The speech was an admirable expression of that new spirit which the
Allies had been fighting for. "Each of the anti-German nations," he
said, "must guard itself against any unconsciously German element in its
soul, if only in order to have the right to combat any trace in others
of the imperialism which had poisoned the outlook of the German people."
With regard to the Adriatic: "Yugoslavia exists, and no one can undo
this. But to the credit of Italy be it said, the attainment of unity and
independence for the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was and must be alike
the reason and the certain issue of our War.... Italy felt that if
Serbia had been swallowed up by that monstrous Empire--itself a vassal
of the German Empire--her own economic expansion and political
independence would have received a mortal blow. And so she was on
Serbia's side, first in neutrality, then in intervention.... Those who
only see, in the formation of the Yugoslav State, a sympathetic or
antipathetic episode of the War, or a subsidiary effect of it, have
failed to detect its inner meaning." As for the Treaty of London which
was concluded against the enemy, it was not to be regarded as intangible
against a friendly people. By special grants of autonomy, as at Zadar,
or by arrangements between the two States, he would see the language and
culture of all the trans-Adriatic sons of Italy assured. He warned his
countrymen lest, in order to meet the peril of a German-Slav alliance
against them, they should have to subordinate themselves to France and
England, and be their proteges instead of their real Allies--a situation
not unlike that of the Triple Alliance when Germany protected them
against the ever-imminent attack of Austria.... "But perhaps the
Yugoslavs will not be grateful or show an equal spirit of conciliation?
Certainly they will then have no vital interests to push against Italy,
and in the long run sentiments follow interests." There was, in fact,
throughout the speech only one questionable passage, that in which he
said that "if Italy renounced the annexation of Dalmatia she might
obtain from Yugoslavia or from the Peace Conference the joy of pressing
to her heart the most Italian city of Rieka, which the Treaty of London
renounced." This may have been a sop to Cerberus. But Bissolati's
appeals to justice and to wisdom fell upon the same stony ground as his
demonstration that Dalmatia's strategic value is very slight from a
defensive point of view to those who possess Pola, Valona and the outer
islands. There is a school of reasonable Italians, such as Giuseppe
Prezzolini, who for strategic reasons asked for the isle of Vis. Mazzini
himself, after 1866, found it necessary, for the same reasons, that Vis
should be Italian, since it is the key of the Adriatic. Some of us
thought that it might have been feasible to follow the precedent of
Port Mahon, which Great Britain occupied without exercising sovereignty
over the rest of the island of Minorca. The magnificent harbour of Vis,
perfectly protected against the bora, would have satisfied all the
demands of the Italian navy. Vis is to-day practically as much Slav as
Minorca was Spanish, and if the Slavs had been left in possession of the
remainder of that island it would have proved the reverse of a danger to
the Italians, since with a moderate amount of good sense the same
relations would have existed as was the case upon Minorca.... The
solution which was ultimately found in the Treaty of Rapallo was to
allocate to the Italians in complete sovereignty not the island of Vis,
but the smaller neighbouring island of Lastovo.
While the vast majority of Italians would not listen to Bissolati they
delighted in Gabriele d'Annunzio. The great poet Carducci[21] had his
heart full when he thought about the ragged, starving Croat soldiers,
pitiable victims of the Habsburgs, exploited by them all their lives and
fighting for them in a foreign land--and they fought bravely; but as
they were often clad in miserable garments, they were called by those
who wanted to revile them "Croat dirt." And that is what they are to
Gabriele d'Annunzio. When the controversies of to-day have long been
buried and when d'Annunzio's works are read, his lovers will be stabbed
by his _Lettera ai Dalmati_. And if the mob had to be told precisely
what the Allies are, it did not need a lord of language to dilate upon
"the thirty-two teeth of Wilson's undecipherable smile," to say that the
French "drunk with victory, again fly all their plumes in the wind, tune
up all their fanfares, quicken their pace in order to pass the most
resolute and speedy--and we step aside to let them pass." No laurel will
be added to his fame for having spoken of "the people of the five meals"
[the English] which, "its bloody work hardly ended, reopens its jaws to
devour as much as it can." All Italy resounded with the catchword that
the Croats had been Austria's most faithful servants, although some
Italians, such as Admiral Millo, as we shall see, when writing
confidentially, did not say anything so foolish. Very frequently,
however, as the Croats noticed, those who had been the most
uncompromising wielders of Austria's despotism were taken on by Italy,
the new despot. For example, at Split when the mayor and other Yugoslav
leaders were arrested at the beginning of the War, one Francis
Mandirazza was appointed as Government Commissary, after having filled
the political post of district captain (Bezirkshauptmann) which was only
given to those who were in the entire confidence of the Government. As
soon as the Italians had possession of [vS]ibenik they took him into
their service.