SUVLA BAY
Beyond the Asmak Dere, which, as described in the last chapter, formed
the northern limit of the Anzac movement against the Sari Bair range,
the coast continues its north-westerly trend till the sharp and rocky
headland of Nibrunesi Point is reached. Inland, the plain naturally
increases in area as the hills diverge towards the north-east. It is
flat and open land, studded with low trees and bushes. Nearly all
the surface is waste, but small farms, surrounded by larger trees
and patches of cultivation, occur here and there, as at Kazlar Chair
close to the Asmak, and Hetman Chair about a mile north of it (“Chair”
meaning meadow). The soil becomes more and more marshy as one proceeds,
and in winter the region nearest the Salt Lake is waterlogged. The bush
also grows more dense, but is crossed by sheep tracks, and is nowhere
impenetrable. The plain, as we have seen, forms the entrance to the
broad and open valley of Biyuk (Big) Anafarta, the cypress groves of
which are clearly visible about three and a half miles to the right.
[Illustration: THE SUVLA LANDING]
[Sidenote: HILLS COMMANDING THE BAY]
Nibrunesi Point, or Kuchuk Kemikli, rises with steep cliffs on both
sides, but steeper on the north, where they fall abruptly into Suvla
Bay. It is the extremity of what was once a high ridge or chain of
reddish conglomerate rock, hard but friable. The chain is now marked
by a series of isolated knolls--first the low knolls upon the Point
itself; then the broad-based rounded hill of Lala Baba, which rises
to about 150 feet; then, beyond the southern end of the Salt Lake and
a stretch of marsh and bushy plain, Yilghin Burnu (better known to us
as “Chocolate Hill,” from its reddish-brown colour even before it was
burnt), which is a similar but larger rounded hill, like an inverted
bowl, rising about 160 feet; then, beyond a brief but steepish dip
or saddle, Hill 50 or “Green Hill” (so called because the thick bush
covering it was not burnt), rising to nearly equal height, but not
so round or definite in shape; lastly, beyond a wide and distinctive
break, the formidable mass of Ismail Oglu Tepe (known to us as “W
Hill” from the waving outline of its crest, but more officially called
“Hill 112” from its approximate height in metres). Ismail Oglu, thus
rising about 330 feet, forms the rectangular corner of the high plateau
on which Anafarta Sagir (Kuchuk or Little Anafarta) stands, and from
the southern face it commands the Biyuk Anafarta valley and the hills
across it at the foot of Sari Bair, while from the western face it
commands Green and Chocolate Hills, almost the whole of the plain north
of them, the Salt Lake, and the northern shores of Suvla Bay. It is,
therefore, the most vital and dominating position, unless long-range
guns were placed on the much loftier height of Tekke Tepe.
But of almost equal importance in the campaign was a rounded hill
which projects sharply from the Anafarta ridge or plateau north of
Ismail Oglu Tepe. Down the western front of this hill, which looks
over the plain to the very centre of the Salt Lake, and to Suvla Bay
beyond, runs a broad yellow “blaze” of bare ground, showing a marl
and soft sandstone surface (the formation of this plateau being again
of the same character as the Sari Bair range). This “blaze” appears
from the sea to be shaped like a Gurkha’s “kukri” or an old-fashioned
Turkish scimitar, and so the hill came to be called “Scimitar Hill.”
But officially it was “Hill 70” from its height in metres (say 200
feet), and commonly the soldiers called it “Burnt Hill,” which was no
distinction. It was connected, apparently without much break or dip,
with the plateau behind it bearing the general name of Baka Baba, on
which the windmills, the white minaret, and some of the houses of
Little Anafarta could be distinctly seen from the beach. The minaret,
however, was destroyed by the Turks on Sept. 6, as affording a sighting
point for naval fire. This description covers the southern and
south-east positions to be attacked in the Suvla district.
[Sidenote: THE SALT LAKE AND BAY]
From Nibrunesi Point the coast-line curves sharply into a semicircular
bay, the diameter of which is close upon two miles. The north side of
the Point itself falls, as described, in steep cliffs to a narrow and
rocky beach. The cliff continues till the foot of Lala Baba is passed,
and then it suddenly ends in low dunes of soft and drifting sand. These
in turn sink into a spit or isthmus, about 700 yards long, and some 200
yards across at its broadest part. It is all of loose sand, very tiring
to walk on, though bent grass and patches of heath bind it together
here and there. The shallow bay lies on the left; the large expanse
of the Salt Lake on the right. The Salt Lake measures about a mile and
a half at its greatest length and breadth each way, forming a kind of
square with irregular sides. Its surface in summer is thinly crusted
with salt deposit upon caked and fissured mud, fairly sound for walking
or riding, though in places the foot sinks above the ankle, and on
the south side above the knees. Consequently, the south side, thickly
covered with high reeds and ending in the marshy plain, is always
impassable for troops, though a track not far from the edge can be used
in summer for carts and even guns.
At the end of the sandy spit is a channel, which in winter admits the
sea into the lake under a strong west wind, and drains it out again.
In summer, though sticky, it can be crossed on foot, but we bridged
it. After crossing it, one continues upon loose and wearisome sand,
the sandhills on the right combining to form a low, heathy plateau,
at first mistaken for “Hill 10” (so called from its height in metres)
about 1000 yards inland. The beach continues sandy, the sea shallow,
and walking very tedious till nearly half-way round the northern
side of the semicircle, when one strikes the rocky formation of the
northern point. The coast-line then rises into rocky cliffs of no great
height under a low hill called Ghazi Baba, and runs into rocky inlets
or creeks. The sea becomes deeper, the land undulates and is thickly
covered with heath and prickly bush. So it continues up to the final
hill, where the bay ends in the jagged rocks of the extremity called by
us Suvla Point, and by the Turks Biyuk Kemikli.
There the coast turns suddenly north-east, and forms the side of the
Gulf of Xeros. The land rises into a steep razor-edge or whale-back
of grey limestone, looking white in the sun, and bare but for shrubs
and aromatic plants growing in the crannies between the rocks. This
razor-edge is really continuous except for notches, knolls, and
shallow scoops along the sky-line. But the Turks have given the ridge
the separate names of Karakol Dagh (Coastguard Mountain) and Kiretch
Tepe Sirt. This Tepe Sirt or Hill Summit rises to the height of 600
feet at the points which we afterwards called Jephson’s Post and the
Pimple. Thence the ridge runs at a varying but lower level till it
reaches Ejelmer Bay, where there is good anchorage and an opening into
a central plain of the Peninsula. The distance from Suvla Point to
Ejelmer Bay is nearly 7 miles.
[Sidenote: HILLS NORTH AND NORTH-EAST OF BAY]
The whole of this ridge is steep and rocky on the south side
overlooking Suvla Bay, but is everywhere accessible by climbing, and
admits of paths being cut obliquely or in zigzag. The northern side
falls abruptly into the Gulf of Xeros, across which the opposite coast
of Thrace, from the mouth of the Maritza eastward, can be distinctly
seen. Near Suvla Point the cliffs are precipitous, and leave little
or no beach. Farther along, the face of the ridge, though always very
steep, becomes accessible, and spreads out at the bottom into a kind
of “undercliff” above the shore, which is indented by a succession
of miniature bays, like bathing coves. All this part of the slope is
deeply scored by ravines, rocky, steep, and covered with thick bush.
This face was commanded by the enemy’s guns only from Kartal Tepe,
a barren promontory of fantastic cliffs, different in formation, and
apparently of dark and slaty shale, which projects from the coast a
mile or so beyond the farthest point reached by our lines.
Farther along the coast towards Ejelmer Bay the razor-edge meets
almost at right angles with a mass of mountain running south towards
the Anafarta plateau. The range rises rapidly to the conjoined heights
of Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe (Saint’s Hill), each about 850 feet. It
completely shuts in the Suvla region on the north-east side, presenting
a steep, though not really a precipitous, western face towards the
bay, and commanding the whole district from end to end. It is dark
with thick scrub to the rounded summits, and always reminded me of the
Wrekin’s western face, looking towards Shrewsbury, as seen from the
site of Uriconium. At the southern end it falls by a similar steep
slope to the Anafarta plateau, throwing up one little isolated hill
above the plateau, like the spadeful of rocks which the devil dropped
in his hurry to pile the Wrekin.
From these descriptions of the northern, eastern, and southern
positions around Suvla, it will be seen that the heights, starting from
Kiretch Tepe and running round over Kavak Tepe and Tekke Tepe to the
elevated Anafarta plateau, Scimitar Hill, and Ismail Oglu Tepe, form an
irregular semicircle, roughly corresponding to the regular semicircle
of Suvla Bay, and commanding it from a wide circumference. This outer
semicircle encloses a fairly open plain, cultivated in parts by ancient
farms, such as Anafarta Ova (Plain) and Sulajik. Large trees, so rarely
seen in the Near East, give that part of the plain the appearance of
a park in one of the fatted counties of England. But most of it is
bare except for heath and thin grass, until the foot of the hills is
reached, when the prickly bush becomes thick as usual, interrupting
any advance in line, effectively concealing numberless snipers, and
impenetrable except by devious and isolating paths. Each farm has
a well or fountain, and one of the watercourses, running into the
north-east corner of the Salt Lake, contains water. There is a spring
at the foot of the Karakol Dagh, not far from the bay. Two good running
fountains, constructed with low bridges, stone spouts, and troughs,
are to be found on the plain north-east of the Salt Lake among the
large trees mentioned; and there is a smaller source just south-west
of Chocolate Hill. But these wells and springs might easily be missed
by troops advancing under fire across an unknown and almost pathless
country.
[Sidenote: GENERAL STOPFORD AND THE IXTH CORPS]
Such was the district into which the IXth Army Corps was launched in
the night of August 6–7. As has been mentioned, Lieut.-General Sir
Frederick Stopford had arrived in the middle of July to take command,
and for a short time had succeeded General Hunter-Weston in command of
the VIIIth Army Corps at Helles, so as to gain experience in Peninsula
warfare. He had entered the Grenadier Guards in the early “Seventies”;
had seen the usual service of officers at the end of last century, in
India, West Africa, and Egypt; during the South African War he was
Military Secretary to General Buller, and entered Ladysmith with him
at the relief. Since then he had occupied various military positions
at home and was still on the Active List though a little over sixty.
His reputation stood high as a student and teacher of military history,
and long experience had given him an accurate knowledge of army
routine. But he had never held high command in the field, and neither
history nor routine in itself inspires to action; still less do years
of official duty in the Metropolis. Rather they suppress the hopeful
buoyancy of spirit and rapid fertility of resource essential for
generalship, while they tend to accentuate the hesitating deliberation
and cautious apprehension of risk which too often develop with
increasing years. Habits mainly sedentary are also likely to reduce the
enthusiasm for physical activity as middle age is passing.
At the same time it is fair to remember that the force now entrusted
to General Stopford for this vital enterprise was an Army Corps only
in name. Nominally it consisted of the 10th, 11th, and 13th Divisions,
composed as we have seen. But the 13th Division (Major-General Shaw)
had been deflected to Anzac for the assault against Sari Bair, together
with the 29th Brigade (Brigadier-General Cooper) of the 10th Division.
General Stopford was thus left with only the 11th (Northern) Division
under Major-General Hammersley, and two brigades of the 10th (Irish)
Division under Lieut.-General Sir Bryan Mahon. All the battalions in
these Divisions were New Army men, and had never been in action before.
Normally each Division should have possessed sixteen batteries of
artillery (including the H.Q. Divisional Artillery), so that (allowing
for the absence of the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade) the IXth
Army Corps should have commanded twenty-eight batteries, or 112 guns;
whereas, at the time of landing, it had only one Field Artillery
battery and two Highland Mountain batteries of small calibre--old and
useless for service--counting twelve guns in all.[177] It is true that
General Stopford could also command the support of naval guns, but by
the nature of the case the guns had been unable to register for fear of
thwarting the surprise, the maps were uncertain, and most of the Suvla
plain was invisible from the sea owing to its flatness.
Of the Divisional Generals, Sir Bryan Mahon was fifty-three, was a
cavalryman (8th Royal Irish Hussars), held a long record of service in
India and Egypt, and had won distinction by the relief of Mafeking in
1900. Since then he had been Military Governor of Kordofan, and had
commanded the Lucknow Division till the outbreak of the war. Possessing
many of the fine Irish qualities, and some of the supposed Irish
defects, he was regarded with patriotic affection by his Division; but,
like most of our Generals, had seen no active service for fourteen
or fifteen years, and then in wars unlike the present. Major-General
Frederick Hammersley (Lancashire Fusiliers) had also served in India,
Egypt, and South Africa, and on various Staff appointments; but owing
to serious illness had recently held no military position.
As in the last chapter, on Sari Bair, it will be convenient to divide
the Suvla fighting by days and nights, counting from evening to evening.
_From the evening of Friday, August 6, to the evening of August 7._
[Sidenote: THE FORCE AT SEA]
By the time darkness set in, Brigadier-General F. F. Hill was making up
the Asiatic coast from Mitylene (120 miles) with his 31st Brigade and
two battalions of the 30th (10th Division), which had been transhipped
from their transports into ten trawlers and passenger steamers.
Brigadier-General L. L. Nicol was on his way from Mudros (60 miles)
with the remaining two battalions of his 30th Brigade and the 5th Royal
Irish (Pioneers), accompanied by Sir Bryan Mahon and his Divisional
Staff. At Imbros, the three brigades of the 11th Division (the 32nd,
33rd, and 34th, under Brigadier-Generals Haggard, Maxwell, and Sitwell)
were embarked in destroyers and “beetles” (motor-lighters), about 500
men being packed in each destroyer and “beetle.” The “beetles” were
under charge of Captain Unwin, the hero of the _River Clyde_. Three
of each kind of vessel were allotted to each brigade, the destroyers
towing the “beetles.” Two cruisers (“blister ships”) also carried
1000 men apiece, to be landed by the “beetles” as soon as their own
contingents and those on the destroyers had been discharged. Behind
the infantry followed trawlers towing horse-boats with horses and
guns;[178] and the sloop _Aster_ with 500 men, presumably gunners,
towing a lighter with eight mountain-guns, and four water-lighters
specially provided by Brigadier-General Lotbinière, then Director of
Works.
[Sidenote: THE WATER SUPPLY]
Each of the water-lighters carried about 50 or 60 tons, and was to be
refilled from two water-ships, the _Krene_ and _Phido_, each carrying
250 tons of water brought from Alexandria. The men embarked with full
water-bottles, and each “beetle” and destroyer was supplied with water
for refills on landing, and for the wants of beach-parties. It was also
confidently expected that plentiful water would be discovered during
the advance. But, though some water was there, it was not discovered,
or was not accessible. Inexperienced soldiers might be expected to
drain their water-bottles soon, and in the excitement and confusion
of landing to neglect the precaution of refilling. So it happened,
and to this natural carelessness must be added the absence of the
_Prah_, an Elder Dempster vessel of 3000 tons, carefully equipped
with water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, and the implements required
for the development of wells or springs--exactly the stores which
the experience of the April landings had proved essential to relieve
the torture of thirst among men exhausted by the nervous excitement
of battle, and by the heat, which in August had risen to glaring
intensity. The danger of thirst had always been present in the minds
of General Headquarters and the Administrative Staff. Petrol tins,
milk cans, camel tanks, water-bags, and pakhals for mules had been
provided in large quantities from India and Egypt. More than 4000 mules
for carrying water as well as rations and ammunition were by this time
collected for Anzac and Suvla, about 600 being allotted to Suvla alone
for the first landing. Critics after the event suggested that the men
should have carried half a dozen water-bottles apiece instead of their
packs. But, as a matter of fact, the 11th Division, at all events,
carried only their haversacks with two days’ iron rations, and left
their packs at Imbros. As to carrying more water-bottles, no one could
have foreseen the partial failure of the most elaborate precautions,
partly owing to the inexperience of a New Army Staff.[179]
The naval side of the whole landing--the organisation of all transport
until each detail came ashore--was in charge of Rear-Admiral Arthur
Christian, on board the sloop _Jonquil_, together with General Stopford
and his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General H. L. Reed, V.C. Vice-Admiral
de Robeck, with his Chief of Staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, was also
present on the light cruiser _Chatham_, and on the light cruiser
_Talbot_ was Brigadier-General S. C. V. Smith, R.A., in command of the
guns. Soon after 8 p.m. the flotilla began to glide northward through
the winding narrows of the netted and buoyed passage from Kephalos Bay.
The last of the vessels except the _Prah_ and water-lighters cleared
about 10 p.m. We heard the firing round the Vineyard at Helles, and the
perpetual whisper and rumble of rifles and guns at Lone Pine. On our
right front as we advanced past Anzac the New Zealanders were standing
mustered for the great assault. The water was dead calm, which was a
mercy for the soldiers crowded on the destroyers and “beetles.” No
lights were shown. There was no light but the brilliant stars. No one
except the Generals and Admirals knew our destination.
[Sidenote: THE LANDING BEACHES]
Sir Ian’s original design had been to land the whole of the 11th
Division at the continuous beach just south of Nibrunesi Point. Here
the shore is “steep to,” and the water comes up deep. A large part of
the force would be concealed or sheltered by the cliffs and hills, but
the beach itself is level and wide enough for mustering. The brigades,
after capturing the Lala Baba promontory, could then have advanced in
unison along the marshy but practicable ground south of the Salt Lake,
or before dawn even over the centre of the Lake itself, to the assault
upon Chocolate and W Hills. Meantime, we must suppose, Sir Ian had
intended the two brigades of the 10th Division to land on the north
side of the bay near Suvla Point and occupy the commanding razor-edge
of Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Most unfortunately, as it turned out, against
his better judgment he accepted General Stopford’s desire to land
one brigade inside the bay itself, apparently with the intention of
advancing across the plain on the north of the Salt Lake. Accordingly,
the navy was directed to put the 34th Brigade (Sitwell’s) ashore on the
sands of the north-east segment of the bay, while the 32nd (Haggard’s)
and the 33rd (Maxwell’s) were to land on the beach south of Nibrunesi
Point. This beach was divided into C (nearer the Point) for the
artillery, and B for the infantry, but it was one and continuous. The
navy originally chose the south-east arc of the bay for landing, hence
called “Old A Beach.” Among the rocky creeks near Suvla Point, A East
and A West were found on the 7th, and A West ultimately became the
main landing-place. But the true A Beach on which the 34th Brigade was
ordered to land was the long and sandy stretch just beside the entrance
or “cut” into the Salt Lake; and there the 34th Brigade landed.
Together with the two brigades of the 10th Division the total number of
all ranks and arms, including transport and supply, was from 25,000 to
27,000 to be landed. There was no wire entanglement along the shore;
the entrenchments were few and slight; the Turkish force holding the
district was estimated under 4000, apart from possible reserves behind
Sari Bair; and the actual bay was guarded, as was believed, only by
about 1000 gendarmes--700 on Lala Baba, 300 on Suvla Point. Sir Ian
confidently expected, therefore, that the two Divisions, though short
in numbers (showing a total of about 20,000 rifles or rather less),
almost destitute of guns apart from the fleet, and unavoidably
destitute of experience in actual war, would certainly be able to
occupy the inner semicircle of the bay and the outer semicircle of the
commanding heights, or at all events the vital points of Kiretch Tepe
and W Hill, by the following morning.
But, like nearly every movement in war, the landing took longer
than was expected, and the customary delay was increased by partial
confusion. In the darkness of midnight the 32nd and 33rd Brigades
approached the shore at B Beach south of Nibrunesi Point. The
destroyers stopped and slipped the “beetles,” which crept ashore
under their own power. Driving close in, they dropped their elevated
drawbridges right on the beach itself, and the crowded men swarmed
over them as over a landing-stage. The “beetles” then returned to the
destroyers for their second load, and so the two brigades came to
shore in good time and without mishap. As soon as the battalions were
formed up, two from the 32nd Brigade (the 6th Yorkshire and the 9th
West Yorkshire) were instructed to occupy Lala Baba. Advancing in that
order along the beach and up the hills from the south, they stormed
the trenches with the bayonet in the darkness, but the 6th Yorks lost
heavily. Colonel Chapman, in command, was killed while cheering on his
men. Fifteen officers fell and 250 men, but apart from that battalion
the loss was not great, and the occupation of the Hill gave us command
of the southern side of the bay.
[Sidenote: MISFORTUNE OF THE 34TH BRIGADE]
With the 34th Brigade things did not go so smoothly. The navy brought
up the destroyers with the “beetles” in time with the rest; but after
the “beetles” had been cast off as they approached the shore in the
middle of the bay, it was found that they could not make A Beach at
all, but went aground with their weight on the sandy shallows. The
disaster might have been anticipated even from the distant appearance
of shelving shore, which possessed all the familiar features of a
children’s bathing-place. Led by their officers, the men plunged into
the water, which in places came up to their armpits, and struggled
ashore. Dripping wet, they reached the sands well below the centre of
the bay’s arc, and south of the entrance to the Salt Lake, considerably
south of the appointed position. Both in the lighters and on shore they
were exposed to considerable fire from Lala Baba (not yet occupied)
and the rocky promontories towards Suvla Point. Many Turks even crept
into their midst in the darkness, and at close quarters killed them
unawares. Nearly the whole of the northern shore had also been sown
with land-mines, exploding on contact and causing some casualties.
The delay and confusion due to the oversight of obvious shallows were
serious. They were the first step in failure. For by the time the
brigade got ashore and sorted itself out it was useless to think of
reaching W Hill, or even Chocolate Hill, under cover of darkness. In
fact, by the time the battalions were reorganised it was nearly dawn.
To protect the left, one battalion (11th Manchester) was now sent up
the rocky steep of Karakol Dagh, which it succeeded in clearing of the
concealed parties of gendarmes. The Colonel was wounded, the second in
command killed, and nearly half the strength put out of action.[180]
But its service in saving the rest of the brigade from enfilading
fire was inestimable. The 5th Dorsets appears to have followed the
Manchesters by mistake of direction.
About the same time another of the battalions (9th Lancashire
Fusiliers) succeeded in the task of clearing the low eminence of
heath-covered sandhill which stood close at hand to the left front of
the landing beach, and was mistaken for Hill 10. The Turks had a strong
outpost there, and the loss to this battalion was also considerable.
In fact, the brigade stood in an isolated and unsatisfactory position
when, just as the eastern sky began to show streaks of brown among the
purple, the 32nd Brigade (Haggard’s) began to appear along the sandy
spit, coming from Lala Baba, which it had seized and left in charge
of the 33rd Brigade (Maxwell’s). As it approached it opened fire upon
the low plateau, where confused fighting was still going on. The 9th
West Yorks (32nd Brigade) also joined in the attack, and suffered
considerable loss.
[Sidenote: HESITATION AND CONFUSION]
Brigadier-General Sitwell, as senior in command, had now two brigades,
half of each still untouched by action. It was the moment for him, one
would have thought, to advance at all hazards upon Chocolate and W
Hills. Yet he hesitated. Perhaps he thought it went beyond his orders
to cross the open plain now that daylight was increasing every minute.
Perhaps he was deterred by a brief counter-attack which the Turks,
noticing the confusion or supineness of the brigades, attempted against
the plateau, though the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers again drove them off
with the bayonet, compelling them to retreat through the low bushes
on the north edge of the plain. Now that the sun was rising, shrapnel
from the two Turkish batteries posted on the hills across the Salt
Lake began to burst over his position, and the naval guns, attempting
to harass the groups of enemy as they stole away, set fire to a large
area of bush straight in his front and to the left.[181] Perhaps he
thought enough had been done by battalions already thirsty, tired after
a sleepless night, and probably shaken by their first losses in battle.
At all events he allowed at least one battalion to gather in crowds
under the shelter of some high sand dunes along the shore north of the
spit, and there for many hours they lay immovable. The second step in
failure had been taken.
The third was already preparing. About an hour before dawn, the ten
trawlers and steamers bringing Brigadier-General Hill’s six battalions
from Mitylene punctually arrived off the bay. As they all belonged to
Sir Bryan Mahon’s 10th Division, General Stopford had intended them
to land near A Beach, to seize the whole length of the razor-edge on
the north of the bay, to occupy the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and advance as
far as possible towards Ejelmer Bay, whence the great hills of Tekke
Tepe could be turned. They were, of course, to be joined by Sir Bryan
Mahon’s other three battalions on their arrival with their General from
Mudros. But the General had not yet arrived: the navy had witnessed
only too plainly the failure of A Beach as a landing-place owing to
the shallows, and they had not yet discovered the practicable creeks
among the rocks near Suvla Point. Accordingly, General Stopford was
advised to land them at B Beach, and after the delay of more than two
hours this was done.[182] That is to say, five of the six battalions
were landed there with Brigadier-General Hill; but before the 5th Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers (of Hill’s own 31st Brigade) had disembarked,
Sir Bryan Mahon put into the bay from Mudros with the remaining three,
and was landed in the creeks which the navy had now discovered among
the rocks east of Suvla Point. Accordingly, the Inniskilling Fusiliers
were counter-ordered to join him there. Thus the 10th Division was
now divided into three entirely different parts: the 29th Brigade
was at Anzac; three battalions of the 31st and two of the 30th were
with Hill at B Beach; two battalions of the 30th, one of the 31st,
and the 5th Royal Irish (Pioneers) were at Suvla Point, where the
Divisional General landed with nothing of his Division left under
his command except these four. Confusion of command and position was
inevitable.[183]
[Sidenote: GENERAL HILL’S NEW ORDERS]
Confusion immediately resulted. As Hill with his five battalions was
landed in the sphere of the 11th Division on the right, instead of
being with his own 10th Division on the extreme left, he was ordered
by General Stopford to put himself under the command of Major-General
Hammersley. His battalions did not begin to disembark till 5.30 a.m.,
when it was nearly full daylight. The enemy’s shrapnel was bursting
over his boats and the beach. Two of our mountain-guns were hurried up
into the Turkish trenches on Lala Baba, though the battery of Field
Artillery did not come into action from behind the cover of that hill
until evening. The ships also maintained a heavy but ineffectual fire
upon invisible or unregistered positions. But the loss at the landing
was considerable while Hill was away looking for the Divisional General
and new orders. This was a long process. Finding at last that his
orders were to combine with the 32nd and 34th Brigades, now under
Sitwell’s command upon the dunes near Hill 10, and then to attack
Chocolate Hill and advance to W Hill, he mustered the five battalions
behind the slopes of Lala Baba, and ordered an advance along the sandy
spit. The march round by Hill 10, and then along the north side of
the Salt Lake, and again south-east to Chocolate Hill, would describe
three parts of a circle. An advance from B Beach along the south
side of the Salt Lake would have followed an almost straight line to
Chocolate Hill; the ground, though marshy in places, was better going
than loose sand, and the apprehended wire was afterwards found to be
negligible. By this route General Hammersley could have brought these
five battalions into action many hours earlier, could have occupied
Chocolate Hill by noon, and pushed on to W Hill before night. It is
true they would not then have co-operated with the brigades under
Sitwell, but the value of that co-operation was not great.
As it was, owing to the delay of changed command, and to co-operation
with a Brigadier in another Division, with whom Hill, having just come
from Mitylene, was probably unacquainted, Hill’s column did not begin
to leave Lala Baba for the sandy spit till noon. The march across that
unprotected spit was a trying passage. The Irishmen (6th Inniskilling
Fusiliers, 5th and 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, of the 31st Brigade, and
6th and 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers of the 30th Brigade) had started
closely packed together for their long sea voyage on the previous
afternoon; except for a cup of tea at 3 a.m. and a snatch of their
rations after landing, they were empty of food; for some hours they
had stood uncertain under a blazing sun and exposed for the first time
to shrapnel, often fatal and continually unnerving. The Turkish guns
on Anafarta and W Hills had carefully registered the sandy spit, and
now swept it with shrapnel from end to end. For sleepless, hungry, and
miserably thirsty men, loose sand is the worst of trials. They crossed
in batches, or “by a section at a time rushing over.”[184]
[Sidenote: HILL’S ADVANCE ROUND SALT LAKE]
As each battalion arrived after this ordeal, it formed up under the
slight cover of the sand dunes about Hill 10, but it was 3 p.m. before
all the five mustered there and Hill could organise the attack upon
Chocolate Hill, which was to have been completed before dawn. Keeping
only the 6th Dublin Fusiliers in reserve, he pushed the other four
battalions forward across the dry bed of the Asmak on the north side of
the Salt Lake, and began the difficult movement of wheeling the whole
force southward through the open country round the lake shore. It was
thus marching across the enemy’s front--an operation of proverbial
risk. The farther it advanced, the more exposed the left flank became.
Sitwell, as senior officer, was, as we have seen, in command of the
34th and 32nd Brigades, which had lain so many hours under the sand
dunes. He was now, indeed, in sole command, since Haggard had been
seriously wounded at noon. But he considered he was justified in
sparing only two battalions in support (6th Lincolns and 6th Borders,
which, however, belonged to the 33rd Brigade and must have been sent
over from Lala Baba by their Brigadier-General Maxwell under General
Hammersley’s order). Even these two appear to have been moved too late
to protect the left flank, for Hill was compelled to defend it, as
it was “in air,” by deploying the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers (Colonel
Pike, an excellent officer, who was with the regiment in Ladysmith)
and advancing them so as to face half-left. An increasing gap was thus
formed between left and right as the force slowly wheeled round the
lake, and the 7th Dublins had to be brought up to fill it.
As the rough country in front of Anafarta plateau was thus being
crossed, the line was continually harassed by an enfilading fire from
swarms of snipers concealed in the bushes on the left, as well as by
copious shrapnel and high explosives from the hills. Contact mines
also exploded, and a Taube dropped a few bombs. Fortunately, about
4 p.m. a sudden squall and shower of rain swept over the bay and
plain, obscuring the enemy’s view, and refreshing the troops, who were
suffering greatly from the extreme heat and from thirst, though they
were passing close to two excellent water-sources, had they but known
it. Their Brigadier Hill, a man of almost excessive indifference to
danger, as I observed on several occasions, did not follow them in
person till midnight. By 5 p.m. they had reached a line within 300
yards of Chocolate Hill, and there they lay down while the ships and
the few batteries on land bombarded.[185]
[Sidenote: CHOCOLATE HILL TAKEN]
The moment the bombardment ceased, the men rose and charged up the
steep and bushy slopes of that rounded hill with fixed bayonets. The
two Royal Irish Fusilier battalions were on the left (the side of
greatest danger), the Dublins in the centre, the Inniskillings on
the right. The 6th Lincolns and 6th Borders then passed through the
line, and were, in fact, first in the charge. The hill was fortified
by an old trench which ran completely round the circumference some
yards below the summit. One long communication trench afterwards ran
down the saddle or neck connecting the hill with “Hill 50” or “Green
Hill” beyond, and probably followed the line of an old excavation. The
Turks poured rifle-fire from the parapets, and fought gallantly with
bayonets. But they were at last all killed or chased away. Just as the
sun set over the distant peaks of Samothrace, the summit was gained. If
only it had been gained as that sun rose!
The battalions spent the night in sorting themselves out, burying the
dead, trying to collect the wounded in the darkness, bringing up what
supplies they could find on the beach (all of which had to be carried
on men’s backs), and, above all, in the endeavour to bring up water. A
certain amount was being distributed on the beach, more than 2 miles
off by the nearest way, which probably no one could find in the dark.
And every drop had to be carried by hand in camp kettles or even in
ammunition boxes or in water-bottles strung by the dozen round one
man’s neck. The night was thus occupied, but thirst was not appeased.
Before sunrise the 6th Lincolns and the 6th Borderers were withdrawn to
rejoin their own brigade, the 7th South Staffords replacing them.
To return to the remaining battalions of the 10th Division. As we have
seen, the Divisional General, Sir Bryan Mahon, arrived from Mudros
with only three battalions--the 6th and 7th Munster Fusiliers of the
30th Brigade (Brigadier-General L. L. Nicol), and the 5th Royal Irish
(Pioneers). In addition he was able to retain the 5th Inniskilling
Fusiliers (31st Brigade) before it disembarked with Hill’s force.
Ordering it to follow, he landed soon after 11 a.m. with the three
battalions among the rocks near Suvla Point, where his men suffered
much from contact mines. He then proceeded to climb Karakol Dagh,
and passed through the shattered companies of the 11th Manchesters,
who had early occupied this part of the rocky razor-edge. Deploying
the Munsters in two lines, he advanced to the attack on Kiretch Tepe
Sirt, the more lofty but continuous edge beyond. The ground is very
difficult, being a steep hillside broken into rocks and craggy ravines,
the lower slopes covered with high bush. The enemy delayed the advance
along the whole mountain-side by accurate and concealed fire, causing
many wounds and deaths, especially among officers. It was past sunset
when the attacking force of Munsters, supported by the Royal Irish,
came within about 100 yards of the highest knoll, which the Turks held
strongly. Here the battalions, wearied and tormented by thirst, like
the whole army corps, lay for the night. But next morning (August 8),
the 6th Munsters under Major Jephson took the knoll by assault. It was
afterwards known as Jephson’s Post, was fortified, in spite of its
rocky and exposed position, and, but for a few hours in the next week,
remained the farthest point in our lines along the north side of the
bay.
[Sidenote: RESULTS OF THE FIRST DAY]
Thus, on the late evening of the 7th, we held the bay and both
extremities, the Salt Lake, Hill 10, a point near Jephson’s Post on the
north, and Chocolate Hill on the south-east. We had not even attempted
W Hill, or Scimitar Hill, or the Anafarta plateau, or the Tekke Tepe
mountain, and from all those points the bay was commanded. Except
along the shore we had established no connection with Anzac, and could
give no support at Sari Bair. Still, something had been gained. The
landing had been effected punctually and with small loss. The 32nd
and 34th Brigades had certainly lost much time in hanging about Hill
10, as though their work was done. The 31st Brigade had been hampered
and delayed by confused commands and the varied positions allotted
to it apart from its own Division. But the situation seemed fairly
hopeful, and with energy and organisation all might be retrieved. Some
battalions had lost heavily, but as a whole the loss was not great--for
so large a movement. Only a little over 1000 wounded were taken off to
the hospital ships.
_From the evening of August 7 to the evening of August 8._
So satisfied was General Stopford with the situation that he
telegraphed to Sir Ian that in his opinion Major-General Hammersley and
his troops deserved great credit for the result attained. Anxiously
awaiting news in General Headquarters at Imbros, Sir Ian replied with
congratulations to General Stopford, stating also how much was hoped
from Hammersley’s bold and rapid advance. The message must have been
prompted by Sir Ian’s inborn optimism or by official courtesy and a
desire to encourage action. For even before the telegram was sent,
tormenting doubts intruded. It was Sunday morning. The Wellingtons
and 7th Gloucesters had climbed the shoulder of Chunuk Bair; the 4th
Australian Brigade was advancing to the assault up Koja Chemen Tepe
by way of Abdel Rahman Bair; at Lone Pine the battle still raged
desperately. If ever help from Suvla was called for, it was now. But
from Suvla came only silence. Hardly a gun could be heard. No further
message arrived.
In Suvla Bay itself a Sabbath peace appeared to reign. No shells burst;
no bullets whined. It was evident that the Turks had withdrawn both
guns and infantry during the night. We could walk at leisure round the
whole beach from Suvla Point to Lala Baba. We could examine the surface
of the Salt Lake, or climb Karakol Dagh and view the calm prospect
over the Gulf of Xeros with equal security. Men whom good fortune had
stationed near the beaches enjoyed the enviable refreshment of bathing
in the sandy shallows. No attempt was being made seriously to push
forward the advance, although W Hill, the most vital point, could have
been occupied by little more than marching, and the distance even from
the beach was 4 miles at most. There was no Turk along the whole range
of Tekke Tepe.
[Sidenote: FAILURE OF WATER DISTRIBUTION]
The Divisional Generals reported to the Corps Commander that they were
unable to move owing to the exhaustion of their men.[186] Undoubtedly
the men were exhausted. The sea journey, the sleepless nights, the
great heat, the excitement of their first battle, the toilsome marching
upon loose sand, and the rations of hard biscuit and salt “bully” had
exhausted them. The 11th Division from Imbros was also infected with
the prevailing diarrhœa, and in a few cases with dysentery. But the
worst exhaustion came from thirst. In spite of all those elaborate
precautions, the water supply broke down. Plenty of water was there.
The water-lighters had arrived on the 7th. One was at A West; one went
aground at “Old A,” and men swam out to her; but Commodore Keyes towed
her near enough ashore for the hose to reach the men that afternoon.
A third was on C Beach, and probably the fourth, for the _Krene_ had
tugged in two, and was there herself, her stem on the shore. What was
wanting was not water, but the troughs and receptacles for issuing and
distribution. Men came with nothing but water-bottles, sometimes a
dozen or more, slung round their necks, and went naked with them into
the sea in hopes of drawing from the tanks. When a hose was attached,
they pierced holes in the cover, and drank, then leaving the water
to run waste. By Sunday morning a poor and leaking trough was stuck
up at one point, but it would not hold water, and the men and mules
crowding round it impeded distribution. The _Prah_ (containing all the
requisites for supply--troughs, hose, and implements for well-sinking),
owing to some over-scrupulous observance of regulations, did not issue
them till some days later. The anguish of thirst was intolerable.
Up in the firing lines some went almost mad.[187] The suffering of
the men exposed to the glaring sun upon the rocks of Kiretch Tepe was
most severe during Sunday, though it was afterwards (perhaps that
night) relieved by the kindly generosity of a destroyer (some say the
_Grampus_, but evidence is for the _Foxhound_), which was deputed
always to patrol that Gulf of Xeros coast, and on this occasion cut her
own water-tank loose and brought it ashore. Even on the beach, where
fresh water was running to waste, men filled water-bottles from the
sea. So serious were the reports from the front that General Stopford
ordered the disembarkation of the artillery horses to be delayed till
the mules for carrying up water had been landed.[188] Thus one thing
acted upon another, for it was want of artillery which finally induced
the Corps Commander to believe that immediate advance was impossible.
Brigades and even battalions were also much confused and scattered,
as we have seen. But the ultimate cause of the confusion, and of the
failure in water supply, and so of the lack of guns, was the decision
to land part of the force inside the bay, and at a beach where any
observer might have suspected shallows fit only for wading.[189]
[Sidenote: SIR IAN AT SUVLA]
Meantime Sir Ian, growing continually more impatient at the silence,
resolved about noon to leave his central position at Imbros and
investigate for himself the situation of his northern force. For some
unexplained reason his destroyer, the _Arno_, instead of keeping
steam always up, had just had her fires drawn, and could not start
till 4 p.m. During those hours of maddening delay, Sir Ian’s worst
suspicions were confirmed by a telegram from a General Staff Officer
(Lieut.-Colonel Aspinall, a trustworthy judge of military affairs)
“drawing attention to the inaction of our own troops, and to the fact
that golden opportunities were being missed.”[190] Arriving at Suvla
at 5 p.m., Sir Ian at once visited General Stopford on board the
_Jonquil_, where he still kept his headquarters so as to advise upon
any action, if any action seemed advisable. There Sir Ian heard, as he
dreaded to hear, that nothing could be done that day. The exhaustion of
the men, the confusion of units, and other pleas mentioned above were
given as reasons. But the deeper reason lay in comfortable satisfaction
with present results, and in the absence of inspiring or remorseless
energy. It is an old military principle that “A General who refuses to
pursue a retreating enemy on the plea that his troops are tired, should
be at once relieved of his command.” In Sir Ian’s own words: “Driving
power was required, and even a certain ruthlessness, to brush aside
pleas for respite for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia.
And inertia prevailed.”
Finding it so, Sir Ian, driven by the extremity of the crisis, took a
step unusual in a Commander-in-Chief. He resolved to try what personal
influence he could use upon the Divisional Commanders. The Corps
Commander raised no objection, and, accompanied by Commodore Roger
Keyes and Lieut.-Colonel Aspinall, Sir Ian hastened to Major-General
Hammersley’s headquarters at the foot of Lala Baba. He pointed out
that time above all price was slipping away unused; that “the sands
were running out fast”; that information showed Turkish reinforcements
already approaching. General Hammersley replied that his force was much
scattered; it was impossible to get orders for a night attack round to
the battalions; and that a general attack was arranged for the early
morning. He admitted, however, that the 32nd Brigade (formerly under
Haggard, who was wounded on the previous day, and now under Colonel
Minogue) was more or less concentrated and could move. His General
Staff Officer, Colonel Neil Malcolm, an experienced soldier, confirmed
this opinion, and Sir Ian took the further unusual step of directly
ordering this brigade or any force, even if it were only a company, to
advance at once without waiting for the morning’s general attack. Their
objective was to be the high ground rising towards Tekke Tepe on the
north of Anafarta Sagir. They were to act as the advance guard to the
attack.
[Illustration: POSITION OF 32ND BRIGADE, EVENING, AUGUST 8]
[Sidenote: SCIMITAR HILL ABANDONED]
It was now 6 p.m. In ignorance, Sir Ian had given an order destined
to entail disaster. It appears almost certain that neither General
Hammersley nor his Chief of Staff knew exactly where the battalions
of the 32nd Brigade stood at the time. Otherwise they must have
informed Sir Ian that, as a matter of fact, one of the battalions (the
6th East York Pioneers) had advanced that day, had occupied Hill 70
(Scimitar Hill), and were at that moment in position there--Scimitar
Hill, next to W Hill the most vital of all the semicircle of heights
overlooking the bay! Closely supported by the 7th South Staffords, the
Pioneer Battalion was there only waiting for the brigade’s further
advance upon W Hill or Anafarta Sagir, to both of which it is the key.
Lieut.-Colonel Moore, in command of that battalion, had even sent out
three officers’ patrols, one of which actually reached the top of
Tekke Tepe, another the outskirts of Anafarta Sagir, the third a point
near Abrikja, though unable to return till dark. But no one in high
authority appears to have known of these movements. In consequence
of this ignorance, the Divisional General, instead of leaving the
selection of battalions to the Brigadier, named the 6th East York
Pioneers as the battalion to lead the advance, believing it to be
the freshest and least tried. Colonel Minogue obeyed and ordered the
battalion to rejoin the brigade concentrated at Sulajik. Colonel Moore,
commanding the 6th East Yorks, obeyed also, but did not receive the
order till 3 a.m. of the 9th. He then withdrew his tired and sleepless
battalion to Sulajik. Without a blow, Scimitar Hill was abandoned. It
was one of those apparently casual misfortunes which throughout the
campaign balked the fairest hopes just at the moment of victory, as
though an evil and ironic destiny mocked at the best-laid schemes.
Having heard from General Hammersley that the water supply was now
arranged and the troops rested, Sir Ian returned to the _Arno_ and
remained on board that night in the bay. Hearing no sound of fighting,
he assumed that the brigade had accomplished its task and established
itself on the slopes of Tekke Tepe overlooking Anafarta, without
opposition.[191]
_From the evening of August 8 to the evening of the 9th._
Unfortunately, Sir Ian’s assumption was groundless. The 32nd Brigade
was far from being concentrated as was supposed by the Divisional
General. One battalion, as we have just seen, was actually on Scimitar
Hill. The 9th West Yorks were half-way up the Anafarta Ridge, and they
tried to advance before dawn, but were overwhelmed by the enemy’s
reinforcements, thus proving that the intended morning attack would
have been dangerously late in any case.[192] The remainder were among
the trees near the farm Sulajik, where there was water. Verbal orders
reached them at 7.30 p.m., but no definite written orders arrived till
nearly 3 a.m. The mistakes were chiefly due to ignorance of location.
Instead of beginning at eight on Sunday evening, as Sir Ian intended,
the movement did not start till 4 a.m. on Monday. Then the brigade
attacked the steep slope leading up to Anafarta. It is covered with
thick and high bush, up which men can advance only in single file along
the cattle-tracks. On their right, Scimitar Hill had been abandoned,
its reverse slope being now occupied by swarms of Turkish snipers and
troops in formation, which were coming up in strong reinforcement. On
their left, one company of the 6th East Yorks (the selfsame battalion
which had occupied Scimitar Hill) succeeded in reaching that isolated
offshoot from Tekke Tepe above mentioned. But the brigade retired to
the line of Sulajik. The losses were heavy, chiefly among the Royal
Engineers, one company of whom (the 67th) accompanied the brigade.
Colonel Moore of the 6th East Yorks (Pioneers), who had shown such
grasp of the situation, was killed.
[Sidenote: THE TURKS RETURN REINFORCED]
As day advanced, the position only grew worse. It was the morning when
the party of Lancastrians and Gurkhas reached the summit near Hill Q
and stared upon the Dardanelles below. As at Chunuk Bair, so at Suvla,
the Turks were rushing up reinforcements. Three Divisions, starting
from Bulair, were beginning to debouch along the valley between the
two Anafartas, and to crowd the heights. Perceiving our inactivity
or hesitation throughout the previous day (Sunday), they now brought
back the guns they had removed on Saturday night, and increased the
number. Hill’s 31st Brigade, and that General himself, were still on
Chocolate Hill, but three battalions of Maxwell’s Brigade had now
arrived there, and the orders for the attack devolved upon him. On the
right he pushed forward those battalions of his own 33rd Brigade, which
made fair progress. Some of the leading troops were reported as even
reaching W Hill, but that appeared to me very doubtful, as I watched
the movements all day from a machine-gun emplacement near the top of
Chocolate Hill. In the centre Brigadier-General Maxwell ordered part
of the 32nd Brigade to advance again, reinforced by two of the 10th
Division battalions under Hill (6th Royal Irish Fusiliers and 6th Royal
Dublin Fusiliers). Their objective was Scimitar Hill--that hill which
had been quietly occupied and quietly abandoned only the day before!
On the left the line was extended by the 6th Lincolns (33rd Brigade)
and the whole of the 34th Brigade, which had moved from the sand dunes
near Hill 10 at last, and arrived in two detachments. Beyond them were
two battalions from the 53rd (Welsh) Division, which had been held by
Sir Ian as part of his special reserve, and was being thrown into Suvla
early that morning.
[Sidenote: OUR ADVANCE CHECKED]
Partly owing to the mixture of brigades, the attack went to pieces.
There was little combination, and no cohesion. Battalions advanced
separately here and there, and separately came back. Two or three times
one or other of them (especially the two battalions of Hill’s brigade)
came close to the summit of Scimitar Hill. A fraction of the 7th South
Staffords in the centre actually reached it. But every hour the enemy’s
fire increased. Shrapnel burst low over us. The men of the 32nd Brigade
were much shaken by their experience and heavy losses in the early
morning. All were much exhausted. Fire broke out on the left side of
the hill itself, and swept over the front and summit, consuming the
dry scrub in sheets of flame. The wounded, both British and Turk, came
creeping out on hands and knees to seek safety upon that yellow open
space or “blaze” which, as I mentioned, gave the name of “Scimitar”
to the hill. But many perished from suffocation and the extreme heat.
Many also were burnt alive, being unable to move. Except a few isolated
parties, which bravely endeavoured to hold their ground, the firing
lines and supports came swarming back. It was no wonder. The situation
was intolerable. The most hardened Regulars could not have endured it,
and hardly any of these officers and men of the New Army had known
fighting before. At length they were formed up into a confused line
along the ditches and shallow trenches between the Sulajik and Green
Hill. It was about noon.
From Chocolate Hill General Maxwell ordered the battalions to be
reorganised at once for another attack, but reorganisation was
impossible. One of the wells, which in the early morning I had found
safe, was now exposed to almost continuous rifle-fire. The usual
scenes of a battlefield added to the distress and alarm. The dead
were lying about; the wounded crying for help; the hands and faces of
hastily buried men protruded from the ground. The 6th Lincolns and
6th Borders, posted on either flank, were mentioned for “steady and
gallant behaviour” during this ordeal. The 9th Sherwood Foresters (same
Brigade) and the Herefords of the 159th were also mentioned. No further
movement was attempted. Walking back to Lala Baba towards evening, I
was asked to report to General Hammersley in his headquarters there,
but could report little good. I found, however, that he had now three
R.F.A. batteries in position behind the seaward slope of Lala Baba,
and three batteries of mountain-guns ashore, some of the guns being
close behind the summit of the hill. The warships were also firing at
intervals upon W Hill and the farthest points of Kiretch Tepe Sirt.
Along that razor-edge or whale-back ridge, Sir Bryan Mahon had now
firmly established himself with the few battalions left to his
command out of the 10th Division. Near the sea-end of the ridge,
about three-quarters of a mile from Suvla Point, General Stopford
was engaged upon the construction of a permanent Corps Headquarters
in a partially sheltered depression among the rocks. Having visited
him there in the morning, Sir Ian climbed along the ridge to Mahon’s
headquarters among the stones close behind his firing line. He found
that General confident of carrying the whole summit of Kiretch Tepe,
and it was probably whilst on that point of widely commanding view over
the whole plain to Koja Chemen Tepe and the Anzac heights that Sir Ian
resolved to press forward the attack upon the left, since the advance
upon W Hill and Anafarta Sagir was obviously now impeded. If Mahon’s
Division could fight its way along the ridge to Ejelmer Bay, and fresh
troops could win the line from Ejelmer Bay over Kavak and Tekke Tepes
to Anafarta Sagir, not only would Suvla remain safe from interference
on that side, but the Turkish reinforcements on W Hill and Scimitar
Hill would be paralysed by the threat from their right, and rendered
incapable of advancing farther towards the sea.
In the afternoon Sir Ian went to Anzac with Commodore Keyes, and, after
consultation with Generals Birdwood and Godley, telephoned to General
Stopford, urging upon him the importance of immediately seizing Kavak
Tepe and the rest of the Ejelmer-Anafarta line, which an aeroplane
reported as still unoccupied and unentrenched. At the same time he
determined to devote to this purpose the last of his own reserve--the
54th (East Anglian) Division, which, however, like the 53rd, consisted
of infantry only, and those little over half strength. The battle to
hold the summit just south of Chunuk Bair was raging at the time.
It is possible that reinforcement by a new Division might have made
all the difference there. But to supply water up those heights was
difficult, as we noticed in the last chapter, and the Generals on the
spot considered there was scarcely room for more troops in the ravines
and up the ridges. So to Suvla the 54th Division was ordered to follow
the 53rd, and Sir Ian was left without reserve. The new Division was to
arrive on the next day but one, the 11th.
_From the evening of August 9 to the evening of the 10th._
[Sidenote: RENEWED ATTACK ON SCIMITAR HILL]
General Stopford, however, was naturally still anxious to retrieve
the check suffered by General Hammersley’s command, and indeed W Hill
was still the most vital and threatening point upon the encompassing
heights. He, therefore, determined to renew the attack upon Scimitar
Hill and the more open field country between it and W Hill, around
the Abrikja farm. For this task he allotted nine battalions of the
53rd Division (Major-General Lindley), supported by two battalions of
the 11th Division on each flank. The result was more lamentable even
than the failure of the previous day. The troops of the 53rd Division
set off about six a.m. across the Salt Lake. The Turkish shrapnel and
rifle-fire poured upon them as they advanced, and only increased at the
foot of Scimitar Hill. To watch parties of them attempting to steal up
sheltered portions of the hill was a piteous sight. The cover was much
reduced, because the ground was now black with burning, and most of the
bushes gone. Many fell on all sides. The corner of a small wheatfield
near Abrikja was fringed with dead who looked like a company lying down
in the shade. One saw many deeds of courage among officers and men.
Backwards and forwards, the fighting went on all morning, but without
result. In the evening the battalions were withdrawn to their original
lines, only more confused, more disheartened, and fewer in numbers.
Generals Maxwell and Hill remained on Chocolate Hill that day. Hill’s
brigade was chiefly occupied in holding Green Hill just in front of
the other, and we were much exposed to shrapnel there, as the trenches
were incomplete. That evening, however, the withdrawal of Hill’s five
battalions in turn began. They were allowed rest and the joy of bathing
on the beach till the 13th (Friday), when they rejoined their own 10th
Division upon Kiretch Tepe Sirt.[193]
On this day, the 10th, Chunuk Bair was lost, and the chance of advance
from Suvla was almost gone. It was the saddest day in the record of
the expedition. Sir Ian telegraphed to General Stopford, ordering
him not to risk the proposed renewal of the attacks with tired and
disintegrated troops, but to consolidate the line from the Asmak Dere
past the front of Chocolate Hill through Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt.
_From the evening of August 10 to the evening of the 11th._
[Sidenote: THE LAST RESERVE LANDED]
It was indeed time that the line was consolidated. During the night and
early morning, the 54th (East Anglian) Division was being landed on the
new A Beaches near Suvla Point.[194] They formed, as has been noticed,
Sir Ian’s last reserve, and were commanded by Major-General F. S.
Inglefield, a stalwart and experienced soldier, who had seen service in
South Africa and had commanded this Territorial Division for two years,
but was already sixty. As in the case of the 53rd (Welsh) Division,
some of the best battalions had been taken for France, and others
suddenly inserted without knowledge of him or of the other battalions,
so that the essential bond of the Territorial spirit was severed. The
landing of some 10,000 or 12,000 inexperienced Territorials ignorant of
cohesion was inevitably a confused business, though only the infantry
had been sent. But that would not have mattered if the confusion
upon the front lines had not been far worse. There the condition was
indeed deplorable. Along the most critical part of the line, between
Green Hill and Sulajik, battalions and brigades were hopelessly mixed
together. The men had lost sight of their officers and their units.
They lay in any ditch or cover they could find. Here and there a party
dug trenches or improved the trenches dug at night. But theirs was not
the spirit of victory. One of the bridged fountains was now almost
deserted, as it came under fire from snipers or from the troops on
Scimitar Hill. But round the other, which was concealed among large
trees, the men still swarmed. In consequence, there was much delay and
much waste of the plentiful water, nor did any attempts to get them
into file, so that each might take his turn, avail for long.
There was no help for it. The only thing to be done was to pull out the
battalions gradually and reorganise. It was now Wednesday, and so far
as action went the day was wasted, as Sunday had been, though there was
better reason for the waste.
_From the evening of August 11 to the evening of the 12th._
That evening Sir Ian again sailed over to Suvla with the object of
urging forward his project for the occupation of the Kavak Tepe and
Tekke Tepe heights before the Turkish reinforcements could arrive and
entrench there. He had expected the 54th Division to start at once
upon a night march, so as to make the ascent at dawn, while the 53rd
Division stood in reserve. But General Stopford raised objections,
foresaw difficulties, and asked for at least twenty-four hours’
delay. He hoped that by that time the 53rd Division would have been
reorganised sufficiently to clear the way for the passage of the 54th
through the jungly, tree-covered ground at the foot of the mountain.
[Sidenote: THE 5TH NORFOLKS DISAPPEAR]
Unfortunately, even this hope was disappointed. Though the 54th
Division had not come under serious fire, the Brigadiers in both
Divisions reported that they were not yet ready for the attack. General
Inglefield, however, was able to send forward one brigade in advance.
It was the 163rd (Brigadier-General F. F. W. Daniell), consisting
of the 4th and 5th Norfolks and the 5th Suffolks and 8th Hants. The
advance began in the afternoon, and the brigade reached the farm
called Anafarta Ova, though the enemy’s opposition steadily increased
as the forest and bush became thicker. Then occurred one of the minor
but startling tragedies of the war. The 5th Norfolks, on the right
of the brigade, were led by Colonel Sir Horace Beauchamp, a bold and
self-confident cavalry officer, who had commanded the 20th Hussars,
and seen hard service in Egypt, the Soudan, and South Africa. In the
army he had been known as “The Bo’sun” owing to his love and knowledge
of the sea.[195] Perhaps inspired by old memories, perhaps hoping to
inspire Territorials also with the tradition of Regulars, or to show
the Generals what this Division could do under dashing leadership, he
led his battalion rapidly forward in advance of the brigade. He was
last seen among the scattered outbuildings of the farm, carrying a cane
and encouraging his men to follow. They reached the rising ground from
which the steep front of Tekke Tepe springs. Whether Colonel Beauchamp
intended to carry the mountain unassisted, or to secure the edge of the
Anafarta plateau to his right front, cannot be known. The bush grew
thicker; the battalion lost formation; the enemy’s fire increased; many
stragglers turned back and reached the Division during the night.
“But,” in Sir Ian’s words, “the Colonel, with 16 officers and 250
men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst
those ardent souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the
King’s Sandringham estates. Nothing more was ever seen or heard of
any of them. They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or
sound. Not one of them ever came back.”
One cannot doubt that their bones lie among the trees and bushes at the
foot of that dark and ominous hill, and the last real hope of Suvla Bay
faded with their tragic disappearance.
In spite of all discouragement, Sir Ian’s mind was still set on
securing a further advance by the occupation of Kavak and Tekke Tepes.
He agreed to the postponement of attack for another twenty-four hours,
and it was arranged for the night and morning of August 13–14. But
on the afternoon of the 13th (Friday), on returning to Suvla with
Major-General Braithwaite, his Chief of Staff, he found that General
Stopford still raised objections. Two out of his four Divisional
Generals despaired of success. The line, he considered, was already
too long for his troops. Some of the brigades were still disorganised
and shaken. Finding that this temper of uncertainty and depression
prevailed, Sir Ian could do nothing but cancel the scheme of attack,
and order the IXth Corps to reorganise and consolidate a line as far
forward as possible.
[Sidenote: THE 10TH DIVISION ON AUGUST 15]
One further effort was, however, made on Sunday, August 15, when
General Stopford called upon the Irish 10th Division to advance along
the Kiretch Tepe Sirt in the direction of Ejelmer Bay. The two brigades
now under Sir Bryan Mahon advanced along the lofty ridge, part along
the summit, the rest strung out down the steep slope towards the sea.
The brigades were the 30th (Nicol’s) and 31st (Hill’s). On the reverse
or southern slope the 162nd (De Winton’s) Brigade, 54th Division,
advanced through thick bushes and deep ravines in support. An unusual
amount of artillery was employed. The 15th Heavy Battery had arrived a
few days before. The 58th Brigade R.F.A. (10th Division) had marched
along the coast from Anzac with safety, and all these guns were
engaged, besides a mountain battery, some machine-guns, and the guns of
the destroyers _Grampus_ and _Foxhound_, firing from the Gulf of Xeros.
But in spite of this support the advance moved very slowly. It started
about noon, and crept bit by bit along the “whale-back,” a good line
being kept from the summit down to the sea, but halts frequent, and
progress difficult. The ground was all rocky, and most of it covered
with prickly scrub, burnt in parts. The summit was bare rock, and the
distance to be traversed under fire about a mile and a half. A prisoner
told us the Turks had six fresh battalions in line or in strongly
fortified redoubts, each battalion provided with twelve machine-guns.
That may be exaggerated, but the machine-guns were numerous and
deadly. Soon after the beginning of the general advance, Major Jephson
was mortally wounded upon the Post which he had originally won and
which always bore his name.
Meantime, the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers, supported by the 6th, had
been extended over the southern slope in front of the 162nd Brigade.
Here the difficulties of advance were even greater, owing to the tangle
of very thick and lofty bush, the steep gullies, the inability of the
naval guns to afford assistance, and the deadly fire from the long
Turkish trench running down the slope in front, as well as from the
guns on the Anafarta and W Hills. Having left the summit, I happened to
be with this part of the attack soon after five o’clock, and found the
men broken up into small groups by the impenetrable bush. Their loss,
especially in officers, was very heavy. Again and again the groups
attempted to combine and advance, but were driven back by the storm of
fire. Progress on that side was impossible. Three battalions of the
162nd Brigade (10th and 11th London and 5th Beds) supported the attack
upon these foothills, and gained their supposed objective, but suffered
heavy loss.
Suddenly, hearing a yell of shouting on our left, I looked up to the
summit, and saw a body of men charging along it with flashing bayonets.
Others, standing up on higher ground behind them, were pouring out a
rapid magazine fire. Two companies of the 6th Munsters and two of the
6th Dublins had worked half-way along the edge between Jephson’s Post
and the Pimple. The remaining 250 yards they now covered with a charge,
cheering as they ran. Some Turks met bayonet with bayonet, and died.
Some threw up their hands. Most ran. One could see them scurrying back
along the ridge and down the southern slope. The Irish pursued them
through the Pimple redoubt and beyond. It was six o’clock.[196]
In the gathering darkness the men attempted to build small sangars of
the rocks, but no real trenching was possible. They lay out in lines
along the seaward slope just below the summit. Then the failure to win
the southern slope was bitterly felt. Twice in the night the Turks
counter-attacked, creeping along that landward side, and, for the first
attack, rushing over the top, only to be cut down by rifle and bayonet.
In the attack just before dawn they trusted chiefly to a deadly form
of round bomb, which they lobbed over the crest in vast numbers. The
Irish could only reply with improvised jam-pot bombs, and few of those.
Sometimes, however, they caught the Turkish bombs and flung them back.
Private Wilkin, of the 7th Dublins, flung back five, but was blown to
pieces by the sixth.
[Sidenote: FAILURE TO ADVANCE ON KIRETCH TEPE]
So the harassing conflict continued. It continued all next day under
the burning sun. The loss was extreme. Many of the very best officers
fell. The 5th and 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers were almost exterminated.
During the night of the 16th-17th the shattered brigades were withdrawn
from the untenable position. It was never recovered. Jephson’s Post and
the steep slopes leading down on either side, one to the sea, the other
to the plain, remained the farthest points held by our lines along the
Kiretch Tepe Sirt.
This attack of August 15 was General Stopford’s last order. That
evening he gave up the command of the IXth Corps, and Major-General
De Lisle took his place, awaiting the arrival of Major-General Julian
Byng. Brigadier-General H. L. Reed, however, remained as Chief of Staff
to the Corps. Meantime, in place of De Lisle, Major-General W. R.
Marshall (87th Brigade) took command of the 29th Division. A few days
later, Major-General Lindley (at his own request) gave up the command
of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, and was appointed to the military command
at Mudros. Major-General Hammersley retired from command of the 11th
Division owing to serious illness. The same cause unfortunately removed
Major-General F. C. Shaw from the 13th (Western) Division, which he had
commanded with such skill and firmness during the assault on Sari Bair.
Brigadier-General Sitwell was succeeded in command of the 34th Brigade
by Brigadier-General J. Hill. Soon afterwards the command of the 31st
Brigade was taken over by Lieut.-Colonel J. G. King-King in place of
Brigadier-General F. F. Hill, who fell seriously ill. It became known
that, besides General Julian Byng, Major-General E. A. Fanshawe and
Major-General F. Stanley Maude (afterwards the hero of Bagdad) were
coming out.
_Note._--Subsequent Turkish information gives the Turkish forces on
the Peninsula on August 6 as follow:--
At Helles, 4 divisions in the line, and 1 in reserve (_c._ 40,000
men) with 94 guns; at Anzac, 3 divisions and 1 regiment in the line,
with 2 regiments in reserve (_c._ 20,000 men) with 76 guns; at Suvla,
3 battalions (_c._ 2000 men) and 20 guns; between Helles and Anzac,
1 division on guard, and 1 in reserve (_c._ 10,000 men); at Bulair,
3 divisions (_c._ 20,000 men) and 80 guns; on the Asiatic coast, 3
divisions. Total on the Peninsula, _c._ 92,000 men and 270 guns.