THE FIFTH ACT
The departure of a Commander-in-Chief acts upon an army like sudden
heart disease in a man, or the collapse of a ship’s steering-gear. All
is at once bewilderment and uncertainty. A sense of loss and change and
failure pervades all ranks. The daily routine appears hardly worth the
trouble of accurate performance, and for enterprise no spirit is left.
This is so, even when the General stands aloof and regards his men with
small esteem, as was Wellington’s way; but the depression is increased
when the recall removes one who is by nature tempted to companionship
in action, and who, at the lowest ebb of fortune, stands always ready
with the encouraging word and the outwardly serene aspect of hope.
[Sidenote: GENERAL MONRO’S REPORT]
In General Birdwood, it is true, such another leader was found. His
adventurous and sunny spirit, always alert, free of intercourse,
and incapable of depression, made him accepted as Sir Ian’s natural
successor by all except the few whose minds were set immovably towards
despair. Yet, in spite of this well-justified confidence, the mere
fact of the change suggested speculation upon other changes, and the
pulse of action flagged, as though paralysed by uncertainty. In this
condition General Sir Charles Monro found the army when, after two
days spent in the Headquarters at Imbros, he visited the Peninsula
on October 30. He was a man of fifty-five, who before the war had
performed the services usual to an officer of that period in South
Africa, India, and at home. During the war he had won reputation in
high command on the Western Front. The Government had sent him out
with a view to obtaining the report of an unbiased opinion, and by
appointing a General from the Western Front, and a man of opposite
temperament to his predecessor’s, they had ensured themselves against
any possible bias, at all events in one direction. His orders were
to report upon the military situation; to give an opinion whether
on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated; and,
otherwise, to estimate the troops required (1) to carry the Peninsula,
(2) to keep the Straits open, and (3) to take Constantinople.[226]
Upon all these points General Monro formed a rapid and decisive
opinion. He represented the military situation as unique in history,
and in every respect unfavourable. The Force, he maintained, held
a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was
without depth, the communications insecure and dependent on weather,
the entrenchments dominated almost throughout by the enemy, the
possible artillery positions insufficient and defective, whereas the
enemy enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions
and opportunity to supplement the natural advantages by all the devices
of engineering. For the troops, they could not be withdrawn to rest
out of the shell-swept area, because every corner of the Peninsula
was exposed; they were much enervated by the endemic diseases of
the summer; there was a grave dearth of competent officers; and the
Territorial Divisions had been augmented by makeshifts in the form of
Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades. As to military objects, the Turks could
hold the army in front with a small force; an advance could not be
regarded as a reasonable operation to expect; and any idea of capturing
Constantinople was quite out of the question. These considerations, in
General Monro’s opinion, made it urgent to divert the troops locked up
on the Peninsula to a more useful theatre, and convinced him that a
complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.[227]
[Sidenote: THE ADVOCATES OF EVACUATION]
About that judgment there was, at all events, no hesitating
ambiguity. Having condemned the whole expedition, root and branch,
the General was obviously not called upon to discuss such minor
details as reinforcements, or the reports of Turkish exhaustion and
demoralisation, or the exact “theatre” in which the army would be
likely to immobilise so large a Turkish force (Mr. Asquith estimated
it as 200,000),[228] and restrain them from co-operating in further
assaults upon Mesopotamia or Egypt. To be sure, there was Salonika as a
possible alternative; but Sir Charles Monro must have been aware that
Serbia was by that time past saving, and that the transference of the
Gallipoli army to Salonika would simply relieve Turkey of all anxiety
and restraint. The probable loss of prestige and of men involved in
the evacuation does not appear to have influenced his decision;
and, indeed, as the event afterwards proved, the loss in both was
vastly overestimated by the advocates of evacuation as well as by its
opponents.
The report was, naturally, grateful to such of the Generals on the
spot and such of Sir Ian’s former Staff as had already abandoned hope.
Some, indeed, were now of opinion that the evacuation should have been
ordered at midsummer or before. Still more welcome was the report
to the party in England which had always distrusted the Dardanelles
adventure, and had so largely contributed to its failure both by their
depreciation and by their encouragement to irresponsible counsellors of
despair. They kept their thoughts fixed upon the Western Front, since,
by a law of human nature, interest varies directly with proximity, and
some mental or imaginative effort is required to realise the importance
of distant undertakings. Already (on October 14, two days before Sir
Ian’s recall) Lord Milner had made the following statement in the House
of Lords:
“When I hear that it would be a terrible thing to abandon our
Dardanelles adventure because this would have so bad an effect in
Egypt, in India, upon our prestige in the East, I cannot help asking
myself whether it will not have a worse effect if we persist in that
enterprise and it ends in complete disaster.”
Lord Lansdowne, naturally, deprecated so public a suggestion; but Lord
Milner found support in Lord Ribblesdale, who urged the Government to
“get out of the unfortunate adventure.”[229] A few days afterwards
(October 18) Sir Edward Carson, the Attorney-General, resigned in
protest against the Government’s hesitation to evacuate the Peninsula
and concentrate upon Serbia’s protection, for which, however, any
efforts would then have been at least a month too late. Thus impelled,
Mr. Asquith’s Cabinet, in hopes of justifying their firm resolution to
adopt one course or the other, decided upon another preliminary step.
They commissioned Lord Kitchener to visit the Dardanelles in person and
assume the responsibility of decision.
[Sidenote: LORD KITCHENER VISITS THE PENINSULA]
Lord Kitchener left England on November 5, and on reaching Mudros
consulted with Sir Charles Monro, who meantime had visited Egypt and
now returned in company with Sir H. McMahon, the High Commissioner,
and Sir John Maxwell, Commanding the Forces in Egypt. On his part,
Lord Kitchener was strongly opposed to evacuation. His military and
political instinct showed him the advantage of maintaining this “thorn
in the side” of Turkey, even if no farther advance were possible during
the winter,--an advantage illustrated too late when Kut-el-Amara fell
in the following April. Some of the most active spirits in the navy
were also continually urging a renewed attempt to force the Narrows
with the fleet now that ships were far more numerous, the position
was better understood, and the army could at least effect a strong
diversion on the Peninsula and protect the communications in case
of success. To them, as to many of the Generals ashore, it seemed
still possible to retrieve the situation and terminate the war from
the Eastern side. But on the _Aragon_ at Mudros Lord Kitchener was
surrounded by advocates of evacuation. We know with what solicitous
anxiety he always regarded any possible danger that might threaten
Egypt, and the highest representatives of our authority there were
present, always ready to urge the danger of a Turco-German invasion
from the East, and trouble with the Senussi on the West. Sir Charles
Monro was also present, and we have seen his opinion--an opinion
decisively supported by his Staff. Support also came from one or two
recently attached members of Sir Ian’s old Staff. As one among them
said, “We brought Lord Kitchener round to our way of thinking.”[230]
This congenial task, perhaps less difficult than it might have
proved ten years before, was no doubt rendered easier still by Lord
Kitchener’s hurried visits to the main points on the Peninsula. At
Helles the visit was little more than a call upon the Headquarters of
the VIIIth Corps, and a walk among the remnant of the French force at
Seddel Bahr. At Anzac (November 13), the Australians received Lord
Kitchener with an enthusiasm due to his massive personality and his
record of service. With resolute energy, outdistancing his retinue,
he strode up the steep ascent of Walker’s Ridge to Russell’s Top,
and penetrated the front trenches whence the assault upon the Nek
had started to destruction. By coincidence, it was a day of singular
calm, and not a shot or shell was fired. At Suvla, in the same way, he
climbed up Karakol Dagh to a prominent cluster of rocks whence a wide
view is obtained over the Salt Lake and the plain to the encompassing
arc of heights still held by the enemy, and to the unassailed eminence
of Koja Chemen Tepe and the fateful bastion of Chunuk Bair beyond. At
the conclusion of a Special Order issued to the Anzac Corps (now under
command of General Godley), General Birdwood wrote:
“Lord Kitchener much regretted that time did not permit of his seeing
the whole corps, but he was very pleased to see a considerable
proportion of officers and men, and to find all in such good heart
and so confidently imbued with that grand spirit which has carried
them through all their trials and many dangerous feats of arms--a
spirit which he is quite confident they will maintain until they have
taken their full share in completely overthrowing their enemies.”
The passage, though apparently confident, was guarded. Upon a sudden
and hurried visit to such scenes, even the shrewdest and most rapid
mind would be likely to exaggerate the disadvantages of the unusual
positions, without taking account of trenches and shelters rendered
impenetrable, or of supplies stored in quantity to defy the weather
on sea; and Lord Kitchener’s mind was deliberative and vasty rather
than shrewdly alert to the moment. But ultimately it was the political
situation, and especially the deflection of Bulgaria into open
hostility, together with the stealthy neutrality of King Constantine,
which compelled Lord Kitchener and even the most high-spirited of the
Peninsula Generals reluctantly to assent to the surrender of hope.
[Sidenote: BIRDWOOD COMMANDS ON PENINSULA]
While at Mudros, Lord Kitchener ordered General Monro to assume
command of all British forces in the Mediterranean east of Malta,
excluding Egypt. General Monro naturally divided these forces into
the “Salonika Army,” under command of Lieut.-General Sir Bryan
Mahon, and the “Dardanelles Army,” under command of Lieut.-General
Sir William Birdwood. Part of the original Headquarters Staff of the
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was now transferred from Imbros to
the _Aragon_ in Mudros harbour, where Sir Charles Monro himself fixed
his headquarters. For there he could keep closely in touch with General
Altham, Inspector-General, Line of Communications, whose energy and
accurate organisation continued to confront the perpetual or increasing
difficulties caused by weather, submarines, and the absence of wharves
and piers for transferring all ordnance and engineering stores from
one ship to another. General Birdwood henceforward to the last
retained command upon the Peninsula, and to him the main credit for
the unexpected issue of the following weeks is due. He and his Staff
occupied the newly constructed headquarters at the foot of the hills
rather more than a mile from the chief landing-stage at Imbros, handing
over his command at Anzac to General Godley, as has been mentioned.
Few events varied the monotony of trench warfare. The mine-sweeper
_Hythe_ was sunk in collision on October 28 and 155 men lost, including
two military officers. The submarine E20 was sunk in the Sea of
Marmora early in November, Lieut.-Commander Clyfford and nine others
being rescued and made prisoner. On November 15 part of the 156th
Brigade (52nd Division) captured nearly 300 yards of Turkish trench
between the Vineyard and the Gully Ravine. Once or twice the Turks
attempted half-hearted attacks both at Helles and Anzac, but were
easily repulsed. For the rest, little was done, except bombing, mining,
and preparing for the winter. Wooden beams and sheets of plate iron
arrived in some quantity, and were especially needed at Anzac. The
beaches were, as far as possible, cleared. Stores which had been piled
up in the gullies were removed to higher positions. On the left, among
the Anzac foothills, Brigadier-General Monash ordered vast caverns
to be excavated as sheltered barracks for his 4th Brigade. Up at the
“Apex,” long subterranean galleries were dug clean through the crest
of Rhododendron Ridge, so as to command the deep ravines between it
and Battleship Hill. On one occasion the fumes in an exploded mine
tunnel caused several deaths. On another, an Anzac party was cut off
in a gallery exploded by a Turkish mine, but dug themselves out and
reappeared over the parapet after three days’ burial.[231]
[Sidenote: GREAT STORM OF NOVEMBER]
To the end of November the weather remained fairly fine, except for
heavy showers and occasional mists and frosts. The dust was laid, even
at Helles and Suvla; flies almost disappeared, and the prevailing
sickness was much reduced. But on November 27 and the following four
days a natural disaster as deadly as a serious engagement befell the
Peninsula. A heavy south-westerly gale brought with it a thunderstorm
accompanied with torrents of rain, which poured down upon the Ægean and
the Peninsula for nearly twenty-four hours. In half an hour the wind
rose to a hurricane, lashing the sea to tempest. At Kephalos one of
the ships forming a breakwater was sunk, and all the craft inside the
little harbour were driven ashore. At Helles and Suvla the light piers
and landing-stages were destroyed, and the shores strewn with wreck.
A destroyer was driven ashore in Suvla Bay. At Anzac the trenches
were filled with water, and streams roared down the gullies. The fate
of Suvla was more terrible. Across a long and deep ravine leading
obliquely down from the “whale-back” ridge of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, high
parapets had been constructed by Turks and British alike. Against these
parapets the water was dammed up, as in a reservoir. They gave way, as
when a reservoir’s embankment bursts, and the weight of accumulated
water swept down the ravine into the valley, and from the valley into
the Salt Lake and the shore, bearing with it stores and equipment, and
mule-carts and mules and the drowning bodies of Turks and Britons,
united in vain struggles against the overwhelming power of nature.
Along the other sections of the lines, the men stood miserably in the
trenches, soaked to the skin, and in places up to their waists in water.
Then, of a sudden, the wind swung round to the north and fell upon the
wrecked and inundated scene with icy blast. For nearly two days and
nights snow descended in whirling blizzards, and two days and nights of
bitter frost succeeded the snow. The surface of the pools and trenches
froze thick. The men’s greatcoats, being soaked through with the rain,
froze stiff upon them. Men staggered down from the lines numbed and
bemused with the intensity of cold. They could neither hear nor speak,
but stared about them like bewildered bullocks. The sentries and
outposts in the advanced trenches could not pull the triggers of their
rifles for cold. They saw the Turks standing up on their firing steps
and gazing at them over the parapets, and still they did not fire. It
was reported at the time that the General, knowing that the condition
of the enemy was probably worse than ours, desired a general attack.
But movement was hardly possible. Overcome by the common affliction,
our men also stood up and gazed back at the Turks. Few can realise the
suffering of those four days.
[Illustration: ANZAC IN SNOW]
[Sidenote: EFFECT OF THE BLIZZARD]
As though to test their power of endurance up to the very last, the
full weight of misery fell upon the 29th Division, detained at Suvla
since their final battle of August 21. Of that Division’s celebrated
battalions, the 2nd Royal Fusiliers (86th Brigade) suffered most,
their sentries standing immovable at their posts until they froze
to death, and being found afterwards watching from the parapet,
rifle in hand. The dead in the IXth Army Corps alone numbered over
200. From the Peninsula about 10,000 sick had to be removed. Many
were “frost-bitten”; many lost their limbs; some, their reason. It is
probable that the Turks suffered even worse; for prisoners said their
men had no blankets, no covering at all except their thin uniforms and
frozen greatcoats. But an enemy’s suffering is small consolation for
one’s own; nor throughout the campaign was the element of vengeful
hatred of the Turk ever one of the impelling motives among our fighting
men, whether British, Irish, Anzac, or Hindu.[232]
This disastrous storm, though none raged again with such fury, may have
hastened the approaching end; but the Cabinet’s decision was probably
taken immediately after Lord Kitchener’s visit. On November 15, Mr.
Winston Churchill, in resigning his office as Chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster--an office, it is true, which afforded little scope for
the activity of his restless interests--defended his conception of
the Dardanelles Expedition in the House of Commons, and expressed a
judgment which I believe will be the judgment of future time until the
campaign fades from memory:
“If,” he said, “there were any operations in the history of the world
which, having been begun, it was worth while to carry through with
the utmost vigour and fury, with a consistent flow of reinforcements,
and an utter disregard of life, it was the operations so daringly
and brilliantly begun by Sir Ian Hamilton in the immortal landing of
April 25.”
That was the natural and just lamentation over the decease of the fine
conception of whose being Mr. Churchill was the author. But now nothing
remained for it but decent burial. On November 30, having visited
Salonika and Italy, Lord Kitchener returned. On December 8, Sir Charles
Monro ordered General Birdwood to proceed with the evacuation of Suvla
and Anzac. By him the whole scheme was designed, in co-operation with
Rear-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, who was in command of the naval side owing
to the temporary absence of Vice-Admiral de Robeck through illness.
[Sidenote: THE PROBLEM OF EVACUATION]
To bring away an army from open beaches fully exposed to a resolute
enemy has always been recognised as one of the most difficult military
operations, involving risk of heavy loss if not disaster. On principle
it is not to be undertaken except after a defeat of the enemy’s
forces. But in this case there could be no question of defeat, and
the enemy was nowhere more than 300 yards distant from our front,
and at many points no more than 10 or 20 yards. At Anzac and Suvla
alone, rather more than 83,000 men had to be embarked, together with
nearly 5000 horses and mules, nearly 2000 carts, about 200 guns, and
at each place thirty days’ supply at an average of 4 lb. per man, to
say nothing of engineering and medical stores, and all the baggage of
Staffs and officers.[233]
The highest estimate of the probable loss was 50 per cent.; the lowest
(and this was the estimate I heard most commonly given by Staff
officers just before the event) was 15 per cent. At Mudros preparation
was made for 6000 to 10,000 wounded, and in case of such losses, many
of the wounded must have been left ashore.[234]
The force of the enemy opposite Suvla and Anzac was roughly calculated
at about 60,000, equally divided between the two positions, and
consisting of Anatolians, Syrians, and Arabs. But, including reserves,
it was thought there were 120,000 in all upon the Peninsula.[235]
[Sidenote: OUR SIMPLE RUSES]
They were engaged upon constructing new gun-positions with cement
platforms, especially behind Kavak Tepe. It was reported that a battery
of 12-inch howitzers and two or three batteries of 9-inch guns were
on their way from Germany, and the violence of the shell-explosions
upon our lines proved that superior ammunition had already arrived. For
the rest, the Turks laboured continuously at deepening or multiplying
their trenches, and up to the final evening we watched their spades
throwing the earth over their parapets. To keep them thus occupied
in improving their time, the army and navy employed many ingenious
devices. Men who had been embarked at night, or under tarpaulins by
day, were brought back again fully exposed to view, as in a stage army.
The Indian muleteers were ordered to drive their carts continuously to
and fro, making as much dust as possible. On the final days all ranks
were ordered to maintain the immemorial British custom of showing
themselves upon the sky-line and serving their country by walking where
they could best be observed. Both at Anzac and Suvla the guns also
had during the last few weeks been ordered not to fire a shot during
certain intervals, which sometimes lasted three days together. At Anzac
on one occasion, the Turks came creeping over towards our parapets,
and even entered the galleries to see if we still were there; but they
were so terribly received with rifles and bayonets that the question of
our intentions appeared to them settled. Prisoners and deserters (who
continued to come in up to the last hour) told us that, in consequence
of these simple artifices, the Turks were even expecting a renewed
attack. They also spread a persistent rumour that the Turks themselves
contemplated evacuation. This report was probably due to the deserter’s
natural exaggeration of his miseries; but since the tempest and snow
the condition of the men in the Turkish trenches had, no doubt, been
deplorable.
[Sidenote: ARRANGEMENTS FOR EMBARKATION]
At Suvla, so soon as the order to evacuate arrived, our men began
fortifying the points at each end of the bay, as positions where a last
stand could be made. The front line extended for 11,000 yards, running
from the shore of the Gulf of Xeros,[236] over the lofty “whale-back”
of Kiretch Tepe Sirt at Jephson’s Post, down the steep southern slope,
across the tree-covered and partly cultivated plain through the farms
of Anafarta Ova and Sulajik, in front of Green and Chocolate Hill, and
out into the swampy level of the Biyuk Anafarta valley, till it joined
up with the Anzac lines. Fortunately, the recent tempest had filled
the Salt Lake with water to an average depth of 4 feet; so that in the
centre of the Suvla position no further defence was required, and, on
the right, only about 1000 yards of marshy and waterlogged plain had to
be entrenched or covered by wire entanglement. The remaining positions
were defended by three lines, wired and entrenched, barbed-wire gates
ready to close being prepared at all openings of paths and roads.
The embarkation was carried out from the north and south points of
Suvla Bay. At the extreme end of the north or Suvla Point a small
harbour, capable of receiving rafts, “beetles,” and even trawlers, had
been constructed, chiefly by the skill of the 5th Anglesey Company R.E.
(Captain Glenn), who had blasted away the rock and built an oblong
of low walls to serve as wharves. Near the narrow entrance of this
small harbour a steamer was also run aground as a stage alongside of
which larger transports could lie. Guns, horses, mules, and stores
were taken off on rafts and “beetles” in the little harbour. The
battalions embarked from the sunken steamer, usually also on “beetles”
or trawlers. The 53rd Division went first. Of the old fighting 29th
Division, the 86th Brigade followed, getting away on the night of
December 14–15. There remained the 11th, 13th, and Mounted Divisions,
together with the 88th Brigade of the 29th, and it was arranged that
the 11th Division with the 88th Brigade and one brigade of the 13th
should leave from the north point, and the other two brigades of the
13th, together with the “mounted” forces and 500 Gurkhas of the Indian
Brigade from Anzac, from the south or Nibrunesi Point, where they could
embark from the C and B Beaches of the original landing, under cover of
Lala Baba and the cliffs. A new pier had also been constructed near the
point on the inside of Suvla Bay, fairly sheltered, though exposed to
observation and shell-fire from “The Pimple” and that part of Kiretch
Tepe Sirt. In fact, on the very last day (December 19), while I was
at General Maude’s 13th Division Headquarters overlooking the pier
from the cliff, a 5·7-inch shell tore a large gap in the middle of it;
but it was rapidly repaired by the Engineers. A similar pier had been
constructed on the far or Xeros side of Suvla Point, below the cliff
on which General Byng had now fixed the IXth Army Corps Headquarters.
This was entirely sheltered and unobserved, but was only to be used
for the withdrawal of the very last detachment. The naval part of the
embarkation at Suvla Point was under the direction of Captain Unwin,
who organised and conducted it with the same enthusiastic, not to say
explosive, energy which he had displayed during the landing on V Beach
from the _River Clyde_.
Night after night, and all night long, the anxious labour was resumed.
Guns--the “heavies,” the howitzers, and the field-guns--were drawn
down to the harbour, and pushed or pulled with ropes upon the rafts.
Mules and horses were brought down, but gradually, lest the enemy
should notice the emptiness of the horse-lines along the point.[237]
Stores were brought down, all that might have been needed only for
summer or for a long campaign coming first. Then came the men, brigade
by brigade, battalion by battalion, mustering at definite points
about half a mile from the harbour, and in turn filing down to the
transports. There was no confusion, no visible excitement. Silently the
men took their places, and moved to quiet orders. Each carried full kit
with pick and shovel or periscope.
[Sidenote: RISKS DURING THE FINAL NIGHTS]
As each night of the final week passed and the defences became weaker,
the anxiety increased, though none was shown or mentioned. Apart from
a general attack, danger lay in three points--the wind, the moon, and
shelling by night. A south-west gale, or even a strong breeze arising
in the last two days, would have stopped embarkation and left us almost
defenceless. The moon was waxing, but a thin mist veiled it almost
every night, and the half-obscured radiance helped to guide our men
down the paths, and did not betray the meaning of the thin black lines
which were just visible upon the twilit sea as trawlers, “beetles,”
and rafts slid away. The Turks had the beaches exactly registered. At
any hour of the night a dozen of their heavy shells would have reduced
the little harbour to a bloody mash of animals and men. On the morning
of December 16 they threw six 4·7-inch shells of improved bursting
quality right into the middle of the embarkation beach, but it was
almost empty then, and only one man was hurt. In the afternoon of the
17th they shelled A West Beach heavily for an hour. Such events showed
their power for our destruction, but the nights remained undisturbed,
except by our own ceaseless toil. An immense blaze of stores, lighted
accidentally at Anzac before dawn on December 18, increased the peril
of discovery, but the Turks remained indifferent to portents.
[Illustration: SCENE ON SUVLA POINT, TWENTY-FOUR HOURS BEFORE THE
DEPARTURE]
[Sidenote: THE FINAL NIGHT AT SUVLA]
The last day came. It was Sunday, December 19. Little by little the
forces at Suvla had been reduced to 12,000 men and 16 guns, whereas,
to hold a front line the length of ours, 33,000 men would be required
by regulation. The day was passed as usual, each man doing his utmost
to give a crowded appearance to the scene. At sunset, the guns fired
their parting salute and were withdrawn--the last at 9.30. The men
were then brought away--rather more than 6000 to Suvla Point, rather
less to Nibrunesi. A small party was left to keep up rifle-fire in the
front trenches. Larger parties were left to hold the second and third
lines. The rest embarked. Shortly before midnight the front line came
in, leaving lighted candles which at irregular intervals burnt a string
to discharge a rifle, so that a desultory fusillade was maintained
for about an hour. The second and third lines followed in turn, only
sappers remaining behind to close up the barbed-wire gates, to cut
the telephone wires, and to set trip- and contact-mines at points of
likely resort. A party of 200 (I think, 9th West Yorks) were to hold
the fourth line to the last, and sacrifice themselves if the Turks
attacked.
Intermittent outbursts of firing came from the Turks, and we could hear
the rumbling explosions as they toiled at blasting new trenches--an
interesting example of labour lost. Once an aeroplane whirred overhead,
invisible until she dropped one green star, which blazed for a few
seconds just below Saturn and showed her to be ours. On the earth a
few fires burned where camps were once inhabited, but gradually they
faded out. Two lights glimmered from deserted hospital tents along the
curving shore; for our doctors had remained to the last in readiness
for the deaths and wounds of disaster. But now even they had gone,
leaving notes to thank the Turks for their consideration towards the
Red Cross. Otherwise, only the sea and the moon showed light, and over
the white surface of the water those thin black lines kept moving away.
From the little harbour arose the varied noise of screaming mules,
rattling anchor chains, shouting megaphones, engines throbbing and
steamers hooting low. Still the Turks gave no sign of hearing, though
they lay almost visible in the moonlight across that familiar scene.
At last the final lines of defenders began silently to steal down
the paths of Karakol Dagh, leaving four A.S.C. officers under Col.
Hodsoll to fire vast piles of abandoned stores--biscuits, bully-beef,
and bacon. Officers of the beach party, which had accomplished such
excellent and sleepless work, collected. At 4.30 a.m. of the 20th the
defenders of the fourth line--about 200 in all--embarked from the
concealed pier on the Gulf of Xeros side of the cliffs. And at the same
time, General Byng, motioning Brigadier-General Reed, his Chief of
Staff, to pass in front of him, left Suvla Point, being the last to
leave.
From Nibrunesi Point, under the direction of General Maude, the
evacuation was accomplished in the same manner and with the same
success. The whole movement involved the loss of only two men,
and those by accident. Hospital tents remained standing, and some
provisions were burnt. Not a man or gun or cart or horse was left
behind.
Those of us who had reached the _Cornwallis_ in Captain Unwin’s pinnace
at four in the morning, were roused at six by bugles sounding to action
quarters. Dawn was just breaking, as on the day when we landed upon
that shore four and a half months earlier. But it was still dark except
for the glare of flames consuming the piles of stores on Suvla Point
and Lala Baba, and the lesser flames of a wrecked hospital lighter
ashore by the “cut” in the sandy spit. By seven it was almost daylight,
and the Turks began pouring shells into the fires to deter us from
putting them out. With the increasing light, they turned all their guns
on to the empty beaches, trenches, and especially the positions on Hill
10, where a battery had stood. Meantime our picket-boats had searched
the shores, but found no stragglers, not even an army medical, left
behind. The Turkish guns were then directed against the battleships,
but they fired wildly and without effect. The _Cornwallis_ answered,
her big guns throwing shells upon the slope of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, her
lesser armament destroying the breakwaters, piers, and little harbour,
so industriously constructed. At nine o’clock she turned and left the
long-familiar scene, passing westward towards the mountains of Imbros
over a tranquil and sunlit sea. The evacuation had been hurried forward
by a day, and fortunate indeed was that anticipation. By nine o’clock
next morning a south-west gale was raging, rain fell in deluge, and the
sea roared upon the coast. What if the movement had been delayed for
those few hours more?
[Sidenote: THE EVACUATION OF ANZAC]
At Anzac the withdrawal was carried out with equal daring and skill.
The problem was slightly different, for the position extended in an
irregular fan-shape, the centre being very short (only about 500 yards
in direct line from the Nek to the Cove) but stretching northward on
the left for rather over 3 miles to Hill 60 and the Biyuk Anafarta
plain; and southward on the right for about 1½ miles to Chatham Post.
The flanks had therefore to be brought in first, and no interior
defences were made except a strong redoubt as a kind of “keep” within
the Cove itself. It is probable that the withdrawal of the left
flank, where the ground is comparatively open, could not have escaped
observation but for the supposed presence of a large force at Suvla,
and, in that sense, Suvla may be said to have been the salvation of
Anzac. The embarkation was carried out partly from the new pier on
Ocean Beach north of Ari Burnu, partly from the repaired piers in the
Cove.
Of the 40,000 at Anzac, about 20,000 had been gradually taken off to
Mudros by December 18. That night over 10,000 more were sent away.
All but nine worn-out guns had gone, two being left close up to the
firing line, where they had been stationed from the first. Aeroplanes
kept watch all day, five being at times up together--a large number
for Gallipoli--and no hostile plane was allowed to approach. On
the morning of Sunday, 19th, the few guns kept up a brave show of
bombardment, the Turks answering with their increased number of
guns, no less than seventeen of which were now posted in the Olive
Grove, commanding the main beach of embarkation. As at Suvla, the few
remaining men (about 10,000 in all) were directed to show themselves
freely, and many spent the morning in tending for the last time the
graves of the 8000 comrades who there lay buried.
The 6000 stationed in the afternoon to guard the outer lines were
divided into three groups--A, B, and C--of 2000 each, and there arose
a violent competition to belong to the C group, known as “Die-hards,”
because they were to be the last to leave. Group A came from the
northern positions and included parties of the 1st and 3rd Light Horse
Brigades, the 4th Australian Brigade, and the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles with the Maoris (from Hill 60). They marched in absolute
silence, magazines empty, no smoking allowed, footsteps deadened by
sacking spread over the hard patches of ground and over the planks. By
ten o’clock they had all embarked from Ocean Beach. At midnight Group
B gathered in the Cove. Among them were New Zealand Infantry from the
heights of Sari Bair, 20th Infantry from the Nek, 17th Infantry from
Quinn’s, 23rd and 24th from Lone Pine, 6th Light Horse from Chatham’s
Post far on the right. Thus the veteran 1st Australian Division of the
Landing was now mingled with the 2nd Division, sent to uphold them and
give them some opportunity for relief. Descending the diverse gullies
from the fan-like extremities, each position bearing so fine a record
during the eight months of struggle and endurance, they concentrated
punctually and without confusion. The Navy held the transports ready,
and they went.
[Sidenote: ANZAC ABANDONED]
Only 2000 men now remained to guard the long and devious lines from
Chatham’s Post to the Apex and the Farm. About 1.30 a.m. of Monday the
20th, a bomb thrown from the “Apex” marked the abandonment of that
hard-won and hard-held position. Thence New Zealanders came down: from
Courtney’s and Pope’s, 18th and 19th Infantry; from Ouinn’s, the 17th.
By 3 a.m. only 800 “Die-hards” were left in groups at points where the
Turkish lines came within a few yards’ distance. By 3.30, Lone Pine,
Quinn’s, and Pope’s were finally abandoned, and Anzacs rushed down
White’s Valley and Shrapnel Gully for the last time. As they reached
the Cove, a violent explosion, which seemed to shake even the ships at
Suvla, thundered from the heights. Three and a half tons of amenol,
laid by the 5th Company Australian Engineers, had blown a great chasm
across the Nek, and that ready entrance to the deserted lines was
blocked as by a moat and rampart. Rifles continued to fire from the old
positions--fired by sand running from buckets. The Turks burst into one
of their panic rages of fire against the empty trenches, from which
they now expected a general assault. The naval guns pounded the hills.
The last of the transports departed, and Anzac shore was nothing but a
lasting name.
A few stragglers were taken off by picket-boats in the early morning.
A few guns--four 18-pounders, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4·7 naval gun
(said to have been in Ladysmith, and, in that case, called the “Lady
Anne” or the “Bloody Mary”), one anti-aircraft, and two 3-pounder
Hotchkiss guns had to be left, but were disabled. Some carts without
wheels, and fifty-six mules were also left, and some stores burnt.
The execution of the whole movement conferred just honour upon
Major-General Sir Alexander Godley and Brigadier-General Cyril B. B.
White, his Chief of Staff, not to mention other names well worthy of
mention, and now regretfully to be parted with.[238]
Even after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac, many hoped that Helles
at least would be retained as a perpetual threat to the heart of the
Turkish Empire. But being by this time deeply entangled at Salonika,
where the French and English forces had lately been driven back from
the edges of Serbia across the Greek frontier, the Cabinet resolved to
wipe out the Dardanelles Expedition, as a gambler “cuts his losses,”
and leave no trace or profit of all the army’s incomparable deeds.
Certainly, it would have been difficult to remain at Helles now that
heavy guns were being brought down from Suvla and Anzac; superior
German shells had arrived, and German guns were on the way. Throughout
the end of December the bombardment was at times very violent, reaching
extreme intensity about 1 p.m. on December 24, when the right and
centre of our line, from the front trenches to the sea, suffered the
severest shelling experienced at Helles.[239] With the help of the
Navy, and by the construction of deeper trenches and solid shelter, it
might have been possible to hold the position as a kind of Gibraltar
guarding the Straits. But Imbros and Tenedos, for a naval Power, served
that purpose with less risk, and since the glorious hope of advancing
upon Constantinople was definitely abandoned, it was argued best to
quit Helles and the whole Peninsula.
[Sidenote: EVACUATION OF HELLES ORDERED]
On Christmas Eve, General Birdwood was directed to prepare a scheme;
four days later to complete the evacuation as quickly as possible.[240]
The problem was to bring away unnoticed rather more than 35,000 men,
about 4000 animals, about 110 guns, and over 1000 tons of stores. Most
of the remaining French Division had been gradually withdrawn during
December, and the 4000 left at the end of the year were embarked on
French warships during the night of January 1–2. By consent of General
Brulard, however, the French guns were left under command of General
Davies with the VIIIth Corps. The French lines were taken over by the
Royal Naval Division--that military maid-of-all-work. Some have said
that the soldier-sailors were dressed in French grey to deceive such of
the enemy as could not hear or understand their language; but this was
untrue.
The 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, which had throughout done
such steady and persistent work under Major-General Douglas, was
withdrawn for a much-needed rest,[241] and the 13th (Major-General
Stanley Maude), having been at Imbros since the Suvla evacuation, was
transferred to Helles. The redoubtable 29th Division was also sent
back to the scene of its early triumphs. The troops to go at the last
belonged, therefore, to the 13th, 29th, 52nd, and Royal Naval Divisions.
[Sidenote: LAST FIGHTING ON THE PENINSULA]
During the days of preparation, little happened to break the appearance
of routine. Almost the last assault from our side had been made on
December 19, when, simply to distract attention from the evacuation in
the north, parts of the 42nd and 52nd Divisions attacked beside the
Krithia Nullah, and the 5th Highland Light Infantry (157th Brigade)
especially distinguished themselves. Sir Charles Monro also mentions a
successful attack by the 52nd Division on December 29. But, for the
most part, on our side we beguiled the Turk by periods of complete
silence, especially between 8 p.m. and 2 a.m., so as to habituate
him to inattentive repose. For the last days, one British 6-inch gun
and six old-fashioned French “heavies” alone were retained, to give
a semblance of active hostility. On January 7, however, the very day
before our departure, the enemy, possessed by one of his unaccountable
moods, directed a terrible bombardment against the 13th Division on
our left from Achi Baba, and a slighter fire against the R.N.D. on
our right from Asia. It lasted all afternoon, and at 3.30 the Turks
attempted an attack near Fusilier Bluff, between Gully Ravine and the
sea. Officers were seen urging the men forward as in earlier days; but
the men had no longer the spirit of earlier days, and since they were
disinclined to move, the attack faded away. Fortunately, our want of
artillery was compensated by a naval squadron off the west coast. None
the less, we lost a hundred and six wounded and fifty-eight killed--the
last to lay their bones upon the earth of that dedicated Peninsula. The
7th North Staffords were chiefly engaged.
Next morning (January 8) rose fair, with a light southerly breeze.
The Turks kept unusually quiet, and it was resolved to accomplish the
evacuation as arranged. Major-General Lawrence (C.O. 52nd Division) had
been put in charge of the embarkation on the military side. Positions
on all the beaches were fortified as redoubts for a small garrison to
hold to the last. On Gully Beach, Major-General Maude selected the
position and prepared the evacuation of his 13th Division. Specially
selected officers superintended the W and V Beaches. The naval
arrangements were carried out by Captain C. M. Staveley, R.N., assisted
by naval officers at each point of embarkation. In addition to the
three strongly wired lines of defence across the Peninsula, a fourth
had been constructed from Gully Beach to De Tott’s Battery. Troops on
the left naturally withdrew from Gully Beach or W (four piers); on the
right from V Beach (three piers and the _River Clyde_).
[Sidenote: THE EVACUATION OF HELLES]
On the afternoon of the final day the Divisions had only four
battalions apiece remaining upon the Peninsula. They came away in three
groups or trips, the first withdrawing soon after 7 p.m. and getting
off in destroyers and “beetles” without difficulty. But at sunset the
breeze freshened, and it began to blow hard from the south-west, the
quarter to which W Beach was most exposed. The connecting platform
between the shore and the hulks which served as wharves there was
washed away by heavy seas. Still, the second group, and even guns, were
safely taken off about midnight. On V Beach, while the second group
was waiting at eleven o’clock, the Asiatic guns began to bombard, but
fortunately all but two shells fell short into the sea, and only one
man was wounded. Hardly, however, had fifty of the R.N.D. put off to
the _Prince George_ in a “beetle” at 11.30 and got under way for Mudros
with 1500 others, when they felt the dull thud of a torpedo against the
vessel’s side. The torpedo did not explode, but the presence of the
submarine, known to the navy all the evening, added to the anxiety of
the final hours. Starting from Gully Beach, a lighter also went aground
after all had left, and the 160 men had to be landed again and marched
over to W Beach for embarkation.
At 11.30 the final party or rearguard--about sixty men from each
Division--withdrew from the front lines. With bombs and rifle-fire
they had kept up as much noise as they could to conceal the movement
of the rest. Now, leaving lights and devices by which dropping water
filled tins and discharged rifles when the tins were full, they crept
away under cover of officers’ patrols, who maintained a desultory fire,
barred the gates, and connected the mines. About 2.30 all arrived at
the beaches, to find a heavy surf dashing upon the shore. Nevertheless,
though under great stress and peril, by 3.30 the beaches were cleared.
The Military Transport Officer, coming off the _River Clyde_, was the
last man to leave. Time fuses lighted the heaps of abandoned stores,
and exploded masses of ammunition. In all, fourteen of our well-worn
old 15-pounders, a 6-inch gun, and the six old French “heavies” were
abandoned and destroyed. Far worse was the fate of 508 horses and
mules, most of which were killed. All animals and stores might have
been embarked, had it been safe to wait. But the rising storm of that
night was a warning, and, as at Suvla, only by the barest luck in
weather was disaster avoided. The Turks began shelling the beaches
at the first sight of the fires, and continued that unprofitable
expenditure till 6.30 a.m. of January 9. At Helles, as at Suvla and
Anzac, those incalculable Orientals remained ignorant of our departure,
though here expecting it. No doubt they were glad at our going;
naturally, they were glad. And so, by the evacuation, our authorities,
whether political or military, were acting contrary to Napoleon’s maxim
of war: “Never do what you know your enemy wants you to do.”
So the episode of the Dardanelles Expedition, equal in splendour of
conception, heroism, and tragedy, came to an end. During the eight and
a half months of its continuance upon the Peninsula itself, the land
forces, including the Royal Naval Division, but not counting the Navy
or the French (whose losses are not published), suffered the following
loss:
+--------------------+---------+---------+----------+
| Killed. | Wounded.| Missing.| Total. |
+--------------------+---------+---------+----------+
|Officers 1,745 | 3,143 | 353 | 5,241 |
|Other ranks 26,455 | 74,952 | 10,901 | 112,308 |
| ------ | ------ | ------ | ------- |
| Totals 28,200 | 78,095 | 11,254 | 117,549 |
+--------------------+---------+---------+----------+
A large proportion of the missing must be counted as killed. The number
of sick admitted to hospital between April 25 and December 11, 1915,
was 96,683, of whom also a considerable proportion died. If we may take
about one-quarter of the missing as killed, and about one-twentieth
of the sick as having died, the total of lives lost amounts to about
36,000. The total losses of the Turks have been variously estimated
between 400,000 and 500,000, but those estimates are conjectural.
[Sidenote: MILITARY CAUSES OF THE FAILURE]
The causes of our failure have been, as I hope, reasonably signified
in the preceding account of the campaign. They may be summarised in
relation either to the movements on the spot, or to the attitude of the
home Government. On the spot, we failed chiefly owing to the premature
naval attacks, which gave the enemy warning of our intention, and owing
to the design of forcing the Straits with the Navy alone, which might
indeed have been temporarily successful if persisted in, but in the end
would have given us only a dubious advantage; for a fleet penetrating
to the Sea of Marmora would have remained dangerously isolated so
long as both sides of the Straits were strongly held by the enemy.
The second initial error was the delay in concentrating the military
forces for the land attack--a delay chiefly due to the retention of
the 29th Division in England, and to the necessity of returning the
transports from Mudros to Alexandria for the rearrangement of the
military stores and munitions. As to the actual operations on land, it
might be argued, in the light of wisdom after the event, that the first
landing had better have been made by a combined force at Suvla Bay
and on the Ocean Beach at Anzac, though, in that case, larger numbers
than those allotted to the Expedition at the beginning must have been
demanded. Again, with regard to the failure of the August operations,
it might now be maintained that the forces at Anzac were dissipated
by the assaults at Lone Pine and the Nek, and by the over-elaborate
subdivision of the attacking forces upon our left. Even in spite of
the natural intricacy of the ground, a concentration of all available
troops into one main body (or at most into two) for a grand assault
upon the Sari Bair range from Chunuk Bair to Koja Chemen Tepe might
have given better results. As to the “inertia” which prevailed at
Suvla on the critical day of August 8, and the confusion, delay, and
fatal mistakes of the preceding and following days, thus precluding
the support to the Anzac movement upon which the Commander-in-Chief
had fairly calculated, no more need be said. Owing partly to the
temperament of Generals, partly to the inexperience of their Staffs,
and perhaps chiefly to the want of confidence between the poorly
trained troops and their senior officers, the instrument to which he
trusted broke in his hand.
[Sidenote: POLITICAL CAUSE OF THE FAILURE]
The ultimate burden of failure, however, lies on the authorities at
home. The Allies were presented with the most brilliant and promising
strategical conception of the war up to the present time (spring,
1918). Success would have given them advantages already repeatedly
enumerated: a passage would have been opened for the supply of grain
from Russia, and a supply of munitions to that country; the enemy’s
hope of advancing either towards Egypt or the Persian Gulf would have
been frustrated; the Balkan States would, at worst, have remained
neutral, or, calculating on future favours, would have joined our
Alliance in hurried gratitude; Venizelos would have remained in power,
and King Constantine’s military and domestic predilections have been
suppressed; the belated attempt to rescue Serbia after her destruction
was assured would not have been required; Tsar Ferdinand would have
scented his own advantage on the side of Bulgaria’s natural sympathies;
Roumania, relieved from apprehension on her southern frontier, could
have watched the Transylvanian passes or crossed them at pleasure;
Russia might possibly have retained her front lines intact, and, at
the worst, would have immobilised large armies of the enemy. The
Central Powers would then indeed have been surrounded with an “iron
ring,” and peace secured in the spring of 1916. The main disadvantages
of such a peace to the world would have been the probable occupation
of Constantinople by Russia, the fortification of the Straits in her
interest, and the continuance in power of the autocratic Tsardom,
surrounded by its attendant supporters in bureaucrats, secret police,
provocative agents, censors of public opinion, and all the other
instruments of political and religious tyranny.
At that time the future of Russia could not be foretold, any more than
it can be foretold now. But the advantages here recapitulated should
have been too obvious even for insular statesmen to overlook. Mr.
Winston Churchill was justified in the protest already quoted, that “if
there were any operations in the history of the world which, having
been begun, it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigour
and fury,” it was those. Far from displaying vigour, let alone fury,
the Government appears to have regarded the Expedition rather as an
overburdened father regards an illegitimate child put out to nurse in
a distant village. It was a “by-blow,” a “side-show,” something apart
from the normal and recognised order of things. A certain allowance
had, unfortunately, to be apportioned for it, but if the person who
superintended its welfare clamoured for more, that person must be kept
in the proper place, or palmed off with gifts that were no gifts.
Every breath of suspicion or detraction must be listened to, every
chance of abandonment welcomed, and the news of a peaceful ending
accepted with a sigh of relief.
[Sidenote: THE END]
For myself, in coming to the conclusion of this account--faithful as
far as I could make it, but so inadequate to the tragic splendour of
the theme--I feel again a mingled admiration and poignant sorrow, as
when for the last time I watched the scene from the battered deck
of the _River Clyde_ and, under the dying brilliance of sunset,
looked across the purple current of the Dardanelles to those deserted
plains which long ago also rang with tragic battle. The time is fast
approaching when the deserted Peninsula of Gallipoli looking across
to Troy will be haunted by kindred memories. There the many men so
beautiful had their habitation. There they knew the finest human
joy--the joy of active companionship in a cause which they accounted
noble. There they faced the utmost suffering of hardship and pain, the
utmost terrors of death, and there they endured separation from those
whom they most loved. The crowded caverns in which they made their
dwelling-place are already falling in, except where some shepherd uses
a Headquarters as more weatherproof than his hut, or as a sheltered
pen for sheep. The trenches which they dug and held to the death have
crumbled into furrows, covered with grass and flowers, or with crops
more fertile for so deep a ploughing. The graves are obliterated, and
the scattered bones that cost so much in the breeding have returned
to earth. But in our history the Peninsula of the Dardanelles, the
Straits, the surrounding seas, and the islands set among them will
always remain as memorials recording, it is true, the disastrous
and tragic disabilities of our race, but, on the other hand, its
versatility, its fortitude, and its happy though silent welcome to any
free sacrifice involving great issues for mankind.
[Illustration: THE PENINSULA, THE STRAITS, AND CONSTANTINOPLE]
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING BRITISH & FRENCH TRENCHES.
GALLIPOLI PENINSULA.
_SOUTHERN ZONE. 7TH. JULY 1915_]
[Illustration: POSITIONS AT ANZAC (END OF AUGUST)]
[Illustration: POSITIONS AT SUVLA (END OF AUGUST)]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 46.
[2] Speech in Foreign Office Debate, July 10, 1914. The whole question
of Germany’s relations to Turkey is discussed with his usual knowledge
by Mr. H. N. Brailsford in _A League of Nations_, chap. v.
[3] Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, October 14, 1915; Foreign
Office Statement, November 1, 1914. On the authority of the Kaiser,
in conversation with M. Theotokis, Greek Minister in Berlin, it now
appears that Germany had already concluded an alliance with Turkey on
August 4, 1914. (See Greek White Book, published August 24, 1917.)
[4] See _Turkey, Greece, and the Great Powers_, by G. F. Abbott
(1917), pp. 167–200.
[5] Changing their religion with their sky, the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_
became the _Jawuz Sultan Selim_ and the _Midilli_ in the Turkish Navy.
See _Two War Years in Constantinople_, by Dr. Harry Stürmer, p. 113.
In an action at the entrance to the Dardanelles, January 20, 1918, the
_Breslau_ was sunk, and the _Goeben_ had to be beached at Nagara Point.
We lost the monitor _Lord Raglan_.
[6] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 45 (omitted in first
publication, but inserted shortly afterwards).
[7] The subject was fully discussed with the present writer by M.
Skouloudis, at that time Premier in Athens (November 9, 1915). That
veteran statesman was apparently honest in his belief both in the
King’s military genius and in the King’s good faith towards the
Allies--a belief unfounded in both cases.
[8] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 47, 48.
[9] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 50–52.
[10] Speech in the House of Commons upon the Dardanelles Commission’s
First Report, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1743).
[11] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 9.
[12] Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1746).
[13] _Ibid._
[14] Mr. Asquith, Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917. Cf.
Sir James Wolfe Murray: “Lord Kitchener acted very much as his own
Chief of the Staff.” Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 18.
[15] “I suppose that upon no man in our history has a heavier burden
fallen than fell upon him, and nothing in connection with this
Report--it may be no imputation upon anybody connected with the
Report itself--has filled me with more indignation and disgust than
that the publication of the criticisms made in it of Lord Kitchener’s
conduct and capacity should have been taken advantage of by those who
only two years ago were in a posture of almost slavish adulation to
belittle his character, and, so far as they can, to defile his memory.
Lord Kitchener’s memory is in no danger. It lives, and will live, in
the gratitude and admiration of the British people and of the whole
Empire.”--Mr. Asquith, Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917
(Hansard, 1748).
[16] See his speech in the House of Commons on Woman Suffrage, March
28, 1917.
[17] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 16.
[18] Speech at Dundee, June 5, 1915.
[19] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 53.
[20] _Ibid._, pars. 54, 55.
[21] This War Staff Group took the place of the Board of Admiralty in
strategical matters, the Second, Third, and Fourth Sea Lords being
thus released for their special functions of manning, shipbuilding,
and transport. Its other members were the First Lord, the Chief of
the Staff (Sir Henry Oliver), the Secretary of the Board (Sir Graham
Greene), and the Naval Secretary (Commodore de Bartolomé).--See “The
Dardanelles Report,” by Mr. Archibald Hurd (_Fortnightly Review_,
April 1917), where the whole subject is discussed with the writer’s
well-known knowledge of naval affairs.
[22] Ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα
μηδενὸς κρατέειν.--Herodotus, ix. 16.
[23] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 19, 87; minutes 1
and 2.
[24] _Ibid._, par. 20.
[25] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 26.
[26] _Ibid._, par. 22.
[27] Speech of March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1744).
[28] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 16.
[29] _Ibid._, Majority Report, par. 68.
[30] _Ibid._, Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 11. The reference is to the
brief bombardment of November 3.
[31] _Ibid._, pars. 7–12.
[32] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 56.
[33] _Ibid._, Majority Report, par. 57; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par.
14. Admiral Jackson’s view as to the unenviable position of a fleet
bottled up off Constantinople without commanding the line of retreat
was probably influenced by the record of Admiral Duckworth’s risk when
in a similar position (1807), and Admiral Hornby’s hesitation about
entering the Straits in 1877.--See Nelson’s _History of the War_,
by John Buchan, vol. vi. pp. 130–36.
[34] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 43.
[35] Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1780).
[36] Dardanelles Commission; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 16.
[37] _Ibid._, par. 20; Majority Report, pars. 60–62.
[38] Lord Fisher had himself suggested the use of the _Queen
Elizabeth_ to Admiral Oliver the day before. Mr. Roch’s Minute, par.
17.
[39] Majority Report, par. 69. Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 18.
[40] Majority Report, par. 94.
[41] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 68.
[42] _Ibid._, par. 83.
[43] Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 22.
[44] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 88.
[45] M. Augagneur, Minister of Marine, had visited London after the
decision of January 13. He approved the subsequent plan, pronouncing it
“prudent et prévoyant.” Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 29.
[46] Majority Report, pars. 86, 87; Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 25, 26.
[47] Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 11 and 22.
[48] Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1783, 1784).
[49] Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 28.
[50] Majority Report, pars. 89–93; Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 28, 29.
[51] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 92.
[52] Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917.
[53] Mr. Archibald Hurd (“The Dardanelles Report,” _Fortnightly
Review_, April 1917, pp. 587, 591) considers that a military force
“was apparently a part of the original scheme.” But the whole evidence
of the Report and of Mr. Churchill’s speech of March 20, 1917, appears
to be against him.
[54] Speech in House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard, 1789). Cf.
Majority Report, par. 94, and Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 29, 32.
[55] Majority Report, par. 95.
[56] Majority Report, par. 96; Mr. Roch’s Minute, pars. 32, 33.
[57] Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons, March 20, 1917 (Hansard,
1752).
[58] Majority Report, pars. 100–103; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 38.
[59]
“Nor was his name unheard or unadored
In ancient Greece; and in Ausonian land
Men call’d him Mulciber; and how he fell
From heaven they fabled, thrown by angry Jove
Sheer o’er the crystal battlements: from morn
To noon he fell, from noon to dewy eve,
A summer’s day; and with the setting sun
Dropt from the zenith like a falling star,
On Lemnos, the Ægean isle.”
_Paradise Lost_, Book I.
[60] _With the Fleet in the Dardanelles_, by William Harold Price,
sometime Chaplain of the _Triumph_.
[61] _“Manchester Guardian” History of the War._
[62] _The Immortal Gamble_, by A. T. Stewart and C. J. E. Peshall
of the _Cornwallis_, p. 10.
[63] Dardanelles Commission; Majority Report, par. 97.
[64] _Ibid._, pars. 78–82.
[65] _With the Fleet in the Dardanelles_, pp. 38–40.
[66] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 97.
[67] _With the Fleet in the Dardanelles_, p. 66; the
_Triumph_ was one of ships detailed for this operation.
[68] Dardanelles Commission; Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 43.
[69] It appears to have been on this occasion that the King, yielding
to the representations of M. Venizelos in favour of actively sharing
in the Dardanelles enterprise, exclaimed, “So be it then, for the love
of God!” See M. Venizelos’ speech to the Chamber in Athens, August 26,
1917 (_The Times_, August 31).
[70] Mr. Roch’s Minute, par. 43; Mr. Churchill’s speech on March 20,
1917 (Hansard, 1793). Unhappily, M. Venizelos resigned on March 6,
1915, owing to Constantine’s renewed opposition to a combination with
the Allies.
[71] Dardanelles Commission; Majority Report, par. 109.
[72] Dardanelles Commission; Majority Report, par. 111.
[73] In _What of the Dardanelles?_ Mr. Martin Fortescue, an
American correspondent, gives a brief but interesting criticism of this
unfortunate action from the Turkish-German point of view (pp. 27–47).
As seen from the _Cornwallis_ the action is described in _The
Immortal Gamble_, pp. 45–53.
[74] The total British casualties during the whole naval enterprise
were 350; on March 18 they were 61.
[75] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, par. 119. Speaking of this
naval attack, Dr. Stürmer writes: “To their great astonishment the
gallant defenders of the coast forts found that the attack had suddenly
ceased. Dozens of the German naval gunners who were manning the
batteries of Chanak on that memorable day told me later that they had
quite made up their minds the fleet would ultimately win, and that they
themselves could not have held out much longer.”--_Two War Years in
Constantinople_, p. 84.
[76] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 115, 119.
[77] _With the Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli_, by Chaplain D.
Creighton, p. 23.
[78] Dardanelles Commission; First Report, pars. 107, 108.
[79] See Sir Ian Hamilton’s first dispatch.
[80] The formation and subsequent exploits of this peculiar body are
described by Colonel Patterson himself in _With the Zionists in
Gallipoli_.
[81] For the history of the Australians in Egypt and Gallipoli,
see _Australia in Arms_, by Phillip Schuler, the fine young
correspondent of _The Age_, Melbourne. To the deep regret of all
who knew him, he was afterwards killed by a chance shell while teaching
cookery to some men in France. Everything written by Captain Bean and
Mr. Malcolm Ross, the authorised correspondents for Australia and New
Zealand respectively, is also invaluable for history.
[82] One of these transports, the _Manitou_, had a narrow escape
upon the voyage from Egypt. She was attacked by a Turkish destroyer,
whose captain courteously gave an opportunity for removing the men
in their boats. In the hurry two of the boats were overturned and
fifty-one men drowned. The enemy destroyer, apprehending the approach
of British ships, then drew in close, and fired three torpedoes, all of
which passed under the transport, the range being too short to allow a
torpedo to rise after its plunge. The destroyer was afterwards driven
ashore in Asia by two of our destroyers and broken up.--See _The
Immortal Gamble_, p. 67.
[83] See also _Charles Lister_, by Lord Ribblesdale, p. 164.
Charles Lister himself was one of the young men of brilliant promise
whose death was due to the Gallipoli campaign. After gallant service in
the Hood Battalion of the Royal Naval Division at Helles, he died of
his third wound, August 28, 1915.
[84] Thucydides, vi. 32; Diodorus, xiii. 3. From Athens herself only
about 3000 of the troops for the Sicilian expedition started. It is
curious to remember that Plato was a boy in Ægina at the time, and
probably watched the race.
[85] _The Immortal Gamble_, pp. 72–82 and 98–104 (account by
Captain Davidson, who went ashore himself).
[86] Besides the names here mentioned, Vice-Admiral de Robeck in his
dispatch especially noticed Able Seaman William Williams (killed),
Seaman George M‘Kenzie Samson (dangerously wounded), Lieutenant John
A. V. Morse, R.N., and Surgeon P. B. Kelly, R.N., as rendering great
and perilous service at this landing.
[87] For this incident and others at V Beach, see _The Immortal
Gamble_, pp. 81–92, besides Sir Ian Hamilton’s and Admiral de
Robeck’s dispatches.
[88] Sir Ian Hamilton’s first dispatch, “The Gallipoli Landing.”
[89] See Mr. Ashmead Bartlett’s dispatches, “Seddel Bahr Landing,” p.
92. Mr. Bartlett was not present, being at the Anzac landing, and Sir
Ian’s dispatch mentions only the company at the foot of Cape Tekke on
the left.
[90] Excellent personal accounts of W Beach landing by three 1st
Lancashire officers are given in _With the Twenty-ninth Division_,
pp. 57–63. It is hard to choose between the three; but I give some
sentences from Major Adams, who had been twenty-five years in the
regiment, and was killed a few days later, as were the other two: “As
the boats touched the shore a very heavy and brisk fire was poured
into us, several officers and men being killed and wounded in the
entanglements, through which we were trying to cut a way. Several
of my company were with me under the wire, one of my subalterns was
killed next to me, and also the wire-cutter who was lying the other
side of me. I seized his cutter and cut a small lane myself, through
which a few of us broke and lined up under the only available cover
procurable--a small sand ridge covered with bluffs of grass. I then
ordered fire to be opened on the crests; but owing to submersion in the
water and dragging rifles through the sand, the breech mechanism was
clogged, thereby rendering the rifles ineffective. The only thing left
to do was to fix bayonets and charge up the crests, which was done in a
very gallant manner, though we suffered greatly in doing so. However,
this had the effect of driving the enemy from his trenches, which we
immediately occupied.... In my company alone I had 95 casualties out of
205 men.”
A still more detailed account of the Lancashire landing, specially
describing the services of Major Frankland (killed while trying to
take assistance to V Beach about 8.30 a.m.) and of Captains Willis,
Shaw, Cunliffe, and Haworth, is given in an additional chapter by Major
Farmar (Lancashire Fusiliers) at the end of the same book, pp. 175–191.
[91] Beside Sir Ian’s dispatch, see Colonel Newenham’s own account in
_With the Twenty-ninth Division_, pp. 55–57.
[92] Authorities differ widely as to the number of boats to each tow,
but four appears to be right, though six was more usual.
[93] During the Anzac landing, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett was in the
_London_, and his account was unusually brilliant, even for
that brilliant writer. Besides that and Sir Ian’s dispatch, the
best published account is in _Australia in Arms_, pp. 94–114.
Mr. Schuler was not present, but he had the advantage of going over
the ground and discussing the action thoroughly. I had the same
advantages, especially owing to the generous assistance of the Anzac
correspondents, Captain Bean and Mr. Malcolm Ross.
[94] _Uncensored Letter from the Dardanelles_, by a French Medical
Officer, pp. 44–74.
[95] _The Immortal Gamble_, p. 147.
[96] _Australia in Arms_, p. 122.
[97] Having held it with skill and resolution for a month, Major Quinn
was himself killed there in a furious attempt which the Turks made to
mine and break through the position (May 29).
[98] From an account privately written by a friend who knew
Doughty-Wylie intimately, I may quote the following sentences: “As the
result of many wounds, he had suffered in health and had transferred
from the army to the Consular Service, and had spent some years in Asia
Minor. I arrived in Adana after the massacres in 1909, just before he
left for Abyssinia, and stayed at the Consulate, learning much from
him about those terrible days of the preceding April. My memories
are permeated with a sense of his oneness with all the warring sects
in that fanatical province. He was the emblem of what they needed:
unity--greatness of heart and mind--an entire absence of self-seeking
or pride.... An Armenian girl described the scene to me: ‘We were all
in a church, hundreds of us huddled together, and the Turks set light
to it. But he came, the Consul Anglais. He forced his way through the
mob, and we saw his face. “Come, my children,” he called to us, and
we followed him out. Like frightened sheep we were, but he calmed us
and led us to safety.’ ... ‘The oppressor is often in the right, and
the oppressed always,’ he used playfully to quote to me.” A permanent
monument to Doughty-Wylie and Walford was erected in Seddel Bahr.
[99] _With the Twenty-ninth Division_, p. 191.
[100] The battalions in the brigades were: 125th Brigade, the 5th, 6th,
7th, and 8th Lancashire Fusiliers; 126th Brigade, the 4th and 5th East
Lancashire, and the 9th and 10th Manchester; the 127th Brigade, the
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Manchester.
[101] In _Australia in Arms_, pp. 136–139, Phillip Schuler gives a
detailed account, obviously derived from officers who were present.
[102] Sir Ian’s dispatch; and _Australia in Arms_, pp. 139–142.
[103] _With the Twenty-ninth Division_, p. 189. The one surviving
officer of the Dublin Fusiliers was Lieutenant O’Hara, afterwards
mortally wounded at Suvla Bay.
[104] _The Immortal Gamble_, p. 145.
[105] Abdul Hamid died at last in Constantinople, February 1918.
[106] The submarine campaign began with E2, 11, 14, and 15; four or
five were subsequently added. Some were lost. On May 25 the E11 also
torpedoed the transport _Stamboul_ inside the Golden Horn, causing
great panic. On April 30 the Australian AE2 had been lost at the
entrance of Marmora. Her crew were taken prisoner.
[107] For the state of Constantinople at this time, see _Inside
Constantinople_, by Lewis Einstein, special agent at the American
Embassy, and _Two War Years in Constantinople_, by Dr. Harry
Stürmer, correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, but a writer of
decidedly pro-Entente sympathies.
[108] In this attack Mr. Asquith’s son Arthur (Hood Battalion), and
Lieutenant-Commander Josiah Wedgwood, M.P., who had come out with the
machine-gun section, were wounded.
[109] Compare Ashmead Bartlett’s _Dispatches from the
Dardanelles_, p. 118.
[110] John Masefield’s account of the soldier’s mind in this battle is
a fine instance of imaginative sympathy. _Gallipoli_, pp. 72–81.
[111] This 2nd French Division was composed as follows: _3rd Brigade
Metropolitaine_ (C.O. Colonel Ruef), comprising the 176ème Régiment
d’Infanterie (Commandant Costemalle), and the 2ème Régiment de Marche
d’Afrique (Lieut.-Colonel Hautville); _Brigade Coloniale_ (C.O.
Général de Brigade Simonin, who afterwards commanded the division),
comprising the 7ème Régiment Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel Bordeaux), partly
Senegalese, and the 8ème Régiment Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel d’Adhémar),
also partly Senegalese. The Division had six batteries of “75’s” and
two of mountain guns. The Corps of the two Divisions had two regiments
of Chasseurs d’Afrique, four 120 mm. guns, four 155 mm. guns (long),
six 155 mm. guns (short), besides detachments of engineers, supply,
army service, and ambulance.
[112] The brigade consisted of the Wellington Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel
W. G. Malone, a splendid soldier and man, afterwards killed at Anzac),
the Auckland (Lieut.-Colonel A. Plugge), the Canterbury (Lieut.-Colonel
D. M. Stewart), and the Otago (Lieut.-Colonel T. W. M‘Donald).
[113] The 2nd Australian Brigade consisted of the 5th Victoria
Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel Wanliss), the 6th (Lieut.-Colonel M‘Nicol),
the 7th (Lieut.-Colonel Garside), and the 8th (Lieut.-Colonel Bolton).
[114] See _Australia in Arms_, pp. 143–156.
[115] _With the Twenty-ninth Division_, p. 94.
[116] _Ibid._, p. 112.
[117] _Australia in Arms_, p. 158.
[118] _Australia in Arms_, p. 166.
[119] _The Immortal Gamble_, pp. 167–174. Lieutenant Cather,
R.N., went down with the _Goliath_, but was kept afloat by a
safety waistcoat. This he gave to a sailor much exhausted. Ultimately
he was himself rescued, and for some months commanded on the _River
Clyde_. It is impossible to mention all such heroic actions, but
hard to omit the deeds of personal friends. One midshipman, also
protected by a safety waistcoat, was found floating about two days and
nights after the disaster, but was too exhausted to live.
[120] Our casualties by the end of May were 38,600.
[121] “We went on board the _Implacable_ on the way back, where
I met Ashmead Bartlett, the official newspaper correspondent, who was
most pessimistic. ‘The best thing we could do was to evacuate the
place. This was developing into a major operation, and we had not the
troops for it. Achi Baba was untakable, except after months of siege
warfare’” (Diary for May 13, by the Rev. O. Creighton, _With the
Twenty-ninth Division in Gallipoli_, p. 90). After his fortunate
escape from the _Majestic_ as she sank, Mr. Ashmead Bartlett
returned to London for a short time, and a memorandum by him, strongly
criticising Sir Ian’s positions, and advising an attack on Bulair,
was considered by the “Dardanelles Committee” (_Second Dardanelles
Report_, p. 26).
[122] Such as Col. Crauford Stewart of the Hood (wounded) and Col.
Roberts, R.A. (Egyptian Army), of the Anson (killed).
[123] The original Collingwood, with the Hawke and Benbow Battalions,
crossed the Dutch frontier in retiring from Antwerp, and were interned.
The new battalions were left to complete their training in England,
when the R.N.D. sailed. Thus the Collingwood (Commander Spearman, R.N.)
was now for the first time under fire. The brother of Lieut.-Commander
Freyberg (see p. 120) was killed on this occasion. The Collingwood
relics and the Benbow were incorporated soon after this battle with
the Hood, Howe, and Anson Battalions as the 2nd Naval Brigade--an
arrangement resented on both sides, but inevitable owing to reduction
of men.
[124] Notes of the battle from hour to hour were taken by a French
medical officer (_Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles_, pp.
121–125).
[125] This fine officer was killed in the battle of July 13.
[126] One brigade of the R.N.D. alone lost 60 officers.
[127] “The worst was that the wounded had not been got back, but lay
between ours and the Turks’ firing line. It was impossible to get at
some of them. The men said they could see them move. The firing went on
without ceasing.... The General had suggested putting up a white flag,
and some one going out to the wounded. They tried this later, but it
failed” (_With the Twenty-ninth Division_, pp. 122, 123). Who the
General was is left uncertain. The passage is from a diary of June 5.
[128] _With the Twenty-ninth Division_, pp. 122–129. Of original
officers in this famous division, the South Wales Borderers now had the
most left. They had eight.
[129] The loss, unhappily, included Colonel Giraudon, Chief of the
Staff, who had been rashly put to command the 2nd Colonial Brigade of
the 1st Division on this occasion--a serious, brave, and intellectual
soldier. He was dangerously wounded, as was Colonel Noguès, commanding
the 6th Colonial Regiment in that brigade, who with his regiment had
distinguished himself greatly in the attack upon Kum Kali and elsewhere
(see _Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles_, p. 137). Colonel
Giraudon returned to his position in the Dardanelles, and survived to
do excellent work in France, where he was, however, ultimately killed
in action.
[130] Account by Mr. Compton Mackenzie, who acted as authorised
correspondent for the London papers during Mr. Ashmead Bartlett’s
temporary absence.
[131] The division consisted of the 155th Brigade (Brig.-General J. F.
Erskine, succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Pollok-M‘Call), containing the
4th and 5th Battalions Royal Scottish Fusiliers, and the 4th and 5th
Battalions K.O.S.B.; the 156th Brigade (Brig.-General Scott-Moncrieff,
killed on June 28; then Brig.-General H. G. Casson, succeeded by
Brig.-General L. C. Koe), containing the 4th and 7th Royal Scots, and
the 7th and 8th Scottish Rifles; and the 157th Brigade (Brig.-General
R. W. Hendry, succeeded by Brig.-General H. G. Casson), containing
the 5th, 6th, and 7th Highland Light Infantry, and the 5th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders.
[132] Now (spring, 1918) Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia in
succession to Sir Stanley Maude, who commanded the 13th Division during
the later part of the Dardanelles campaign.
[133] “Scenes of desperate fighting are plainly visible all around our
front line. On a small rise a little to the left (_i.e._ of our
advanced position up the Gully) lie half a dozen of our men killed in
the final advance, whom it had been impossible to get at and bury.
Right in front a line of khaki figures lie in perfect order only a few
yards away, yet the sniping is so heavy that even at night it is almost
impossible to bring them in. Farther up the ravine are heaps of Turkish
dead, piled together, who have fallen in the big counter-attack. In
a gorse patch farther to the left lie a further large number of the
enemy, mixed up with some of our men, for there seems to have been a
general mêlée in the open at dawn on the 29th, when our men issued
from their trenches and hunted the enemy out of the gorse, killing
large numbers of them.”--_Dispatches from the Dardanelles_, by E.
Ashmead Bartlett, p. 152 (July 4).
[134] _Uncensored Letters_, pp. 144–146.
[135] _Australia in Arms_, pp. 205–210.
[136] “A rough estimate of their number (Turkish troops) since
mobilisation is as follows: At the Dardanelles, 130,000; in Thrace,
30,000; at Constantinople and Chitaldja, 20,000; on the Bosphorus,
20,000; in the Caucasus, 60,000; at Bagdad and the Persian Gulf,
20,000; Syria, 30,000; Aleppo and Mersine, 30,000; Smyrna district,
30,000; gendarmerie, 30,000; at the depôts, 50,000; scattered, 30,000”
(_Inside Constantinople_, p. 125). This makes a total of 480,000,
and the writer estimates that Turkey had by that time (June 18, 1915)
lost 260,000, including 100,000 on Gallipoli. But these statistics are
probably of little more than Turkish value.
As to the neglect to supply the Dardanelles Expedition with guns and
shells, it must, of course, be remembered that they were then short on
all fronts, and it was only in the beginning of June that Mr. Lloyd
George was appointed to a Ministry of Munitions.
[137] This destruction of a signal and telegraph station was probably
the incident referred to at the end of Sir Ian’s second dispatch. He
tells how Corporal G. A. Walker, R.E., although much shaken, repaired
the damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communication
by apologising for the incident and saying he required no assistance.
Twelve were killed or wounded, beside the officer on duty, killed.
[138] This was the German General Weber, commanding the “Southern
Group” on the Peninsula. He was superseded by Vehib Pasha, “a grim and
fanatical Turk,” the change causing great discontent among the Germans.
“In this case, the Turkish point of view prevailed, for General Liman
von Sanders, Commander-in-Chief of the Gallipoli Army, was determined
not to lose his post, and agreed slavishly with all that Enver Pasha
ordained” (_Two War Years in Constantinople_, p. 46).
[139] See note on p. 223.
[140] The _Aragon_ was torpedoed in the Mediterranean, January
1918.
[141] First Dardanelles Commission Report, par. 14, note. It seems to
have been a section of the “War Committee” established by the Coalition
Government of May 19.
[142] This estimate does not include the French casualties, which are
not published.
[143]
The 13th Division consisted of the following brigades:
38th (Brigadier-General Baldwin)--
6th Royal Lancashire, 6th East Lancashire, 6th South
Lancashire, and 6th North Lancashire.
39th (Brigadier-General W. de S. Cayley)--
9th Royal Warwick, 7th Gloucester, 9th Worcester, and
7th North Stafford.
40th (Brigadier-General J. H. du B. Travers)--
4th South Wales Borderers, 8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers,
8th Cheshire, and 5th Wilts.
The 8th Welsh Regiment were Divisional Pioneers.
[144]
The 11th Division consisted of the following brigades:
32nd (Brigadier-General H. Haggard)--
9th West York, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th
York and Lancaster.
33rd (Brigadier-General R. P. Maxwell)--
6th Lincolnshire, 6th Border, 7th South Stafford, and 9th
Sherwood Foresters.
34th (Brigadier-General W. H. Sitwell)--
8th Northumberland Fusiliers, 9th Lancashire Fusiliers,
5th Dorset, and 11th Manchester.
The 6th East Yorkshire were Divisional Pioneers.
[145]
The 10th Division consisted of the following brigades:
29th (Brigadier-General R. J. Cooper)--
10th Hampshire, 6th Royal Irish Rifles, 5th Connaught
Rangers, and 6th Leinster.
30th (Brigadier-General L. L. Nicol)--
6th and 7th Royal Munster Fusiliers, 6th and 7th Royal
Dublin Fusiliers.
31st (Brigadier-General F. F. Hill)--
5th and 6th Inniskilling Fusiliers, 5th and 6th Royal Irish
Fusiliers.
The 5th Royal Irish Regiment were Divisional Pioneers. Only about 60
per cent. of the men in these battalions were Irish, the rest being
chiefly North-country miners and Somerset. For the complete list of the
battalions in this Division, the Artillery, Engineers, etc., see _The
Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli_, by Major Bryan Cooper, pp. 2
and 3.
[146] I am unable to give the exact formations of these Divisions.
The battalions were changed shortly before they left England. From
dispatches and other sources, however, one can make the following list:
_53rd (Welsh) Division_:
158th Brigade (Brigadier-General E. A. Cowans)--
5th, 6th, and 7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and the 1/1st
Herefordshire.
159th Brigade (Brigadier-General F. C. Lloyd)--
4th and 7th Cheshires, and the 4th and 5th Welsh.
160th Brigade (Brigadier-General J. J. F. Hume)--
4th Queen’s (Royal West Surrey), 4th Royal Sussex, a
composite Kent Battalion, and the 10th Middlesex.
_54th (East Anglian) Division_:
161st Brigade (Brigadier-General C. M. Brunton)--
4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Essex.
162nd Brigade (Brigadier-General C. de Winton)--
10th and 11th London, 5th Bedfordshire, and 4th Northants.
163rd Brigade (Brigadier-General Brunker, later under F. F. W.
Daniell)--
4th and 5th Norfolks, 5th Suffolks, and 8th Hants.
[147] _Uncensored Letters_, p. 170. There were 10 French planes.
[148] Our estimates of the enemy’s forces for the days of fighting in
August were:
+-----------+--------+--------+--------+----------+
| Date. | Suvla.| Anzac. | Helles.| Reserve. |
+-----------+--------+--------+--------+----------+
|August 6–7 | 3,000 | 25,000 | 33,000 | 39,000 |
| „ 8 | 5,000 | 31,000 | 33,000 | 20,000[A]|
| „ 9 | 7,000 | 38,000 | 33,000 | 20,000[B]|
| „ 10 | 9,000 | 38,000 | 33,000 | 25,000 |
| „ 11 | 13,000 | 38,000 | 33,000 | 25,000 |
| „ 15 | 20,000 | 47,000 | 15,000 | 12,000 |
| „ 22 | 26,000 | 41,000 | 15,000 | 12,000 |
+-----------+--------+--------+--------+----------+
[A] 11,000 marching south. [B] 2000 marching south.
[149] Part of this small and undisciplined body actually landed, but
meeting with opposition rapidly withdrew to the ship in characteristic
disorder, assuming their object to be accomplished.
[150]
“_Special Order_.
“GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
_August 5, 1915_.
“SOLDIERS OF THE OLD ARMY AND THE NEW.--Some of you have
already won imperishable renown at our first landing, or have since
built up our footholds upon the Peninsula, yard by yard, with deeds
of heroism and endurance. Others have arrived just in time to take
part in our next great fight against Germany and Turkey, the would-be
oppressors of the rest of the human race.
“You, veterans, are about to add fresh lustre to your arms. Happen
what may, so much at least is certain.
“As to you, soldiers of the new formations, you are privileged indeed
to have the chance vouchsafed you of playing a decisive part in
events which may herald the birth of a new and happier world. You
stand for the great cause of freedom. In the hour of trial remember
this, and the faith that is in you will bring you victoriously
through.
“IAN HAMILTON, _General_.”
[151] Here, as in other places, it is impossible to record individual
acts of courage, but the service of Lieut. W. T. Forshaw (9th
Manchesters) became almost a legend on the Peninsula. On the night
7th-8th, he was holding a northern corner of the vineyard with half a
company when he was attacked by a swarm of Turks converging down three
trenches. “He held his own, not only directing his men and encouraging
them by exposing himself with the utmost disregard of danger, but
personally throwing bombs continuously for forty-one hours. When his
detachment was relieved, after twenty-four hours, he volunteered to
continue the direction of operations. Three times during the night
of August 8–9 he was again heavily attacked, and once the Turks got
over the barricade; but after shooting three with his revolver he led
his men forward and recaptured it. When he rejoined his battalion he
was choked and sickened by bomb fumes, badly bruised by a fragment
of shrapnel, and could barely lift his arm from continuous bomb
throwing.”--Official Report for his V.C.
[152] Sir Ian’s Suvla dispatch; and _Australia in Arms_, pp.
221–223.
[153] The name was due to a repeated saying of Colonel J. L. Johnston
(11th West Australian Battalion), that if only he could bring howitzers
instead of field-guns to bear on it, he would have “a jolly good time
there.”--_Australia in Arms_, p. 188.
[154] _Australia in Arms_, p. 225. The author, Phillip Schuler,
was present, but it is noticeable that Captain C. E. W. Bean, who was
also present, does not directly mention this underground line.
[155] Of this eagerness, Capt. Bean, the Australian correspondent,
gives an example: “‘Is there any room up there?’ I heard a man in the
trench ask of those who were crouching under the parapet. One of the
men on the fire-step looked down. ‘I dare say we could make room for
one,’ he said. ‘Shift along, you blokes--we can squeeze in a little
one.’ The man in the trench was clearly relieved. ‘I want to get up
here along with Jim,’ he said. ‘Him and me are mates.’”--See the
Australian newspapers, October 17, 1915.
[156] As to these seventy prisoners (who were caught and disarmed in
one tunnel) and the Turkish wounded, Major-General Walker, commanding
the division, and my old schoolfellow at Shrewsbury, told me shortly
afterwards as we stood on the spot that, until they could be brought
safely across the open, they were carefully placed lying down in line
under the shelter of that white loopholed parapet as the most secure
place the Australians could find for their comfort.
[157] _Australia in Arms_, p. 238.
[158] Captain C. E. W. Bean, in the Australian papers, October 4, 1915.
[159] Captain C. E. W. Bean’s account in Australian papers of October
4, 1915. Phillip Schuler (_Australia in Arms_, p. 241) says his
words were: “Men, you have ten minutes to live,” and “Three minutes,
men.” But this is an unlikely utterance from so good an officer.
[160] Captain C. E. W. Bean in the Australian papers of November 2,
1915.
[161] The arrangement of these forces is given in Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[162] Captain Bean, Australian papers, October 14, 1915.
[163] See “From Quinn’s to Rhododendron,” in the _Chronicles of the
N.Z.E.F._, August 8, 1917.
[164] It was either on this position or upon a neighbouring knoll
known as Destroyer Hill that the following peculiar event occurred, as
narrated by Captain Bean (Australian papers, October 25, 1915): “The
Otago Battalion, which was clearing out the small trenches ahead of it
as its head wormed up the Chailak Ravine, swung up the slopes of this
hill. The battalion had just reached the shelf below the Table Top, and
was pushing up its line for the final rush over the hill when there
arose a strange uproar on the top above them. There was the sound of
the piling of arms, followed by vociferous cheering and wild rounds of
applause and hand-clapping. It was the Turks on the top of the hill who
had decided to surrender, and who did not want any mistake to be made
as to their intention.” The Otagos alone are said to have taken 250
prisoners that night (_Australia in Arms_, p. 253).
[165] Captain Bean, Australian papers, October 25. He adds: “I believe
that fifteen men actually managed to reach the Turkish trench on the
summit. They never came back.”
[166] Captain Bean’s account in Australian papers, October 25, 1915.
[167] Fortunately for the brigade, the Turks had withdrawn their guns
during the night (7th and 8th) owing to the Suvla landing, and had not
yet brought them back to W Hill.
[168] Sir Ian’s dispatch quotes the order.
[169] Phillip Schuler definitely says: “Mistaking the target, the
destroyers dropped 6-inch high-explosive shells amongst the Indian
troops” (_Australia in Arms_, p. 261). But, accurate though
he generally was, I believe he is here mistaken. I never heard the
destroyers mentioned at the time, and I doubt if their guns could have
shelled a _reverse_ slope. Further on (p. 263) he says that during
the Turkish counter-attack next day the _Anzac_ guns shelled “the
reverse slope.” If that was possible, another explanation besides the
one I suggest above may be considered.
[170] Apparently, it was mainly to this incident that Dr. Stürmer
referred in the following passage: “In those September” (he means
August) “days I had already had some experience of Turkish politics
and their defiance of the laws of humanity, and my sympathies were all
for those thousands of fine Colonial troops--such men as one seldom
sees--sacrificing their lives in one last colossal attack, which if
it had been prolonged even for another hour might have sealed the
fate of the Straits and would have meant the first decisive step
towards the overthrow of our forces; for the capture of Constantinople
would have been the beginning of the end.”--_Two War Years in
Constantinople_, p. 86.
[171] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[172] _The Story of the Anzacs_ (Messrs. Ingram & Son, Melbourne),
p. 87.
[173] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[174] For a detailed account of the four battalions in the 29th Brigade
during this action see _The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli_,
pp. 62–120. Two companies of the 5th Connaught Rangers (Colonel
Jourdain) went up to the Farm on the evening of the 10th after the
other troops had been withdrawn, and brought in many wounded whom they
found lying there in great need of water and attention.
[175] Phillip Schuler put them at 18,000 (_Australia in Arms_, p.
270).
[176] _Australia in Arms_, p. 271.
[177] Sir Ian’s dispatch twice mentions these batteries as the sole
land artillery. All three belonged to the 11th Division. Other
batteries of field-guns and howitzers arrived later, but we are
speaking of the Suvla first landing--the really critical time.
[178] Sir Ian in his dispatch reckons twelve 18-pounder guns and
eight mountain-guns as starting. Only the mountain-guns and four of
the 18-pounders were in action by August 8, but the 59th Brigade,
R.F.A., and the 4th Highland Mountain Brigade, R.G.A., were attached
to the 11th Division. On the 9th, two field batteries were on Lala
Baba. On August 13 to 15 the 58th Brigade also arrived at Suvla, and
was attached to the 10th Division. On the 19th a battery of the 4th
Howitzer Lowland Brigade, R.F.A., was placed in position on Lala Baba.
[179] Sir Ian’s dispatch gives a full account of the warships,
lighters, and trawlers sent with the landing-force, together with
details about the water-supply provided. He does not mention the large
transport _Minneapolis_, which I think must have taken the place
of the sloop Aster, for we certainly had batteries of mountain-guns
with their teams on board. She was a liner, taken over with all her
staff; and as instances of petrifying routine I remember that, as I
hoped to land at 4 a.m., I asked if one could get a cup of tea then,
and was haughtily informed, “On this ship breakfast is always at
8.30”; and later in the morning, when the fighting was at crisis, the
“stewards” were sweeping out the gangways with vacuum-cleaners as they
had swept for years. Habits of routine were, however, fatally disturbed
in the following spring when the _Minneapolis_ was torpedoed
between Egypt and Salonika.
[180] _The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli_, p. 142.
[181] These fires appear to have arisen near the true Hill 10, which
was taken about this time by a mixed force of Northumberland Fusiliers,
Dorsets, and West Yorks, after a severe struggle against a redoubt
there.
[182] Sir Ian’s dispatch says the naval authorities were unwilling to
land them at A Beach “for some reason not specified.” Considering what
misfortune had already happened there, the above explanation appears to
me at least sufficient. But A East and A West had been discovered by
the navy before the unfortunate landing at B Beach began.
[183] _The Tenth (Irish) Division at Gallipoli_, pp. 125 and 140.
[184] So Major Bryan Cooper in _The Tenth (Irish) Division_,
p. 129. My impression at the time was of no rush, but a calm though
laborious trudge. Major Cooper, however, continues: “The 7th Dublins
in particular were much encouraged by the example of their Colonel....
While every one else was dashing swiftly across the neck, or keeping
close under cover, it is recorded that Colonel Downing--a man of
unusual height and girth--stood in the centre of the bullet-swept zone,
quietly twisting his stick.” “Dashing swiftly across” that sand would,
I think, be impossible under any impulse, and cover did not exist;
at least I never found it, though I toiled over that spit many dozen
times, and it always remained exposed to shell-fire from W Hill.
[185] The movements of Hill’s battalions, and their relation to
Sitwell’s are difficult to follow, chiefly owing to the changes of
command and intention. After speaking of these changes, Sir Ian in his
dispatch continues: “I have failed in my endeavours to get some live
human detail about the fighting which followed.” The detail has now
been largely supplied by Major Bryan Cooper in _The Tenth (Irish)
Division in Gallipoli_, pp. 127–135. In the main, I have followed
his account, the chief outstanding difficulty being the presence of
the 6th Lincoln and 6th Border Battalions, which did not belong to
Sitwell’s or Haggard’s Brigades, but to Maxwell’s (the 33rd). Major
Cooper says two battalions of the 11th Division reinforced Hill’s
column, and Sir Ian mentions those two as distinguished at the taking
of the hill. But how they came to be under Sitwell’s command, or under
Hill’s, is not yet clear. I can only suppose that, as Sitwell’s force
could not or did not move, General Hammersley ordered Maxwell to send
them over from Lala Baba. After Brigadier-General Haggard was wounded,
Colonel J. O‘B. Minogue (9th W. Yorks) took temporary command of the
32nd Brigade.
[186] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[187] For an account of the thirst, see Sir Ian’s dispatch and _The
Tenth (Irish) Division_, pp. 137, 145, 148, 157–158. Also _Suvla
Bay and After_, by Juvenis, pp. 37, 40–43, where the services of the
destroyer to the 10th Division are mentioned.
[188] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[189] The water question was much disputed at the time, and many
contradictory versions were given. I have here followed the account
given me in recent (1917) conversation by a naval officer who was
closely connected with the superintendence of the landing. The real
causes of the thirst, in any case, were the want of receptacles and the
distance from the firing line. As to the failure at A Beach, it must of
course be remembered that the naval chart was old and useless, and no
survey had been possible without betraying the point chosen for landing.
[190] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[191] So as not to interrupt the narrative, one is obliged to mention
only in a note the remarkable achievement of our submarines on this
critical and unfortunate day. In order to help E14, which was already
in the Sea of Marmora, E11 had forced her way through the nets in the
Straits, and on the 8th torpedoed a Turkish warship coming down towards
Maidos with reinforcements.
[192] Turkish information has since shown that Liman von Sanders had
brought up two divisions (7th and 12th) by forced marches from Xeros.
[193] _The Tenth (Irish) Division_, pp. 158–161.
[194] One of these was called A East, the other A West. Between them
was Kangaroo Beach, where the Australian Bridging Train built a
landing-stage. They also built a very useful little pier close to the
“cut” into the Salt Lake, chiefly for the service of the wounded being
taken off to hospital ships. Of the Suvla beaches A West was the most
generally used, though a small harbour was afterwards blasted out of
the rocks at the extreme point.
[195] _The “Times” History of the War_, chap. cxii. p. 198.
[196] A detailed account of this small but gallant action is given in
_The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli_, pp. 161–180.
[197] The daring of the Turkish snipers, who crept across our lines at
night and perched in the small trees, was proved when, on September
8, General Inglefield’s horse was shot under him as he rode along the
beach from Anzac.
[198] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[199] _Ibid._
[200] In the spring of 1916, General Peyton commanded the successful
expedition against the Senussi, west of Egypt.
[201] The brigades were composed as follows:
(1) _1st South Midland_ (Brigadier-General Wiggin)--
Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanry, Gloucestershire Hussars.
(2) _2nd South Midland_ (Brigadier-General Lord Longford)--
Bucks Hussars, Berks and Dorset Yeomanry.
(3) _North Midland_ (Brigadier-General F. A. Kenna, V.C.)--
Derbyshire Yeomanry, Sherwood Rangers, South Notts Hussars.
(4) _London Brigade_ (Brigadier-General Scatters Wilson)--
City of London Roughriders, 1st County of London Middlesex
Hussars, 3rd County of London Sharpshooters.
_Divisional Cavalry_--
Westminster Dragoons, Herts Yeomanry.
[202] The two brigades (30th and 31st) of the 10th Division, at Suvla,
having lost nearly three-quarters of their officers and half the men,
were withdrawn to rest near Suvla Beach on August 17, and on August 22
General F. F. Hill, the trusted Brigadier of the 31st, was invalided
away with dysentery. As previously noticed, he was succeeded in
command by Brigadier-General J. G. King-King, General Staff Officer
(1).--_The Tenth (Irish) Division_, p. 208.
[203] _The “Times” History of the War_, Part 84, p. 205.
[204] It was unfortunate that, standing beside a machine-gun at the
front parapet of Chocolate Hill, I was just at that moment struck
on the head by shrapnel, and so was unable to witness the confused
advance which led to the failure. By the time I returned to my
position at 4.15, the mistake had been made. It may, perhaps, be
medically interesting that for the previous forty-eight hours I had
been suffering from high fever, but the violent rush of blood from the
wound appeared to reduce the temperature, and at night I walked to the
dressing-station at Suvla Point in perfect health, except for mere pain
and exhaustion.
[205] Sir Ian’s dispatch. In a Supplementary Dispatch the 9th Sherwood
Foresters and 6th Borders were also specially mentioned.
[206] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[207] As usual throughout this history, I have found it impossible to
record the countless instances of individual bravery, but I may mention
the case of Captain O’Sullivan (1st Inniskilling Fusiliers). Early in
July, describing one of the actions at Helles, Sir Ian had written: “A
young fellow called O’Sullivan, in the Inniskilling Fusiliers, led a
bombing party into one end of an enemy trench, and cleared it of the
enemy. The Turks counter-attacked with bombs, and drove him and his men
out with a good deal of loss. Again he cleared the trench, filling his
pockets and belt with bombs. Again he was driven back. A third time he
led the attack, and this time the trench was held and remains in our
possession. Within an hour of this last feat of arms, a trench was lost
to the right in prolongation of the Inniskilling Fusiliers. This same
young fellow, who had already gone through enough to shake the nerves
of the most veteran soldiers, led his company down into the trench
himself, running along a few yards ahead of them out on the parapet,
exposed to a tremendous musketry fire, chucking bombs into the trench
just in front of the leading files, so as to clear the way for them.
There is a limit to luck, and this time he was wounded, but I hope he
may pull through.” He pulled through, and on August 21 twice led his
company up against the Turkish trenches on Scimitar Hill, and twice
was driven back. Collecting the men in a little hollow of the ground,
he said, “Now I depend on you, my lads, and we’ll just have one more
charge for the honour of the regiment.” He led them all by a clear 20
yards up the hill, leapt into the trench, and there died.
[208] Brigadier-General R. S. Vandeleur succeeded to the command of
this brigade on September 22.
[209] _The Tenth (Irish) Division_, pp. 188–192. Until that volume
appeared, the Connaught Rangers had not received the public credit due
to this serviceable exploit, though in Gallipoli they were spoken of
with the highest praise.
[210] During the night Captain Gilleson, the Presbyterian chaplain
of the 14th Australian (Victoria) Battalion, worked incessantly at
bringing the wounded back to safety. After daylight next morning, still
hearing cries from the exposed slope over the crest of the ridge, he
crept out and found a British soldier (probably Hants or Connaught
Rangers) wounded and tormented by ants. With help of two others (one
also a Presbyterian chaplain) he had dragged the man about a yard when
he fell mortally wounded. The man, I believe, was also killed; the
Presbyterian was wounded. Later on (August 28) Captain Grant, a New
Zealand padre (the form of religion was not mentioned to me at the
time) went searching for a wounded friend along a trench filled with
dead and wounded Turks. To the wounded he attended on his way; but
hearing conversation farther on, he thought he recognised his friend’s
voice. Turning a sharp corner of a traverse, he came face to face with
the Turks, and was instantly killed.
Both Captain C. E. W. Bean (Australian papers, Oct. 28, 1915) and
Phillip Schuler (_Australia in Arms_, p. 275) mention these
incidents, which were described to me on the spot a few days after they
happened. Taken with Sir Ian’s dispatch, these two authorities give a
clear idea of the confused fighting around Hill 60. For the action of
the Connaught Rangers, _The Tenth (Irish) Division in Gallipoli_
should be read, as mentioned above. For myself, I had the great
advantage of going over the ground with General A. H. Russell a day or
two after the final action of August 29.
[211] Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Gwynn was Chief of Staff. The Division
consisted of:
_5th Australian Brigade_ (Brigadier-General W. Holmes)--17th,
18th, 19th, and 20th Battalions.
_6th Australian Brigade_ (Colonel R. S. Browne)--21st, 22nd,
23rd, and 24th Battalions.
_7th Australian Brigade_ (Colonel J. Burston)--25th, 26th, 27th,
and 28th Battalions.
[212] _The Tenth (Irish) Division_, p. 197.
[213] _The Tenth (Irish) Division_, p. 199.
[214] One of the transports (the _Southland_), conveying a
battalion of the 2nd Australian Division, was torpedoed on September 2,
thirty-one miles from Mudros. The firemen took to the boats, but the
engineers kept sufficient head of steam to work the pumps and electric
light. Finding she was filling only slowly, they called for soldier
volunteers to help with the stoking, and in an hour got steam up to
the blowing-off point. The destroyer _Racoon_, which had come
alongside, was then able to supply practised stokers, and they, with
the engineers, stoked the boilers into Mudros harbour.
[215] “It was not entirely an easy matter to assimilate these
reinforcements. As a rule, a draft is a comparatively small body of men
which easily adopts the character of the unit in which it is merged. In
Gallipoli, however, units had been so much reduced in strength that in
some cases the draft was stronger than the battalion that it joined,
while it almost invariably increased the strength of what was left of
the original unit to half as much again. As a result, after two or
three drafts had arrived, the old battalions had been swamped.”--_The
Tenth (Irish) Division_, p. 235.
[216] _The Tenth (Irish) Division_, p. 229. The 54th Brigade
remained in Egypt.
[217] During this period of comparative inaction, it was announced
that Flight-Lieutenant Edmonds in a seaplane sank a Turkish transport
full of reinforcements with a heavy bomb, and that a submarine sank a
transport of 11-inch guns in the Sea of Marmora (September 7).--_The
“Times” History of the War_, Part 84, p. 211.
[218] The full speech is quoted in _Nelson’s History of the War_,
by Colonel John Buchan, vol. xi. p. 18.
[219] See Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch on the Dardanelles evacuation.
[220] The further history of the 10th Division (which I visited once
more among the mountains beyond Lake Doiran), as well as of the whole
Salonika campaign up to summer 1917, is told in _The Story of the
Salonika Army_, by my colleague, Mr. G. Ward Price.
[221] Colonel John Buchan puts the number at 13,000 (_Nelson’s
History of the War_, xi. 26).
[222] See the speech of Venizelos to the Athenian Chamber, August 26,
1917.
[223] Belgrade fell to Mackensen on October 9; the Bulgarians crossed
the Serbian frontier on the 11th, occupied Uskub on the 22nd, and
Nish on November 5, thus opening direct railway communication between
the Central Powers and Constantinople through Sofia. Monastir fell on
December 2, and by the middle of that month the Serbian army and the
Allies had been entirely driven out of Serbian territory.
[224] Sir Ian’s dispatch, last section but two.
[225] Sir Ian’s dispatch.
[226] Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch (March 6, 1916).
[227] Sir Charles Monro’s dispatch (March 6, 1916).
[228] Speech in the House of Commons, November 2, 1915.
[229] See _The “Times” History of the War_, Part 84, p. 213. It is
worth noticing that on November 18, Lord Ribblesdale in the House of
Lords declared that it was common knowledge that Sir Charles Monro had
“reported in favour of withdrawal from the Dardanelles, and adversely
to the continuance of winter operations there.” One can only suppose
that, in saying this, Lord Ribblesdale deliberately intended to mislead
the enemy, who could hardly believe so rash a betrayal of intention
could be made with impunity, if the statement were true.
[230] Lord Kitchener’s original objection to evacuation may perhaps
be supported by a passage in an article by Dr. E. J. Dillon
(_Fortnightly Review_, February 1918): “The evacuation of
Gallipoli was not warranted in the light of all the elements of the
problem, because from the point of view of the Coalition it meant the
asphyxiation of Russia and her ultimate disappearance as a belligerent,
and to ward off this calamity the sacrifice of several warships would
not have been excessive.”
[231] See _Australia in Arms_, pp. 284, 285. The fate of those
suffocated by fumes perhaps caused the rumour that the Turks used
poison gas. I never heard an authentic case of this, though at one time
we were all ordered to carry gas-masks.
[232] That little animosity existed on the Turkish side either is shown
by the following note which I made early in December, though I cannot
date the incident precisely: “The community of human nature between men
who are out to kill each other was lately shown here by an interval
of friendliness, as often in France. It began with the wagging of a
Turkish periscope over the sandbags. One of the Australians (it was at
Anzac) wagged his periscope in answer. Then Turkish hands were held up,
moving the fingers together in the Turkish sign of amity. Presently
heads appeared on both sides, the few words that could be understood
were said, cigarettes and fruit were thrown from one side to the other,
and a note, written in bad French, was thrown to the Australians,
saying, ‘We don’t want to fight you. We want to go home. But we are
driven on by the people you know about.’ I presume that meant the
Germans. Then signs were made that an officer was approaching. The
heads disappeared, and bombs were thrown from trench to trench in place
of fruit.”
[233] The figures for Suvla, as given me by the Staff at the time, were
44,000 men; 90 guns of all calibre, including one anti-aircraft gun;
3000 mules; 400 horses; 30 donkeys; 1800 carts; 4000 to 5000 cartloads
of stores.
[234] The account of the Suvla evacuation is founded on notes I made
at the time and on an article of mine which passed the Military Censor
two days after the event, but was not published in full till I received
General Birdwood’s permission in the following spring. It is perhaps
worth while here contradicting the report that the Turks were bribed
to allow the army to withdraw without opposition. That malignant
depreciation of a most skilful enterprise was a libel both on the enemy
and on our own officers and men. There was not a vestige of truth in it.
[235] The following rough estimate of the Turkish forces was made by
the General Staff about a week before the evacuation:
+-----------------------------+---------+---------+
| Place. |Regiment.| Number. |
+-----------------------------+---------+---------+
|_Suvla Lines_-- | | |
| Kiretch Tepe | 126th | 2100 |
| At foot of Kiretch Tepe | 127th | 3000 |
| Farther in plain | 33rd | 3000 |
| Anafarta plain | 79th |Uncertain|
| Farther south | 35th |Uncertain|
| Still farther south | 34th | 1800 |
| Near Scimitar Hill | 66th |Uncertain|
| Foot of W Hill | 25th | 2400 |
| Opposite Hetman Chair | 66th |Uncertain|
|_Anzac Lines_-- | | |
| Opposite Kabak Kuyu | 17th | 1600 |
| Opposite Hill 60 | 16th | 1200 |
| Upper Asma Dere | 20th | 1800 |
| Abdel Rahman Bair | 19th | 2300 |
| Koja Chemen Tepe | 24th | 2000 |
| The Farm | 22nd | 1800 |
| Battleship Hill | 48th | 2000 |
| Opposite Russell’s Top | 72nd | 2000 |
| In reserve there | 48th |Uncertain|
| Opposite Quinn’s | 27th | 2000 |
| German Officers’ and | | |
| Johnston’s Jolly | 57th | 2000 |
| Lone Pine | 125th | 1600 |
| South of Lone Pine | 47th | 1800 |
| Leane’s Trench | 36th | 1000 |
| Extreme south to Gaba Tepe | 77th | 2700 |
+-----------------------------+---------+---------+
Three regiments were in reserve at Suvla, and three at Anzac. The Army
Headquarters were just south of Koja Dere; Corps Headquarters in the
north behind Anafarta Sagir; in the south at Koja Dere. There were
large camps at Ejelmer Bay and Turchen Keui (a few miles inland from
the bay) in the north, and at Koja Dere in the south.
At Helles the numbers were then uncertain or not available, but the
following regiments were posted opposite our lines from our left to
right:
+------------------------------+---------+
| Place. |Regiment.|
+------------------------------+---------+
|West of Gully Ravine | 70th |
|East of Gully Ravine | 71st |
|West of Krithia Nullah | 124th |
|East of Krithia Nullah | 38th |
|On Achi Baba Nullah | 45th |
|Between that and Kerevez Dere | 56th |
|In Kerevez Dere | 55th |
|Opposite Fort Gouez | 42nd |
|Overlooking the Strait | 41st |
+------------------------------+---------+
Taking an average of 2000 per regiment, this gives a total of 18,000,
apart from reserves; but it is a low estimate. The Headquarters were at
Ali Bey Farm.
[236] The 11th Division (Major-General Fanshawe) now held the Xeros
shore and the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. On the broad and deeply ravined
undercliff below Jephson’s Post, and even beyond it, the 32nd Brigade
(9th West Yorks, 6th Yorkshire, 8th West Riding, and 6th York and
Lancaster) had elaborately entrenched and fortified positions which
they called the “Green Knoll” and “The Boot.” Brigadier-General Dallas
was justifiably proud of the work and of his Yorkshire Brigade. After
going round the complicated trenches with me on December 11, he
whispered sorrowfully, “Pity to leave them! Pity to leave them!” And
to the last he went from man to man, adjuring one to shave, another to
wash his shirt, and all to keep smart whatever happened. To such temper
the difficult operation owed its success.
[237] The management of their mules by the Indians was remarkable. They
controlled those incalculable animals as though they were trained dogs.
It was pathetic that the Indians mistook the name of their destination
(Mudros) for Madras. “Do you want to go to India so much, then?” an
officer asked. “Does a man want to go to heaven?” was the reply.
[238] Beside my personal observation during visits from Suvla in
the final days, my chief authorities upon the Anzac evacuation are
Phillip Schuler’s _Australia in Arms_, an officer’s diary in the
_“Manchester Guardian’s” History of the War_, Part 43, p. 187; Sir
Charles Monro’s dispatch; and conversation with men who were present.
A German correspondent with the Turks on the night of the evacuation
wrote in the _Vossische Zeitung_ of January 21, 1916: “So long as
wars exist, the British evacuation of the Ari Burnu and Anafarta fronts
will stand before the eyes of all strategists of retreat as a hitherto
quite unattained masterpiece.”
[239] A dilatory and whispering 6-inch shell, thrown from a
black-powder battery north of Troy, was called “Creeping Caroline”
by our men. Similarly the French called one particular shell “Marie
pressée”--no doubt a “high velocity.”
[240] On December 30 Sir Charles Monro handed over his command to
General Sir Archibald Murray and left Mudros for Alexandria on his way
back to France.
[241] Shortly before it left, a deed of singular heroism added honour
to the 42nd Division. On December 22, in front of Krithia, Second
Lieut. Alfred Victor Smith (5th East Lancashire, 126th Brigade), only
son of the Chief Constable of Burnley, was throwing a grenade when it
slipped from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to
several officers and men. He shouted a warning, and jumped clear into
safety. But seeing that the others were unable to get into cover, and
knowing the grenade was due to explode, he returned without hesitation
and flung himself down on it. He was instantly killed by the explosion.
See the _London Gazette_ announcing that the Victoria Cross had
been conferred on him after death.
INDEX
(_I am indebted to_ MRS. E. M. WHITE _for undertaking the difficult
task of this Index_.--H. W. N.)
A Beach (true), 299, 301, 304 and _n._, 358.
A East Beach, 299, 304, 325 and _n._
A West Beach, 299, 304, 325 and _n._
Abdel Rahman Bair, 252, 265, 268, 269, 283.
Abdul Hamid, 2, 144 and _n._
Abrikja, 317, 323–4.
Achi Baba, situation of, 79;
enemy shelling from, 132, 171, 197, 403;
strength of position, 170 _n._, 220.
Achmet, 257.
Adana massacres, 99, 128 _n._
Adramyti Bay, 222, 362.
Adrianople, 55.
Aeroplanes--British, 167, 218–19, 397;
enemy, 308.
African troops, 136, 147, 149, 151, 175.
_Agamemnon_, 48–9, 51–3, 59, 91.
Aghyl Dere, 250, 251, 255, 262, 263, 355.
Agnew, Lt.-Col., 349.
Aire Kavak, 341.
_Albion_, 49, 52, 53, 60, 94, 99.
Alexandria, transports reloaded at, 69–70, 408.
Allanson, Maj. Cecil G. L., 272–6.
Altham, Maj.-Gen., 212, 381.
_Amethyst_, 49, 108, 109.
Ammunition, shortage of, 133, 148, 171, 181, 182, 185, 192, 193, 194
_n._, 200, 219, 229.
Anafarta Biyuk, 114, 251, 269, 286, 287, 335;
entrenched by Turks, 339.
Anafarta Hills, shelling from, 197.
Anafarta Ova, 291, 327.
Anafarta plateau, Turkish guns on, 340.
Anafarta Sagir--situation of, 287, 288;
Moore’s patrol on outskirts of (8 Aug.), 317;
Turkish headquarters at, 388 _n._
“Anafartas, the,” 263.
“Andarti,” 225 and _n._
Antwerp, R.N.D. at, 24, 148, 203.
Anzac Cove--conformation of, 110–12;
storming of (25 April), 111 ff.;
danger of, from shelling, 196.
Anzacs. _See_ Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
Apex, the, situation of, 261, 360–1;
Anzac occupation of, 261, 270;
subterranean galleries made at, 382;
abandonment of (Dec.), 399.
_Aragon_--reputation of, 211–12 and _n._;
Kitchener’s entourage on, 379;
Monro’s H.Q. on, 381.
_Arcadian_, 80, 148, 166.
Ari Burnu, 112, 113, 250;
pier at, 371.
_Ark Royal_, 49, 218.
Armstrong, Lt.-Col. J. C., 81.
_Arno_, 315.
Art of war, 189.
Artillery:
Inferiority of, 181.
Loans from the French, 134, 184, 401.
Shortage of, 148, 171, 181, 184, 192, 193, 194 _n._, 219, 228, 229,
339, 361;
no anti-aircraft guns till winter, 219, 400.
_Askold_, 88, 120.
Asma Dere, 251–2, 263–4, 268–70.
Asmak Dere, 251.
Aspinall, Lt.-Col., 315, 316.
Aspinall, Capt. C. F., 81.
Asquith, Arthur, 149 _n._
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., War Minister, 16–17;
agrees to Churchill’s plan, 34–5;
encourages Italy’s entry, 56;
the Coalition Ministry, 170;
estimate of, 19–21;
quoted on position of experts, 28;
cited, 376.
_Aster_, 295–6, 297 _n._
Athenian expedition to Sicily, 88–9 and _n._
Atrocities, 98.
Augagneur, M., cited, 35 _n._ 2.
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps:
Casualties of--25–6 April, 127;
2 May, 139;
4–5 June, 190;
Lone Pine, 240;
6–10 Aug., 283;
of 4th Austr. Brig. (8 Aug.), 270.
Characteristics of, 72–3.
Egypt, in, 70–1.
Engagements fought by--2 May, 138;
advance on Krithia (8 May), 155–6;
19 May, 161–2;
4 and 28 June, 188 ff.;
Lone Pine (6–9 Aug.), 231–41;
Sari Bair, 253 ff.
Evacuation of, 397–400 and _n._
Godley’s tribute to, 284.
Kitchener’s visit to, 380.
Landing of (25 April), 113 ff.;
objects, 79;
brigades confused, 124, 125.
Officers of, list of, 82–3.
Quarters of, 117–18, 125;
extension of, by 7–10 Aug. fighting, 285.
Turkish troops opposite (Dec.), 388 _n._
Units of, 83, 154 _n._ 2, 352 _n._ 1.
Withdrawn by battalions to Mudros, 355.
1st Australian Division:
1st (N.S. Wales) Infantry Brigade--landing of, 116;
Lone Pine, 233–40.
2nd (Victoria) Infantry Brigade--units of, 154 _n._ 2;
landing of, 116;
at Helles, 147, 153, 233;
Lone Pine (8–9 Aug.), 240;
the Nek (7 Aug.), 241.
3rd (Australia) Infantry Brigade:
9th (Queensland) Batt., 115, 190–1.
10th (S. Austr.) Batt., 115.
11th (W. Austr.) Batt., 231.
12th (S. Austr., W. Austr., and Tas.) Batt., 239.
New Zealand and Australian Division:
Officers’ reconnaissances, 249.
Reserve (May), 147.
Sari Bair, 253.
Machine-Gun Section, 280.
New Zealand Mounted Infantry Brigade--fighting at the Nek (30
June), 191;
Sari Bair, 254 ff.;
evacuation, 398.
Auckland Regiment--Sari Bair, 257, 265, 266, 277–8;
Hill 60 attack (27 Aug.), 353.
Canterbury Regt.--Sari Bair, 258;
Hill 60 attack (21 Aug.), 349;
(27 Aug.), 353.
Otago Regt.--Hill 60 attack (21 Aug.), 349;
(27 Aug.), 353.
Wellington Regt., 353.
1st Australian Lt. Horse Brigade--evacuation of, 398.
1st N.S. Wales Regt., 242–3.
2nd Queensland Regt., 242.
New Zealand Infantry Brigade--units of, 83, 154 _n._ 1;
landing of, 116;
at Helles, 147, 153.
Auckland Batt.--occupies Plugge’s Plateau, 116;
Sari Bair, 254, 260–1;
on Rhododendron Nek (7 Aug.), 264.
Canterbury Batt., 254, 260–1.
Otago Batt.--“Baby 700,” 139;
Sari Bair, 254, 260 and _n._ 2, 261.
Wellington Batt.--Sari Bair, 254, 260–1, 266, 277–8.
4th (Australian) Infantry Brigade--landing of, 116;
“Baby 700,” 139;
Sari Bair, 255, 262, 283;
Hill 60 attack (21 Aug.), 348–9, 351;
evacuation of, 398.
All Battalions of, in Sari Bair assault, 268–70.
Otago Mounted Rifles Regt., 254, 256, 258–9.
2nd Australian Lt. Horse Brigade, 84;
6th Regt., 398.
3rd Australian Lt. Horse Brigade, 84;
evacuation of, 398.
8th (Victorian) Regt., 244.
9th Regt., 354.
10th (W. Australian) Regt., 244, 354.
2nd Australian Division:
Arrival of, 355 and _n._;
of 18th Batt., 352.
Composition of, 338 _n._ 1.
Infection of, with dysentery, 357.
18th Batt., 352, 353.
Australian Engineers--5th Company, 399.
Bridging Train, 325 _n._
Maori Contingent, 254, 256, 258, 265, 268, 353, 398.
New Zealand Engineers, 254, 255, 259.