(_Photo from Paul Thompson_)]
_As proof of this statement, Signor Salandra read the following
telegram sent by the Marquis di San Giuliano to the Duke of Avarna
(Italian Minister in Vienna) on July 25 last:_
"Salandra, von Flotow, and myself have had a long conversation.
Salandra and I emphatically pointed out to von Flotow that Austria had
no right, according to the spirit of the treaty of the Triple
Alliance, to make a démarche like that made in Belgrade without coming
to an agreement beforehand with her allies."
In effect, [continued Signor Salandra,] Austria, in consequence of the
terms in which her note was couched, and in consequence of the things
demanded, which, while of little effect against the Pan-Serbian
danger, were profoundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly so to
Russia, had clearly shown that she wished to provoke war. Hence we
declared to von Flotow that, in consequence of this procedure on the
part of Austria and in consequence of the defensive and conservative
character of the Triple Alliance Treaty, Italy was under no obligation
to assist Austria if, as the result of this démarche, she found
herself at war with Russia, because any European war would in such an
event be the consequence of the act of provocation and aggression
committed by Austria.
The Italian Government on July 27 and 28 emphasized in clear and
unmistakable language to Berlin and Vienna the question of the cession
of the Italian provinces subject to Austria, and we declared that if
we did not obtain adequate compensation the Triple Alliance would have
been irreparably broken. [Loud and prolonged cheers.] Impartial
history will say that Austria, having found Italy in July, 1913, and
in October, 1913, hostile to her intentions of aggression against
Serbia, attempted last Summer, in agreement with Germany, the method
of surprise and the fait accompli.
The horrible crime of Serajevo was exploited as a pretext a month
after it happened--this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept
the very extensive offers of Serbia--nor at the moment of the general
conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional
acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31 declared to
the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation
being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had
already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great
Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not
disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions
indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been
increased at the end of the war.
If, moreover, Serbia had decided meanwhile to accept the
aforementioned note in its entirety, declaring herself ready to agree
to the conditions imposed on her, that would not have persuaded
Austria to cease hostilities. It is not true, as Count Tisza declared,
that Austria did not undertake to make territorial acquisitions to the
detriment of Serbia, who, moreover, by accepting all the conditions
imposed upon her, would have become a subject State. The Austrian
Ambassador, Herr Merey von Kapos-Mere, on July 30, stated to the
Marquis di San Giuliano that Austria could not make a binding
declaration on this subject, because she could not foresee whether,
during the war, she might not be obliged, against her will, to keep
Serbian territory. [Sensation.]
On July 29 Count Berchtold stated to the Duke of Avarna that he was
not inclined to enter into any engagement concerning the eventual
conduct of Austria in the case of a conflict with Serbia.
Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after
nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which
recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we
resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany
believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak,
blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not
enforcing by arms her good right, with an Italy which could be
paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she
could not avow was placing herself between the country and the
Government. [Very loud cheers.]
I will not deny the benefits of the alliance; benefits, however, not
one-sided, but accruing to all the contracting parties, and perhaps
not more to us than to the others. The continued suspicions and the
aggressive intentions of Austria against Italy are notorious and are
authentically proved. The Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von
Hoetzendorf, always maintained that war against Italy was inevitable,
either on the question of the irredentist provinces or from jealousy,
that Italy intended to aggrandize herself as soon as she was prepared,
and meanwhile opposed everything that Austria wished to undertake in
the Balkans, and consequently it was necessary to humiliate her in
order that Austria might have her hands free, and he deplored that
Italy had not been attacked in 1907. Even the Austrian Minister of
Foreign Affairs recognized that in the military party the opinion was
prevalent that Italy must be suppressed by war because from the
Kingdom of Italy came the attractive force of the Italian provinces of
the empire, and consequently by a victory over the kingdom and its
political annihilation all hope for the irredentists would cease.
[Illustration: GENERAL KONRAD VON HOETZENDORF