To sum up this part of our long and, I fear, rather tiring dissertation
on the Yugoslav-Albanian frontier that is to be: the Yugoslav delegates
at the Peace Conference invariably disclaimed any desire to have
Albanian lands conferred on them against the wish of the inhabitants.
According to Prince Sixte of Parma, the ex-Emperor Karl was disposed to
offer to the Serbs as a basis of peace a Southern Slav kingdom
consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the whole of
Albania. But this last item only made it clear that in his brief tenure
of the throne the Emperor had grasped something of the grand generosity
of European statesmen when they deal with the possessions of other
people in the Near East. The Albanians are not Southern Slavs, and it is
merely the voice of the thoughtless mob in Montenegro which has been
claiming Scutari for the reason that they held it in the Middle
Ages--several of their rulers are buried there--and because 20,000
Montenegrins gave their lives to take it in the Balkan War. Responsible
persons in Yugoslavia, such as Dr. Trumbi['c], the former Foreign
Minister, do not believe that Scutari is a necessity for their
State--whether Yugoslavia is a necessity for Scutari is another
question--and they hold that it is quite possible to preserve the 1913
frontier (perhaps with a minor rectification in Klementi) and live in
friendship with their neighbours. This, of course, is under the
assumption that these neighbours will "play the game"--and it is just
this which the Albanians will be unable to do if they are left to their
own slender resources. How could one expect so poor--or shall we say so
unexploited?--a country to make any social progress without the help of
others? It has become the habit of many Albanians to accept financial
assistance from Italy; if an independent Albania is now established
these subsidies will be increased--and he who pays the piper calls the
tune. If, however, an arrangement could be made for helping the
Albanians--and the country undertaking this would have to be devoid of
Balkan ambitions on its own account--then the 1913 frontier would be
possible. No doubt the cynics will say that the Yugoslavs are aware that
this is an unlikely solution, and that failing a disinterested Power,
whose supervision would cause the Albanians during the troublesome
civilizing process to be moderately peaceable neighbours, failing such a
Power the Yugoslavs would feel that they were justified in asking for
the frontier of the Drin. But this frontier I have heard advocated less
by Yugoslavs of any standing than by those Albanians who despair of the
administrative capacities of their fellow-countrymen. The Yugoslavs have
not the smallest wish to add to their commitments, and even if all the
Albanians on the right bank of the Drin were anxious for Yugoslav
overlordship--and this, naturally, is not the case--there would be
serious hostility to be expected from some of those on the other bank.
If no disinterested Power, such as Great Britain or Sweden, will take
the matter in hand, then Dr. Trumbi['c] has an alternative proposal,
which is for a free, independent Albania (with the 1913 frontier) which
would exist on the Customs and on a loan made by the Great Powers, who
would put in a Controller charged with seeing that the money were spent
on roads, schools, etc. A police force, and not an army, would be
maintained; while, if need be, the country could be neutralized; and Dr.
Trumbi['c], within whose lifetime bandits and heiduks were roaming
through Bosnia, believes that the Albanians would gradually discard
their cherished system of feuds.... This would be the happiest solution,
for it would leave the Balkans to the Balkan peoples, while it would aim
at the development of whatever good qualities there are in the
Albanians, and it would definitely recognize a Yugoslav-Albanian
frontier which is acceptable to both countries.