, proclaimed by demagogues, 8. 565 E, 566 E.
Delphi, religion left to the god at, 4. 427 A (cp. 5. 461 E, 469 A;
7. 540 B).
Demagogues, 8. 564, 565.
Democracy, 1. 338 D; spoken of under the parable of the captain and the
mutinous crew, 6. 488; democracy and philosophy, _ib._ 494, 500; the third
form of imperfect state, 8. 544 [_cp._ Pol. 291, 292]; detailed account
of, _ib._ 555 foll.; characterised by freedom, _ib._ 557 B, 561-563; a
'bazaar of constitutions,' _ib._ 557 D; the {346} humours of democracy,
_ib._ E, 561; elements contained in, _ib._ 564.--democracy in animals,
_ib._ 563:--the democratical man, _ib._ 558, 559 foll., 561, 562; 9. 572;
his place in regard to pleasure, 9. 587.
Desire, has a relaxing effect on the soul, 4. 430 A; the conflict of
desire and reason, 4. 440 [_cp._ Phaedr. 253 foll.; Tim. 70 A];--the
desires divided into simple and qualified, 4. 437 foll.; into necessary
and unnecessary, 8. 559.
Despots (masters), 5. 463 A. _See_ Tyrant.
Destiny, the, of man in his own power, 10. 617 E.
Dialectic, the most difficult branch of philosophy, 6. 498; objects of,
_ib._ 511; 7. 537 D; proceeds by a double method, 6. 511; compared to
sight, 7. 532 A; capable of attaining to the idea of good, _ibid._; gives
firmness to hypotheses, _ib._ 533; the coping stone of the sciences, _ib._
534 [_cp._ Phil. 57]; must be studied by the rulers, _ib._ 537; dangers of
the study, _ibid._; years to be spent in, _ib._ 539; distinguished from
eristic, _ib._ D (cp. 5. 454 A; 6. 499 A):--the dialectician has a
conception of essence, 7. 534 [_cp._ Phaedo 75 D].
Dialectic. [_Dialectic, the 'coping stone of knowledge,' is everywhere
distinguished by Plato from eristic, i.e., argument for argument's sake_
[_cp._ Euthyd. 275 foll., 293; Meno 75 D; Phaedo 101; Phil. 17; Theaet.
167 E]. _It is that 'gift of heaven'_ (Phil. 16) _which teaches men to
employ the hypotheses of science, not as final results, but as points from
which the mind may rise into the higher heaven of ideas and behold truth
and being. This vague and magnificent conception was probably hardly
clearer to Plato himself when he wrote the Republic than it is to us_
[_cp._ Introduction, p. xcii]; _but in the Sophist and Statesman it
appears in a more definite form as a combination of analysis and synthesis
by which we arrive at a true notion of things._ [_Cp. the_ [Greek:
u(phêgême/nê metho/dos] _of Aristotle_ (Pol. i. 1, § 3; 8, § 1), _which is
an analogous mode of proceeding from the parts to the whole.] In the Laws
dialectic no longer occupies a prominent place; it is the 'old man's
harmless amusement'_ (7. 820 C), _or, regarded more seriously, the method
of discussion by question and answer, which is abused by the natural
philosophers to disprove the existence of the Gods_ (10. 891).]
Dice ([Greek: ku/boi]), 10. 604 C; skill required in dice-playing,
2. 374 C.
Diet, 3. 404; 8. 559 C [_cp._ Tim. 89].
Differences, accidental and essential, 5. 454.
Diomede, his command to the Greeks (Iliad iv. 412), 3. 389 E; 'necessity
of,' (proverb), 6. 493 D.
Dionysiac festival (at Athens), 5. 475 D.
Discord, causes of, 5. 462; 8. 547 A, 556 E; the ruin of states, 5. 462;
distinguished from war, _ib._ 470 [_cp._ Laws 1. 628, 629].
Discourse, love of, 1. 328 A; 5. 450 B; increases in old age, 1. 328 D;
pleasure of, in the other world, 6. 498 D [_cp._ Apol. 41].
Disease, origin of, 3. 404; the right treatment of, _ib._ 405 foll.; the
physician must have experience of, in his own person, _ib._ 408; disease
and vice compared, 4. 444; 10. 609 foll. [_cp._ Soph. 228; Pol. 296; Laws
10. {347} 906]; inherent in everything, 10. 609.
Dishonesty, thought by men to be more profitable than honesty, 2. 364 A.
Dithyrambic poetry, nature of, 3. 394 B.
Diversities of natural gifts, 2. 370; 5. 455; 7. 535 A.
Division of labour, 2. 370, 374 A; 3. 394 E, 395 B, 397 E; 4. 423 E, 433 A,
435 A, 441 E, 443, 453 B; a part of justice, 4. 433, 435 A, 441 E (cp.
_supra_ 1. 332, 349, 350, _and_ Laws 8. 846 C);--of lands, proclaimed by
the would-be tyrant, 8. 565 E, 566 E.
Doctors, flourish when luxury increases in the state, 2. 373 C; 3. 405 A;
two kinds of, 5. 459 C [_cp._ Laws 4. 720; 9. 857 D]. Cp. Physician.
Dog, Socrates' oath by the, 3. 399 E; 8. 567 E; 9. 592;--dogs are
philosophers, 2. 376; the guardians the watch-dogs of the state, _ibid._;
4. 440 D; 5. 451 D; breeding of dogs, 5. 459.
Dolphin, Arion's, 5. 453 E.
Dorian harmony, allowed, with the Phrygian, in the state, 3. 399 A.
Draughts, 1. 333 A; skill required in, 2. 374 C;--comparison of an
argument to a game of draughts, 6. 487 C.
Dreams, an indication of the bestial element in human nature, 9. 571, 572,
574 E.
Drones, the, 8. 552, 554 C, 555 E, 559 C, 564 B, 567 E; 9. 573 A [_cp._
Laws 10. 901 A].
Drunkenness, in heaven, 2. 363 D; forbidden in the guardians, 3. 398 E,
403 E;--the drunken man apt to be tyrannical, 8. 573 C. Cp. Intoxication.
Dyeing, 4. 429 D.
E.
Early society, 2. 359.
Eating, pleasure accompanying, 8. 559.
Education, commonly divided into gymnastic for the body and music for the
soul, 2. 376 E, 403 (_see_ Gymnastic, Music, _and_ _cp._ Laws 7. 795 E);
both music and gymnastic really designed for the soul, 3. 410:--use of
fiction in, 2. 377 foll.; 3. 391; the poets bad educators, 2. 377; 3. 391,
392, 408 B; 10. 600, 606 E, 607 B [_cp._ Laws 10. 886 C, 890 A]; must be
simple, 3. 397, 404 E; melody in, _ib._ 398 foll.; mimetic art in, _ib._
399; importance of good surroundings, _ib._ 401; influence of, on manners,
4. 424, 425; innovation in, dangerous, _ibid._; early, should be given
through amusement, _ib._ 425 A; 7. 536 E [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B]; ought to
be the same for men and women, 5. 451 foll., 466; dangerous when
ill-directed, 6. 491; not a process of acquisition, but the use of powers
already existing in us, 7. 518; not to be compulsory, _ib._ 537
A;--education of the guardians, 2. 376 foll.; 4. 429, 430; 7. 521 (cp.
Guardians, Ruler);--the higher or philosophic education, 6. 498, 503 E,
504; 7. 514-537; age at which it should commence, 6. 498; 7. 537; 'the
longer way,' 6. 504 (cp. 4. 435); 'the prelude or preamble,' 7. 532 E.
Education. [_Education in the Republic is divided into two parts,_ (i)
_the common education of the citizens;_ (ii) _the special education of the
rulers._ (i) _The first, beginning with childhood in the plays of the
children_ [_cp._ Laws 1. 643 B], _is the old Hellenic education,_ [_the_
[Greek: katabeblême/na paideu/mata] _of Aristotle_, Pol. viii. 2, § 6],
{348}--_'music for the mind and gymnastic for the body'_ [_cp._ Laws 7.
795 E]. _But Plato soon discovers that both are really intended for the
benefit of the soul_ [_cp._ Laws 5. 743 D]; _and under 'music' he includes
literature_ ([Greek: lo/goi]), _i.e. humane culture as distinguished from
scientific knowledge. Music precedes gymnastic; both are not to be learned
together; only the simpler kinds of either are tolerated_ [_cp._ Laws Book
VII, _passim_]. _Boys and girls share equally in both_ [_cp._ Laws 7.
794 D]. _The greatest attention must be paid to good surroundings; nothing
mean or vile must meet the eye or strike the ear of the young scholar. The
fairy tales of childhood and the fictions of the poets are alike placed
under censorship_ [_cp._ Laws Book X, _and see s. v._ Poetry]. _Gentleness
is to be united with manliness; beauty of form and activity of mind are to
mingle in perfect and harmonious accord._--(ii) _The special education
commences at twenty by the selection of the most promising students. These
spend ten years in the acquisition of the higher branches of arithmetic,
geometry, astronomy, harmony_ [_cp._ Laws 7. 817 E], _which are not to be
pursued in a scientific spirit or for utility only, but rather with a view
to their combination by means of dialectic into an ideal of all knowledge_
(_see s. v._ Dialectic). _At thirty a further selection is made: those
selected spend five years in the study of philosophy, are then sent into
active life for fifteen years, and finally after fifty return to
philosophy, which for the remainder of their days is to form their chief
occupation_ (_see s. v._ Rulers).]
Egyptians, characterised by love of money, 4. 435 E.
Elder, the, to bear rule in the state, 3. 412 B [_cp._ Laws 3. 690 A;
4. 714 E]; to be over the younger, 5. 465 A [_cp._ Laws 4. 721 D; 9. 879 C;
11. 917 A].
Embroidery, art of, 3. 401 A.