The Republican party had the inestimable advantage in the year 1889 of
being able to act. It controlled the Senate which had become the seat
of legislative authority; it controlled the House; and it had placed its
candidate in the presidential chair. All branches of the Government
were now in party accord. The leaders in both Houses were able
men, experienced in the diplomacy which, far more than argument or
conviction, produces congressional action. Benjamin Harrison himself
had been a member of the ruling group of Senators, and as he was fully
imbued with their ideas as to the proper place of the President he was
careful to avoid interference with legislative procedure. Such was the
party harmony that an extensive program of legislation was put through
without serious difficulty, after obstruction had been overcome in the
House by an amendment of the rules.
In the House of Representatives, the quorum is a majority of the whole
membership. This rule enabled the minority to stop business at any
time when the majority party was not present in sufficient strength to
maintain the quorum by its own vote. On several occasions, the Democrats
left the House nominally without a quorum by the subterfuge of refusing
to answer to their names on the roll call. Speaker Reed determined to
end this practice by counting as present any members actually in the
chamber. To the wrath of the minority, he assumed this authority while
a revision of the rules was pending. The absurdity of the Democratic
position was naively exposed when a member arose with a law book in his
hand and said, "I deny your right, Mr. Speaker, to count me as present,
and I desire to read from the parliamentary law on the subject." Speaker
Reed, with the nasal drawl that was his habit, replied, "The Chair is
making a statement of fact that the gentleman from Kentucky is present?
Does he deny it?" The rejoinder was so apposite that the House broke
into a roar of laughter, and the Speaker carried his point.
Undoubtedly, Speaker Reed was violating all precedents. Facilities of
obstruction had been cherished by both parties, and nothing short of
Reed's earnestness and determination could have effected this salutary
reform. The fact has since been disclosed that he had made up his mind
to resign the Speakership and retire from public life had his party
failed to support him. For three days, the House was a bedlam, but the
Speaker bore himself throughout with unflinching courage and unruffled
composure. Eventually he had his way. New rules were adopted, and the
power to count a quorum was established.* When in later Congresses a
Democratic majority returned to the former practice, Reed gave them such
a dose of their own medicine that for weeks the House was unable to keep
a quorum. Finally, the House was forced to return to the "Reed rules"
which have since then been permanently retained. As a result of
congressional example, they have been generally adopted by American
legislative bodies, with a marked improvement in their capacity to do
business.
* The rule that "no dilatory motion shall be entertained by the
Speaker" was also adopted at this time.
With the facilities of action which they now possessed, the Republican
leaders had no difficulty in getting rid of the surplus in the Treasury.
Indeed, in this particular they could count on Democratic aid. The
main conduit which they used was an increase of pension expenditures.
President Harrison encouraged a spirit of broad liberality toward
veterans of the Civil War. During the campaign he said that it "was
no time to be weighing the claims of old soldiers with apothecary's
scales," and he put this principle of generous recognition into effect
by appointing as commissioner of pensions a robust partisan known as
"Corporal" Tanner. The report went abroad that on taking office he had
gleefully declared, "God help the surplus," and upon that maxim he acted
with unflinching vigor. It seemed, indeed, as if any claim could count
upon being allowed so long as it purported to come from an old soldier.
But Tanner's ambition was not satisfied with an indulgent consideration
of applications pending during his time; he reopened old cases,
rerated a large number of pensioners, and increased the amount of their
allowance. In some cases, large sums were granted as arrears due on the
basis of the new rate. A number of officers of the pension bureau
were thus favored, for a man might receive a pension on the score of
disability though still able to hold office and draw its salary and
emoluments. For example, the sum of $4300 in arrears was declared to
be due to a member of the United States Senate, Charles F. Manderson of
Nebraska. Finally, "Corporal" Tanner's extravagant management became
so intolerable to the Secretary of the Interior that he confronted
President Harrison with the choice of accepting his resignation or
dismissing Tanner. Tanner therefore had to go, and with him his system
of reratings.
A pension bill for dependents, such as Cleveland had vetoed, now went
triumphantly through Congress.* It granted pensions of from six to
twelve dollars a month to all persons who had served for ninety days
in the Civil War and had thereby been incapacitated for manual labor to
such a degree as to be unable to support themselves. Pensions were
also granted to widows, minor children, and dependent parents. This law
brought in an enormous flood of claims in passing, upon which it was
the policy of the Pension Bureau to practice great indulgence. In one
instance, a pension was granted to a claimant who had enlisted but never
really served in the army as he had deserted soon after entering the
camp. He thereupon had been sentenced to hard labor for one year and
made to forfeit all pay and allowances. After the war, he had been
convicted of horse stealing and sent to the state penitentiary in
Wisconsin. While serving his term, he presented a pension claim
supported by forged testimony to the effect that he had been wounded in
the battle of Franklin. The fraud was discovered by a special examiner
of the pension office, and the claimant and some of his witnesses were
tried for perjury, convicted, and sent to the state penitentiary at
Joliet, Illinois. After serving his time there, he posed as a neglected
old soldier and succeeded in obtaining letters from sympathetic
Congressmen commending his case to the attention of the pension office,
but without avail until the Act of 1890 was passed. He then put in a
claim which was twice rejected by the pension office examiners, but
each time the decision was overruled, and in the end he was put upon the
pension roll. This case is only one of many made possible by lax methods
of investigating pension claims. Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire
eventually said of the effect of pension policy, as shaped by his own
party with his own aid:
"If there was any soldier on the Union side during the Civil War who was
not a good soldier, who has not received a pension, I do not know who
he is. He can always find men of his own type, equally poor soldiers who
would swear that they knew he had been in a hospital at a certain time,
whether he was or not--the records did not state it, but they knew it
was so--and who would also swear that they knew he had received a shock
which affected his hearing during a certain battle, or that something
else had happened to him; and so all those pension claims, many of which
are worthless, have been allowed by the Government, because they were
'proved.'"
* June 27, 1890.
The increase in the expenditure for pensions, which rose from
$88,000,000 in 1889 to $159,000,000 in 1893, swept away much of the
surplus in the Treasury. Further inroads were made by the enactment of
the largest river and harbor appropriation bill in the history of the
country up to this time. Moreover, a new tariff bill was contrived in
such a way as to impose protective duties without producing so much
revenue that it would cause popular complaint about unnecessary
taxation. A large source of revenue was cut off by abolishing the
sugar duties and by substituting a system of bounties to encourage home
production. Upon this bill as a whole, Senator Cullom remarks in
his memoirs that "it was a high protective tariff, dictated by the
manufacturers of the country" who have "insisted upon higher duties than
they really ought to have." The bill was, indeed, made up wholly
with the view of protecting American manufactures from any foreign
competition in the home market.
As passed by the House, not only did the bill ignore American commerce
with other countries but it left American consumers exposed to the
manipulation of prices on the part of other countries. Practically all
the products of tropical America, except tobacco, had been placed upon
the free list without any precaution lest the revenue thus surrendered
might not be appropriated by other countries by means of export taxes.
Blaine, who was once more Secretary of State, began a vigorous agitation
in favor of adding reciprocity provisions to the bill. When the Senate
showed a disposition to resent his interference, Blaine addressed to
Senator Frye of Maine a letter which was in effect an appeal to the
people, and which greatly stirred the farmers by its statement that
"there is not a section or a line in the entire bill that will open
the market for another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork." The
effect was so marked that the Senate yielded, and the Tariff Bill, as
finally enacted, gave the President power to impose certain duties
on sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides imported from any country
imposing on American goods duties, which, in the opinion of the
President, were "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable." This more
equitable result is to be ascribed wholly to Blaine's energetic and
capable leadership.
Pending the passage of the Tariff Bill, the Senate had been wrestling
with the trust problem which was making a mockery of a favorite theory
of the Republicans. They had held that tariff protection benefited
the consumer by the stimulus which it gave to home production and by
ensuring a supply of articles on as cheap terms as American labor
could afford. There were, however, notorious facts showing that certain
corporations had taken advantage of the situation to impose high prices,
especially upon the American consumer. It was a campaign taunt that the
tariff held the people down while the trusts went through their
pockets, and to this charge the Republicans found it difficult to make a
satisfactory reply.
The existence of such economic injustice was continually urged in
support of popular demands for the control of corporations by the
Government. Though the Republican leaders were much averse to providing
such control, they found inaction so dangerous that on January 14, 1890,
Senator John Sherman reported from the Finance Committee a vague but
peremptory statute to make trade competition compulsory. This was the
origin of the AntiTrust Law which has since gone by his name, although
the law actually passed was framed by the Senate judiciary committee.
The first section declared that "every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal." The law made no attempt to define the offenses it penalized
and created no machinery for enforcing its provisions, but it gave
jurisdiction over alleged violations to the courts--a favorite
congressional mode of getting rid of troublesome responsibilities. As a
result, the courts have been struggling with the application of the law
ever since, without being able to develop a clear or consistent rule
for discriminating between legal and illegal combinations in trade and
commerce. Even upon the financial question, the Republicans succeeded
in maintaining party harmony, notwithstanding a sharp conflict between
factions. William Windom, the Secretary of the Treasury, had prepared a
bill of the type known as a "straddle." It offered the advocates of free
coinage the right to send to the mint silver bullion in any quantity
and to receive in return the net market value of the bullion in treasury
notes redeemable in gold or silver coin at the option of the Government.
The monthly purchase of not less than $2,000,000 worth of bullion was,
however, no longer to be required by law. When the advocates of silver
insisted that the provision for bullion purchase was too vague, a
substitute was prepared which definitely required the Secretary of the
Treasury to purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion in one month.
The bill, as thus amended, was put through the House under special rule
by a strict party vote. But when the bill reached the Senate, the
former party agreement could no longer be maintained, and the Republican
leaders lost control of the situation. The free silver Republicans
combined with most of the Democrats to substitute a free coinage bill,
which passed the Senate by forty-three yeas to twenty-four nays, all the
negative votes save three coming from the Republican side.
It took all the influence the party leaders could exert to prevent a
silver stampede in the House when the Senate substitute bill was brought
forward; but by dexterous management, a vote of non-concurrence was
passed and a committee of conference was appointed. The Republican
leaders now found themselves in a situation in which presidential
non-interference ceased to be desirable, but president Harrison could
not be stirred to action. He would not even state his views. As Senator
Sherman remarked in his "Recollections," "The situation at that time was
critical. A large majority of the Senate favored free silver, and it was
feared that the small majority against it in the other House might yield
and agree to it. The silence of the President on the matter gave rise to
an apprehension that if a free coinage bill should pass both Houses, he
would not feel at liberty to veto it."
In this emergency, the Republican leaders appealed to their free silver
party associates to be content with compelling the Treasury to purchase
4,500,000 ounces of silver per month, which it was wrongly calculated
would cover the entire output of American mines. The force of party
discipline eventually prevailed, and the Republican party got together
on this compromise. The bill was adopted in both Houses by a strict
party vote, with the Democrats solidly opposed, and was finally enacted
on July 14, 1890.
Thus by relying upon political tactics, the managers of the Republican
party were able to reconcile conflicting interests, maintain party
harmony, and present a record of achievement which they hoped to make
available in the fall elections. But while they had placated the party
factions, they had done nothing to satisfy the people as a whole or to
redress their grievances. The slowness of congressional procedure
in matters of legislative reform allowed the amplest opportunity to
unscrupulous business men to engage, in the meantime, in profiteering at
the public expense. They were able to lay in stocks of goods at the
old rates so that an increase of customs rates, for example, became
an enormous tax upon consumers without a corresponding gain to the
Treasury; for the yield was largely intercepted on private accounts by
an advance in prices. The Tariff Bill, which William McKinley reported
on April 16, 1890, became law only on the 1st of October, so there were
over five months during which profiteers could stock at old rates
for sales at the new rates and thus reap a rich harvest. The public,
however, was infuriated, and popular sentiment was so stirred by the
methods of retail trade that the politicians were both angered and
dismayed. Whenever purchasers complained of an increase of price, they
received the apparently plausible explanation, "Oh, the McKinley Bill
did it." To silence this popular discontent, the customary arts and
cajoleries of the politicians proved for once quite ineffectual.
At the next election, the Republicans carried only eighty-eight seats in
the House out of 332--the most crushing defeat they had yet sustained.
By their new lease of power in the House, however, the Democratic
party could not accomplish any legislation, as the Republicans still
controlled the Senate. The Democratic leaders, therefore, adopted the
policy of passing a series of bills attacking the tariff at what were
supposed to be particularly vulnerable points. These measures, the
Republicans derided as "pop-gun bills," and in the Senate they turned
them over to the committee on finance for burial. Both parties were rent
by the silver issue, but it was noticeable that in the House which was
closest to the people the opposition to the silver movement was stronger
and more effective than in the Senate.
Notwithstanding the popular revolt against the Republican policy which
was disclosed by the fall elections of 1890, President Harrison's annual
message of December 9, 1891, was marked by extreme complacency. Great
things, he assured the people, were being accomplished under his
administration. The results of the McKinley Bill "have disappointed
the evil prophecies of its opponents and in large measure realized the
hopeful predictions of its friends." Rarely had the country been so
prosperous. The foreign commerce of the United States had reached the
largest total in the history of the country. The prophecies made by the
antisilver men regarding disasters to result from the Silver Bullion
Purchase Act, had not been realized. The President remarked "that the
increased volume of currency thus supplied for the use of the people was
needed and that beneficial results upon trade and prices have followed
this legislation I think must be clear to every one." He held that the
free coinage of silver would be disastrous, as it would contract the
currency by the withdrawal of gold, whereas "the business of the world
requires the use of both metals." While "the producers of silver
are entitled to just consideration," it should be remembered that
"bimetallism is the desired end, and the true friends of silver will be
careful not to overrun the goal." In conclusion, the President expressed
his great joy over "many evidences of the increased unification of the
people and of the revived national spirit. The vista that now opens to
us is wider and more glorious than before. Gratification and amazement
struggle for supremacy as we contemplate the population, wealth, and
moral strength of our country."
Though the course of events has yet to be fully explained, President
Harrison's dull pomposity may have been the underlying reason of the
aversion which Blaine now began to manifest. Although on Harrison's side
and against Blaine, Senator Cullom remarks in his memoirs that Harrison
had "a very cold, distant temperament," and that "he was probably the
most unsatisfactory President we ever had in the White House to those
who must necessarily come into personal contact with him." Cullom is
of the opinion that "jealousy was probably at the bottom of their
disaffection," but it appears to be certain that at this time Blaine had
renounced all ambition to be President and energetically discouraged any
movement in favor of his candidacy. On February 6, 1892, he wrote to
the chairman of the Republican National Committee that he was not
a candidate and that his name would not go before the convention.
President Harrison went ahead with his arrangements for renomination,
with no sign of opposition from Blaine. Then suddenly, on the eve of
the convention, something happened--exactly what has yet to be
discovered--which caused Blaine to resign the office of Secretary of
State. It soon became known that Blaine's name would be presented,
although he had not announced himself as a candidate. Blaine's health
was then broken, and it was impossible that he could have imagined that
his action would defeat Harrison. It could not have been meant for more
than a protest. Harrison was renominated on the first ballot with Blaine
a poor second in the poll.
In the Democratic convention, Cleveland, too, was renominated on the
first ballot, in the face of a bitter and outspoken opposition. The
solid vote of his own State, New York, was polled against him under the
unit rule, and went in favor of David B. Hill. But even with this large
block of votes to stand upon, Hill was able to get only 113 votes in
all, while Cleveland received 616. Genuine acceptance of his leadership,
however, did not at all correspond with this vote. Cleveland had come
out squarely against free silver, and at least eight of the Democratic
state conventions--in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Nevada,
South Carolina, and Texas--came out just as definitely in favor of
free silver. But even delegates who were opposed to Cleveland, and who
listened with glee to excoriating speeches against him forthwith, voted
for him as the candidate of greatest popular strength. They then solaced
their feelings by nominating a free silver man for Vice-President, who
was made the more acceptable by his opposition to civil service reform.
The ticket thus straddled the main issue; and the platform was
similarly ambiguous. It denounced the Silver Purchase Act as "a cowardly
makeshift" which should be repealed, and it declared in favor of "the
coinage of both gold and silver without discrimination," with the
provision that "the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of
equal intrinsic and exchangeable value." The Prohibition party in that
year came out for the "free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold." A
more significant sign of the times was the organization of the "People's
party," which held its first convention and nominated the old Greenback
leader, James B. Weaver of Iowa, on a free silver platform.
The campaign was accompanied by labor disturbances of unusual extent
and violence. Shortly after the meeting of the national conventions, a
contest began between the powerful Amalgamated Association of Steel
and Iron Workers, the strongest of the trade-unions, and the Carnegie
Company over a new wage scale introduced in the Homestead mills. The
strike began on June 29, 1892, and local authority at once succumbed
to the strikers. In anticipation of this eventuality, the company had
arranged to have three hundred Pinkerton men act as guards. They arrived
in Pittsburgh during the night of the 5th of July and embarked on barges
which were towed up the river to Homestead. As they approached, the
strikers turned out to meet them, and an engagement ensued in which men
were killed or wounded on both sides and the Pinkerton men were defeated
and driven away. For a short time, the strikers were in complete
possession of the town and of the company's property. They preserved
order fairly well but kept a strict watch that no strike breakers should
approach or attempt to resume work. The government of Pennsylvania was,
for a time, completely superseded in that region by the power of the
Amalgamated Association, until a large force of troops entered Homestead
on the 12th of July and remained in possession of the place for several
months. The contest between the strikers and the company caused great
excitement throughout the country, and a foreign anarchist from New
York attempted to assassinate Mr. Frick, the managing director of the
company. Though this strike was caused by narrow differences concerning
only the most highly paid classes of workers, it continued for some
months and then ended in the complete defeat of the union.
On the same day that the militia arrived at Homestead, a more bloody and
destructive conflict occurred in the Coeur d'Alene district of Idaho,
where the workers in the silver mines were on strike. Nonunion men were
imported and put into some of the mines. The strikers, armed with rifles
and dynamite, thereupon attacked the nonunion men and drove them
off, but many lives were lost in the struggle and much property was
destroyed. The strikers proved too strong for any force which state
authority could muster, but upon the call of the Governor, President
Harrison ordered federal troops to the scene and under martial law order
was soon restored.
Further evidence of popular unrest was given in August by a strike of
the switchmen in the Buffalo railway yards, which paralyzed traffic
until several thousand state troops were put on guard. About the same
time, there were outbreaks in the Tennessee coal districts in protest
against the employment of convict labor in the mines. Bands of strikers
seized the mines, and in some places turned loose the convicts and
in other places escorted them back to prison. As a result of this
disturbance, during 1892 state troops were permanently stationed in the
mining districts, and eventually the convicts were put back at labor in
the mines.
Such occurrences infused bitterness into the campaign of 1892 and
strongly affected the election returns. Weaver carried Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, and Nevada, and he got one electoral vote in Oregon and in
North Dakota; but even if these twenty-two electoral votes had gone to
Harrison, he would still have been far behind Cleveland, who received
277 electoral votes out of a total of 444. Harrison ran only about
381,000 behind Cleveland in the popular vote, but in four States, the
Democrats had nominated no electors and their votes had contributed to
the poll of over a million for Weaver. The Democratic victory was so
sweeping that it gained the Senate as well as the House, and now for the
first time a Democratic President was in accord with both branches of
Congress. It was soon to appear, however, that this party accord was
merely nominal.