order to get crops in the ground, he found himself so thwarted by the
unruly conduct of the apprentices, late slaves and Betshuana refugees
alike, that he addressed a memorial to the authorities, representing the
insufficiency of the existing laws for their correction, and praying for
the interference and protection of the government.[101] It was
impossible for Sir Benjamin D’Urban to give him any relief, but even if
it had been otherwise, he would probably have left the colony, for he
had been charmed with the appearance of Natal, the almost uninhabited
territory that he had visited in the preceding year.
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
It is impossible to give even approximately the number of those who had
left the Cape Colony before this time. The government called for returns
from the civil commissioners of the different districts, and in July
1837 these officials reported that one thousand and sixty-seven persons
had left and two hundred and sixty others were about to follow. But
these numbers are certainly much too low, though the estimate of Mr. Uys
given in his letter of the 7th of August is probably too large.
It was the intention of the party under Uys to proceed to Natal, but not
to attempt to go through Kaffraria. He had found such difficulties in
travelling there in 1834 that he thought a better road might be found by
moving northward over the Orange river, and then seeking a pass through
the Drakensbergen that would lead him to the beautiful land below. This
was the route that he followed, and at the beginning of August 1837 he
and his party were on the northern bank of the Great river, without
having met with any accident on the way. On the 7th of that month he
addressed a letter to Sir Benjamin D’Urban, of which a literal
translation made for the governor’s use and preserved among his papers
is given here _in extenso_:
RIGHT
“Orange River, 7th August 1837.
“SIR,--I beg to submit to your Excellency a statement of what I
have observed since I left Capetown and set out on my journey
beyond the Orange river. I there met more than three thousand
persons, lately inhabitants of the Colony, who have left their
country and gone to a foreign land, even to a desert. I have spoken
to many old men amongst them, with the view of ascertaining their
reasons for leaving their native country, and they give the
following as the principal causes:
“1. The laws made for this colony by Parliament, however
inapplicable to the people and their condition, must be implicitly
obeyed.
[Sidenote: Causes of the Emigration.]
“2. We were put to great expense for the measurement, of our farms
prior to their grant, and for a small farm must pay an annual rent
of from forty to two hundred rixdollars. (£3 to £15.)
“3. All power of domestic coercion of our apprentices in our houses
and on our farms has been taken away from us, which has brought the
apprentices into such a state of insubordination as to expose us to
the risk of the loss of property and even life. Neither have we the
right to defend ourselves against these people who live at our
expense, and if they think proper go to a magistrate and make a
false oath, without witnesses, upon which we are seized by black
and white constables, in the same manner as murderers, and brought
before the court, to the great injury of our reputation; whilst if
they lose their cause, then the costs are paid from the government
chest, to which we must pay heavy taxes annually; and if we are
condemned, we must then pay a fine out of our own pockets or be
sent to prison. On this point your Excellency is aware how I myself
was treated in the late Kaffir war and whilst I was in presence of
the enemy and my property left unprotected;[102] which vexatious
treatment has also had great influence on many of the inhabitants.
“4. The, slaves who were our property, who cost us much money, and
for whom we paid every government due, have been taken from us upon
an appraisement made by order of Parliament, and have become free
for a third part of the money at which they were valued, and our
power of maintaining order and discipline having been taken away,
the masters and mistresses are scandalously treated.
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
“5. The last Kaffir invasion is also one of the causes. The Kaffirs
have for many years murdered and plundered the inhabitants, and
government has always held out hopes of improvement in this
respect, if we would remain at peace with them; and now, to crown
the whole, we are accused of being the cause of the war, and must
lose all our cattle, as well as put up with our other losses.
“I have stated but a few of the points upon which the greatest
stress is laid by the colonists who have emigrated. To state every
point would go too much into detail; but these will be sufficient
to show why the people are discontented.
“The inhabitants asked for a vagrant law, but that was refused.
They asked for power to punish their insubordinate apprentices, but
this was also refused. Many of them prayed to be relieved from
taxes for the first year after the war, but this was not acceded
to. Their waggons, oxen, and horses were used for the purposes of
the war, but they received no satisfactory remuneration. Several
other things are also stated, too many to be mentioned here.
“I hope your Excellency will be convinced of the truth of what I
have here said, and I do not doubt that if it had been in your
power, our country would now be in a prosperous state; but, as it
is, our country is ruined, for we see that everything taken by you
from the enemy has been restored to them, which will more encourage
them.
“To make the country yet more unfortunate, we see with astonishment
a governor who could do much good by the existing laws, and we see
other persons, such as missionaries and other prejudiced writers,
who are believed, whilst what this governor writes is not attended
to.
[Sidenote: Political Attitude of Uys.]
“We address memorials to the governor and to parliament, but we
find no change. Now we see the mischievous effects to the
inhabitants, and we are thus obliged to quit the colony. It is not
our fault that we leave our native land; we have begged and prayed
for a change, and none is made. We therefore emigrate, but we
shall, notwithstanding, not yet separate ourselves from our
respected governor, who endeavoured to do us good; and whenever we
can be of any assistance, we shall not fail to afford it.
“If I can be of any use to your Excellency, or any report of mine
be of service to a governor whom I so much esteem, I shall spare no
trouble; and I remain, etc.
RIGHT
“P. L. UYS, Commandant.”
The political position, or the attitude assumed by Pieter Uys and his
party towards the emigrants who had preceded them, was one of
independence. As well he thought might he assert authority over Mr.
Retief as Mr. Retief over him. The time had not yet come for framing a
constitution, which should be deferred until the tide of emigration had
slackened, when it could be done with the consent of the whole body of
the people, and not merely of a small section of them. Accordingly on
the 14th of August 1837 a series of resolutions were drawn up and
signed, placing their attitude clearly before their countrymen. These
resolutions literally translated were as follows:
RIGHT
“Caledon River, 14th August 1837.
“Resolutions adopted by us, the undersigned travellers and exiles
from the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, now on our journey
between the Orange and Vet rivers. We make known to our countrymen
in advance with what object and intention we have undertaken our
journey, and that our unanimous wish is:
“1. To select the country called the Bay of Port Natal as our
seaport.
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
“2. To inspect the extent of country joining the same inland, as
far as we shall deem necessary.
“3. That we have placed ourselves under certain chiefs as field
commandants, as protecting leaders over us, to investigate and
redress all grievances that may take place on our journey.
“4. We place our dependence on the Allwise Ruler of heaven and
earth, and are resolved to adhere to the sure foundation of our
reformed Christian religion, entertaining the hope that when we
have reached the place of our destination we shall live a better
and safer life.
“5. As regards the establishment and execution of legal authority
as exercised by some of our countrymen, we must unanimously declare
that we entirely disapprove thereof; and we shall only regulate
ourselves in the wilderness by the old burgher regulations and
duties, and all differences which may arise shall be adjusted in
accordance with those burgher regulations.
“6. We have come to the final determination not to submit to any
laws that may have been established by a few individuals, and which
we conceive have a tendency to reduce us from a state of banishment
to a state of slavery.
“7. When we shall have attained our object and have arrived at the
place of our destination, we trust to see the whole of our
countrymen assembled together, then by the public voice to proceed
to the election and appointment of our chief rulers and the framing
of proper laws, and in general to consider what is useful both for
the country and the people.
“8. The judicial appointments and laws as now established will not
be noticed by us in the slightest degree, but are considered as of
no value.
“9. We trust that every burgher will participate in these
sentiments, in order to be placed in the situation of a free
citizen.
“10. We purpose to establish our settlement on the same principles
of liberty as those adopted by the United States of America,
carrying into effect, as far as practicable, our burgher laws.
Every person agreeing herewith will therefore attach his signature
for the information of those who are still in doubt on the subject.
“P. L. UYS,
J. J. UYS,
J. P. MOOLMAN,
H. J. POTGIETER,
J. LANDMAN,
And 165 others.”
[Sidenote: Action of Pieter Retief.]
At this time Mr. Retief was preparing to send an expedition against
Moselekatse, to follow up the blow struck at Mosega in January 1837 by
the commandos under Gerrit Maritz and Hendrik Potgieter. The Matabele
had provoked hostilities by the robbery and massacre of a hunting party
under Fieldcornet Stephanus Petrus Erasmus, of the Kraai river,[103] and
of many emigrant families belonging to the party of Potgieter who had
imprudently ventured across the Vaal. But this expedition was not
carried out, Mr. Retief’s partisans assigning as a reason that they
believed the Griquas under Adam Kok and Andries Waterboer would attack
the camps while so many of the men were away, but the real cause
probably being the dissensions between the emigrants themselves.
In October 1837 Mr. Retief, having found a pass in the Drakensbergen,
with some of his followers went down into Natal, and Messrs. Potgieter
and Uys determined to carry out the plan of attacking the Matabele
again. Uys had no personal interest in the matter, for he had resolved
to settle in Natal, but his sympathy with his countrymen led him to
assist them against the barbarians who had done them so much injury. On
the 19th of this month he concluded an agreement of friendship with
Moroko, chief of the principal section of the Barolong at Thaba Ntshu,
and immediately afterwards the two commandos set out from the camps on
the border of the Caledon and at Winburg. One of the most important
campaigns yet entered upon in South Africa between Europeans and Bantu
had commenced.
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
An account of this campaign has been given in my _History of South
Africa_, and Dr. J. C. Voigt has entered even more fully into the
details of the nine days’ struggle on the Marikwa than I did.[104] The
result of this expedition was the flight of the whole Matabele tribe to
the country north of the Limpopo, the opening of the territory now
comprised in the Transvaal Province and the Orange Free State to
European settlers, and the relief of the remnants of the Betshuana
tribes from the misery in which they had been existing. It would be
difficult to exaggerate the importance of the victory on the Marikwa in
November 1837 to civilisation and the happiness of both white and black
people in South Africa. And yet Pieter Lavras Uys, one of the leaders of
the little band of brave men who risked their lives against terrible
odds and won it, is well nigh forgotten in the land he served so well.
On the 21st of July 1837 Mr. Retief had written to Sir Benjamin D’Urban
a letter of which the following is a translation:
“The undersigned Pieter Retief, as conductor-in-chief of the united
encampments, most humbly sheweth,
“That we as subjects of the British government during our
distressed circumstances submitted our grievances to his Majesty
the King; but as all our endeavours proved fruitless, we have
ultimately found ourselves compelled to quit the land of our birth
in order that we might not become guilty of opposition or rebellion
against our government.
[Sidenote: Letter of Pieter Retief.]
“That this abandonment of our native country has occasioned us
enormous and incalculable losses, but that notwithstanding this we
on our side will not show any enmity towards the British nation.
“That consequently all trade and commerce between us and the
British merchants will on our part be free and uninterrupted, as
with all other nations, with this understanding that we desire to
be considered as a free and independent people.
“That we have learnt with grief that almost all the native tribes
by whom we are now surrounded have been instigated to attack us;
but although we feel ourselves fully able to resist all our
enemies, we would however beg of your Excellency to prevent, as far
as lies in your power, such hostilities, so that we may not be
compelled to spill human blood, which has already been the case
with Moselekatse.
“That we will prove to the world by our conduct that it never has
been our intention unlawfully to molest any nation or people; but
that on the contrary we have no greater satisfaction than in the
general peace and amity of all mankind.
“That, finally, we confidently trust that the British government
will allow us to receive the amount of all the just claims and
demands which we still have within the colony. I have &c.
RIGHT
“P. RETIEF.”
This letter seems to have taken a long time to reach the governor. On
the 25th of October 1837 he wrote the following note upon it:
“A little time must be suffered to elapse before any answer be sent
to this, and this of necessity, because there are three contending
chiefs: Retief, Maritz (_sic_, it should be Potgieter), and Uys;
and although Retief has now the greatest influence, yet it does not
extend over the whole of the emigrants, nor is there any positive
certainty that it will continue. Before the government condescends
to treat with them at all, it must at least be certain that it
treats with an acknowledged and undivided authority; this matter
must lay by, therefore, for a while, which also may afford time for
an answer to the dispatch of July last, in which the question is
asked of his Majesty’s government ‘What are the relations to be in
future kept between the emigrants and the colonial government?’ And
in the meanwhile the emigrants are moving far out of contact with
the Colony, to the eastward, so that there can arise in the interim
no collision between them and the colonial authorities or
inhabitants.--B. D’URBAN.”
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
Of Pieter Retief’s negotiations with the Zulu chief Dingan, of the
removal to Natal of the whole of the party that adhered to him, and of
the terrible massacres of the emigrants by the Zulus, nothing needs to
be stated here.[105] These events are fully recorded in my _History of
South Africa_ and in Mr. G. S. Preller’s _Piet Retief: Lewenskets van
die Grote Voortrekker_, (6de druk), a demi octavo volume of one hundred
and ninety-four pages, published at Pretoria in 1909.
[Sidenote: Visit of Pieter Uys to Natal.]
It was the intention of Mr. Potgieter to settle on the highlands of the
interior and to endeavour to open communication with the outer world if
possible through the Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay. Mr. Uys, on the
other hand, had from the first resolved to make homes for himself and
his party in the neighbourhood of Port Natal. But he was not in a hurry
to move over the mountains, especially as the pasture around his
temporary camp was good, and the cattle, large and small, would be the
better of a long rest after their journey from Oliphants Hoek. With a
few companions on horseback, however, he rode over to inspect the
country again, and on the 15th of December 1837 arrived in the first of
the camps under Retief and Maritz on the Bushman’s river in Natal.
There the question of the form and personnel of the government was the
topic of discussion again, and it became evident to Mr. Uys that he and
his adherents would be in a minority in Natal. He therefore stated that
after his party had arrived and settled on farms he would be prepared to
abide by the decision of a majority of the whole community, but he could
not be induced to sign a document pledging fidelity to Mr. Retief as
governor and commandant-general, which was pressed upon him. After a
short visit he returned to his camp on the highlands, and was there when
the heartrending tidings reached him of the treacherous massacre of Mr.
Retief and his companions at Dingan’s kraal on the 6th of February 1838
and of the even more atrocious massacre of men, women, and children
alike, near the present village of Weenen on the 17th of the same month.
All political differences disappeared at once on receipt of this sad
intelligence, and as soon as possible Uys and his men were on their way
to the assistance of their sorely afflicted countrymen and women who
were still alive in Natal. So quickly was the commando got together and
so rapidly did it ride that it arrived at the camp on the 1st of March
1838. Potgieter also assembled his men as speedily as he could, and went
down into Natal with the same intention.
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
The condition of things there was wretched. The survivors of the
massacre were huddled together in lagers, each under a commandant, but
all close together to ensure their safety, and recognising Mr. Maritz as
commandant-general and president of the council of war. Every day they
were expecting another attack from Dingan’s army. Constant watch had
therefore to be kept, and the men did not venture to move about unarmed,
while the women were confined to the precincts of the lagers.
The accession of strength derived from the commandos of Uys and
Potgieter made it unnecessary to act solely on the defensive any longer.
Offensive operations were decided upon, not only with a view of
punishing the Zulus, but of proving to them that the arms and tactics of
Europeans were so superior that a prolonged conflict would be averted,
and peace based upon the white man’s supremacy be secured. But the
emigrants had still much to learn. The heavy firelocks that they carried
were indeed more formidable weapons than the Zulu stabbing spears, but
were far short of being as efficient as modern rifles. To load them it
was necessary to pour a certain quantity of powder from a horn into the
barrel, to insert a wad and beat it down with a ramrod, then to put in
the slugs or a ball and wad down again, and finally to put priming in
the pan and adjust the flint and lock. All this took time, even with the
most expert and practised man, and while the gun was being loaded its
owner was practically unarmed. The difference between a modern military
rifle and a gun used by a South African farmer in 1838 is vastly greater
in point of efficiency in conflict than that between such a gun and a
Zulu stabbing spear.
Then as to military tactics. The farmer considered himself superior,
simply because he was a civilised man. He was accustomed to circumvent
game, and used the same methods in war that he used in the chase. But he
had yet to learn that many a Zulu induna as well as the wily chief of
the mountain, who was even then gathering strength at Thaba Bosigo, was
greatly his superior in military skill. The almost naked black man,
whose general knowledge was so defective that he might be regarded as
intellectually little superior to a child, in all that relates to
tactics and strategy was in advance of the ordinary untrained European.
[Sidenote: Arrangements to punish Dingan.]
It was arranged that Uys and Potgieter with all the men they could
muster should advance towards Dingan’s residence from the camp on the
Bushman’s river, and that the English chiefs with their warriors should
cross the Tugela much nearer its mouth and press on towards the same
point. It was hoped in this way to divide Dingan’s forces, and it was
certain that the black army of Natal, as the English chiefs called their
followers, would fight desperately, as their existence depended upon
victory over the Zulus. Several hundreds of them were armed with
muskets, which their chiefs had imported and paid for with ivory, and
their leaders were brave and capable men. But this really formidable
force was drawn into an ambush by the strategy of the Zulu commander who
was sent to oppose it, and after such a battle as is only fought by men
who know that they must conquer or die, it was almost annihilated.[106]
As neither Potgieter nor Uys would serve under Maritz, who may have been
wanting in tact and was certainly charged with being overbearing in his
manner, though no man could have been more devoted to the public welfare
than he, it was resolved that he should remain to protect the camps in
case of attack, and that they should lead their respective adherents in
separate commandos, but acting in concert with each other, to attack
Dingan in his principal kraal Umkungunklovu. The two commandos, when
finally mustered, numbered three hundred and forty-seven men, exclusive
of a few coloured attendants. Their commissariat and spare ammunition
was taken with them on pack horses.
[Sidenote: Historical Sketches.]
Neither of the leaders had a full conception of the hazardous nature of
their expedition. A much smaller force than that under their command
could have marched anywhere in the Xosa or Tembu country, and by keeping
on open plains or ridges have been perfectly safe. They had served in
the Kaffir war, and knew this. Then their decisive defeat of the
Matabele had inspired them with the belief that they were invincible.
They did not reflect that perhaps the field of operations against Dingan
might not be so favourable to them as that against Moselekatse had been,
and so they rode on in unbounded confidence. For five days they saw
hardly any people, as the inhabitants had removed by order of Dingan to
places of greater safety.
On the 11th of April 1838 they were close to the spot where eight months
and five days later in the same year the battle was fought that gave to
the stream from which they drank the name Blood River and to the date of
the memorable engagement the name Dingan’s Day. Here for the first time
since they left the camp they saw what appeared to them to be a small
Zulu army. They drew hastily into battle order, and then dashed forward
to charge, Potgieter with his men on one wing of the enemy, and Uys with
his on the centre. The Zulus did not wait to meet the shock, but fled as
fast as they could, and the farmers pursued them. Uys and his followers
were too eager in the chase to act with proper caution, and did not
observe that they were riding into a defile between two parallel chains
of hills until a great Zulu army, that had been lying there concealed,
suddenly showed itself on each side and in front of them. Its horns were
even closing in behind before they realised that they were in an
ambuscade and in the utmost danger.[107]
[Sidenote: Death of Pieter Uys.]