Worrying the Hun.
Never since the weary entry into Katia did the 7th Manchesters present
such a sorry appearance as they did when they straggled into Soustre in
the grey hours of April 8th. It was an effort to drag one leg in front
of another, and our feet were sodden and painful. Almost every particle
of clothing and equipment was smothered with red, clayey mud, and thin,
tired faces were covered with a many days' growth of beard. Here we
struggled into a row of lorries and were carried off to Vauchelles to be
housed in huts vacated by some army school. After a good meal and a
sleep we were roused in the middle of the afternoon to be told that
another move had to be accomplished. With imprecations on the staff and
all its works we fell in and marched off to Louvencourt to occupy
billets, and were at last assured that we had settled for a rest.
The next few days we spent in recuperation and cleaning up. The rapidity
with which the men recovered their smart appearance was one of the
striking features of the war, and indicated the wonderful desire for
fitness that the Britisher had acquired in his soldiering days. Col
Bromfield, however, had not been able to withstand the strain, and to
the regret of everyone departed to hospital with pleurisy, a
circumstance made all the more depressing when we learnt that his return
was highly improbable. A more popular C.O. never commanded the 7th, and
we were always proud of his high opinion of us. In his dealings with all
ranks, from the second in command to the lowest private, he had ever
proved himself a perfect gentleman, while his control of matters during
the most anxious times inspired an unswerving confidence. As a gallant
leader and commander his name stands high in the records of the
battalion.
It was by no means certain that the enemy would not open out with
another onslaught on this front, for he was making desperate efforts to
reach Amiens further south, and a break through here would make his task
much easier. With the assistance of Chinese labour lines of trenches had
been dug, and they were speedily wired in by batches of Royal Engineers
and Labour Corps. The first system to be defended if the front line
collapsed was called the Purple Line. Behind that was the Red Line,
while further back still was the Brown Line, protecting Doullens. It was
here during these troubled days that the historic meeting took place
between Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Foch, when the latter took over
supreme command. As well as regaining lost energy the 42nd division had
to be responsible for a portion of the Red Line in the event of a break
through, so at various times parties of officers and N.C.O's. made trips
to it for reconnaisance purposes, and schemes were evolved for the
possible disposition of companies and the siting of L.G. posts, etc.,
under the leadership of Major Higham, now commanding the battalion.
After a week at Louvencourt we moved up into the line again, the
division relieving the 37th division in the Hebuterne and Rossignol Wood
sector. No one was sorry to get into a fresh part of the line. We felt
that we did not wish to see the Bucquoy-Ablainzevelle road again! For
some time now the 42nd had been one of the divisions of the IV. Corps,
commanded by Lt.-Gen. Harper, the one-time commander of the famous 51st
(Highland Territorial) division, and as such we were to remain until
Germany was defeated. We were in goodly company, for the other divisions
were the New Zealanders, the 37th and eventually the 5th, but we were
never put to shame at any time. Indeed, the spirit of "Go one better"
was always amplified by deeds, and by none more assiduously than the 7th
Manchesters.
Hebuterne and the immediate district was the "happy hunting ground" of
the division until the final grand hunt in August. As in 1914 the
village stood on the high-water mark of the advancing tide of Huns. In
their last effort they had captured it but the Australians had driven
them out again. If a visit be paid to this part of France the reason for
its importance to either side will be seen at once, for it stands near
the northern end of a commanding ridge which runs north and south, and
from which good observation is obtained for many miles in all
directions. This was the ridge over which the Huns had swarmed in March,
to be thrown back again, after a severe dispute, by the newly arrived
Anzacs, so that the present position was good for us but poor for
"Jerry." Hebuterne was the culminating point of a very pronounced Hun
salient, and our line swept round in a noticeable curve from the corner
of Bucquoy to Beaumont Hamel, almost touching the south-eastern edge of
the village. Looking north was the famous ground where Gommecourt had
once stood. In 1917 the French had decided that Gommecourt should be
preserved in its battle-scarred state as a national monument, for the
blood of many brave soldiers had there been shed during the fierce Somme
fighting of 1916. Notices were put up, huge white boards with black
printing in French and English, enjoining no one to interfere with the
trenches and wire, etc., but to leave things just as they were. Oh, the
irony of it! Here was the Hun again pounding, pounding with fierce wrath
and insistent desire to smash his way through. Those self-same notices
were shell-shattered, while in his zeal to destroy the dug-outs which he
knew so well in Gommecourt, for he had made them, he dropped, in one
morning, more than thirty 15-inch shells in the village. To the right of
Gommecourt could be seen the naked stumps of Rossignol Wood, a beautiful
name reminiscent of delightful summer evenings. But the song of the
nightingale was now gone, and the only tunes to be heard were the deadly
rat-tat-tat of Boche machine guns and the fierce hissing of our shrapnel
bullets through the decayed undergrowth, the time for this devil's
music being regularly thundered out by the crash, crash, of heavy
howitzers.
East of our ridge, and parallel to it, was a long gentle valley. In the
old days the Germans had been content to build their trenches half-way
up the eastern slope, and the French had faced them on the opposite
side, but now the Huns in the foolish arrogance of their hearts must
needs swarm over the whole valley, and offer themselves and their works
as targets for our searching gun-fire. On the summit of their ridge and
due east of Hebuterne is Puisieux-au-Mont, in almost the same condition
of devastation as Gommecourt, while further beyond, the trees of Achiet
can be seen. During the summer months those who wished could reckon up
the times of arrival and departure of trains at the German railhead at
Achiet, for the smoke from the engines could be distinctly observed.
Night after night our planes droned heavily over to the accompaniment of
wonderful displays of "flaming onions," parachute flares, searchlights,
and anti-aircraft gun-fire, and bombed these back areas with
demoralising effect. Further along the enemy ridge to the right, and
closer in, was what the trench maps grimly described as "Serre (site
of)." If you want testimony of the complete destructive power of British
shell-fire, go to Serre. The roads round about were marked on these
maps, but ironically labelled "Damaged by shell-fire." I think the word
"obliterated," openly admitted in the case of one or two, would have
applied to all. In other words the whole terrain bore the traces of the
thunderous days of 1916, and nothing of value was left standing. Thus,
when keen observers set their maps and scanned the low ground for Mark
Copse, Luke Copse, Touvent Farm, Observation Wood, or Red Cottage, there
was nothing visible. It was all a myth. Further south the masses of
white chalk thrown up by the historic crater at Beaumont Hamel were
useful for they served as a landmark and helped to locate other points
of interest.
Compared with the enemy we were in a relatively happy position. The
ridge which contained the front line shielded all the immediate back
area from direct observation, so that even the garrisons of the support
trenches could wander about in the open, while if there was "nothing
doing," the men back in reserve could lie out in the long grass and bask
in the sunshine. This was all very comforting and relieved the strain of
war very considerably, but the advantages in the matter of organisation
were illimitable. Rations came up in the middle of the day, and the
limbers and water carts, in singles of course on account of balloon
observation, trundled up the road in the afternoon to a point within
four hundred yards of the front line! As the men put it "We were
laughing"--especially when the enemy once or twice attempted a relief
before darkness over their exposed ground, and were severely knocked
about for their pains.
But to return to Hebuterne and the days of our first acquaintance with
it. Many people were convinced that the Hun would attack again, and our
higher command had found support for this gloomy prospect amongst their
archives, so that we were enjoined to remain on the strictest qui vive.
The first day's work consisted in re-organisation of the line, based
upon the principle of defence "in depth." This meant that a battalion,
for instance, did not expose the whole of its personnel in the front
line to be obliterated in the first shock of attack, but they must be
disposed in the best tactical positions, with a slight garrison in front
and the remainder ranged along behind. Speaking very generally a unit
was made responsible for the defence of an area, and the principle of
defence was to hold it, not by successive lines of defence, but by a
series of mutually supporting posts arranged chequerwise and in depth.
This arrangement was intended to break up the enemy's attack formation,
to stop parts of it and to allow other parts to advance, but to advance
only in such places as would make them most vulnerable to
counter-attack. This principle applied also down to the company and even
the platoon. It is easily seen that a good deal of organisation was
demanded from the battalion commander, while the smallest unit
commander, perhaps a lance-corporal, was left with much responsibility.
In view of the possibly impending attack, Hebuterne was hurriedly put
into a sound state of defence by the untiring energy of Gen. Henley and
his subordinates. Whilst all this was going on our patrolling was
excessively active, and every night No Man's Land fell into our hands
right up to the enemy posts. If possible we were to "Snaffle a Hun" with
a view to identification and information about the supposed attack, and
when it was discovered that the Boche was too alert in spite of
persistent small attempts by the Manchesters and the L.F's. this was
regarded as good proof by the attack theorists. However, nothing
materialised beyond the steady arrival of Boche shells of all calibres,
and we were not sorry.
When the brigade moved out into reserve the 7th had to dig themselves
into the earth near Chateau-de-la-Haie north of Sailly-au-Bois. In less
than twenty-four hours small groups of men had made a hole for
themselves, covered it with an elephant shelter, and camouflaged it with
sods. It was heavy work while it lasted, but it was necessary to work
quickly because of hostile aircraft. A neighbouring battery of
60-pounders were righteously indignant at our invasion, but still the
staff said we were to go there, and there we went. On the other hand it
was by no means comforting to realise that once the Hun spotted the
60-pounders we should be partakers in the unwelcome attention that would
probably follow, so we were quits anyhow. Luckily the enemy did not see
us, or he was displaying a lofty contempt, for after five day's
residence the battalion moved up into the line at Gommecourt, having had
no mishap. During this period our lists of "Bucquoy decorations" came
through, and they were very gratifying. In addition to the M.C's.
already mentioned, Capt. Nidd and 2nd-Lt. Harland were similarly
rewarded for their work as company commanders. Sgt. McHugh, who had
acted as C.S.M. of "C" company, received a bar to his M.M., and Sgt.
Heath, who had died of wounds, was decorated in like manner.
Twenty-four other men received the Military Medal, their names being
recorded in the appendix at the end of the book.
On April 30th the new C.O., Lt.-Col. Manger, of the Durham L.I.,
arrived. A regular soldier of many years' standing, he was pleased to be
sent again to a territorial battalion, for he had learnt the value of
these troops whilst commanding the 2nd 9th King's Liverpool Regiment of
the 57th division. He joined the battalion at Gommecourt and Major
Higham immediately went down for a rest. There was very little of
outside interest during the succeeding days beyond the usual work of
consolidation and keeping the enemy under closest possible observation.
Still, the battalion was glad to be relieved on May 6th, the whole
division coming out for a good period of rest.
The 127th brigade were given camp areas around Henu, divisional
headquarters being at Pas. We made the most of these May weeks, filled
with delightful sunshine, and, as events worked out, it was as well we
did, for it was the last long rest period we were to get until after the
armistice. Important changes took place in the battalion about this
time. Major Higham and Capt. Townson, both pre-war officers of the 7th,
severed their active service connection with us by being invalided to
England, the former's place being taken by Major Rae of the Liverpool
Scottish. Amongst a draft of officers that we received from a division
that had been broken on the fifth army front was Capt. Allen, M.C.,
whose original unit was the 6th Manchesters. He was put in command of
"A" company. R.S.M. Anlezark, of the 1st battalion, was posted to us for
duty, and A/R.S.M. Clough succeeded R.Q.M.S. Ogden, who had returned to
England after a long period of hard and useful work with the 7th. It was
not many weeks after this period of rest that another long-standing and
popular officer was lost to the 7th; this was Capt. Nidd, M.C. We had
always known that his grit and determination exceeded his physical
capacity, but his splendid sense of duty led him to ignore this fact,
although it was common knowledge that had he so wished he could have
been invalided out of the army long before. After severe trials on
Gallipoli, a campaign he went through from June to the evacuation (he
was one of the very few men to whom that evacuation was irksome), he had
had a relapse in hospital in Egypt for some weeks. The Bucquoy fight,
however, had proved too much for him, and he never really recovered from
the ill-effects of it. This was accentuated by the death of two of his
near and dear friends--Lt. W. Thorp for whom, as one of his subalterns,
he had a particular esteem, and Capt. Tinker. The latter was a pre-war
officer of the 7th, while Thorp had gone out to the Sudan in the ranks,
served through Gallipoli with distinction (vide Major Hurst's book) and
then received a commission early in 1916. Capt. Tinker's record with the
battalion was one of steady confidence. After being invalided to England
from a wound received on Gallipoli, he rejoined in Egypt in Feb. 1916,
and was immediately given command of "A" company. From that day he had
always been amongst us, and, except when on leave or on a course, he was
with his company, in the line or out of it. In fact, it was a record of
"full steam ahead" until the day he was killed amongst his men. What
Tinker was to "A" so was Nidd to "B" company, and his greatest regret,
when at last hospital claimed him, was in leaving the men whom he knew
so well. His departure was followed by a long illness, and it was a
great blow to his friends to hear of his death after the armistice in
his own home at Cheadle Hulme. His name can be added to the long list of
victims of the great German offensive in March.
Strict training was indulged in during these weeks, and in addition hot,
laborious days were occupied by rehearsals of the manning of the Red
Line in the neighbourhood of Souastre, to say nothing of skeleton
counter-attacks upon Beer Trench, Rum Trench, and Stout Trench, near
Gommecourt. We never knew the point of these names unless they were to
act as a stimulant to the vigour of our thrusts, the troops labouring
under the delusion that the trenches were filled with the liquids
indicated. At all events they were not there during the rehearsals in
spite of the hot weather. But if these diversions caused us to attain
the boiling point of excitement, the arrival of General Byng on May 21st
to witness a special stunt by the 7th almost burst the thermometer. A
source of some interest was the presence of an American battalion
consisting of raw troops of three weeks' New York training, to which the
127th brigade was acting as godfather. They worked diligently and with a
keen appreciation of any hints supplied to them by their British
friends. Also, not to be outdone by our frequent displays of football,
they regularly utilised our ground for baseball, of which game they
possessed a few brilliant exponents. We soon grew to like our new
allies, and we were rather sorry when they departed to join their own
division.
On June 6th the 42nd division took over the line once more and were not
relieved of responsibility of the front until Sept. 6th, sixteen days
after the big offensive had commenced. The 7th occupied the part of the
front which we knew so well at Hebuterne, relieving a battalion of the
New Zealand Division. The "Diggers" had worked hard upon these trenches
with the result that they were now in excellent condition. A good spell
of weather also assisted in the comfort of the troops. Col. Manger's
policy was to give the Hun no rest, and he began to put his principles
into practice at Hebuterne. As soon as we arrived, a thorough
reconnaissance of the enemy positions was made, and we began to make
preparation for a raid of some magnitude. This was carried out by "B"
company, of which Capt. Grey Burn was now in command, and the officers
selected to go over with the raiders were Lieut. Wender, D.C.M., who had
previously served with the 1st Battalion in Mesopotamia, 2nd-Lt. Milne
and 2nd-Lt. Goodier. Goodier had been a sergeant in "C" company, and for
his excellent services at Bucquoy had been recommended for promotion in
the field to the commissioned ranks, a distinction which came through
while we were at Henu.
It was known that the enemy held his front line in a series of isolated
posts, each armed with light machine guns. Curiously enough, whether
through lack of material or not we never knew, he paid little or no
attention to wiring in these days, except in utilising what old wire lay
about. One of these posts was located within one hundred yards of our
front line in Fusilier Trench, and this, it was decided, should be
raided. At 1 a.m. on the morning of June 16th a three minutes' shrapnel
barrage was opened on the enemy's trench, while a box barrage of H.E.
was placed all round the portion to be raided. At the end of this time
the boys leapt over in four parties, three to make for the trench and
the fourth to act as support and as a covering party for withdrawal.
Then it was found that the shelling had hardly been sufficient for
numerous enemy flares went up, throwing daylight over the whole scene,
and our men were greeted by heavy machine gun fire. Wender, who was on
the right, jumped over first and rapidly dashed off for the Boche
trench, leaving his men well behind. He was never seen or heard of
again, and it must be presumed that he was killed in the trench. Goodier
got his men across on the left and they jumped into the trench, only to
find it filled with concertina barbed wire, so they came out again and
worked their way along the top to the centre, being by this time heavily
bombed. They came to a party of Huns who immediately fled, but Goodier
seized one and he and his now tiny party returned triumphantly with
their prisoner and with fragments of bombs in their bodies. Milne,
having ranged over part of the Boche trench to find no one, covered the
withdrawal and then brought his party in. It was an extraordinary show
in which everyone had displayed considerable pluck, and the taking of
one prisoner had just converted it into a success, but we had sustained
a large number of casualties, most of them, fortunately, only slight. Of
the officers, Goodier was scratched, and Milne had a bullet through his
arm, whilst among those who were not actually with the raiders Lt. C. S.
Wood, the signalling officer, was somewhat badly wounded, his work being
taken over later by 2nd-Lt. Smith, and Lt. S. J. Wilson was slightly
wounded. 2nd-Lt. Goodier was awarded the M.C., Sgt. Fleetwood and Sgt.
Green the D.C.M., while five others received the M.M. for this night's
work. This was the concluding page of our first chapter in the front
line, for we then moved out to Sailly in reserve.
When the brigade went into the line again it was to take over the sector
to the right of Hebuterne on the ridge previously mentioned. The most
important feature about this part of the line was La Signy Farm, which
lay just below the crest on the eastern side of the ridge. The ruins of
the farm building were in Boche hands, but the eastern side of the five
hundred yards square hedge that surrounded the grounds ran along our
front line. North of the grounds our line was echeloned forward and then
ran due north to the corner of Hebuterne. Skeletons of large trees stood
up like tall sentinels over the piles of bricks and stones which had
once made up the farm buildings. At the farthest corner of the hedge was
a shell-pitted patch of ground in a slight depression marked on the map
as Basin Wood. This was known to be honeycombed with deep dug-outs and
galleries and was therefore a frequent target for our heavy howitzers.
Further south the two opposing lines were almost parallel as far as the
vicinity of Watling Street--then a Boche trench. In the dead ground
behind our line was Euston Dump, which had gone up with a tremendous
roar in the early days of the March fighting, leaving a large hole.
Stoke's mortar shells, "footballs," etc., were scattered about in all
directions. Not far away from here was the Sugar Factory, which, from
the attention it received, the Hun regarded as more important than we
did.
The C.O. maintained his policy of worrying the Hun in every possible
manner, the fullest use being made of the artillery liaison officers and
the Stokes and Newton trench mortars for this purpose. Every night
little strafes were planned which must have kept Fritz in a constant
state of speculation as to what might happen next. To assist in these
annoying tactics a special company of R.E., whose particular devilry was
gas, came up and dug in 1,000 gas projectiles behind the support lines.
On two separate nights, after everything had been considered favourable,
they gleefully let them off at La Signy Farm and its environs, and then
disappeared down their dug-outs to gloat over the picture of choking and
writhing Huns. We consoled ourselves with the probability that the enemy
had sustained more casualties than we had.
On July 8th Corps had a sudden recurrence of "attackitis," and,
doubtless at the instigation of a junior intelligence officer, they sent
out a frantic request to "all whom it may concern" to ascertain who the
enemy were in front. They had feared a relief by large German soldiers
who were anxious to smell the blood of the Hated English. This message,
or an adulterated form of it, filtered "through the usual channels" and
so reached the 7th in the late afternoon. Two hours before darkness it
had been answered in the following manner.
Reconnaissance had indicated an enemy post within eighty yards of our
line close to where the Serre road crossed it, but it was protected by
concertina barbed wire. "D" company were holding that part of the line,
and they were asked to furnish a party prepared to go over almost at
once for a Hun. An enterprising artillery liaison officer, Lt. Bates,
obtained permission to make use of a couple of 4.5 howitzers which he
said were new and very accurate, and these, firing graze fuse shells at
his correction would smash the wire. The only place from which
observation on this wire could be obtained was in our front line
directly opposite to it, and here a temporary O.P. with telephonic
communication to the battery was rigged up, the garrison of this part
being moved off left and right for safety. It was a nerve-racking
experience in that O.P., as may be gathered from the fact that we were
trying to hit an object less than 70 yards away! It took over an hour to
get a satisfactory result, and then 2nd-Lt. Gorst, Sgt. Horsfield and
seven other men, in shirt sleeves and armed with revolvers, hopped
quickly over, ran along a shallow trench or ditch, and entered the Hun
post. It was empty with the exception of one dead man who had just been
killed by one of our shells. He was quickly carted back, but with great
difficulty for he was a big heavy fellow, while Gorst and Horsfield
searched along the trench both ways for more Huns. None were to be
found, however--evidently our inexplicable shelling had scared them off
altogether. Still the dead man was good enough for the purpose, for he
furnished the required identification, and his regiment was immediately
wired to H.Q. There had been no relief, so calm reigned once more.
The spirit of "Go one better" inspired Lieut. Wilkinson and a few of his
transport men to perform deeds of "derring do" in the line, for one
night they came up and captured a German G.S. wagon from No Man's Land.
It lay just in front of our line near the Serre Road and had evidently
been abandoned during the New Zealand counter attack in March. A bridge
of duck boards was put over the trench and Wilkinson and his men went
out and skilfully dragged their prize back to safety. Its arrival at the
transport lines next morning was naturally the occasion for great
rejoicing and hero-worship, after the sensation caused by dressing up
the driver in a Boche tin hat and great coat. On another night Sgt.
Aldred with a small party made an exceptionally plucky effort to enter
an enemy post and was afterwards awarded the M.M. After eight days of
such work as this in the front line we moved out to Bus in divisional
reserve to enjoy a most pleasant few days under canvas.
We lost Padre Hoskyns at this period. He had received an order which
filled him with chagrin to report for duty as Senior Chaplin to the 6th
division, so he journeyed at once to the divisional H.Q. and told the
major-general he would sit on his doorstep until he got permission from
him to stay with the battalion. Efforts were made but they were of no
avail, and a more peremptory order than the last was received, so he
took a sorrowful farewell and departed, followed by the regrets of the
whole battalion, and indeed of a good number of the division. "Some have
greatness thrust upon them," was applicable in his case, for he had not
sought promotion but preferred to remain a "parish priest" and live
amongst the men. Much the same remark applied to the C.O. who, in the
absence of General Henley at Divisional Headquarters, was called upon
to take command of the brigade during the succeeding weeks, for he
always expressed his preference for battalion work. Owing to the fact
that Major Rae was in hospital at this time with the "flue," Capt.
Creagh assumed command of the battalion, and Lt. Barratt being on a
month's leave in England, Lt. Wilson was temporarily appointed Adjutant.
Capt. Palmer, an old officer of the 7th, who had been carrying out
important work in England since his recovery from a wound obtained in
Gallipoli on June 4th, returned to us some weeks previous to this and
was put in command of "C" company.
During our period in reserve the 126th brigade had continued our
worrying tactics and had attempted to raid La Signy Farm. They found the
place strongly held, however, and after repeated efforts to get to the
Hun positions had been forced to abandon the attempt. When we took over
the front line from the 10th Manchesters for a continuous spell of
sixteen days, we found that we were expected to co-operate at once in a
forward movement with the New Zealanders, who were in the Hebuterne
sector, and who intended to occupy a shorter line across the valley. The
first day, July 19th, found us making preparations for this operation at
express speed ready for evening. Lieut. Edge, an old second line
officer, was put in charge of a party supplied by "C" company, and they
were expected to capture and hold a Boche post about 500 yards away. It
was decided that the silent method would be the best, so artillery
support was declined. Edge displayed consummate skill and patience in
carrying out this hazardous enterprise, and his difficulties were not
lessened by disturbing events on both flanks. All along the New Zealand
front, from Hebuterne to Rossignol Wood, an advance was taking place,
while immediately on the left the 6th were moving forward and in the
process had met with considerable resistance so that a pitched battle
had arisen. To add to the troubles the Naval Division on our right had
selected this night for a raid near Beaumont Hamel, accompanied with
noise, with the result that the Hun put down his protective barrage all
along our ridge. Our front line was packed with men who were to go over
and dig a communication trench and generally assist in the consolidation
when the post had been captured, and how they escaped casualties from
this shelling was nothing short of a miracle. Meanwhile, Edge and his
men were creeping steadily forward, and were encountering difficulties
amongst huge shell holes, loose tags of wire and a very irregular hedge
which they were trying to follow as a guide. Eventually they reached the
post and took the enemy completely by surprise. A short rush carried
them in and one Boche was captured, but the rest got away in the
darkness, leaving their gear behind them. The consolidating party
followed up quickly, and covered by a protective screen who lay out well
in front in the vicinity of Red Cottage, they dug L.G. positions, fire
steps for riflemen and placed coils of wire out in front and on the
flanks. A good deal of the C.T. was also dug--quite sufficient at any
rate to enable a careful man to crawl down to the new post in daylight.
It was a good night's work, and earned a well-deserved M.C. for Lieut.
Edge and M.M's. for Sgt. Banahan and three others.
Next day, brigade considered the necessity for careful consolidation of
the ground gained by the 6th and 7th, but Capt. Creagh intimated that he
wished to make his position more secure by capturing the Triangle, a
strong triangular redoubt which lay in the grounds of La Signy Farm, and
which dominated the post we had just taken. Permission was granted to
carry out this enterprise, and once more preparations were rushed
forward and orders made out for the operation to be accomplished that
night. This time "D" company, temporarily commanded by Lt. Douglas, was
selected to provide the attackers. They were back in reserve, close to
Batt. H.Q., and on suitable ground for carrying out a quick rehearsal.
Also it was decided that the best method of clearing the Boche would be
by bombing. The battalion bombing officer was Lieut. Gresty, who
belonged to "D" company, and he was put in command of the attacking
party, 2nd-Lt. Gorst, at his own request, being detailed to assist him.
The post captured the previous night was the "jumping off" place, and
the plan was to work along the enemy trench to the right, clear it by
bombing, and so get to the Triangle. The whole operation was a huge
success, and never did the eager fighting qualities of the Fleur de Lys
show up to prouder advantage than in the display given by "D" company
that night. The unexpected direction of approach took the enemy
completely by surprise, for our men had not proceeded far before they
caught a working party out in the open. There was a short scrap, but
most of the poor Jerries had no weapons handy, and they ran off
squealing and chattering like a lot of monkeys, leaving their dead and
wounded behind. Our men pushed on quickly, anxious to make the fullest
possible use of the surprise element, until the northern corner of the
Triangle was reached. Here they split up into two parties, Gresty
continuing the original direction, and Gorst turning along to the right.
The latter party found the trench strongly occupied, but the enemy were
so oblivious of what was happening that they were busy "dishing out
stew" for the evening meal. When they were surprised a few of them
indeed showed plucky fight, hurriedly seizing bombs and throwing them
wildly in the direction of the attackers. Others succeeded in grasping
their rifles, and Gorst received a nasty bullet wound in the shoulder,
but not before he had accounted for one or two Huns with his revolver.
Sgt. Horsfield, who understood perfectly the meaning of "Carry on,
Sergeant!" continued this part of the show, and the Huns were chased
along the trench to the western apex. Here a pitched bombing battle
ensued, and very soon the enemy got out and raced across the open in the
direction of the farm. Meanwhile, Gresty had led his men over a sort of
switch back trench, for it had been so heavily pounded by our Newton
T.M's. that it was difficult to make it out at all in the dark.
Nevertheless they struggled along, and finding the far corner of the
Triangle occupied, quickly bombed the enemy out of it and proceeded to
consolidate. At the same time other parties, each of one N.C.O. and six
men, had been detailed in the work of manning various posts en route,
digging L.G. emplacements, and wiring and constructing of communication
trenches. In fact, in a very short time the whole place, which had been
a Hun strong point, was swarming with British soldiers busily working to
turn round the defences.
Just as dawn was breaking a few Huns effected an entrance into one of
the trenches and commenced to bomb the post at the far corner, whereupon
the late Lce.-Cpl. Lockett of "C" company, who was in charge of the post
at the apex, took a couple of men and promptly counter attacked them.
Their leader, an N.C.O. with the Iron Cross and another man were
captured, while the rest made off again. Lce.-Cpl. Lockett was awarded
the D.C.M. for his sensible and courageous action. A good many
casualties must have been inflicted on the enemy during this night's
work for they left a number of dead and wounded behind, whilst several
others suffering from slighter wounds must have got away. They left
booty in our hands, and the large number of rifles and machine guns
alone indicated the strength of the garrison. Our men obtained plenty of
souvenirs, but they were sensible enough to hand over anything of
military value, which was returned to them after examination by
competent authorities. Useful disposition maps, and intelligence
reports, to say nothing of piles of letters and post-cards were thus
sent up for inspection, while during the next few days when visiting the
area occupied by "D" company one was greeted by the unwonted scent of
cigar smoke, for the Hun was ever a connoisseur on cheap cigars.
Heavy rain during the following days converting our new trenches into a
quagmire, the necessity for digging and cleaning up became all the more
urgent, although it entailed a heavy strain upon the men under most
uncomfortable conditions. As "B," "C" and "D" companies had each "had a
stunt" and covered themselves with glory, it now remained for "A"
company to do likewise. Their turn came on the night of July 27th, when
it was decided to push forward and occupy Cetorix Trench, about 300
yards beyond the Triangle, and so make our position even more secure.
Unfortunately there was very heavy rain in the early evening, but the
party went out, and after a serious dispute with the enemy, in which
2nd-Lt. Goodier, M.C., was wounded again, gained their objective. What
was supposed to be a trench, however, was found to be a sunken road,
frightfully shell-pitted, and in a most appalling condition of mud and
water. It was not considered worth holding and the whole party was
wisely withdrawn.
The La Signy Farm fighting was not yet over, for on the morning of
August 3rd, while "B" company were in the front line, the enemy put down
a heavy barrage on all our positions, particularly on the Triangle.
Then, just as dawn broke, a party of about forty Huns rapidly started
across No Man's Land, but the 7th were too much for them. They stuck to
their posts and rapidly emptied Lewis guns and rifles amongst them, and
when they were sufficiently close greeted them also with bombs. The
Boche became disorganised and scattered, some groping about for gaps in
our hastily constructed wire, but it was a hopeless business and the
remaining plucky ones cleared off in disgust. Then Lt. Pell-Ilderton
followed out with a small party, and finding a couple of dead brought
them in. The Huns had carefully removed all evidences of identification
before the venture, but one man had a black and white cockade in his
cap, which proved him to be a Prussian. As the previous division was
known to be Wurtemburger, we immediately notified this fact to H.Q.
Further proof was afforded by a slightly wounded Boche who, having
apparently got lost, had wandered into a post occupied by the 6th.
That day we were relieved by the L.F's. and went back into divisional
reserve, this time to billets in Louvencourt, and there received
congratulations from various people for our excellent work during the
last long spell in the line. The final incident furnished Col. Manger
with an extra battalion motto: "What we have, we hold." For the attack
on the Triangle, Military Crosses were awarded to Lieut. Gresty and
2nd-Lt. Gorst, while Sgt. Horsfield, who had already earned the D.C.M.
and Belgian Croix de Guerre when with the 9th Manchesters, received a
Military Medal. Five other ranks were similarly decorated.
The battalion was augmented about this time by the arrival of the cadre
of the 2nd 7th Manchesters. The 66th division had suffered severely in
March and as it was undergoing re-organisation, all the second line
units, or what remained of them, were sent to the 42nd division. Capt.
Nelson also returned after a long absence since his wound in May, 1915,
and was given command of "A" company, Capt. Allen, M.C., having been
detailed to take charge of a divisional L.G. school.