If, then, it is difficult to see where the Italian interests will be
profited by the possession of Dalmatia, there remains the argument that,
irrespective of the consequences, she must have a good deal of it since
it was allotted to her by the Treaty of London,[24] although the
engagements entered into by Italy, France and Great Britain when they
signed the Treaty with Germany caused the earlier instrument to be
subject to revision where its terms had been disregarded. Signor
Orlando, in an interview granted in April 1918 to the _Journal des
Debats_, eagerly insisted that the Treaty had been concluded against the
Austrian enemy, not against the Yugoslav nation; and if this be more
than a mere phrase it is clear that with the disappearance of
Austria-Hungary the Treaty automatically fell to the ground. By this
Treaty of April 1915, France and Great Britain are bound--if necessary,
by force of arms--to assist Italy in appropriating what, I believe, will
be acknowledged to be some one else's country, at all events a country
the vast proportion of whose inhabitants have determined that on no
account will they come under the Italians. Would it not have been
advisable if those who signed this document had made a few not very
recondite researches into eastern Adriatic questions? They must have
felt some qualms at the cries of indignation and amazement which arose
when the provisions of the Treaty were disclosed, for it did not remain
a secret very long. They had imagined, on the whole, that as Dalmatia
had been under alien rulers, Venetian, Austrian and so forth, for so
many years it really would not matter to them very much if they were
governed from Vienna or from Rome. Perhaps a statesman here and there
had heard that the Dalmatian Diet had petitioned many times since 1870
that they should be reunited to their brothers of Croatia and Slavonia
in the Triune Kingdom. But all the calculations seem to have been made
upon the basis that Austria-Hungary would survive, as a fairly
formidable Power at any rate. The union of the Southern Slavs was too
remote, and the Italians would be kindly masters. When the howl of
indignation rose, the statesmen seem to have conceived the hope that the
Italians would be generous and wise. The chief blame for the Treaty does
not rest, however, on the Frenchmen and the Englishmen, but on the
Russians; it was naturally felt that they should be more cognizant of
Slav affairs, and if they were content to sign the Treaty, France and
England might well follow their example. When Dr. Zari['c], the Bishop
of Split, saw the former Russian Foreign Minister, M. Sazonov, in Paris
in the spring of 1919, this gentleman was in a state of such dejection
that the Bishop, out of pity, did not try to probe the matter.
"Sometimes," said Sazonov, "sometimes the circumstances are too much
opposed to you and you have to act against your inclinations."[25] The
French and British statesmen gave the Bishop the impression that they
were ashamed of the Treaty. He read to them in turn a memorandum in
which he suggested that the whole Dalmatian question should be left to
the arbitration of President Wilson, who was well informed, through
experts, of the local conditions. And was it, in any case, just that an
Italian, both claimant and judge, should sit on the Council of Four, to
which no Yugoslav was admitted? To President Wilson the Bishop said,
"You have come to fight for the just cause."
The President made no reply.
The Bishop, a native of the island of Hvar, a great linguist, was a man
who made you think that a very distinguished mind had entered the body
of the late Cardinal Vaughan. To him the most noticeable features of the
President were the clear brow, the mystic eyes and the mouth which
showed that he stood firmly on the ground.
"You have come to work and fight for the peace," said the Bishop.
"Yes, indeed, to fight," said Dr. Wilson. "And I will act with all my
energy. You," he said, "you must help me."
"I will help you," said the Bishop, "with my prayers."
The Yugoslav Delegation in Paris had, on the authority of the Belgrade
Cabinet, suggested that the question should be arbitrated.
"The Italians have declined the arbitration," said Dr. Zari['c], "just
as in the War Germany and Austria declined yours."
The President nodded.
"They have committed many disorders in our fair land," said the Bishop.
"I know, I know," said the President.
But, it will be asked, why did not Dr. Wilson insist on a just
settlement of the Adriatic question, taking into his own hands that
which Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were so chary of touching?
These two statesmen, with the London Treaty hanging over them, wanted
Wilson's assent for matters in which British and French interests were
more directly concerned, while they required Sonnino's co-operation in
the Treaty with Germany. It would have suited them very well if Wilson
had taken such energetic steps with Italy that they themselves could,
suitably protesting to Sonnino, be swept along by the presidential
righteousness. But Dr. Wilson was disappointing those who had--in the
first place because of the lofty language of his Notes--awaited a really
great man. He was seen to be out of his depth; strenuously he sought to
rescue his Fourteen Points and to steer the Covenant of the League
through the rocks and shallows of European diplomacy. Sonnino, playing
for time, involved the good Wilson in a maze of confused negotiations,
while nearly every organ of Italian official and unofficial opinion was
defaming the President. On April 15 Dr. Wilson in a memorandum suggested
the famous "Wilson Line" in Istria, which thrust the Italian frontier
westwards, so that Rieka should be safeguarded from the threat of an
Italian occupation of Monte Maggiore. Italy was to give up northern
Dalmatia and all the islands, save Lussin and Vis; in return she was to
be protected by measures limiting the naval and military powers of
Yugoslavia. When Wilson appealed over the head of the Italian Government
to the people, their passions had been excited to such a degree that
much more harm was done than good. It is said that he had promised
Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau that he would not publish his letter
for three hours, but that--pride of authorship triumphing over
prudence--it was circulated to the Press two hours before this time was
up, and a compromise which had been worked out by Mr. Lloyd George had
perforce to be abandoned. This was one of the occasions when the
President's impulsiveness burst out through his cold exterior, when his
strength of purpose, his grim determination to fight for justice were
undermined by his egotism.