111. "I wish it exceedingly," he replied.

"It appeared to me, then," said he, "after this, when I was wearied with

considering things that exist, that I ought to beware lest I should

suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of

the sun, for some lose the sight of their eyes, unless they behold its

image in water, or some similar medium. And I was affected with a

similar feeling, and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my

soul through beholding things with the eyes, and endeavoring to grasp

them by means of the several senses. It seemed to me, therefore, that I

ought to have recourse to reasons, and to consider in them the truth of

things. Perhaps, however, this similitude of mine may in some respect be

incorrect; for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in

their reasons considers them in their images, more than he does who

views them in their effects. However, I proceeded thus, and on each

occasion laying down the reason, which I deem to be the strongest,

whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true, both

with respect to the cause and every thing else; but such as do not

accord I regard as not true. 112. But I wish to explain my meaning to

you in a clearer manner; for I think that you do not yet understand me."

"No, by Jupiter!" said Cebes, "not well."

"However," continued he, "I am now saying nothing new, but what I have

always at other times, and in a former part of this discussion, never

ceased to say. I proceed, then, to attempt to explain to you that

species of cause which I have busied myself about, and return again to

those well-known subjects, and set out from them, laying down as an

hypothesis, that there is a certain abstract beauty, and goodness, and

magnitude, and so of all other things; which if you grant me, and allow

that they do exist, I hope that I shall be able from these to explain

the cause to you, and to discover that the soul is immortal."

"But," said Cebes, "since I grant you this, you may draw your conclusion

at once."

"But consider," he said, "what follows from thence, and see if you can

agree with me. For it appears to me that if there is any thing else

beautiful besides beauty itself, it is not beautiful for any other

reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty; and I say the

same of every thing. Do you admit such a cause?"

"I do admit it," he replied.

113. "I do not yet understand," he continued, "nor am I able to

conceive, those other wise causes; but if any one should tell me why any

thing is beautiful, either because it has a blooming florid color, or

figure, or any thing else of the kind, I dismiss all other reasons, for

I am confounded by them all; but I simply, wholly, and perhaps

foolishly, confine myself to this, that nothing else causes it to be

beautiful except either the presence or communication of that abstract

beauty, by whatever means and in whatever way communicated; for I can

not yet affirm this with certainty, but only that by means of beauty all

beautiful things become beautiful. For this appears to me the safest

answer to give both to myself and others; and adhering to this, I think

that I shall never fall, but that it is a safe answer both for me and

any one else to give--that by means of beauty beautiful things become

beautiful. Does it not also seem so to you?"

"It does."

"And that by magnitude great things become great, and greater things,

greater; and by littleness less things become less?"

"Yes."

114. "You would not, then, approve of it, if any one said that one

person is greater than another by the head, and that the less is less by

the very same thing; but you would maintain that you mean nothing else

than that every thing that is greater than another is greater by nothing

else than magnitude, and that it is greater on this account--that is, on

account of magnitude; and that the less is less by nothing else than

littleness, and on this account less--that is, on account of littleness;

being afraid, I think, lest some opposite argument should meet you if

you should say that any one is greater and less by the head; as, first,

that the greater is greater, and the less less, by the very same thing;

and, next, that the greater is greater by the head, which is small; and

that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something

small. Should you not be afraid of this?"

Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates · 第 28 / 35 题