The idea of the necessity of a contact, to effect a movement, would

never have occurred, if we had bounded our observations to the influence

of our ideas on our determinations, and the influence of those

determinations on our physical being. In short, the laws of attraction

and repulsion are subject to great exceptions; which exceptions may

serve to support the system of the spirituality of the soul. We may be

allowed to say, that there exists a vacuum in the universe, since,

without this vacuum, there could not have been any motion? It is known

that this motion depends on the laws of attraction but how can

attraction act through a vacuum, unless it is by a spiritual force,

which acts without contact, and notwithstanding the absolute

interruption of matter? It is then this force, or its equivalent, that I

may adopt to define the cause of the impressions of which our souls are

susceptible.

Let others explain, in their turn, by what material communication, the

sight of a few immoveable characters, traced on insensible marble,

disturbs my soul. It is very easy to comprehend by what mechanism the

eye distinguishes these characters; but there ends the physical action,

for we cannot attribute to that action, the general power of producing

sensations in the mind, since, perhaps, many other men may consider the

same characters, without receiving any impression.

It is very possible, that our intellectual preceptions have not any

connection with motion, such as we conceive it. Our interior nature,

which we distinguish by the name of immaterial, is probably subject to

laws very different from those which govern nature in general; but as we

are obliged to apply to the mysteries of our souls, those expressions

which serve to delineate or to interpret the phœnomena submitted to our

inspection; these expressions, and their continual use, have insensibly

habituated us to certain opinions, about the causes and developement of

our intellectual faculties. It is thus that, after having used the words

motion, rest, agitation, and action, to discriminate different

affections of our souls, of which we know very little, we have

afterwards assimilated them, foolishly, to our moral nature, to all the

ideas which were represented by these denominations; and even death

itself, of which we have not any clear knowledge, but by the dissolution

of our physical being; death, an image borrowed from things which are

under the inspection of our senses, has not, perhaps, either relation or

analogy with the nature and essence of our spirit; all these are

incomprehensible secrets, not mixt with any thing we are acquainted

with.

We act, in this respect, like men born deaf, who apply to sounds those

terms which they were accustomed to use, to express the sensations the

other senses produced.

I shall only add another observation to the ideas on which I have just

dwelt: perhaps we should never have thought of applying the words which

express action and motion, to all the operations of our souls, if we had

not at first divided our spiritual being into a great number of

dependencies, such as attention, reflection, thought, judgment,

imagination, memory, and foresight; and if afterwards, in order to

render intelligible the variable relations of these abstract parts of

our mind (these parts of a unit which we have taken to pieces, though it

composed that single being ourself) we had not been obliged to have

recourse to some plain expressions, like those of action, motion,

attraction, and repulsion; but this familiar use of these expressions,

in order to explain the accidents of our intellectual system, very much

resembles the use which we make of X in Algebra, to express unknown

terms.

In short, were we to submit the action of our souls to the laws of a

particular movement, forming one of the dependencies of the great one,

we should still have to explain the cause of the consciousness that we

have of this action, which Atheists refuse to nature itself, at the very

moment they make it the God of the Universe. Were reasoning able to

subject all the operations of our mind to the impressions of external

objects, we could not rank under the same laws, that consciousness which

we have of our existence, and of the different faculties of the soul.

This consciousness is not an effect, or the production of any known

force, since it has been always in us independent of any external

object, consequently we cannot investigate it. The conception of the

existence of our souls, is as incomprehensible to us as that of

eternity; what a profound thought, which even our imagination cannot

embrace!

Let us admit, however, for a moment, that all the operations of our

souls are determined by some impulsion, whatever it may be, we shall

still be struck with the absolute difference which exists, according to

our knowledge between the regular movements of matter, and the almost

infinite and unaccountable emotions of our hearts and minds; so variable

and so differently modified, that the attention is lost in the

examination of them. And after having vainly endeavoured to conceive the

union established between our thoughts and exterior objects, we have

still to form an idea of the actions of these thoughts on themselves,

their progression and connection; our mind led astray, lost in such a

meditation, leaves us only a consciousness of our weakness, and we feel,

that there is an intellectual altitude which the human faculties can

never reach.

We distinguish, in a single character which our judgment can decypher,

an absolute difference between soul and matter: we cannot avoid

representing the latter as infinitely divisible, whilst, on the

contrary, all the efforts of our imagination could never divide that

indivisible unit which composes the soul, and which is the sovereign

over our will, thoughts, and all our faculties[5].

But if we examine again, under another appearance, the properties of

matter, we know not how to assimilate to them the emotions of our soul;

for we distinctly feel those emotions, let their number be ever so

numerous, when even they act together and terminate in the same center,

which is that Indivisible Being before alluded to; whereas matter, by an

essential property, cannot, in the same instant be pressed or struck in

several manners, unless it is in parts which have a tendency to

different centres.

There is not then any resemblance between the impressions that our souls

receive, and the various effects which may be attributed to the action

of all the material substances of which we can form any conception: they

are always connected with the idea of space and extent; but that centre,

where all our perceptions meet, that Judge, who dictates laws in the

internal empire, whose revolutions we only know, that last Director of

our will, this Indivisible Being, at the same time our friend and

master, is not to be found in any compounded idea; and this unity so

simple, ought necessarily to convince us, that nothing which is

submitted to the dominion of our senses, can serve as a type of the idea

which we are to form of the soul.

We discover the traces of this truth, when we fix our attention on the

comparisons with which our spiritual unit, our identical self, is

continually occupied: we imagine it seated on a throne, listening, and

examining the various reasons which ought to determine its action; we

see it, like Nero, yielding sometimes to Narcissus, and sometimes to

Burrhus; but at the same time we distinctly perceive all the

counsellors, all the flatterers, all the enemies which surround it; we

never remark but a single master in the midst of the tumult and the

intrigues of this court.

Whilst our soul then is thrown into motion by contemplation, and by the

imperceptible modification of a fugitive idea, as well as by every thing

which is opposed to material action, why should we not suppose that it

is purely intelligent and spiritual? It must be confessed, that

sometimes our corporeal infirmities influence our minds; but this

relation is not a proof of identity, since our body may be an instrument

entrusted to our soul, one of the organs which it is to make a

transitory use of. The continuity of existence, considered abstractedly,

certainly is in the universe a simple and natural state; and the

temporary existence is perhaps the only one which is heterogeneous and

accidental; the soul seems too noble to be assimilated to the latter

state, it may exist in a different manner when joined to a material

substance, but that connection does not make it lose its original

essence.

It is to be acknowledged, that it is through the medium of our senses we

know all the force of our existence; and that they are those parts of

our mixt being which strike us most during a little while; and it is

perhaps by a law of the same kind that we see men, engrossed by a great

passion, entirely strangers to every other moral affection; but, why

should it be contrary to the nature of things, that the soul, once

stripped of its terrestrial cloathing, should be acquainted with the

nature of its existence, and at the same time perceive those truths

which now are obscured by clouds. An innate fire languishes a long time

unknown in a rough stone, that stone is struck, and we see issue out a

splendid light; this is perhaps a faint picture of the state in which

our soul is when death breaks its fetters.

In short, in a matter so obscure every supposition is admissable, which

assures us that the soul is not on earth in a state of enchantment, or

in a kind of interruption of its ordinary existence. All that we see of

the universe is an assemblage of incomprehensible phœnomena; and when we

wish to discover the conclusion, through the aid of the ideas most on a

level with our intelligence, we wander perhaps from truth; since,

according to appearances, it is in the depths of infinity that it

reposes.

I doubt, whether we can allow the authority of those metaphysical

arguments which are made use of to defend the spirituality of the soul

to be decisive; but they are sufficient to repulse the different attacks

of materialists. The most evident opinion to me is, that we are too weak

to comprehend the secret we search for. We have, according to our petty

knowledge, divided the universe into two parts, spirit and matter; but

this division serves only to distinguish the little we know from that

which we have no knowledge of; there is perhaps an infinite gradation

between the different properties which compose motion and life, instinct

and intelligence; we can only express the ideas conceived by our

understandings, and the general words which we make use of, serve only

to detect the vain ambition of our mind; but with respect to the

universe, in considering its immensity, we shall find, that there is

sufficient space for all the shades and modifications we have no idea

of. We confess, that it is the connection between our physical powers

and intellectual faculties, and the action that they seem to have on

each other, which nourishes our doubts and anxieties; but without this

relation, without the appearance of our fall, all would be distinct in

the fate of man, all would be manifest. It is then, because that there

is a shade in the midst of the picture, which continually catches our

attention, that we have need to collect the light of the mind and the

feelings, in order to see in perspective our destiny; and it is from

this motive that we find it necessary, above all, to be penetrated with

the idea of a God, and to search for, in his power and goodness, the

last explication which we want.

There is, in the judgments of men, a contrast which I have often been

struck with. Those people, who, at the sight of the immensity of the

universe, at the view of the wonders in the midst of which they are

placed, fear not to attribute to our intellectual faculties the power of

interpreting and understanding every thing, and even the capacity of

attaining almost to the hidden secrets of our nature; these same people

are nevertheless most eager to strip the soul of its true dignity, and

the most obstinate in refusing it spirituality and duration, and every

thing else which can exalt it.

But happily, these refusals or concessions fix not our fate: the nature

of the soul will always be as unknown as the essence of the Supreme

Being; and it is one of the proofs of its grandeur, to be wrapped up in

the same mysteries which hide from us the universal spirit. But there

are simple ideas and sentiments, which seem to bring along with them

more comfort and hope than metaphysical arguments.

We cannot profoundly meditate on the marvellous attributes of thought;

we cannot attentively contemplate the vast empire which has been

submitted to it, or reflect on the faculty with which it is endowed, of

fixing the past, approaching the future, and bringing into a small

compass the expanded views of nature, and of containing, if I may use

the phrase, in one point the infinity of space, and the immensity of

time; we cannot consider such a wonder, without continually uniting a

sentiment of admiration to the idea of an end worthy of such a grand

conception, worthy of Him whose wisdom we adore. Shall we, however, be

able to discover this end, in the passing breath, in the fleeting

moments which compose life? Shall we be able to discover it in a

succession of phantoms, which seem destined only to trace the progress

of time? Shall we, above all, perceive it in this general system of

destruction? and ought we to annihilate in the same manner the

insensible plant, which perishes without having known life; and the

intelligent man, who every day explores the charms of existence? Let us

not thus degrade our fate and nature; and let us judge and hope better

of that which is unknown. Life, which is a means of improvement, should

not lead to an eternal death; the mind, that prolific source of

knowledge, should not be lost in the dark shades of forgetfulness;

sensibility and all its mild and pure emotions, which so tenderly unite

us to others, and enliven our days, ought not to be dissipated as if it

were the vapour of a dream; conscience, that severe judge was not

intended to deceive us; and piety and virtue are not vainly to elevate

our views towards that model of affection, the object of our love and

adoration. The Supreme Being, to whom all times belong, seems already to

have sealed our union with futurity by endowing us with foresight, and

placing in the recesses of our heart the passionate desire of a longer

duration, and the confused sentiment which it gives of obtaining it.

There are some relations still obscure, some connections between our

moral nature and futurity; and perhaps our wishes, our hopes, are a

sixth sense, a faint sense, if I may be allowed to express myself so, of

which we shall one day experience the satisfaction. Sometimes also I

imagine, that love, the most noble ornament of our nature, love, sublime

enchantment, is a mysterious pledge of the truth of these hopes; for in

disengaging us from ourselves, transporting us beyond the limits of our

being, it seems the first step towards an immortal nature; and in

presenting to us the idea, in offering to us the example of an existence

out of ourselves, it seems to interpret by our feelings that which our

minds cannot comprehend.

In short, and this reflection is the most awful of all, when I see the

mind of man grasp at the knowledge of a God; when I see him, at least,

draw near to such a grand idea; such a sublime degree of elevation

prepares me, in some manner, for the high destiny of the soul; I search

for a proportion between this immense thought and all the interests of

the world, and I discover none; I search for a proportion between these

boundless meditations and the narrow picture of life, and I perceive

none: there is then, I doubt not, some magnificent secret beyond all

that we can discern; some astonishing wonder behind this curtain still

unfurled; on all sides we discover the commencement of it. How imagine,

how resolve the thought, that all which affects and animates us, all

which guides and captivates us, is a series of enchantments, an

assemblage of illusions? The universe and its majestic pomp would then

have been only destined to serve as the theater of a vain

representation; and such a grand idea, so magnificent a conception would

have had for an object a mere dazzling chimera. What would then have

signified that mixture of real beauties and false appearances? What had

signified that concourse of phantoms, which, without design or end,

would be less admirable than a ray of light, destined to enlighten our

abode? In short, what had signified in men that union of sublime

thoughts and deceitful hopes? Guard us from giving credit to such a

supposition! Is it to Him then, whose power has not any limits, that we

dare to attribute the artifices of weakness? Should we have seen every

where order, design, and exactness, as far as our understanding can

reach, and as soon as we are arrived at the utmost boundary of our

faculties, should we stop the views of the Supreme Intelligence, and

imagine that all is finished, because futurity is unknown? Alas! we

endure but a moment, and we presume to know the past and the future! But

grant us only the idea of a God; do not deprive us of our confidence in

Him; it is in relying on that grand truth, that we shall be able to

guard our hopes against all the metaphysical arguments which we are not

immediately prepared to answer.

Would you object, that hope is not sufficient to determine men to the

observance of morality, and to subject them to the sacrifices which the

practice of virtue seems to impose? What then attracts them, in all the

bustle of life, unless it is hope; what is it that renders them greedy

of honour and of fortune, unless it is expectation? And when they obtain

the object of their wishes, they have frequently only the imaginary

advantages hope created. Why then would you ask for a demonstrated

certainty, in order to devote yourself to all the researches which the

human mind can conceive to be the most grand, the most worthy of an

ardent pursuit? On the contrary, the most trifling degree of expectation

should become a motive of encouragement. And what is it, of all our

interests, which could be put in competition with the most fugitive

idea, with the slightest hope of pleasing the Master of the World, and

maintaining the intercourse which seems to be indicated by our natural

sentiments, and by the first perceptions of our minds?

I would wish to go still further, and I would demand, not of all men,

but of some at least, if, were even this life to be their only heritage,

they would think themselves freed from the desire of pleasing the

Sovereign Author of Nature. The moment that is given us to know and

admire Him, would it not still be a blessing? We celebrate the memory of

those princes who have done good to men; are we not to do the same with

Him to whom we are indebted for our existence; to Him who has contrived,

if I may be allowed to say so, the various enjoyments we are so

unwilling to detach ourselves from? Shall we dare, weak and ignorant as

we are, to measure the wisdom, and calculate the power of our

Benefactor, and rashly reproach him for not having done more for us?

This would be the language of ingratitude. But, as I have shown, our

sentiments have not been put to this test; and it is on more liberal

terms that we have been admitted to treat with the Supreme Being: He has

surrounded us with every thing that can encourage our expectations; He

allows us, by contemplation, to attain almost a knowledge of his

perfections; He lets us read them in that collection of glory and

magnificence which the universe displays; He permits us to perceive his

power and goodness, infinity and happiness; and by that succession of

ideas he has guided our wishes and our hopes. How grand is the

contemplation of the Eternal, they who have sensibility can tell! But

this idea should be very early implanted in the human heart, it is

necessary that it should be connected with our first feelings, that it

should rise by degrees, in order to gain strength before men are thrown

into the midst of that world which boasts of being freed from childish

prejudices; left, hurried along by its levity, they follow every day a

new master, and render themselves the slaves of pleasure and vanity.

And that which is to maintain, amongst men, the principles first

inculcated, is public worship, an idea as beautiful as simple, and the

most proper to vivify all that is vague and abstract in reasoning and

instruction: public worship, in assembling men, and in turning them

without public shame to their weaknesses, and in equalising every

individual before the Master of the world, will be, in this point of

view a grand lesson of morality; but this worship, besides, habitually

reminds some of their duty, and is for others a constant source of

consolation; in short, almost all men, astonished and overwhelmed by the

ideas of grandeur and infinity, which the appearance of the universe,

and the exercise of their own thoughts, present to them, aspire to find

repose in the sentiment of adoration which unites them in a more

intimate manner to God, than the developement of their reason ever will.

We should guard ourselves carefully from despising the emotions of

piety, which cannot be separated from its advantages; and philosophers

themselves know not how far they would go, when they try to reduce the

interests of men to the narrow circle of demonstrated truths: that which

we perceive confusedly, is more precious than all we have a certain

knowledge of; that which we anticipate, is of more value than the

blessings scattered round us. Thus, we should be miserably impoverished,

if they could retrench from the various comforts which we shall never

possess, but through the aid of the imagination. However, if we take

this imagination as a guide and encouragement, when we are engaged in

the pursuits of fortune and ambition, and if the wise themselves find

that to be good which serves to nourish our passions, why would you

reject it, when, simply more grand and more sublime in its object, it

becomes the support of our weaknesses, the safeguard of our principles,

and the source of our most interesting consolations?

It is the part of legislators to study these truths, and to direct

towards them the spirit of laws, and the uncertain course of opinions.

How honourable is it for them to be called to form the august alliance

which is to unite happiness with morality, and morality with the

existence of a God!

CHAP. XII.

_That there is a God._

That there is a God! How is it possible to avoid being penetrated with

an awful respect in uttering these words? How reflect on them without

the deepest humility, and even an emotion of surprise, that man, this

weak creature, this atom dispersed in the immensity of space, undertakes

to add some weight to a truth, of which all nature is the splendid

witness? However, if this truth is our supreme good, if we are nothing

without it, how can we banish it from our minds? Does it not constrain

us to dwell continually on the subject? Compared with it, all other

thoughts are insignificant and uninteresting; it gives birth to, and

sustains all the sentiments on which the happiness of an intelligent

creature depends. I confess I tremblingly discussed the different

objections which are employed to destroy our confidence in the existence

of a Supreme Being; I dreaded the melancholy which those arguments

produced; I was afraid to feel the impression of it myself, and thus to

hazard the opinion most dear to my heart, and most essential to my

happiness; it appeared to me, that a few general ideas, supported by

lively feelings, would have been sufficient for my tranquillity; and

without an interest more extended, without the desire of opposing,

according to my powers, a spirit of indifference and false philosophy,

which is every day gaining ground, I should never have stepped beyond my

circle. But, I am far from regretting the part I have taken: I have ran

over, without much trouble, those books where the most pernicious

doctrines are ingeniously disseminated; and have thought that a person,

endowed with common sense, on whom metaphysical subtleties were

obtruded, would resemble those savages who are brought sometimes amongst

us, and who, from the depraved refinement of our morals and manners,

have often recalled us, by some natural reflections, to those simple

principles which we have abandoned, to those ancient truths whose

vestiges are lost.

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