THE PREPARATION
[Sidenote: SIR IAN’S APPOINTMENT]
As was mentioned, Sir Ian Hamilton reached Tenedos on March 17, the day
before the naval engagement. The appointment to command the military
forces had come to him unexpectedly but five days earlier, and on
March 13 he started from London. He had received only slight and vague
instructions from Lord Kitchener, but on certain limitations the
Secretary for War insisted, and all of them strongly influenced Sir
Ian’s subsequent action. If possible a landing was to be avoided; none
was to be attempted until the fleet had made every effort to penetrate
the Straits and had failed; if a landing became unavoidable, none
should be made until the full force available had assembled; and no
adventurous operations were to be undertaken on the Asiatic side. All
these instructions were followed.[78]
But they revealed the hesitating reluctance with which the Dardanelles
campaign was regarded, not only by Lord Kitchener himself, but by his
subordinate generals at home and in France. The “Westerners” were,
naturally, in the ascendant. The danger to the Allied cause lay close
at hand. It had only recently been averted from the Channel and from
Paris. The British Staff, equally with the French, represented that not
a man could be spared from France, and that the only assured road to
victory lay straight through the German lines. The opposition to any
“side-show,” especially if it diverted a Regular Division such as the
29th, was expressed with the emphasis of jealous alarm.
[Sidenote: SIR IAN’S QUALIFICATIONS]
Even the appointment of Sir Ian Hamilton to the distant enterprise was
likely to be received with mingled sentiments. He counted forty-two
years of service in the army. Since the days of the Afghan War and
Majuba Hill (where his left hand was shattered), he had risen step by
step to all but the highest commands. The Nile, Burma, Chitral, and
Tirah had known him. He commanded the infantry in the rapid but vital
engagement at Elandslaagte, and during the siege of Ladysmith had
charge of the extensive and dangerous sector known as Cæsar’s Camp and
Wagon Hill. In the final months of the Boer War he was Lord Kitchener’s
Chief of Staff, and commanded mobile columns in the Western Transvaal,
greatly contributing to the conclusion of the war. Since then he had
served at home as Quartermaster-General, as G.O.C.-in-Chief of the
Southern Command, and as Adjutant-General. Abroad he had served as
Military Representative of India with the Japanese army in Manchuria
(1904–1905, when, in _A Staff Officer’s Scrap-Book_, he foretold the
disappearance of cavalry and the prevalence of the trench in future
warfare), as General Officer-Commanding-in-Chief in the Mediterranean,
and Inspector-General of the Overseas Forces (1910–1915). Except that
he had never yet held supreme command in any considerable campaign,
his experience in military affairs and in almost every phase of our
army’s activity was hardly to be surpassed.
On the other hand, he was sixty-two; and, though he was a year younger
than Lord French, and retained a slim and active figure such as enabled
Lord Roberts to take command in South Africa at seventy, sixty-two
was regarded as a full age for any officer in so difficult a campaign
upon a desert promontory. From a mingled Highland and Irish descent
he had inherited the so-called Celtic qualities which are regarded by
thorough Englishmen with varying admiration and dislike. His blood
gave him so conspicuous a physical courage that, after the battles of
Cæsar’s Camp and Diamond Hill, the present writer, who knew him there,
regarded him as an example of the rare type which not merely conceals
fear with success, but does not feel it. Undoubtedly he was deeply
tinged with the “Celtic charm”--that glamour of mind and courtesy of
behaviour which create suspicion among people endowed with neither.
Through his nature ran a strain of the idealistic spirit which some
despise as quixotic, and others salute as chivalrous, while, with
cautious solicitude, they avoid it in themselves. It was known also
that Sir Ian was susceptible to the influence of beauty in other forms
than those usually conceded to military men. He was an acknowledged
master of English prose, and though our people read more in quantity
than any other nation, the literary gift is regarded among us as a sign
of incapacity, and is not, as in France and ancient Greece, accepted as
assurance of far-reaching powers. What was worse, he was known to have
written poetry.
Before the war, his opposition to the introduction of conscription
in the United Kingdom had roused the animosity of all who aimed at
establishing militarism as a permanent system in this country. Thus
political animosity was added to the official prejudice against a
buoyant and liberal temperament, conjoined with a politeness and an
open-hearted manner startlingly at variance with official usage. One
must acknowledge that, in choosing the man for command, Lord Kitchener
hardly took sufficient account of qualities likely to arouse antipathy
among certain influential classes and the newspapers which represent
their opinions. But careless of such prudent considerations, as his
manner was, he allowed his decision to be guided by the General’s long
experience of warfare, and designedly selected an eager temperament,
liable to incautious impetuosity, but suited, as might be supposed,
to an undertaking which demanded impetuous action. It was, however,
probably in fear lest natural impulse should be given too loose a
rein that the instructions mentioned above impressed only caution
upon the appointed commander. In view of the strong opposition to the
whole enterprise, it was also assumed that no reinforcements could be
promised, and none should be asked for. Even the allotted Divisions
were not allowed the ten per cent. extra men usually granted to fill up
the gaps of immediate loss.
After that conference in the _Queen Elizabeth_ on March 22 (when
Sir Ian left the final decision to the naval authorities), it was
evident that a military landing could not be avoided, unless the
whole expedition were abandoned. It is easy now for belated prudence
to maintain that Sir Ian should then have abandoned it, secured (if
he could) the acquiescence of the navy in defeat, counter-ordered
the assembling troops, and returned to London. Prudence could have
said much for such a retirement. Small preparation had been made; the
strongest part of the striking force was still distant; the number of
the enemy (though roughly estimated at 40,000 on the Peninsula, and
30,000 in reserve beyond Bulair) was quite unknown; ever since the
appearance of our fleet, Turks had been digging like beavers every
night at most of the possible points of our offence; and it had been
proved that the cross-fire of naval guns could not dislodge them even
from the toe of the Peninsula, where, for about five miles up to the
rising ground in front of Achi Baba, the surface appeared comparatively
level. All these objections could have been urged, and, indeed, were
urged at the time by Generals to whom, as to the German commanders
of the Turkish defence, a landing appeared impossible. But if any
one believes that a high-spirited and optimistic officer was likely
to consider a retirement to be his duty just when he had received a
command which he regarded as the surest means of terminating the war,
he errs like a German psychologist in his judgment of mankind.
[Sidenote: DELAY OF RELOADING TRANSPORTS]
So, in the face of all objections, the preparations for an assault
upon the Peninsula began. The immediate difficulty was a question
of transport. Besides 5000 Australians from Egypt, the Royal Naval
Division (less three battalions) had already arrived at Mudros, and
their twelve transports were anchored in the great harbour. But it
was found that the ships were indeed well enough packed for peace
conditions, but the freight had not been arranged with a view to
launching separate units complete upon the field of action. Men were
divided from their ammunition, guns from their carriages, carts from
their horses. Perhaps, for a long voyage, it is impossible to load
transports so as to make each unit self-supporting. At all events,
it was not done, and on the desert shores of the Mudros inlet it was
impossible to unload and sort out and repack. Unless incalculable time
was to be lost, such a confused piece of work could not be undertaken
apart from wharves and cranes and docks. Wharves and cranes and docks
were to be found at Alexandria, but no nearer; and to Alexandria the
transports were ordered to return. That historic city thus became the
main base--Mudros harbour, which had previously been selected, now
serving as intermediate or advanced base.[79] Lord Kitchener approved
the return and repacking of the transports, and certain advantages in
the matter of drill and organisation were gained by the delay, to say
nothing of the inestimable advantage of more settled weather. But the
enemy also gained advantages, and in the extra month allowed them they
increased their defensive works with laborious anxiety.
[Sidenote: THE FORCES IN EGYPT]
On March 25 (a calendar month before the great landing) Sir Ian
Hamilton followed the transports to Egypt and remained there till April
7. While he was there his Administrative Staff arrived (April 1). It
had been appointed after he left England, and until its arrival the
administrative work had been, with much extra exertion, carried on by
his Chief of Staff, General Braithwaite, and the rest of the General
Staff. Sir Ian took the opportunity of his presence in Egypt to inspect
the 29th Division (under Major-General Hunter-Weston), which began
to arrive in Alexandria on March 28 and was encamped at Mex outside
the city while its transports were being reloaded for the landing.
He also inspected the Royal Naval Division (under Major-General
Paris) at Port Said, and the French Division (under Général d’Amade)
near Alexandria, where their transports also were being reloaded. At
least equally significant, when viewed from what was then the future,
was his inspection of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps,
or “Anzacs,” as they came to be called. The corps was commanded by
Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood: the Australian Division under
Major-General W. T. Bridges, the mixed New Zealand and Australian
Division under Major-General Sir Alexander Godley. The Australian
Division was encamped at Mena, near the Pyramids; the mixed Division
at Heliopolis on the other side of Cairo. Sir Ian also inspected the
42nd (East Lancashire) Division (under Major-General W. Douglas, the
first Territorials to volunteer for foreign service), although they
were not as yet part of his own force, but stood under command of
Major-General Sir John Maxwell for the defence of Egypt. Beside these
fighting Divisions, since so renowned, there remained the Assyrian
Jewish Refugee Mule Corps (better known as “the Zionists”), organised
only a few days before out of Jewish refugees from Syria and Palestine,
chiefly Russian subjects, who had sought safety in Egypt. Colonel J. H.
Patterson had been commissioned to select a body of about 500, with 750
transport mules. Orders were given in Hebrew and partly in English; the
men were armed with rifles taken from the Turks in the battle of the
Canal; and the regimental badge was the Shield of David. Probably this
was the first purely Jewish fighting corps that went into action since
Jerusalem fell to the Roman armies under Titus.[80]
[Sidenote: THE ANZACS IN EGYPT]
The fortunate presence of the “Anzacs” in Egypt was due to Lord
Kitchener’s constant apprehension of a Turkish attack upon the Suez
Canal and the main country, in which it was natural to suppose that
a nationalist and religious feeling would rally a large part of the
inhabitants to the enemy’s side. At the outbreak of war with Germany
thousands of the youth in Australia and New Zealand (including
large numbers of Maoris) had eagerly volunteered, moved by love of
adventure and a racial affection for the mother-country. After nearly
three months’ preparation--a difficult task, persistently effected
in Australia by Major-General Bridges, who for three years had been
commandant of Duntroon Military College--the whole force assembled
at King George Sound on October 31, 1914, and set sail next day (the
day of Turkey’s entrance into the war as the Central Powers’ Ally).
Thirty-eight transports carried the army corps, and they were convoyed
by cruisers, one of which (the _Sydney_, under Captain Glossop) gained
the distinction upon the route of destroying the active raider _Emden_
at Cocos Island, and taking her gallant and resourceful captain, Karl
von Müller, prisoner (November 9). Having reached Egypt on December 3,
the “Anzacs” went into camps at points near Cairo for further training,
and some selected battalions took part in the repulse of Djemal Pasha’s
attack upon the Canal near Ismailia in the first week of February 1915.
A finer set of men than the “Anzacs” after their three months’ training
upon the desert sands could hardly be found in any country. With the
aid of open-air life, sufficient food, and freedom from grinding
poverty, Australia and New Zealand had bred them as though to display
the physical excellence of which the British type is capable when
released from manufacturing squalor or agricultural subjection. Equally
distinguished in feature and in figure--the eyes rather deep-set and
looking level to the front, the nose straight and rather prominent,
shoulders loose and broad, moving easily above the slim waist and
lengthy thighs, the chest, it is true, rather broad than deep, owing to
Australia’s clear and sunny air--they walked the earth with careless
and dare-devil self-confidence. Gifted with the intelligence that
comes of freedom and healthy physique, they were educated rather to
resourceful energy in the face of nature than to scientific knowledge
and the arts. Since they sprang from every Colonial class, and had
grown up accustomed to natural equality, military discipline at first
appeared to them an irritating and absurd superfluity, and they could
be counted upon to face death but hardly to salute an officer. Indeed,
their general conception of discipline was rather reasonable than
regular, and their language, habitually violent, continued unrestrained
in the presence of superiors; so to the natural irony of our race was
added a Colonial independence.
Except in action, the control of such men was inevitably difficult.
Released from a long voyage, exposed to the unnatural conditions of
warfare, and beguiled by the curious amenities of an Oriental city,
now for the first time experienced, many availed themselves of Cairo’s
opportunity for enjoyment beyond the strict limit of regulations. The
most demure of English tourists upon the Continent, having escaped from
the trammels of identity, have been known in former times to behave as
they would not behave in their own provincial towns; much more might
unrestrained behaviour be expected in men whose sense of personal
responsibility in a foreign city had been further reduced by uniform,
and who were encouraged to excess by the easy standard of military
tradition, and by the foreknowledge that, to get beforehand with death,
the interval for pleasure might be short. It was no wonder, therefore,
that, while twenty per cent. of the Colonial forces (later ten per
cent.) poured into Cairo daily upon any animal or conveyance which
could move, the beautiful city became a scene of frequent turmoil.[81]
Upon his journey back to the advanced base, there were many
thoughts to divide and even oppress the mind of the most sanguine
Commander-in-Chief. The fateful decision had now to be made--a decision
upon which the future destiny of the war, and, indeed, of his country,
so largely depended. The burden of responsibility lay upon his head
alone. To his single judgment were entrusted, not only the lives of
many thousand devoted men, but the highest interests of an Alliance
in the justice of whose cause he whole-heartedly believed. As the
inevitable hour approached, the difficulties of the appointed task were
recognised as greater even than foreseen. The strongest nerve might
well hesitate to confront them. Even at this crisis of decision, the
chief among his commanding Generals were inclined to turn aside from
the Peninsula as from impossibility. One advocated an attack upon Asia
Minor, with a view to diverting the enemy’s main force, and so clearing
a passage for the fleet. Another favoured further delay and continuous
training, in hope of some more propitious opportunity. A third, while
offering no alternative, considered the attempt too desperate to be
tried. Upon a sensitive and imaginative nature the risk, the sacrifice
of lives, the difficulties of a small force too rapidly organised,
insufficiently equipped with modern ammunition, and unsupported by
reinforcements, weighed heavily. To these were added the discouraging
representations of friendly, trusted, and experienced officers, upon
whose diligent co-operation the success of the whole design entirely
depended. In such hours as those, deep searchings of mind and heart are
the unenviable lot of the man whose word decides.
[Sidenote: ATTACK THROUGH BULAIR CONSIDERED]
But Sir Ian’s decision was already taken, and subsequent conference
with the Admirals de Robeck and Wemyss only confirmed it. On their
arrival at Mudros, his Generals also agreed, and the General whose
objections to landing on any condition had been the most serious,
became enthusiastic for the scheme, if landing was attempted. Various
lines of attack were possible, and each was carefully considered. To
the lay mind, an assault upon the neck of the Peninsula at Bulair
appeared so obvious that, from the very outset of operations, Sir Ian
was blamed for not attempting it. The neck is narrow--not more than
three miles across. If it were cut, the enemy on the main Peninsula
might be expected to surrender for want of supplies; the Straits would
then be free from obstacle on the European side, and the Asiatic side
could be commanded by big guns on Achi Baba and the Kilid Bahr plateau
opposite Chanak. The main objection to this obvious strategy was the
disconcerting truth that the enemy’s chief line of communication
did not run through Bulair, but across the strait itself, chiefly
from the Asiatic coast to the town of Gallipoli, and even if Bulair
were occupied, the supply of the Turkish army on the Peninsula could
be maintained; while an Allied force advancing from Bulair towards
the Narrows (which was the objective of the whole expedition) would
be perpetually threatened from the rear. Bulair itself was also a
formidable obstacle. The famous lines, originally fortified by the
Allies in the Crimean War, and renewed to resist Russian, Bulgarian,
and Greek attacks from the north, had been incalculably strengthened
in the preceding weeks under German direction. On his first survey
(March 18) Sir Ian had observed the labyrinth of white lines marking
the newly-constructed trenches upon which thousands of Turks had
already been long at work. The gleam of wire was apparent around the
only two possible points of landing, both difficult, and unsuited for
naval co-operation. An assault upon Bulair would have involved immense
losses, and, even if successful, could not have advanced the solution
of the problem--the problem of the Narrows--without further dubious and
speculative fighting, front and rear.
[Sidenote: OTHER POSSIBLE LINES OF ATTACK]
Another proposal, which found favour with some, was a landing at Enos,
on the mouth of the Thracian river Maritza (the ancient Hebrus). Except
that the actual landing upon the level coast might have been easier,
the same objections held, but in exaggerated form. The distance from
the Narrows was more than twice as long. An army on the march round
the head of the Gulf of Xeros would have had its left flank exposed
the whole way to the large Turkish reserves known to be stationed at
Rodosto and Adrianople. The two main roads from those important towns
meet at Keshan, about fifteen miles from the Xeros coast, and from that
base fairly good roads extend to Enos on the one side, and to Kavak,
at the head of the Bulair neck, on the other. The Turkish armies could
thus concentrate as at the handle of a fan, ready to strike at any
point along the edge where the British were moving within reach of the
coast. Nor could the navy have afforded much protection to our troops
upon the march, the head-waters of the gulf being shallow far out from
shore. Had Sir Ian attempted, as others have suggested, to turn inland
and fight his way towards Constantinople, disregarding his appointed
task at the Straits, he would, of course, have lost the assistance of
the navy altogether, except as defence to his precarious base and lines
of communication along the bit of coast; and, apart from the navy, he
had no transport available for a long march.
Between Bulair and the sharp northern point of Suvla Bay, steep
cliffs and the absence of beach, except in tiny inlets, prevent the
possibility of landing. But inland from Suvla Bay itself there is
open ground, and a practicable beach extends south as far as the
cliff promontory of Gaba Tepe, although the main mass of the Sari
Bair mountain rises close behind the southern part of the beach in
a series of broken precipices and ravines. From Suvla Point to Gaba
Tepe it would certainly have been possible to put the whole united
force ashore, and, to judge from subsequent events, this might have
been the wisest course. On the other hand, Suvla is far removed from
the Narrows; a straight line thence to Maidos measures nearly fifteen
miles; it passes over the top of Sari Bair, a formidable barrier;
while, upon the long and devious route alone possible for a movement of
troops, the army would have had both flanks exposed, on the right to
the strong Turkish position of Kilid Bahr plateau, and on the left to
large forces available to the enemy from Rodosto and Gallipoli. It is
probable that Sir Ian’s troops were not then numerous enough to hold
so long a line of communications and at the same time resist flank
attacks, especially the strong attack to be anticipated from the left.
A landing at Gaba Tepe itself, where north and south the ground is
open, and a fairly level gap between the Sari Bair range and the Kilid
Bahr plateau allows the long and wandering road from Krithia to cross
the Peninsula to Maidos, would have exposed the army to similar flank
attacks; but the distance is short (not much over five miles), and in
all probability a landing in full force might have been attempted here
had not the fortification and armament on the promontory itself, and on
the gradually sloping land upon both sides of it, appeared too powerful
for assault. The barbed-wire entanglements extended into the sea, and
the country formed the most dangerous of all approaches--a glacis with
no dead ground and little cover. South of this position the cliffs rise
abruptly again, and along all the coast round Cape Helles to Morto Bay
(which was commanded by guns from the Asiatic side) a survey showed no
beach or opening, except at a few small gaps and gullies, so soon to be
celebrated.
[Illustration: HELLES AND THE STRAITS]
[Sidenote: THE SELECTED LANDING-PLACES]
As he rejected the coast between Suvla and Gaba Tepe, Sir Ian was
compelled to disregard Napoleon’s maxim of war and divide his forces.
His object was to shake the enemy’s _moral_, and puzzle the command
by several simultaneous attacks, threatening front and rear, and
keeping the Turkish Staff in flustered uncertainty where the main
defence should be concentrated. Accordingly, a few of those small but
practicable landing-places round the extremity of the Peninsula were
selected. Here the assault upon the Turkish defences was to be made
chiefly by units of the 29th Division. The chosen points were S Beach,
or De Tott’s Battery, on the farther side of Morto Bay, where only a
small force was to attempt holding on so as to protect our right flank;
V Beach, just below the large village and ancient castle of Seddel
Bahr, where a main attack was to be made and the ground permanently
occupied; W Beach, where a similar force was to land, and link up with
V Beach, having the same object in view; X Beach (round the point of
Cape Tekke, looking out towards the Gulf of Xeros), where a force was
to work up the face of a cliff and attempt to join hands with W Beach;
and Y Beach, about three and a half miles north along the cliffs, where
a small body was to scramble up a precipitous ravine and make a feint
upon Krithia. Both flanks of the main attack were further protected by
the sea and the naval guns.
Such was the task of the 29th Division, their general objective being
the low but formidable position of Achi Baba, a hill sitting asquat
almost across the Peninsula about five miles from Cape Helles, and
rising by gradual and bare slopes to a truncated pyramid, some 600
to 700 feet high. About nine miles along the coast beyond Y Beach,
between a point north of Gaba Tepe and a slight projection then called
Fisherman’s Hut, three miles farther up the coast from Gaba Tepe, the
Anzacs were to land on Z Beach, and work their way into the defiles
and up the heights of Sari Bair. Their main purpose was to distract
the enemy forces south of Achi Baba by threatening their rear and
communications. With a similar object the greater part of the Royal
Naval Division, which had no guns, and for which no small boats could
be supplied, was to make a feint near the Bulair lines at the head of
the Gulf. Further to distract the enemy’s attention, one infantry
regiment and one battery from the French mixed Division were instructed
to land on the Asiatic shore near Kum Kali; but not to remain there,
nor advance beyond the river Mendere. Such, in brief, was the general
design for attacking the Peninsula position, confidently described by
German authorities as impregnable.
By the middle of April the force appointed to accomplish this
overwhelming task had assembled in the Mudros harbour or loch. Large
as that inlet is, the surface was so crowded with ships that the naval
authorities, among whom Commodore Roger Keyes was Chief of Staff to
Admiral de Robeck, had difficulty in finding anchorage for all. Beside
the ships of war, places had to be fixed for 108 transports and other
vessels. The 29th Division had arrived in twenty transports;[82]
the Anzacs in forty; the Royal Naval Division in twelve; the French
Division in twenty-three; the Supply and Store Ships numbered twelve,
and the _Arcadian_ was detailed for General Headquarters.
[Sidenote: PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS]
The names of the officers appointed to the most important positions
upon Sir Ian’s Staff may here be mentioned, his personal Aides being
Captain S. H. Pollen and Lieutenant G. St. John Brodrick:
_Chief of the General Staff_, Major-General W. F. Braithwaite; other
members of the General Staff, Lieut.-Colonel M. C. P. Ward, R.A.;
Lieut.-Colonel Doughty-Wylie (Royal Welsh Fusiliers); Captain
C. F. Aspinall (Royal Munster Fusiliers); Captain G. P. Dawnay
(Reserve of Officers); Captain W. H. Deedes (King’s Royal Rifles).
_Deputy Adjutant-General_, Brigadier-General E. M. Woodward.
_Deputy Quartermaster-General_, Brigadier-General S. H. Winter.
_Liaison Officers_, with the British, Commandant de Cavalerie Breveté
Berthier de Sauvigny, Lieut. Pelliot, and Lieut. de Laborde.
With the French, Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Farquharson, and Captain C.
de Putron.
_Camp Commandant_, Major J. S. S. Churchill (Oxfordshire Fusiliers).
_Censor_, Captain William Maxwell (the well-known war correspondent
in former campaigns).
_Principal Chaplain_, The Rev. A. C. Hordern.
HEADQUARTERS OF BASE.
_Base Commandant_, Brigadier-General C. R. M‘Grigor, C.B.
_General Staff Officer_, Major E. A. Plunkett (Lincolnshire Regiment).
_Assistant Quartermaster-General_, Lieut.-Colonel P. C. J. Scott
(A.S.C.).
_Assistant Director of Medical Services_, Major M. J. Sexton
(R.A.M.C.).
HEADQUARTERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.
_Director of Army Signals_, Lieut.-Colonel M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold
(R.E.).
_Director of Supplies and Transport_, Colonel F. W. B. Koe, C.B.
_Assistant Director of Transport_, Major O. Striedinger (A.S.C.).
_Director of Ordnance Services_, Colonel R. W. M. Jackson, C.B.,
C.M.G.
_Director of Works_, Brigadier-General G. S. M‘D. Elliot.
_Director of Medical Services_, Surgeon-General W. E. Birrell.
_Paymaster-in-Chief_, Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Armstrong (A.P.D.).
The total number of the Staff at the beginning of the great enterprise
was eighty-four. Brigadier-General Woodward and Surgeon-General Birrell
did not arrive till April 19, having remained in Egypt under orders
to organise the hospitals. In their absence the general scheme for
the evacuation of the wounded was drawn up by Lieut.-Colonel A. E. C.
Keble, R.A.M.C.
[Sidenote: AVAILABLE FORCES]
The military force under Sir Ian’s command at the beginning of the
campaign was composed as follows:
THE 29TH DIVISION.
_Commander_, Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O.
_Divisional Artillery Commander_, Brigadier-General R. W. Breeks.
_Division Engineers Commander_, Lieut.-Colonel C. B. Kingston (R.E.).
_86th Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Brigadier-General S. W. Hare.
(1) 2nd Royal Fusiliers.
(2) 1st Lancashire Fusiliers.
(3) 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers.
(4) 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
_87th Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Brigadier-General W. R. Marshall.
(1) 2nd South Wales Borderers.
(2) 1st King’s Own Scottish Borderers.
(3) 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
(4) 1st Border Regiment.
_88th Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Brigadier-General H. E. Napier.
(1) 4th Worcester Regiment.
(2) 2nd Hampshire Regiment.
(3) 1st Essex Regiment.
(4) 5th Royal Scots (Territorials).
THE ANZAC ARMY CORPS.
_General Officer Commanding_, Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Birdwood,
K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.
_Brigadier-General, General Staff_, Brigadier-General H. B. Walker,
D.S.O.
_General Staff Officer_, Lieut.-Colonel A. Skeen (24th Punjabis).
_Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General_, Brigadier-General R. A.
Carruthers, C.B.
_Medical Officer_, Colonel C. S. Ryan, V.D. (A.A.M.C.).
_Attached as Specialist on Water Supply_, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Joly
de Lotbinière, C.S.I., C.I.E.
AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
_Commander_, Major-General W. T. Bridges, C.M.G.
_General Staff Officer_, Lieut.-Colonel C. B. B. White (R.A.A.).
_Commanding Divisional Artillery_, Colonel J. J. T. Hobbs, V.D.
_Commanding Divisional Engineers_, Lieut.-Colonel G. C. E. Elliott
(R.E.).
_1st (New South Wales) Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Colonel H. N. M‘Laurin. (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Battalions, New South Wales.)
_2nd (Victoria) Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Colonel the Hon. J. W. M‘Cay, V.D. (5th, 6th, 7th, and
8th Battalions, Victoria.)
_3rd (Australia) Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Colonel E. G. Sinclair Maclagan, D.S.O. (Yorkshire
Regiment). (9th Queensland, 10th South Australian, 11th West
Australian, 12th South Australian, West Australian, and Tasmania.)
_Divisional._ 4th (Victoria) Light Horse.
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIAN DIVISION.
_General Officer Commanding_, Major-General Sir A. J. Godley,
K.C.M.G., C.B.
_Chief Staff Officer_, Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Braithwaite, D.S.O.
(Royal Welsh Fusiliers).
_Commanding Divisional Artillery_, Lieut.-Colonel G. N. Johnston
(R.A.).
_Commanding Divisional Engineers_, Lieut.-Colonel G. R. Pridham
(R.E.).
_New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade._
_Commander_, Brigadier-General A. H. Russell, A.D.C. (Auckland,
Canterbury, and Wellington Mounted Rifles.)
_1st Australian Light Horse Brigade._
_Commander_, Colonel H. G. Chauvel, C.M.G. (1st New South Wales, 2nd
Queensland, 3rd South Australian, and Tasmania Regiments.)
_New Zealand Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Colonel F. C. Johnston (North Staffordshire Regiment).
(Auckland, Canterbury, Otago, and Wellington Battalions.)
_4th Australian Infantry Brigade._
_Commander_, Colonel J. Monash. (13th New South Wales, 14th Victoria,
15th Queensland and Tasmania, and 16th South and West Australia
Battalions.)
_Divisional._ Otago Mounted Rifles.
CORPS TROOPS.
_2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade._ (5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments.)
_Commander_, Colonel G. de L. Ryrie.
_3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade._ (8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments.)
_Commander_, Colonel F. G. Hughes, V.D.
The Mounted Units had left their horses behind them in Egypt, and the
popular pictures representing cavalry charging over broken ground upon
the Peninsula are imaginative.
ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION.
_General Officer Commanding_, Major-General A. Paris, C.B.
_General Staff Officer_, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Ollivant (R.A.). (The
Division had no guns.)
_Commanding Divisional Engineers_, Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Carey (R.E.).
_First Naval Brigade._
_Commander_, Brigadier-General D. Mercer (R.M.L.I.). (Drake,
Nelson, Hawke, and Collingwood Battalions.)
_Second Naval Brigade._
_Commander_, Commodore O. Backhouse (R.N.). (Howe, Hood, Anson,
and Benbow Battalions.)
_Third Naval Brigade._ (Marine.)
_Commander_, Brigadier-General C. N. Trotman (R.M.L.I.). (Chatham,
Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Deal Battalions.)
FRENCH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
_Général Commandant le Corps Expeditionnaire Français d’Orient_,
Général de Division d’Amade.
_Chef d’Etat-Major_, Lieut.-Colonel Descoins.
_Commandant d’Armes de la Base_, Général Baumann.
_Division._
_Général Commandant_, Général Masnou.
_Chef d’Etat-Major_, Commandant Romieux.
_Colonel Commandant l’Artillerie_, Lieut.-Colonel Branet.
_Commandant du Génie_, Capitaine Bouyssou.
_1ère Brigade Metropolitaine._
_Général de Brigade_, Général Vandenberg. Comprising 175ème
Régiment d’Infanterie Metropolitaine (Lieut.-Colonel Philippe),
and a Régiment de marche d’Afrique (Lieut.-Colonel Desruelles),
mixed Zouaves and Foreign Legion. _Brigade Coloniale._
_Général de Brigade_, Colonel Ruef. Comprising 4ème Régiment
mixte Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel Vacher), and 6ème Régiment mixte
Colonial (Lieut.-Colonel Noguès). The Division had six batteries
of “75’s,” and three of “65” mountain guns; four guns to each
battery.
Most unfortunately, the Indian Brigade, under General Cox, was for the
present left in Egypt, though its service there was no longer required,
and Sir Ian had appealed to Lord Kitchener for it. Ultimately it
arrived, just too late, on May 1.
The total number of the force was under 70,000; of these certainly not
more than 60,000 could be used for action, even including the necessary
reserves.
[Sidenote: SIR IAN’S ADDRESS]
Landing was intended on April 23, but on the 20th a heavy wind arose,
and blew for forty-eight hours, rendering the movement of small boats
difficult even in Mudros harbour. On the 21st the Commander-in-Chief
issued the following address to his forces:
“SOLDIERS OF FRANCE AND OF THE KING:
“Before us lies an adventure unprecedented in modern war. Together
with our comrades of the Fleet, we are about to force a landing upon
an open beach in face of positions which have been vaunted by our
enemies as impregnable.
“The landing will be made good, by the help of God and the Navy; the
positions will be stormed, and the War brought one step nearer to a
glorious close.
“‘Remember,’ said Lord Kitchener, when bidding adieu to your
Commander, ‘Remember, once you set foot upon the Gallipoli Peninsula,
you must fight the thing through to a finish.’
“The whole world will be watching your progress. Let us prove
ourselves worthy of the great feat of arms entrusted to us.
“IAN HAMILTON,
_General_.”
A few further points remain to be mentioned. On April 17, one of our
submarines, E15, ran aground off Kephez Point, and by a very gallant
action was destroyed by the two picket-boats of the _Triumph_ and
_Majestic_ (ships afterwards sent to the bottom by submarines).
Lieut.-Commander Eric Robinson was in command, and, though coming under
heavy fire, he succeeded in torpedoing the submarine and rendering it
useless to the enemy.
[Sidenote: CONTEMPORARY EVENTS]
On the 23rd, just after the transports had started, news came from the
rugged island of Skyros, eighty miles south-west of Lemnos, that Rupert
Brooke, the poet, had died there of blood-poisoning that evening.
During his visit to the Royal Naval Division at Port Said, Sir Ian
had seen him in his tent upon the sand, prostrate with fever, and had
offered him a place on his Staff. With fine resolution, and a modesty
equally characteristic, Brooke refused, being determined to abide by
the Royal Naval Division, which he had joined before the quixotic
fiasco at Antwerp. On April 20 he took part in a field-day on Skyros,
and in an olive grove there, high up on the mountain Pephko, looking
over Trebaki Bay, he was buried at midnight of the 23rd, his own petty
officers carrying his body over the rocks and prickly bushes. A wooden
cross, surrounded by lumps of marble, marks the spot. His colonel in
the Hood Battalion, Arnold Quilter, Grenadier Guards, who was killed
a fortnight later, wrote to his mother: “His men were devoted to him,
and he had all the makings of a first-rate officer.” Alas! his friends
know that he had all the makings of so much beside, and for them the
world was darkened by the loss of so singularly beautiful a character,
a personality so fine and full of the noblest promise.[83]
Upon other fronts of the war, the chief events of the weeks following
the costly and inconclusive movement at Neuve Chapelle (March 10) were
the capture of Przemysl by the Russians (March 22), followed by heavy
fighting in the Carpathian passes, and the second battle of Ypres,
inaugurated (April 22) on the German side by the earliest use of poison
gas.