THE NAVAL ATTACKS
At the War Council meetings of January 28 a demonstration extending to
the possible capture of Constantinople was thus decided upon, and the
demonstration was to be purely naval. All the members of the Council
would have agreed that a joint naval and military (or “amphibious”)
attack would have made success surer; but Lord Kitchener declared the
necessary troops could not be supplied, and his decision was accepted
without question. The evidence shows that when first Admiral Carden
was commanded to attack, no hint of military support was given him.
He was expected to depend entirely upon small landing-parties of his
own marines to demolish the forts.[53] Mr. Churchill has himself told
us that, if an amphibious attack had then been thought essential or
seriously contemplated, nothing at all would have been done. Nothing
less than 100,000 or 150,000 men could have been asked for, together
with large supplies of high explosives and artillery. Whereupon, “all
the military experts” (_i.e._ Lord Kitchener, with the possible
addition of Lord French) “unanimously would have said that the men
were not available, and the ammunition could not be spared from the
French front.”[54] Whether it would not have been well, even at this
last moment, to abandon the whole scheme rather than act contrary to
the best judgment of experts and laymen alike, has now, unfortunately,
become a matter of vain speculation.
[Sidenote: HESITATION RENEWED]
Hardly had the naval orders been given, and the ships dispatched,
when the Council began to waver. It is impossible to fix a day for
this change, for the change itself wavered. In his evidence, General
Callwell (the D.M.O.) said: “We drifted into the big military
attack”;[55] and “drift” is the precise word for the Council’s
uncertain course. By the middle of February the feeling had evidently
set towards an amphibious movement; but up to the middle of March
they hoped that the need of landing troops upon a large scale might
be avoided by purely naval success. It appears that early in February
Lord Kitchener began to yield. Probably his former decision was shaken
by the abandonment of a large-scale offensive in France, and by the
failure of the Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal (February 3 and 4).
Though the Turkish force was allowed to retreat without the destruction
which greater energy in the Egyptian Command might have brought upon
it, the troops then in Egypt had proved more than sufficient for
defence; and Egypt, as we have noticed, was always Lord Kitchener’s
peculiar care. On February 9 he remarked in the War Council that “if
the Navy required the assistance of the land forces at a later stage,
that assistance would be forthcoming.”
[Sidenote: THE 29TH DIVISION DETAINED]
But, by the majority of the Council, the claim for assistance was not
postponed to a later stage. On February 15 Sir Henry Jackson sent a
long memorandum of “suggestions” to Admiral Carden in regard to the
approaching naval attack. Not only did this memorandum speak of strong
military landing-parties with strong covering forces as necessary, but
it added that “full advantage of the undertaking would only be obtained
by the occupation of the Peninsula by a military force acting in
conjunction with the naval operations.” The very next day (February 16)
the War Council decided to send the 29th Division (hitherto destined
for France) at the earliest possible date to Lemnos; to arrange for a
force from Egypt, if required; and to order the Admiralty to prepare
transport for the conveyance and landing of 50,000 men.[56] The navy
and army were thus at last committed to an amphibious enterprise; but
nineteen days had been lost. What was worse: the 29th Division was to
have started on February 22, but on the 20th Lord Kitchener, on his own
initiative, without consulting the First Lord or the Admirals, told
the Director of Naval Transport to stop the preparation of transport,
as the Division was not to go. In spite of Mr. Churchill’s vehement
protests (for even his confidence in a purely naval attack was now
shaking), Lord Kitchener stood by his decision till March 10, and the
Division did not begin to start till March 16. Twenty-two more days
lost! Add the nineteen of the Council’s hesitation, and forty-one days
were lost in all. Forty-one days in an enterprise which depended upon
speed and secrecy!
Undoubtedly Lord Kitchener had sufficient reason for delay. The Russian
armies were hard pressed on their right or northern flank, and in
the centre Hindenburg was pushing his third attempt upon Warsaw. If
the Germans were successful at either point, it was probable that
they would transfer large forces to their Western front, with which
the French were then heavily engaged in Champagne and between the
Moselle and Meuse, while the British were preparing and executing the
assault at Neuve Chapelle (March 10 to 14).[57] There may have been
other reasons, but those were enough to justify caution in allowing
a splendid Regular Division like the 29th to be diverted from the
critical strategic lines in France. Its retention, without due notice
to the War Council, was sudden and arbitrary. That was Lord Kitchener’s
way, and no more could be said. Perhaps the Division should not
have been offered, and the Secretary for War, who also held supreme
military command, could not be blamed for retaining it under his hand.
Nevertheless, its retention stands high among the causes of ultimate
disaster.
By the middle of February the War Council had tacitly abandoned the
idea of a mere demonstration from which the ships could be at any
moment withdrawn. But both Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill still
thought that troops, if used at all, would be wanted only for “minor
operations,” such as the final destruction of batteries, and both clung
to this idea for about four weeks longer. Yet, in the first week of
March, General Birdwood, who had been sent from Egypt to report upon
this very question, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was doubtful
if the navy could force a passage unassisted, and that Admiral Carden’s
forecast was too sanguine.[58]
[Sidenote: THE DARDANELLES]
By that time General Birdwood had definite experience to guide him;
for, in obedience to Mr. Churchill’s orders, Admiral Carden had on
February 19 begun to execute his detailed plan for forcing the Straits
by naval power alone. The scene of our narrative accordingly shifts
from the Council Chambers of Whitehall to that famous channel which,
like a broad, deep river, divides the European from the Asiatic
coast. Celebrated beyond all other waters of the world by legend and
history, and by one of mankind’s noblest poems, it is haunted by almost
overwhelming memories, to which the great tragedy here described has
added new. At the very entrance, where the passage is three miles
broad, you see upon your right hand the flat and gently curving beach
upon which Agamemnon tied his ships for the prolonged siege of a low
hill, formed even in his time of ruined and piled-up cities. It rises,
still quite visible from the opposite shore, above the marshes where
Simois and Scamander unite their small and immortal streams.
[Illustration:
_Vandyk_]
GENERAL SIR WILLIAM BIRDWOOD]
Steering north-east, a vessel beats up against the swirling eddies
of a tideless current, always pouring down against her bows, with a
force that varies from three knots to four, and even to five in the
centre when the wind drives it on. Sailors have told me that they
believe an undercurrent passes the water back; else, they think,
it could not perpetually run so strong. What was the experience of
submarine officers like Lieutenant Holbrook, who, on December 13, 1914,
groped his way below the surface and through the mines till he emerged
near the entrance to the Sea of Marmora, and destroyed the Turkish
warship _Messoudieh_, I do not know. But it seems probable that enough
water is poured into the Black Sea by the Dnieper, Dniester, and Don,
rivers of the Steppes, to account for a rapid current, not to speak of
the glacier streams issuing from the snows of the Caucasus beyond the
magic Phasis. All the more likely is the current to be swift since the
waters from the shores of Azoff, the Euxine, and Marmora are discharged
down a constricted funnel, which at the narrowest point, between Chanak
and Kilid Bahr, is hardly more than three-quarters of a mile across.
At Chanak, as a ship makes its way against the stream, the strait
turns north from north-east for about four miles, and at the point of
Nagara (the old Abydos) the channel becomes again almost as narrow as
at Chanak. That part of the strait between Chanak and Nagara (both on
the Asiatic side) is called especially “The Narrows,” and it forms, as
it were, “The Gut” of the whole salt river. Here Xerxes stretched his
bridge of boats, having chained and flogged the turbulent waters. Here
Alexander crossed upon his way to India. Seven hundred years later
the Goths crossed here, and the Turks here entered Europe, a century
before they stormed the city of Constantine, which still retained the
traditions of the classic world. Beyond the Narrows the strait runs
north-east again with a channel about two miles broad for some twenty
miles, until between Gallipoli and Chardak it begins to widen gradually
into the Sea of Marmora. The total length of the strait from Cape
Helles to Gallipoli is between thirty-five and forty miles. The Asiatic
side is the coast of the ancient Troad, rising to high hills when the
plain of Troy is passed. On the European side the long promontory or
peninsula of Gallipoli precludes the channel from issuing into the Gulf
of Xeros at the neck of Bulair, or lower down into the Ægean Sea. It
is the south-western third of that peninsula which is the scene of the
present tragic episode in history. There is no railway on either side
of the strait. A coast road is marked from Kum Kali (at the entrance on
the Asiatic side) up to Chanak; but it is probably of the usual Turkish
quality, as were all roads upon the peninsula. Along both coasts the
inhabitants in peace-time communicate chiefly by water, in spite of the
current.
[Sidenote: THE ISLAND OF LEMNOS]
The small island of Tenedos lies about fifteen miles south-west from
Kum Kali, and the domed hill at the farther end of the island stands
up like a large haycock, visible not only from the Trojan plain, but
from all the surrounding seas and islands. The town is a pleasant and
well-built place, serviceable to the French for the purchase of extra
luxuries in the months following; and as Turkey had refused to yield
the island to Greece at the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, it
had been seized by the Allies as a station for watching the mouth of
the strait. From epic times, however, it was known as an untrustworthy
anchorage, and for a naval base the Allies occupied the great harbour
of Mudros upon the island of Lemnos, sixty miles from the scene of
action. The greater part of this island is bare of trees, and barren
but for patches of cultivation around the scattered villages. In
summer the low hills are scorched to a pale brown, and, for an Ægean
island, the country possesses little beauty or interest apart from the
hot springs for which it was consecrated to the god of fire.[59] But
into the centre of the southern coast runs a deep and broad inlet,
protected at its entrance by two small islands, and affording space and
anchorage enough for a vast navy. Its size is indeed excessive; for
when the wind sweeps down from the north-east across the dismal and
dusty town of Mudros, it can raise such a storm in the harbour that
pinnaces and smaller boats have trouble in lying alongside the ships,
and in loading up or unloading. There are, of course, no docks or
wharves, though our sailors subsequently constructed a few small piers
and landing-stages. All supplies, including most of the water, had to
be brought from the remote base at Alexandria; but the harbour became,
none the less, invaluable as a secure port for our navy and transports,
a forwarding station for supply and ammunition, the headquarters of the
Communication and Transport departments, and an advanced hospital base.
The use of it was granted by the Greek Government under Venizelos;
for the island had fallen into Greek possession in consequence of the
Balkan Wars; and King Constantine appears to have acquiesced graciously
in a concession which could not be refused.
[Sidenote: SHIPS OF THE FLEET]
In this vast harbour, and upon the open roadstead of Tenedos, Admiral
Carden had gathered a large fleet by the middle of February. Ships
were collected from various parts of the world (the _Triumph_ had
lately come from China);[60] but Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt supplied
most of them. At Lord Fisher’s own suggestion the super-Dreadnought
_Queen Elizabeth_ had been added to the pre-Dreadnought ships upon
which Mr. Churchill had originally depended. The _Inflexible_ was
also a “Dreadnought” battle-cruiser (she had shared in the Falkland
Islands battle of December 8, 1914), and the sister ships _Agamemnon_
and _Lord Nelson_, which Lord Fisher also added a little later than
the rest of the fleet, were generally regarded as fit to fight in
line with “Dreadnoughts.” The French Admiralty, at our request, also
supplied a few ships, though of old types, which have an overhampered
and top-heavy appearance. The most important units in the fleet as
concentrated at that time may be tabulated thus:
BRITISH.
+------------------+----------+--------+--------------------------+
| |Completed.| Tons. | Guns. |
+------------------+----------+--------+--------------------------+
|_Queen Elizabeth_ | 1915 | 27,500 | 8 15-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Inflexible_ | 1908 | 17,250 | 8 12-in. | 16 4-in. |
|_Agamemnon_ | 1908 | 16,500 | 4 12-in. | 10 9·2-in. |
|_Lord Nelson_ | 1908 | 16,500 | 4 12-in. | 10 9·2-in. |
|_Irresistible_ | 1901 | 15,000 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Majestic_ | 1895 | 14,900 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Prince George_ | 1896 | 14,900 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Cornwallis_ | 1904 | 14,900 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Vengeance_ | 1901 | 12,950 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Albion_ | 1902 | 12,950 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Ocean_ | 1900 | 12,950 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Canopus_ | 1899 | 12,950 | 4 12-in. | 12 6-in. |
|_Triumph_ | 1904 | 11,800 | 4 10-in. | 14 7·5-in. |
|_Swiftsure_ | 1904 | 11,800 | 4 10-in. | 14 7·5-in. |
| |
| FRENCH. |
| |
|_Suffren_ | 1903 | 12,520 | 4 12-in. | 10 6·4-in. |
|_Bouvet_ | 1898 | 12,007 | 2 12-in. | {2 10·8-in. |
| | | | | {8 5·5-in. |
|_Gaulois_ | 1899 | 11,080 | 4 12-in. | 10 5·5-in. |
|_Charlemagne_ | 1898 | 11,000 | 4 12-in. | 10 5·5-in.[61]|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
To these main fighting ships were added four light cruisers (the
_Amethyst_, _Sapphire_, _Dublin_, and _Doris_), two destroyer
depôts, sixteen destroyers, six submarines, twenty-one mine-sweeping
trawlers, and a seaplane ship (the _Ark Royal_) accommodating six
seaplanes; besides from the French navy six torpedo-boats and fourteen
mine-sweepers.
Out of this fleet, Admiral Carden selected the British ships
_Inflexible_, _Agamemnon_, _Cornwallis_, _Triumph_, and _Vengeance_,
together with the French ships (under Admiral Guépratte) _Suffren_,
_Bouvet_, and _Gaulois_, covered by a large number of destroyers, for
the first attack upon the outer forts. Orders for washing and clean
clothes (to avoid septic wounds) were issued on February 18, and next
morning, in clear and calm weather, “General Quarters” was sounded.
The firing began at eight, and the first scene in the drama of the
Dardanelles Expedition was enacted.[62]
The main forts to be destroyed were four in number; two on either side
the entrance. One stood on the cliff of Cape Helles, just to the left
or south-west of the shelving amphitheatre afterwards celebrated as V
Beach. Another lay low down, on the right of the same beach, close in
front of the medieval castle of Seddel Bahr, where still one sees lying
in heaps or scattered over the ground huge cannon-balls of stone, such
as were hurled at Duckworth’s fleet more than a century before. Upon
the Asiatic side stood the fort of Kum Kali, at the very mouth of the
strait, not far from the cliff village of Yenishehr, and separated from
the plain of Troy by the river Mendere, near neighbour to the Simois
and Scamander conjoined. About a mile down the coast, close beside
Yenishehr village, is the remaining fort of Orkhanieh. None of these
forts was heavily armed. The largest guns appear to have been 10·2 inch
(six on Seddel Bahr, and four on Kum Kali), and when our squadron drew
their fire, as before narrated, on November 3, 1914, their extreme
range was found to be 12,500 yards.
[Sidenote: FIRST NAVAL ACTION]
Throughout the morning Admiral Carden concentrated his bombardment upon
these forts at long range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he had
silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced six ships to closer
range in the afternoon, and then the reply came in earnest, though the
shooting was poor. At sunset he withdrew the ships, though Kum Kali was
still firing. In evidence, he admitted that “the result of the day’s
action showed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by
direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight.”[63] It was a lesson
repeated time after time throughout the campaign. The big naval shells
threw up stones and earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm.
But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether on earthworks or
trenches, usually disappointing. For naval guns, constructed to strike
visible objects at long range with marvellous accuracy, have too flat
a trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which devastates
earthworks and trenches. It was with heavy howitzers that the Germans
destroyed the forts of Liége, Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this
obvious difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill’s expectation
of crushing the Dardanelles defences by the big guns of the _Queen
Elizabeth_ and the _Inflexible_ was frustrated.[64]
Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and heavy sea (a common
event at this season, which might have been anticipated), Admiral
Carden renewed the bombardment on February 25, employing the _Queen
Elizabeth_, _Irresistible_, _Agamemnon_, and _Gaulois_. The _Queen
Elizabeth_, firing beyond the enemy’s range, assisted in silencing
the powerful batteries on Cape Helles, and though the _Agamemnon_
was severely struck at about 11,000 yards range, the subsidiary
ships _Cornwallis_, _Vengeance_, _Triumph_, _Albion_, _Suffren_, and
_Charlemagne_ stood in closer, and by the evening compelled all the
outer forts to cease fire. Next day landing-parties of marines were
put ashore to complete their destruction; which they did, though at
Kum Kali they were driven back to their boats with some loss. The
story that marines had tea at Krithia and climbed Achi Baba for the
view--places soon to acquire such ill-omened fame--is mythical. But
certainly they met with no opposition on the Peninsula, and if a large
military force had then been available, the gallant but appalling
events of the landing two months later would never have occurred. Had
not the War Council persisted in the design of a solely naval attack,
even after their resolve had begun to waver, a large military force
might have been available, either then, or to co-operate with a similar
naval movement only a week or two later.
[Sidenote: SUBSEQUENT NAVAL ACTIONS]
Stormy weather delayed further attack till March 4, when a squadron,
including the _Triumph_, _Albion_, _Lord Nelson_, and _Ocean_, passed
up the strait to a position beyond the village of Erenkeui, conspicuous
upon a mountain-side of the Asiatic coast, and bombarded Fort Dardanus.
The fort stands upon Kephez Point, which projects as though to defend
the very entrance of the Narrows. Over the top of the promontory the
houses and mosques of Chanak and Kilid Bahr could be plainly seen,
where those towns face each other across the narrowest part of the
passage. Of the eight lines of mine-field drawn across the strait, five
lay between Kephez Point and Chanak. Day and night our mine-sweeping
trawlers were engaged upon them, and considerable praise must be given
to the courage and endurance of their crews, who for the most part
had been North Sea fishermen before the expedition. Their service
throughout, whether for mine-sweeping or transport, was of very high
value. It almost justified the remark made to me by a skipper whom I
had met before on the Dogger Bank: “If the Kayser had knowed as we’d
got trawlers, he would never have declared war!”
A similar advance to engage the forts at Dardanus, and, after those
were thought to be silenced, the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, was
made next day, and again, in stronger force, on March 6.[65] The
_Prince George_, _Albion_, _Vengeance_, _Majestic_, and _Suffren_ were
employed, and suffered damage, though without loss of life. At the
same time, on the 6th, the _Queen Elizabeth_, stationed off Gaba Tepe
on the outer coast, flung her vast shells clear over the Peninsula
into the Chanak forts, her fire being directed by aeroplanes. She was
supported by the _Agamemnon_ and _Ocean_, and there were high hopes
of thus crushing out the big guns defending the Narrows, some of
which were believed to be 14-inch. Nevertheless, when the four French
battleships advanced up the strait on the following day (March 7),
supported at long range by the _Agamemnon_ and her sister ship _Lord
Nelson_, the Chanak forts replied with an effective and damaging
fire. It was impossible to say when a fort was really out of action.
After long silence, the Turkish and German gunners frequently returned
and reopened fire, as though nothing had happened. In his evidence,
Admiral Carden stated that when the demolition parties landed after the
bombardment of the outer forts, they found 70 per cent. of the guns
apparently intact upon their mountings, although their magazines were
blown up and their electrical or other communications destroyed.[66]
Still worse than these disappointing results was the opportunity left
to the enemy of moving, not only bodies of men, but field-guns and
heavy howitzers from one point of the Peninsula and Asiatic coast to
another, and opening fire upon the ships from concealed and unexpected
positions. Our landing-parties of marines also suffered considerably
from the advantage thus given to the enemy, as happened to a body which
landed at Kum Kali for the second time on March 4. All such dangers and
hindrances would have been removed if the navy had been supported by
sufficient military force to occupy the ground behind the ships as they
advanced.
[Sidenote: EFFECT ON BALKAN STATES]
A bombardment of the Smyrna forts farther down the coast of Asia was
carried out on March 5 and 7 by a detachment under Vice-Admiral Peirse.
It was hoped that the Vali of Smyrna might come over to us, and that
in any case the attack would detain a Turkish force there by means of
a rather obvious feint.[67] Nothing of vital importance was as yet
accomplished there or in the Straits, but up to about March 10 the
Admiralty at home remained sanguine, in spite of General Birdwood’s
rather discouraging telegram of March 5, mentioned above. They had a
right to consider that the attack upon the Dardanelles had produced a
stirring effect in the Near East. The Turks withdrew large forces from
the Caucasus, greatly easing the situation for the Russian Grand Duke.
They concentrated more troops round Adrianople, fearing that Bulgaria
might clutch this opportunity for retrieving her loss of that city in
1913. Bitter as was the Bulgarian hatred of Serbia and Greece for their
reversal of the Balkan League policy in that year, and for their breach
of treaties and territorial arrangements, it now seemed certain that
if Bulgaria departed from neutrality at all, she would stand among our
Allies. Only a few days later (March 17) General Paget, then engaged on
a special mission to the Balkans, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener:
“The operations in the Dardanelles have made a deep impression;
all possibility of Bulgaria attacking any Balkan State that might
side with the _Entente_ is now over, and there is some reason to
think that shortly the Bulgarian army will move against Turkey to
co-operate in the Dardanelles operations.”[68]
That was a high hope, for the attitude of Bulgaria was then, as it
became still more definitely later on, the key of the Near Eastern
situation. But for the moment, the effect upon Greece appeared even
more propitious. M. Venizelos had in the previous month refused to
allow Greece to be drawn into a war for the defence of Serbia, though
England and France promised a Division each at Salonika, and it was
believed that this strategy was specially favoured by Mr. Lloyd
George. Now, however (March 1), he voluntarily offered our Minister in
Athens three Greek Divisions for Gallipoli on condition that Greece
received the vilayet of Smyrna; and next day our Minister telegraphed
that the King had been sounded and “wanted war.”[69] The proposal
was abruptly checked by the jealousy of the Tsar’s Government, which
refused to allow a Greek soldier to approach the long-desired prize of
Constantinople. But to make Constantine “want war” must have required a
miraculous interposition, and the effect of three Divisions--even Greek
Divisions--landing upon the Peninsula at that moment might have been
more miraculous still.[70] Of even greater ultimate importance was the
influence upon Italy; for it was now that, under the guidance of Baron
Sonnino, and the strong encouragement of Mr. Asquith, she entered upon
the devious negotiations which led to her declaration of war against
Austria on May 23.
But valuable as were these political results, the naval attack itself
was going slow, and Mr. Churchill read the daily telegrams with
increasing impatience. The fact was that the enemy, having the free
run of the Peninsula as well as of the Asiatic coast, could plant and
conceal his movable howitzers and other armaments where he pleased, and
it was becoming increasingly evident that, unless the Peninsula was
occupied by our military forces, the passage of the Narrows would mean
extreme risk for our ships, and, even if they got through, the channel
would not be cleared for transports following them. Now was the moment
when a permanent landing would be of the highest service, and on March
10 Mr. Churchill evidently realised the need of troops acutely. But it
was only on that very day that Lord Kitchener finally decided to allow
the 29th Division to start from England, and they did not leave port
till the 16th. Regarding the other detailed troops as less trained and
experienced than they really were, Lord Kitchener refused to allow a
landing till the Regular Division arrived. And, indeed, he still clung
to the idea that no landing would be necessary.
[Sidenote: MR. CHURCHILL URGES GREATER VIGOUR]
Accordingly, Mr. Churchill, though striving to restrain his impatience,
strongly urged Admiral Carden to press forward the naval attack with
the utmost vigour. In a telegram of March 11 he wrote:
“If success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results
to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole
operation may be decided, and consequences of a decisive character
upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak....
We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but
we recognise clearly that at a certain period in your operations
you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know
whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every
well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable
losses be entailed, will receive our support.”
To this Admiral Carden replied that he considered the stage for
vigorous action had now been reached, but that, when the fleet entered
the Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be
opened at once, so as to secure communications. On March 15 Mr.
Churchill, still anxious not to allow his impatience to drive him into
rashness, telegraphed again that, though no time was to be lost, there
should be no undue haste. An attempt to rush the passage without having
cleared a channel through the mines and destroyed the primary armament
of the forts was not contemplated. The close co-operation of army and
navy must be carefully studied, and it might be found that a naval rush
would be costly without military occupation of the Kilid Bahr plateau.
On these points the Admiral was to consult with the General who was
being sent out to take command of the troops. To all of this Admiral
Carden agreed. He proposed to begin vigorous operations on March 17,
but did not intend to rush the passage before a channel was cleared.
This answer was telegraphed on March 16. But on the same day the
Admiral resigned his command owing to serious ill-health.[71]
[Sidenote: DE ROBECK SUCCEEDS CARDEN]
Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in command, was next day
appointed his successor. He was five years younger, was, of course,
fully cognizant of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of
them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though strongly urged by
Mr. Churchill to act on “his independent and separate judgment,” and
not to hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying on
the pre-arranged scheme was not so much his confidence in success as
his fear lest a withdrawal might injure our prestige in the Near East;
and, secondly, his desire to make the best he could of an idea which he
regarded as an order. “The order was to carry out a certain operation,”
he said, “or try to do it, and we had to do the best we could.” If the
ships got through, he, like many others, expected a revolution or other
political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he saw that transports could
not come up, and that the ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora
for more than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run the
gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral Duckworth did in 1807.[72]
In his telegram accepting the command, however, he made no mention of
these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing
the mine-fields after silencing the forts.
Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very
first day after receiving his command (March 18) he undertook the main
attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favourable--no mist and
little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively.
The first blow was given by the four most powerful ships--_Queen
Elizabeth_, _Inflexible_, _Lord Nelson_, and _Agamemnon_--which poured
heavy shell at long range into the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr,
while the _Triumph_ and _Prince George_ bombarded Fort Dardanus on the
Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it upon the Peninsula.
This bombardment lasted from about 11 a.m. till 12.30 p.m., and all
six ships found themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and
from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied positions upon both
shores. At about 12.30 the second squadron, consisting of the four
French ships, came up into action, advancing beyond the former line in
the direction of Kephez Point. Though suffering considerably (chiefly
owing to their inability to manœuvre in such narrow waters, thus
presenting very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy’s guns),
the ten ships maintained the bombardment for about an hour (till nearly
1.30). The enemy’s forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many
of them, at all events, had been destroyed.
[Sidenote: THE MAIN NAVAL ACTION]
Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six British ships
(_Irresistible_, _Vengeance_, _Ocean_, _Swiftsure_, _Majestic_, and
_Albion_), were brought up, with the design of advancing first through
the Narrows, so as to ensure a clear passage for the greater ships
which made the first attack. At the same time the four French ships,
together with the _Triumph_ and _Prince George_, were ordered to
withdraw, so as to leave more room for the rest. During this manœuvre,
all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire again, their
silence having been due, not to destruction, but to the absence of
the gunners, driven away by the gases or terror of our shells. Most
of the ships suffered, and as the _Bouvet_ moved down channel with
her companion ships, she was struck by three big shells in quick
succession. The blows were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It
is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting in her magazine,
or to a torpedo fired from the Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty
report said, to a mine drifting down the current. In two or three
minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, carrying nearly
the whole of her crew to the bottom. The cries of the men dragged down
with her, or struggling in the water as they were swept downstream,
sounded over the strait.
At 2.30 the bombardment of all the forts was renewed, but they were
not silenced. At 4 o’clock the _Irresistible_ drew away with a heavy
list. Apparently she also was struck by a mine adrift; but she remained
afloat for nearly two hours, and nearly all her crew were saved by
destroyers, which swarmed round her at great risk to themselves,
since they offered a crowded target. A quarter of an hour after she
sank, the _Ocean_ was struck in a similar manner (6.5 p.m.) and sank
with great rapidity. Most of her crew, however, were also saved by
destroyers near at hand. Many of the other ships were struck by shell.
The _Inflexible_ and _Gaulois_ suffered especially, and only just
crawled back to be beached, the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit
Island. At sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved once more
that, in an attack upon land forts, ships lie at a great disadvantage.
In this case the disadvantage was much increased by the narrowness of
the waters, which brought the ships within range of howitzer and other
batteries hidden upon both shores, and also gave special opportunity
for the use of mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored right
across the channel in successive rows. The mines of the second row
were opposite the intervals in the first, and so on, until the passage
was covered as with a net, each row containing twenty-six mines.
Whether shore-torpedoes were also used is still uncertain. But, without
them, the fleet suffered under sufficient disadvantages to explain
the failure. The first serious attempt to force the Straits was the
last.[73]
Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at once. Perhaps he thought
that English people are given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship.
After all, the loss of even three battleships is far surpassed by the
loss of lives and calculable wealth in one day’s ordinary fighting in
France, and the objective in the Dardanelles was at least as vital.[74]
Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson agreed that the action should be
continued, and the _London_ and _Prince of Wales_, in addition to the
_Queen_ and _Implacable_, were actually sent to reinforce. The French
also sent an old battleship (the _Henri IV._) to replace the _Bouvet_.
At first Admiral de Robeck shared this view. It was suspected at the
Admiralty that the ammunition in the forts was running short, and, at a
much later date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said:
“If the English had only had the courage to rush more ships through
the Dardanelles, they could have got to Constantinople; but their
delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six
weeks’ time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns.”[75]
[Sidenote: PURELY NAVAL ACTION ABANDONED]
That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy was not to blame. On
March 22 Admiral de Robeck and Admiral Wemyss consulted with Sir Ian
Hamilton (who on the very day before the engagement had arrived at
Tenedos to take command of the land forces) and with General Birdwood;
and as their decision to await the concentration of the army was
accepted by Lord Fisher and the other Admiralty advisers, Mr. Churchill
reluctantly yielded. General Birdwood, it is true, wished to land at
once, even with such troops as were at hand. Sir Ian “thought there
was a good deal to be said for it,” and as to the fleet, he urged
the Admiral to keep on hammering the forts. But his orders from Lord
Kitchener were “not to land if he could avoid it,” and in any case to
await the arrival of the 29th Division.[76]
And where was the 29th Division? On March 23 its first transport was
just reaching Malta, where nearly all the officers attended a special
performance of _Faust_.[77]