A battle which took place near Tuzi, not far from Podgorica, in December
1919, may assist the study of the difficult Albanian question. At the
first attack about 150 Montenegrins, mostly young recruits, were killed
or wounded; but in the counter-attack the Albanian losses were much
greater, 167 of them being made prisoners. On all of these were found
Italian rifles, ammunition, money and army rations. On the other hand, a
few Montenegrins, with three officers, were also captured and were
stripped and handed over, naked, to the Italians. But these declined to
have them, saying that the conflict had been no concern of theirs, and
the unfortunate men--with the exception of one who escaped--remained
among the Albanians. The fact that Tuzi would be of no value to the
Italians neither weakens nor strengthens the supposition that they were
privy to the Albanian attack; but it may very well be that the natives
had taken their Italian equipment by force of arms. It would, anyhow,
seem that the Italians have little understanding of this people: during
the War, when General Franchet d'Esperey was straightening his line, he
paid some hundreds of Albanians to maintain his western flank, and they
were very satisfactory. (It troubled them very little whether they were
holding it against the Austrians or against other Albanians.) When Italy
took over that part of the line she employed a whole Division, which--to
the amusement, it is said, of Franchet d'Esperey--provided the local
population with a great deal of booty, and in particular with mules.
There was constant trouble in those regions of Albania which were
occupied by the Italians,[72] and in June 1920 things had come to such a
pass that the Italian garrisons, after being thrown out of the villages
of Bestrovo and Selitza, were actually retiring with all the stores they
could rescue to Valona. Their retreat, said Reuter, in a euphemistic
message from Rome, was "attended by some loss." As Valona was their last
stronghold in Albanian territory, it seemed that very few, if any, of
the tribes were in favour of an Italian protectorate. And since it was
calculated that during the first six months of 1920 the Italian
Government was paying from 400 to 500 million lire a month for corn, and
the year's deficit might be enough to lead the State to the very verge
of bankruptcy, one was asking whether from an economic, apart from any
other, point of view, it would not be advisable for the Italians to cut
their losses in central Albania. And this they very wisely determined to
do. Would that their subsequent policy in northern Albania had been as
well-inspired.
It would also seem as if the affair of Tuzi shows that the Albanians
have no wish for a Yugoslav protectorate, and there are a good many
Serbs, such as Professor Cviji['c], who view with uneasiness any
extension of their sway over the Albanians. Many of the tribes are
prepared, after very small provocation or none, to take up arms against
anybody; and those who, in the north and north-east of the country, are
in favour of a Yugoslav protectorate would undoubtedly have opposed to
them a number of the natives, less because they are fired with the
prospect of "Albania for the Albanians" than on account of their
patriarchal views. We must, however, at the same time, acknowledge that
those Albanians who are impelled by patriotic ideals, and who would like
to see their countrymen within the 1913 frontiers, resolutely turn away
from the various attractions which the Slavs undoubtedly exercise over
many of them and combine in a brotherly fashion, under the guidance of a
disinterested State, to work for an independent Albania--those idealists
have every right to be heard. Their solution is, in fact, the one that
would, as we have elsewhere said, be best for everyone concerned. The
late Professor Burrows, who believed in the possibility of such an
arrangement, thought that it would take generations for this people "to
pass from blood feud and tribal jealousy to the good order of a unified
State, unless they have tutorage in the art of self-government." There
seem to be grave difficulties, both external and internal, in the way of
setting up such a tutorage over the whole of the 1913 Albania; and if a
majority of the northern and north-eastern tribes prefer to turn to
Yugoslavia, rather than to join the frustrated patriots and the wilder
brethren in turning away from it, they should not be sweepingly
condemned as traitors to the national cause. The frame of mind which
looks with deep suspicion on a road that links a tribe to its neighbour
is not very promising for those who dream of an Albanian nation; it is a
prevalent and fundamental frame of mind. "The Prince of Wied," we are
told by his countryman, Dr. Max Mueller, "succeeded in conquering the
hearts of those Albanians who supported him and of gaining the highest
respect of those who were his political opponents." No doubt they were
flattered when they noticed that he had so far become an Albanian as to
surround his residence at Durazzo with barbed-wire entanglements.
Among the solutions of the Albanian problem was that which Dr. Mueller
very seriously, not to say ponderously, put forward in 1916.[73] This
gentleman, with a first-hand knowledge of the country, which he gained
during the War, did not minimize the task which would face the Prince of
Wied on his return. Of that wooden potentate one may say that his work
in Albania did not collapse for the reason that it was never started; a
few miles from Durazzo, his capital, from which, I believe, he made only
that one excursion whose end was undignified, a few miles away he
excited the derision of his "subjects," and a few miles farther off they
had not heard of him. Dr. Mueller, after reproving us sternly for smiling
at the national decoration, in several classes, with which his Highness
on landing at the rickety pier was graciously pleased to gladden the
meritorious natives, admits that at his second coming he will have to
take various other steps. Austrians and Germans should be brought to
colonize the country, and not peasants, forsooth, like those who have
laboriously made good in the Banat, but merchants, manufacturers,
engineers, doctors, officials and large landowners--not by any means
without close inquiry, so as to admit only such as are in possession of
a blameless repute and a certain amount of cash. Dr. Mueller was resolved
that, so far as lay with him, none but the very best Teutons should
embark upon this splendid mission. He desired that, after landing, they
should first of all remain at the harbour, there to undergo a course of
tuition in the customs and peculiarities of the tribe among which they
proposed to settle. His compatriots would be so tactful--apparently not
criticizing any of the customs--that the hearts of the Albanians would
incline towards them and by their beautiful example they would make
these primitive, wild hearts beat not so much for local interests but
very fervently for the Albanian fatherland. One cannot help a feeling of
regret that circumstances have prevented us from seeing Dr. Mueller's
scheme put into action.