Hammering the Hun.
SERRE RIDGE AND WARLENCOURT.
After a fortnight at Louvencourt the brigade went into the line again on
August 18th, this time on the right of the divisional front. During our
period in reserve important events had taken place south of the Somme. A
lightning stroke, chiefly delivered by the Canadian Corps who had been
suddenly and secretly rushed down from the Lens area, had altered the
whole aspect of the war, for the German Army, which not long before had
entertained such high hopes of reaching the coast and Paris, was driven
to anxiously defending his line. Weak spots in the Hun armour were being
sought out and pierced so that on the whole the enemy was having a bad
time. Anticipating trouble on the third army front he had withdrawn his
outposts to a safer line all along the Ancre and up to Puisieux, and our
men had been able to walk cautiously forward several hundred yards.
Such was the situation when the 7th took over the front line, at the
moment quite unsuspicious of the stirring events in which they were
shortly to take a share. Major Rae commanded the battalion, the C.O.
being away on Paris leave, while Capt. Barratt had resumed the duties of
Adjutant. The Company Commanders for this tour of duty were Lt. C. B.
Douglas, "A," Capt. Grey Burn, "B," Lt. Abbott, "C" and Capt. J. Baker,
"D." Suddenly, without previous warning, operation orders were received
on August 20th for a big attack to commence along the whole army front
the following morning. This was rapid work indeed, and the hurried
state of preparation can be better imagined than described, especially
in view of the extraordinary nature of the barrage which called for most
accurate timing and an elaborate barrage table. The manner in which
Major Rae and Capt. Barratt swiftly dealt with all these details and
communicated their wishes to the people concerned, a task of no small
magnitude under more favourable conditions, calls for the keenest
appreciation from all who took part in that first important battle.
The division expected to cover, in the first day's fighting, the large
mass of high ground which is flanked on its western edge by Serre and
overlooks Miraumont on the eastern side. A Prussian division was known
to be defending this part of the line. The 7th were to take part in the
initial assault in the right brigade sector, while the 125th brigade
were on the left. A thick mist enshrouded the land in the early morning
of August 21st, and doubtless many men on both sides thought of the
similar conditions which prevailed on the 21st of another month when the
Hun attacked with such terrible results. Here was the revenge and it was
to take place, curiously enough, under like circumstances. At 4.50 a.m.
the attack commenced, preceded by a short but destructive barrage over
the enemy position. For the Fleur de Lys "C" and "D" companies led off,
their objective being a part of the sunk road running across the front
from Puisieux to Beaumont Hamel. It was impossible to see more than
forty yards, and this rendered control by the officers practically out
of the question. The section commanders, however, in many cases
Lance-Corporals and even privates, rose magnificently to the occasion,
with the result that touch was maintained and the direction of advance
preserved. Short, sharp struggles took place at various points, but the
Boche were overpowered, and eventually a good line was established on
the objective. "C" company lost 2nd-Lt. Harland, M.C., and Lt.
Lofthouse, both wounded, while "D" company, although keeping their
officers, had Sgt. W. Brown killed.
The next phase of the battle comprised the attack of "A" and "B"
companies who passed through the first objectives and advanced to the
top of the ridge. Lieut. H. N. Kay of "B" company was shot dead at close
range during the clearing of a dug-out in the early stages of this
fight, while later on this company suffered heavy casualties, Sgt.
Green, D.C.M., M.M., being killed and Sgts. Guttery and Gleeson wounded.
On reaching the final objective Lt. Douglas carried out work of the
greatest value in the organisation of his company. In spite of the
strongly increasing enemy shell-fire he moved about amongst his men with
such coolness and disregard for personal danger that his example
inspired the men for the strong counter attacks which later took place.
For his splendid leadership and initiative he was afterwards awarded the
Military Cross. Capt. Grey Burn and his company on the right were having
an awkward time from enemy snipers, but he organised his now small
numbers very carefully, and personally kept the enemy under close
observation. Seeing an enemy concentration in progress, evidently for a
counter-attack, he quickly gave information, and the gunners were able
to disperse the enemy with a very effective barrage.
The conduct of all ranks during the counter-attack, which was launched
early in the afternoon, was so splendid that it broke up the Hun effort.
Later in the day the enemy made another attack with a strong body of
picked storm-troops from another division brought up specially from the
reserves, but the greeting they received from our rifle, Lewis gun, and
machine-gun fire caused enormous casualties, and the attack collapsed.
Capt. Grey Burn was decorated with the M.C. for his share in this
splendid day's work. The ground captured in the first day's fighting,
representing an advance of 5,000 yards, was consolidated and held for
the next two days, during which time the left of the division was
executing a turning movement to encircle Miraumont from the north. The
work of the signallers, under Lt. Smith, cannot be too highly praised
for their contribution to the success of this battle, because
communications throughout the operation were excellent and twice served
to bring down a barrage in short time, so assisting the infantry to
smash the enemy attacks. The stretcher bearers nobly performed their
work under most trying conditions, what with the heavy mist followed
later by intense heat, the badly broken ground and the long distances
they had to carry the wounded under shell fire. Lce-Cpl. Twist, M.M., of
"D" company, performed prodigies of strength and valour in this way,
receiving a bar to his M.M., and Pte. Greer, M.M., of "B" company,
proved an able second to him. Lt. Stanier was badly wounded whilst with
"A" company, losing the sight of one eye.
The next movement was the crossing of the River Ancre in the early hours
of August 23rd. This was well done by "B" company, "A" company, now
under the command of Capt. Nelson, being in support with "C" company.
During the advance, and with the co-operation of the East Lancs. north
of Miraumont, large bodies of prisoners were cut off and rounded up on
the far side of the Ancre. When the ground had been made good and it was
ascertained that the Hun had definitely retired, it was thought that the
day's work was done. This, however, proved to be wrong, as a further
advance to Warlencourt was ordered, and it was to commence as soon as
possible. The 6th moved off about dusk with the 7th in support, and
although the right flank was exposed this did not hinder the advance.
The greater part of the movement was carried out in darkness and over
strange ground, but the leadership was very skilful and the brigade came
in contact with the enemy on the outskirts of Warlencourt about 10.30
p.m. Boche M.G. nests quickly opened a terrific fire, but few casualties
were caused. A rapid deployment took place and positions quickly
occupied in case of a surprise. The enemy fire, however, increased in
intensity, and the cover afforded being of the scantiest, it was decided
to withdraw a short distance to a line of trenches and there await
daylight. Fortunately no serious losses had been incurred, and when dawn
broke it was found that the enemy had retired still further during the
night.
At this point the division was pinched out of the line by the Naval
Division on the right and the N.Z. Division on the left converging
across our front in the next day's advance, and we were enabled to take
advantage of a short respite from the struggle. The vigour and
effectiveness of the 42nd division's attack has been since proved by an
unexpected tribute from the enemy. The following extract from
Ludendorf's "Memoirs of the War, 1914-1918," Vol. II., page 692, refers
to the fighting at this time:--
"On August 21st the English attacked south of Arras between
Boisleux and the Ancre.... As the offensive developed, the enemy
succeeded on the north in pushing us back from the Ancre. At this
point a Prussian division ... given a sector covered by the river,
had failed badly. This threw the whole line into confusion.... The
situation there became extremely critical about August 25th."
The 7th marched back a short distance to Irles, and made themselves
comfortable in the German dug-outs there for a day and a half. Looking
back over those days of new experiences for the battalion one realises
the valuable work accomplished by Lt. Wilkinson and his transport
section. When out of the line he invariably carried off the honours in
the "spit and polish" transport competitions frequently held in the
division, but it was on difficult occasions such as these that he showed
up to prouder advantage. The transport lines had been brought up to
Colincamps, and the distance from there to Warlencourt was about twelve
miles. The roads were in an impossible condition so that all supplies
had to be carried on pack animals, and the fact that nothing failed
reflects the greatest credit upon the administrative arrangements of
Capt. and Q.M. Wood and the transport officer.
VILLERS-AU-FLOS.
During our few hours' absence from the line the Naval Division had been
in some heavy fighting as we saw when we arrived on the night of August
27th in the support position near Loupart Wood. Skilfully sited machine
guns had taken terrible toll of the brave naval men, and their bodies
still lay where they had fallen, so that one of our first jobs was to
bury them. The front line ran along the western outskirts of
Ligny-Thilloy, but it was suspected that the enemy would not make a
vigorous stand here. His shelling was particularly beastly, however, and
if he did intend to retire further he was at least taking the necessary
artillery precautions. By August 30th preparations were complete for
another forward move, but early morning showed us that the Hun had gone,
so we were merely required to follow him up.
The pre-arranged plan was carried out, and after the 127th brigade had
made good the high ground east of Thilloy, in face of some opposition,
the East Lancs. came through and took up the advance on what had now
become a one brigade front. They had not gone far before they
encountered the enemy in strength holding Riencourt, and they promptly
attacked it. The 8th Manchesters bore the brunt of this attack and they
suffered very heavily, little ground being gained. A brilliant night
show by the 10th the next night, however, subdued Riencourt, and this
rendered the line sufficiently straight to be able to continue the
advance. The 127th brigade took over the front again and rapid
preparations were made to co-operate in an attack which was to take
place along the whole army front. It was now clear that our higher
command were not disposed to allow the enemy to settle anywhere, if
possible. It promised to be ding-dong work amidst ever-changing scenes,
with the guns making the most of their opportunities and struggling over
the torn ground behind the infantry as best they might. But the supply
services experienced the biggest demand upon their wits and resources,
uprooted from their comfortable and secure villages and cast out upon
the shelterless land of the devastated area just like the infantry.
Their work was wonderful, however, and very rarely had Tommy occasion to
grouse about either the quality or the quantity of the food that was
served up to him under these trying conditions. It was common knowledge
that when the Boche had come over in March, he had not been so well
treated, and had been forced in the urgency of his plight to eat horses
and mules killed in the fighting.
It was evident that we had now got the full measure of our foes, and
were in the comfortable position of being able to give battle when and
where we pleased, and be practically confident of success. The front was
becoming shorter also, with the result that a divisional sector was
considerably smaller than formerly, and this entailed of course longer
periods out of the line for the soldier. Leave also continued to flow,
and proved an important factor in keeping up the morale of the troops.
How different from the old days, when we used to advertise our
intentions to the Hun when a stunt was impending by stopping leave in
the army concerned! Capt. Grey Burn, M.C., went to England for a month
on August 31st, and Lt. S. J. Wilson was put in command of "B" company
for the coming operations, while in the continued absence of Capt.
Palmer, Lt. Hammond was in charge of "C" company. Lt. Smithies, recently
joined from the second line, took over the duties of intelligence
officer. Col. Manger was required to temporarily command the 126th
brigade, and this left Major Rae in command of the battalion once more.
The next village in our line of advance, now practically due east, was
Villers-au-Flos, and this, with the high ground beyond it, was to be
taken in the first stride of the coming battle, a matter of 2,500 yards.
After this the L.F's. would leap-frog through and exploit success as far
as possible. This time the 5th and 6th were detailed to execute the
first shock of the assault with the 7th in close support. As a matter of
fact "C" company were sent forward to act under the orders of the 5th in
view of the extra opposition which was expected on the right sector. On
the night of September 1st the remainder of the battalion, in order "B,"
"A," "D," companies moved up close to Riencourt, to occupy old, shallow
trenches, and await the needs of the brigade either during or after the
assault.
Soon after dawn the barrage opened, and simultaneously the Manchesters
advanced accompanied by a single tank. The New Zealanders were carrying
out a similar task on the left, while the 17th division had to get
through Beaulencourt and over a large stretch of bare country on the
right. The 6th Manchesters progressed in fine style, and everything went
according to plan. The enemy put up a stiff fight for it and hung on to
the last in the cunningly concealed machine gun posts. It was in this
part of the fighting that Lieut. Welch (a one-time 7th officer) with a
section of Stokes' mortar men performed a gallant deed that earned for
him the D.S.O. The progress of events on the right, however, was not so
clear and straightforward. As was expected the 5th encountered strong
opposition, for they advanced along a double row of old German trenches
which contained a large number of dug-outs, and disconcerting masses of
wire at irregular intervals. It was thus difficult to maintain cohesion
in the attack, while every dug-out contained machine gun crews who had
been unharmed by the barrage, and who, owing to the delay in getting
ahead, had been able to come out and man their positions without
interruption. The 5th, therefore, lost heavily, particularly on their
right flank, and before very long "C" company of the 7th found
themselves in the front, almost isolated, and taking a stern part in the
assault.
They pushed on until all the enemy trenches had been cleared to the
south-east corner of Villers-au-Flos, and then stayed in order to get in
touch with the remnants of the 5th on their left, after which Lieut.
Hammond reported progress. In view of the danger from this flank, for we
were already well ahead of the troops on our right, "B" company was
ordered forward to protect the southern and eastern sides of Riencourt,
and so prevent any Hun attempt to get in behind our forward line. Later
it was found that the 5th positions required more strength, and "A"
company were sent up for that purpose, while Capt. Baker was ordered to
take his company to form a defensive flank behind the 6th, for the New
Zealanders were still echeloned to the rear. Evening of September 2nd
thus found the 6th at the tip of a sharp salient, and the enemy still
very active in front, with his shelling steadily increasing in
intensity. "B" company were thus ordered to continue the advance on the
right and attain the final objective, slow and complicated work for it
all took place in the dark. First the 1,500 yards from Riencourt to "C"
company had to be traversed, and from there it was another 1,000 yards
to the required position; meanwhile the enemy was continually shelling
with 5.9's at important points and with whizz-bangs promiscuously.
Nothing was known of the enemy in front, and the situation on the right
was equally obscure. Patrols worked cautiously ahead however and
fortunately no opposition was encountered, so that the final objective
was made before dawn.
As daylight broke on the 3rd Sept. it was found that the next village,
Barastre, had been rapidly evacuated by the enemy who had left a
quantity of material behind him. Although the men were dog-tired "B"
company sent out a large fighting patrol to try to get in touch with
him, but they traversed well beyond Bus, the next village, and returned
according to orders without seeing him. Meanwhile a squadron of cavalry
(Scots Greys) had been ordered up, and they preceded the advance of the
125th brigade who by this time were marching through in accordance with
previous plans. They encountered Hun rearguards near Ytres, but the
attack was resumed at once, and in the course of the next two days the
enemy was pressed back into the Hindenburg system in the vicinity of
Havrincourt.
The Manchesters had now the opportunity of seeing how great an
organisation must follow in the wake of advancing infantry. First came
the field guns, drawn by teams of mules, followed by the 6-in.
howitzers, bouncing along in jolly fashion over the uneven roads behind
motor lorries containing their ammunition. Then the observation balloons
appeared, still observing, at a height of about 100 feet, being pulled
steadily by motor conveyances. Intermingled amongst these were staff
cars, ambulances, motor lorries for all purposes, infantry transport,
D.A.C. waggons and various other impedimenta of a moving army. Most of
these people took up their abode around Barastre, occupying old British
huts, or erecting tents and bivouac sheets, so that ground which twelve
hours previously had been Hun land, gingerly approached by us, had
become a huge camp seething with an active soldier population of
Britishers.
On September 6th the division came out for a long-delayed rest, and
marched back to Warlencourt in Corps reserve. A few tents were provided,
but only a small portion of the battalion could be accommodated in them,
so it was necessary to dig in once more. There was quite a quantity of
material about, however, and it did not take us long to make ourselves
weather-proof and more or less comfortable. Fortunately, the Huns had
not had time to destroy the two wells in the village, although the
explosive charges had been laid, so that water did not prove the
difficulty it might otherwise have done. A special order of the day from
the brigadier admirably epitomised our feelings of satisfaction with our
work in the war up to this date, so it would be as well to quote it at
length:--
MANCHESTERS,
You have added a new anniversary to those which your gallantry has
already made famous. On 4th June, 1915, in Gallipoli, you forced
your way like a spearhead into and through line upon line of
Turkish trenches. On 25th March, 1918, at Achiet and Bucquoy, you
stemmed and stopped the onrush of the tide of Huns that was to have
found its way to the Coast.
Yesterday, after three months of unbroken fighting in trenches and
in the open, and in face of stubborn resistance by Huns more than
equal in numbers, you stormed and took Villers-au-Flos with the
utmost dash and determination; a feat which would have been notable
if performed by battalions at full strength and fresh from a period
of rest.
When Manchester hears of this new proof of your prowess, she may
well be as proud of her sons as I am of commanding such soldiers.
ANTHONY HENLEY, _Brig.-Gen._,
Commanding 127th Inf. Brigade.
_3rd September, 1918._
The fortnight at Warlencourt was spent in refitting, and intensive
training in attack. One day was occupied by a demonstration of an
assault by a company, using live ammunition. This was carried out by "D"
company in the presence of the corps commander and large numbers of
officers and N.C.O's. of the division, and was followed by educational
criticism by the General.
THE HINDENBURG LINE.
It was obvious that all this had a specific purpose, and we were not
left long to wonder what the purpose was. A tremendous battle was
brewing, and rumours placed its magnitude at from three army fronts to
the whole allied front. Anyhow, the chief thing that concerned us was
that the 42nd was to take part in the cracking of the hardest nut in the
German defence, namely, the Hindenburg system. The enemy had had three
weeks in which to consolidate his already perfected ramification of
trenches and dug-outs, and there was no doubt as to their determination
to definitely stop the British advance there. If this failed they had
lost the War.
On September 22nd the division marched up, and took over the front from
the 37th division, the 125th brigade occupying the forward positions
just east of Havrincourt Wood. The 7th found themselves out in reserve
just north of the Canal du Nord behind Hermies, and it was pleasing to
see the old haunts again. Men thought grimly of the experiences we had
been through since those happy days more than a year ago, and these
sights served to call up the memory of many a pal who had since made the
big sacrifice. And now, perhaps, we should get an opportunity of seeing
those mysterious lands beyond Flesquieres, Marcoing and so on, that we
had gazed upon so long. As far as possible training was continued and a
certain amount of company re-organisation took place. Owing to the
weakness of companies they had been reduced to three platoons, some of
these being much below strength. Reinforcements had been expected, but
they did not materialise to an appreciable extent. However, the
exigencies of the task in hand demanded that the four platoon formation
should be adopted in spite of the small numbers. In view of this,
therefore, it was necessary to crowd in rapid training in attack on this
principle, so that each man should be well acquainted with his function.
After the battle surplus had been eliminated the company commanders were
as follows:--"A" company, Capt. Nelson, "B" Lt. S. J. Wilson, "C" Capt.
Allen, M.C., and "D" Lieut. Gresty, M.C. Lt.-Col. Manger commanded the
battalion, while Capt. Creagh had returned and was Adjutant. Two days
before the attack Capt. Nelson went into hospital with dysentery which
had frequently recurred in a violent form during the preceding weeks. A
slight re-adjustment was thus demanded amongst the officers to give
every company a fair share of leadership and Lieut. Hammond was sent to
command "A" company.
Briefly the plan of attack was as follows. The divisional frontage was
covered by the 125th brigade on the right and the 127th brigade on the
left, with the remaining brigade in support. As far as the 127th brigade
was concerned, the attack was to be accomplished in five bounds. The
first objective, along the whole of the brigade front, was the work of
the 5th Manchesters, and consisted in capturing the German front line
which ran chiefly along Chapel Wood Switch. The next four objectives,
called for convenience the Red, Brown, Yellow and Blue Lines, were to
engage the attention of the 7th on the right and the 6th on the left of
the brigade front, and were to be taken by the leap-frog method by
companies. Thus, in the 7th, "C" company's objective was the Red Line,
"A" the Brown, "D" the Yellow, and "B" the Blue Line. These lines were
by no means parallel to one another, their shape being largely
controlled by the configuration of the ground and the German trenches.
It is also important to note that the Hindenburg system was being taken
in enfilade on this part of the front. Two or three great parallel
trenches ran along in the direction of the advance, and they were full
of deep dug-outs capable of holding thousands of men. Our main security
lay in the fact that a simultaneous attack was taking place along a
widely extended front, and the enemy would not be able to fill these
dug-outs with counter-attacking troops drawn from other fronts.
[Illustration: ATTACK ON THE HINDENBURG LINE, SEPT. 27th, 1918.]
Space does not allow of a detailed description of the orders for attack,
but it can easily be imagined that they were pretty considerable in view
of the heavy work to be accomplished by the artillery. As this portion
of the German line was known to be powerfully defended by large numbers
of troops, extensive trench systems, dug-outs and wire, it was part of
the strategy of Foch to concentrate artillery here, and records showed
that on the two days September 27th and 28th shells were consumed at an
unprecedented rate. In our sector alone, the programme comprised the
capturing of 3,500 yards in depth of the most strongly defended ground
in France, including the vicinities of the famous Highland and Welsh
Ridges of terrible memory in the Battle of Cambrai. Every yard of this
ground was subjected to a continuous creeping shrapnel barrage lasting
for almost three hours, while moving steadily ahead of this was a
terrific bombardment by all calibres from 4.5 howitzers upwards upon the
enemy's main trenches and supposed defence points. The brigade frontage,
measured north to south, was 1,250 yards, and this was equally divided
between the 6th and 7th. As we were going over one company behind
another, each company was responsible for nearly 700 yards--a very large
front considering our depleted numbers. There is no doubt, as far as we
were concerned, the task looked formidably ambitious.
On the morning of Sept. 26th final operation orders were issued, and
that night we moved up to our assembly positions in a huge dug-out near
Femy Wood, capable of holding the whole battalion. It was slow work
moving along the canal and across the Trescault-Havrincourt road, and it
is not surprising that eventually the intervals between platoons closed
up and the four companies were strung out in one long line. The
confidence felt in the success of the operations, was evident by the
fact that the 6-inch howitzers were installed in front of the Trescault
road within 500 yards of the enemy. Whilst we were assembling there
were motor lorries on the road unloading stacks of ammunition for them!
By the time the battalion had been packed into the dug-out dawn was
swiftly approaching, which meant the commencement of the battle, for
Zero for the third army was 5.25 a.m. The VIth corps, the 62nd division
of which touched up with our left, were to have three hours' fighting
before we commenced, and for this reason we welcomed the shelter of the
dug-out while it was in progress. The configuration of the ground was
responsible for the manner in which the battle was to grow along the
whole front. The advance of the 127th brigade was to take place along
the shoulder of a long hill running broadly east to west. North of this
high ground was a long valley stretching through Ribecourt towards
Marcoing. Another shoulder similar to but higher than ours flanked the
valley on the north, and it was this, together with the commanding
village of Flesquieres, that the VIth corps were to make good before our
attack commenced. Again, the 125th brigade, who were on our right, and
also on the higher part of the shoulder, were to open the 42nd
divisional assault half an hour ahead of ourselves.
About 8 o'clock "C" company led the way out of the dug-out and took up
their assault positions near the front line. At the appointed hour,
following behind the 5th, they moved forward to the attack, in the
formation which we had practised so frequently, and which was the most
suitable for the large frontage that had to be covered. All four
platoons were in line, and each platoon was divided into four sections,
the two rifle sections on the flanks, and the two L.G. sections in the
middle and echeloned to the rear. This was the artillery formation
useful for covering the ground previous to the actual assault, each
section moving in file (_i.e._, two ranks) well opened out. When close
to the enemy position the platoons extended and formed two lines, with a
L.G. in the centre of each line, and riflemen on the flanks. Every
Company went over in this formation, and strict orders were issued that
no man was to enter the enemy trenches for the purpose of covering the
ground, but to keep out in the open, otherwise great confusion would
arise, and officers would lose control of their men.
Misfortune greeted "C" company from the start. Capt. Allen, M.C. and
2nd-Lt. Ray were killed immediately, and casualties were soon very
heavy. It was evident the enemy was making the most of his superior
position and the clear sweep of ground. The remnants of the company
pushed on, however, and reached their objective. "A" company followed
and they also suffered severely from the moment they advanced out of
Ferny Wood. Then it was noticed that most of the machine gun fire was
from the right flank, and our men were being subjected to a terrible
enfilading fire as they moved across the open. All the officers became
casualties, Lt. Hammond wounded, 2nd-Lt. McAlmont wounded, 2nd-Lt. T.
Woods wounded, and 2nd-Lt. Carley, killed. The few men of the company,
now led by C.S.M. Joyce, reached the Red Line and joined "C" company,
which, Lt. Edge, M.C., having been hit, was now under the command of
2nd-Lt. Jones. It was impossible, with the small number of men,
scattered over a wide front, to continue the advance for the moment. "D"
company, moving up according to programme, were treated similarly to the
previous two companies and men began to drop long before they
anticipated meeting any resistance. Thus, before they had gone very far
2nd-Lt. Thrutchley and 2nd-Lt. Wright were wounded, which left Lt.
Gresty, M.C. and 2nd-Lt. Milne to carry on the leadership, a task which
they performed in fine style. They quickly arrived at the Red Line, and
then took cover for a short period. Soon after this, "B" company came
along, but on nearing the Red Line, they found many men of "D" turned
about firing rifles and L.G. towards their right rear. It was now
obvious that the ground to the right of us had not been cleared at all,
and the enemy was left free to work his will upon us from the higher
ground. By this time a tank had arrived and materially assisted us in
dealing with the problem. Gresty then decided to push on and his company
mounted the rising ground in front. From this point they unfortunately
swerved to the left, probably being influenced by a road which ran
diagonally across the front towards Ribecourt, but nothing could stop
their irresistible dash. As they crossed this road Milne, with a handful
of his platoon, added to our already considerable number of prisoners,
by capturing a large crowd of Huns.
With characteristic impetuosity, reminiscent of the La Signy Farm days,
Gresty and the men of "D" following up under the barrage, rushed across
the Brown Line and made for the Yellow Line. They were now only a small
gallant band but they were undaunted. Prisoners captured were told to go
down to the rear, which they did right gladly without an escort, so that
the assaulting party who now in formation and well-nigh in size, began
to resemble a Rugby football team, could preserve their strength. Two 77
m.m. guns lay in their path, and at their approach the Boche gunners
spiked them and made off, leaving them an easy prey to the 7th. After
this, Gresty decided that he was on his objective, as indeed he was, but
he was more or less in the 6th sector, and when he was quickly joined by
a company of the 6th he began to realise it. There was trouble on his
right, however, as well as from the front, and the small party of men
were disposed to defend the ground they had captured, a difficult enough
task in view of the fact that they had to find positions to face in two
or three different directions. Touch was obtained with the 62nd division
in Ribecourt, and it was found that the VIth corps had had great success
in their part of the battle, so that already the advance was proceeding
towards Marcoing.
"B" company's effort was really a separate story. As soon as "D" company
had disappeared over the crest in front of the Red Line they continued
the advance. 2nd-Lt. Pearson was on the extreme right and he had been
instructed to keep touch with the L.F's. From the beginning, however, he
had not seen them, and his platoon was moving along "in the air," and
naturally meeting with strong resistance. They had not expected to meet
the enemy for another 1,500 yards if events had worked out "according to
plan," but they were now fighting them at every step. Gallant deeds were
performed in dealing with Hun machine guns, and many prisoners were
taken, but greatest of all were the achievements of Pte. Jack White.
Single-handed he rushed a machine gun post, bayonetted the man on the
gun and pursued the remainder of the team with fire, inflicting
casualties. Later on he again rushed forward alone to a strongly held
trench, but was killed practically on the parapet. His name was
recommended for a V.C., but unfortunately nothing more was heard of it.
In view of the heavy casualties, Lt. Wilson went across to Pearson and
told him to close his platoon slightly towards the left, in order to
keep a cohesion in the company, for it was evident that the Hun
resistance promised to be strong, and there was no hope now of
assistance from the right flank. In this manner the high ground near the
Brown Line was reached, but the company was suffering from fire both
from the front and the right flank. 2nd-Lts. Siddall and Gapp were
wounded, as well as three platoon sergeants, and there was no knowledge
as to what had happened to "D" company. At this moment the Germans
developed a counter-attack from the right in a manner to be expected
from an intelligent and courageous enemy. The obvious thing for them to
do was to cut in behind "B" company's right flank and attempt to regain
a footing in "Unseen Trench" which had just been taken from them. From
an offensive force we were suddenly transformed into a defensive force,
and the men were still out in the open. Wilson drew back his right flank
so as to face the Huns, but kept his left in touch with the 6th on the
road in front of the Brown Line, and from this position, the men being
disposed in shell holes, "B" company held up the enemy attack and
defended the ground won. The Huns were on higher ground and when they
had been finally driven to earth they kept up vigorous sniping at very
close range, a form of fighting that we returned with interest. Pearson
was hit in the stomach and later died on the way down, so that Wilson
and C.S.M. Shields were left to control the remainder of the company.
The arrival of 2nd-Lt. Smith with signalling apparatus enabled
communication to be obtained with battalion H.Q. Lt. Wilson outlined
the situation and was told in return that the L.F's. had not yet reached
Boar Copse, having met with powerful resistance. He was further ordered
to hang on to his position and wait until the L.F's. had drawn up in
line. Meanwhile a company of the 5th was sent up to strengthen the
flank. Continuous touch by means of patrols were kept with the enemy,
and his movements were carefully watched. Within 300 yards were a couple
of German 77 m.m. guns, pluckily worked by the gunners at point blank
range until our machine gunners, who had now arrived, co-operated with
L.G's. from the 6th and ourselves in putting them out of action. They
were taken by the 10th in the night. Meanwhile Gresty and the company of
the 6th on the Yellow Line had been ordered to fall back 300 yards to a
less isolated position, and a sound front and flank was thus
established.
The battle had now reached a stage when the next move would be ordered
by the brigade or even by the division. Careful observation of the enemy
led us to suppose that he was weakening and Gresty and Wilson intimated
that when the L.F's. arrived at the Brown Line, having re-organised
their companies, they should be prepared to continue the advance in the
7th sector. Division had decided otherwise, however, and had ordered up
a battalion of the 126th brigade. Rapid preparations were made for a
night attack to complete the divisional task, the 10th Manchesters to
cover the 127th brigade front and the L.F's. to continue on their right.
Before nightfall, the enemy having withdrawn from the trenches
immediately in front, "B" company pushed on again and established a good
line running north and south in front of the Brown Line, and touching up
with the L.F's. who had now arrived. This considerably simplified the
work of the 10th, who were able to assemble in the night on an even
front.
The night attack was a success. The Huns were evidently demoralised and
put up no fight at all, surrendering in large batches without firing a
shot when our men arrived at their dug-outs, so that the Blue Line was
made good before dawn. Then came the work of exploiting success, and on
the 42nd divisional front this was carried out by the 8th Manchesters,
and the 5th East Lancs., the 126th brigade having taken over the front
during the afternoon of Sept. 28th. They were able to make good progress
over Welsh Ridge before encountering serious resistance. Later in the
day the New Zealand Division marched through to follow up the enemy, so
that the 42nd could go down for a rest. Gladly did the Fleur de Lys pack
up their traps and march back over the ground that had recently seen
such stern work. The brigadier had been up and personally thanked Lts.
Gresty and Wilson for the work achieved by "D" and "B" companies,
remarking that having seen the ground, and knowing the difficulties
which had to be encountered, he thought all the men were heroes in
having accomplished so much. Such praise coming from so sound a soldier
was naturally received with gratitude and pride, and we felt that once
again the name of the 7th Manchesters had been scored honourably and
deeply in the records of warfare. The battalion reassembled in the big
dug-out and there realised sadly the abundance of accommodation now
afforded.
It had been a glorious fight but won at a terrible cost. Out of the 450
or so men who went over there had been more than 300 casualties. Of the
sixteen officers who started out four only remained. 2nd-Lt. Pearson's
death was particularly sad. He had gone out in the ranks in 1914 with
the 7th, and had been twice wounded on Gallipoli, after which he served
continuously with the battalion till the winter of 1917, when he went
home for a commission. He had returned as an officer only a few weeks
previously, and in this fight proved himself a courageous and skilful
leader of men.
About 600 prisoners had been taken by the battalion, as well as the two
field guns, large numbers of machine guns and other booty. More
important was the death-blow to the German resistance. The Hindenburg
Line had been smashed, the enemy was obviously demoralised, and they
were in full flight for the next piece of ground which could offer a
suitable position for delaying our rapid advance. The awards to the 7th
for this battle included a bar to his Military Cross for Lt. Gresty, and
Military Crosses for Lt. Wilson, 2nd-Lt. Milne, 2nd-Lt. Siddall, and
2nd-Lt. Thrutchley. C.S.M. McHugh, M.M., C.S.M. Tabbron, and Sgt. Mather
received the D.C.M., while twenty N.C.O's. and men obtained the M.M.,
Pte. Greer being given a bar to his M.M.
The following Special Order of the Day indicates the value of the work
done by the Manchesters in this day's fighting:--
_29th September, 1918._
MANCHESTERS,
For the second time in this month of September you have struck the
enemy a heavy blow. It has brought us appreciably nearer to the
complete victory which our country is determined to achieve.
I do not yet know the full amount of our booty. It can be estimated
from the two miles of our advance, and from the prisoners,
considerably more than a thousand in number.
I wish to record my admiration for the splendid behaviour of all
ranks. The victory was won under conditions of exceptional
difficulty, and, as at Villers-au-Flos, against an enemy superior
in numbers to the attackers; and it was won by the magnificent
determination and devotion of the troops.
ANTHONY HENLEY, _Brig.-Gen._,
Commanding 127th Inf. Brigade.