Some of Yugoslavia's neighbours were anxious, during the months which
followed the War, that we should learn how Serb and Croat were
continually at each other's throat. The dissensions between the two
branches of the Yugoslav family would have been much more serious and
more prolonged if their neighbours had paid less attention to them. It
is true that "our Serbian customs," in the words of Ja[vs]a Tomi['c],
"come from the village, while those of the Croats come from the nobles."
The humbler Croat, one may say, was an employee in a big store, while
the Serb was a small trader. The Croat would naturally like to introduce
the big-store system into Yugoslavia, but this the Serb does not
understand. He has a greater sense of responsibility and is more careful
with regard to the expenses. To the Croat, in the old Empire, it was
immaterial whether the officials were more or less costly. The bill was
paid by Austria, who was the foe. For some time the Croat found himself
forgetting that he was in Yugoslavia. When Cardinal Bourne came to
Zagreb in the spring of 1919 and the town-hall was decorated with the
British, Croatian, Serbian, Slovene and the town flag, some one asked
the mayor why the State flag had been omitted. He was horrified. "The
State flag!" he cried. Then it dawned upon him.... Numbers of Croats
have belonged to the governing class and--impelled by the Catholic
religion--have displayed more devotion to the arts than to the freedom
of their country. On the other hand the Serbs, a race of practical
peasants, have a highly developed national consciousness. This they owe
partly to their inborn political gifts and largely to their Church, for
the Orthodox religion--one may say, I think, without injustice--has more
frequently shown itself, so closely is it connected with the idea of the
State, to be rather of this world than of another. One should say the
Orthodox religion as it flourishes in the Balkans, for when the Russian
General Bobrikoff, who was attached to the person of King Milan, came
back with him to Belgrade after the Peace of San Stefano, he was
scandalized to see that religion had no greater share in the national
rejoicings. "Accustomed as I was in my own country," he said, "to see
nothing done without prayers and the blessing of the Church, I was
indeed astounded to observe that the priests played the part of
officials even in the cathedral, and often were altogether absent." This
reminds one of von Baernreiter, who wished to learn the Serbian
language, so that he would be more eligible for the governorship of
Bosnia. He asked his teacher at Vienna when one could hear sermons in
the Serbian church, and was informed that these occurred but twice a
year and that on those occasions everybody left the church. The Serb and
the Bulgar have come to neglect our distinctions between that which is
spiritual and that which is temporal; their religion is, in consequence
of their history, so inherent a part of the nation's life that in losing
it one would almost cease to be a Serb or a Bulgar. Their Church is as
national as that of the Armenians.[118] This may not be an ideal state
of things, but it prevailed in Spain under the Moorish oppression and in
the France of Jeanne d'Arc. During the crisis of the Great War the
churches in the West were everywhere national; and in Serbia it was
calculated that 60 per cent. of the sermons had a pronounced national
colouring....
Now with these differences between the Croat and the Serb, does it not
seem strange that the vast majority of them are for union, with a part
of this majority in favour of a reasonable decentralization? But if we
investigate the motives of the Serbs and Croats who would thwart this
union, we will see that they have nothing of that faith which, after all
these centuries, has moved the Yugoslav multitude. Some of the Serbs
wish to keep aloof on the ground that Serbia in the last hundred years
has borne the brunt of the battle--and this, whether they were or were
not faced with a more difficult situation, is acknowledged by most of
the Croats, who for that reason would never dream of wishing the more
modern Zagreb to supplant Belgrade. Those few Croats who are not for
Yugoslavia are moved by ecclesiastical prejudice or by their longing for
the privileges which the Habsburgs granted them. But those who, for
various reasons, criticize the central Government are by no means
necessarily in favour of setting up a separate one. Whatever the
impetuous Radi['c] may have said, he is out for Yugoslavia. Still one
cannot be astonished that he was sometimes misunderstood. The Zagreb
students who, towards the end of 1918, came to Svetozar Pribi[vc]evi['c]
with the request that he would let them kill the demagogue, were for
expressing in this way what Dr. Du[vs]an Popovi['c], the well-known
deputy, expressed in another. It was at the Zagreb Provincial Parliament
that he exclaimed, in the summer of 1918, that "This idea will be
victorious and therefore I say publicly, in the presence of the whole
people, that I am a Croat, a Serb and a Slovene, or, if you prefer it,
none of them but merely a Yugoslav." In 1914 when Stambouluesky, the
future Prime Minister of Bulgaria, was arrested and accused of
Serbophilism, he declared: "I am neither Bulgar or Serb; I am a
Yugoslav!" ... For at least a generation Zagreb will remain
particularist, zealously preserving the differences--personal, social
and religious--which distinguish her people from the dominant Serbs. The
Croat officers who burned with shame at the Archduke's murder on Bosnian
soil, the Croat regiments that in 1915 marched into Belgrade with bands
playing and their colours flying, the Croat officials whose bread and
salt came from the Habsburgs in administering Yugoslav countries during
the War--all these will not forget a long, deep-rooted and honourable
tradition. But Zagreb is now even as Munich was in 1866; after having
been the Rome of the Yugoslav movement, the seat of its philosophy and
the centre of its politics, the Croat capital has now an atmosphere of
sad futility, for Belgrade is the beacon of the Yugoslav world. While
comparing Zagreb with Rome one must add that she had also the misfortune
to resemble Rome of the decadence--a good deal of outer polish was
imparted by the Austrians, at the expense of their victims' backbone.
The five centuries of Turkish domination had no such demoralizing
influence upon the Serbs, especially not in the country places. In the
opinion of a very close observer,[119] whom I quote, there is nothing
that so thoroughly displays the dominance of Belgrade as the agrarian
problem. The projected reforms, which have been based on the principle
that no one should own more land than he can cultivate with the aid of
his family, would dispossess large numbers of big landowners in Croatia
and still larger numbers of men with moderate holdings, whose
compensation would be "determined hereafter." The application of these
reforms has been delayed for various reasons, but nowhere at any time
has it been suggested that Croatia might reject them. In the old kingdom
of Serbia, with much the greater part of the land in peasant possession,
it may be said that there is no agrarian problem.... Those enemies of
Yugoslavia, by the way, who have hoped that the particularism of Croatia
would be something altogether different from what it is, should have
mingled with the crowd at Zagreb on the evening of Prince Alexander's
arrival in July 1920. The Prince interrupted his dinner, came out on to
the balcony and made a speech. "Draga moja bratjo Hrvati," he
said--"Croatians, my dear brothers." Not for a thousand years had a
ruler of Croatia addressed his people in their own tongue. One immense
roar of delight broke, as the _Morning Post's_ special correspondent
tells us, from the assembled multitude; men fell on each other's necks,
laughed, wept and kissed each other.... Such manifestations must not
lead us to believe that all the internal problems of the young State are
settled. Croatia (as also Slovenia) is jealous of her separate identity,
suspicious to some extent of Serbia, her prestige and projects; she has
no intention of allowing herself, after the hard fight against
Magyarization, to be "Balkanized." But one thing was made clear by the
Prince's visit: there can be no word or thought of separation.
* * * * *
We have spoken of the disaffection prevalent among the Croats, and on
this the world has fixed its eyes, because of the large number of Croat
deputies who have hitherto declined to come to Belgrade. Nevertheless
there is a more general and more grievous discontent in Yugoslavia,
since, after all, the Croats' attitude is of a temporary character--for
it is probable that after the next general election their peculiar
upbringing will not be so potent in determining their sentiments
towards the State. More and more will they be ready to make common cause
with Serbs and Slovenes; and their criticisms, which are now so
negative, will be of a more useful kind. (They will recognize, for
example, that if it costs 3000 dinars to open an inn in Serbia they were
not justified in protesting when the fee in Croatia was raised from 5
crowns to 5 dinars.) That Yugoslavia gives ground for criticism no one,
least of all her well-wishers, deny. And those who pray that she will
prosper do so for the reason that the scattered Southern Slavs have for
the first time now been able--most of them at any rate--to link their
arms together; and we hope that with high qualities outweighing their
defects the Southern Slavs will permanently take their place among the
nations. But this will not be brought about unless those ailments which
they suffer from are now confronted. Serbs themselves are often saying
that their little Serbia was better than this fine new country which is
thrice as large. She had fewer problems, she had fewer parties, and if
people were corrupt they were so on a smaller scale. Traditions which
are deprecatingly called Balkan, but which were at that time suited to a
Balkan country, should not be allowed to spread across a country which
is so much more than Balkan. Merit does not everywhere in this imperfect
world advance you automatically, but an effort is required in Yugoslavia
to resist the calls of friendship in appointing men to offices. The army
of officials is too numerous; yet many of them are so badly paid that
even if a great reformer could reduce by half their numbers he would be
inclined to lay no hand upon the total sum they now enjoy. But this
necessity of cleansing the public services is not peculiar to
Yugoslavia. The politicians must have courage to lay heavier taxes on
the peasants: the strange phenomenon is seen of peasants who assert that
they are quite prepared for this, and on the other hand of politicians
who are frightened lest it lose them many votes. The peasants generally
are so prosperous that some, for instance, whom I know of near
Kragujevac, men occupied in growing cereals, find that the fowls which
they keep rather as a hobby do not have to lay them golden eggs in order
to pay all the taxes. In that region it is usual nowadays for peasants
not to count their bank-notes, but to weigh them; recently a man
disposed of certain fields for his own weight in notes of ten dinars.
The peasants are not only dissatisfied with the two chief parties, the
Radicals and the Democrats, for not taxing them sufficiently--so that at
the next general election they may give a good deal more support than
hitherto to their own Peasants' party--but they complain that their
interests are neglected although, as we have seen, the lawyers and other
townsfolk of the Radical and Democrat parties are so anxious with
respect to peasants' votes.
The difficult position of the Yugoslavs--observe how in the last year
their exchange has fallen--is due in part to the deplorable activities
of other peoples (vast amounts have had to be imported for
reconstruction purposes, Rieka has been practically unavailable as a
port, and conditions have been such that the Yugoslavs have had to keep
a large army mobilized), partly their position is due to measures
ill-advised but which they were compelled to take (such as their system
of Agrarian Reform), partly to political inexperience and partly to
their lack of organizing powers. Let us hope that from now onwards
Yugoslavia will have to arm herself less heavily against the slings and
arrows of the world, and that she will be able therefore to become a
more proficient swimmer in this sea of troubles.