"In the same manner," he replied, "as with things very little and very
large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large
on a very little man, or dog, or any thing else? and, again, swift or
slow, beautiful or ugly, white or black? Do you not perceive that of all
such things the extremes are rare and few, but that the intermediate are
abundant and numerous?"
"Certainly," I replied.
"Do you not think, then," he continued, "that if a contest in wickedness
were proposed, even here very few would be found pre-eminent?"
"It is probable," I said.
"It is so," he said, "but in this respect reasonings do not resemble
men, for I was just now following you as my leader, but in this they do
resemble them, when any one believes in any argument as true without
being skilled in the art of reasoning, and then shortly afterward it
appears to him to be false, at one time being so and at another time
not, and so on with one after another,[34] and especially they who
devote themselves to controversial arguments, you are aware, at length
think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that there is
nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings but that all
things that exist, as is the case with the Euripus, are in a constant
state of flux and reflux, and never continue in any one condition for
any length of time."
"You speak perfectly true," I said.
90. "Would it not, then, Phædo" he said "be a sad thing if, when there
is a true and sound reasoning, and such as one can understand, one
should then, through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one
time true and at another false, not blame one's self and one's own want
of skill, but at length, through grief, should anxiously transfer the
blame from one's self to the arguments, and thereupon pass the rest of
one's life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the
truth and knowledge of things that exist?"
"By Jupiter!" I said, "it would be sad, indeed."
"In the first place, then," he said, "let us beware of this, and let us
not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be nothing
sound in reasoning, but much rather that we are not yet in a sound
condition, and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to
become sound, you and the others, on account of your whole future life,
but I, on account of my death, since I am in danger, at the present
time, of not behaving as becomes a philosopher with respect to this very
subject, but as a wrangler, like those who are utterly uninformed 91.
For they, when they dispute about any thing, care nothing at all for the
subject about which the discussion is, but are anxious about this, that
what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons
present. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from
them only in this respect, for I shall not be anxious to make what I say
appear true to those who are present, except that may happen by the way,
but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. For I thus reason,
my dear friend, and observe how interestedly. If what I say be true, it
is well to be persuaded of it, but if nothing remains to one that is
dead, I shall, at least, during the interval before death be less
disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. But this ignorance of
mine will not continue long, for that would be bad, but will shortly be
put an end to. Thus prepared, then, Simmias and Cebes," he continued, "I
now proceed to my argument. Do you, however, if you will be persuaded by
me, pay little attention to Socrates, but much more to the truth, and if
I appear to you to say any thing true, assent to it, but if not, oppose
me with all your might, taking good care that in my zeal I do not
deceive both myself and you, and, like a bee, depart leaving my sting
behind."
92. "But let us proceed," he said "First of all, remind me of what you
said, if I should appear to have forgotten it For Simmias, as I think,
is in doubt, and fears lest the soul, though more divine and beautiful
than the body, should perish before it, as being a species of harmony.
But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this, that the soul is more durable
than the body, but he argued that it is uncertain to every one, whether
when the soul has worn out many bodies and that repeatedly, it does
not, on leaving the last body, itself also perish, so that this very
thing is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body never ceases
decaying Are not these the things, Simmias and Cebes, which we have to
inquire into?"
They both agreed that they were.
"Whether, then," he continued "do you reject all our former arguments,
or some of them only, and not others?"
"Some we do," they replied, "and others not."
"What, then," he proceeded, "do you say about that argument in which we
asserted that knowledge is reminiscence, and that, this being the case,
our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was inclosed
in the body?"
93. "I, indeed," replied Cebes "was both then wonderfully persuaded by
it, and now persist in it, as in no other argument."
"And I, too," said Simmias, "am of the same mind, and should very much
wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point."
"Then," Socrates said, "you must needs think otherwise, my Theban
friend, if this opinion holds good, that harmony is something
compounded, and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the
parts compacted together in the body. For surely you will not allow
yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which
it required to be composed Would you allow this?"
"By no means, Socrates" he replied.
"Do you perceive, then," he said, "that this result from what you say,
when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form
and body, but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist?
For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it, but first the
lyre, and the chords, and the sounds yet unharmonized, exist, and, last
of all, harmony is produced, and first perishes. How, then, will this
argument accord with that?"
"Not at all," said Simmias.
94. "And yet," he said, "if in any argument, there ought to be an
accordance in one respecting harmony."
"There ought," said Simmias.
"This of yours, however," he said, "is not in accordance. Consider,
then, which of these two statements do you prefer--that knowledge is
reminiscence, or the soul harmony?"
"The former by far, Socrates," he replied; "for the latter occurred to
me without demonstration, through a certain probability and speciousness
whence most men derive their opinions. But I am well aware that
arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle;
and, unless one is on one's guard against them, they are very deceptive,
both in geometry and all other subjects. But the argument respecting
reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a
satisfactory hypothesis. For in this way it was said that our soul
existed before it came into the body, because the essence that bears the
appellation of 'that which is' belongs to it. But of this, as I persuade
myself, I am fully and rightly convinced. It is therefore necessary, as
it seems, that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to
maintain that the soul is harmony."
95. "But what, Simmias," said he, "if you consider it thus? Does it
appear to you to appertain to harmony, or to any other composition, to
subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is
composed?"
"By no means."
"And indeed, as I think, neither to do any thing, nor suffer any thing
else, besides what they do or suffer."
He agreed.
"It does not, therefore, appertain to harmony to take the lead of the
things of which it is composed, but to follow them."
He assented.
"It is, then, far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends
forth sounds contrariwise, or is in any other respect opposed to its
parts?"
"Far, indeed," he said.
"What, then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony, so far as it has
been made to accord?"
"I do not understand you," he replied.
"Whether," he said, "if it should be in a greater degree and more fully
made to accord, supposing that were possible, would the harmony be
greater and more full; but if in a less degree and less fully, then
would it be inferior and less full?"
"Certainly."
"Is this, then, the case with the soul that, even in the smallest
extent, one soul is more fully and in a greater degree, or less fully
and in a less degree, this very thing, a soul, than another?"
"In no respect whatever," he replied.
96. "Well, then," he said, "by Jupiter! is one soul said to possess
intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another folly and vice, and
to be bad? and is this said with truth?"
"With truth, certainly."
"Of those, then, who maintain that the soul is harmony, what will any
one say that these things are in the soul, virtue and vice? Will he call
them another kind of harmony and discord, and say that the one, the good
soul, is harmonized, and, being harmony, contains within itself another
harmony, but that the other is discordant, and does not contain within
itself another harmony?"
"I am unable to say," replied Simmias; "but it is clear that he who
maintains that opinion would say something of the kind."
"But it has been already granted," said he, "that one soul is not more
or less a soul than another; and this is an admission that one harmony
is not to a greater degree or more fully, or to a less degree or less
fully, a harmony, than another; is it not so?"
"Certainly."
"And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor
less harmonized: is it so?"
"It is."
"But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more
or less harmony, or an equal amount?"
"An equal amount."
97. "A soul, therefore, since it is not more or less this very thing, a
soul, than another, is not more or less harmonized?"
"Even so."
"Such, then, being its condition, it can not partake of a greater degree
of discord or harmony?"
"Certainly not."
"And, again, such being its condition, can one soul partake of a greater
degree of vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord, and virtue
harmony?"
"It can not."
"Or rather, surely, Simmias, according to right reason, no soul will
partake of vice, if it is harmony; for doubtless harmony, which is
perfectly such, can never partake of discord?"
"Certainly not."
"Neither, therefore, can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of
vice."
"How can it, from what has been already said?"
"From this reasoning, then, all souls of all animals will be equally
good, if, at least, they are by nature equally this very thing, souls?"
"It appears so to me, Socrates," he said.
"And does it appear to you," he said, "to have been thus rightly argued,
and that the argument would lead to this result, if the hypothesis were
correct, that the soul is harmony?"