only God, but his neighbour as well; as Cato says: "Reverence parents."
Hence religion establishes a relation between ourselves and our
neighbour as well as between ourselves and God.
But we are said to reverence those men whom we honour or
remember, or to whose presence we resort. So, too, even things
which are subject to us are said to be "cultivated" by us
(_coli_); thus husbandmen (_agricolae_) are so called because
they "cultivate" the fields; the inhabitants of a place, too
(_incolae_), are so called because they "cultivate" the spots
where they dwell. But since special honour is due to God as the
First Principle of all, a special kind of "cultus"[41] or
"reverence" is His due, and this the Greeks call _eusebia_ or
_theosebia_, as S. Augustine says.[42]
5. Lastly, all who are in a state of salvation are subject to God. But
not all who are in a state of salvation are called "religious," but
those only who bind themselves by certain vows and observances and who
undertake to obey certain men. Hence religion does not seem to mean the
relationship of subjection of man to God.
But although, generally speaking, all those who worship God can
be termed "religious," yet those are specially so called who
dedicate their whole lives to the Divine worship and cut
themselves off from worldly occupations.
Thus those are not termed "contemplatives" who merely
contemplate, but they who devote their lives to contemplation.
And such men do not subject themselves to men for man's sake,
but for God's, as the Apostle says: _You received me as an Angel
of God, even as Christ Jesus._[43]
* * * * *
_S. Augustine_: We are to abide in Christ! How then shall That not be
now our possession Where we are then to abide and Whence we are to draw
Life? Let Holy Scripture speak for us lest we should seem in mere
conjecture to be saying things contrary to the teaching of the Word of
God. Hear the words of one who knew: _If God be for us who is against
us?_[44] _The Lord_, he says, _is the portion of my inheritance._[45] He
saith not: Lord, what wilt Thou give me for mine inheritance? All that
Thou canst give me is worthless! Be Thou mine inheritance! Thee do I
love! Thee do I wholly love! With all my heart, with all my soul, with
all my mind do I love Thee! What, then, shall be my lot? What wilt Thou
give me save Thyself? This is to love God freely. This is to hope for
God from God. This is to hasten to be filled with God, to be sated with
Him. For He is sufficient for thee; apart from Him nought can suffice
thee! (_Sermon_, cccxxxiv. 3).
_S. Augustine_: I cried to the Lord with my voice.[46] Many cry to the
Lord that they may win riches, that they may avoid losses; they cry that
their family may be established, they ask for temporal happiness, for
worldly dignities; and, lastly, they cry for bodily health, which is the
patrimony of the poor. For these and suchlike things many cry to the
Lord; hardly one cries for the Lord Himself! How easy it is for a man to
desire all manner of things from the Lord and yet not desire the Lord
Himself! As though the gift could be sweeter than the Giver! (_on Ps._
lxxvi.).
_S. Augustine:_ Picture God as saying to you--He Who re-created you and
adopted you: "My son, why is it that day by day you rise and pray, and
genuflect, and even strike the ground with your forehead, nay, sometimes
even shed tears, while you say to Me: 'My Father, my God! give me
wealth!' If I were to give it to you, you would think yourself of some
importance, you would fancy you had gained something very great. Yet
because you asked for it you have it. But take care to make good use of
it. Before you had it you were humble; now that you have begun to be
rich you despise the poor! What kind of a good is that which only makes
you worse? For worse you are, since you were bad already. And that it
would make you worse you knew not, hence you asked it of Me. I gave it
to you and I proved you; you have found--and you are found out! You were
hidden when you had nothing. Correct thyself! Vomit up this cupidity!
Take a draught of charity!... Ask of Me better things than these,
greater things than these. Ask of Me spiritual things. Ask of Me
Myself!" (_Sermon_, cccxi. 14-15).
II
Is Religion a Virtue?
A virtue is that which both renders its possessor, as also his work,
good. Hence we must say that every good act comes under virtue. And it
is clear that to render to another what is his due has the character of
a good act; for by the fact that a man renders to another his due there
is established a certain fitting proportion and order between them. But
order comes under the ratio of good, just as do measure and species, as
S. Augustine establishes.[47] Since, then, it belongs to religion to
render to some one, namely, God, the honour which is His due, it is
clear that religion is a virtue.
Some, however, deny this, thus:
1. It belongs to religion to show reverence to God. But reverence is an
act of fear, and fear is a gift.[48] Religion, then, is a gift, not a
virtue.
To reverence God is indeed an act of the gift of fear. But to
religion it belongs to do certain things by reason of our
reverence for God. Hence it does not follow that religion is the
same thing as the gift of fear, but it is related to it as to a
higher principle. For the gifts are superior to the moral
virtues.
2. All virtue consists in the free-will, and hence virtue is called an
elective or voluntary habit. But _latria_ belongs to religion, and
_latria_ implies a certain servitude. Hence religion is not a virtue.
But even a servant can freely give to his master the service
that is his due and thus "make a virtue of necessity"[49] by
voluntarily paying his debt. And similarly the payment of due
service to God can be an act of virtue according as a man does
it voluntarily.
3. Lastly, as is said in Aristotle's _Ethics_,[50] the aptitude for the
virtues is implanted in us by nature; hence those things which come
under the virtues arise from the dictates of natural reason; but it
belongs to religion to offer external reverence to the Divine Nature.
Ceremonial, however, or external reverence, is not due to the dictates
of natural reason. Hence religion is not a virtue.
But it is due to the dictates of natural reason that a man does
certain things in order to show reverence to God. That he should
do precisely this or that, however, does not come from the
dictates of natural reason, but from Divine or human positive
law.
III
Is Religion One Virtue?
S. Paul says to the Ephesians[51]: _One God, one faith._ But true
religion maintains faith in one God. Consequently religion is one
virtue.
Habits are distinguished according to the divers objects with which they
are concerned. But it belongs to religion to show reverence for the One
God for one particular reason, inasmuch, namely, as He is the First
Principle, the Creator and Governor of all things; hence we read in
Malachi[52]: _If I am a Father, where is my honour?_ for it is the
father that produces and governs. Hence it is clear that religion is but
one virtue.
But some maintain that religion is not one virtue, thus:
1. By religion we are ordained[53] to God. But in God there are Three
Persons, and, moreover, divers attributes which are at least
distinguishable from one another by reason. But the diverse character of
the objects on which they fall suffices to differentiate the virtues.
Hence religion is not one virtue.
But the Three Divine Persons are but One Principle as concerns
the creation and the government of things. And consequently They
are to be served by one religion. And the divers attributes all
concur in the First Principle, for God produces all and governs
all by His Wisdom, His Will, and the power of His Goodness.
Hence religion is but one virtue.
2. One virtue can have but one act; for habits are differentiated
according to their acts. But religion has many acts, _e.g._, to worship,
to serve, to make vows, to pray, to make sacrifices, and many other
similar things. Consequently religion is not one virtue.
But by one and the same act does man serve God and worship Him;
for worship is referred to God's excellence, to which is due
reverence: service regards man's subjection, for by reason of
his condition he is bound to show reverence to God. And under
these two heads are comprised all the acts which are attributed
to religion; for by them all man makes protestation of the
Divine excellence and of his subjection of himself to God,
either by offering Him something, or, again, by taking upon
himself something Divine.
3. Further, adoration belongs to religion. But adoration is paid to
images for one reason and to God for another. But since diversity of
"reason" serves to differentiate the virtues, it seems that religion is
not one virtue.
But religious worship is not paid to images considered in
themselves as entities, but precisely as images bringing God
Incarnate to our mind. Further, regarding an image precisely as
an image of some one, we do not stop at it; it carries us on to
that which it represents. Hence the fact that religious
veneration is paid to images of Christ in no sense means that
there are various kinds of _latria_, nor different virtues of
religion.
IV
Is Religion a Special Virtue Distinct From Others?
Religion is regarded as a part of Justice, and is distinct from the
other parts of Justice.
Since virtue is ordained to what is good, where there exists some
special ratio of good there must be some special corresponding virtue.
But the particular good towards which religion is ordained is the
showing due honour to God. Honour, however, is due by reason of some
excellency. And to God belongs pre-eminent excellence, since He in every
possible way infinitely transcends all things. Hence special honour is
due to Him; just as we note that in human concerns varying honours are
due to the varying excellencies of persons; one is the honour of a
father, another that of a king, and so on. Hence it is manifest that
religion is a special virtue.
Some, however, maintain that religion is not a special virtue distinct
from others, thus:
1. S. Augustine says[54]: "True sacrifice is every work undertaken in
order that we may be joined to God in holy fellowship." But sacrifice
comes under religion. Every work of virtue therefore comes under
religion. And consequently it is not a special virtue.
But every work of virtue is said to be a sacrifice in so far as
it is directed to showing God reverence. It does not thence
follow that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands
all the other virtues.
2. The Apostle says to the Corinthians[55]: _Do all to the glory of
God._ But it belongs to religion to do some things for the glory of God.
Hence religion is not a special virtue.
But all kinds of acts, in so far as they are done for the glory
of God, come under religion; not, however, as though it elicited
them, but inasmuch as it controls them. Those acts, however,
come under religion as eliciting them which, by their own
specific character, pertain to the service of God.
3. Lastly, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the
charity by which we love our neighbour. But in the _Ethics_[56] it is
said: "To be honoured is akin to being loved." Hence religion by which
God is honoured is not a specifically distinct virtue from those
observances, whether _dulia_ or piety, whereby we honour our neighbour.
Hence it is not a special virtue.
But the object of love is a _good_ thing; whereas the object of
honour or reverence is what is _excellent_. But it is God's
Goodness that is communicated to His creatures, not the
excellence of His Goodness. Hence while the charity wherewith we
love God is not a distinct virtue from the charity wherewith we
love our neighbour, yet the religion whereby we honour God is
distinct from the virtues whereby we honour our neighbour.
V
Is Religion One of the Theological Virtues?
Religion is considered a part of Justice, and this is a moral virtue.
Religion is the virtue whereby we offer to God His due honour. Two
things have therefore to be considered in religion. First we have to
consider what religion offers God, namely, worship: this may be regarded
as the material and the object with which religion is concerned.
Secondly, we have to consider Him to Whom it is offered, namely, God
Himself. Now, when worship is offered to God it is not as though our
worshipful acts touched God, though this is the case when we believe
God, for by believing in God we touch Him (and we have therefore said
elsewhere[57] that God is the object of our faith not simply inasmuch as
we believe in God, but inasmuch as we believe God). Due worship,
however, is offered to God in that certain acts whereby we worship Him
are performed as homage to Him, the offering sacrifice, for instance,
and so forth. From all which it is evident that God does not stand to
the virtue of religion as its object or as the material with which it is
concerned, but as its goal. And consequently religion is not a
theological virtue, for the object of these latter is the ultimate end;
but religion is a moral virtue, and the moral virtues are concerned with
the means to the end.
But some regard religion as a theological virtue, thus:
1. S. Augustine says[58]: "God is worshipped by faith, hope, and
charity," and these are theological virtues. But to offer worship to God
comes under religion. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
But it is always the case that a faculty or a virtue whose
object is a certain end, controls--by commanding--those
faculties or virtues which have to do with those things which
are means to that end. But the theological virtues--_i.e._,
faith, hope, and charity--are directly concerned with God as
their proper object. And hence they are the cause--by commanding
it--of the act of the virtue of religion which does certain
things having relation to God. It is in this sense that S.
Augustine says that "God is worshipped by faith, hope, and
charity."
2. Those are called theological virtues which have God for their object.
But religion has God for its object, for it directs us to God alone.
Therefore it is a theological virtue.
But religion directs man to God, not indeed as towards its
object, but as towards its goal.
3. Lastly, every virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral.
But religion is not an intellectual virtue, for its perfection does not
consist in the consideration of the truth. Neither is it a moral virtue,
for the property of the moral virtues is to steer a middle course
betwixt what is superfluous and what is below the requisite; whereas no
one can worship God to excess, according to the words of
Ecclesiasticus[59]: _For He is above all praise._ Religion, then, can
only be a theological virtue.
But religion is neither an intellectual nor a theological
virtue, but a moral virtue, for it is part of justice. And the
_via media_ in religion lies, not between the passions, but in a
certain harmony which it establishes in the acts which are
directed towards God. I say "a certain," not an absolute
harmony, for we can never show to God all the worship that is
His due; I mean, then, the harmony arising from the
consideration of our human powers and of the Divine acceptance
of what we offer. Moreover, there can be excess in those things
which have to do with the Divine worship; not indeed as regards
quantity, but in certain other circumstances, as, for example,
when Divine worship is offered to whom it should not, or at
times when it should not, or in other unfitting circumstances.
VI
Is Religion to be preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?
In Exodus[60] the commandments which concern religion are put first, as
though they were of primary importance. But the order of the
commandments is proportioned to the order of the virtues; for the
commandments of the Law fall upon the acts of the virtues. Hence
religion is chief among the moral virtues.
The means to an end derive their goodness from their relation to that
end; hence the more nigh they are to the end the better they are. But
the moral virtues are concerned with those things which are ordained to
God as their goal. And religion approaches more nearly to God than do
the other moral virtues, inasmuch as it is occupied with those things
which are directly and immediately ordained to the Divine honour. Hence
religion is the chief of the moral virtues.
Some, however, deny that religion is pre-eminent among the moral
virtues, thus:
1. The perfection of a moral virtue lies in this, that it keeps the due
medium.[61] But religion fails to attain the medium of justice, for it
does not render to God anything absolutely equal to Him. Hence religion
is not better than the other moral virtues.
But the praiseworthiness of a virtue lies in the will, not in
the power. Hence to fall short of equality--which is the midpath
of justice--for lack of power, does not make virtue less
praiseworthy, provided the deficiency is not due to the will.
2. Again, in our service of men a thing seems to be praiseworthy in
proportion to the need of him whom we assist; hence it is said in
Isaias:[62] _Deal thy bread to the hungry._ But God needs nothing that
we can offer Him, according to the Psalmist: _I have said: Thou art my
God, for Thou hast no need of my goods._[63] Hence religion seems to be
less praiseworthy than the other virtues, for by them man is succoured.
But in the service we render to another for his profit, that is
the more praiseworthy which is rendered to the most needy,
because it is of greater profit to him. But no service is
rendered to God for His profit--for His glory, indeed, but for
our profit.
3. Lastly, the greater the necessity for doing a thing the less worthy
it is of praise, according to the words: _For if I preach the Gospel, it
is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me._[64] But the greater
the debt the greater the necessity. Since, then, the service which man
offers to God is the greatest of debts, it would appear that religion is
the least praiseworthy of all human virtues.
Where necessity comes in the glory of supererogation is
non-existent; but the merit of the virtue is not thereby
excluded, provided the will be present. Consequently the
argument does not follow.
VII
Has Religion, That is _Latria_,[65] any External Acts?
In Ps. lxxxiii. 3 it is said: _My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in
the living God._ Now interior acts belong to the heart, and in the same
way exterior acts are referred to the members of the body. It appears,
then, that God is to be worshipped by exterior as well as by interior
acts.
We do not show reverence and honour to God for His own sake--for He in
Himself is filled with glory to which nought can be added by any created
thing--but for our own sakes. For by the fact that we reverence and
honour God our minds are subjected to Him, and in that their perfection
lies; for all things are perfected according as they are subjected to
that which is superior to them--the body, for instance, when vivified by
the soul, the air when illumined by the sun. Now the human mind
needs--if it would be united to God--the guidance of the things of
sense; for, as the Apostle says to the Romans[66]: _The invisible things
of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made_.
Hence in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of certain
corporal acts, so that by their means, as by certain signs, man's mind
may be stirred up to those spiritual acts whereby it is knit to God.
Consequently religion has certain interior acts which are its chief ones
and which essentially belong to it; but it has also external acts which
are secondary and which are subordinated to the interior acts.
* * * * *
Some deny, however, that exterior acts belong to religion or _latria_,
thus:
1. In S. John iv. 24 we read: _For God is a Spirit, and they that adore
Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth._ External acts belong,
however, rather to the body than to the spirit. Consequently religion,
which comprises adoration, has no exterior acts, but only interior.
But here the Lord speaks only of that which is chiefest and
which is essentially intended in Divine worship.
2. The end of religion is to show reverence and honour to God. But it is
not reverent to offer to a superexcellent person what properly belongs
to inferiors. Since, then, what a man offers by bodily acts seems more
in accordance with men's needs and with that respect which we owe to
inferior created beings, it does not appear that it can fittingly be
made use of in order to show reverence to God.
But such external acts are not offered to God as though He
needed them, as He says in the Psalm: _Shall I eat the flesh of
bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?_[67] But such
acts are offered to God as signs of those interior and spiritual
works which God accepts for their own sakes. Hence S. Augustine
says: "The visible sacrifice is the sacrament--that is, the
visible sign--of the invisible sacrifice."[68]
3. Lastly, S. Augustine praises Seneca[69] for his condemnation of those
men who offered to their idols what they were wont to offer to men: on
the ground, namely, that what belongs to mortal men is not fittingly
offered to the immortals. Still less, then, can such things be fittingly
offered to the True God Who is _above all gods_.[70] Therefore to
worship God by means of bodily acts seems to be reprehensible. And
consequently religion does not include bodily acts.
But idolaters are so called because they offer to their idols
things belonging to men, and this not as outward signs which may
excite in them spiritual affections, but as being acceptable by
those idols for their own sake. And especially because they
offered them empty and vile things.
* * * * *
_S. Augustine:_ When men pray, they, as becomes suppliants, make use of
their bodily members, for they bend the knee, they stretch forth their
hands, they even prostrate on the ground and perform other visible acts.
Yet all the while their invisible will and their heart's intention are
known to God. He needs not these signs for the human soul to be laid
bare before Him. But man by so doing stirs himself up to pray and groan
with greater humility and fervour. I know not how it is that whereas
such bodily movements can only be produced by reason of some preceding
act on the part of the soul, yet when they are thus visibly performed
the interior invisible movement which gave them birth is thereby itself
increased, and the heart's affections--which must have preceded, else
such acts would not have been performed--are thereby themselves
increased.
Yet none the less, if a man be in some sort hindered so that he is not
at liberty to make use of such external acts, the interior man does not
therefore cease to pray; in the secret chamber of his heart, where lies
compunction, he lies prostrate before the eyes of God (_Of Care for the
Dead_, v.).
VIII
Is Religion the Same as Sanctity?
In S. Luke's Gospel[71] we read: _Let us serve Him in holiness and
justice._ But to serve God comes under religion. Hence religion is the
same as sanctity.
The word "sanctity" seems to imply two things. First, it seems to imply
_cleanness_; and this is in accordance with the Greek word for it, for
in Greek it is _hagios_,[72] as though meaning "without earth."
Secondly, it implies _stability_, and thus among the ancients those
things were termed _sancta_ which were so hedged about with laws that
they were safe from violation; similarly a thing is said to be
_sancitum_ because established by law. And even according to the Latins
the word _sanctus_ may mean "cleanness," as derived from _sanguine
tinctus_, for of old those who were to be purified were sprinkled with
the blood of a victim, as says S. Isidore in his _Etymologies_.[73]