THE LAST EFFORTS
The great assault of the second week in August, extending from Lone
Pine to Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and having the mountain height of Chunuk
Bair as the centre of its line, must be described as a failure. It
failed of its objects--the objects of the whole military campaign--to
open the Straits for the fleet, to secure the possession of
Constantinople, to hold all the Balkan States steady for our Alliance,
to complete the blockade of the Central Powers by land and sea, to
divert any possible threat towards Egypt, or towards the Persian Gulf,
and so to hasten the termination of the war. The aim of this fine
strategical conception was not accomplished, and the causes of failure
have been suggested in the narrative of the three preceding chapters.
Incidents and accidents contributed--the gallant but hopeless attempt
to cross the Nek in face of the Chessboard redoubt, the gallant but
unsuccessful attempts to hold the summits at Chunuk Bair and “Hill Q,”
the error of Baldwin’s brigade, the confusion of the landing inside
Suvla Bay, the separation of the units in the 10th Division, the
immobility of the 11th Division on August 7 and 8, the breakdown of the
water supply through want of receptacles, the unwitting recall of a
battalion from Scimitar Hill on the evening of Sunday the 8th, and the
apparent failure of the Higher Command at Suvla to realise the vital
necessity of speed and energy, no matter at what cost, during the four
critical days from the morning of the 7th to the evening of the 10th.
But at the back of all these causes of failure lay the ultimate
reason that many of the troops employed, especially at Suvla, were
not strong or experienced enough for the difficult task of attacking
an enemy posted in the most favourable positions for defence, over
an unknown, complicated, and deserted country, and in unaccustomed
conditions of intense heat and insatiable thirst. Few in the New Army
or Territorial Divisions were acquainted with the realities of war;
few had been exposed to its sudden and overwhelming perils. They had
neither the traditions, nor the veteran experience, nor the disciplined
self-confidence of the Regular Army. They had neither the physique,
nor the adventurous spirit, nor the intense national bond of the
Anzacs. What they might have done under more decisive or youthful or
inspiring leadership we can judge only from their subsequent rapid
improvement even upon the Peninsula, and from their excellent service
in later campaigns--such service as was performed in Palestine by
these Territorial Divisions. But in August 1915 their leadership was
not conspicuously decisive, youthful, or inspiring. And so it came
about that General Stopford suffered the worst fate which can befall a
commanding officer in the field.
[Sidenote: GAINS AND FAILURES]
On the other hand, the gain had been considerable. The important,
though not vital positions of the Vineyard at Helles, and Lone Pine on
the right front at Anzac, had been won. In the centre, the Anzac Corps
were relieved from an arduous, if not untenable, situation. It could
now move freely over a widely extended ground; many points formerly
harassed by the enemy’s guns and snipers were now secure; water-springs
had been gained; and the lines were drawn three or four miles nearer
the summits of Sari Bair. On the left, Suvla Bay afforded a more
sheltered winter roadstead than Kephalos. The lofty ridge of Kiretch
Tepe Sirt was ours to the summit, and the wide plain around the Salt
Lake, including Chocolate and Green Hills, was ours also. We held the
entrance of the broad valley leading up to Biyuk Anafarta, and, but for
the risk from occasional snipers, communication with Anzac was freely
open.[197] To these great advantages must be added the heavy losses
inflicted upon the Turks--losses, however, which were counterbalanced
by our own, and could be more speedily replaced.
The immediate weakness of our position was due to the enemy’s continued
occupation of the heights in the range of varied mountain and plateau
from Ejelmer Bay to W Hill; for guns on those heights commanded the
greater part of the Salt Lake plain and the positions round the
bay, especially on the north side, where our main landing-places
and headquarters were situated. Another weakness was the enemy’s
occupation of Hill 60 (Kaiajik Aghala), which faces W Hill across the
Biyuk Anafarta valley and commanded the approach to the upper reaches,
as well as threatening the communication between Anzac and Suvla.
Reckoning up the advantages gained, and refusing to be discouraged by
the ill-success of his main design, Sir Ian resolved at once to remove
these causes of weakness by a renewal of the combined attack. It was
probable also that, if the reinforced Turkish Army were allowed to
remain undisturbed, it would assume a violent offensive, especially
directed against Suvla.
[Sidenote: ADEQUATE REINFORCEMENTS REFUSED]
The losses during the second week in August had been serious--not less
than 30,000 on all three fronts together. Sir Ian estimated his total
force at 95,000 in the middle of August (40,000, including 17,000
French troops, at Helles; 25,000 at Anzac; under 30,000 at Suvla).[198]
But this was a sanguine estimate. The real fighting strength of the
British and Anzac troops was probably not over 60,000, and of the
French about 15,000. The British Divisions alone were short by nearly
1500 officers. On August 16 he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener stating
that 45,000 rifles to fill up gaps in the British Divisions, and
50,000 rifles as fresh reinforcements, were essential for a quick
and victorious decision.[199] Unfortunately, as it now appears, the
great strategic and political conception of the Dardanelles had now
less support than ever in the Cabinet. The fall of Warsaw (August 4)
had destroyed the last hope of Russian co-operation. The influence
of the “Westerners” was supreme. The attempt to break through the
German line at Loos in September was already in preparation, and all
available forces were concentrated upon that. By various means, an
increasingly despondent or hostile criticism of the Gallipoli campaign
was insinuated throughout the country, and Sir Ian’s request for
further assistance was refused. The hesitating Cabinet may have hoped
that, if the Western offensive succeeded, the Dardanelles campaign,
after remaining suspended for two or three months, might then be
pushed forward again without loss of opportunity. If that was their
expectation, they had forgotten Napoleon’s maxim, that war is like a
woman in that, if once you miss your opportunity, you need never expect
to find either war or woman the same again.
All the reinforcement allowed for the moment was the 2nd Mounted
Division from Egypt, where it had been in training since April. This
Division of four brigades, numbering just under 5000 men, was composed
of Yeomanry regiments from the Midland and Southern counties. The men
were of singularly fine physique, accustomed to hunting, and well
trained in cavalry manœuvres. But, like all “mounted” forces on the
Peninsula, they left their horses in Egypt and fought on foot. They
were under the command of Major-General William Peyton, a cavalry
officer, who had served with distinction in Egypt and South Africa, and
was now about fifty.[200] His Brigadiers and regimental officers were
also cavalrymen of distinction, and, so far as its numbers allowed,
the Division could be counted upon to strengthen any attack.[201]
[Sidenote: THE ASSAULT OF AUGUST 21]
But, however excellent in itself, the Mounted Division was not numerous
enough to give stability to the Suvla Divisions, most of which were
still fatigued and disheartened by the ill success of their first
attempts at warfare.[202] In the hope of affording the much-needed
stiffening to the IXth Corps, Major-General De Lisle, accordingly, was
instructed to bring the three brigades of his own 29th Division round
from Helles by night, and land them at Suvla for the attack. They were
under the command of their next senior officer, Major-General W. R.
Marshall of the 87th Brigade. De Lisle himself, being in temporary
command of the IXth Corps, directed the whole action. His scheme was
very simple. On his right, the 11th Division was to assault the
trenches which the Turks had now dug across the Biyuk Anafarta valley
or plain, south and a little east of Chocolate and Green Hills, and so
to protect the right flank until the moment came for a general attack
upon W Hill, the ultimate objective of the whole movement. On his
centre, the 29th Division was to storm Scimitar Hill, the possession of
which, as before explained, was essential to any advance against W Hill
itself. To his left, the long line from Sulajik Farm across the wooded
plain up to the summit of Kiretch Tepe was held by the two Territorial
Divisions, the 53rd and 54th, so as to check any attempt to turn the
flank on that side by getting behind our attacking force. Chocolate
Hill, 1000 yards from the summit of Scimitar Hill, was the centre
of our advance, and on the night of August 20–21 the 29th Division
entered the trenches close to the left of that hill, the 11th Division
stretching down the slope and into the plain on the right.
The action was to open with the customary bombardment, intended to
shatter the enemy’s trenches. For this purpose, two battleships and
two cruisers were available, and on land the IXth Corps’ artillery now
counted two R.F.A. Brigades (short of horses), two heavy batteries,
two mountain batteries, and two batteries of 5-inch howitzers.[203]
For an Army Corps of nominally six Divisions the number of guns was
absurdly small. But as the front to be attacked measured only a mile,
it was hoped the bombardment would be effective. Unfortunately, even
this hope was frustrated by a condition which could not be foreseen.
Usually, in the afternoon, the prospect from Suvla towards the hills
is brilliantly clear. The whole range stands visible in every detail.
The westering sun appears to reveal every kink and cranny, every tree
and mass of bush. Even as far away as Sari Bair, the rocks of Koja
Chemen ravine, the “chimney” down the face of Chunuk Bair, and the
yellow patch of the Farm are distinct in the clear air and sunlight.
For this reason the afternoon had been chosen for attack, the sun being
then behind us, but glaring, as might be hoped, in the enemy’s eyes.
But that day it so happened that the whole country was covered with a
thin grey mist, as on an October morning in England. From the sea, the
hills were dim. From the front, all details were obscured. Sir Ian, who
had come over from Imbros, wished to postpone the attack, and prudence
might have been wise for once. But he tells us that “various reasons”
which remain unknown, but were perhaps concerned with the presence of
the 29th Division in the Suvla sphere, made postponement impossible.
Accordingly, at 2.45 a violent bombardment began, directed upon
Scimitar and W Hills. It was a terrific sight. Our large shells flung
up great spouts and fountains of earth and stones, so that the summits
smoked with repeated eruption. At the same time, the air was full
of the white balls of bursting shrapnel. But the Turks could answer
now. At first they directed their shrapnel and high explosives upon
Chocolate Hill, where we had twenty-eight machine-guns in position.
Besides the guns on W Hill, the Turks now had guns concealed somewhere
on the Anafarta plateau or on the foothills of Tekke Tepe, whence they
could bring a converging fire to bear. Their bombardment of our
position was very heavy. The shells tore at our parapets. The air above
our trenches hissed with bullets and fragments. Many of us were struck.
But at 3.15 our infantry began to advance.[204]
[Illustration: CONTOUR IN METRES.
(1m. = 39.87 in.)
ATTACK OF 11TH DIVISION, AUGUST 21]
[Sidenote: MISTAKES IN ADVANCE ON RIGHT]
On the right the 34th Brigade (now under Brigadier-General J. Hill)
advanced successfully across the narrow front of plain between the
small farms of Hetman Chair and Aire Kavak (a quarter-mile south of
Hetman). They took the trenches on the plain without great loss. But
the 32nd Brigade (now under Lieut.-Colonel J. T. R. Wilson), which was
to have kept in touch with them at Hetman Chair, and to have seized
a long trench running thence towards W Hill, lost direction and kept
edging off to their left or north-east, instead of due east. The plain
is open but for a sprinkling of small trees, and the mist was not thick
enough to confuse. They may have been attracted by the chance of cover
among the slopes leading up to the hills on their left, and the fire
from the long communication trench was certainly very severe. It was
still more unfortunate that when the 33rd Brigade (Maxwell’s) was sent
up to capture the trench at all costs, they “fell into precisely the
same error,” as we are told. Some of the brigade followed the 32nd
to the left; some edged away to their right in the direction of Susuk
Kuyu, which must have taken them behind the 34th Brigade, almost into
the Anzac country. But as we are further told that the 32nd, though
without success, attempted to rectify the error by bravely attacking
the trench from the north-east, the solution remains uncertain.[205]
The attack on that side did not develop further. After 4.30 p.m. one
could perceive that the battalions were confused, and still suffering
heavily both from that long and loopholed trench which ran across the
open almost diagonally to their right flank, and from most formidable
trenches which the Turks had now visibly constructed right across
the sombre face of W Hill, against which they showed up as lines of
whitish grey, loopholed also and roofed with head-cover. Parties
tried to press forward here and there, and the dead lay scattered.
Two stretcher-bearers I saw quietly going up a slope under very heavy
fire, when both fell dead simultaneously, dropping on hands and knees,
so that the stretcher remained supported on their shoulders after
they were dead. But no individual courage could retrieve the error of
direction.
[Sidenote: THE 29TH DIVISION IN THE CENTRE]
The attack in the centre suffered from the mistake. The 29th Division
now contained far less than half of the troops who landed in April.
Few indeed of their original officers were left, few of the trusted
sergeants and corporals whom they knew. They had been brought hurriedly
into the midst of an unknown scene, and found themselves included
between lines of unknown and untried battalions. Their former
General was gone. His successor was compelled to remain in the Corps
Headquarters far away on Karakol Dagh. The Division was commanded by
the C.O. of a brigade. None the less, this indomitable Division, in
this its last battle upon the Peninsula, displayed to the last the
indomitable spirit habitual to its nature, and fought with the same
proud self-sacrifice and confident enthusiasm as had distinguished it
at the landing.
Between 3.30 and 4, the 87th Brigade (2nd South Wales Borderers, 1st
K.O.S.B., 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and 1st Border Regiment)
advanced from our front trenches, and began working up through the
bush on the left front of Scimitar Hill. At first they were partially
concealed by the thickets or covered by dead ground in ravines.
Reaching the top of the slope, they charged forward to the summit. The
Inniskillings, who were leading, actually gained it. They drove the
Turks back along the communication trenches towards Anafarta Sagir.
They even pursued them down the reverse slope, which is not steep but
runs without much fall toward the village plateau. For a few minutes
the Hill was ours. But still stronger trenches had been constructed on
the edge of the plateau beyond. They were invisible from the ascent to
Scimitar Hill; but from Chocolate Hill we could see fire flashing from
them, and Turks springing on to the parapets to pour bullets upon our
scattered line as it advanced. At the same time the enemy’s guns on
W Hill and on the concealed point near the foot of Tekke Tepe hurled
a storm of incessant shrapnel over the summit of Scimitar Hill and
all its slopes. The converging fire was intolerable. Unless help came
speedily, the position could not be held. It is doubtful whether any
help could have retained the hold. But none came.
On the right of the hill the 86th Brigade (2nd Royal Fusiliers, 1st
Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st Munster Fusiliers, and 1st Dublin Fusiliers)
was intended to storm the position in a similar manner from that side.
But as they advanced they found their progress hindered by battalions
of the 32nd and 33rd Brigades, which, as narrated above, had edged off
to their left instead of keeping their direction straight forward and
working on parallel lines with the 29th Division. Battalions in the
three brigades thus converged and became confused. The men were mixed
up in the shallow valley beyond Green Hill and upon the south-west
slopes of Scimitar Hill. Instead of being covered by the 11th Division
as intended, the right flank of the 29th Division was hampered and
almost paralysed. Such battalions as got clear attempted to work up
that side of the hill, turning north-east. But the confusion was
increased by a raging fire, which with long tongues of flame consumed
what was left of the bush around the base of the hill already called
“Burnt,” and entirely shut off co-operation with the 87th Brigade on
the left. Such parties as reached the broad bare patch of ravine from
which the other name of “Scimitar” was derived, became at once exposed
to the storm of shrapnel and rifle-fire. Sir Ian in his dispatch says,
“The leading troops were simply swept off the top of the spur, and
had to fall back to a ledge south-west of Scimitar Hill, where they
found a little cover.” If the “top of the spur” means the summit of
the hill, it is certain that none of this brigade ever reached it. The
Inniskillings were the only men who occupied it even for a time.
[Sidenote: ADVANCE OF THE YEOMANRY]
About five o’clock the Yeomanry Division was ordered to advance from
the cover of Lala Baba, where it had remained in reserve, and to take
up its position under the slighter cover of Chocolate Hill. In extended
order the small brigades, each numbering about 350, advanced with the
steadiness and regularity of parade across the bare and fully exposed
level of the Salt Lake. Some of the enemy’s guns diverted their fire
from Scimitar Hill and showered shrapnel over the slowly moving lines.
But their regularity was exactly maintained, and owing to the accurate
distance kept in the intervals the loss was small. Only too eager to
reach the firing line, they forced their way through the reserves of
the 11th Division around the slopes on the left side of Chocolate Hill,
and plunged into the brigades at the centre of the lines, already so
much confused and embarrassed. There was much delay, and in places the
crowding troops exposed themselves unnecessarily to heavy fire. But the
2nd South Midland Brigade (Bucks, Berks, and Dorsets) concentrated, as
was intended, behind Chocolate Hill itself, and was at last able to
advance with fair cohesion. Very slowly the men made their way across
our trenches to the left front of the hill, and through the difficult
and intricate ground beyond, still swept by the flames of the burning
bushes, and encumbered by groups of men who had lost leadership. It was
past seven by the time they reached the foot of the main ascent, and
began to work their way up through fire and smoke and shrapnel.
At 7.30, through the gathering obscurity of mists and evening, we
from the parapet in front of Chocolate Hill dimly discerned a crowd
of khaki figures struggling at full speed up that broad, bare patch
of the “Scimitar.” They seemed to gain the summit, and then darkness
covered them. All thought the terrible position was won at last, and
though there was no cheering, and hardly a word was said, all felt the
joy of hope renewed. We did not know the hope was disappointed as soon
as raised. The cross-fire of shrapnel, machine-guns, and rifles from
the two hidden trenches beyond the summit, swept off the Yeomanry as
it had swept off the 87th Brigade at an earlier hour. Hearing that the
position was utterly untenable, General Marshall was compelled to order
a withdrawal to the original line, and in the darkness the sorely tried
and exhausted men came back. One regiment, working round the right of
the hill later in the evening, gained a knoll between Scimitar and W
Hills, apparently near the Abrikja Farm, and reported they had taken W
Hill itself. When the mistake was discovered, they also were withdrawn,
for in daylight they would have been exterminated there.[206]
[Sidenote: FAILURE AT SCIMITAR HILL]
This unsuccessful attempt to capture the hill so ominously known as
“Scimitar,” and occupied, it may be remembered, without opposition
by a single battalion on Sunday evening, August 8, cost little less
than 6500 casualties. Most of the loss fell on the 29th Division, but
the Yeomanry lost nearly 1000 of their small force, and among the
killed were Brigadier-General F. A. Kenna, V.C. (formerly of the 21st
Lancers), Brigadier-General the Earl of Longford (formerly of the 2nd
Life Guards), whose body was never found, and Sir John Milbanke, V.C.
(formerly of the 10th Hussars), commanding the Sherwood Rangers.[207]
The failure of the attempt had proved that even when acting in
combination with the finest Regulars, inexperienced and untried
brigades cannot be hurried into the firing lines of an important attack
without risk of confusion or collapse. For neither in officers nor
in men had the sense of leadership, confidence, or even of direction
been trained into an instinct strong enough to bear the strain of
the shocks and confused impressions inevitable to a violently opposed
advance.
On the south or Anzac side of the broad valley leading up to Biyuk
Anafarta, the action was far more successful. The main object in this
region was to secure complete possession of the Kaiajik Aghala, that
rough and intersected ridge partly occupied by the 4th Australian
Infantry Brigade during the general attack upon Sari Bair a fortnight
earlier. That brigade, reduced to some 1500 men, now held a position
separated by a deep creek from the main ridge, the whole of which, and
especially the broad and flattish eminence at the northern extremity,
had been occupied by the Turks and strongly fortified. The white lines
of their trenches were visible from Suvla and the whole district, the
earth being whitish there, as though mixed with chalk. The eminence,
which we knew as Hill 60, was chequered with these lines, and resembled
the back of a large tortoise with the markings picked out in white.
It was, indeed, converted into a fortress commanding the broad and
flattish valley between it and W Hill about one and a half miles away.
As before explained, the possession of Hill 60 was essential for the
security of communication between Anzac and Suvla. If W Hill had been
occupied, Biyuk Anafarta and the northern approaches to Koja Chemen
Tepe would also have lain open.
[Sidenote: ATTACK ON KABAK KUYU WELLS]
Only a short distance west of Hill 60, just where the ridge begins
to rise from the plain, two wells called Kabak (or Kaba) Kuyu are
situated, equally desirable to the enemy and to ourselves. These
also the Turks had strongly fortified, and our first stroke was to
seize them. Major-General Sir Herbert Cox, who was in command of
the whole movement, had at his disposal his own Indian Brigade, two
regiments (Canterbury and Otago) of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, a mixed
force of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, the 4th South Wales
Borderers (40th Brigade, 13th Division), the 5th Connaught Rangers,
and the 10th Hampshires (both of the 29th Brigade, 10th Division,
now under Lieut.-Colonel Agnew).[208] His guns were commanded by
Brigadier-General Napier Johnston. He arranged his line so as to have
the 5th Gurkhas in the open ground on his extreme left, guarding
the communication with Suvla, the Connaught Rangers in the centre
opposite the wells, the New Zealanders under Brigadier-General Russell
to the right of them, the Hampshires in support of the Australians
who attacked on the right, and the remainder in reserve. After a
preliminary but insufficient bombardment, the advance began about 3.30
p.m. on August 21, almost exactly at the same time as the attack upon
Scimitar Hill across the broad valley.
The moment the guns ceased, the Connaught Rangers, who were finely
commanded throughout by Lieut.-Colonel Jourdain, issued from a ravine
in the maze of Damakjelik Hill, where they had lain concealed all day.
“With a yell like hounds breaking covert,” they dashed forward by
platoons in line. They had nearly 400 yards to run, and the ground was
open. A terrible fire from the parapets around the wells and from the
slopes of Hill 60 itself met them at once. Without firing a shot in
answer, they charged forward with bayonets level. It was a race which
a young officer won--an International football player for Ireland. The
Turks stood the wild onset, but not for long. In a few minutes they
had died or escaped; the wells were ours, the communications cleared.
A reserve company charged still farther forward to assist the New
Zealanders at the foot of Hill 60, but was almost exterminated.[209]
The remainder became scattered in the confusion of the assault, lost
direction, and were not re-formed till nightfall.
[Sidenote: FIRST ATTACK ON HILL 60]
To the right of the Connaught Rangers, the New Zealanders issued at
the same time from the almost inextricable gullies of the Damakjelik,
but between them and Hill 60 ran a singularly deep ravine, one of the
branches of the Kaiajik Dere. In climbing down the steep side of this
ravine, entangled in prickly bushes, many fell to the bullets poured
from the opposite trenches, and the bodies of many who fell there
could not be recovered for burial. The only chance for safety was to
rush down to the bottom of the ravine and shelter in the dead ground
against the steep side of the hill itself. The New Zealanders made
the rush, and some succeeded in climbing up the dead ground opposite
and driving the enemy out from 50 yards of his lowest trench. Others
remained clinging to the steep side, and there a few of the South Wales
Borderers, who came between the New Zealanders and the Connaught
Rangers, succeeded in joining them. Three hundred yards farther to
their right, a party of the 4th Australian Brigade rushed across the
ravine in the same manner, and the hundred who came over untouched
also clung to the side of the hill just below the trench. So the night
was passed, our men along the steep dead ground just holding their
position, but exposed to repeated bombing from the trench above them.
Fortunately, the Australian Brigade dug a deep zigzag right across the
middle of the ravine as a communication trench, thus rendering the
approach over the upper or southern reach of the Dere fairly secure.
During the night also many wounded, lying on the exposed slope of the
ravine, and drawing attention by their cries, were brought in. But the
hours passed in great peril and discomfort.[210]
[Sidenote: SECOND ATTACK ON HILL 60]
Next morning a new battalion (the 18th Australian) appeared. It had
arrived at Anzac only the day before as the first instalment of the
2nd Australian Division, commanded by Major-General J. G. Legge, who
had occupied various military positions in New South Wales, had served
in South Africa, and represented Australia on the Imperial General
Staff.[211] Early on August 22 the 18th Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel
A. E. Chapman) passed through the Gurkhas on our left, and charging
across the open, fought their way up the northern end of the hill and
captured another piece of the outer trench. Bombed and enfiladed there,
most of them struggled along the trench to their right--a difficult
task, for the Turks had dug it so deep and narrow that only one man
at a time could squeeze along it. Thus they linked up with the New
Zealanders, still in the same position where they had passed the night.
The trench, in fact, ran continuously all round the oval of the hill,
and for the next five days we could but cling on to the small segment
gained. Meantime the Connaught Rangers were withdrawn for four days to
rest. They had lost 12 officers and over 250 men.[212] After the first
attack, the 29th (British) Brigade under Colonel Agnew was employed by
General Russell to dig a communication trench past Kaba Kuyu to Hill
60. They therefore had little rest.
The hill was not taken, but so important was the position considered
that Major-General Cox was instructed to attack once more on August
27, three weeks after the beginning of the great battle of Suvla-Sari
Bair. The fighting round Hill 60 had, in fact, been almost continuous
since the 21st. The battalions were now worn so thin by losses and
sickness (especially by dysentery) that definite numbers of men were
allotted for action instead of units. On the right, 350 men were chosen
from the 4th Australian Brigade; in the centre, 100 Maoris and 300
New Zealanders from the Mounted Rifles Brigade (Auckland, Canterbury,
Wellington, and Otago), together with 100 of the new 18th Australian
Battalion; on the left, 250 of the Connaught Rangers--only 1100 men
in all.[213] This attacking party was under the direct command of
Brigadier-General Russell.
The action began at 4 p.m. with the usual, as it was the last,
bombardment. Sir Ian describes it as “the heaviest we could afford,”
and certainly it appeared sufficient to flatten out any trenches. None
the less, as was usual from first to last in this campaign, its terrors
were deceptive, and the moment that the assaulting parties advanced
they were met by overwhelming fire. The Australians on the right were
swept back by a whole battery of machine-guns. The Connaught Rangers
on the left, though much enfeebled by dysentery, charged upon the
northern trenches with their accustomed enthusiasm. Torn by accurate
shrapnel as they ran forward, they still fought their way into the
first narrow trench, and occupied it by 6 p.m. But all that evening
and night, by the light of the crescent moon, the Turks stormed down
upon them in successive waves, shouting their battle-cry of “Allah!
Allah!” At 10.30 p.m. they bombed and shot the Rangers out of the
northern extremity, and drove them along the trench upon the centre. It
was in vain that their own reserves (forty-four sick men!) came up to
reinforce, and the 9th Light Horse (3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade)
attempted about midnight to recapture the position. Only in the centre
were the New Zealanders able to cling tight to the 150 yards they had
by this time already won.
[Sidenote: THE LAST BATTLE]
All next day (August 28) the Turkish attacks upon that position
continued with repeated violence. The shattered remnants of the
Connaught Rangers were withdrawn, but still the New Zealanders held on
through the long hours and the next night, until at 1 a.m. on the 29th
all that remained of the 10th Light Horse, after their wild assault
upon the Nek three weeks before, formed up in the trenches occupied
by the New Zealanders, and stormed across the centre of the fortified
hill, driving the enemy sheer off the circumference of the western
semicircle. The eastern side of the hill was never taken, but our line
was advanced till it ran across the summit, and there consolidated. Our
loss was about 1000. The Turkish loss was roughly estimated at 5000,
and we captured 46 prisoners and a considerable quantity of rifles and
ammunition, besides three trench-mortars and three machine-guns. It
was not a great action judged by the standard of the battles in the war
elsewhere. But it was an action worthy of the persistence, courage, and
endurance displayed throughout by Anzacs, Irish, and British upon the
Peninsula; and it was the last.
The whole of the Anzac force, which had never left the fighting zone
since the landing in April, was now gradually withdrawn by battalions
(only 200 or 300 men in each) to rest in Mudros, their places being
filled in turn by the newly arrived 2nd Australian Division, which,
however, was not completely settled upon that hard-won ground till
after the first week in September.[214] The 54th (East Anglian)
Division was also brought round from Suvla, Major-General Inglefield’s
headquarters being dug upon the Aghyl Dere, and his Division extended
north over the ravines of Damakjelik up to the confines of Hill 60
itself. But the 13th Division, now under Major-General F. Stanley
Maude, was returned to the IXth Corps at Suvla, so that Anzac did not
gain.