OCCURRENCES SUBSEQUENT TO THE AUTHOR’S RETURN.
CORRESPONDENCE OF MESSRS. GORDON, ROBERTSON, DAWSON, AND COLLINS —
INACTIVITY OF THE ASHANTEES — STOPPAGE OF TRADE — CONDUCT OF MR. SMITH —
GOVERNMENT TAKE POSSESSION OF THE FORTS — EFFECTIVE FORCE THERE —
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES — ATTACK OF MOUREE BY THE BRITISH —
OBSERVATIONS — VINDICATION OF THE DUTCH FROM THE CHARGE OF EXCITING
HOSTILITIES — APPOINTMENT OF SIR CHARLES M‘CARTHY AS GOVERNOR OF THE
BRITISH SETTLEMENTS ON THE WESTERN COAST OF AFRICA — HIS IDEAS OF THE
POWER OF ASHANTEE — STATE OF THE GOLD COAST ON HIS ARRIVAL — BLOCKADE BY
THE ASHANTEES — THEIR MILITARY TACTICS — MURDER OF A SERJEANT — THE
BRITISH FORCE TAKES THE FIELD — DEFEAT AND DEATH OF SIR CHARLES M‘CARTHY
— CORRESPONDENCE — OBSERVATIONS.
In order to put my readers in possession of the present state of English
affairs on the coast of Guinea, I subjoin an account of such events,
subsequent to my return, as have come to my knowledge.
In the months of November and December, 1820, during my residence in
London, I received letters from my correspondents on the Gold Coast,
dated at periods between one and two months subsequent to my quitting
the African _stage_. These letters, which were written by the late Mr.
Gordon, governor of Accra Fort, and member of the council, Mr. George
Robertson,[78] a merchant and representative of that highly respectable
firm of Henry Hunt and Co., Jeffery’s Square, London, Mr. Dawson, late
governor of Cape Coast Castle, and Mr. Collins. The inferences to be
gleaned from all this correspondence were satisfactory, inasmuch as they
conveyed the most unqualified assurances that the public tranquility
remained undisturbed. More than this could not be expected, neither
could it be hoped that the lowering calm, like Mr. Bowdich’s treaty,
“would last for ever.” Prince Adoom sent his compliments to me; and it
was moreover stated that no apprehensions of any unfavourable tendency
were entertained; but on the contrary, the most hopeful feelings were
indulged in, from the circumstance of my being on the spot where justice
and good faith ruled the destiny, not of men alone, but of nations. The
little Ashantee army, it was believed, would not in the interval take
the field against the natives of Cape Coast, supported as they were by
the whites, however hostilely and insultingly they might conduct
themselves towards the king. It was believed, moreover, that Adoom
having communicated my parting messages to the monarch, the latter would
confidingly wait the issue of the time I had prescribed for my return;
and that in the interval, the Ashantee troops would be equally
scrupulous in conducting themselves with order and moderation upon the
coast.
It seemed, however, as if this state of inactivity, on the part of the
court, had been construed by the British authorities there into a
political ruse, calculated to gain all that was possible by negociation,
without risking its honour and its interests in the sequel. It was, in
fact, believed by them that Ashantee would not dare to take up arms,
even against the natives, while the whites supported them in their
resistance with unqualified vigour, such as they had already evinced in
_cabinet_ theory, and were inclined, as they represented, to carry into
active effect in the field.
In short they argued as men whose concealed prejudices, interests, and
resentments, had blinded their eyes to every prudential thought, every
maxim of temperate and judicious policy, as they might have connexion
with the true honour of the crown, the interests of commerce, and
British faith. The denial of this can only lead to a belief in the other
alternative, viz., that the authorities who presided over our African
establishments were wholly _ignorant_ of the temper and resources of the
monarchy, whose confidence they had already betrayed, and whose
friendship they were insulting by puerile, and, it cannot be refuted,
unnecessary and undeniable acts of provocation, purposely to thwart the
measures which had been contemplated by government for _opening the
communication with interior Africa_, by a cultivation of the friendship
of the very monarch whom they by insults were urging to the necessity of
taking up arms, if not in self defence, at least in defence of his
maritime provinces—provinces which had been subdued by his
arms—provinces wherein the conqueror’s title, from the days of governor
Torrane, had been recognized by treaties and by “notes,” as they are
called, which, by reversion, fell into the hands of the king, and upon
which he constantly received his monthly, quarterly, or annual pay for
the ground rent of the castles themselves, as the Fantees themselves
originally used to do.
Peaceably as the Ashantees were inclined, it became apparent that the
king reposed his faith upon that of the British government, as the
fountain of supremacy; and the traders, oppositely circumstanced, and
having none but mercantile interests to influence their movements,
naturally placed no confidence whatever in the local authorities, either
of Cape Coast Castle, or the town under its walls; consequently,
although the Dutch markets were, as usual, constantly resorted to by
Ashantee merchants and traders, scarce any of those people ever visited
the Cape or its neighbourhood, and, as heretofore, the only vent for
British merchandize, _guns, powder, and rum_ included, was at El Mina,
through the agency of our commercial rivals, who, in truth, reaped the
harvest of a double profit, upon all the commodities they purchased of
us.
In April and May, 1821, further accounts were received from the Gold
Coast. I also received private letters from Mr. Dawson, Mr. Robertson,
and Mr. Collins. Those of the two gentlemen last named dwelt forcibly
and interestingly upon the state of public affairs there, as they
interfered with mercantile interests, and the danger impending over
councils which were termed rash and inconsiderate.
The Ashantees under Prince Adoom, it seemed, were still in the town.
They had waited the issue of the eight months with admirable patience
and forbearance, even without a murmur. Already, however, up to the date
of these letters, had nearly ten months elapsed, and ultimately they
manifested some uneasiness at not learning any thing favourable to the
cause of their sovereign, who, on his part, it was believed, was still
averse from the adoption of any hasty resolutions of a tendency to
resent the rupture which the company’s authorities had created by
recourse to arms.
Mr. Smith, it seemed, the original instigator of all the mischief that
had ensued, or that might ultimately ensue, did not repose quite so
calmly under the political frowns of the Ashantee monarch, as the reader
might suspect, from the ostensible character of the public reports. This
gentleman, whatever exterior surface he might shew, could not avoid
betraying his fears, in the secret course of politics he thought it
convenient to adopt; for notwithstanding recent proceedings, and without
regard to the tenor of his sentiments, as they were to be gleaned from
the public dispatches and letters designed for the inspection of his
Majesty’s ministers, or others in authority and of interest in the
state, he renewed, it is said, the negotiations on behalf of the
Fantees, when he found ultimately that it was his interest to meet the
impatience of the Court of Ashantee, offering, it is stated, the 100
ounces, or from that to 150 ounces of gold, as a settlement of the
claim.
Whether this renewal of overtures, if the account be true, associated as
they were, too, with professions of friendship, was calculated to amuse
only and procrastinate the time, is what I cannot take upon myself to
say, although I believe most cordially that Mr. Smith, in despite of
that insensibility and contracted knowledge of men for which he is so
justly characterized, was alarmed ultimately at the attitude of public
affairs. I can entertain little doubt of this; else, setting other
reasons connected with my correspondence aside, why should he have
continued to send messengers to court from time to time, directly or
otherwise; or have held any communication with the prince upon the
subject of a claim which he had resisted at the hazard of our dearest
affections and interests, the honour of the British flag, and the
prosperity of its commerce.
To give the reader a clearer insight into the secret machinations of the
Cape politicians, it must be told that ministers, at least, were
sensible of the imbecility of those to whom the public trust had been so
long confided,[79] to legislate on the Coast of Africa. Mr. Goulburn,
perhaps to relieve the natural anxiety I felt, had already done me the
honour to say, that Government were sensible of the many evils attending
the administration of public affairs upon the Gold Coast, and it was
consequently designed to take the forts under their own management. This
intelligence was moreover confirmed to me by a gentleman high in office
in the Admiralty, and by several others in public trust, both in Downing
Street and at the Treasury. This event, in truth, had been long looked
for, and I think I am justified in saying, ardently wished by every
reflecting man, whose property or whose interests entitled them to a
vote in regard to their protection. These changes were not unexpected,
but had been long in contemplation. In reference to the secret spring of
action among the leading servants of the Company, but more especially
Mr. Smith himself, they were of inducement sufficient to warrant every
exertion on his part to persevere _ostensibly_ in resisting the demand
made by the king, without suffering his recent temporizing maxims to
escape to the knowledge of supremacy, even in a whisper. And this he was
mainly anxious about, because the public correspondence for some time
past, from the Committee of African merchants, guaranteed to their
servants, perhaps in a limited sense, retirements proportionate to their
respective ranks, to be paid to them from the date that the forts might
be transferred to the possession of his Majesty’s government. Mr. Smith,
therefore, in common with his adherents, looked interestedly to his rank
in that service, and he was accordingly doubly anxious to support the
character of consistency, although at every hazard (short perhaps of an
actual appeal to arms against the Ashantees). It was moreover hoped that
Government, with their customary liberality would look with a favourable
eye upon what had been described to them by his friends, and those who
supported his pretensions, as the _energetic_ and dignified resistance
of a man of _talent_ and _discretion_; and in reviewing the transactions
on the day when their intrinsic worth might be estimated in sterling
money, that they might be influenced to apportion the award upon a scale
adequate to such services, as they stood arranged in order with the
fulsome, and, as it would seem, designed misrepresentations of his
nephew, in the description he gave of the former mission. Hence the
panegyrists who edited the public testimonials submitted to the Colonial
office and other departments of government, gave implicit credit to his
public spirit, zeal, _discretion_, &c.
The king of Ashantee, it appeared, down to the month of January,
resisted every overture (however indirectly they may have been made
through the agency of the prince) of a tendency short of recognizing his
supremacy at Cape Coast in quality of sovereign over the natives, of
whom he demanded satisfaction, equivalent to the offence they had given;
it would appear also that this monarch, having lost the original
confidence he possessed, was not to be amused with vain negociations,
whose tendency he might have probed, through his ambassadors and
emissaries upon the coast, where, for some months past, they had been in
constant habits of gleaning intelligence from the company’s servants of
inferior rank, relating to the change immediately contemplated, and
which the Ashantees doubtless imagined would bring their sovereign’s
“palaver” to the cognizance of the fountain of truth, purity, and good
faith. Upon these grounds, simply, we may account for a subsequent pause
of the duration of many weeks.
About the latter end of the summer of 1821, fresh accounts arrived from
the Gold Coast. My own letters from Mr. Robertson stated that the king
was inflexible as regarded his claims, but that tranquillity generally
prevailed, and every apprehension was removed from the minds of the
British and the Fantees, from the circumstance of his Majesty’s
government having, it was thought, finally taken upon themselves the
management of the forts. It was no longer doubted that the first object
of ministers would be to send an efficient force to garrison the
castles, for, will it be credited, that notwithstanding the assumed
dignity of the governor, or governor and council,[80] the total amount
of the garrisons, themselves included, was only _forty-five_ white men,
and these to give protection to no less than eight castles and
factories, viz. Cape Coast Castle, Annamaboe, Tantum, Accra, Succondee,
Commenda, Dixcove, and Apollonia, all situated within the territory of
Ashantee.[81] These reports of proceedings in London in particular,
animated the drooping spirits of the natives of Cape Coast, as it
moreover revived the courage of the British, instigating both to throw
aside the mask, and leave to chance alone, I presume, the issue. Mr.
Smith, it was clear, would be content to resign his trust with what he
termed honour, i.e. under the semblance of having supported the dignity
of the British flag in trials of severity, and under circumstances which
might appear of critical terror to those he wished to imbibe the
impression, and who would naturally weigh in the balance the total
numbers of the disposable British force, without learning the nature of
the intrigues.
The Fantees eagerly and anxiously looked out for the arrival of an
English fleet and a _white_ army to their succour, such as the
thoughtful or the thoughtless had led them to build their hopes upon.
Such was the substance of private letters, my own among the number.
Public as well as private ones of a few days’ subsequent date, contained
matters of a greater political importance, for as the great crisis
approached, so it appeared that the spirit of resistance was suddenly
metamorphosed into one of enterprize, in which blacks and whites
together participated in common with the hero of the Cape. But this,
besides its relative importance, which may warrant the insertion, being
written by one of the servants of the company (Mr. Colliver), who had
charge of the expedition, I submit the report verbatim as it was penned.
“Cape Coast Castle, 21st April, 1821.
“By the time you receive this, it is probable the African company will
have ceased to exist. We have received orders to hold ourselves in
readiness to deliver up the forts and settlements here to government. It
is understood they are to be put on the same footing as Sierra Leone. A
list has been furnished to government by the company’s committee, of
their officers, their age, length of service, the situations they fill,
their emoluments, &c. We have been blockaded here since the 10th of
February,[82] by the Ashantees (an African tribe), who have commenced
hostilities against us. On the day before-mentioned our governor
received intelligence that a black man belonging to Cape Coast, where
the people are under _our protection_, had been cruelly murdered by a
chief of the _Fantees_, at a place about six miles from Cape Coast,
called Mouree. I was immediately ordered to assemble all the soldiers I
could in five minutes, and proceed to Mouree to seize the murderer. I
quickly set off with four officers and eighty-five soldiers. A little
before we entered the town of Mouree where the savages, (_the Fantees_)
between two and three thousand in number, were assembled, we saw the
mangled remains of their unfortunate victim. The town stands near the
top of a hill, on the summit of which is an old Dutch fort. As soon as
we entered the town a fire was opened upon us, but as my orders were to
seize the murderer, if possible, without bloodshed, I did not for some
time allow the men to return the fire. However, perceiving they were
resolved to oppose us, I gave directions to my little party to give them
a volley, and then to charge. The negroes retired as we advanced, and in
less than an hour we gained the hill, from which our opponents fled in
every direction. We demanded the keys of the fort from the principal man
belonging to Mouree, who, not being engaged in the affair, had remained,
and who immediately gave them up. In the fort, which has a drawbridge,
we were perfectly secure from the attack of the negroes. The body we
defeated were _Fantees_, who were _assembled to assist the Ashantees_ in
enforcing some _very unjust_ demands made by them on the people of Cape
Coast. As soon as the Ashantees who reside near Cape Coast heard that
the Governor had sent an armed force against their friends, their drum
beat to arms, and they hastened after us. _Fortunately_, we had defeated
our opponents before they arrived; however, they rallied the Fantees,
and took a position about half-a-mile from the town with a determination
to oppose our little party. The governor, apprised of our situation,
assembled all the force he could muster, and speedily about five
thousand of the Cape Coast people, headed by our officers and carrying
the British flag, were seen approaching. The enemy immediately retired,
and we were released from our _disagreeable_ situation, after having
been, from nine in the morning till four in the afternoon, exposed to a
burning sun without refreshment. The negroes had forty-seven killed, and
upwards of one hundred wounded, in this affair. We had one soldier
killed, and four wounded. Since the affair, we have not seen one of the
Ashantees _or the Fantees_ here (at Cape Coast): and now a total
stoppage of trade has taken place. We have not learned how the king of
Ashantee intends to act, nor is it _safe_ to _venture_ out of _our
limits_ except in large parties.”
Thus it appears upon the clearest evidence, that we were the first who
appealed to arms, and under circumstances which, according to my
reasoning, were rash and unjustifiable in the extreme, either upon the
face of the old treaty, which it would seem Mr. Smith had some time back
insinuated a desire to recognise, or, as regarded the laws of nations;
for in the first instance, the murderer, (a Fantee) should have been
demanded either of the prince, the authorities of the town of Mouree, or
the Dutch governor-general at El Mina, ere any appeal was made to force,
and this never was done. Without looking to the great waste of human
life, as the sequel proved, and as might naturally have been foreseen in
a meeting between organized blacks and a mob of fishermen, such as the
Mourees in particular are, above all the little Fantee tribes, was it
reputable to make an inroad and an abrupt attack upon a town where the
flag of his majesty of the Netherlands waved upon the battlements of a
castle which might almost vie as a fortification with Cape Coast itself,
and which, before the Dutch took Elmina from the Portuguese[83] was the
head establishment of that nation upon the Guinea coast? Was it just and
honourable, admitting all the circumstances of the misunderstanding with
the king of Ashantee down to this period,—was it just, I would ask, or
creditable, without paying the compliment first of demanding the
offender to be delivered up, to adopt such precipitate and summary
proceedings? Was it agreeable even to that particular clause in the
treaty made by Mr. Bowdich, which ran to the following effect.—“_The
governor reserves to himself the right of punishing any of the subjects
of Ashantee, guilty of secondary offences; but in cases of magnitude the
offenders shall be sent to the king to be dealt with according to the
laws of their country_.” Although we were not upon friendly terms with
the king, we certainly were not in hostility, for hitherto the Ashantees
had conducted themselves with the greatest propriety and moderation, as
it has been already described, paying for every thing they required in
gold. But now they no longer deemed it requisite to observe the bounds
of neutrality, as in all probability they may have conceived that
British councils, as they were regulated and administered in Africa,
certainly teemed with nothing but perfidy. This, it is true, is
conjectural, but it seems very likely to have been the case, for the
Ashantees having taken up their position at a short station inland of
Cape Coast, never afterwards opened any conference with the authorities
of the Cape, or held any direct communication whatever with them or the
town, the natives of which scarcely ever durst trust themselves out of
sight of their habitations, when necessitated by their respective
employments to go in the “bush,”[84] although for a time they would
probably have been secure from molestation, as the prince himself durst
not certainly have acted in a military capacity (unless defensively, for
so he told me himself,) without express orders from the court to that
effect.
Let it be remembered, that besides the internal resources of the
monarchy, every town upon the line of coast, El Mina itself included,
acknowledged fealty and was tributary to Ashantee, and from El Mina
alone the enemy might, if he had thought proper, put in motion from
eight hundred to one thousand men, as the Dutch government,
notwithstanding their great castle and the title by which they inherited
it, claimed no sort of supremacy over that or any other town of Guinea,
but on the contrary distinctly admitted the title by which the king
claimed sovereignty over the whole extent of country, including all the
towns upon the sea shore which are overlooked by their forts and
factories, from Axim to the Volta.
That these, our rivals in commercial enterprise, did secretly rejoice at
a misunderstanding between the king and the British authorities on the
coast, whereby the latter were necessarily excluded from participating
in the benefits of a lucrative trade in the precious metal, pure as the
Ashantees carry it to market; and that these disputes should have been
procrastinated to the unconscionable length of years, to their exclusive
advantage and satisfaction, is what I can readily conceive, because I
know it to be a fact, from the sentiments I gathered from the Dutch
officers, when I was last at Elmina.[85] But is not this feeling
strictly in unison with commercial rivality and private interests? Was
it, taken in any sense, unnatural or unlooked for, that the Dutch should
rejoice in the good fortune which accident alone, whether founded upon
bad faith or bad politics among the contending parties, had cast in
their way? If we thought proper, from private views and resentments, to
enter into the quarrels of the natives, and make their “palavers” our
own, at the risk of our dearest interests and the only motives which
could induce a residence in such a climate, it surely did not follow
that the Dutch, because they were of the same colour as ourselves, and
were only distinguished by their blue coats instead of red, should tread
in our steps, and follow the tortuous maze of a course of politics which
they, and every sensible man, knew to be ruinous to their prosperity?
Nor can it be imputed to a nation of such renown in these parts, (as
successors to the Portuguese), that the government of the parent
country, friendly as it is, in all its relations, with our own, should
have contributed by any means, even of the most indirect tendency, to
foment discord and kindle the embers of war, purposely to destroy the
interests of their dearest ally, and those friends who love and serve
them best. No, the government of the Netherlands is, as I conceive, too
honorable and too grateful to entertain such sentiments, and her
citizens and burghers too respectable to entertain any sentiment
inimical to our happiness and prosperity in Africa, beyond the natural
scope of local and commercial speculation, for which they are no way
responsible, any more than ourselves.
Dearly as I love my country, and much as I respect its constitution, I
can subscribe only to sentiments such as these; and if it has fallen to
my humble pen to resist calumny and misrepresentation in other matters,
it may as well include the task of vindicating the honour of Holland,
and the good faith of its rulers, as far as their jurisdiction in Africa
has come under my observation.[86] The Dutch then, I affirm, during my
residence in that part of Africa, were in no way instrumental to the
misfortunes that have since befallen our arms under Sir Charles
M‘Carthy; but they were the natural and foreseen results of early
indiscretions, wherein Mr. Smith (I will take it religiously upon my
conscience to say so) consulting, as it would seem, nothing but his own
secret interests, prejudices, and animosities, drove the Ashantees to
their only resource—arms, and prompted the government to adopt, what has
been represented to them as the only alternative left to their choice,
the necessity of vindicating the honour of the flag, and defending the
settlement from foreign and barbarous devastation. The war, it is true,
had not yet been proclaimed by the enemy down to the period when the
forts were transferred to his majesty’s government; but when that event
did happen, it must have been clearly perceptible that nothing short of
a recourse to negociation, could prevent the probable consequences of
that rash and precipitate attack on the natives of Mouree, coupled, as
it was, with a train of auxiliary aggravations such as no sovereign upon
earth, meriting a throne, could compatibly with his dignity endure.
In dismissing the subject of the little Mouree war, I shall simply point
out to the reader, as an instance of the governor’s military talent, the
precarious situation in which he must have left Cape Coast, when
himself, the residue of the officers, and all the townsmen capable of
bearing arms, were pushed forward to rescue the eighty-nine men from
their supposed perilous situation on the eastern beach, as it was not
known at the time that they had sought the favour of the _friendly_
castle, whose flag they had insulted. Surely if I know any thing about
Cape Coast, there could scarcely have been more than two sentinels left
to guard the gates, and an invalid, perhaps, in charge of the fort. And
as regards the town, it must have been proportionably defenceless.
Still, however, it is consistent with other proceedings, and where is
there room for astonishment?
To return to the sequel of this narrative, Sir Charles M‘Carthy,[87]
whom I was in the practice of visiting during his residences in London,
obtained, about the time of the Mouree affair, through the interest of
certain individuals, an appointment as governor in chief of the whole of
our settlements on the western coast of Africa, from the Gambia to the
Volta rivers, the former inclusive. The death of my correspondents,
Messrs. Gordon and Collins, happened at no great distance of time after
these regulations were carried into effect; but before Sir Charles left
England, I had many interviews with him, wherein I took some pains to
impress upon that gentleman a just conception of the impolicy and
injustice of late proceedings. Sir Charles, I believe, was at this
period of my own way of thinking, for his reasonings inclined to the
same object as that for which I was commissioned, viz. that of promoting
commerce with the interior of Africa, (and consequently through the
dominions of Ashantee) by every possible means consistent with the
dignity of the flag and the interests of the colonists. Sir Charles,
however, was pleased to consider somewhat lightly, descriptions which
tended to convey an adequate idea of the disposable force of Ashantee.
He doubted that the king could send into the field more than twenty or
twenty-five thousand men; yet had he confided in the reports of his
friend Sir George Collier, he would at least have coincided in opinion
with the commodore, that the dispositions of the sovereign, his
tributaries, and people, were extremely prone to war, and the population
considerable, and proportionate to the great extent of territory held by
that government; for Sir George (from the information furnished him by
Mr. Smith, whose object in this particular, and at this time, was by no
means to deviate from the truth[88] (unless in derogation of the king),
has represented in his reports that “the Ashantee army is _numerous
beyond belief_, and though quite an irregular mass[89], yet more than
sixty thousand men can be collected, acquainted with the use of _fire
arms_, and ready to sacrifice their _lives_ to the nod or caprice of
their chief or king, who is known to be _savage_ and _cruel_ in the
extreme[90].”
Sir Charles finally sailed for the Gold Coast, by the circuitous route
and stoppages at the Gambia, Sierra Leone, &c. He landed at Cape Coast
Castle in the early part of the year 1822, and found that settlement as
might have been expected, and, as had been described, like a gangrened
member of the empire, from which all communication was cut off, to
prevent the contagion from spreading and infecting the vitals. It was in
fact a dreary solitude, as regarded its former connexions with the
interior; and with respect to information of any thing but the objects
which immediately surrounded the castle, the colonists might as well
have been stationed upon the little barren rock of Ascension in the
midst of the Atlantic waves, for they were strictly blockaded, although
no enemy could be seen. Trade, of course, was at a total stand, except
as regarded the supply of the Dutch merchants, and one or two of the
settlements both to windward and leeward, where the inland traders
occasionally resorted with their gold and ivory. This was the reputable
state to which Mr. Smith, to say the least of it, from mistaken notions
of honour and dignity, had reduced the national reputation in Africa,
and the character of its sovereign at the court of Ashantee: and this
was the state in which he resigned into the hands of Sir Charles
M‘Carthy the guardianship of that flag, whose reputation, tarnished as I
conceive it was by such a train of proceedings, he could not, it is
probable, at the utmost stretch of ingenuity, have protected from the
last violence and insult many months longer.
A change of chief governors, it would seem, led the king to hope for a
change in the hostile sentiments of the whites; hence for several
subsequent months he was quiet, and Cape Coast, although as rigidly
blockaded as ever, enjoyed its solitude and that delusion of
tranquillity which it had imposed upon itself. As it became apparent to
the _enemy_ (for such he was now considered and characterised), that the
new governor was treading in the path of his predecessor, as regarded
the “palaver,” and that little or no hope remained that the British
could or would descend to expostulation after so great an infraction of
the peace, he laid an embargo, it is imagined, even upon the tongues[91]
of his trading subjects, who visited either the Dutch or windward
settlements, and it was impossible to gain any intelligence whatever
relating to the interior. Indeed it was not so much as known at what
particular spot the Ashantees had stationed themselves.
Whatever opinions Sir Charles M‘Carthy may have imbibed in England or at
Sierra Leone, in respect to Ashantee (where indeed all his information
concerning the Gold Coast must have been gained,) it seems he was
extremely anxious to learn more of that country than what he could glean
either from the reports of Sir George Collier or Mr. Smith, or from the
works of Mr. Bowdich and Mr. Hutton. This anxiety was expressed in
letters which he addressed to me in the year 1822, urging me, (agreeably
to my representations to him in London that I had much important
information to communicate) to lose no time in pushing matters forward,
and desiring to have two or three copies of the present work by the very
first opportunity, if I did not bring them out myself. Sir Charles,
moreover, evinced a desire to obtain prompt information as regarded
some, perhaps the political knowledge I had gained at Ashantee, but time
and occupation rendering it impossible I could oblige him, I was
reluctantly compelled to resign the honour of a correspondence, which
private feelings of friendship and respect would have influenced me to
continue, although my sentiments could never have swerved from that tone
and feeling which have hitherto guided my pen, and therefore might not
have been productive of good, if, as it was reported some months
afterwards, Sir Charles seriously meditated, as soon as he should have
organized an army, marching with it to Coomassy to dethrone the king in
his capital.
To pursue this narrative,—Sir Charles speedily set about organizing the
natives whose towns are situated under the castles; for hitherto this
precaution had never been taken by his predecessor; and while this was
transacting, every thing was as quiet as if no such country as Ashantee
existed. It was not conjectured that the enemy might have been engaged
in an inland war, neither that he was busying himself with
preparations[92] for a campaign on the sea coast; but on the contrary,
it was believed that the king would be contented to preserve a defensive
posture. It was hoped, that besides the organization of the militia, as
they were called, (the bands of Fantees, or Cape Coast people, whose
cause we had adopted) government would plentifully supply the place with
arms, ammunition, &c., and men, if needful; but the latter were scarcely
deemed needful at this time, as the colony of Sierra Leone and the
shipping would furnish as many as might be wanting, if the enemy should
evince more activity, or become bolder than heretofore.
Sir Charles, conformably to the system pursued by the great Cortez, the
conqueror of the empire of Mexico, judiciously enough for defensive war,
formed certain little alliances with a few of the inferior southern
tribes of Fantees, Fetuans, Dinkrans, Inkrans, &c.. But besides that the
bulk of the population of these parts, whose numbers since the wars of
conquest were never great, still adhered faithfully in allegiance to the
king, those mercenaries who embarked in the cause were never steady, and
I believe never attached to our interests beyond the natural feeling
that they did not wish to pay gold to the king or to any one else,
whether their protectors or their oppressors.
Towards the close of the year 1823, Sir Charles, who doubtless was
extremely impatient at the rigorous blockade enforced by the Ashantees,
seemed to have come to a final resolution of marching at the head of his
militia bands and West India troops into the interior, for the purpose
of dethroning the king. He accordingly, I believe, wrote home (to
England) for cannon of the description of light artillery[93]. In the
mean while he arranged his plans for the meditated campaign; intending
to avail himself of the ensuing dry season, which usually commences
about the middle of November. Sir Charles, to whom credit is due for
more than a moderate share of activity, zeal and talent, as a governor,
did not neglect opportunities of improving the condition of the
settlements, for indeed a very great proportion of his time, as was
usual with him at Sierra Leone, was devoted exclusively to that
important object.
Thus situated, the most sanguine hopes were entertained by the
particular friends of Sir Charles, of the success which they imagined
must, or would attend a plan of military operations conducted by him
upon a scale of such imposing magnitude. About the month of March last
(1824) further accounts were received from the Gold Coast, but they were
in no way important, except as it was stated in a private letter, the
king—the inflexible, the hospitable, the celebrated, the friendly, the
distressed _Sai Quamina_, was no more; having, as it would appear,
departed this life in grief and vexation, bequeathing to his successor
the kingdom and the palaver together, as Mr. Smith had already resigned
his share of it to the interest which succeeded him. The successor to
Sai, the same accounts stated, had commenced his reign by an _edict_
against the British, wherein they were accused (whether justly or not it
is the reader’s province to decide) of perfidy, infractions of treaties,
violations of public faith, treachery, cruelty, &c. To revenge which,
and to appease the shade of the departed conqueror, in the region of
spirits, the new monarch vowed eternal war against the British until he
had obtained satisfaction; declaring (in the form of the great oath of
his predecessors) that he would not cease from hostility until he had
watered the grave of the departed Sai Quamina with the blood of white
men, &c.[94]
The first victim to the first aggressive act on the part of the
Ashantees fell at a short period after this event, when they surprised a
black man, who filled the situation of corporal in our service, and whom
they put to death, as is their usual practice in common with all
negroes. To revenge this insult, and to co-operate at the same time with
Captain Laing, who had the command of another division of troops in the
neighbourhood of Annamaboe, now the capital of Fantee, Sir Charles
resolved immediately to take the field.
Thus, as it was believed, upon the eve of the most important transaction
that has ever been witnessed in that part of Africa, and while the
public, from the nature of the last accounts, were in hopeful and
sanguine expectations of receiving advices from Africa of the most
satisfactory and flattering character, the appalling news reached
England of defeat and distress. But let the reader form his own judgment
upon the materials, as some of them have been already laid before the
public. “The new energy displayed by the English on the Gold Coast
imposed a salutary check on the savage chief of Ashantee, and at the
same time held out to the neighbouring states a hope of protection
against his oppressions. He was, therefore, for some time, quiet; but
having _in a fit of passion_ seized on a negro sergeant in our service,
Sir C. M‘Carthy felt himself bound to avenge the insult. A new corps had
been formed on the Gold Coast under the title of the Royal African Light
Infantry, and had attained a _high degree_ of _discipline_; a detachment
of this corps took the field under Captain Laing, an officer peculiarly
well qualified for this service, inasmuch as he had a year or two before
penetrated very far into the interior on an exploratory mission from
Sierra Leone. The tribes which had previously suffered from the tyranny
of Sai Tooto Quamina now seized the opportunity of shaking off his yoke,
and many swore allegiance to the English government. In May last (1823)
all the districts on the sea coast, west of the Volta, were in arms, to
the amount of 30,000 warriors, while in the _interior_ the inhabitants
_unanimously_ refused to pay the tributary exactions. Captain Laing took
the Fantee country under his especial care. This officer in August
last[95] (with a detachment of the West India regiment, and a detachment
of the Annamaboe militia, supported by several native chiefs, totally
defeated the Ashantees at Assecuma. On the 19th of last November, Sir
Charles M‘Carthy arrived from Sierra Leone, at Cape Coast, to take upon
himself, in person, the direction of public affairs there. At that time
it is stated the Ashantees had not ventured to approach the coast. A
camp had been formed of the British troops (including the West India
regiments, and others from Sierra Leone,) and great numbers of the
native chiefs had joined them and sworn allegiance to the British
government.
This is the substance of the reports of public transactions. Now it will
be essential to turn to the less consolatory matters of private
correspondence; the truth of which is too prominent to need any
observation of its authenticity.
Accra, January 31, 1824.
“It is unnecessary for me to communicate to you the seizure of one of
our sergeants by order of the Ashantee Despot, and other causes that
have led to a war between the British and that nation, as you have
already been put in possession of these circumstances by my friend ——.
Suffice it to say your prediction (that unless speedy and effectual aid
were sent from England, things would go hard with us,) has been too soon
verified. The Ashantees have long threatened us with an attack; and on
the 25th of last month intelligence was brought to Sir C. M‘Carthy, that
they were approaching the coast; but contrary to what is usual, their
forces were by report _diminished_ as to their real numbers; the
consequence was that Sir Charles divided his forces in four divisions,
and marched into _the interior!_ The enemy instead of dividing theirs,
collected a force of 10,000 men, and attacked the division commanded by
Sir Charles himself, (who did not muster 1000 muskets) and I regret to
say, totally defeated and dispersed it! The whole of the whites are
either killed or missing, except Major Ricketts and Ensign Erskine, who
after many hardships, have succeeded in getting to Cape Coast. Among the
killed and missing are Sir Charles himself, Messrs Buckle and Wetherill
from Sierra Leone; also Robertson,[96] Dr. Tedlie, Jones, Brandon,
Williams and Keddle of Cape Coast, all of whom you have seen, and
several others with whom you are not acquainted. H—— and I were with the
Accra division, commanded by Captain Blenkarne, and at least 150 miles
to the eastward of Sir Charles, when this afflicting intelligence was
brought to us; and by the same messenger we were ordered to fall back on
Accra, and put the town and port in the best state of defence. It will
now be seen that the Ashantees are a _people not to be utterly
despised!_[97] In short it has come to this, if government do not
instantly send out two or three thousand troops to put down this power,
they must withdraw the British flag from the coast, and leave the field
to the _cunning_ Dutchmen to reap the harvest of _their_ intrigue. The
moment the issue of the battle was known, the people of El Mina
commenced seizing our people, and those of Shamah, (another Dutch
settlement) had the temerity to fire on the boats of the _Owen
Glendower!_ But here they suffered for their rashness by the total
destruction of the town. It is a most _fortunate_ circumstance that the
frigate was in the vicinity of Cape Coast at this moment, as I know not
how much _more_ dreadful the result would have been. The divisions
commanded by Majors Chisholm and Laing have returned to Cape Coast and
Annamaboe; they can get no tidings of either Sir Charles or the
Ashantees, and it is supposed the latter have fallen back a short
distance to communicate their great success to their king, before they
renew the contest. Sir Charles’s orderly, who escaped from the field,
affirms that Sir Charles was wounded in two places early in the action.
“It is but justice to say, the Danish governor Richlieu, has acted the
part of a man of honour towards us. He has spared neither expence nor
personal exertion to assist us in putting down the Ashantees, and if the
Dutch had acted the same part, matters would ere this have been settled
in our favour. To secure the favour and trade of the Ashantees, the
Dutch have been so mean as to instil into the minds of these _people
that our object_ is to bring _their nation_ under _our yoke_,[98] and if
we are driven from the coast, they (the Ashantees,) will again have
opportunities of disposing of their slaves to the Portuguese and Spanish
vessels!
P.S.—“A report has just reached us, that Sir Charles is _safe_ among the
Dinqueras, a country situate about sixty-five miles north west of Cape
coast, and in our alliance. I sincerely hope this report may be
confirmed, but for my part, I much doubt it.”
Accra, January 31, 1824.
“The late disastrous events have brought us into a very critical
situation! On the 29th ultimo Sir Charles directed Captain Blenkarne,
the commandant of James Fort, Accra, to proceed to Aikin, and there to
form an encampment. The object of this was (I have some reason to think)
to menace and divide the forces of the Ashantees. We left this on the
4th instant for that purpose, but in consequence of some dissatisfaction
among those on whom we relied for aid, our forces were but slender, and
after having remained in the Aguassim territory three weeks, our forces
having _refused_ to _proceed_, we were _obliged_ to fall back on this
place. In the mean time, our good governor, hoping by his own presence
to infuse confidence into the _dastardly_ Fantees, among whom he had
trusted himself, was attacked on the 21st instant by 10,000 Shantees who
had been _near_ him for _some_ days. It was unfortunate that at this
time, a force under Major Chisholm, another under Captain Lestrange, and
a third under Captain Laing, were all at distinct camps, and knew
nothing of what was going on until all was over. We have nothing
authentic, but report is busy in making bad worse. We have every reason
to believe almost all the whites have been killed. Mr. Erskine, the only
officer who returned, is wounded; Sir Charles is said to have been
wounded in two places; nothing to this day has been heard of him. The
action took place behind Secondee almost ten miles inland. The wounded
(one hundred) made their way to that settlement and afterwards to the
Cape, in canoes. On the 28th, Major Chisholm returned to Cape Coast, but
had not heard of Sir Charles. He mustered all the forces he could, and
Captain Laing was sent with him to search for Sir Charles. The amount of
their forces I cannot state, not having heard, but the _blacks_ are, I
fear, _panic_ struck.
Government will see the necessity of now doing what ought to have been
done long ago. Unless three or four thousand men are sent out to beat
these _savages_ out of hand, they will keep the country agitated until
they effect the total subjugation of the coasts. You can scarcely
imagine the panic which prevails _every where_. The defeat appears by
the imperfect accounts we now have, to have been _complete_. The forces
under Sir Charles, are supposed to have been only five hundred.[99] What
was that to ten thousand, in a wood, surrounded and out of ammunition?
Poor poor Sir Charles! The _treacherous_ and _timorous boasting Fantees
have effected a mischance_ which _time_ cannot repair. If alive what
must be your feelings! If no more, how horrid a death must we suppose to
have been invented for you! Major Chisholm is doing all he can to put
this castle in a state to repel every aggression. The _sincerity_ of the
Dutch is doubtful. The enemy have not been heard of since the action;
they are, it is supposed, returned to their encampment; _we_ are the
most exposed to their attacks, this situation being so open.”
Thus far had the printing of this work proceeded, when the following
correspondence appeared in the daily journals, containing but too simple
a solution of the silence of my own friends. They had _all_ perished in
this unequal contest. My predictions have been but too completely
fulfilled.[100]
[Illustration: A Caboceer of Ashantee equipt for War.]
[Footnote 78: This gentleman, a man of the first talent and
respectability in the country, happened unfortunately to be at Sierra
Leone, when I returned from the interior. Independently of reasons which
may not be interesting to the public, or grateful to the hearing of
some, and which therefore, may be suppressed, I shall simply observe,
that at Sierra Leone, I conferred upon him the appointment of acting
consul during my absence, subject to the approval of his majesty’s
government. With this power, after the recovery of his property which
had been sequestered by the intrigues of the company’s servants, he
sailed back to the Cape.]
[Footnote 79: See Quarterly Review, “Bowdich’s Mission to Ashantee.”]
[Footnote 80: Mr. Swanzy and Mr. Smith, the two leaders.]
[Footnote 81: An equal division of the white forces would leave five and
five-eighths of a man to each establishment. The black troops, including
artificers, amounted to about one hundred, twelve of whom might be
spared for each of the five officers.]
[Footnote 82: Thus (and by my own accounts also) it appears that the
king waited patiently two months over and above the eight he had been
advised of, for it was exactly ten months after my departure when the
prince and the troops under his command deserted the town, and took up a
station in the rear of Cape Coast. Still, however, they avoided every
act of hostility.]
[Footnote 83: El Mina Castle, the town under whose walls is called
Addena by the natives, was taken by the Dutch in 1638, chiefly by the
aid of cannon which they planted upon the top of the hill of St. Jago.
When become possessed of this, the strongest and best situated fort of
Guinea, they naturally shifted their head-quarters from Mouree to El
Mina. The outwork or little fort of Condaadsburg they subsequently built
upon the top of St. Jago hill, and thereby rendered it wholly
impregnable on the land side, and, if properly garrisoned, it would bid
defiance every way to a powerful armament, whether by sea or land. St.
Jago is scarcely two furlongs from El Mina, yet it is situated in what
sixty years ago constituted a distinct kingdom, viz. Fetu, in which our
chief establishment (Cape Coast) stands. El Mina, from which it is
separated by a little river, called the Salt River, is the metropolis of
another little kingdom westward, called in those days Commany, from
which Commenda is derived. Fetu and Commany, although formerly very
populous, were about equal in strength and extent of dominions; for the
kings of each governed but the extent of eleven or twelve miles of
coast, and inland in about the same proportion. The town of El Mina is
built of stone, and it is the only one so constructed on the Gold Coast.
Mouree is also another of these kingdoms or principalities, formerly
called Saboe. Old Fantee, properly so called, lies next to the eastward,
of which Annamaboe was the capital, but each of the others is considered
of the same family.]
[Footnote 84: Notwithstanding the outcry about Fantee having been
_ceded_ to the king, the governor and council never actually presumed to
have any right or title of protection over it, neither would the people
have recognized their supremacy, or cast off their fealty to the king,
to enjoy the very precarious protection of the whites at that time.]
[Footnote 85: His excellency, the late governor-general Oldenburgh,
during one of my visits to Elmina, where I was his guest for some days,
received a message from the king, purporting to learn what the
sentiments of that nation were in reference to his misunderstanding with
the British. To the honour of that gentleman’s memory, be it recorded,
that he took the messenger to the top of the castle, from whence,
pointing eastward to Cape Coast, he said, “Do you see that flag?” Yes.
“Then tell the king that the Dutch have ever esteemed him as a friend:
they will have nothing to do, however, with quarrels; but so long as
that flag shall be seen flying on its battlements, just so long will
ours, for our monarchs are the greatest friends, and white men are all
of one family.]
[Footnote 86: Some days previous to my leaving Coomassy, the Dutch sent
a present to the king, of brocade, damask, and other rarities, which
gave him great pleasure. To this present was annexed a message, whose
purport may be gathered from the following sentences only: “The Dutch
king is your friend as well as the English king, and now you are known
in the land of the whites, every body will love you while you are the
friend of their countrymen. The Dutch governor sends his compliments to
congratulate you that the English king has sent an ambassador to
Coomassy,” &c. It must be admitted I did not learn this of the king. I
was extremely anxious to know the purport of the message, fearing the
possibility of a jealous interference, and I employed the Bashaw to
obtain this intelligence.]
[Footnote 87: This gentleman, it may be recollected, I was upon friendly
terms with at Sierra Leone, he also sailed for England a short time
after I left that colony, and the honour of knighthood was conferred
upon him soon after his arrival.]
[Footnote 88: I know, notwithstanding, that accounts were transmitted to
government on another occasion, stating that “the power and means of the
king of Ashantee were extremely limited.”]
[Footnote 89: Sir George, however, was not well informed of the military
discipline of the Ashantees.]
[Footnote 90: Neither was he better acquainted with the nature of the
king’s disposition, who, in regard to his own people, or those of
friendly powers, certainly does not deserve the name of savage and
cruel—with reference to enemies, I have elsewhere pourtrayed the negro
character, a character which I fear has too close an affinity to the
human heart in general, white or black,—i.e. the negro never forgets, or
forgives, unless atonement is made in time.]
[Footnote 91: By administering the oath draught, as it is termed. Before
our conferences opened at Coomassy, the king compelled my linguists, and
his own together, to take this species of “Fetische,” not, however, for
the purpose of stopping their mouths, but as a compulsory obligation,
which enjoined, under the penalty of death, and the vengeance of the
gods, a strict adherence to truth in the faithful interpretation of
words and sentiments. The same draught is administered in all cases
where the monarch’s interests are concerned, and it was usual to compel
the traders to take it during the Gaman war, that they might divulge
nothing prejudicial to their sovereign, during their sojournment at the
settlements. On their return to Coomassy, the oath was repeated under
another obligation, viz. that they should report faithfully every
political circumstance which came within the compass of their knowledge,
binding themselves by the usual covenant of invocations and
imprecations. The force and impression of this fetische may be well
imagined, when I relate that my linguists, terrified at the bare thought
of taking the oath draught, (simply a sort of consecrated water
impregnated with sacred vegetable infusions,) urged me by various moving
intreaties to prevail on the king to exempt them from compliance. Of
course I would do nothing that way, as it was my interest as well as
that of the sovereign to be able to distinguish falsehood from truth.
The crowd of courtiers and priests, on that occasion, impeded the
vision, so that I could not observe the particular ceremonies without
committing a breach of decorum, and forgetting my rank, &c. I confess my
incompetence therefore to explain the mystery, but for the reader’s
amusement shall quote what Bosman, on his own authority, relates. “The
oath draught is usually accompanied with an imprecation that the
fetische may kill them if they do not perform the contents of their
obligation, and all parties are obliged to drink this swearing liquor.
But of late years, (in covenants between party interests) some negroes
are so refined that they oblige the priest to swear first, and drink the
oath draught with an imprecation that the priests should punish him with
death, if he ever absolved any person from their oath, without the
unanimous consent of all. If you ask what opinion the negroes have of
those who falsify the obligations of the oath draught, they believe the
perjured person shall be swelled by that liquor till he bursts; or if
that doth not happen, that he shall shortly die of a languishing
sickness: the first punishment they imagine more peculiar to women, who
take this draught to acquit themselves of any accusation of adultery,
and if I may be allowed to make a comparison, this drink seems very like
the bitter water administered to the women in the Old Testament, by way
of purgation from the charge of adultery.” The following is the form he
describes of the most obligatory oath known:—
“Each priest or feticheer hath his peculiar idol prepared and adjusted
in a particular and different manner, but most of them like the
following description. They have a great wooden pipe filled with earth,
oil, blood, and bones of dead men and beasts, feathers, hair, and to be
short, of all sorts of excrementitious and filthy trash, which they do
not endeavour to mould into any shape, but lay it in a confused heap in
the pipe. The negro who is to take an oath before this idol is placed
directly opposite to it and asks the priest the name of his idol (each
having a particular one), of which being informed, he calls the fetische
by its name, and recites at large the contents of what he designs to
bind by an oath, and makes it his petitionary request that the idol may
punish him with death if he swears falsely; then he goes round the pipe
and stands still and swears a second time as before, and so a third time
likewise, after which the priest takes some of the mentioned ingredients
out of the pipe, with which he touches the swearer’s head, arms, belly,
and legs, and holding it above his head, turns it three times round,
then he cuts off a bit of the nail of one finger in each hand, of one
toe of each foot, and some of the hair of his head, which he throws into
the pipe where the idol is lodged: all which done the oath is firmly
obligatory.” (pages 124, 125, 126.) This is descriptive of the coast
“fetische,” but I believe it to be very similar to that which the
Ashantees themselves practise, and which I have witnessed in various
forms, excepting only the oath draught. The Moslems themselves are
terrified at the _oby_ of the Ashantees—the king’s fetische.]
[Footnote 92: The Ashantees never undertake any national concerns
without invocations to the deities, conjurations, incantations, and a
variety of customs which occupy incredible time, as these mysteries can
only be practised on particular days of the week or month, the others
being deemed ominous and portending evil, are days of grief and
tribulation. Out of the 365, the proportion of good or lucky days, the
Bashaw says, is no more than 150 or 160. During the evil days, councils
cannot be holden, nor can troops either march or engage the enemy,
unless in self-defence. An Ashantee army, in proportion to the rank of
its commander, and certainly if the king was at its head, could not
march to Cape Coast or to the seaside in less than three or four months,
for there are various other causes (independent also of circumspection,
rank, and dignity) to impede the march, such as divinations from the
flight of birds, track of particular beetles and insects, screechings of
the turkey buzzard, dreams, predictions, celebration of customs, &c. &c.
In short, the Ashantees are slow, and I believe, cautious in the
cabinet; they are slower, however, in warlike movements, and, for those
very reasons, more to be dreaded by those who do not know them; and
certainly no man had a just conception of this nation during my
residence on the Gold Coast. The Ashantees are energetic in the field on
days when they can act; and, as the Bashaw and the Moslems in general
relate, are more justly dreaded than any other tribe of Negroes. When
the army takes the field, it usually pushes forward a body of two or
three thousand men to the distance of a day or two in advance of the
main army, covering the enemy’s towns and frontiers by little detached
corps of observation, who prosecute their march during the silence of
night, in the most intricate parts of the forest, only seeking refuge as
occasion may require, in the loftiest boughs of the trees, where they
sustain life for many days, if necessary, upon a sort of soluble gum,
pounded grain, and “war nuts,” called by them Boesie, which they never
travel without. As the main body advances, so do these detachments, and
when the king and priesthood deem the opportunity a fit one for battle,
these corps of observation, strengthened by others, concentrate
themselves within a compass adequate to support the war with a most
deadly effect from ambush and intrenched positions, or from the canopy
which conceals their comrades; for during the attack, these elevated
warriors pour incessantly upon the foe a tempest of musquet-shot, and
poisoned missiles, javelins, and arrows.
The precautions taken by the Ashantees, during a march through the
enemy’s country, are equal to what is related of the tribes of North
American Indians; and it is almost impossible to collect intelligence
adapted to the service of an opposing force. Incredible as it may seem,
it often occurs, as it happened in the Gaman war, that the king in
person, at the head of an army, is able to conceal himself in the heart
of an enemy’s country (provided there are forests of sufficient
capacity) until the crisis for action is deemed auspicious.]
[Footnote 93: The artillery certainly could have been of no use in such
a forest as I have described, nor indeed would it have been practicable
to transport the pieces, unless by dismounting them from the trucks, and
loading the heads of the people with both. In open spots, however, there
can be no doubt that they would prove very destructive engines.]
[Footnote 94: It is essential to observe, that the account of the king’s
death may not be true, although it is highly probable. If correct, it
induces me to suppose that that monarch was tenacious of the oath he had
sworn to me, of fidelity; and under the fear of incurring the
displeasure of his gods, by violating it he might possibly never have
had recourse to other measures than those which he had already pursued
in maintaining a defensive posture against the settlements. Certain it
is, as the king confessed to me, that neither inclination, policy, nor
the desire of getting the good things, possessed by the whites in their
castles, could ever induce him to do them an injury. They were his best
friends he said, for he derived all his power and influence through
their means. In truth, it is not probable that the Ashantees, unless
their safety depended upon it, would ever attempt our expulsion from the
sea coast.]
[Footnote 95: About the time the sergeant was killed by the Ashantees.]
[Footnote 96: This was my friend and correspondent before spoken of.]
[Footnote 97: This sentiment indeed betrays the fatal secret that Sir
Charles was over confident, perhaps deluded by the puerile or false
insinuations of his predecessor in respect to Ashantee and its monarch.
If so, to what an extent has not Mr. Smith to atone to his country,
whether this loss of blood, treasure, commerce, and honour, may have
proceeded from ignorance or misrepresentation, calumny or resentments,
or secret intrigues and interests.]
[Footnote 98: Setting all prejudices aside, it would hardly have been
possible for the Ashantees to draw any other conclusions from the
magnitude of our military preparations on the coast. I greatly fear the
king must have reflected as I have done myself, with bitterness of
feeling upon the days when he favoured me with a visit at my quarters,
to explain the fears of his captains respecting the Fantees—as on the
day when he made me swear I had no intention to deceive him, and arm the
Southern tribes to war upon him. It would be thought romantic to say, my
heart still throbs with anguish at the retrospect.]
[Footnote 99: This is not probable when it seems the British
confederated force, allies included, could assemble together 30,000 men.
If true, however, it is an unaccountable sample of that prejudice or
contempt entertained for the enemy. Sir Charles’s judgment must have
been clouded indeed, to have dreamt of marching ten miles inland with
five hundred men only!!!]
[Footnote 100:
“Cape Coast, Feb. 23.
“The news I have to tell you are of the most distressing nature. His
Excellency Sir C. M‘Carthy, with a few regulars and militia, and some of
the natives, made a rapid advance into the Wassaw country to repel the
Ashantees, who advanced in great numbers, and in the most gallant style.
The attack commenced about two o’clock p.m., on the 21st of January,
across a river about twenty or thirty feet wide. The firing was
tremendous on both sides till six p.m., when it was found the ammunition
on our side was all expended; on which the Ashantees began to cross the
river in great numbers, and the havoc began. The natives of our party
(the Fantees) would never carry bayonets; but the regulars and militia
used them with the most deadly effect. Each one bayonetted three or four
Ashantees; then, snatching the bayonet from the musket, they dashed into
the middle of the enemy’s force, falling nobly and killing till the
last. As his Excellency and staff commenced retreating, they were
attacked in the rear by about two thousand of the enemy, who had been
sent round to intercept them, after which nothing certain has been
learned of any of the whites. Only two officers escaped out of the
battle, who were Brigade Major Ricketts and Lieutenant Erskine. Those
that are missing are his Excellency Sir Charles M‘Carthy, the Honourable
Mr. Buckle, Messrs. Wetherell, Williams, Heddle, Jones, Rayden,
Robertson, Tedlie, Brandon. There is not a doubt of his Excellency and
most of them being killed. It is said their corpses were used in the
most shocking manner. It is pretty well ascertained that Williams is a
prisoner. Thus in one day has the sword cut off what disease left.
“The most lamentable part of the catastrophe is, that it was caused in a
great measure by the officer who had charge of the ammunition, and did
not bring it forward as he ought: the Ashantees never would have broken
our line had there been powder. When Major Ricketts went to open the
three last kegs, he found—what think you? Why _Macaroni!!!_—while the
Ashantees, who plundered the camp next day, took ten barrels of ball-
cartridges, with a great quantity of other booty. When we got the news
of Sir Charles’s disastrous fight, we retreated directly; captain Laing
going to Cape Coast, by the way of Annamaboe, while I, with Mr. Fraser,
and all the Fantee force, marched across the country to reinforce Major
Chisholm; but when Captain Laing arrived at Annamaboo, the reports from
Cape Coast were, that the major and his party were also cut to pieces,
and he sent expresses after me to fall back and garrison Cape Coast, as
the panic was so great, and an attack dreaded. I shall always recollect
with pleasure, the reception I met with when the standard was seen
advancing over the rocks, and the bugles played ‘Over the hills and far
away.’ The whole town appeared mad with joy: such a day in a man’s life
richly repays for years of pain. Fortunately, next day, Major Chisholm
and party arrived, having never been engaged. I was ordered to occupy
the camp of Djguah with my little band of eighty; none of the
auxiliaries having come up.
“All trade is at a complete stop; every merchant’s goods are deposited
in the forts, which I have no doubt we shall have to defend till we hear
from England, as the Ashantees will no doubt make a push to destroy us
before supplies can come out. The short of the matter is this—England
must either now withdraw her protection from this coast, or send down a
force to put down as cruel an enemy as the world produces. The loss of
the merchants is not to be calculated, such a quantity of goods being on
hand.”
Another letter of the same date says,
“When Sir Charles M‘Carthy and Major Chisholm were in the interior, they
divided their army, and each took a different route. Sir Charles, I
hear, had only 1,000 men and ten officers, of which only fifty have
returned. They had gone but a short way, when they were attacked by the
Ashantees, by all accounts 10,000 in number. Our party behaved very
well, and had much the advantage, until they found all their ammunition
was expended. There were only two officers that were not killed, and
they had to make their escape after being wounded. The battle took place
on the 21st, and we did not hear of it until the 23d ultimo. Poor Mr.
Heddle was the first that fell a sacrifice to these dreadful barbarians.
He was shot through both his knees, and in that state he killed with his
sword two of the enemy. In a short time after a party of the Ashantees
came to cut off his head, when he shot himself in the heart.
“The officers who returned wounded are Major Ricketts and Ensign
Erskine. It is said that the heads of those who were killed are carried
to Coomassy. We expect the enemy to come down to attack this place, but
if they do, they will meet with a warm reception, as we have the frigate
_Owen Glendower_ and the _Raven_ sloop of war to assist us. I have put
all our property into the castle for safety; but I do not think there is
the least fear, but it is better to be on the safe side, as the people
of the Dutch fort of Elmina are supposed to be rather favourable to the
Ashantees. We have blockaded it to prevent any supplies being brought
there. In fact, we shall never be at peace until Elmina is under the
British flag; and instead of Government sending out a few white troops,
they should send out three or four regiments. Major Chisholm is sending
home despatches, and I have no doubt he has stated to Government the
actual necessity of sending immediate relief.”
Cape Coast Castle, March 23, 1824.
The following are the heads of what has lately occurred on this coast:—
The late warfare that the Gold Coast has been engaged in with the
Ashantees, for the last twelve months, has created little or no
importance until the present period.
His Excellency, Sir Charles M‘Carthy arrived here from Sierra Leone, in
December last, and in the early part of January marched to the interior,
towards the river Pra, with the force of from 6,000 to 7,000 men,
consisting of natives and companies of a West India regiment. On the
21st of January, near the Pra, a most desperate battle was fought, and
from the superior force of the enemy, they had surrounded our troops in
every direction; and after our ammunition was totally expended, the
troops under Sir Charles retreated, with a loss of nearly all the
officers, and sorry I am to state the inhuman manner in which they have
been treated, amongst whom the gallant chief, Sir Charles M‘Carthy, who
was wounded and taken prisoner. The loss of the Ashantees was upwards of
1,000, who were brought down by our fire. Every possible means has been
taken to ascertain the loss of our officers and men, and intelligence
has been received from a messenger, who saw at the enemy’s camp the
heads of nine white men (officers) with their jaw-bones taken out, and
amongst them was the head of sir Charles. This is invariably a practice
among these savages, when an enemy falls into their hands. It is said,
that our loss of men was not to any great amount: out of 140, said to
have arrived in the _Joseph Green_ transport in November last, one half
have paid the debt of nature.
Extract of a letter from Mr. Williams, the Colonial Secretary,
addressed, to the commandant of Cape Coast Castle, from the Dutch
settlement of Elmina, dated March, 1824, and read to the writer of the
above by Brigade Major Ricketts, the day before I sailed from Cape Coast
Castle, March 22, 1824:—
“It was my fortune to be near our lamented chief when he received a
wound in the breast by a musket ball, I believe mortal. Buckle,
Wetherell, and myself conveyed him under shelter of the nearest tree,
and there sat to await that fate which appeared inevitable. We had not
remained long before we were discovered by the enemy, who immediately
rushed on us with their knives. In the struggle, I received a desperate
cut on the left side of my neck, and before the stroke could be
repeated, a man who appeared to be of authority among them fortunately
passed, and ordered my executioner to desist, which was immediately
complied with. On my being released from their grasp, and turning round,
I was horror-struck at seeing my three companions lying headless corpses
at my feet. I was now bound as a prisoner and conveyed towards their
camp.”
A strong force have now crossed the Pra, under the command of Captain
Blenkairn, West India regiment; and it is to be hoped that the Ashantees
will meet their reward. An action is hourly expected to take place, and
the natives appear fully resolved to revenge the fate of our poor
countrymen. The _Owen Glendower_ has been usefully and actively engaged
with the army in destroying the towns along the coast, where the enemy
had taken shelter; she sails to-morrow morning to destroy a town in the
Gaboom, which has lately insulted the British flag, and murdered the
crew of an English merchant vessel.]