THE SERVICE OF SECURITY
(Based on the Field Service Regulations.)
General Principles
=1020. The Service of Security= embraces all those measures taken by a
military force to protect itself against surprise, annoyance or
observation by the enemy. On the march, that portion of a command
thrown out to provide this security is called an advance, flank or
rear guard, depending on whether it is in front, to the flank or in
rear of the main command; in camp or bivouac, it is called the
outpost.
The principal duties of these bodies being much the same, their
general formations are also very similar. There is (1) the cavalry
covering the front; next (2) a group (4 men to a platoon) or line of
groups in observation; then (3) the support, or line of supports,
whose duty is to furnish the men for the observation groups and check
an enemy's attempt to advance until reinforcements can arrive; still
farther in rear is (4) the reserve.
In small commands of an infantry regiment or less there usually will
not be any cavalry to cover the front, and the reserve is generally
omitted. Even the support may be omitted and the observation group or
line of groups be charged with checking the enemy, in addition to its
regular duties of observation. But whatever the technical designation
of these subdivisions, the rearmost one is always in fact a reserve.
For example, if the command is so small that the subdivision formally
designated as the reserve is omitted, the rear element (squad or
platoon or company, etc.) is used as a reserve. As this text deals
principally with small commands and only those larger than a regiment
usually have the subdivision termed the reserve, this distinction
between the element in the Field Service Regulations called the
reserve and the actual reserve, must be thoroughly understood.
The arrangements or formations of all detachments thrown out from the
main force to provide security against the enemy, are very flexible,
varying with every military situation and every different kind of
country. The commander of such a detachment must, therefore, avoid
blindly arranging his men according to some fixed plan and at certain
fixed distances. Acquire a general understanding of the principles of
the service of security and then with these principles as a foundation
use common sense in disposing troops for this duty.
ADVANCE GUARD
=1021. Definition and Duties.= An advance guard is a detachment of a
marching column thrown out in advance to protect the main column from
being surprised and to prevent its march from being delayed or
interrupted. (The latter duty is generally forgotten and many
irritating, short halts result, which wear out or greatly fatigue the
main body, the strength of which the advance guard is supposed to
conserve.)
In detail the duties of the advance guard are:
1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by reconnoitering
to the front and flanks.
2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their
observing, firing upon or delaying the main body.
3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit the
main body to prepare for action.
4. When the enemy is met on the defenses, seize a good position and
locate his lines, care being taken not to bring on a general
engagement unless the advance guard commander is authorized to do so.
5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way
possible the steady march of the column.
=1022. Strength:= The strength of the advance guard varies from
one-ninth to one-third of the total command. The larger the force the
larger in proportion is the advance guard, for a larger command takes
relatively longer to prepare for action than a small one. For example,
a company of 100 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of from
one to two squads, as the company could deploy as skirmishers in a few
seconds. On the other hand, a division of 20,000 men would ordinarily
have an advance guard of about 4,500 men, all told, as it would
require several hours for a division to deploy and the advance guard
must be strong enough to make a stubborn fight.
=1023. Composition.= The advance guard is principally composed of
infantry, preceded if possible, by cavalry well to the front. When
there is only infantry, much more patrolling is required of the front
troops than when cavalry (called "Advance cavalry") is out in advance.
This book does not deal with large advance guards containing artillery
and engineers. Machine guns, however, will be frequently used in small
advance guards to hold bridges, defiles, etc.
=1024. Distance From Main Body.= The distance at which the advance
guard precedes the main body or the main body follows the advance
guard depends on the military situation and the ground. It should
always be great enough to allow the main body time to deploy before it
can be seriously engaged. For instance the advance guard of a company,
say 1 squad, should be 350 to 500 yards in advance of the company. The
distance from the leading man back to the principal group of the squad
should generally be at least 150 yards. This, added to the distance
back to the main body or company, makes a distance of from 500 to 650
yards from the leading man to the head of the main body.
Examples:
Command. Advance Guard. Distance (yds.).
Patrol of 1 squad 2 men 100 to 300
Section of 3 squads 4 men 200 to 400
Inf. platoon of 50 men 1 squad 300 to 450
Cav. platoon of 20 men 4 men 300 to 450
Inf. company of 108 men 1 to 2 squads 350 to 500
Cav. troop of 86 men 1/2 platoon 450 to 600
Inf. battalion 1/2 to 1 company 500 to 700
Cav. squadron 1/2 to 1 troop 600 to 800
These are not furnished as fixed numbers and distances, but are merely
to give the student an approximate, concrete idea.
=1025. Connecting Files.= It should be remembered that between the
advance guard and the main body, and between the several groups into
which the advance guard is subdivided, connecting files are placed so
as to furnish a means of communicating, generally by signals, between
the elements (groups) of the column. There should be a connecting file
for at least ever, 300 yards. For example, suppose the advance guard
of a platoon is 300 yards in front of the main body. In ordinary
rolling country, not heavily wooded, a connecting file would be placed
half way between the two elements--150 yards from each one.
It is generally wiser to use two men together instead of one, because
this leaves one man free to watch for signals from the front while the
other watches the main body. However, in very small commands like a
company, this is not practicable, as the extra man could not be
spared.
FORMATION OF ADVANCE GUARDS.
=1026. Subdivisions.= The advance guard of a large force like a
brigade or division is subdivided into a number of groups or elements,
gradually increasing in size from front to rear. The reason for this
is that, as has already been explained, a larger group or force
requires longer to deploy or prepare to fight than a smaller one,
therefore the small subdivisions are placed in front where they can
quickly deploy and hold the enemy temporarily in check while the
larger elements in rear are deploying. The number of these
subdivisions decreases as the strength of the advance guard decreases,
until we find the advance guard of a company consists of one or two
squads, which naturally cannot be subdivided into more than two
groups; and the advance guard of a squad composed of two men, which
admits of no subdivision.
=Distance to next
element in rear.=
=Advance Cavalry= 1 to 5 miles
{=Advance party= {=Point= 150 to 300 yds.
=Support= {(=furnishes patrols=) {=Advance party proper= 300 to 600 yds.
{=Support proper= 400 to 800 yds.
=Reserve= (usually omitted in small commands) 500 yds. to
1 mile
The distances vary principally with the size of the command--slightly
with the character of the country.
The advance cavalry is that part of the advance guard going in front
of all the foot troops. It is generally one to five miles in advance
of the infantry of the advance guard, reconnoitering at least far
enough to the front and flanks to guard the column against surprise by
artillery fire--4,500 yards.
=1027. Support.= (=a=) The support constitutes the principal element
or group of all advance guards. It follows the advance cavalry, when
there is any, and leads the advance guard when there is no cavalry.
The support of a large command is subdivided within itself in much the
same manner as the advance guard as a whole is subdivided. It varies
in strength from one-fourth to one-half of the advance guard.
=1028. (b) Advance Party.= As the support moves out it sends forward
an advance party several hundred yards, the distance varying with the
nature of the country and size of the command. For example, the
advance party of a support of one company of 108 men, would ordinarily
be composed of one section of three squads, and would march about 300
yards in advance of the company in open country, and about 200 yards
in wooded country.
The advance party sends out the patrols to the front and flanks to
guard the main body of the support from surprise by effective rifle
fire. Patrols are only sent out to the flanks to examine points that
cannot be observed from the road. As a rule they will have to rejoin
some portion of the column in rear of the advance party. As the
advance party becomes depleted in strength in this manner, fresh men
are sent forward from the main body of the support to replace those
who have fallen behind while patrolling. When there is advance
cavalry, much less patrolling is required of the infantry.
(=c=) The point is a patrol sent forward by the advance party 150 to
300 yards. When the advance party is large enough the point should
ordinarily consist of a complete squad, commanded by an officer or
experienced noncommissioned officer. It is merely a patrol in front of
the column and takes the formation described for patrols.
(=d=) The commander of the support ordinarily marches with the advance
party. He should have a map and control of the guide, if any is
present. He sees that the proper road is followed; that guides are
left in towns and at crossroads; that bridges, roads, etc., are
repaired promptly so as not to delay the march of the column and that
information of the enemy is promptly sent back to the advance guard
commander; he verifies the correctness of this information, if
possible.
=1029.= (=a=) A thorough understanding of the arrangement of the
support and the duties of the leaders of its subdivisions--point,
flank patrols, advance party and main body (of the support)--is of the
greatest importance to a noncommissioned officer. For example, the
ignorance of one noncommissioned officer leading the advance party of
a column of troops six miles long can cause the entire column to be
delayed. If he halts because a few shots are fired at his men, and
conducts a careful reconnaissance before attacking (instead of pushing
right in on the enemy, forcing him to fall back quickly, if a weak
detachment; or, to disclose his strength, if strong), the entire
column, six miles long, is halted, the march interrupted, valuable
time lost, and what is more important, the men irritated and tired
out.
(=b=) The leader of the point must understand that as the principal
duty of an advance guard is to secure the safe and uninterrupted march
of the main body, he is the first man to discharge this duty. If, for
example, his squad receives a volley of shots from some point to the
front, he cannot take the time and precautions the commander of a
large body would take to reconnoiter the enemy's position, determine
something about his strength, etc., before risking an attack. If he
did he would not be securing the uninterrupted march of the main body.
He has to deploy instantly and press the enemy hard until the hostile
opposition disappears or the advance party comes up and its commander
takes charge. The point will lose men in this way, but it is
necessary, for otherwise one small combat patrol could delay the march
time after time.
(=c=) The same problem must be met in much the same manner by the
leader of the advance party. In this case there is more time to think,
as the point, being in advance, will have begun the fight before the
advance party arrives; but the leader of the advance party must use
his men freely and quickly to force the enemy to "show his hand," thus
preventing small harassing or combat detachments from delaying the
march.
(=d=) As the subdivisions of the advance guard become larger their
leaders act with increasing caution, for as soon as it develops that
the enemy in front is really present in some strength, then a halt
becomes obligatory and a careful reconnaissance necessary.
(=e=) The leader of every subdivision must always start a
reconnaissance the instant the enemy develops. He may, as in the case
of the point, only send one man around to discover the enemy's
strength; or, if the leader of the main body of the support, he may
send an entire squad. In almost every case the instant he has given
his orders for deploying and firing at or rushing the enemy, he sends
out his man or men to work around to a position permitting a view of
the hostile force. Every noncommissioned officer should impress this
on his memory so that he will not forget it in the excitement of a
sudden engagement.
(=f=) No attempt should be made to subdivide the advance guard of a
small force into all the elements previously described. For example,
the advance guard of a squad is simply a point of one or two men; the
advance guard of a company is usually no more than a squad acting as a
point, the squad actually having several men from 100 to 150 yards in
advance, who really constitute a point for the squad; the advance
guard of a battalion would usually consist of a company or less
distributed as an advance party proper and a point. The advance guard
of a regiment would have no reserve--if, for example, a battalion were
used as the advance guard of a regiment, there would be only a
support, which would be distributed about as follows: A support proper
of about three companies and an advance party (point included) of
about one company.
[Illustration: Fig. 1]
=1030. Reserve.= An advance guard large enough to have a reserve would
be distributed as follows:
[Illustration: Fig. 2]
The distance Z would be greater than Y and Y would be greater than X.
For example, a regiment acting as the advance guard of a brigade
would, under ordinary conditions, be distributed about as follows:
[Illustration: Fig. 3]
As only large commands have a reserve, which would always be commanded
by an officer, noncommissioned officers need not give this much
consideration, but it must be understood that while this fourth
subdivision of the advance guard is the only one officially termed
reserve, the last subdivision of any advance guard actually is a
reserve, no matter what its official designation.
The advance guard of a cavalry command adopts formations similar to
those described above, except that the distances are increased because
of the rapidity with which the command can close up or deploy. An
advance party with a few patrols is usually enough for a squadron, and
precedes it from 600 to 1,000 yards.
=1031. Reconnaissance.= In reconnaissance the patrols are, as a rule,
small (from two to six men).
The flanking patrols, whether of the advance cavalry or of the advance
party, are sent out to examine the country wherever the enemy might be
concealed. If the nature of the ground permits, these patrols march
across country or along roads and trails parallel to the march of the
column. For cavalry patrols this is often possible; but with infantry
patrols and even with those that are mounted, reconnaissance is best
done by sending the patrols to high places along the line of march to
overlook the country and examine the danger points. These patrols
signal the results of their observations and, unless they have other
instructions, join the columns by the nearest routes, other patrols
being sent out as the march proceeds and as the nature of the country
requires.
Deserters, suspicious characters and bearers of flags of truce (the
latter blindfolded), are taken to the advance guard commander.
=1032. Advance Guard Order.= On receipt of the order for a march
designating the troops for the advance guard, the commander of the
latter makes his estimate of the situation; that is, he looks at the
map or makes inquiries to determine what sort of a country he must
march through and the nature of the roads; he considers what the
chances are of encountering the enemy, etc., and then how he should
best arrange his advance guard to meet these conditions, and what time
the different elements of his advance guard must start in order to
take their proper place in the column. He then issues his order at the
proper time--the evening before if possible and he deems it best, or
the morning of the march.
The order for a large advance guard would ordinarily be written; for a
small command it would almost invariably be verbal, except that the
commander or leader of each element should always make written notes
of the principal points, such as the road to be followed, time to
start, distances, etc.
ADVANCE GUARD PROBLEMS
Problem No. 1. (Infantry)
=1033. Captain (to one platoon of his company):= We will assume that
our battalion camped last night at Oxford (Elementary Map) in the
enemy's country. It is now sunrise, 5:30 A. M.; camp has been broken
and we are ready to march. The officers have returned from reporting
to the major for orders and I fall in the company and give the
following orders:
"A regiment of the enemy's cavalry is thought to be marching towards
Salem from the south. Our battalion will march at once towards Salem
to guard the railroad trestle over Sandy Creek, following this road
(pointing southeast along the road out of Oxford) and the Chester Pike
Which is one and three-quarters miles from here.
"This company will form the advance guard.
"Sergeant Adams, you will take Corporal Baker's squad and form the
point, followed by the remainder of the company at about 400 yards.
Patrols and connecting files will be furnished by the company.
"The company wagon will join the wagons of the battalion.
"I will be with the company.
"Move out at once."
The weather is fine and the roads are good and free from dust. It is
August and nearly all the crops are harvested. Bushes and weeds form a
considerable growth along the fences bordering the road.
Sergeant, give your orders.
=Sergeant Adams:= 1st squad, =1. Right, 2. FACE, 1. Forward, 2.
MARCH.= Corporal Baker, take Carter (Baker's rear rank man) and go
ahead of the squad about 200 yards. Move out rapidly until you get
your distance and then keep us in sight.
I would then have the two leading men of the rest of the squad follow
on opposite sides of the road, as close to the fence as possible for
good walking. This would put the squad in two columns of files of
three men each, leaving the main roadway clear and making the squad as
inconspicuous as possible, without interfering with ease of marching
or separating the men. [Par. 1028 (c).] What sort of crops are in the
fields on either side of the road?
=Captain:= The field on the right (south) is meadow land; that on the
left, as far as the railroad, is cut hay; beyond the railroad there is
more meadow land.
=Sergeant Adams:= I would have told Corporal Baker to wait at the
cross roads by the Baker house for orders and--
=Captain:= If you were actually on the ground you probably could not
see the cross roads from Oxford. In solving map problems like these do
not take advantage of seeing on the map all the country that you are
supposed to go over, and then give orders about doing things at places
concerning which you would not probably have any knowledge if actually
on the ground without the map.
Besides, in this particular case, it was a mistake to have your point
wait at the cross roads. If there was any danger of their taking the
wrong road it would be a different matter, but here your mission
requires you to push ahead. (Par. 1029.) The major is trying to get
south of the trestle towards Salem before the cavalry can arrive and
destroy it.
=Sergeant Adams:= I would march steadily along the road, ordering the
last man to keep a lookout to the rear for signals from the connecting
file (Par. 511a), and I would direct one of the leading men to watch
for signals from Corporal Baker.
=Captain:= You should have given the direction about watching for
signals earlier, as this is very important. You also should have
ordered two men to follow along the timber by the creek to your south
until you signaled for them to come in. The trees along the creek
would obstruct your view over the country beyond the creek.
=Sergeant Adams:= But I thought, Captain, that the patrolling was to
be done by the company.
=Captain:= Yes, the patrolling is to be done by the company, but the
creek is only a quarter of a mile, about 400 yards, from the road you
are following and the men sent there are merely flankers, not a
patrol. You have eight men under your command and you are responsible
for the ground within several hundred yards on either side of your
route of march. Long Ridge is almost too far for you to send your men,
because they would fall far behind in climbing and descending its
slopes, but it would not be a great mistake if you sent two men there.
As Long Ridge affords an extended view of the valley through which the
Chester Pike runs, a patrol should go up on it and remain there until
the battalion passes, and this would be more than the leading squad
could be expected to attend to. The creek is almost too far from the
road in places, but as it is open meadow land you can keep the men
within easy touch of you and recall them by signal at any moment you
desire. In this work you can see how much depends on good judgment and
a proper understanding of one's mission.
Corporal Baker, explain how you would move out with Carter.
=Corporal Baker:= We would alternate the walk and double time until we
had gotten about 200 yards ahead of the squad. I would then say,
"Carter, walk along this side of the road (indicates side), keeping on
the lookout for signals from the squad. I will go about fifty yards
ahead of you." I would keep to the opposite side of the road from
Carter, trying to march steadily at the regular marching gait, and
keeping a keen watch on everything in front and to the flanks.
=Captain:= Very good. When you arrive at the cross roads you see a man
standing in the yard of the Baker house.
=Corporal Baker:= I would not stop, but would continue on by the cross
roads, as I have no time to question the man and the Sergeant will
want to do that. I would call to him and ask him if he had seen any of
the enemy about and how far it was to the Chester Pike. If anything
looked suspicious around the house or barnyard, I would investigate.
=Captain:= Sergeant, you arrive at the cross roads, and see the
Corporal and Carter going on ahead of you.
=Sergeant Adams:= I would have already signaled to the two men
following the creek to come in and would send a man to meet them with
the following order: "Tell Davis to move along the railroad fill with
Evans, keeping abreast of us. Then you return to me." I would then
say, "Fiske, look in that house and around the barn and orchard and
then rejoin me down this road (pointing east)." I would have the
civilian join me and walk down the road with me while I questioned
him.
=Captain:= Do you think you have made careful arrangements for
searching the house, etc., by leaving only one man to do the work?
=Sergeant Adams:= I have not sufficient men nor time enough to do much
more. I simply want to make sure things are reasonably safe and I
thought that a couple of men from the main body of the advance guard
would do any careful searching, questioning, etc., that might be
deemed necessary. I must not delay the march.
=Captain:= That is right. You learn nothing from the civilian and he
does not arouse any suspicion on your part. You continue along the
road. The fields to the north of the road are in wheat stubble; the
ground to the south, between your road and the railroad, is rough,
rocky grass land with frequent clumps of bushes. Davis and Evans, your
right flankers on the railroad fill, are just approaching the cut;
Fiske has rejoined; Corporal Baker and his men are about 200 yards
from the road forks at Brown's, and you and your four men are 200
yards in their rear, at the turn of the road. At this moment a half
dozen shots are fired down the road in your direction from behind the
wall along the edge of the orchard on the Brown farm. This firing
continues and your two leading men are lying down at the roadside
returning the fire. Tell me quickly just what you are going to do?
=Sergeant Adams:= I order my four men to deploy as skirmishers in that
field (pointing to the rough ground south of the road); I go under the
fence with the men and lead them forward at a fast run, unless the
fire is very heavy.
=Captain= (interrupting the Sergeant): Davis, you had just reached the
cut on the railroad when this happened. What do you do?
=Private Davis:= I take Evans forward with me at a run through the
cut. What do I see along the Chester Pike or Sandy Creek?
=Captain:= You see no sign of the enemy any place, except the firing
over the wall.
=Private Davis:= I run down the south side of the fill and along
towards the road with Evans to open fire on the enemy from their
flank, and also to see what is in the orchard. I will probably cross
the road so that I can see behind the stone wall.
=Captain:= That's fine and shows how you should go ahead at such a
time without any orders. There is usually no time or opportunity at
such a moment for sending instructions and you must use common sense
and do something. Generally it would have been better to have tried to
signal or send word back that there was nothing in sight along the
road or in the valley, but in this particular case you could probably
do more good by going quickly around in rear as you did, to discover
what was there and assist in quickly dislodging whatever it was. If
there had been no nose of the ridge to hide you as you came up and a
convenient railroad fill to hurry along behind as you made for the
road, your solution might have been quite different.
Sergeant, continue with your movements.
=Sergeant Adams:= I would attempt to rush the wall. If the fire were
too heavy, I would open fire (at will) with all my men, and, if I
seemed to get a little heavier fire than the enemy's, I would start
half of my men forward on a rush while the others fired. I would try
to rush in on the enemy with as little delay as possible, until it
developed that he had more than a small detachment there. I assumed it
was a delaying patrol in front of me, and as my mission requires me to
secure the uninterrupted march of the main body, I must not permit any
small detachment to delay me. If, however, it proves to be a larger
force, for instance, the head of an advance guard, I will lose some
men by plunging in, but as I understand it, that is the duty of the
point. Then again, if it be the head of a hostile advance guard, I
will want to rush them out of their favorable position under cover of
the stone wall, buildings and orchard, before any more of their force
can come up. This would give the favorable position to our force; by
acting too cautiously we would lose the valuable moments in which the
enemy's reenforcements (next elements of the advance guard) were
coming up, with this desirable position being weakly held by a small
part of the enemy.
=Captain:= That is all correct. What messages would you have sent?
=Sergeant Adams:= Up to the present time I would not have sent any. I
could not have sent any. I could not afford to take the time to send a
man back, nor could I spare the man. Besides, all I could say was that
we were fired on, and you should be able to see and hear that from
where the company is.
=Captain:= About the time you reached the position of Corporal Baker
the firing ceases, and when you reach the wall you see five mounted
men galloping northeast up Farm Lane. The Brown farm appears to be
deserted.
=Sergeant Adams:= I would turn to one of the men and say, "Run back to
the Captain and tell him we were fired on from this orchard by a
mounted patrol of five men who are galloping off up a lane to the
northeast. I am going south." When he had repeated the message I would
start south down the Chester Pike, directing Corporal Baker to follow
this road south and to tell Davis to follow the high ridge west of the
road, going through the clump of woods just ahead. I would send one
man as a left flanker to follow the west bank of Sandy Creek. This
would leave me with two men, one watching for signals from the front
and along Sandy Creek, the other from Davis and from the rear. I would
expect to see a patrol from the company moving across towards Boling
Woods. Had I not been mixed up in a fight as I approached the Brown
farm I would have sent two men as left flankers across country to the
cut on the Chester Pike on the western edge of the Boling Woods.
=Captain:= Very good. That is sufficient for this problem. All of you
should have caught the idea of the principal duties of the point and
flankers of an advance guard. You must watch the country to prevent
being surprised and you must at the same time manage to push ahead
with the least possible delay. The point cannot be very cautious so
far as concerns its own safety, for this would mean frequent halts
which would delay the troops in rear, but it must be cautious about
reconnoitering all parts of the ground near the road which might
conceal large bodies of the enemy.
The leader of the point must be careful in using his men or he will
get them so scattered that they will become entirely separated and he
will lose all control of them. As soon as the necessity for flankers
on one side of the line of march no longer exists, signal for them to
rejoin and do not send them out again so long as you can see from the
road all the country you should cover.
Problem No. 2. (Infantry)
=1034. Captain (to one platoon of his company):= Let us assume that
this platoon is the advance party of an advance guard, marching
through Salem along the Chester Pike [Par. 1028 (b)]. One squad is 350
yards in front, acting as the point. The enemy is thought to be very
near, but only two mounted patrols have been seen during the day. The
command is marching for Chester. The day is hot, the roads are good
but dusty, and the crops are about to be harvested.
Sergeant Adams, explain how you would conduct the march of the advance
party, beginning with your arrival at the cross roads in Salem.
=Sergeant Adams:= The platoon would be marching in column of squads
and I would be at the head. Two pairs of connecting files would keep
me in touch with the point. (Par. 1025.) I would now give this order:
"Corporal Smith, take two men from your squad and patrol north along
this road (pointing up the Tracy-Maxey road) for a mile and then
rejoin the column on this road (Chester Pike), to the west of you." I
would then say to Private Barker, "Take Carter and cut across to that
railroad fill and go along the top of that (Sandy) ridge, rejoining
the column beyond the ridge. Corporal Smith with a patrol is going up
this road. Keep a lookout for him." When we reached the point where
the road crosses the south nose of Sandy Ridge and I saw the valley in
front of me with the long high ridge west of Sandy Creek, running
parallel to the Chester Pike and about 800 yards west of it, I would
give this order: "Corporal Davis, take the three remaining men in
Corporal Smith's squad, cross the creek there (pointing in the
direction of the Barton farm) go by that orchard, and move north along
that high ridge, keeping the column in sight. Make an effort to keep
abreast of the advance guard, which will continue along this road."
I gave Corporal Davis the remaining men out of Corporal Smith's squad
because I did not want to break up another squad and as this is, in my
opinion, a very important patrol, I wanted a noncommissioned officer
in charge of it. Unless something else occurs this will be all the
patrols I intend sending out until we pass the steel railroad trestle
over Sandy Creek.
=Captain:= Your point about not breaking up a squad when you could
avoid it by using the men remaining in an already broken squad, is a
very important one. Take this particular case. You first sent out two
pairs of connecting files between the advance party and your
point--four men. This leaves a corporal and three men in that squad.
If we assume that no patrols were out when we passed through Salem,
this corporal and two of his men could have been sent up the
Tracy-Maxey road, leaving one man to be temporarily attached to some
squad. From the last mentioned squad you would pick your two men for
the Sandy Ridge patrol and also the corporal and three men for the
Barton farm, etc., patrol. This would leave three men in this squad
and you would have under your immediate command two complete squads
and three men. As the patrols return, organize new squads immediately
and constantly endeavor to have every man attached to a squad. This is
one of your most important duties, as it prevents disorder when some
serious situation suddenly arises. Also it is one of the duties of the
detachment commander that is generally overlooked until too late.
The direction you sent your three patrols was good and their orders
clear, covering the essential points, but as you have in a very short
space of time, detached nine men, almost a third of your advance
party, don't you think you should have economized more on men?
=Sergeant Adams:= The Sandy Ridge patrol is as small as you can make
it--two men. I thought the other two patrols were going to be detached
so far from the column that they should be large enough to send a
message or two and still remain out. I suppose it would be better to
send but two men with Corporal Davis, but I think Corporal Smith
should have two with him.
=Captain:= Yes, I agree with you, for you are entering a valley which
is, in effect, a defile, and the Tracy-Maxey road is a very dangerous
avenue of approach to your main body. But you must always bear in mind
that it is a mistake to use one more man than is needed to accomplish
the object in view. The more you send away from your advance party,
the more scattered and weaker your command becomes, and this is
dispersion, which constitutes one of the gravest, and at the same
time, most frequent tactical errors.
To continue the problem, we will suppose you have reached the stone
bridge over Sandy Creek; the point is at the cross roads by the Smith
house; you can see the two men moving along Sandy Ridge; and Corporal
Davis' patrol is just entering the orchard by the Barton farm. Firing
suddenly commences well to the front and you hear your point reply to
it.
=Sergeant Adams:= I halt to await information from the point.
=Captain:= That is absolutely wrong. You command the advance party of
an advance guard; your mission requires you to secure the
uninterrupted march of the main body; and at the first contact you
halt, thus interrupting the march (Par. 1021). The sooner you reach
the point, the better are your chances for driving off the enemy if he
is not too strong, or the quicker you find out his strength and give
your commander in the rear the much desired information.
=Sergeant Adams:= Then I push ahead with the advance party, sending
back the following message--
=Captain= (interrupting): It is not time to send a message. You know
too little and in a few minutes you will be up with the point where
you can hear what has happened and see the situation for yourself.
Then you can send back a valuable message. When but a few moments
delay will probably permit you to secure much more detailed
information, it is generally best to wait for that short time and thus
avoid using two messengers. When you reach the cross roads you find
six men of the point deployed behind the fence, under cover of the
trees along the County Road, just west of the Chester Pike, firing at
the stone wall along the Mills' farm lane. The enemy appears to be
deployed behind this stone wall, from the Chester Pike west for a
distance of fifty yards, and his fire is much heavier than that of
your point. You think he has at least twenty rifles there. You cannot
see down the Chester Pike beyond the enemy's position. Your patrol on
Sandy Ridge is midway between the 68 and 66 knolls, moving north. The
ground in your front, west of the road, is a potato field; that east
of the road as far as the swamp, is rough grass land.
=Sergeant Adams:= I give order, "Corporal Gibbs, deploy your squad to
the right of the Pike and push forward between the Pike and the swamp.
Corporal Hall (commands the point), continue a heavy fire. Here are
six more men for your squad." I give him the four connecting files and
two of the three men in the advance party whose squad is on patrol
duty. "Corporal Jackson, get your squad under cover here. Lacey, run
back to the major and tell him the point has been stopped by what
appears to be twenty of the enemy deployed behind a stone wall across
the valley 500 yards in our front. I am attacking with advance party."
=Captain:= Corporal Davis (commands patrol near Barton farm), you can
hear the firing and see that the advance is stopped. What do you do?
=Corporal Davis:= I would head straight across for the clump of woods
on the ridge just above the Mills' farm, moving as rapidly as
possible.
=Captain:= That is all right. Sergeant, Corporal Hall's squad keeps up
a heavy fire; Corporal Gibb's squad deploys to the right of the pike,
rushes forward about 75 yards, but is forced to lie down by the
enemy's fire, and opens fire. Corporal Gibbs, what would your command
for firing be?
=Corporal Gibbs:= =AT THE BOTTOM OF THAT WALL. BATTLE SIGHT. CLIP
FIRE.=
=Captain:= Why at the bottom of the wall?
=Corporal Gibbs:= The men are winded and excited and will probably
fire high, so I gave them the bottom of the wall as an objective.
=Captain:= The enemy's fire seems as heavy as yours. Sergeant, what do
you do?
=Sergeant Adams:= I give this order. "Corporal Jackson, deploy your
squad as skirmishers on the left of Corporal Hall's squad and open
fire." What effect does this additional fire have on the enemy?
=Captain:= His bullets seem to go higher and wider. You appear to be
getting fire superiority over him.
=Sergeant Adams:= If I do not see any signs of the enemy being
reenforced, dust in the road behind his position, etc., I take
immediate command of the squads of Corporals Hall and Jackson, and
lead them forward on a rush across the potato field.
=Captain:= Corporal Gibbs, what do you do when you see the other two
squads rush?
=Corporal Gibbs:= I order, =FIRE AT WILL=, and urge the men to shoot
rapidly in order to cover the advance.
=Captain:= Sergeant Adams' squads are forced to halt after advancing
about 150 yards.
=Corporal Gibbs:= I keep up a hot fire until they can resume their
firing, when I lead my squad forward in a rush.
=Captain:= What do you do, Sergeant?
=Sergeant Adams:= I would have the Corporals keep up a heavy fire. By
this time I should think the support would be up to the cross roads.
=Captain:= It is, but have you given up your attack?
=Sergeant Adams:= If it looks as if I could drive the enemy out on my
next rush, I do so, but otherwise I remain where I am, as I have no
reserve under my control and the action has gotten too serious for me
to risk anything more when my chief is practically on the ground to
make the next decision. He should have heard something about what is
on the Pike behind the enemy, from the patrol on Sandy Ridge.
=Captain:= Your solution seems correct to me. Why did you send
Corporal Gibbs' squad up between the pike and the swamp?
=Sergeant Adams:= It looked as if he would strike the enemy from a
better quarter; there appeared to be better cover that way, afforded
by the turn in the road, which must have some weeds, etc., along it,
and the swamp would prevent him from getting too far separated from
the remainder of the advance party.
=Captain:= The Sergeant's orders for the attack were very good. He
gave his squad leaders some authority and attached his extra men to a
squad. He did not attempt to assume direct control of individual men,
but managed the three squads and made the squad leaders manage the
individual men. This is the secret of successful troop leading. His
orders were short, plain and given in proper sequence.
Problem No. 3 (Infantry)
(See Fort Leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.)
[Illustration: MAP of FORT LEAVENWORTH, KAS. and VICINITY]
=1035.= Situation.
A Blue battalion, in hostile country, is in camp for the night, August
5-6, at Sprong (ja'). At 9:00 P. M., August 5th, Lieutenant A,
Adjutant gives a copy of the following order to Sergeant B:
1st Battalion, 1st Infantry,
Sprong, Kansas,
5 Aug., '09.
Field Orders No. 5.
1. The enemy's infantry is six miles east of FORT LEAVENWORTH. His
cavalry patrols were seen at F (qg') today.
Our regiment will reach FRENCHMAN'S (oc') at noon tomorrow.
2. The battalion will march tomorrow to seize the ROCK ISLAND
BRIDGE (q) at FORT LEAVENWORTH.
3. (a) The advance guard, consisting of 1st platoon Co. A and
mounted orderlies B, C, and D, under Sergeant B, will precede the
main body at 400 yards.
(b) The head of the main body will march at 6:30 A. M., from 19
via the 17 (jc')--15 (jg') 1--5 (lm')--FORT LEAVENWORTH (om')
road.
4. The baggage will follow close behind the main body under escort
of Corporal D and one squad, Co. B.
5. Send reports to head of main body.
C,
Major, Comdg.
Copies to the company commanders, to Sergeant B and Corporal D.
=A. Required, 1.= Give Sergeant B's estimate of the situation. (The
estimate of the military situation includes the following points:
1. His orders or mission and how much discretion he is allowed.
2. The ground as it influences his duty.
3. The position, strength and probable intentions of the enemy.
4. Sergeant B's decision.)
=Answer.= 1. The size of the advance guard, its route and the distance
it is to move in front of the main body are prescribed by Major C.
Sergeant B is free to divide up the advance as he sees fit, to use the
various parts so as to best keep open the way of the main body,
maintain the distance of 400 yards in front of it, and protect it from
surprise by the enemy.
2. The ground may be such as to make easy or to hinder reconnaissance,
such as hills or woods; to impede or hasten the march, such as roads,
streams, defiles; to offer good or poor defensive positions; to offer
good or poor opportunities for an attack. Sergeant B sees from his map
that the ground is rolling and open as far as Kern (ji') with good
positions for reconnaissance and for defense or attack. There is a
bridge over Salt Creek (ig') which has steep banks and will be a
considerable obstacle if the bridge has been destroyed. From this
creek to Kern the advance would be under effective fire from Hancock
Hill (ki'), so that these heights must be seized before the main body
reaches 15 (jg').
Beyond Kern the heavy woods make reconnaissance difficult and must be
treated somewhat like a defile by the point. (Par. 991.)
3. There is little to fear from the main body of the enemy which is
1-1/2 miles farther from the Rock Island bridge than we are, but we
know the enemy has cavalry. The size of the cavalry force is not
known, and may be sufficient to cause us considerable delay,
especially in the woods. The enemy's evident intention is to keep us
from seizing the bridge.
4. Having considered all these points, Sergeant B comes to the
following decision: ... (Before reading the decision as contained in
the following paragraph, make one of your own.)
=Answer:= To have only an advance party with which to throw forward a
point of 5 men 200 yards to the front and send out flankers, as needed
(Par. 983); to send the three mounted orderlies well to the front of
the point to gain early information of the enemy, especially on
Hancock Hill (ji') and the ridge to the north of 11 (jj').
=Required, 2.= Sergeant B's order. (Par. 963.)
=Answer.= Given verbally to the platoon and mounted orderlies, at 9:30
P. M.
"The enemy's cavalry patrols were seen at F (qh') today; no hostile
infantry is on this side of the Missouri river. The battalion will
move tomorrow to Fort Leavenworth, leaving 19 (ja') at 6:30 A. M.
"This platoon and orderlies B, C, and D will form the advance guard,
and will start from the hedge 400 yards east of 19 at 6:30 A. M. via
the 17 (jc')--15 (jg')--5 (lm') road.
"The point, Corporal Smith and 4 men of his squad, will precede the
remainder of the advance guard at 200 yards.
"I will be with the advance party. Privates X and Y will act as
connecting files with the main body."
The flankers will be sent out from time to time by Sergeant B as
necessary.
=Required, 3.= The flankers sent out by Sergeant B between 19 (ja')
and 15 (jg').
=Answer.= A patrol of 3 men is sent to Hill 900 southeast of 19 (ja'),
thence by Moss (kc') and Taylor (lc') houses to Hill 840 east of
Taylor, thence to join at 15 (jg').
Two men are sent from the advance party as it passes Hill 875.5 (ie')
to the top of this hill to reconnoiter to the front and northeast.
These men return to the road and join after the advance party has
reached Salt Creek. Two men are sent ahead of the advance party at a
double time take position on "Hill 875 northeast of J. E. Daniels"
place (jf') and reconnoiter to the northeast and east.
=Reasons.= The patrol sent out on the south moves out far enough to
get a good view from the hills which an enemy could observe or fire
into the column. There is no necessity of sending out flankers north
of the road at first, because from the road itself a good view is
obtained. Hills 875.5 and 875 give splendid points for observing all
the ground to the north and east. (Don't send flankers out unless they
are necessary.)
=Required, 4.= When the advance party reaches J. E. Daniels' house
(je') a civilian leaves the house and starts toward 15. What action
does Sergeant B take?
=Required, 5.= When the advance party reaches Salt Creek bridge (jg')
the point signals "enemy in sight," and Private H reports that he saw
about 6 or 8 mounted men ride up to the edge of the woods at Kern,
halt a moment, and disappear. What action does Sergeant B take?
=Answer.= He at once sends a message back by Private H stating the
facts. He then orders the advance party to move forward, hastens up to
the point and directs it to continue the march, seeking cover of
fences and ravines and hill top.
=Required, 6.= When the point reaches Schroeder (jh') it receives fire
from the orchard at Kern. What action is taken?
=Answer.= The men in the point are moved rapidly down the hill and
gain shelter in the ravines leading toward Kern. Two squads are
rapidly placed in line along the ridge west of Schroeder and under
cover of their fire the remainder of the advance party run down the
hill at 10 yards distance to join the point. A squad of this force is
then hurried forward to the Kern house. Here the squad is stopped by
fire and Sergeant B deploys two more squads which advance by rushes
and drive out the enemy, found to be 10 cavalrymen. The squads left at
Schroeder now join at double time and the advance party moves forward,
without having delayed the march of the main body.
Problem No. 4 (Infantry)
=1036. Situation:=
A Blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on
the line Pope Hill (sm')--National cemetery (pk')--E (qh'). A Red
force is reported to have reached Soldiers' Home (3 miles south of
Leavenworth) from the south at 7:00 o'clock this morning. Corporal A
is directed by Sergeant B, in command of the left support at Rabbit
Point (tn'), to take out a patrol toward the waterworks and south
along the Esplanade (xo') to the Terminal bridge.
=Required, 1.= Give Sergeant B's orders to Corporal A.
=Answer.= "The enemy, strength unknown, was at Soldiers' Home at 7:00
o'clock this morning. Another patrol will advance along Grant avenue
(tm').
"Our outposts will remain here for the day.
"Select from the first section a patrol and reconnoiter this road
(Farragut avenue) as far as the waterworks (vn'), thence by Esplanade
to the Terminal bridge, and report on the ground in our front. When
you reach the Terminal bridge return if no enemy is seen.
"Send reports here."
=Required, 2.= How many men does Corporal A select, and why? (Par.
456.)
=Answer.= Five men are taken because the patrol is to reconnoiter, not
to fight, and on account of the distance to go and lack of information
of the enemy, 2 or 3 messages may have to be sent.
=Required, 3.= What equipment should Corporal A have? (Par. 457.)
=Required, 4.= State the points to be noted by Corporal A in selecting
his patrol and what inspection does he make? (Par. 964.)
=Answer.= He selects Privates C, D, E, F and G, on account of their
bravery, attention to duty and discretion. He directs them to carry
one meal in their haversacks, full canteen and fifty rounds of
ammunition. He then inspects them as to their physical condition, sees
that they have proper equipment and that nothing to rattle or glisten
is carried.
=Required, 5.= What does Corporal A next do? (Par. 965.)
=Answer.= He gives them their instructions as follows: "The enemy,
strength unknown, was at Soldiers' Home (about three miles south of
Leavenworth) at 7 o'clock this morning. There will be a friendly
patrol along that road (pointing to Grant avenue). We are to
reconnoiter along this road and down toward that bridge (pointing). Be
very careful not to be seen, take advantage of all cover, and keep in
touch with C and myself on this road at the point of the patrol. In
case we get separated meet at the waterworks (vn')."
He then explains the signals to be used, and moves the patrol in,
close order out along the road until it passes the sentinel at the
bridge XV (un'), to whom he gives the direction to be taken by the
patrol.
=Required, 6.= Upon leaving XV, what formation would the patrol take,
and reasons for same. (Par. 968.)
=Answer.= Corporal A and Private C form the point on the road leading
southwest of the waterworks; Private D moves on the left overlooking
the railroad; Private E moves promptly up Corral creek (um') to the
top of Grant Hill (um') to observe the country toward the southwest;
Private F moves about 50 yards in rear of the point, followed at 50
yards by Private G.
Corporal A forms his patrol as stated because of the necessity of
getting a view from the hill on each side. Only one man is sent out on
each side because they can be plainly seen by the patrol on the road,
and no connecting file is necessary. The distances taken along the
road assure at least one man's escape, and Corporal A is in front to
get a good view and to signal the flankers.
Problem No. 5 (Infantry)
=1037. Situation:=
The head of the patrol is now at the bridge, XVI (un') northwest of
the waterworks.
Private E has reached the top of Grant Hill and signals the enemy in
sight; the patrol halts and Corporal A moves out to meet Private E who
is coming down toward the patrol. He says he saw three mounted men
ride up to Grant and Metropolitan avenues (wm') from the south and
after looking north a moment move west.
=Required, 1.= Corporal A's action. (Pars. 979 and 981.)
=Answer.= Corporal A at once writes the following message and sends it
back by Private E:
"No. 1 Patrol, Company B,
Farragut Avenue,
Northwest of Waterworks,
10 May, '09, 8:30 A. M.
To Commander Blue Left Support,
Rabbit Point.
Three mounted Reds, seen by Private E, just now reconnoitered at
Grant and Metropolitan avenues; they are moving west on
Metropolitan avenue; the patrol will continue toward the Terminal
bridge.
A,
Corporal."
=Reasons.= The message is sent because this is the first time the
enemy has been seen, and they have not been reported north of
Soldiers' Home before. The message should state who saw the enemy, and
the man seeing them should always carry the message telling of the
facts. The patrol would not allow this small hostile patrol to stop
its advance, but would proceed on its route cautiously to avoid being
seen, and to see if the Red cavalrymen are followed by others of the
enemy.
=Required, 2.= Give the method of reconnoitering the buildings at the
waterworks and coal mine. (Par. 996.)
=Answer.= Private D carefully examines the east side of the enclosures
and buildings, while Private C examines the west side. The remainder
of the patrol halts concealed in the cut west of the north enclosure,
until C and D signal no enemy in sight, whereupon the patrol moves
forward along the road (XV--3rd St.), C and D advancing rapidly
between the buildings to the town where they join the patrol.
=Required, 3.= Give the route followed by E from Grant Hill to edge of
Leavenworth.
=Answer.= He moves down the east slope of Grant Hill to the ravine
just east of the old R. R. bed (um'), being careful to keep concealed
from the direction of Leavenworth. He moves up the ravine, keeping a
sharp lookout to the front, and moving rapidly until abreast, if he
has fallen behind. He takes the branch ravine lying just west of
Circus Hill (vm'), and moves up to its end. Here he halts and makes
careful inspection of Metropolitan avenue and the street south into
the city. Being sure the coast is clear, he darts across the narrow
ridge south of Circus Hill to the ravine to the east and then joins
the patrol. He reports to Corporal A any indication of the enemy he
may have seen.
Problem No. 6 (Infantry)
=1038. Situation:=
A Blue force holds Fort Leavenworth (om') in hostile country. Outposts
occupy the line Salt Creek Hill (gh')--13 (ij')--Sheridan's Drive,
(mi') against the Reds advancing from the northwest.
At 4:30 P. M., June 25th, Sergeant A is given the following orders by
Captain B, commanding the support:
"The enemy will probably reach Kickapoo late today. Our outposts
extend as far north as Salt Creek Hill. There were six of our men
prisoners at 45 (de') this afternoon at 1 o'clock, being held by 15
home guards at Kickapoo. Take ---- men from the company and move to
Kickapoo, recapture the prisoners and gain all the information you can
of the enemy north of there."
=Required, 1.= How many men does Captain B name, and why? (Par. 960.)
=Answer.= Thirty men are assigned.
=Reason.= This is twice as many as the enemy holding the prisoners,
and to secure secrecy no larger force than is absolutely necessary
should be taken. This force will allow men to surround the enemy while
the remainder rush them.
=Required, 2.= Give the order of Sergeant A to his patrol. (See 6th
requirement. Problem 4.)
=Required, 3.= What route will the patrol take?
=Answer, 11= (jj')--13 (ij')--Salt Creek Hill (gh')--and along the
edge of the woods east of the M. P. R. R. (fg') as far as the bridge
opposite Kickapoo Hill--thence up Kickapoo Hill toward 45 (de').
=Reasons.= Since the patrol's orders do not require any reconnaissance
before reaching Kickapoo the shortest and most practical route is
chosen. The route as far as Salt Creek Hill lies behind our outpost
line and is thus protected. The main roads are avoided because they
will be carefully watched by the enemy. The edge of the woods east of
the M. P. Ry. (beginning about ff') gives good cover and by moving to
the bridge the patrol can probably sneak close in on the enemy and
capture them by surprise.
Problem No. 7 (Infantry)
=1039. Situation:=
The patrol reaches the top of Kickapoo Hill (cd'). Sergeant A and
Private C move cautiously to the top and see the six prisoners in the
cemetery (cd') just west of Kickapoo Hill, and a Red sentinel at each
corner. Just west of the cemetery are about 10 more Reds. No others
are visible.
=Required, 1.= What decision does Sergeant A make and what does he do?
=Answer.= He decides to capture the enemy by surprise. He leaves
Private C to watch and, moving cautiously back to his patrol, makes
the following dispositions: Corporal D with 10 men to move up to
Private C and cover the enemy, remaining concealed. He takes the
remainder of the patrol with fixed bayonets around the northeast slope
of Kickapoo Hill in the woods and moves up the ravine toward 29. When
his detachment arrives within about 100 yards of the enemy, they
charge bayonet and rush them. Corporal D's party at the same time rush
in from the opposite side. (Note: The enemy are demoralized by the
surprise and are captured without a shot being fired.)
=Required, 2.= What action does Sergeant A now take?
=Answer.= He causes the enemy to be kept apart while he and his
noncommissioned officers question them separately. He then questions
the Blue prisoners, and furnishing them the guns taken from the Reds,
sends them and the captured Reds back to our line under Corporal D,
with a written message giving the information secured from his
questions. (Par. 984.)
=Required, 3.= What does he then do?
=Answer.= Places his main body in concealment at the Cemetery (cd')
and sends a patrol under Corporal H via 35-41-43 and one under
Corporal F via 29-27-23 west to learn further of the enemy in
execution of the second part of his orders.
The patrol under Corporal H sends back the following message:
"No.1 Patrol, Company A, 1st Infantry,
21 June, '09; 5:30 P. M.
Commander Expeditionary Patrol at 45:
A column of infantry is moving east about 1 mile west of
Schweizer (aa'); about 800 yards in front of this body is another
small body with 8 to 10 men 300 yards still farther east. It took
the main body 2 min., 45 sec. to pass a point on the road. I
remain in observation.
H,
Corporal."
=Required, 3.= The size of the command reported by Corporal H and its
formation. (Par. 983.)
=Answer.= One battalion infantry (512 men), preceded by 1 section at
advance guard. The advance guard having only advance party and point,
2-3/4 minutes x 175 = 481 men in the main body, leaving about 32 men
for the advance men for the advance guard.
Problem No. 8 (Infantry)
=1040. General Situation:=
A Blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on
the line Pope Hill (sm'), National Cemetery (qk')--E (qi'). A Red
force moving north reached Soldiers' Home at 7 o'clock this morning.
=Special Situation:=
Corporal B is chosen by Sergeant A, commander of the right support at
the National Cemetery, to take a patrol south as far as 20th street
(yf') and Metropolitan avenue (wh'), to report on the ground along the
route, and to reconnoiter the enemy. A friendly patrol moves along
Sheridan's Drive (i)--Atchison Hill (rg')--Southwest Hill (ue'), and
one on Prison Lane (rk').
=Required, 1.= Sergeant A's orders, verbatim (that is, word for word).
=2.= Give the various details attended to by Corporal B before he
moves out with his patrol.
=3.= What is the formation of the patrol when its point is at E (qh')?
=4.= When the patrol reaches 14 (ug'), how are the intersecting roads
reconnoitered?
=5.= Four mounted men are seen riding west at a walk at 64 (wb'). What
action does Corporal A take?
=6.= Describe the ground passed over by the patrol.
Problem No. 9 (Infantry)
=1041. Situation:=