"The Italian Government," said the _Morning Post_,[22] "is well
qualified to judge of the interests of its own people." Here the
_Morning Post_ is not speaking of the Italian Government which dealt
with Tripoli, but that which has been dealing with Dalmatia. The reasons
which have been advanced for an Italian or a partly Italian Dalmatia are
geographical, botanical, historical, ethnical, military, naval and
economic. As for the geographical reasons: even in the schools of Italy
they teach that the Italian natural frontier is determined by the point
of division of the waters of the Alps and that this frontier falls at
Porto Re, a few miles to the south of Rieka--everything to the south of
that belonging to the Balkan Peninsula. We may note the gallant
patriotism of an Italian cartographer mentioned by Prezzolini; this
worthy has inscribed a map of Dalmatia down to the Narenta with the
pleasing words: "The new natural boundaries of Italy." As for the
argument that the flora of Dalmatia resembles that of Italy, this can
equally well be employed by those who would annex Italy to Dalmatia.
Historically, we have seen that Venice, which held for many years the
seacoast and the islands, did not alter the Slav character of the
country. It is not now the question as to whether Venice deserved or did
not deserve well of Dalmatia, but "the truth is," says M. Emile
Haumant,[23] the learned and impartial French historian, "the truth is
that when Marmont's Frenchmen arrived they found the Slav language
everywhere, the Italian by its side on the islands and the coast,
Italian customs and culture in the towns, and also the lively and
sometimes affectionate remembrance of Venice; but nowhere did a
Dalmatian tell them that he was an Italian. On the contrary, they all
affirmed that they were brothers of the Slav beyond, in whose
misfortunes they shared and whose successes they celebrated." The
Italians themselves, in achieving their unity, were very right to set
aside the undoubted historical claims of the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies, those of the House of Este and those of the Vatican, seeing
that they were in opposition to the principle of nationality and the
right of a people to determine its own political status. With regard to
the ethnical reasons, we are flogging another dead horse, as the
statistics--even those taken during the Italian occupation--prove to the
meanest intellect; and now the pro-Italians, despairing to make anyone
believe that the 97.5 per cent. of the people of Dalmatia are truly
Italians who by some kink in their nature persist in calling themselves
Slavs, have invented a brand new nationality, the Dalmatian, after the
classic style of the late Professor Jagi['c] who at Vienna, under the
pressure of the Austrian Government, began talking of the Bosnian
language in order not to say that it is Serbo-Croat. He was drowned in
laughter. With respect to the military reasons, the Dalmatian littoral
cannot be defended by a State which is not in possession of the
hinterland. In time of peace a very strong army would be needed; Italy
would, in fact, have to double her army for the defence of a frontier
700 kilometres long. And in the event of war it would be necessary
either to abandon Dalmatia or to form two armies of operation, one on
the frontiers of Julian Venetia, the other in Dalmatia, and without any
liaison between them. From the military point of view it is incomparably
more to the interest of Italy that she should live on friendly terms
with the people of the eastern shore of the Adriatic than that she
should maintain there an army out of all proportion to her military and
economic resources--an army which in time of war would be worse than
useless, since, as M. Gauvain observes, the submarines, which would find
their nesting-places in the islands, would destroy the lines of
communication. An Italian naval argument is, that if she had to fight on
the eastern side of the Adriatic her sailors in the morning would have
the sun in their eyes; but the Yugoslavs would be similarly handicapped
in the case of an evening battle. With regard to the economic reasons,
the longitudinal lines will continue to guarantee to the Germans and
Magyars the commercial monopoly of the East, and Italy will perceive
that she has paid very dearly for a blocked-up window. The sole method
by which Italy can from the Adriatic cause her commerce to penetrate to
the Balkans is by concluding with a friendly Yugoslavia the requisite
commercial treaties, which will grow more valuable with the construction
of the lateral railways, running inland from the coast, which Austrians
and Magyars so constantly impeded.