I. NAVAL OPERATIONS

_First Dutch War (1652-53)._--Though political causes were at work, the

main incentive to hostility between the peoples was commercial rivalry.

It was therefore natural that their first encounters should have taken

place between fleets engaged in convoying trade, or in endeavouring to

intercept the trade of their enemy. Blows were exchanged before war was

formally declared. On the 12th of May 1652 an English officer, Captain

Young, stopped a Dutch convoy near the Start in order to enforce the

salute to the English flag, which England then demanded from all who

used the seas round her coast. The demand was resisted, and was only

yielded to after a sharp conflict. Though the Dutch were still

endeavouring to negotiate a peace with the Council of State which

governed in the British Isles after the execution Of King Charles I.,

they made ready for war. In May forty sail of their war-ships appeared

off Dover under command of Martin Harpertzoon Tromp--then the best known

of their admirals. There were then 8 British ships in Dover under

Rear-Admiral Nicholas Bourne, and 15 near Rye under Robert Blake, a

member of parliament, and soldier who had gained a great reputation in

the Civil War. Blake came into the Straits of Dover with his ships, and

on the 19th of May a sharp collision took place between him and Tromp.

Bourne joined his countryman after the action began. The encounter,

which the Dutch attributed to the English, and the English to the Dutch,

made war inevitable, even if the relations of the two powers had allowed

of the maintenance of peace. The first operations on both sides took the

form of attacks on trade. Sir George Ayscue, who had lately returned

from the West Indies, whither he had been sent to subdue the Royalist

party in Barbados, had a sharp encounter with a Dutch convoy while on

his way up Channel to the Downs, and had captured several prizes. The

Council of State, being mainly anxious to destroy the Dutch trade and

fisheries, began by reinforcing Blake, and sending him north to scatter

the Dutch herring fleet. He had with him 60 vessels. Ayscue remained in

the Downs with 16. Soon after Blake had gone, Tromp appeared in the

Downs with a stronger force and threatened an attack on Ayscue. Want of

wind prevented the operation. Tromp was also most intent on collecting

the home-coming Dutch convoys, and seeing them safe into port. He

therefore also sailed north to meet the Baltic trade. No meeting,

however, took place between him and Blake, while bad weather scattered

the Dutch. Their herring fishery was ruined for the year, and the outcry

against Tromp was loud. He was notoriously no friend to the Loevenstein

party then prevalent in Holland, and was displaced, his place being

taken by Cornelius de Witt and Michiel Adriaanzoon de Ruyter. De Ruyter

was sent into the Channel to convoy the outward-bound convoys, and meet

the home-coming trade. On the 16th of August he had an encounter off

Plymouth with Ayscue, whom he worsted, and then cruised at the Land's

End. The failure of Ayscue, who was not employed again in this war,

induced the Council of State to send Blake, who had now returned from

the north, into the Channel. He was not, however, more successful. His

fleet was allowed to become scattered, and the Dutchman brought his

convoy back safe after a partial action with Penn, Blake's subordinate,

on the 16th of August.

So far the operations had been confined to commerce destroying, or to

the protection of trade by convoy. The next moves were more purely

warlike. In the 27th of September the Dutch appeared in force off the

mouth of the Thames, and Blake, whose fleet was collected in the Downs,

stood to sea. On the 28th of September the first real battle of the war

was fought off the Kentish Knock, a shoal opposite the coast of Essex.

The English fleet standing to the north passed to west of the Dutch, and

then turned. In the close engagement which followed, the Dutch were

defeated. They did not fight well, and their failure was attributed in

part to the discontent of their seamen with the removal of Tromp, and

the unpopularity of de Witt. The states-general found it necessary to

replace Tromp, who was at once sent to sea, again with the charge of

seeing the outward-bound trade down Channel, and waiting for the

homeward-bound. Blake had not remained on the coast of Holland, for the

Council of State was still almost as intent as the Dutch on convoying

trade or molesting the enemy's. It brought its fleet back, and then

divided the ships, sending some to the north with Penn, and keeping the

others, 40 in all, with Blake in the Downs. Thus when Tromp appeared "at

the back of the Goodwins" with a fleet of 80 war-ships and a crowd of

merchant vessels on the 29th of November, Blake was not in a position to

engage him with any assured prospect of success. But he made the

attempt, and a hot engagement took place off Dungeness on the 30th. Two

English vessels were taken, and the loss would have been greater if some

of the English captains had not shown themselves backward. Many of the

ships were merchant vessels pressed or hired, and commanded by their own

skippers, who displayed little military spirit. Blake, who offered to

resign, complained of the conduct of many of them, and some were

punished. The Council of State saw the necessity for making a strong

effort against Tromp, who ranged the Channel unopposed. Penn was

recalled from the north, Richard Deane and George Monk were united with

Blake as "admirals and generals at sea," and a competent force was

collected by the middle of February. The legend (for it is nothing more)

that Tromp hoisted a broom at his mainmast-head to announce his

intention to sweep the English off the sea, refers to this period.

On the 18th of February 1653 the Dutch admiral, who had now collected

the homeward-bound convoys, was off Plymouth on his way back to Holland,

and was attacked by the English fleet. The encounter, which lasted from

the 18th to the 20th of February and ranged from Plymouth to Calais, is

commonly named the "Three Days' Battle" and was described by Clarendon

as "stupendous." The Dutch admiral brought his charge of merchant ships

up Channel between him and the French shore. His war-ships were arranged

in what was called a half-moon, and was in fact an obtuse angle with his

flagship, the "Brederode," at the apex. During the 18th and 19th, the

attacks of the English though fierce were partial, and met with no great

success. Tromp had to complain of the conduct of several of his

captains. On the 20th his line was broken and some 60 of his merchant

ships were captured. He anchored in some confusion in Calais roads. Yet

by taking advantage of the dark, and the turn of the tide, he succeeded

in carrying the great majority of his merchant ships home. The English

fleet had suffered severely, Blake himself was seriously wounded, and

his colleague Deane was also hurt. Blake's wound disabled him greatly

through the remainder of the war.

The Three Days' Battle was followed by a pause in the war. On the

English side much damage had to be repaired. The administration of the

navy, called upon as it was to deal with a war of unprecedented

magnitude, was overtaxed by the obligation to refit ships, raise crews,

and provide for the numerous sick or wounded. The close approach of the

great political crisis in which Cromwell expelled the Long Parliament

and established the Protectorate (17th of April 1653), may have had some

influence. The fleet adhered to the new government on the 22nd of April.

On the Dutch side much damage had to be repaired, and their complicated

administration, by five independent admiralty boards, rendered rapid

work impossible. They had also begun to realize that the quality of

their ships was inferior. Reflection had further shown them that to

hamper their fleets by imposing the direct protection of a great flock

of merchant ships on them was not even an effectual way to protect

commerce. When, therefore, Tromp was next sent to sea, it was with an

unhampered fleet of war-ships, and for the purpose of bringing the

English fleet to battle.

In spite of their heavy losses and their awkward administration, the

Dutch were at sea before the end of May, and were close to the mouth of

the Thames. The English fleet was not all ready. Part was in the river

fitting out under Blake, who had not fully recovered from his wound. The

bulk of it was, however, ready for service, and Blake's colleagues, Monk

and Deane, attacked Tromp on the 2nd of June. Changes of wind made the

battle somewhat confused. At first the English were to windward and they

bore down with Rear-Admiral John Lawson in command of the van. Tromp,

conscious that his ships were weaker in build, at first drew away,

firing at the spars of the English ships in order to cripple them. A

shift of the wind having given him the weather-gage, he concentrated a

vigorous attack on Lawson. But the wind changed again and transferred

the weather-gage to the English. Monk and Deane brought on a general

action, in which the Dutch were outmatched, and forced to retreat to

their own coast. Deane was slain by a cannon-shot by the side of his

colleague Monk, who threw his cloak over the mangled body. Blake,

informed by the sound of the cannon, which was audible on the Thames,

that an action was in progress, hurried to sea and joined Monk in the

pursuit of the Dutch on the 3rd of June. Tromp was driven into port and

told the states-general that they must build better ships if they wished

to beat the English at sea. Blake was forced by his still unhealed wound

to go ashore, and the sole command was left to Monk, who remained

cruising on the coast of Holland. The states-general now sought for

peace, but Cromwell's demands were excessive, and could not be accepted

without a surrender of the independence of Holland. A last effort was

therefore made to regain the command of the sea. A great fleet was

fitted out, partly at Flushing, partly in the Texel. Between the 26th

and the 30th of July Tromp, by a series of skilful manoeuvres, united

the divided Dutch squadrons in the face of Monk's fleet, and on the 30th

he stood out to sea with the wind in his favour, and gave battle. More

than a hundred vessels were engaged on either side. The Dutch admiral

manoeuvred to keep, and Monk to gain, the weather-gage. The fleets

passed on opposite tacks, and the Dutch tried to destroy their enemy

with fire-ships without success. At last the weatherly qualities of the

ships enabled Monk to break through the Dutch line, cutting some of

their ships off from the others. The vessels thus cut off fled to the

Maas, and Tromp with the others retired to the Texel. He was shot dead

by a musket bullet in the retreat. The loss of life had been heavy on

both sides. Six captains of Monk's fleet were slain. The Dutch now

sought peace, and Cromwell offered better terms. During the fighting in

the North Sea the Mediterranean trade of England had suffered severely.

A squadron of trading ships and a few war vessels were blocked in

Italian ports till some of them were taken and others forced to flee in

March 1653 off Leghorn. The battle of the 31st of July was the last

serious operation of the war, though peace was not formally made till

some months later.

_Second Dutch War (1663-67)._--Although the formal declaration of war

was not made by the government of King Charles II. till March 1665, the

operations of the second Dutch War began in October 1663. The king and

his brother the duke of York (James II.), who were largely interested in

the slave-trading Guinea Company, were eager to remove the Dutch ports

from the slave coast. They knew that war with the Republic, which had

recovered very rapidly from the disasters of the war of 1652-53, would

be popular with the trading classes in England. They relied also on the

known reluctance of the Dutch government to go to war. In October 1663,

therefore, a squadron was sent out under command of Sir Robert Holmes to

attack the Dutch in Gambia and America. Their posts on the African coast

were captured and New Amsterdam (now New York) taken. The states-general

under the skilful management of the Grand Pensionary, John de Witt,

retaliated by sending de Ruyter from the Mediterranean, where he was

cruising against the Barbary pirates, to follow Holmes. De Ruyter

re-established the Dutch posts in Gambia, and, though he failed to

retake New Amsterdam, did much injury to English trade before he

returned to Holland. It may be pointed out that all colonial settlements

belonged at that time exclusively to England, and the war was made

entirely by her, and in her interest, Scotland and Ireland having no

share. Numbers of Scotch sailors and of English deserters served in the

Dutch fleet in this war--the bad administration of the navy and the

constant ill-treatment of the crews having caused bitter discontent.

Other attacks were made on Dutch trade during 1664, but the great

operations of war did not begin till May 1665. In that month the duke of

York was on the east coast of England with a fleet of 80 to 90 sail,

composed, according to the custom of the time, of vessels of all sizes.

A Dutch fleet of corresponding strength was sent to sea, under command

of Baron Opdam van Wassenaer. In this war we do not find that the

movements of fleets were subordinated to the work of providing convoy.

They were sent to sea for the much more intelligent purpose of seeking

out the enemy and driving him off. It was understood that the trade of

the victor would be secure.

The first battle took place from 30 to 40 m. S.E. of Lowestoft, on the

3rd of June 1665. By the bad conduct of some of the captains in the

centre of the Dutch line, the English, who fought with much spirit, were

able to win a considerable victory. Opdam's flagship was blown up and he

perished. But the pursuit of the English fleet was feeble, and the

retreat of the Dutch was ably covered by Cornelius van Tromp, son of

Martin Tromp. Much scandal was caused by the mysterious circumstances in

which an order to shorten sail was given in the English flagship, and

doubts were expressed of the courage of the duke of York. He withdrew,

or was withdrawn, from the active command at sea, and was replaced by

the earl of Sandwich. On the Dutch side vigorous measures were taken to

enforce good discipline. Four of the captains who had misbehaved on the

3rd of June were shot for cowardice, and others were dismissed. De

Ruyter was named commander-in-chief, and John de Witt, or later his

brother Cornelius, accompanied the admiral as delegate of the

states-general to support his authority. The earl of Sandwich did

nothing becoming a capable commander. Under his command the fleet made

no attempt to blockade the Dutch coast, but was turned from its proper

work to engage in a prize-hunting plot with the king of Denmark. The

object was to plunder a Dutch convoy which had taken refuge at Bergen in

Norway, then united to Denmark. The mutual interest of the associates

led to the failure of the plot. Sir Thomas Teddeman, who was sent by

Sandwich to attack the Dutch at Bergen, was suspected by the Danish

governor of intending to play false, was fired on by the batteries, and

was beaten off. De Ruyter covered the return of the trade to Holland.

Sandwich, who had taken some prizes, unlawfully seized part of their

cargoes for the benefit of himself and the other flag officers. A loud

outcry was raised in the fleet and the country. Sandwich was displaced,

and his command was transferred to Monk, with whom was associated the

king's cousin, Prince Rupert. The war had so far been unsuccessful for

England. The victory of the 3rd of June was barren. Great injury was

inflicted on English trade by Dutch cruisers, while the wasteful

administration of his officers reduced the king's treasury to much

embarrassment. Winter suspended the movements of the fleets.

The year 1666 (called the _annus mirabilis_, for it included the plague

and the fire of London) was marked by fierce fighting and changes of

fortune. The French, who had signed a treaty with Holland in 1662, were

reluctantly induced to intervene in the war as the enemies of England.

By May a Dutch fleet of some eighty sail was at sea, preparing to watch

the English, and unite with the French. Monk and Rupert were fitting out

a fleet of nearly the same strength in the Thames. Under the influence

of their fear of a French naval force King Charles's ministers committed

a great blunder. They detached Prince Rupert into the Channel with 20

ships, leaving Monk with only 57 to face the Dutch. The English

commander put to sea, and found the enemy anchored on the coast of

Flanders, in three divisions. He boldly attacked the van, hoping to

cripple it before it could be helped by the centre and rear. This daring

and well-judged move brought on the Four Days' Battle of the 1st, 2nd,

3rd and 4th of June (O.S.). On the 1st the Dutch van, under Cornelius

van Tromp, bore the brunt of the English attack. The fighting was very

fierce. One English admiral, Sir William Berkeley, was slain, and

another, Sir John Harman, was in great danger. Monk drew off at night

without doing all the harm he had wished to the Dutch. During the 2nd of

June the fleets engaged again, and on this day the self-will of Van

Tromp, who commanded the rear in the battle, and the misconduct of some

of the ships in the van, prevented De Ruyter from making full use of his

numbers. Yet Monk was clearly overtaxed, and on the 3rd he prepared to

retreat to the Thames. During this movement the "Prince" (100) carrying

the flag of Admiral Sir Robert Ayscue, ran on the Galloper Sand, and was

lost. In the evening Prince Rupert returned, and by hugging the coast of

Kent to the south of the fleets, was able to rejoin his colleague. Monk

and Rupert renewed the battle on the 4th. It was fought with extreme

fury, and terminated in the retreat of the English to the Thames with a

loss of 20 ships and 6000 men.

The Dutch remained masters of the approach to the Thames till the 21st

of July. They menaced the coast of Essex, and could easily have covered

an invasion of England by a French army if Louis XIV. had been disposed

to send one. Danger stimulated the English government to active

exertions, and by the 21st of July Monk and Rupert were enabled by a

happy combination of wind and tide to set to sea through the passage

called the Swin. A storm which scattered both fleets delayed their

meeting till the 25th of July. On that and the two succeeding days the

Dutch were again defeated and driven into port. The English fleet then

burnt the Dutch East India Company's dockyard at Terschelting,

inflicting great loss. But the fruits of the victory were less than they

would have been if it had been properly followed up. The British fleet

withdrew to its own coast and within a month De Ruyter was at sea again,

hoping to effect a junction with a French squadron. The French failed to

keep tryst, and De Ruyter was watched by Rupert, who was now in sole

command, Monk having been recalled to London to take command amid the

confusion caused by the fire and the plague. Nor did the failure of King

Charles's government to press the war with vigour end here. Embarrassed

by want of money, on bad terms with his parliament, and secretly intent

on schemes incompatible with a policy which could earn the approval of

his subjects, the king preferred to spend what money he could command on

raising troops, and neglected his fleet. Peace negotiations were begun

with the Dutch, and the line-of-battle ships were put out of commission.

A light squadron was, however, kept at sea to injure the Dutch trade,

and as no armistice was arranged the Republic was free to continue

warlike operations. The Dutch, being well aware of the disarmed

condition of the English coast, sent out a powerful fleet again under

the command of De Ruyter in June. It entered the Thames, forced the

entrance of the Medway, and burnt both the dockyard at Chatham and a

number of the finest ships in the navy which were lying in the river. A

terrible panic prevailed in London, where an attack was expected. The

Dutch were content with the injury they had done at Chatham, and dropped

down the river. De Ruyter remained cruising in the Channel till the

peace of Breda was signed in July. During the last months of the war Sir

John Harman had fought a successful campaign in the West Indies against

the French on whom he inflicted a severe defeat at Martinique ~~ on the

24th of June. By the terms of the peace England retained possession of

New York, but the war, though it contained some passages glorious to her

arms, was very disastrous to her commerce.

_Third Dutch War (1672-74)._--This war differed very materially in its

inception and conduct from the first and second. They had been popular

in England, and even the second gave Englishmen not a little to be proud

of. The third was undertaken by the king in pursuit of a policy arranged

between him and his cousin Louis XIV. Their avowed object was a

partition of Holland, but there was a secret understanding that King

Charles II. was to establish Roman Catholicism, and to make himself

despotic in England, with the help of the French king. This hidden

purpose was suspected, and the war became intensely unpopular with the

English parliament and nation. Parliament would grant the king no

supplies, and he could find the means of fitting out a fleet only by

defrauding his creditors. The English fleets were, therefore,

comparatively small, were ill-provided and had to co-operate with French

squadrons which in the then raw state of King Louis' young navy, proved

inefficient allies.

In this as in former wars, attacks on Dutch commerce preceded a formal

declaration of hostilities. On the 13th of March 1672 Sir Robert Holmes

fell upon a Dutch convoy under the command of Van Ness in the Channel.

In the penury of the dockyards Holmes could not be provided with the

force he was promised, and the enterprise was but partially successful.

It was characteristic of the morality of his time and the spirit of the

English navy as it had been shaped by the corrupt government of Charles

II., that the officers concerned quarrelled violently and accused one

another of fraud. A fleet of 60 sail was with difficulty got together

under the duke of York, who now went to sea for the second time. The

duke was joined in May, and at Portsmouth, by 40 French ships under the

comte d'Estrees, a soldier and noble who had been made an admiral late

in life. The allies entered the North Sea but did not take the offensive

against the Dutch. The English were ill supplied, and were compelled to

anchor at Southwold Bay on the coast of Suffolk in order to obtain water

and provisions. The Dutch, who had to contend with an overwhelming

French invasion on shore, nevertheless fitted out a fleet of 70 to 80

sail of the line and the command was given to De Ruyter. On the 28th of

May 1672 he fell upon the allies in a N.W. wind. D'Estrees, who was

stationed with his squadron at the south end of the line, went to sea on

the port tack, heading to the S.E. The English, who constituted the

centre and rear, stood out on the starboard tack. Thus the allies were

at once divided into two widely separated bodies, and the Dutch admiral

was able to concentrate nearly his whole force on the centre division,

which suffered severely. The flagship of the duke of York, the "Prince"

(100), was so shattered that he was compelled to leave her, and go to

the "St Michael." The "Royal James" (100), the flagship of his second in

command, the earl of Sandwich, after being much shattered by the Dutch

artillery, was set alight by a fire-ship, and destroyed with enormous

loss of life. The earl himself perished. His body was picked up three

days afterwards, so disfigured that it was only recognized by the star

on his coat. The ships at the head of the English line at last tacked to

the support of the centre, and at evening De Ruyter drew off. A foolish

attempt was made to claim his retreat as a victory, but the allies were

too severely damaged to attempt an attack on the Dutch during the rest

of the year. The Republic was so hard pressed by the French invasion

that it had to land the gunpowder from its ships for the service of its

army.

In 1673 the allies made an effort to invade Holland from the sea coast.

Prince Rupert replaced the duke of York, who as a Roman Catholic was

driven from office by the newly passed Test Act. He was supplied with 54

ships and was joined early in the year by d'Estrees with 27. Soldiers

were embarked, and in May the allied fleet stood over to the Dutch

coast. The distress of the Republic prevented it from equipping more

than 55 ships, but the patriotism of the race was roused to white heat,

and in De Ruyter they possessed an admiral of consummate skill and

heroic character. He took up an anchorage at Schooneveld and stood on

his guard. On the 28th of May Rupert and d'Estrees, believing that De

Ruyter was too much afraid of their superior numbers to venture to sea,

sent in a squadron of light vessels and fire-ships to attack him, but he

took the offensive at once, scattering the light squadron, and falling

with energy on the rest of the fleet, which, not being in expectation of

a vigorous assault, was taken at a disadvantage. On this occasion the

English placed the French in the centre, in order to avoid such a

separation as had taken place in the battle at Southwold Bay. But the

disposition made no difference in the result. De Ruyter concentrated on

the van and centre of the allies, and in spite of his great inferiority

of numbers was able to be superior at the point of attack. The allies

were compelled to retreat, and De Ruyter, satisfied with having averted

the invasion of his country, anchored at West-Kappel.

Seven days later, on the 4th of June, a second encounter took place. The

French were now placed in the rear of the line as it engaged. The Dutch

admiral, who had the advantage of the wind, fell on the English in the

van and centre. His inferiority in numbers did not allow him to push his

attack quite home, but he inflicted so much injury that the allies were

forced to return to the Thames to refit. At the end of July the allies

again appeared off the coast of Holland, bringing four thousand soldiers

in the war-ships and two thousand in transports. De Ruyter's fleet had

been raised to 70 vessels, but the allies had also been reinforced and

were 90 strong. On the 11th of August the Dutch admiral kept in the

shallow waters of the coast looking for a favourable opportunity to

attack. On the 11th of August the wind, which had been westerly, turned

to the S.E., giving him the weather gage. The French division was

leading, and De Ruyter fell furiously upon the English in the centre and

rear. The French were kept in play by a small squadron under Bankert,

while De Ruyter drove Prince Rupert in the centre out of the line, and

in the rear Cornelius van Tromp fought a desperate duel with the English

rear division commanded by Sir E. Spragge. The two admirals engaged in a

species of personal conflict, and each was compelled to shift his flag

to another vessel. While Sir E. Spragge, whose second flagship was

shattered by the Dutch fire, was on his way to a third, his boat was

sunk by a cannon shot and he was drowned.

The defeat of the allies was undeniable, and a violent quarrel broke out

between them. Want of money, and the increasing violence of popular

opposition to the French alliance, compelled the king to withdraw from

the war. Peace was made in the following spring.

In this war, which presented no features of a creditable kind, the loss

to English commerce from Dutch cruisers was so great that it was found

necessary to suspend the clause of the navigation act which forbade the

purchase of foreign-built vessels.

As England withdrew from her alliance with Louis XIV., the other powers

of Europe, frightened by the growth of the aggressive French power,

began to come forward to the support of Holland. The coalition then

formed continued the struggle till 1678. But the war was conducted

mainly on the land. The French king, who knew that his fleet was not as

yet capable of meeting the Dutch single-handed, was content to withdraw

his ships from the North Sea and the ocean. The Dutch, who had to pay

subventions to their German allies, and to support a large army, could

spare little for their fleet. For some time they willingly confined

themselves to efforts to protect their commerce from French privateers.

In 1674 a revolt of the people of Sicily against their Spanish rulers

gave the French king an opportunity of seizing the island. Spain, unable

to defend its possessions single-handed, appealed to the Dutch for naval

help. In September 1675 De Ruyter was sent into the Mediterranean with

18 sail of the line and four fire-ships. The force was inadequate, but

it was all that Holland could spare. The Dutch admiral, who was hampered

rather than helped by his Spanish allies, did his best to make good his

weakness by skilful management. He cruised off Messina to intercept the

supplies which were being brought to the French garrison by a fleet of

20 sail under the command of Abraham Duquesne. Conscious that he must

spare his small force as much as possible, he abstained from such

vigorous attacks as he had made in 1672 and 1673. When Duquesne appeared

on the 7th of January 1676 near the Lipari Islands, De Ruyter allowed

them to get the weather-gage, and on the 8th of January waited passively

for their attack. The French, with more recklessness than was usual with

them in later times, bore down on their enemy courageously but in some

disorder. Their leading ships were severely mauled, and their whole

force so crippled that they could make no pursuit of the Dutch when they

drew off, their injured ships being towed by the Spanish galleys, in the

late afternoon. Duquesne was able to reach Messina and join the French

ships at anchor there. De Ruyter made his way to Palermo, which was in

the hands of the Spaniards. One of his vessels sank on the way and he

was reduced to 17. It is true that his allies provided him with 10 ships

of their own, but the Spanish navy had sunk to abject inefficiency.

Their commander, the marquis of Bayona, arrogantly insisted on occupying

the centre of the line with his worthless squadron instead of allowing

his ships to be scattered among the Dutch for support. When on the 22nd

of April the allies, 27 strong, met the fleet of Duquesne, 29 ships, off

Agosta, they attacked from windward. De Ruyter, who led the van, was

mortally wounded. The Spaniards in the centre behaved very ill, and no

victory was gained. The serious fighting was, in fact, confined to the

vans of the two fleets. After the battle the allies retired to Syracuse,

where De Ruyter died, and where their ships were mostly destroyed by the

French a month later. Reinforcements sent out from Holland were stopped

in the Straits of Gibraltar and blockaded in Cadiz. The French remained

masters of the Mediterranean. In the meantime, however, angry disputes

had arisen between France and England. King Louis XIV. enforced his

belligerent rights at sea with as much disregard of neutral interests as

was shown by England in later times. His naval officers insisted on

making prize of all Dutch-built vessels found under the English flag. In

1678 war seemed imminent between France and England. King Louis then

withdrew his soldiers from Sicily, and made the peace of Nijmwegen.

AUTHORITIES.--For the English side, see _Naval History of England_, by

Thomas Lediard (London, 1735); _Memorials of Sir W. Penn_, by

Grenville Penn (London, 1833); _The First Dutch War, 1652-1654_,

edited by S.R. Gardiner for the Navy Record Society (1899). For the

Dutch side: _Het Leven un Bedryf van den Heere Michiel de Ruiter_, by

Gerard Brandt (Amsterdam, 1687); _Geschiedenis van den Nederlandsche

Zeewegen_, by J.C. de Jongke (Haarlem, 1858); _Annales des

Provinces-Unies_, by J. Basnages de Beauval (The Hague, 1726). For the

French side; _Abraham du Quesne et la marine de son temps_, by A. Jal

(Paris, 1873). For the small Spanish share; _Armada Espanola_, by

Captain Cesareo Fernandez Duro (Madrid, 1895-1901). For critical

studies of these wars the reader may be referred to _Naval Warfare_,

by Rear-admiral P.H. Colomb (London, 1899), and _The Influence of Sea

Power upon History_, by Captain A.T. Mahan. (D. H.)

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Dübner, Johann Friedrich" to "Dyeing" Volume 8, Slice 8 · 第 35 / 40 题