THE CREATION.
God is the Absolute, Infinite, and Perfect Being, in whom, through whom,
and for whom are all things. This is the Christian conception of God;
and it is the only conception which furnishes an adequate and
satisfactory explanation of all the facts of the universe. Here we have
a First Principle, an Originative Cause which is sufficient to account
for all existence.
But what conception are we to form of the nature and mode of this
Origination? Was it a pure, supernatural Origination, an absolute
Creation? or was it simply a formation out of a first substance existing
coeval with and independent of God? Was that act of creation determined
by necessity? was it an unconscious emanation from, or a necessary
development of that First Principle? Or was it a conscious, free
exertion of power for the realization of a foreseen and predetermined
plan--a mental Order? What is the Biblical conception of Creation? This
is the question we must now endeavor to answer.
Until very recently it has been the practice of theologians to attempt
the determination of the Biblical notion of Creation on purely
philological grounds. It is now generally conceded that this method is
inadequate and inconclusive. The Greeks probably never conceived the
idea of an absolute creation (commonly, though we judge incorrectly,
styled creation _ex nihilo_), and consequently the Greek language has no
terms expressive of a primal origination, an absolute beginning of the
world. Ποιεῖν, the term employed in the LXX. (Gen. i. 1), and
also by St. Paul (Acts xvii. 24), means to endow with a certain quality
(ποῖος = _qualis_)--to construct, make, form, build, and
evidently conveys the notion of _formation_ rather than _origination_,
the production of qualitative phenomena rather than real entity; κτίζειν
is also ordinarily used in the sense of forming, fashioning,
building, and seems to imply pre-existing materials.
There is also a wide difference of opinion among Oriental scholars with
respect to the precise import of the verbs בָּרָא (bara), עָשָׂה (aysah), and
יִצֶר (yetsar), as employed in the Hebrew Scriptures. Some distinguished
critics, as Parkhurst, Clarke, Lange, and Delitzsch, assert that בָּרָא
means to originate _de novo_, to create in an absolute sense; and that
עָשָׂה and יִצֶר strictly mean to fashion out of pre-existent materials.[47]
But Pusey, Kitto, Tayler Lewis, and some of the Rabbinical commentators
(Aben Ezra especially), affirm that בָּרָא, both by its etymology and its
connections, indicates _formation_ as much as origination, and is, in
fact, indifferent and neutral either as to a supposed creation _ex
nihilo_, or a creation, that is, a formation from pre-existing
materials. Furthermore, it is affirmed that the three Hebrew verbs are
used indiscriminately in the Mosaic record. It is said in Gen. i. 27
that God created בָּרָא man, and that statement is amplified and explained
at ch. ii. 7: "And the Lord God formed עָשָׂה man _out of the dust of the
earth_."[48] An appeal to the merely verbal expressions of Scripture
does not, therefore, promise any satisfactory and conclusive results.
By what method, then, are we to determine the Biblical notion of
Creation? Clearly, not by a critical study of the several words which
are employed to express the creative act--not by confining our attention
to the visible embodiment of the Divine word, and neglecting the
informing thought. We must ground our conception of creation upon the
fundamental ideas and principles of Divine revelation, and determine it
in harmony with the Christian idea of God, and the Christian doctrine of
the relation of the world to God.
These fundamental principles we have already presented. They may be
succinctly restated in the following propositions:
(1.) God is the one only self-existent, independent, unconditioned
Being, "who alone hath immortality," "the incorruptible or immutable
God" (ἀφθάρτος Θεός), "with whom is no variableness or shadow of
change."[49] (2.) God is the sole causality of the heavens and the
earth, in the most absolute sense. Whatever is, and is not God, is the
creature of God. "By Him were all things created which are in heaven and
which are upon earth, things visible and things invisible"--the objects
of sense-perception and of rational intuition. The origin, development,
and end, the principle, law, and reason of all existence, are in God and
from God--πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, εἰς τὸν Θεόν.[50] (3.) The all
of the finite is in ceaseless and complete dependence on the Divine
causality--"He upholdeth all things," and "by Him all things consist."
Our interpretation of the formal language of Scripture, especially of
the verbs which are employed to denote the act of creation, must
therefore be informed and determined by these fundamental principles. If
God is the unconditioned Cause of all existence, then the Creation must
be the absolutely _free_ and self-determined act of God. As such, it can
not have been conditioned by any immanent necessity in the Divine nature
itself, nor by any necessary existence out of and extraneous to the
Divine nature. By this conception of God, and of his relation to the
world, we are debarred from supposing the coeval existence of any thing
besides God (_e. g._, ἄπειρον, τὸ μὴ ὄν of Plato, the ὕλη of Aristotle,
the "matter" of the modern Physicist) as the condition and medium of the
Divine agency and manifestation. While, therefore, it is acknowledged
that in Gen. i. 21, 27, בָּרָא (bara) denotes the _formation_ of organic
bodies out of pre-existent materials, we can not be restricted to this
meaning of the term when dealing with verse 1, "In the beginning God
created the heaven and the earth." We are compelled to believe that
"bara" here means _origination_--origination _de novo_; first, because
the primal act of creation must have been a supernatural, miraculous
production of something which had not previously existed under any
form--an unconditioned creation antecedent to nature; and, secondly,
because we are informed that after this primal act of creation, "the
earth was still _without form_ and void." No possible ingenuity of
criticism can construe that opening sentence of revelation to mean, "In
the beginning God gave _form_ to pre-existing matter." That first
beginning is the _principium principiorum_, the beginning of all
beginnings, and must be distinguished from the six new beginnings of the
six days' work.[51] We must regard this sublime utterance, standing at
the head of all God's communications, as affirming this foundation-idea
of revelation--that God is the sole causality of the heavens and the
earth in an absolute sense, the efficient cause of time, and all
temporal relations; the all-mighty cause of space, and all spatial
relations; the originator of the primordial substance, and all its
qualities--in a word, the unconditioned Creator of all finite being,
quality, and relation--"בְּרֵאשִית--ἐν ἀρχῆ--_in principio_--first of all
(in the order of conception rather than the order of time) God
originated, laid the foundations of, the heavens and the earth."[52]
And now that the Creation here affirmed was an absolute origination, a
bringing into being of the primordial elements out of which the heavens
and the earth were subsequently "formed," is the doctrine of the best
Hebrew lexicographers. It is held by many of the best authorities that
the particle אֵת (ayth) means "the very substance of," "the very or
real essence." Fürst, in his recently published Hebrew and Chaldee
Lexicon, gives "being, essence, substance," as the meaning of "ayth."
Gesenius, in his Hebrew Grammar, says "'ayth' means being, substance"
(p. 216). And furthermore, he says "'_ayth_' is a substantive derived
from a pronominal stem, and signifies essence, substance, being." "The
particle '_ayth_,'" says Aben Ezra, "signifies the substance of a
thing." Kimchi, in his famous "Book of Hebrew Roots," gives a similar
definition. In the Syriac version, "_yoth_" takes the place of "_ayth_,"
and is very appropriately rendered in Walton's Polyglot, "_esse cœli
et esse terræ_"--the being or substance of the heavens and the earth. It
is not, therefore, a fanciful and altogether unauthorized reading of
this opening sentence of Divine revelation which the Christian idea of
God, and of his relation to the world, seems to demand--"_In the
beginning God originated, brought into being, the primordial elements of
the heavens and the earth._"
For manageable clearness, in dealing with the Mosaic primeval history,
we shall find ourselves under the necessity of accepting the distinction
made by theologians between _creatio prima, immediata_, and _creatio
mediata, formativa_.
1. _An absolute Creation_, a pure supernatural origination--the
Beginning of all beginnings.
2. _An artistic, architectonic Creation_, a supernatural formation out
of a first substance--the production of new things or beings by
aggregation, organization, and development according to pre-established
laws and archetypal ideas.
The first notion of Creation is grounded on the Omnipotence of God, the
second on the Infinite Wisdom of God, and both are united in and
ultimately grounded on the unconditioned Will.
And now let us confine our attention to the first conception of
Creation--_creatio prima, immediata_, or ABSOLUTE CREATION.
The fundamental Theistic conception which lies at the very root of the
Biblical doctrine of Creation, and clearly distinguishes it from all
Materialistic, Pantheistic, and Dualistic notions of the origin of the
world, is that God is the _Absolute Personality_--the eternally
self-conscious, self-complete, self-sufficient Being, all the
determinations of whose _nature_ and _action_ are grounded in his
absolute Will. The Divine essence, in its inmost, deepest ground, is not
determined being, but _unlimited power of self-determination_. The
primitive, root idea of the Godhead is an _ever-living, unconditioned
Will_--an unconditioned Will as the indivisible unity and perpetual
differentiation of _reason_ and _power_, a will which realizes itself in
self-affirmation (IPSËITY); manifests itself in self-determination and
choice (ALTERITY); and completes itself in the actualization of a final
purpose (PERFECTION).[53] The _nature_ of God, as distinct from his
_essence_, is absolutely his own act.[54] God, as the manifested God, is
what He is by his own determination and choice. God is just, because He
wills to be just; God is holy, because He wills to be holy; God is good,
because He wills to be good, and not from any constraining, immanent
necessity, otherwise He could not be the object of praise, adoration,
and love. If God is not good by virtue of his own determination and
choice, then there is nothing praiseworthy and adorable in his nature,
and all the thanksgiving of sacred psalmody is meaningless; worship is
groundless, religion has no significance, and love to God is impossible.
A necessitated goodness can no more command our moral esteem than the
uniform revolution of the planetary orbs, and where there is no moral
esteem, there can be no love, no worship, and no praise.[55]
If, then, God is a personal Being, the Absolute Personality, another
being can not proceed from Him except in virtue of his own free
determination. _Creation must therefore be a_ VOLUNTARY _act_.
And for the full comprehension of this fundamental principle, we must
remember that volition is something more than a simple efflux of power,
something more than a mere developing tendency--an evolution or process
without motive and without design. A voluntary act is a designed, an
_intentional_ act, the act of a being who can previously contemplate the
act in thought, who can have a reason or motive for the doing of the
act, and who can determine and condition the deed. This conception of
creation as a voluntary act is unmistakably presented in the
oft-repeated language of the Mosaic record, "God said, _Let there
be--and there was!_" "The speaking of God most certainly indicates the
thinking of God, and it thence follows that all the works of creation
are _thoughts_ of God (idealism). But it indicates also a will making
itself externally known, an active operation of God; and thence it
follows that all the works of creation are _deeds_ of God (realism).
Thinking and operating, however, are one in the Divine speaking, the
primal source of language--his personality making Himself known
(personalism).... Through creating, speaking, making, forming, the world
is ever and again denoted as the _free deed_ of God."[56] Furthermore,
creation is a voluntary act in the most absolute sense--that is, it is
an act of God to which He was not determined by any _inherent_ necessity
or want of his own nature, and an act which was not conditioned, in a
necessary manner, by any thing out of, distinct from, and extraneous to
the Divine nature.
1. _Creation was an act of God to which He was not determined by any
inherent necessity or want of his own nature._
If God is the eternally self-conscious, self-complete, and
self-sufficient Being, He is under no necessity to create other beings
in order to realize perfect self-consciousness, or to secure his own
perfect blessedness. He does not need "otherness"--that which is not
Himself--in order to become manifest to Himself; neither does He "crave
beings not Himself"[57] in order to his complete felicity. The
antithesis of self and non-self--the _ego_ and the _non-ego_--may be a
necessary condition of finite personality, but it can not be a necessary
condition of Absolute Personality. God is eternally revealed to Himself
in an unconditioned manner as self-conscious Love, self-conscious
Reason, self-conscious Energy--the Father, the Word, the Spirit; and He
is from all eternity "the ever-blessed God," who has in the Divine
Triunity the eternal and absolutely worthy object of his Love,
independent of every relation to the world and humanity--"Thou lovedst
Me _before_ the foundation of the world" (John xvii. 24), "before the
world was" (ver. 5).[58]
If, then, creation be the act of an Absolute Personality, the act of a
Being who freely and unconditionally determines his own nature and
conditionates all existence, then _the Will of God is the sole causality
of the world_, and in his Will alone we have the unlimited, infinite
ground-principle of all reality. Absolute Personality tolerates no other
transition from the idea of God to the idea of the world than that of a
Will which freely conditions itself by Love. This Free Love is the
highest determining principle for the Divine efficiency. Therefore, in
order to derive the essential existence of the world from God, the
Scriptures postulate nothing beside or beyond an ever-living,
intelligent Will which has its reason or motive, but not its
necessitating cause, in Love--"_the benevolence_ (εὐδοκία) _of
his Will_" (Eph. i. 5). The Creation is nothing else than the free
self-communication of God, who is Himself eternally self-complete and
self-sufficient, but who from love alone wills that other beings shall
have existence and, in fellowship with Him, eternal life.[59]
It is only by holding fast to these principles in all their integrity
that we can escape the seductions of Pantheism, that perpetual
temptation of metaphysical minds. The fundamental idea of Pantheism is
"an indeterminate principle which is _necessarily_ determined to become
successively every thing. Absolute necessity is the beginning, middle,
and end."[60] We can escape its iron grasp only by distinctly
recognizing and firmly holding the Absolute Personality of God--that is,
by affirming a perfect self-consciousness which is not conditioned by an
antithetical not-self; a perfect self-determination which is not
conditioned by an antecedent _natura naturans_; and a perfect
self-sufficiency which knows no want. The first affirmation rejects the
dialectical necessity of Hegel, the second excludes the mathematical
necessity of Spinoza, the third cancels the metaphysical necessity of
Cousin.[61]
2. _Creation as the free act of God was not conditioned by any thing out
of and foreign to the Divine nature._
A moment's reflection will suffice to convince us that a _limitation
posited from without_ would be as fatal to the idea of God as a supposed
inherent necessity determining the Divine causality from within. The
idea of God as the Being who is absolutely self-grounded,
self-sufficient, and self-determined, equally excludes both. If God is
the sole causality of the heavens and the earth in an absolute
sense--the efficient cause of time and all temporal succession--the
all-mighty cause of space, and of all spatial relations--the sole
originator of the primordial substance, and of all its qualities, then
the creative act can not have been conditioned by _Time_ or _Space_ or
_Matter_.
In his otherwise admirable essay on "Nature and God," Mr. Martineau
asserts that we can have no conception of even the possibility of a
creation except on the assumption of the coeval existence of something
objective to God as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and
manifestation. He therefore affirms the coeval and co-eternal existence
of _Space_ and _Matter_, _Time_ and _Number_, "with Him, and yet
independent of Him."[62] The idea of God's "_supplying Himself_ with
objectivity" is, in his judgment, "discredited by modern science." The
creative act must therefore have been conditioned by something other
than God, and independent of God.
Now it must be obvious to every thoughtful mind that this assumption
tends to the invalidation of every proof of the existence of God. If it
can be shown that any one thing exists aside from and independent of
God--that any thing exists which was not created by God--then may we
claim equal independence for every other thing, and He who claims to be
the Creator of _all_ things is discredited. As Herbert Spencer urges,
with great force, "If we admit that there can be something uncaused,
there is no reason to assume a cause for any thing."[63] With what
reason can we say that some things do exist that never were created, but
others can not so exist? If substances are eternal, why not attributes?
If matter is self-existent, why not force? If space is independent, why
not form? And if we concede the eternity of matter and force, why not
admit the eternity of law--that is, uniformity of relations? And if so
much is granted, why not also grant that a consequent order of the
universe is also eternal? If we admit that any thing besides God is
self-existent, that any thing exists independent of God as "the
_condition_ of the Divine agency and manifestation," then God is not the
unconditioned Absolute Being. "A limitation posited from without
directly destroys the idea of God, for it contradicts the idea of the
Absolute."[64]
Mr. Martineau admits that the assumption of "the coeval existence of
matter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency" "rests on quite
other grounds than those which support our belief respecting space."[65]
We can conceive the non-existence of matter, but we can not conceive the
non-existence of space. The idea of space is absolutely necessary,
therefore "no one asks a cause for the space of the universe."[66] In
making this assertion, however, Mr. Martineau betrays some want of
acquaintance with the history of the philosophy of space and time. Many
able and thoroughly philosophic minds have "asked a cause," and have
assigned a cause for "the space of the universe." Sir Isaac Newton held
that "God endures always and is present every where, and by existing
always and every where _constitutes_ duration and space."[67] This
doctrine, thus generally stated, is held by Saisset to be
incontestible.[68] McCosh also believes that time and space are not
independent of God: "I am not necessarily obliged to believe that the
infinity of space and time is independent of the infinity of God.... Who
will venture to affirm that space and time, being dependent on God, may
not stand in some relation to God which is altogether indefinable and
utterly incomprehensible by us."[69] Finally, Schleiermacher and Nitzsch
do not hesitate to teach that "God is the all-mighty cause of space" and
"the efficient cause of time."[70]
The question whether the idea of space is conditionally or
unconditionally necessary can only be determined by the solution of the
deeper question whether space is a real entity or a relation. If space
is a real entity, it must have properties or attributes, but what
philosopher of any reputation has ever attempted to set down the
properties or attributes of space? They who assert that space is an
uncreated, independent, and indestructible entity, ought to be able to
define it and tell _what_ it is. Dr. Porter tells us that space can not
be defined, "We can not form a concept of this _entity_ by means of
generalized attributes or relations."[71] Can that be for us an entity
of which we can form no concept, and which we can not determine in
thought by any attribute or relation? The writer of the article on "The
Philosophy of Time and Space," in the _North American Review_,[72] is an
earnest defender of the objective reality of space as an independent and
indestructible entity, and he has defined and analyzed the concept.
"Space is _absolute vacuity_" (p. 91). "The idea of space is a triple
synthesis ... of three _negative_ notions--receptivity, unity, and
infinity; the first is the negation of matter, the second is the
negation of divisibility, the third is the negation of limitation" (p.
95). Do these words convey any knowledge? Absolute vacuity is void,
empty, inane. Absolute vacuity is pure nothing, and of course there is
nothing to be divided and nothing to be limited. Absolute vacuity is a
negation, and unity and infinity are negations of a negation--that is,
they are predicates of nothing. "Negative notions" must be predicates of
_something_, otherwise they are a mere negation or absence of thought,
and convey absolutely no knowledge. We may, if we please, assert with
Hegel, that "Nothing is the same as Being," and then amuse ourselves
with making affirmations concerning vacuity, nihility, and unreality to
the disgrace of philosophy; but the common-sense of mankind will
repudiate our absurdities. We can not think about nothing; all thought
must be positive. Thought must have an object, and that object must be
either an entity, or the attribute of an entity, or a relation between
entities.
If pure space is regarded as "_absolute vacuity_"--pure nothing--then we
may readily dispose of the argument on which Prof. Stewart relies with
so much confidence. "Divine omnipotence can not annihilate space,"[73]
therefore it must be an independent reality. We have simply to
answer--the notion of annihilating nihility is an absurdity and a
contradiction. There is nothing to be annihilated, and Omnipotence even
must be inadequate to the annihilation of nothing.
If, with Leibnitz, Lord Monboddo, Calderwood, and many modern
physicists,[74] we reject the notion of "absolute vacuity"--infinite
space--and regard space as a _relation_--the relation of position,
distance, direction--then, like all the quantitive relations of
mathematics, it may be regarded as conditionally necessary--that is,
bodies being given, they must necessarily have place, distance, and
direction.[75] Space as a necessary relation is a reality, but a reality
which is conditioned and conditional, and "God is the all-mighty cause
of space." If all bodies were annihilated, there would be no position,
no distance, no direction, and consequently space would be annihilated.
There would remain nothing but the timeless, spaceless, Infinite One,
who is the efficient cause of all existence, all qualities, and all
relations. This, again, would be a sufficient answer to the sophism of
Dr. Clark, quoted and indorsed by Stewart--"God can not annihilate the
space in this room!" Annihilate the room, and the relative space in the
room is no more--that is, the distance between the inclosing walls. Of
"pure space" apart from the relations of bodies we have no conception,
can have no conception; for to annihilate all bodies, in thought, we
must annihilate our own body, and to a disembodied spirit there can be
no _here_ and no _there_. Place is a relation belonging to extension,
and extension is a property of matter only.[76]
There has been so much confusion of thought generated by the mere
word-jugglery of philosophers in the use of the terms _time_ and
_space_, _duration_ and _extension_, _eternity_ and _immensity_, that a
revision of the whole terminology in the interest of true science is
demanded. It is perilous to launch out upon this ocean of equivocal
phraseology, called the philosophy of time and space, before taking our
bearings, amid notions so closely related, yet so dissimilar, and
endeavoring to fix some definite meaning to these terms, which, like
points of the compass, shall enable us to find our position.
1. _Let us commence our effort with_ SPACE, EXTENSION, _and_ IMMENSITY.
Some philosophers--Cousin,[77] Hamilton,[78] Spencer,[79] McCosh,[80]
for example--confound _space_ and _extension_, and all of them confound
both with absolute _immensity_.[81]
Now if space is identical with extension, it must be cognized by the
senses and the sensuous imagination. This is unhesitatingly affirmed by
Hamilton: "We _see_ extension," and "by the name extension we designate
our empirical knowledge of space."[82] So also McCosh: "Of space in the
concrete we have an immediate knowledge by the senses, certainly by some
of them, such as the touch and sight."[83] Space in this connection can
not therefore be regarded as an _à priori_ cognition. It is equally
obvious that if space is identical with extension, it must have color
and form. This also is admitted by Hamilton: "I can easily annihilate
all corporeal existence [in imagination]. I can imagine _empty_ space.
But there are two attributes of which I can not divest it--that is,
shape and color."[84] Now if space has "shape," that is, figure, it must
have dimensions, and accordingly we find almost all philosophers
speaking of the three dimensions of space--length, breadth, and depth.
That which has length, breadth, and depth must be divisible, must have
parts and proportions, must have susceptibilities of exact measurement,
and therefore must be _finite_. This again is the doctrine of Hamilton:
"Space is finite, and a finite, that is, a bounded space constitutes a
figure"--a sphere.[85] The fundamental doctrine of Hamilton is that
"space, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a certain
correlation of existence--of existence, therefore, _pro tanto_, _as
conditioned_. _It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned._"[86]
But if space be only a correlation of conditioned, and therefore finite
existence, how can he speak of it "being conceived as infinite,"[87]
and, above all, how can he speak of "the absolute totality" and "the
infinite immensity of space."
McCosh, also, though evidently with some hesitation, teaches that "we
can conceive _proportion_ in space, and if we take any of these
proportional sections, and divide it into two, thought will compel us to
say that the two make up the whole. In this sense the _parts_ make up
the whole--that is, the subsections make up the section. If the question
be extended beyond this, and it be asked, Is infinite space made up of
parts? I answer, that as we can have no adequate notion of infinite
space, so we can not be expected to answer all the questions which may
be put regarding it. _It is certain that neither infinite space nor
finite space is made up of separate parts._ We can speak intelligibly
of _proportions_ in finite space, and determine their relations to each
other and the whole. I tremble to speak of the proportions of infinite
space, lest I be using language which has or can have no proper meaning,
and the signification attached to which by me or others might be
altogether inapplicable to such a subject. Still there are propositions
which we might intelligibly use. It is self-evident that _any proportion
of space must be less than infinite space_. And if infinite space can be
conceived as having _proportions_, and we could conceive all these
proportions, then these proportions would be equal to the _whole_!"[88]
Well may the author say that he is "in a region dark and pathless;" for
the language here employed "can have no proper meaning" in regard to
infinite space. Well may he "tremble to speak of _the proportions of
infinite space_," for what can proportion (_pro_, for _portio_, a part)
mean except a numerical relation of parts? Proportions--numerical
relations--are measurable quantities, therefore finite quantities, and
no addition of finite quantities, can make the infinite. What confusion
and contradiction is here wrought by this word-jugglery with "the whole
and parts" of space!
Cousin, also, falls into the same inaccuracy and confusion. He tells us
that "human reason can conceive of a space determined and limited,"[89]
therefore divisible, measurable, and _finite_; and yet at the same time
he teaches that "space is illimitable, absolutely continuous, an
indivisible unity."[90]
And now let us note the contradictions which flow from this confounding
of space with extension, and both with immensity. Space is cognized _à
posteriori_, space is cognized _à priori_. Space has parts and
proportions, space has no parts or proportions. Space is divisible,
space is indivisible--an absolute unity. Space is finite, space is
infinite. Space is susceptible of exact measurement, space is
immeasurable--that is, absolute immensity.
Space and extension are not identical. Extension is simply an attribute
of body--the continuity of matter. Space is place, distance, direction,
relations of bodies. _Space is a certain correlation of finite
existences._ Immensity is the attribute of the unconditioned Being, the
absolute Spirit--that is, God. He is incorporeal, boundless, spaceless,
infinite.
2. The same confusion pervades the writings of philosophers in regard to
TIME, DURATION, _and_ ETERNITY.
Succession is confounded with duration,[91] duration with time,[92] and
time with eternity.[93]
If succession and duration are identical, then, there is no permanent
substance underlying the fugitive phenomena of the outer world, and no
personal existence which remains the same through all the changes of our
mental states. The human mind is simply "a series of feelings," a
succession of mental states without any enduring ground principle
constituting our personal identity, and we are thus landed in the
constructive Idealism of John Stuart Mill.[94] On the other hand, if
there be a permanent substance or essence underlying all mental
phenomena, whose continuance in existence is measured by phenomenal
change, time succession, then duration can not be identical with time,
any more than permanence can be the same as change. With finite duration
there is necessarily given change; the past is like the future--always a
minus in relation to the present.
Furthermore, if time is synonymous with eternity, then eternity is
divisible, measurable, it has limits and parts. Time, say the
philosophers, has one dimension, while space has three. "We," says
McCosh, "represent time as a line,"[95] it must therefore be divisible,
and, if divisible, it is legitimate to speak, with Hamilton, of "time
and its parts." "Time has succession, or priority and posteriority."[96]
And yet this same writer in the same work tells us, "Time has no
limits," and "Time can not be divided into separable parts."[97] If time
and eternity are identical, eternity has a past, a present, and a
future--"eternity _ab ante_ and eternity _a post_."[98] The eternity
past is bounded by the present, it _ends_ now; the eternity to come
_begins_ now. We may with propriety ask, How can that which has
succession, which is capable of exact measurement, which has a beginning
and an end, be infinite? That which had a beginning can not be
unbeginning, that which will come to an end can not be endless. Is not
the "eternity of _time_" a contradiction in terms? Is not "absolute
time" an absurdity?
Mark, then, the contradictions which flow from the confounding of
succession and duration, time and eternity. Time has limits, time has no
limits. Time is divisible, time is indivisible. Time is finite, time is
infinite. Time is relative, time is absolute. Time is moving, "it
flows;" time is immovable, "it does not flow."[99]
Duration and succession, eternity and time, are not identical. Duration
is the continuance in existence of finite creatures, a continuance which
is measured by the equable motion of planetary orbs, and imperfectly by
phenomenal changes in our mental states. Succession is simply an order
of phenomena, the recurrence, at regular or irregular intervals, of like
changes, or the series of different states in the same existence. _Time
is a certain correlation of successive existences._ Eternity is an
attribute of the absolute Being--the _timelessness_ of God. He is not
subject to the law of change, and therefore not to the law of time,
therefore his absolute being can not be measured by successive epochs.
Let us now endeavor to dismiss from our thought all this perplexing
necromancy of words, and humbly pray, with Themistocles, for "some sweet
voluptuous art of forgetting." Let us fix our mental gaze upon the
_objects_ of thought which are denoted by the terms _time_ and _space_,
and ask what are they? Are they existences or attributes, are they ideal
or real, are they entities or relations? Have we any clear and definite
notions of which these are the unequivocal signs? The solution of these
questions is the essential condition of a true philosophy of time and
space.
First of all, is it not self-evident that, if time and space are for us
the objects of thought, they must be conceived under the categories of
_Being_ or _Quality_ or _Relation_? If they can not be thought as real
existences, or as attributes of existing things, or as relations among
existing things, they can not be thought at all--they are non-entities,
and we can not think about nothing. "Thought can only be realized by
thinking _something_ ... this something must be thought as existing ...
and we can only think a thing as existing, by thinking it as existing in
this or that determinate manner of existence; and whenever we cease to
think of something as existing--something existing in a determinate
manner of existence--we cease to think at all."[100]
McCosh asserts that time and space are "neither substances, modes, nor
relations."[101] What, then, are they? He answers, "They seem to be
entitled to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble substances,
modes, relations only in that they are _existences, entities,
realities_."[102] But if they are entitled to be put in a class by
themselves, what is the name of that class, and by what characteristic
marks shall we distinguish it? If they are realities, they must have
being, or inhere in something that has being, or be relations of
something in being. If they are existences, they must be the objects of
_sense perception_, or _rational intuition_, or _immediate judgment_,
otherwise they can not be cognized at all, for "the mind can not create
objects of its own cognition."
We ask again, What _are_ space and time? McCosh and Dr. Porter both
answer: 1. They are not substances. This no one will dispute. They are
not material substances having sensible qualities which can be the
objects of sense perception. Space and time are not perceived by the
senses.[103] Neither are they spiritual substances. We do not know them
as having power and performing acts. 2. They both reply, They are not
attributes or qualities of matter or spirit. This, also, no one will
dispute, if the word "time" is not used as a synonym for "eternity," and
the word "space" is not used as a synonym for "immensity," because
"eternity" and "immensity" are attributes of the absolute Spirit. 3.
They both assert, They are not relations. This is disputed by many: by
Leibnitz, by Hamilton, by Saisset, by Calderwood, and by others.
Leibnitz says, "Space is the order of things co-existing. Time is the
order of things successive."[104] Hamilton says, "Space, like time, is
only the intuition or the conception of a certain correlation of
existence."[105] Calderwood defines time "as a certain correlation of
existence," and "space as the recognized relation of extended
objects."[106] And Saisset regards time and space as standing in the
same category with mathematical relations.[107] These are, to say the
least, distinguished names in philosophy. The opinions of men who have
for years pondered these profound problems are at any rate entitled to
proper consideration, and if in opposition to their views it is affirmed
that time and space as understanding-concepts are _not_ relations, some
reasons should be assigned. All the proof offered by Dr. McCosh is that
"we know no two or more things which by their relation could yield space
and time" (p. 211). We answer, promptly, _duration_ and _change_ do
yield the relation of time. "The consciousness of succession in our
mental states is in reality our consciousness of time."[108] The
co-existence of two or more extended objects must yield the relation of
space, for "empty space is nothing more than the relative distance of
extended objects from each other, measured on a standard similar to that
which applies to the bodies themselves. In this way it is equally
accurate to say that there is a certain specified _distance_ between the
bodies, and that there is _nothing_ between them, because space is
nothing but their relation to each other."[109] Annihilate all finite
existences, and what remains? Nothing but the immensity of God. Let one
atom of matter be created, and we have extension. Let a second atom be
created, and there is now a relation of distance, position,
direction--that is, there is _space_.
The only remark made by Dr. Porter which has a direct bearing on this
important discussion is that "Space and time are neither relations nor
correlations, but _correlates_ to beings and events" ("The Human
Intellect," p. 568). It may seem an act of presumption in one who has
spent much less time on these studies than Dr. Porter to offer a
criticism on this final deliverance. But when he tells us that space and
time are neither relations nor correlations, after having through four
pages "On the relations of space and time concepts to motion" labored to
sustain the doctrine of Trendelenberg that "the categories of space and
time are derived from the universal and all-pervading motion which is
common to both" (p. 526), we confess we are amazed. Let it be granted
that the spatial and temporal relations can be, in their last analysis,
resolved into motion, still the question remains, How can we conceive of
motion except as the result of force?--that is, of power actually
exerted somewhere. In the last analysis, therefore, the relations of
space, time, and motion are resolved into "_the relation of
causality_." The conclusion seems inevitable that time and space are
_correlations of finite existences_. Annihilate all finite existences
and finite duration, and there is neither space nor time--that is, there
is "pure nothing." Or, more properly, there is the Omnipotence, the
Immensity, the Eternity of God, whose causation may give existence to
finite beings with all their necessary as well as contingent relations.
"Whoever maintains a beginning of the world must also adopt _a beginning
of time_, for only worldly being, which according to its notion has not
its ground in itself, but is an originated being, can at all have time
for the form of its existence."[110]
And now, in summing up, let us see if we can clearly disengage three
classes of distinct notions:
1. The notion of concrete and finite EXTENSION as the essential quality
of matter; and the notion of finite DURATION as a quality of changeful
dependent existence.
2. The notion of SPACE as the relation of co-existing material
things--that is, the relation of position, distance, direction,
hereness, thereness; and the notion of time as the relation of
successive existence--that is, the relation of priority and
posteriority, of past, present, and future.
3. The notion of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY--that is, an absolute continuity
and illimitability of being, the absence of all limit, all quantity, all
beginning and end, the attributes of the unconditioned Being. Let us
endeavor sharply to define these notions, which unhappily are too often
confounded.
1. The external senses in their different degrees, especially sight and
touch, give us the knowledge of objects that are _extended_ and figured.
The body I grasp with the hand or survey with the eye has limits,
outlines, angles, surfaces--that is, it has more or less EXTENSION. The
inner sense gives us the knowledge of the changes and successions of our
mental life. But, amid all these changes, I am conscious there is a
something which _endures_. What is that permanent something which I
apprehend under all the varying mental states? It is that principle of
personal identity which I call _I_--_myself_. To feel and know that I am
the same person under all modifications of my mental activity is to
_endure_. Through the aid of memory, which enables me to recall past
mental states, and the immediate consciousness of personal existence,
through all these changes I obtain the notion of DURATION. The notions
of Extension and Duration are clear to my mind.
2. Besides the notion of extended bodies, I have also the notion of
position, distance, direction among extended bodies. They exist in
various relations to each other; they are here or there, above or below,
near at hand or indefinitely remote. It may be the distance between two
particles of dust in the sunbeam, or the walls of the room, or between
the earth and the sun, or between the sun and the outermost planet of
our system, or between the earth and the remotest star which twinkles at
the outposts of the universe. Position, distance, direction are all
_relations_. And to all these relations I prefer, with Sir John
Herschel, to give the generic name SPACE.[111] Then I have no confusion
of thought, and no difficulty or contradiction in using the language of
Cousin, Hamilton, and McCosh, when they speak of "determinate and
limited space," "particular spaces," "parts of space," and "proportions
of space."
Along with the notion of duration (and succession of different states in
the same existence), I am conscious that this duration is capable of
admeasurement by common standards, and ideally divided into periods of
longer or shorter duration. This duration may be measured by successive
states of consciousness, or facts of domestic history, or, better still,
by the succession of day and night, or the relative position of the sun
in the heavens, the revolutions of the moon around the earth, or of the
earth around the sun. These are really world-measurements of duration.
Since, then, duration can be measured from any point and in any
proportions, it is clear that measurement is a purely relative thing--a
relation. Of any such thing as "pure time" or "absolute time" we have no
knowledge. TIME _is the measure of finite duration_--the correlation of
things successive. And if I confine myself to this usage, I am under no
necessity of using the paradoxical language of many philosophers, "time
is eternity!"
3. We come, lastly, to the notions or ideas of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY,
and we ask, Are these necessary ideas of the reason, or can they be
confounded with the relations of co-existence and succession on the one
hand, or with the attributes of finite extension and duration on the
other?
This is not a mere question of systems of philosophy or theology--it is
a question of facts. Are the ideas of Absolute Infinity and Eternity
necessary intuitions of the reason? The world of sense-perception, the
world of science, is phenomenal and contingent. All that is offered to
our observation is _limited_ and _temporal_. The universe surrendered to
our science is one of quantities and quantitative relations. It is
conditioned by number and form. Its extensions, spaces, and motions are
capable of admeasurement. Its worlds and systems are subject to
numeration. The phenomena of the universe are all subject to change,
they have beginning, succession, and end. But beyond the notions of the
limited and the temporal, we find in consciousness the ideas of the
_illimitable_ and the _eternal_; the latter always appearing to reason
as the necessary correlates of the former. The finite necessarily
supposes the infinite; the temporal necessarily supposes the eternal.
The two classes of notions are essentially different, and defy all
attempts to generalize them under higher concepts. The infinite is not
the totality of finite existences; eternity is not the prolongation of
finite durations. Immensity and eternity are absolutely and
unconditionally necessary ideas. I can easily conceive the non-existence
of any finite thing. I can, without any contradiction, suppose the whole
world to be destroyed. All which has a derived and a dependent existence
may cease to be. But we can not conceive the source of all existence
annihilated. There is one notion which it is impossible for me to
annihilate in thought, and that is the notion of absolute
being--underived, unconditioned, changeless, eternal being. Despite the
destruction of all determinate extension and all finite duration, there
remains a Supreme Reality, unlimited, unbeginning, and endless, as an
absolute necessity of thought.
Here, then, are two absolute ideas found in the depths of
consciousness--the ideas of IMMENSITY and ETERNITY; ideas as real, as
natural, and as necessary as the notions of extension and duration.
Immensity and Eternity are attributes of God. Extension and Duration are
attributes of finite, dependent existence. Space and time are relations
between co-existing things and successive events.
If by this somewhat abstruse and, perhaps, too lengthy discussion we
have succeeded in proving that Time and Space are simply relations
between co-existent things and successive events, which, apart from
things and events, have no reality, and are "nothing but the bare
possibility of body and change," then we have disentangled the Christian
doctrine of absolute creation from the embarrassment occasioned by
supposing "the coeval and co-eternal existence of Time and Space as the
_necessary_ conditions of the Divine activity." If Time and Space are
relations between things and events, then God, as the almighty cause of
things and relations, is the efficient cause of space and time, and the
creative act was not conditioned by them.
The affirmation of the necessary existence of Space, Time, and Number as
co-eternal with and independent of God,[112] prepared the way for and
rendered plausible the further affirmation of "the coeval existence of
matter as the condition and medium of the Divine agency and
manifestation."[113] For if Space, Time, and Number are eternal, _why
may not Matter be eternal_? But why stop with the assertion of the
eternity of Space, Time, Number, and Matter? "If we admit that there may
be something uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause of
anything." If we admit the eternity of Matter, how can we deny the
eternity of Force? We can not conceive of the existence of substance
without some properties or qualities, and of all the properties of
matter, gravitation or weight seems to approach nearest to an essential,
necessary quality. And if we concede the eternity of matter and
gravitating force, why not admit the eternity of law--that is,
"uniformity of properties and relations;" uniformity in the results
arising from the motions and changes of matter? And when so much is
granted, why not grant that a consequent _Order_ of the universe must
also be eternal? why not grant that the universe is an infinite
succession of orderly phenomena without a beginning and end? After the
first concession that matter is uncreated and eternal, how can any one
refute the doctrine of Hume that the universe never had a beginning, and
that under some one or another possible phase--amid the infinite
possibility of phases--it is both eternal and infinite? How, after this
admission, can we deny that the universe is "a series of events existing
eternally in a state of order without a cause other than the eternally
inherent laws of matter?"
It would be easy to show that all those writers on "Natural Theology"
who have made the least concession in regard to this fundamental
question have involved themselves in entanglements and difficulties from
which they could not logically extricate themselves.
Dr. Chalmers contends that the mere existence of matter with its
properties and laws would not involve the affirmation of an Absolute
First Cause. The proof, he says, lies solely in the disposition,
collocation, and arrangement of these properties and laws in their
relation to each other, so as to secure harmonious and beneficial
results. So far as the argument for the existence of God is concerned,
he provisionally concedes that _matter, with all its laws, may be
eternal_.[114] True, he says that he grants the eternity of matter
simply for the purposes of his argument. But what right has he to grant
it for the purposes of his argument, and then to deny it in obedience to
the decisive affirmation of a "well-accredited revelation?" If Divine
revelation teaches the non-eternity of matter, this is for the Christian
a truth--a fundamental truth; and whoever surrenders or compromises a
fundamental position must finally fail in his management of the Theistic
argument. The intuitions of reason and the doctrines of revelation are
but separate rays from the one eternal fountain of light; and if we
ignore or compromise the fundamental truths of revelation, reason will
refuse to place her _imprimatur_ upon and give her indorsement to our
lame and halting proofs. This is strikingly illustrated by Chalmers's
failure to "construct an argument for a God" that satisfies the reason,
after he has affirmed "the eternity of matter for the purpose of
bringing out his conclusion" (p. 79). But Dr. Chalmers can not stop with
the simple concession that matter is eternal. Only grant its necessary
existence, and "it is impossible to imagine that along with existence it
should not have _properties_ ... and _laws_" (p. 75). Now, if the
admission that a finite, composite, divisible substance may be
self-existent, and have eternal properties and laws, is not logically
inconsistent, how can he show that these properties and laws in their
eternal action and reaction are not adequate to the production of a
series of phenomena which to our understanding may appear harmonious?
Can eternal laws produce any thing but order? The existing order of
things is the only possible order that could arise from the _necessary_
operation of eternal laws, and there can be no choice, design, or
purpose in the universe. Collocation, arrangement, adaptation, are only
subjective anthropomorphic conceptions we impose upon nature. If matter
and its laws are eternal, how will Chalmers extricate himself from this
dilemma? By this admission he places a weapon in the hands of the
anti-Theist, by which the latter may cut the teleological argument to
pieces.
My esteemed friend, Dr. Mahan, in his zeal to overthrow the ontological
proof of the being of God, and to vindicate for the etiological proof
the sole claim to validity, has been betrayed into a similar
inconsistency. That there is any _à priori_ proof of the being of God is
in his estimation a "wild chimera." "_Formation_ from pre-existing
materials" constitutes "the exclusive basis" of Natural Theology.[115]
Matter, then, _may_ be eternal, and an infinite series of events
existing in a state of order is conceivable and possible. At page 85 of
his "Natural Theology" he writes: "Mr. Hume has undeniably announced the
truth _as it is_ upon this subject, to wit, that the idea of a nature
eternally existing in a state of order without a cause other than the
eternally inhering laws of nature, is no more self-contradictory than
the idea of an eternally existing and infinite mind who originated this
order--a mind existing without a cause." After several pages disfigured
by a labored effort to prove the possibility and logical consistency of
an "infinite series of events existing in an orderly succession," he
sums up with the imperious assertion that "the argument against the
possibility of an infinite series of events stands revealed as a
_logical absurdity_" (p. 88).
It is our deliberate conclusion, however, that the "logical absurdity"
lies in the position of Dr. Mahan. "The idea of order in the Finite
without a cause is no more self-contradictory than the idea of order in
the Infinite without a cause." Mark the two points which stand out
clearly in this strange assertion. First, the Finite here is
nature--that is, matter and its laws. Secondly, the Infinite is the
Supreme Mind. Dr. Mahan asserts that this _finite_ may be conceived as
_eternally_ existing--that is, as existing through _infinite_ time; in
other words, _the finite may be infinite_. For a thing or being, or for
a series of things or beings, to be at once "finite" and "infinite" Dr.
Mahan says "is not self-contradictory." This is on a par with the logic
of Hegel--"Contradictory opposites are identical." Again, we ask, Is
there no difference between "finite matter" and "Infinite Mind?" Is not
matter composite, extended, divisible, and limited? Is not Infinite Mind
unextended, incomposite, indivisible, and illimitable? The mere
existence of matter does not necessarily involve the idea of _Order_.
There are nebulæ existing in the universe "utterly devoid of all
symmetry of form, ... irregular and capricious in their shapes and
convolutions to a most extraordinary degree."[116] Wherever order is
presented, we instinctively and infallibly ascribe it to mind. Mind for
all of us, and forever, is the analogon and exponent of Order in every
sphere, irrespective of all knowledge on our part as to when or how it
had a beginning.
Furthermore, on the main issue we affirm briefly--if matter is extended,
it is measurable; if it is measurable, it must have definite limits; if
it has definite limits, it can not be infinite. Now that which is
finite, limited, quantitive, conditioned, can not be self-existent, can
not be infinite. Infinitude is illimitation by kind, quantity, or
degree--illimitation by temporal, spatial, or numerical relations. An
"infinite series" is therefore a contradiction _in adjecto_. "As every
number, although immeasurably and inconceivably great, is impossible
without _unity_ as its basis, so every series, being itself a number, is
impossible unless a _first term_ is given as its commencement.... Even
if it should be allowed that the series has no _first term_, but has
originated _ab æterno_, it must always at each instant have a _last
term_; the series as a whole can not be infinite."[117] If one thing
more can be added to the number of existing things in the universe, then
it is not infinite in number or in extent. In short, a series implies a
succession of terms, or members, or links; if there is a last term,
there must be a first term; if there is a last link, there must be a
first. Through an Unconditioned First Cause, originating and
conditioning all the members thereof, is a series conceivable or
possible. To apply to number or quantity the designation of infinitude
is surely _the_ "absurdity" in presence of which all others pale. We
grant that the term "infinite series" is employed by mathematicians in a
loose manner, to denote that which exceeds our powers of mensuration or
conception, but which nevertheless has bounds or limits--the
_indefinite_, but not the infinite;[118] such loose use of terms in
philosophy, however, is inadmissible. The final reply of Dr. Mahan,
"that the series under consideration is one which by hypothesis has no
first," is the extreme of absurdity. It is as though a man should talk
of a "round square" or a "bilinear figure," and when remonstrated with
as to the contradictory character of these phrases, should reply, "Yes,
but the 'square' under consideration is one which by hypothesis is
'round,' and the 'figure' is one which by hypothesis is formed by 'two
lines!'" Men may make all kinds of strange hypotheses, but the strangest
of all is that of an infinite-finite.
These incautious writers of "Natural Theology" all assert, as a
fundamental doctrine, that God is the Absolute and Unconditioned Cause.
We might ask, Whence do they derive this fundamental truth that God is
"absolute and unconditioned," if not by an _à priori_ rational
intuition? We let that pass, however, to press the more pertinent
question--How can God be "the absolute cause," if matter is coeval with
and independent of Him? And how can He be the "unconditioned cause," if
space, time, number, and matter necessarily exist as the _conditions_ of
the Divine agency and manifestation? If matter, with its essential
properties and laws, exist independent of the Deity, do not these impose
conditions upon the action of the Deity, and determine it to certain
necessary modes? If so, God can not be the unconditioned Cause. Instead
of one supreme, sole First Principle, there are at least two
principles, God and Necessity, and may be more. No system of Natural
Theology can maintain its integrity and consistency except by holding
fast to the fundamental postulate--God is the Absolute and Unconditioned
Cause of all things, of matter and form, quality and relation, purpose
and law.
And now, in conclusion, we may properly ask, Whence arises the necessity
for assuming the coeval and co-eternal existence of matter besides and
independent of God? Why should the theologian feel himself under the
necessity of prejudicing the Biblical conception of Creation by any such
concession? The only reasons we have seen assigned are, first, that
"creation out of nothing is discredited by the discoveries of modern
science;"[119] secondly, that "an absolute origination is inconceivable
and self-destructive."[120] In attempting an estimate of the weight of
these reasons, we would first suggest that the question of _absolute_
creation has been prejudiced by the persistent employment of the old
formula of "creation out of nothing," as though "nothing" contained the
cause of existence, and the universe was developed out of nothing. The
Christian Fathers, who first employed the phrase κτίσις ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
ὄντος, never indulged in such representations. The idea they sought
to express was that the production of "_otherness_," the awarding of
existence to something besides Himself, was an absolutely free act of
God which was not conditioned by any thing external to Himself--in a
word, that God is the positive original ground of all existence.
But who shall decide that this doctrine has been discredited by the
progress of science? What special discovery of modern science has so
revealed to us the ultimate constitution of matter, that we can affirm
its absolute reality and its eternal existence? Nay, are the most
advanced physicists and physiologists agreed as to whether, apart from
our subjective, ideal conceptions, matter has any reality? If we are not
utterly mistaken, the entire tendency of science is to reduce matter
from the rank of entities to the rank of phenomena. "The old
speculations of Philosophy, which cut the ground from Materialism by
showing how little we know of matter, are now being daily reinforced by
the subtle analysis of the physiologist, the chemist, and the
electrician. Under that analysis matter dissolves and disappears,
_surviving only as the phenomena of Force_."[121] We offer no opinion as
to the validity of this new doctrine, but are sure it is the doctrine of
modern science as represented by Faraday, Owen, McVicar, Bayma, Exley,
Wallace, Poisson, Poyntong, Laycock, and, we think, Huxley. If modern
science has resolved all our external sensations, even the feeling of
resistance, into "phenomena of Force," then, according to the doctrine
of Mr. Martineau, it had a beginning--"_phenomena demand causation_....
Supreme Entity needs no cause." "The universe resolves itself into a
perpetual genesis," and "the Theist is perfectly justified in treating
it as disqualified for self-existence."[122]
Sir William Hamilton contends that "an absolute commencement" is
inconceivable. All the conception we can possibly form of Creation is
"merely as the evolution of new forms of existence by the fiat of the
Deity." "Let us suppose the very crisis of creation. Can we realize it
to ourselves in thought, that the moment after the universe came into
manifested being there was a larger complement of existence in the
universe and its Author together than there was the moment before in
the Deity himself alone? This we can not imagine."[123]
There are, we presume, very few Hamiltonians who are prepared to indorse
this bold statement of their master. Mansel, the editor and annotator of
his "Lectures," has very distinctly and emphatically expressed his
dissent. "Whether it be true or not that we can not conceive the
quantity of existence to be increased or diminished, there is at any
rate no such inability as regards the _quantity of matter_. It may be
true as a fact that no material atom has been added to the world since
the Creation; but the assertion, however true, is certainly not
necessary. The power which created once must be conceived as able to
create again, whether that ability is actually exercised or not. The
same conclusion is still more evident when we proceed from the
consideration of matter to that of mind. Of matter, we maintain that the
creation of new portions is _perfectly conceivable_--as a result, at
least, if not as a process; of mind, we believe that such creation
actually takes place. Every man who comes into the world comes into it
as a distinct individual, having a personality and consciousness of his
own, and that personality is a distinct accession to the number of
persons previously existing.... Every new person that comes into the
world is a _new existence_."[124] Hence we are not justified in
asserting that all actual existences are only different modes of one
identical reality. We can not merely conceive, but we _know_, as a
primary fact of consciousness, that the _sum_ of existence, of personal
conscious being, which is the most fundamental reality, may be increased
in the universe.[125]
We readily confess that the act of creation--that is, _causing wholly
new existence_--is utterly incomprehensible to us; so are thousands of
other things. I am told by the physicist that eight hundred billions of
ether-impulses impinge on the retina of the eye in a second of time to
produce the sensation of deep violet;[126] and I believe it, but at the
same time it is to me incomprehensible. My reason affirms that the First
Cause must be infinite; and I believe it, but I can not comprehend
Infinity. No logician of the present day teaches that comprehensibility
is a test of truth. Is our finite capacity of conceiving or of doing a
standard for Omnipotence? The only question here involved is, Can
Infinite Power produce that mode of being we call matter? Does such an
exercise of Infinite Power involve a contradiction? I conscientiously
submit this question to my own reason, and I confess I am unable to see
any contradiction. To my experiential knowledge matter presents "the
essential characteristics at once of a _manufactured article_ and a
_subordinate agent_."[127] "This," says the distinguished Prof. Maxwell,
"precludes the idea of its being eternal and self-existent.... It must
have been _created_."[128] The notion of its origination by a Power
which is unconditioned and every way unlimited, satisfies my reason, and
affords the best solution of the problem of its existence. That it is
self-existent, independent, eternal--"a second other God"--is directly
contradictory. The original, primitive fountain of existence is _Mind_.
This must stand at the fountain-head. God is the sole and absolute Cause
of all things--of time, and all temporal relations; of space, and all
spatial relations; of the primordial element, and all its properties.
_The creative act was not conditioned by Time or Space or Matter._[129]