_The New Europe_, whose directors had taken a chief part in bringing the
Italians and the Yugoslavs together, which congress had resulted in the
Pact of Rome, of April 1918, pointed out that in those dark days of the
high-water mark of the great German offensive, this Pact--which provided
the framework of an agreement, on the principle of "live and let
live"--was publicly approved of by the Italian Premier and his
colleagues, but was rejected now when the danger was past and Austria
was broken up. Those who brought about the Pact reminded Italy that she
was bound to it by honour and that the South Slav statesmen never had
withdrawn from the position which it placed them in with reference to
Italy.... Everyone must sympathize with the disappointment of those
gentlemen who--Messrs. Franklin-Bouillon, Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson
were associated in this endeavour--had striven for a noble end, had
achieved something in spite of many obstacles, and now saw that one
party simply would not use the bridge which they had built for it. This
party had, however, shown such reticence both while the bridge was being
made and afterwards that one could scarcely be astonished at their
attitude. The Congress at Rome was in no sense official, but a
voluntary meeting of private persons, who were got together with a
certain amount of trouble. So unofficial, in fact, was the Congress that
those Serbs who worked with the representatives of the Yugoslav
Committee belonged to the Opposition; the Serbian Government, then in
Corfu, not giving their adhesion to the Congress, which was perhaps a
very clever move on the part of Pa[vs]i['c]. Whether it be true or not
that Signor Amendolla, the General Secretary--he is the political
director of the _Corriere della Sera_--was asked by the Yugoslav
Committee not to admit any Serbian deputies except those of the
Opposition, it appears that no other Serbs took a part in the
proceedings. The Italian Government adopted an ambiguous attitude, for
while Orlando publicly endorsed the resolutions, as did several other
Ministers, notably Bissolati, the Premier gave no confirmation to those
who interpreted his attitude as implying the tacit abandonment of
Italy's extreme territorial claims. Sonnino was so reserved that he took
no share at all in the Congress and refused to receive the Yugoslavs. He
made no secret of his determination to exact the London Treaty. Nothing
was signed by the Italian Government; and if Orlando's honour was
involved it certainly does not seem possible to say the same of Sonnino.
It may be that Pa[vs]i['c] foresaw what would happen and was therefore
unwilling to be implicated. He is an astute statesman of the old
school--"too old," says _The New Europe_, which regards him as an
Oriental sultan. But respecting the Pact of Rome they were rather at
issue with the Italians. What the Italians gained was that the various
clauses of the Pact were used as the basis for propaganda in the
Austrian ranks on the Piave. And when once the Austrian peril had
vanished the old rancour reappeared, particularly when, by the terms of
the military armistice with Austria, Italy obtained the right to occupy
a zone corresponding with what she was given by the London Treaty.
Whereas in that instrument the frontiers were exactly indicated, there
was in the Pact of Rome no more than a general agreement that the
principles of nationality and self-determination should be applied, with
due regard to other "vital interests." Bissolati's group was in favour
of something more definite, but to this Orlando was not well disposed;
and Trumbi['c], the President of the Yugoslav Committee, did not avail
himself of the, perhaps rather useless, offer of some Serbs who were not
participating in the Congress, but suggested that while he worked with
the Government they would keep in touch with the Bissolati group; even
as Bismarck who would work openly with a Government, and through his
agents with the Opposition.