The enemy is moving east toward Frenchman (oc') and is expected to

reach there early tomorrow. A company at 72 (uj') forms the left

support of an outpost in hostile country, on the line 70

(vj')--National Cemetery (qj'). At 4 P. M. Sergeant A is ordered to

take a patrol of 12 men and go to Frenchman and destroy the bridge

there, and remain in observation in that vicinity all night.

=Required, 1.= His orders to the patrol.

=2.= The route the patrol will follow, and its formation crossing the

Atchison Hill--Government Hill ridge.

=3.= Give the conduct of the patrol from Atchison Hill

(rg')--Government Hill (tf') to its position at the bridge at

Frenchman.

=General Situation:=

A Blue squadron is camped for the night at Waterworks (vn'), Fort

Leavenworth, and has outposts on the line XIV (un')--Grant Hill

(um')--Prison Hill (wk'). A Red force is reported to be advancing from

the north on Kickapoo (cb').

Problem No. 10 (Cavalry)

=1042. Special Situation:=

Lieutenant A, commanding the left support on Prison Hill, at 5 P. M.,

directs Sergeant Jones to take a patrol of 5 men from his platoon and

move via Atchison Cross (ug') to the vicinity of Kickapoo and secure

information of any enemy that may be in that locality. Another patrol

is to go via Fort Leavenworth (ol').

=Required, 1.= The order given by Lieutenant A, verbatim. (Pars. 963

and 965.)

=Answer.= "Sergeant Jones, the enemy is north of Kickapoo, moving on

that place. This squadron will remain here tonight; Sergeant B will

take a patrol through Fort Leavenworth.

"Select a patrol of 5 men from your platoon and move out via

Frenchman's (oc') toward Kickapoo.

"Secure any information you can of the enemy in that locality.

"Report on the condition of the bridges between here and 47 (fd').

"You may have to stay out over night.

"Send messages here."

Sergeant Jones selects five good men, directs them to take one cooked

ration each and canteen full of water. He inspects the men and horses

carefully; sees that no horse of conspicuous color or that neighs is

taken. Explains the orders to his men, etc., as was done in the

infantry patrol.

=Required, 2.= What route does the patrol take, and why?

=Answer.= Metropolitan avenue (w)--70 (vj')--72 (vj')--14

(ug')--Frenchman (oc')--17 (jc')--47 (ec').

=Reasons.= The enemy is distant and Kickapoo, the objective of the

patrol, is seen from the map, which Sergeant Jones has, to be over an

hour's ride at a walk and trot. It is not at all probable that the

enemy will be met until the patrol reaches the vicinity of Kickapoo

and Sergeant Jones decides to take the shortest and best road though

it is a main highway, instead of Sheridan's Drive (j) of the F

(qg')--15 (jg') lane.

It is always well for a patrol to avoid main highways when the enemy

is near, especially in hostile country, but here the time saved more

than justifies the use of the direct route.

Problem No. 11 (Cavalry)

=1043.= Same situation as Problem 1.

=Required, 1.= The formation and conduct of the patrol as far as

Frenchman's.

=Answer.= Sergeant Jones determines to move at a walk and trot (5

miles per hour) in order to reach the vicinity of Kickapoo and take up

a position of observation before night. Sergeant Jones and Private B

are in the lead, 2 men about 100 yards to the rear, the remaining 2

men about 75 yards in the rear of these. They move out at a trot along

the road until Atchison Cross is reached. The two cross roads are

reconnoitered without halting the patrol, inasmuch as from the cross

roads a good view is had north and south.

From Atchison Cross to 16 (sf') the patrol moves at a walk, being up a

slope from 4 to 6 degrees. Usually such a place would be rushed

through, but the distance of the enemy makes this unnecessary. No

scouting is done off the road through the woods, because of the

distance of the enemy. On reaching the top of the hill the patrol is

halted while Sergeant Jones moves up to the high ground south of the

road at the crest, and in concealment searches with his glasses the

road as far as Frenchman's, especially the village beyond G (qf').

Seeing no signs of the enemy he moves the patrol down the hill at a

walk until the cut is passed and there takes a fast trot, so as to

avoid being long in a position where they could be seen from the

direction of Kickapoo. The same formation and gait are maintained as

far as Gauss' (pd'), where a walk is taken to rest the horses and to

gain opportunity to see if any enemy are holding the bridge at

Frenchman's.

=Situation:=

Just as the patrol comes to a walk Sergeant Jones sees what appears to

be a dismounted patrol moving south over the ridge about 650 yards

north of Frenchman's. He can see three men.

=Required, 2.= Action taken by Sergeant Jones.

=Answer.= The patrol is moved into the orchard just off the road,

while Sergeant Jones moves quickly to the top of the hill and,

concealed by the trees, examines the road north to see if the 3 men

are followed by others forming a part of a larger patrol or column.

He finds the three men are not followed.

=Required, 3.= What does he do next?

=Answer.= He determines to capture the patrol by surprise. He has the

horses led over south of the orchard hill so as not to be visible to

the enemy. He then distributes his men along the north edge of the

orchard, himself nearest the bridge, 2 men 75 yards back along the

road toward G (qf'), then 2 men 75 yards farther along toward G. As

the third man comes opposite him, Sergeant Jones cries "Halt," which

is the signal for the other parties to similarly hold up their men.

=Reasons.= Sergeant Jones might either capture the hostile patrol or

let it pass, and then proceed on his road. Since they are the first

enemy seen and there is such a good chance to capture them, and as

they may furnish definite information of the enemy's main force, he

decides as stated. There is an objection in capturing them that he

will have to send one or two men to take them to camp. The patrol is

placed as described above so as to have the two men opposite each of

the enemy, except for Sergeant Jones, who is alone. By thus covering

each man of the hostile patrol by two of our men, they will at once

see the folly of an effort to escape and no shot need be fired. One

man is holding the horses.

Problem No. 12 (Cavalry)

=1044.= Same situation as Problem 10.

=Required:=

1. What action does Sergeant Jones take before leaving the vicinity of

Frenchman's?

2. Give the formation and conduct of the patrol after leaving here.

3. Give the report submitted by Sergeant Jones under his instructions

in regard to bridges. (Par. 1000.)

At 6:30 P. M. (it is dark at 7:30) the patrol reaches 17 (jc').

4. Give the route followed from here and the disposition of the patrol

made for the night.

Problem No. 13 (Cavalry)

=1045. Situation:=

The Missouri river is the boundary between hostile countries.

A Blue separate brigade (3 regiments infantry, 1 squadron cavalry, 1

battery field artillery) is moving from Winchester (19 miles west of

Leavenworth) to seize the Rock Island bridge (q) across the Missouri

river at Fort Leavenworth. The cavalry squadron is camped at Lowemont,

8 miles west of Leavenworth, for night June 4-5. At 3 P. M. Sergeant

Jones is directed to take a patrol of six men and move via the Rock

Island bridge into Missouri and gain information of the enemy reported

to be now just east of the river.

=Required, 1.= Give the formation of the patrol when it first comes on

the map.

=Required, 2.= Give the conduct of the patrol from Mottin's (oa') to G

(qf').

At Frenchman's, Sergeant Jones met a farmer coming from Fort

Leavenworth, who said about 200 hostile cavalry were seen just east of

the Missouri about 2 P. M., moving towards the Terminal Bridge (z).

=Required, 3.= Action of Sergeant Jones. (Does he hold the man? Does

he send a message? Does he change his plans or direction of march?)

The patrol reaches the top of the hill, Sheridan's Drive--Government

Hill (tf').

=Required, 4.= What action does Sergeant Jones take before proceeding

east?

FLANK GUARDS

=1046.= The flanks of a column are ordinarily protected by the advance

guard, which sends out patrols to carefully examine the country on

both sides of the line of march. In some cases, however, the direction

of march of the column is such that there is a great danger of the

enemy's striking it in flank and some special provision is necessary

to furnish additional security on the threatened flank. This is done

by having a detachment, called a flank guard, march off the exposed

flank. The flank guard usually follows a road, parallel to the one on

which the column is marching and at least 1,000 yards (effective rifle

range) beyond it. If hostile artillery is feared this distance is much

greater.

The flank guard regulates its march so as to continue abreast of the

advance guard of the main column. It takes a formation similar to an

advance guard, does most of its patrolling to the front and on the

exposed flank, and keeps in constant touch with the main column by

means of mounted or dismounted messengers.

In case the enemy is encountered the flank guard drives him off if

practicable or takes up a defensive position, protecting the march of

the main column, and preventing the enemy from disturbing the latter's

march.

REAR GUARD

=1047. Definition and Duties.= A rear guard is a detachment of a

marching column following in rear to protect the main column from

being surprised and to prevent the march from being delayed or

interrupted.

When the main column is marching toward the enemy the rear guard is

very small and its duties relatively unimportant. It is principally

occupied in gathering up stragglers.

When the main column is marching away from the enemy (retreating) the

rear guard is all important. It covers the retreat of the main body,

preventing the enemy from harassing or delaying its march.

=1048. Strength.= The strength of a rear guard is slightly greater

than that of an advance guard, as it cannot expect, like the latter,

to be reinforced in case it is attacked, as the main column is

marching away from it and avoiding a fight.

=1049. Form of Order.= The rear guard commander, on the receipt of the

retreat order, issues a rear guard order, according to the form given

in the Field Service Regulations.

The distance of a rear guard from the main body and its formation are

similar to those of an advance guard. The elements corresponding to

the advance cavalry, the point, and the advance party of an advance

guard are termed the rear cavalry, rear point and rear party,

respectively. The support and reserve retain the same designations.

A rear guard formed during an engagement to cover the withdrawal or

retreat of the main body, may first be compelled to take up a

defensive position behind which the main body forms up and moves off.

It may be forced to withdraw from this position by successive skirmish

lines, gradually forming up in column on the road as it clears itself

from fighting contact with the enemy.

The rate of march of the rear guard depends upon that of the main

body. The main body may be much disorganized and fatigued,

necessitating long halts and a slow marching rate.

=1050. Action of the Rear Guard.= The withdrawal of defeated troops is

delayed, if possible, until night. If it becomes necessary to begin a

retreat while an engagement is in progress, the rear guard is

organized and takes up a defensive position generally behind the

fighting line; the latter then falls back and assembles under cover of

the rear guard.

The rear cavalry gives away before the enemy's pursuit only when

absolutely necessary, maintains communication with and sends

information to the rear guard commander, and pays special attention to

the weak points in the retreat, namely, the flanks. It makes use of

every kind of action of which it is capable, according to the

situation, and unless greatly outnumbered by hostile cavalry, it

causes considerable delay to the enemy.

When the enemy is conducting an energetic pursuit the rear guard

effects its withdrawal by taking up a succession of defensive

positions (that is, where the nature of the ground enables the rear

guard to defend itself well) and compelling the enemy to attack or

turn them. (It should be understood that these successive defensive

positions must, in the case of a large force, be from two to four

miles apart and in the case of a small force at least one-half mile

apart--not a few hundred yards as is frequently attempted in peace

maneuvers.)

When the enemy's dispositions for attack are nearly completed, the

rear guard begins to fall back, the cavalry on the flanks being

usually the last to leave. The commander designates a part of the rear

guard to cover the withdrawal of the remainder; the latter then falls

back to a new position in rear, and in turn covers the withdrawal of

the troops in front. These operations compel the enemy continually to

deploy or make turning movements, and constantly retard his advance.

The pursuit may be further delayed by obstacles placed in the enemy's

path; bridges are burned or blown up; boats removed or destroyed;

fords and roads obstructed; tracks torn up; telegraph lines cut, and

houses, villages, woods and fields fired. Demolitions and obstructions

are prepared by engineers, assisted, if necessary, by other troops

detailed from the reserve, and are completed by the mounted engineers

of the rear party at the last moment.

The instructions of the supreme commander govern in the demolition of

important structures.

OUTPOSTS

(See "Outpost," Par. 887)

=1051. Definition and Duties.= Outposts are detachments thrown out to

the front and flanks of a force that is in camp or bivouac, to protect

the main body from being surprised and to insure its undisturbed rest.

In fact, an outpost is merely a stationary advance guard. Its duties,

in general, are to _observe_ and _resist_--to observe the enemy, and

to resist him in case of attack. Specifically its duties are:

(=a=) To observe toward the front and flanks by means of stationary

sentinels and patrols, in order to locate the enemy's whereabouts and

learn promptly of his movements, thus making it impossible for him to

surprise us.

(=b=) To prevent the main body from being observed or disturbed.

(=c=) In case of attack, to check the enemy long enough to enable the

main body to prepare for action and make the necessary dispositions.

=1052. Size.= The size of the outpost will depend upon many

circumstances, such as the size of the whole command, the nearness of

the enemy, the nature of the ground, etc. A suitable strength for an

outpost may vary from a very small fraction to one-third of the whole

force. However, in practice it seldom exceeds one-sixth of the whole

force--as a rule, if it be greater, the efficiency of the troops will

be impaired. For a single company in bivouac a few sentinels and

patrols will suffice; for a large command, a more elaborate outpost

system must be provided. The most economical form of outpost is

furnished by keeping close contact with the enemy by means of outpost

patrols, in conjunction with resisting detachments on the avenues of

approach.

Troops at a halt are supposed to be resting, night or day, and the

fewer on outpost the more troops will there be resting, and thus

husbanding their strength for approaching marches and encounters with

the enemy. Outpost duty is about the most exhausting and fatiguing

work a soldier performs. It is, therefore, evident that not a man or

horse more than is absolutely necessary should be employed, and that

the commander should use careful judgment in determining the strength

of the outpost, and the chiefs of the various outpost subdivisions

should be equally careful in disposing their men so as to permit the

greatest possible number to rest and sleep undisturbed, _but at the

same time always considering the safety of the main body as the chief

duty_.

=1053. Composition.= The composition of the outpost will, as a rule,

depend upon the size and composition of the command, but a mixed

outpost is composed principally of infantry, which is charged with the

duty of local observation, especially at night, and with resisting the

enemy, in case of attack, long enough for the main body to prepare for

action.

The cavalry is charged with the duty of reconnaissance, and is very

useful in open country during the day.

Artillery is useful to outposts when its fire can sweep defiles or

large open spaces and when it commands positions that might be

occupied by hostile artillery.

Machine guns are useful to command approaches and check sudden

advances of the enemy.

Engineers are attached to an outpost to assist in constructing

entrenchments, clearing the field of fire, opening communication

laterally and to the rear. The outpost should be composed of complete

organizations. For example, if the outpost is to consist of one

company, do not have some of the platoons from one company and the

others from another, and if it is to consist of one battalion, do not

have some of the companies from one battalion and others from another,

etc.

FORMATION OF OUTPOSTS

=1054. Subdivisions.= As in the case of an advance guard, the outpost

of a large force is divided into elements or parts, that gradually

increase in size from front to rear. These, in order from the main

body, are the reserve, the line of supports, the line of outguards,

and the advance cavalry, and their formation, as shown by the drawing

on the preceding page, may be likened to an open hand, with the

fingers apart and extended, the wrist representing the main body, the

knuckles the line of supports, the first joints the line of outguards,

the second joints the line of sentinels and the finger tips the

advance cavalry.

[Illustration: Fig. 4]

In case of attack each part is charged with holding the enemy in check

until the larger element, next in rear, has time to deploy and prepare

for action.

=1055. Distances Between the Subdivisions.= The distances separating

the main body, the line of supports, the line of outguards, the line

of sentries and the advance cavalry, will depend upon circumstances.

There can be no uniformity in the distance between supports and

reserves, nor between outguards and supports, even in the same

outpost. The avenues of approach and the important features of the

ground will largely control the exact positions of the different parts

of the outposts. The basic principle upon which the distances are

based, is: _The distance between any two parts of the outpost must be

great enough to give the one in rear time to deploy and prepare for

action in case of attack, and the distance of the whole outpost from

the main body must, in the case of small commands, be sufficiently

great to hold the enemy beyond effective rifle range until the main

body can deploy, and, in case of large commands, it must be

sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective artillery range

until the main body can deploy._

It is, therefore, evident that the distances will be materially

affected not only by the size of the main body, but also by the nature

of the cover afforded by the ground.

The following is given merely as a very general guide, subject to many

changes:

Distance to next

element in rear.

Advance cavalry 2 to 6 miles

Supports {Sentinels (furnished by outguard) 20 to 40 yds.

(Generally {Outguards (furnished by support) 200 to 500 yds.

two or {Support proper furnishes majority 400 to 800 yds.

more) of patrols.

Reserve (usually omitted in small commands) 1/2 to 2 miles

=1056. Advance Cavalry.= The advance cavalry is that part of the

outpost sent out in front of all foot troops. It generally operates

two to six miles beyond the outpost infantry, reconnoitering far to

the front and flanks in order to guard the camp against surprise by

artillery fire and to give early information of the enemy's movements.

After dusk the bulk of the cavalry usually withdraws to a camp in rear

of the outpost reserve, where it can rest securely after the day's

hard work and the horses can be fresh for the next day. Several

mounted patrols are usually left for the night at junctions or forks

on the principal roads to the front, from one to four miles beyond the

infantry line of observation.

=1057. Supports.= The _supports_ constitute a line of _supporting_ and

_resisting_ detachments, varying in size from a half a company to a

battalion. In outposts consisting of a battalion or more the supports

usually comprise about one-half of the infantry. Supports are numbered

numerically consecutively from right to left and are placed at the

more important points on the outpost line, on or near the line on

which resistance is to be made in case of attack.

As a rule, roads exercise the greatest influence on the location of

supports, and a support will generally be placed on or near a road.

Each support has assigned to it a definite, clearly-defined section of

front that it is to cover, and the support should be located as

centrally as possible thereto.

=1058. Outguards.= The outguards constitute the line of small

detachments farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy, and their

duty is to maintain uninterrupted observation of the ground in front

and on the flanks; to report promptly hostile movements and other

information relating to the enemy; to prevent unauthorized persons

from crossing the line of observation; to drive off small parties of

the enemy, and to make temporary resistance to larger bodies. For

convenience outguards are classified as pickets, sentry squads, and

cossack posts. They are numbered consecutively from right to left in

each support.

=1059.= _A picket_ is a group consisting of two or more squads,

ordinarily not exceeding half a company, posted in the line of

outguards to cover a given sector. It furnishes patrols and one or

more sentinels, double sentinels, sentry, squads, or cossack posts for

observation.

Pickets are placed at the more important points in the line of

outguards, such as road forks. The strength of each depends upon the

number of small groups required to observe properly its sector.

=1060.= _A sentry squad_ is a squad posted in observation at an

indicated point. It posts a double sentinel in observation, the

remaining men resting near by and furnishing the reliefs of sentinels.

In some cases it may be required to furnish a patrol.

=1061.= _A cossack post_ consists of four men. It is an observation

group similar to a sentry squad; but employs a single sentinel.

At night, it will sometimes be advisable to place some of the

outguards or their sentinels in a position different from that which

they occupy in the daytime. In such case the ground should be

carefully studied before dark and the change made at dusk. However, a

change in the position of the outguard will be exceptional.

=1062.= _Sentinels_ are generally used singly in daytime, but at night

double sentinels will be required in most cases. Sentinels furnished

by cossack posts or sentry squads are kept near their group. Those

furnished by pickets may be as far as 100 yards away.

Every sentinel should be able to communicate readily with the body to

which he belongs.

Sentinel posts are numbered consecutively from right to left in each

outguard. Sentry squads and cossack posts furnished by pickets are

counted as sentinel posts.

If practicable, troops on outpost duty are concealed and all movements

made so as to avoid observation by the enemy; sentinels are posted so

as to have a clear view to the front and, if practicable (though it is

rarely possible), so as to be able, by day, to see the sentinels of

the adjoining outguards. Double sentinels are posted near enough to

each other to be able to communicate easily in ordinary voice.

Sentinels are generally on duty two hours out of six. For every

sentinel and for every patrol there should be at least three reliefs;

therefore, one-third the strength of the outguards gives the greatest

number of men that should be on duty as sentinels and patrols at one

time.

Skillful selection of the posts of sentinels increases their field of

observation. High points, under cover, are advantageous by night as

well as by day; they increase the range of vision and afford greater

facilities for seeing lights and hearing noises. Observers with good

field glasses may be placed on high buildings, on church steeples or

in high trees.

Glittering objects on uniform or equipment should be concealed. It is

seldom necessary to fix bayonets, except at night, in dense fog, or in

very close country.

Reliefs, visiting patrols, and inspecting officers, approach sentinels

from the rear, remaining under cover if possible.

=1063. Reserve.= The reserve forms a general support for the line of

resistance. It is, therefore, centrally located near the junction of

roads coming from the direction of the enemy, and in concealment if

practicable.

Of the troops detailed for outpost duty, about one-half of the

infantry, generally all of the artillery, and the cavalry not

otherwise employed, are assigned to the reserve. If the outpost

consists of less than two companies the reserve may be omitted

altogether.

The arms are stacked and the equipments (except cartridge belts) may

be removed. Roads communicating with the supports are opened.

When necessary, the outpost order states what is to be done in case of

attack, designates places of assembly and provides for interior

guards. Interior guards are posted in the camp of the reserve or main

body to maintain order, and furnish additional security. Additional

instructions may be given for messing, feeding, watering, etc. In the

vicinity of the enemy or at night a portion of the infantry may be

required to remain under arms, the cavalry to hold their horses

(cinches loosened), and the artillery to remain in harness, or take up

a combat position.

In case of alarm, the reserve prepares for action without delay, and

word is sent to the main body. In combat, the reserve reinforces the

line of resistance, and if unable to check the enemy until the arrival

of the main body, delays him as much as possible.

The distance of the reserve from the line of resistance varies, but is

generally about half a mile; in outposts of four companies or less

this distance may be as small as 400 yards.

=1064. Patrols.= Instead of using outguards along the entire front of

observation, part of this front may be covered by patrols only. These

should be used to cover such sections of the front as can be crossed

by the enemy only with difficulty and over which he is not likely to

attempt a crossing after dark.

In daylight much of the local patrolling may be dispensed with if the

country can be seen from the posts of the sentinels. However, patrols

should frequently be pushed well to the front unless the ground in

that direction is exceptionally open.

Patrols must be used to keep up connection between the parts of the

outpost except when, during daylight, certain fractions or groups are

mutually visible. After dark this connection must be maintained

throughout the outpost except where the larger subdivisions are

provided with wire communication.

The following patrols are usually sent out from the main bodies of the

supports:

(=a=) Patrols of from three men to a squad are sent along the roads

and trails in the direction of the enemy, for a distance of from one

to five miles, depending on how close the enemy is supposed to be,

whether or not there is any advance cavalry out, and how long the

outpost has been in position. The extreme right and left supports send

patrols well out on the roads to the flanks. These patrols generally

operate continuously as soon as one returns from the front, or

possibly even before it returns, another goes out in the same general

direction to cover the same country. Frequently a patrol is sent out

along a road to the front for two or three miles with orders to remain

out until some stated time--for example, 4 P. M., dusk or dawn. It

sends in important information, and remains out near the extremity of

its route, keeping a close watch on the surrounding country.

An effort should always be made to secure and maintain contact with

the enemy, if within a reasonable distance, in order that his

movements or lack of movement may be constantly watched and reported

on. The usual tendency is towards a failure to send these patrols far

enough to the front and for the patrol leader to overestimate the

distance he has traveled. A mile through strange country with the

ever-present possibility of encountering the enemy seems three miles

to the novice.

At night the patrols generally confine their movements to the roads,

usually remaining quietly on the alert near the most advanced point of

their route to the front.

The majority of such patrols are sent out to secure information of the

enemy--reconnoitering patrols--and they avoid fighting and hostile

patrols, endeavoring to get in touch with the enemy's main force.

Other patrols are sometimes sent out to prevent hostile detachments

from approaching the outposts; they endeavor to locate the hostile

patrols, drive them back, preventing them from gaining any vantage

point from which they can observe the outpost line. These are called

combat patrols and have an entirely different mission from

reconnoitering patrols.

(=b=) Patrols of from two men to a squad, usually two men, are sent

from the support around the line of its outguards, connecting with the

outguards of the adjacent supports, if practicable. These are

"visiting patrols," and they serve to keep the outguards of a support

in touch with it and with each other; to keep the commander of a

support in touch with his outguards and the adjacent supports; and to

reconnoiter the ground between the outguards. Since a hostile force of

any size is practically forced to keep to the roads, there are rarely

ever any supports and very few outguards posted off the roads, the

intervals being covered by patrols, as just described.

When going out a patrol will always inform the nearest sentinel of the

direction it will take and its probable route and hour of return.

=1065. Detail for Patrols.= Since for every patrol of four men, twelve

are required (3 reliefs of 4 men each), the importance of sending out

just enough men and not one more than is actually needed, can readily

be understood. As fast as one visiting patrol completes its round,

another should usually be sent out, possibly going the rounds by a

slightly different route or in the reverse direction. The same

generally applies to the reconnoitering and combat patrols, though

frequently they are sent out for the entire day, afternoon or night,

and no 2d and 3d relief is required. Three reliefs are required for

the sentinel or sentinels at the post of the supports, so care should

be taken to establish but one post, if it can do all that is required.

It should not be considered that every man in the support should be on

duty or on a relief for an outguard, a patrol or sentinel post. There

should be as many men as possible in the main body of a support (this

term is used to distinguish this body from the support proper, which

includes the outguards and their sentinels) who only have no duty

other than being instantly available in case of attack.

=1066. Flags of Truce.= Upon the approach of a flag of truce, the

sentry will at once notify the commander of the outguard, who will in

turn send word to the commander of the outpost and ask for

instructions. One or more men will advance to the front and halt the

party at such distance as to prevent any of them from overlooking the

outposts. As soon as halted, the party will be ordered to face in the

opposite direction. If permission is given to pass the party through

the outpost line, they will be blindfolded and led under escort to the

commander of the outpost. No conversation, except by permission of the

outpost commander, is to be allowed on any subject, under any pretext,

with the persons bearing the flag of truce.

=1067. Entrenchments and Obstacles.= The positions held by the

subdivisions of an outpost should generally be strengthened by the

construction of entrenchments and obstacles, but conditions may render

this unnecessary.

=1068. Concealment.= Troops on outpost must keep concealed as much as

is consistent with the proper performance of their duties; especially

should they avoid the sky line.

=1069. Detached Posts.= In addition to ordinary outguards, the outpost

commander may detail from the reserve one or more detached posts to

cover roads or areas not in general line assigned to the supports.

In like manner the commander of the whole force may order detached

posts to be sent from the main body to cover important roads or

localities not included in the outpost line.

Detached posts may be sent out to hold points which are of importance

to the outpost cavalry, such as a ford or a junction of roads; or to

occupy positions especially favorable for observation, but too far to

the front to be included in the line of observation; or to protect

flanks of the outpost position. Such posts are generally established

by the outpost commander, but a support commander might find it

necessary to establish a post practically detached from the rest of

his command. They usually vary in strength from a squad to a platoon.

The number and strength of detached posts are reduced to the absolute

needs of the situation.

=1070. Examining Posts.= An examining post is a small detachment,

under the command of an officer or a noncommissioned officer,

stationed at some convenient point to examine strangers and to receive

bearers Of flags of truce brought in by the outguards or patrols.

Though the employment of examining posts is not general in field

operations, there are many occasions when their use is important; for

example: When the outguards do not speak the language of the country

or of the enemy; when preparations are being made for a movement and

strict scrutiny at the outguards is ordered: at sieges, whether in

attack or defense. When such posts, are used, strangers approaching

the line of observation are passed along the line to an examining

post.

No one except the commander is allowed to speak to persons brought to

an examining post. Prisoners and deserters are at once sent under

guard to the rear.

=1071. Cavalry Outpost.= Independent cavalry covering a command or on

special missions, and occasionally the advance cavalry of a mixed

command, bivouac when night overtakes them, and in such cases furnish

their own outposts. The outposts are established, in the main, in

accordance with the foregoing principles, care being taken to confine

outpost work to the lowest limits consistent with safety. No

precaution, however, should be omitted, as the cavalry is generally in

close proximity to the enemy, and often in territory where the

inhabitants are hostile.

The line of resistance is occupied by the supports, the latter sending

out the necessary outguards and patrols. Each outguard furnishes its

own vedettes (mounted sentinels), or sentinels. Due to the mobility of

cavalry, the distances are generally greater than in an outpost for a

mixed command. An outguard of four troopers is convenient for the day

time, but should be doubled at night, and at important points made

even stronger. The sentinels are generally dismounted, their horses

being left with those of the outguards.

Mounted cavalry at night can offer little resistance; the supports and

outguards are therefore generally dismounted, the horses being under

cover in rear, and the positions are strengthened by intrenchments and

obstacles. By holding villages, bridges, defiles, etc., with

dismounted rifle fire, cavalry can greatly delay a superior force.

There should always be easy communication along the line of resistance

to enable the cavalry to concentrate at a threatened point.

A support of one squadron covers with its outposts a section rarely

longer than two miles.

As such a line is of necessity weak, the principal reliance is placed

on distant patrolling. If threatened by infantry, timely information

enables the threatened point to be reinforced, or the cavalry to

withdraw to a place of safety. If there is danger from hostile

cavalry, the roads in front are blocked at suitable points, such as

bridges, fords, defiles, etc., by a succession of obstacles and are

defended by a few dismounted men. When compelled to fall back these

men mount and ride rapidly to the next obstacle in rear and there take

up a new position. As the march of cavalry at night is, as a rule,

confined to roads, such tactics seriously delay its advance.

In accordance with the situation and the orders they have received,

the support commanders arrange for feeding, watering, cooking, resting

and patrolling. During the night the horses of the outguards remain

saddled and bridled. During the day time cinches may be loosened,

one-third of the horses at a time. Feeding and watering are done by

reliefs. Horses being fed are removed a short distance from the

others.

Independent cavalry generally remains in outpost position for the

night only, its advance being resumed on the following day; if stopped

by the enemy, it is drawn off to the flanks upon the approach of its

own infantry.

ESTABLISHING THE OUTPOST

=1072.= The outpost is posted as quickly as possible, so that the

troops can the sooner obtain rest. Until the leading outpost troops

are able to assume their duties, temporary protection, known as the

_march outpost_, is furnished by the nearest available troops.

Upon receipt of the _halt order_ from the commander of the main

column, the outpost commander issues the _outpost order_ with the

least practicable delay.

The _halt order_, besides giving the necessary information and

assigning camp sites to the parts of the command, details the troops

to constitute the outpost, assigns a commander therefor, designates

the general line to be occupied, and, when practicable, points out the

position to be held in case of attack.

The _outpost order_ gives such available information of the situation

as is necessary to the complete and proper guidance of subordinates;

designates the troops to constitute the supports; assigns their

location and the sector each is to cover; provides for the necessary

detached posts; indicates any special reconnaissance that is to be

made; orders the location and disposition of the reserve; disposes of

the train if the same is ordered to join the outpost; and informs

subordinates where information will be sent. In large commands it may

often be necessary to give the order from the map, but usually the

outpost commander will have to make some preliminary reconnaissance,

unless he has an accurate and detailed map.

Generally it is preferable for the outpost commander to give verbal

orders to his support commanders from some locality which overlooks

the terrain. The time and locality should be so selected that the

support commanders may join their commands and conduct them to their

positions without causing unnecessary delay to their troops. The

reserve commander should, if possible, receive his orders at the same

time as the support commanders. Subordinates to whom he gives orders

separately should be informed of the location of other parts of the

outpost.

=1073.= After issuing the initial orders, the outpost commander

inspects the outpost, orders the necessary changes or additions, and

sends his superior a report of his dispositions.

_The reserve_ is marched to its post by its commander, who then sends

out such detachments as have been ordered and places the rest in camp

or bivouac, over which at least one sentinel should be posted.

Connection must be maintained with the main body, the supports, and

nearby detached posts.

The supports march to their posts, using the necessary covering

detachments when in advance of the march outpost. A support

commander's order should fully explain the situation to subordinates,

or to the entire command, if it be small. It should detail the troops

for the different outguards and, when necessary, define the sector

each is to cover. It should provide the necessary sentinels at the

post of the support, the patrols to be sent therefrom, and should

arrange for the necessary intrenching.

In posting his command the support commander must seek to cover his

sector (the front that he is to look after) in such manner that the

enemy can not reach, in dangerous numbers and unobserved, the position

of the support or pass by it within the sector intrusted to the

support. On the other hand, he must economize men on observation and

patrol duty, for these duties are unusually fatiguing. He must

practice the greatest economy of men consistent with the requirements

of practical security.

As soon as the posting of the support is completed, its commander

carefully inspects the dispositions and corrects defects, if any, and

reports the disposition of his support, including the patrolling

ordered, to the outpost commander. This report is preferably made by

means of a sketch.

By day the outpost will stack arms and the articles of equipment,

except the cartridge belt and canteen, will be placed by the arms. At

night the men will invariably sleep with their arms and equipment near

them.

In addition to the sentinel posted over the support, a part of the

support, say one-third or one-fourth, should always be awake at night.

Each outguard is marched by its commander to its assigned station, and

especially in the case of a picket, is covered by the necessary

patrolling to prevent surprise.

Having reached the position, the commander explains the situation to

his men and establishes reliefs for each sentinel, and, if possible,

for each patrol to be furnished. Besides these sentinels and patrols,

a picket must have a sentinel at its post.

The commander then posts the sentinels and points out to them the

principal features, such as towns, roads, and streams, and gives their

names. He gives the direction and location of the enemy, if known, and

of adjoining parts of the outpost.

He gives to patrols the same information and the necessary orders as

to their routes and the frequency with which the same shall be

covered. Each patrol should go over its route once before dark.

Each picket should maintain connection by patrols with the outguards

on its right and left.

=1074. Intercommunication.= It is most important that communication

should be maintained at all times between all parts of the outpost,

and between the outpost and the main body. This may be done by

patrols, messengers, wire or signal.

The commander of the outpost is responsible that proper communication

be maintained with the main body, and the support commanders keep up

communication with the outguards, with the adjoining supports and with

the reserve. The commander of a detached post will maintain

communication with the nearest outguard.

=1075. Changes for the Night.= In civilized warfare, it is seldom

necessary to draw the outpost closer to the main body at night in

order to diminish the front; nor is it necessary to strengthen the

line of observation, as the enemy's advance in force must be confined

to the roads. The latter are therefore strongly occupied, the

intervening ground being diligently patrolled.

In very open country or in war with savage or semi-civilized people

familiar with the terrain, special precautions are necessary.

=1076. Relieving the Outpost.= Ordinarily outposts are not kept on

duty longer than twenty-four hours. In temporary camps or bivouac they

are generally relieved every morning. After a day's advance the

outpost for the night is usually relieved, the following morning when

the support of the new advance guard passes the line of resistance. In

retreat the outpost for the night usually forms the rear guard for the

following day, and is relieved when it passes the line of observation

of the new outpost.

Outguards that have become familiar with the country during the day

time should remain on duty that night. Sentinels are relieved once in

two hours, or oftener, depending on the weather. The work of patrols

is regulated by the support commander.

Commanders of the various fractions of an outpost turn over their

instructions and special orders, written and verbal, to their

successors, together with the latest information of the enemy, and a

description of the important features of the country. When practicable

the first patrols sent out by the new outposts are accompanied by

members of the old outpost who are familiar with the terrain. When

relieved the old outguards return to their supports, the supports to

the reserve and the latter to the main body; or, if more convenient,

the supports and reserves return to the main body independently, each

by the shortest route.

When relieved by an advance guard, the outpost troops ordinarily join

their units as the column passes.

Evening and shortly before dawn are hours of special danger. The enemy

may attack late in the day in order to establish himself on captured

ground by intrenching during the night; or he may send forward troops

under cover of darkness in order to make a strong attack at early

dawn. Special precaution is therefore taken at those hours by holding

the outpost in readiness, and by sending patrols in advance of the

line of observation. If a new outpost is to be established in the

morning it should arrive at the outpost position at daybreak, thus

doubling the outpost strength at that hour.

OUTPOST PROBLEMS

Problem No. 1 (Infantry)

=1077. Lieutenant (to two squads of his company):= Two battalions of

our regiment have camped by Baker's Pond (Elementary Map) for the

night. It is now 3 P. M. on a rainy day in August. The enemy is

thought to be about five miles to the south of us. Our platoon is the

left support of the outpost and is stationed at the road fork on the

Chester Pike, by the Mason house. The Twin Hills-Lone Hill ridge is

taken care of by other troops. Corporal Baker, where do you think I

should place outguards?

=Corporal Baker:= One at the junction of the Mills farm lane and the

Chester Pike, and one at the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.

=Lieutenant:= Those positions are both too far from the support,

almost a half mile, but they cover the two main avenues of approach

and there is no good place for a position nearer the support. A

position farther north of the Mill's farm lane would have its view

obstructed by the wall and trees along the lane and the wall would be

a bad thing to leave unoccupied such a short distance to your front.

So in this case, in spite of the excessive distances from the support,

I think the two positions are well chosen. Each should be an outguard

of a squad, for in the day time, in addition to furnishing a sentinel

to observe to the front, they should have some power of resistance,

particularly at the trestle. At night they should each have one double

sentinel post. This requires three reliefs of two men each, which,

with the corporal, only leaves one extra man, who can be used as a

messenger.

Corporal Baker, I order you to take your squad and post it as Outguard

No. 1, at the junction of this (Chester) pike and that farm lane

(Mills farm) in front. Corporal Davis' squad will be Outguard No. 2,

at the railroad trestle over there (pointing). Friendly troops will be

on the ridge to the east of your position. Your meals will be cooked

here and sent to you.

Explain how you post your squad.

=Corporal Baker:= I order Smith to double time 150 yards to the front

and act as point for the squad. I then march the squad down to its

position, keeping Smith about 200 yards in front until I have arranged

everything. I then post Brown under cover of the trees along the lane

where he can look down the road as far as possible and I tell him,

"Brown, you are to take post here, keeping a sharp lookout to the

front and flanks. The enemy is thought to be about five miles south

(pointing) of us. This is the Chester Pike. That creek over there is

Sandy Creek. Salem is about a mile and three-quarters down this pike

in that (S. E.) direction. York is a mile and a half in that (S. W.)

direction. Our troops are on that ridge (Twin Hills) and a squad is at

the trestle over there. It is Outguard No. 2. You are in Outguard No.

1. You know where we left our platoon. It is our support. Signal Smith

to come in." I then have the squad pitch their shelter tents along the

northern side of the wall, where they will be hidden to view from the

front by the trees along the lane and the wall. I want the men to get

shelter from the rain as soon as possible. I then instruct the men of

the squad, in the same manner that I did Brown; I notice the time,

and detail Davis as second relief and Carter as third relief for

Brown's post.

I then direct two men to take all the canteens and go over to that

farm (Mills) and fill them, first questioning the people about the

enemy and about the country around here. I also direct these two men

to get some straw or hay for bedding in the shelter tents, and

instruct them to return with as little delay as possible.

I wait until they return and order two other men to go down to the

cross roads, question the people there, look the ground over and

return here. I caution them not to give any information about our

force or the outguard. I would see that the sentinel's position was

the best available and that the men had as comfortable quarters as

possible, without being unduly exposed to view and without interfering

with their movements in case of attack. They would keep their rifles

at their sides at all times and not remove their equipments. After

dark I put two men on post at the same time. To do this I arrange

three reliefs of two men each. They are posted in pairs for two hours

at a time.

If no patrol from the support appeared within a half hour after I

first took position I would send a messenger back to you to see if

everything was all right and tell you what I had done.

=Lieutenant:= I think the two men sent to the crossroads should have

been started out before sending anyone to the Mills house as this was

a more important point. The Field Service Regulations state that

outguards do not patrol to the front, but what you did was entirely

correct. You were securing yourself in your position and should be

familiar with your immediate surroundings. You should have told the

crossroads patrol to determine how much of an obstacle Sandy Creek

was. I suppose you assumed the swamp was impassable.

The sentinel in this case is, I suppose, across the lane from the

outguard about ten or fifteen yards in advance. After dark the double

sentinel post should be posted on the pike about thirty yards in

advance of the outguard.

Very frequently it would not be wise to put up your shelter tents on

outguard. But here, considering the rain and the protection the trees

and wall furnish, it was wise to do so.

The noncommissioned officer in charge of an outguard should be very

precise in giving his orders and in making his arrangements, details,

etc. The discipline must be strict; that is, the men must be kept

under absolute control, so that in case of sudden attack there will be

no chance of confusion and the outguard commander will have his men

absolutely in hand and not permit any independent action on their

part. This is often not the case, owing to the familiar relations that

usually exist in our army between a corporal and the members of his

squad.

We will not have time to go into the arrangements for Outguard No. 2

other than to say that the conditions there are somewhat different

from those Corporal Baker has had to deal with. The outguard should be

posted on the west bank of Sandy Creek and the sentinel at the

southeastern end of the trestle. A skirmish trench should be dug down

the western slope of the fill west of the creek, and extended across

the track by throwing up a parapet about two and one-half feet high,

slightly bent back towards the northeast so as to furnish cover from

fire from the east bank of the creek, north of the trestle. The

shelter tents could be pitched as "lean tos" against the western slope

of the fill, and hidden by bushes and branches of trees.

(Note: The details of commanding this outguard, its action in case of

attack, what should be done with a passing countryman, etc., can be

profitably worked out in great detail.)

Problem No. 2

=1078. Lieutenant (to six squads):= We will take the same situation as

we had in Problem 1, with squad outguards as before.

Sergeant Adams, you have command of the platoon and have sent out the

two outguards. Explain your arrangements for the support.

=Sergeant Adams:= I have the men fall out by squads and rest on the

side of the road while I look the ground over. I then tell Sergeant

Barnes, "You will have immediate charge of the guard, cooking,

visiting patrols, etc., here at the support. Detail three men from

Corporal Evan's squad as first, second and third relief for the

sentinel over the support Post your sentinel at the road fork and give

him the necessary instructions as to the outguards, the adjacent

support which is on this road (pointing west) on top of that ridge,

etc. I will give you further instructions later." I then fall in the

remainder of the support (one sergeant, one cook, four corporals and

twenty-seven privates, three squads being intact and one man on duty

as sentinel) and have shelter tents pitched under cover of the orchard

and Mason house. While this is being completed I select a line for a

trench, about thirty-five yards long, behind the fence on the east and

west road and extending east of the Chester Pike about fifteen yards,

slightly bent back towards the northeast. No trench in the road. I

then say to Sergeant Foss, "Take Graves' squad and construct a shelter

trench along this line (indicating) having the parapet concealed. Cut

the fences so as to furnish easy access."

I then say to Corporal Evans, "Take three men from your squad and, as

a reconnoitering patrol, cross the trestle there (pointing), and

follow that road (pointing to the Boling-Salem road) into Salem,

reconnoitering that village. Then take up a position on that ridge

(pointing to Sandy Ridge) and remain out until dusk. Send me a message

from Sandy Ridge with a sketch and description of the country."

I assume that Corporal Evans is familiar with the information about

the enemy, the location of our outguards, etc.

Selecting five men from Corporal Geary's squad and the remaining man

of Corporal Evans' squad (three having been detailed for sentinel

duty, and three sent out on patrol duty with Corporal Evans), I turn

them over to Sergeant Barnes, saying, "Here are six men to furnish

three reliefs for a visiting patrol of two men. Have this patrol visit

Outguard No. 2 and cross the trestle, going south down the east bank

of the creek; thence recross the creek at the road bridge, visiting

Outguard No. 1; thence across to the adjacent outguard of the support

on our left, which is somewhere on that ridge (pointing to the Twin

Hills-Lone Hill Ridge); and thence to the starting point. Have them

locate that support on their first trip. You can reverse the route

and make such minor changes from time to time as you think best.

Report to me after they have completed the first round. Make

arrangements for sending supper to the outguards. Take two men from

Corporal Jackson's squad to carry it out. Be careful that the cook

fire is not visible. I am going out to visit Outguard No. 1 and then

No. 2. You will have charge until I return."

The men have stacked arms in front of the tents and have removed all

equipment but their belts.

I would now visit the outguards, taking a man with me, and see if they

are properly located. I would instruct the outguard commanders as to

what to do in case of attack, in case strangers approach, point out

their line of retreat in case of necessity, etc. I would make a sketch

of the position and send it, with a description of my dispositions, to

the commander of the outpost.

=Lieutenant:= Your arrangements and dispositions appear satisfactory.

You should have been more prompt in sending Corporal Evans out with

his patrol. Why didn't you send a patrol towards York, or south along

the Chester Pike?

=Sergeant Adams:= I considered that the support on my right would

cover that ridge (Twin Hills-Lone Hill), and that the route I laid out

for Corporal Evans would cover the Chester Pike and the country east

of Sandy Creek at the same time, thus avoiding the necessity for two

patrols.

=Lieutenant:= That seems reasonable, but you should have given some

specific orders about reporting on the width, depth, etc., of Sandy

Creek, which might prove a very valuable or dangerous obstacle. You

can readily see how quickly a command becomes broken up and depleted

in strength, and how important it is to make only such detachments as

are necessary. It looks as if your outguards might have been made

smaller considering the size of your platoon (6 squads), but I think

the squad outpost is so much better than one not composed of a

complete unit, that it is correct in this case. With Corporal Evans'

patrol of three men, the visiting patrol requiring six men, the

sentinel post requiring three men, Sergeant Barnes, and the two

outguards, you have thirty men actually on duty or detailed for duty,

out of fifty-one. Of course, the men constituting the outguards, the

man detailed for the visiting patrol and support sentinel, have

approximately two hours on duty and four hours off duty, so they get

some rest. Furthermore, you should have a three-man patrol watching

the crossroads at Salem during the night, Corporal Evans' patrol

having returned. This patrol should be relieved once during the night,

at a previously stated hour, which means six more men who do not get a

complete night's rest.

=Sergeant Adams:= Isn't Salem rather far to the front to send a patrol

at night?

=Lieutenant:= Yes, it is, but unless you touch the crossroads there

you would have to have two patrols out, one near Maxey's farm and one

on the Chester Pike. As it is you are leaving the road from York to

the crossroads in front of Outguard No. 1 uncovered, but you should

find that this is covered by a patrol from the adjacent support. The

cross roads in front of Outguard No. 1 is the natural place for a

stationary, night patrol, but it is so close to the outguard that the

benefit derived from a patrol there would be too small to justify the

effort.

(Note: Further details of the duties of this support can be gone into.

The messages should be written, and patrols carried through their tour

of duty with the resulting situations to be dealt with; the sentinels

tested as to their knowledge of their duties, etc. Also note carefully

the manner in which the support commander uses his noncommissioned

officers for carrying out his intentions, and thus avoids the most

objectionable and inefficient practice of dealing directly with the

privates.)

Problem No. 3 (Infantry)

=1079.= (See Fort Leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.)

=Situation:=

A Blue force, Companies A and B, 1st Infantry, under Captain A, in

hostile country, is covering the Rock Island Bridge and camped for the

night, April 20-21, on the south slope of Devin ridge (rm'). The enemy

is moving northward from Kansas City (30 miles south of Leavenworth).

At 3:30 P. M. Captain A receives a message from Colonel X at Beverly

(2 miles east of Rock Island Bridge, (qo')), stating that two or three

companies of hostile infantry are reported five miles south of

Leavenworth at 2:30 P. M. No enemy is west of Leavenworth. Captain A

decides to place one platoon on outpost.

=Required, 1.= Captain A's order.

=Answer.= Verbally: "Two or three Red companies were five miles south

of Leavenworth at 2:30 P. M. today. No enemy is west of Leavenworth.

We will camp here. 1st Platoon, 'A' company, under Sergeant A, will

form the outpost, relieving the advance guard (2d Platoon Co. A). The

line, Pope Hill (sm')--Rabbit Point (tn') will be held. Detached posts

will be placed on Hill 880, west of Merritt Hill (rl'), and on

Engineer Hill (ql'). In case of attack the outpost line will be held.

"The baggage will be at the main camp.

"Messages will reach me on Devin Ridge (rm')."

Issued verbally to officers and Sergeant A.

=Required, 2.= Give verbatim (word for word) the order issued by

Sergeant A.

=Answer.= "Two companies of the enemy were five miles south of

Leavenworth at 2:30 P. M. today. Our camp is to be here. This platoon

will be the outpost on the line, Rabbit Point (im')--Pope Hill (sm').

"The right support, 1st section, less 1 squad, under Sergeant B, will

take position north of Pope Hill and cover the following front: the

ravine (XIX--Merritt Hill) west of Grant avenue to the ravine about

midway between Grant Avenue and Rabbit Point (tn').

"The left support, 2d section, less 1 squad under Sergeant H, will

take position on north slope of Rabbit Point and will cover the

following front: The ravine midway between Grant Avenue and Rabbit

Point to Missouri River.

"Corporal D, you will take the eight men of your squad and form a

detached post on Engineer Hill (qk').

"Corporal E, take your squad and form a detached post on Hill 880 west

of Merritt Hill (rl').

"If attacked hold your front. Each support and detached post will

entrench.

"Send messages to me at right support."

The outpost moves out, each support and detached post separately,

without throwing out covering patrols, because the advance guard is

now holding the front. There is no reserve.

=Required, 3.= What does Sergeant A do now?

=Required, 4.= What does Sergeant B do as soon as he reaches Pope

Hill?

(Note: During the remainder of the afternoon one man up in a tree on

Grant Avenue will be the only observing post necessary for this

support. At night an outguard would be placed on Grant Avenue with

continuous patrols along the front, because the open ground furnishes

easy approach to the enemy. A post of four men might also be placed on

the bridge over Corral Creek (um').)

=Required, 5.= The location of supports and the main body of detached

post on Engineer Hill.

=Required, 6.= What patrolling would be done from the left support?

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