The period between May 1881 and July 1887 occupied, in the region of

foreign affairs, by the negotiation, conclusion and renewal of the

triple alliance, by the Bulgarian crisis and by the dawn of an Italian

colonial policy, was marked at home by urgent political and economic

problems, and by the parliamentary phenomena known as _trasformismo_. On

the 29th of June 1881 the Chamber adopted a Franchise Reform Bill, which

increased the electorate from 600,000 to 2,000,000 by lowering the

fiscal qualification from 40 to 19.80 lire in direct taxation, and by

extending the suffrage to all persons who had passed through the two

lower standards of the elementary schools, and practically to all

persons able to read and write. The immediate result of the reform was

to increase the political influence of large cities where the proportion

of illiterate workmen was lower than in the country districts, and to

exclude from the franchise numbers of peasants and small proprietors

who, though of more conservative temperament and of better economic

position than the artizan population of the large towns, were often

unable to fulfil the scholarship qualification. On the 12th of April

1883 the forced currency was formally abolished by the resumption of

treasury payments in gold with funds obtained through a loan of

£14,500,000 issued in London on the 5th of May 1882. Owing to the

hostility of the French market, the loan was covered with difficulty,

and, though the gold premium fell and commercial exchanges were

temporarily facilitated by the resumption of cash payments, it is

doubtful whether these advantages made up for the burden of £640,000

additional annual interest thrown upon the exchequer. On the 6th of

March 1885 parliament finally sanctioned the conventions by which state

railways were farmed out to three private companies--the Mediterranean,

Adriatic and Sicilian. The railways redeemed in 1875-1876 had been

worked in the interval by the government at a heavy loss. A commission

of inquiry reported in favour of private management. The conventions,

concluded for a period of sixty years, but terminable by either party

after twenty or forty years, retained for the state the possession of

the lines (except the southern railway, viz. the line from Bologna to

Brindisi belonging to the Società Meridionale to whom the Adriatic lines

were now farmed), but sold rolling stock to the companies, arranged

various schedules of state subsidy for lines projected or in course of

construction, guaranteed interest on the bonds of the companies and

arranged for the division of revenue between the companies, the reserve

fund and the state. National control of the railways was secured by a

proviso that the directors must be of Italian nationality. Depretis and

his colleague Genala, minister of public works, experienced great

difficulty in securing parliamentary sanction for the conventions, not

so much on account of their defective character, as from the opposition

of local interests anxious to extort new lines from the government. In

fact, the conventions were only voted by a majority of twenty-three

votes after the government had undertaken to increase the length of new

state-built lines from 1500 to 2500 kilometres. Unfortunately, the

calculation of probable railway revenue on which the conventions had

been based proved to be enormously exaggerated. For many years the 37½%

of the gross revenue (less the cost of maintaining the rolling stock,

incumbent on the state) scarcely sufficed to pay the interest on debts

incurred for railway construction and on the guaranteed bonds. Gradually

the increase of traffic consequent upon the industrial development of

Italy decreased the annual losses of the state, but the position of the

government in regard to the railways still remained so unsatisfactory as

to render the resumption of the whole system by the state on the

expiration of the first period of twenty years in 1905 inevitable.

Finance.

Intimately bound up with the forced currency, the railway conventions

and public works was the financial question in general. From 1876, when

equilibrium between expenditure and revenue had first been attained,

taxation yielded steady annual surpluses, which in 1881 reached the

satisfactory level of £2,120,000. The gradual abolition of the grist tax

on minor cereals diminished the surplus in 1882 to £236,000, and in 1883

to £110,000, while the total repeal of the grist tax on wheat, which

took effect on the 1st of January 1884, coincided with the opening of a

new and disastrous period of deficit. True, the repeal of the grist tax

was not the only, nor possibly even the principal, cause of the deficit.

The policy of "fiscal transformation" inaugurated by the Left increased

revenue from indirect taxation from £17,000,000 in 1876 to more than

£24,000,000 in 1887, by substituting heavy corn duties for the grist

tax, and by raising the sugar and petroleum duties to unprecedented

levels. But partly from lack of firm financial administration, partly

through the increase of military and naval expenditure (which in 1887

amounted to £9,000,000 for the army, while special efforts were made to

strengthen the navy), and principally through the constant drain of

railway construction and public works, the demands upon the exchequer

grew largely to exceed the normal increase of revenue, and necessitated

the contraction of new debts. In their anxiety to remain in office

Depretis and the finance minister, Magliani, never hesitated to mortgage

the financial future of their country. No concession could be denied to

deputies, or groups of deputies, whose support was indispensable to the

life of the cabinet, nor, under such conditions, was it possible to

place any effective check upon administrative abuses in which

politicians or their electors were interested. Railways, roads and

harbours which contractors had undertaken to construct for reasonable

amounts were frequently made to cost thrice the original estimates.

Minghetti, in a trenchant exposure of the parliamentary condition of

Italy during this period, cites a case in which a credit for certain

public works was, during a debate in the Chamber, increased by the

government from £6,600,000 to £9,000,000 in order to conciliate local

political interests. In the spring of 1887 Genala, minister of public

works, was taken to task for having sanctioned expenditure of

£80,000,000 on railway construction while only £40,000,000 had been

included in the estimates. As most of these credits were spread over a

series of years, succeeding administrations found their financial

liberty of action destroyed, and were obliged to cover deficit by

constant issues of consolidated stock. Thus the deficit of £940,000 for

the financial year 1885-1886 rose to nearly £2,920,000 in 1887-1888, and

in 1888-1889 attained the terrible level of £9,400,000.

Nevertheless, in spite of many and serious shortcomings, the long series

of Depretis administrations was marked by the adoption of some useful

measures. Besides the realization of the formal programme of the Left,

consisting of the repeal of the grist tax, the abolition of the forced

currency, the extension of the suffrage and the development of the

railway system, Depretis laid the foundation for land tax re-assessment

by introducing a new cadastral survey. Unfortunately, the new survey was

made largely optional, so that provinces which had reason to hope for a

diminution of land tax under a revised assessment hastened to complete

their survey, while others, in which the average of the land tax was

below a normal assessment, neglected to comply with the provisions of

the scheme. An important undertaking, known as the Agricultural Inquiry,

brought to light vast quantities of information valuable for future

agrarian legislation. The year 1885 saw the introduction and adoption of

a measure embodying the principle of employers' liability for accidents

to workmen, a principle subsequently extended and more equitably defined

in the spring of 1899. An effort to encourage the development of the

mercantile marine was made in the same year, and a convention was

concluded with the chief lines of passenger steamers to retain their

fastest vessels as auxiliaries to the fleet in case of war. Sanitation

and public hygiene received a potent impulse from the cholera epidemic

of 1884, many of the unhealthiest quarters in Naples and other cities

being demolished and rebuilt, with funds chiefly furnished by the state.

The movement was strongly supported by King Humbert, whose intrepidity

in visiting the most dangerous spots at Busca and Naples while the

epidemic was at its height, reassuring the panic-stricken inhabitants by

his presence, excited the enthusiasm of his people and the admiration of

Europe.

"Trasformismo."

During the accomplishment of these and other reforms the condition of

parliament underwent profound change. By degrees the administrations of

the Left had ceased to rely solely upon the Liberal sections of the

Chamber, and had carried their most important bills with the help of the

Right. This process of transformation was not exclusively the work of

Depretis, but had been initiated as early as 1873, when a portion of the

Right under Minghetti had, by joining the Left, overturned the

Lanza-Sella cabinet. In 1876 Minghetti himself had fallen a victim to a

similar defection of Conservative deputies. The practical annihilation

of the old Right in the elections of 1876 opened a new parliamentary

era. Reduced in number to less than one hundred, and radically changed

in spirit and composition, the Right gave way, if not to despair, at

least to a despondency unsuited to an opposition party. Though on more

than one occasion personal rancour against the men of the Moderate Left

prevented the Right from following Sella's advice and regaining, by

timely coalition with cognate parliamentary elements, a portion of its

former influence, the bulk of the party, with singular inconsistency,

drew nearer and nearer to the Liberal cabinets. The process was

accelerated by Sella's illness and death (14th March 1884), an event

which cast profound discouragement over the more thoughtful of the

Conservatives and Moderate Liberals, by whom Sella had been regarded as

a supreme political reserve, as a statesman whose experienced vigour and

patriotic sagacity might have been trusted to lift Italy from any depth

of folly or misfortune. By a strange anomaly the Radical measures

brought forward by the Left diminished instead of increasing the

distance between it and the Conservatives. Numerically insufficient to

reject such measures, and lacking the fibre and the cohesion necessary

for the pursuance of a far-sighted policy, the Right thought prudent not

to employ its strength in uncompromising opposition, but rather, by

supporting the government, to endeavour to modify Radical legislation in

a Conservative sense. In every case the calculation proved fallacious.

Radical measures were passed unmodified, and the Right was compelled

sadly to accept the accomplished fact. Thus it was with the abolition of

the grist tax, the reform of the suffrage, the railway conventions and

many other bills. When, in course of time, the extended suffrage

increased the Republican and Extreme Radical elements in the Chamber,

and the Liberal "Pentarchy" (composed of Crispi, Cairoli, Nicotera,

Zanardelli and Baccarini) assumed an attitude of bitter hostility to

Depretis, the Right, obeying the impulse of Minghetti, rallied openly to

Depretis, lending him aid without which his prolonged term of office

would have been impossible. The result was parliamentary chaos, baptized

_trasformismo_. In May 1883 this process received official recognition

by the elimination of the Radicals Zanardelli and Baccarini from the

Depretis cabinet, while in the course of 1884 a Conservative, Signor

Biancheri, was elected to the presidency of the Chamber, and another

Conservative, General Ricotti, appointed to the War Office. Though

Depretis, at the end of his life in 1887, showed signs of repenting of

the confusion thus created, he had established a parliamentary system

destined largely to sterilize and vitiate the political life of Italy.

Colonial policy.

Contemporaneously with the vicissitudes of home and foreign policy under

the Left there grew up in Italy a marked tendency towards colonial

enterprise. The tendency itself dated from 1869, when a congress of the

Italian chambers of commerce at Genoa had urged the Lanza cabinet to

establish a commercial depôt on the Red Sea. On the 11th of March 1870

an Italian shipper, Signor Rubattino, had bought the bay of Assab, with

the neighbouring island of Darmakieh, from Beheran, sultan of Raheita,

for £1880, the funds being furnished by the government. The Egyptian

government being unwilling to recognize the sovereignty of Beheran over

Assab or his right to sell territory to a foreign power,

Visconti-Venosta thought it opportune not then to occupy Assab. No

further step was taken until, at the end of 1879, Rubattino prepared to

establish a commercial station at Assab. The British government made

inquiry as to his intentions, and on the 19th of April 1880 received a

formal undertaking from Cairoli that Assab would never be fortified nor

be made a military establishment. Meanwhile (January 1880) stores and

materials were landed, and Assab was permanently occupied. Eighteen

months later a party of Italian sailors and explorers under Lieutenant

Biglieri and Signor Giulietti were massacred in Egyptian territory.

Egypt, however, refused to make thorough inquiry into the massacre, and

was only prevented from occupying Raheita and coming into conflict with

Italy by the good offices of Lord Granville, who dissuaded the Egyptian

government from enforcing its sovereignty. On the 20th of September 1881

Beheran formally accepted Italian protection, and in the following

February an Anglo-Italian convention established the Italian title to

Assab on condition that Italy should formally recognise the suzerainty

of the Porte and of the khedive over the Red Sea coast, and should

prevent the transport of arms and munitions of war through the territory

of Assab. This convention was never recognized by the Porte nor by the

Egyptian government. A month later (10th March 1882) Rubattino made over

his establishment to the Italian government, and on the 12th of June the

Chamber adopted a bill constituting Assab an Italian crown colony.

The Egyptian Question.

Disaster of Dogali.

Within four weeks of the adoption of this bill the bombardment of

Alexandria by the British fleet (11th July 1882) opened an era destined

profoundly to affect the colonial position of Italy. The revolt of Arabi

Pasha (September 1881) had led to the meeting of an ambassadorial

conference at Constantinople, promoted by Mancini, Italian minister for

foreign affairs, in the hope of preventing European intervention in

Egypt and the permanent establishment of an Anglo-French condominium to

the detriment of Italian influence. At the opening of the conference

(23rd June 1882) Italy secured the signature of a self-denying protocol

whereby all the great powers undertook to avoid isolated action; but the

rapid development of the crisis in Egypt, and the refusal of France to

co-operate with Great Britain in the restoration of order, necessitated

vigorous action by the latter alone. In view of the French refusal, Lord

Granville on the 27th of July invited Italy to join in restoring order

in Egypt; but Mancini and Depretis, in spite of the efforts of Crispi,

then in London, declined the offer. Financial considerations, lack of

proper transports for an expeditionary corps, fear of displeasing

France, dislike of a "policy of adventure," misplaced deference towards

the ambassadorial conference in Constantinople, and unwillingness to

thwart the current of Italian sentiment in favour of the Egyptian

"nationalists," were the chief motives of the Italian refusal, which had

the effect of somewhat estranging Great Britain and Italy. Anglo-Italian

relations, however, regained their normal cordiality two years later,

and found expression in the support lent by Italy to the British

proposal at the London conference on the Egyptian question (July 1884).

About the same time Mancini was informed by the Italian agent in Cairo

that Great Britain would be well disposed towards an extension of

Italian influence on the Red Sea coast. Having sounded Lord Granville,

Mancini received encouragement to seize Beilul and Massawa, in view of

the projected restriction of the Egyptian zone of military occupation

consequent on the Mahdist rising in the Sudan. Lord Granville further

inquired whether Italy would co-operate in pacifying the Sudan, and

received an affirmative reply. Italian action was hastened by news that,

in December 1884, an exploring party under Signor Bianchi, royal

commissioner for Assab, had been massacred in the Aussa (Danakil)

country, an event which aroused in Italy a desire to punish the

assassins and to obtain satisfaction for the still unpunished massacre

of Signor Giulietti and his companions. Partly to satisfy public

opinion, partly in order to profit by the favourable disposition of the

British government, and partly in the hope of remedying the error

committed in 1882 by refusal to co-operate with Great Britain in Egypt,

the Italian government in January 1885 despatched an expedition under

Admiral Caimi and Colonel Saletta to occupy Massawa and Beilul. The

occupation, effected on the 5th of February, was accelerated by fear

lest Italy might be forestalled by France or Russia, both of which

powers were suspected of desiring to establish themselves firmly on the

Red Sea and to exercise a protectorate over Abyssinia. News of the

occupation reached Europe simultaneously with the tidings of the fall of

Khartum, an event which disappointed Italian hopes of military

co-operation with Great Britain in the Sudan. The resignation of the

Gladstone-Granville cabinet further precluded the projected Italian

occupation of Suakin, and the Italians, wisely refraining from an

independent attempt to succour Kassala, then besieged by the Mahdists,

bent their efforts to the increase of their zone of occupation around

Massawa. The extension of the Italian zone excited the suspicions of

John, negus of Abyssinia, whose apprehensions were assiduously fomented

by Alula, ras of Tigré, and by French and Greek adventurers. Measures,

apparently successful, were taken to reassure the negus, but shortly

afterwards protection inopportunely accorded by Italy to enemies of Ras

Alula, induced the Abyssinians to enter upon hostilities. In January

1886 Ras Alula raided the village of Wa, to the west of Zula, but

towards the end of the year (23rd November) Wa was occupied by the

irregular troops of General Gené, who had superseded Colonel Saletta at

Massawa. Angered by this step, Ras Alula took prisoners the members of

an Italian exploring party commanded by Count Salimbeni, and held them

as hostages for the evacuation of Wa. General Gené nevertheless

reinforced Wa and pushed forward a detachment to Saati. On the 25th of

January 1887 Ras Alula attacked Saati, but was repulsed with loss. On

the following day, however, the Abyssinians succeeded in surprising,

near the village of Dogali, an Italian force of 524 officers and men

under Colonel De Cristoforis, who were convoying provisions to the

garrison of Saati. The Abyssinians, 20,000 strong, speedily overwhelmed

the small Italian force, which, after exhausting its ammunition, was

destroyed where it stood. One man only escaped. Four hundred and seven

men and twenty-three officers were killed outright, and one officer and

eighty-one men wounded. Dead and wounded alike were horribly mutilated

by order of Alula. Fearing a new attack, General Gené withdrew his

forces from Saati, Wa and Arafali; but the losses of the Abyssinians at

Saati and Dogali had been so heavy as to dissuade Alula from further

hostilities.

Abyssinia.

Treaty of Uccialli.

In Italy the disaster of Dogali produced consternation, and caused the

fall of the Depretis-Robilant cabinet. The Chamber, eager for revenge,

voted a credit of £200,000, and sanctioned the despatch of

reinforcements. Meanwhile Signor Crispi, who, though averse from

colonial adventure, desired to vindicate Italian honour, entered the

Depretis cabinet as minister of the interior, and obtained from

parliament a new credit of £800,000. In November 1887 a strong

expedition under General di San Marzano raised the strength of the

Massawa garrison to nearly 20,000 men. The British government, desirous

of preventing an Italo-Abyssinian conflict, which could but strengthen

the position of the Mahdists, despatched Mr (afterwards Sir) Gerald

Portal from Massawa on the 29th of October to mediate with the negus.

The mission proved fruitless. Portal returned to Massawa on the 25th of

December 1887, and warned the Italians that John was preparing to attack

them in the following spring with an army of 100,000 men. On the 28th of

March 1888 the negus indeed descended from the Abyssinian high plateau

in the direction of Saati, but finding the Italian position too strong

to be carried by assault, temporized and opened negotiations for peace.

His tactics failed to entice the Italians from their position, and on

the 3rd of April sickness among his men compelled John to withdraw the

Abyssinian army. The negus next marched against Menelek, king of Shoa,

whose neutrality Italy had purchased with 5000 Remington rifles and a

supply of ammunition, but found him with 80,000 men too strongly

entrenched to be successfully attacked. Tidings of a new Mahdist

incursion into Abyssinian territory reaching the negus induced him to

postpone the settlement of his quarrel with Menelek until the dervishes

had been chastised. Marching towards the Blue Nile, he joined battle

with the Mahdists, but on the 10th of March 1889 was killed, in the hour

of victory, near Gallabat. His death gave rise to an Abyssinian war of

succession between Mangashà, natural son of John, and Menelek, grandson

of the Negus Sella-Sellassié. Menelek, by means of Count Antonelli,

resident in the Shoa country, requested Italy to execute a diversion in

his favour by occupying Asmarà and other points on the high plateau.

Antonelli profited by the situation to obtain Menelek's signature to a

treaty fixing the frontiers of the Italian colony and defining

Italo-Abyssinian relations. The treaty, signed at Uccialli on the 2nd of

May 1899, arranged for regular intercourse between Italy and Abyssinia

and conceded to Italy a portion of the high plateau, with the positions

of Halai, Saganeiti and Asmarà. The main point of the treaty, however,

lay in clause 17:--

"His Majesty the king of kings of Ethiopia _consents_ to make use of

the government of His Majesty the king of Italy for the treatment of

all questions concerning other powers and governments."

Upon this clause Italy founded her claim to a protectorate over

Abyssinia. In September 1889 the treaty of Uccialli was ratified in

Italy by Menelek's lieutenant, the Ras Makonnen. Makonnen further

concluded with the Italian premier, Crispi, a convention whereby Italy

recognized Menelek as emperor of Ethiopia, Menelek recognized the

Italian colony, and arranged for a special Italo-Abyssinian currency and

for a loan. On the 11th of October Italy communicated article 17 of the

treaty of Uccialli to the European powers, interpreting it as a valid

title to an Italian protectorate over Abyssinia. Russia alone neglected

to take note of the communication, and persisted in the hostile attitude

she had assumed at the moment of the occupation of Massawa. Meanwhile

the Italian mint coined thalers bearing the portrait of King Humbert,

with an inscription referring to the Italian protectorate, and on the

1st of January 1890 a royal decree conferred upon the colony the name of

"Eritrea."

Operations in Abyssinia.

In the colony itself General Baldissera, who had replaced General

Saletta, delayed the movement against Mangashà desired by Menelek. The

Italian general would have preferred to wait until his intervention was

requested by both pretenders to the Abyssinian throne. Pressed by the

home government, he, however, instructed a native ally to occupy the

important positions of Keren and Asmarà, and prepared himself to take

the offensive against Mangashà and Ras Alula. The latter retreated south

of the river Mareb, leaving the whole of the cis-Mareb territory,

including the provinces of Hamasen, Agameh, Seraè and Okulè-Kusai, in

Italian hands. General Orero, successor of Baldissera, pushed offensive

action more vigorously, and on the 26th of January 1890 entered Adowa, a

city considerably to the south of the Mareb--an imprudent step which

aroused Menelek's suspicions, and had hurriedly to be retraced.

Mangashà, seeing further resistance to be useless, submitted to Menelek,

who at the end of February ratified at Makallé the additional

convention to the treaty of Uccialli, but refused to recognize the

Italian occupation of the Mareb. The negus, however, conformed to

article 17 of the treaty of Uccialli by requesting Italy to represent

Abyssinia at the Brussels anti-slavery conference, an act which

strengthened Italian illusions as to Menelek's readiness to submit to

their protectorate. Menelek had previously notified the chief European

powers of his coronation at Entotto (14th December 1889), but Germany

and Great Britain replied that such notification should have been made

through the Italian government. Germany, moreover, wounded Menelek's

pride by employing merely the title of "highness." The negus took

advantage of the incident to protest against the Italian text of article

17, and to contend that the Amharic text contained no equivalent for the

word "_consent_," but merely stipulated that Abyssinia "_might_" make

use of Italy in her relations with foreign powers. On the 28th of

October 1890 Count Antonelli, negotiator of the treaty, was despatched

to settle the controversy, but on arriving at Adis Ababa, the new

residence of the negus, found agreement impossible either with regard to

the frontier or the protectorate. On the 10th of April 1891, Menelek

communicated to the powers his views with regard to the Italian

frontier, and announced his intention of re-establishing the ancient

boundaries of Ethiopia as far as Khartum to the north-west and Victoria

Nyanza to the south. Meanwhile the marquis de Rudini, who had succeeded

Crispi as Italian premier, had authorized the abandonment of article 17

even before he had heard of the failure of Antonelli's negotiations.

Rudini was glad to leave the whole dispute in abeyance and to make with

the local ras, or chieftains, of the high plateau an arrangement

securing for Italy the cis-Mareb provinces of Seraè and Okulè-Kusai

under the rule of an allied native chief named Bath-Agos. Rudini,

however, was able to conclude two protocols with Great Britain (March

and April 1891) whereby the British government definitely recognized

Abyssinia as within the Italian sphere of influence in return for an

Italian recognition of British rights in the Upper Nile.

First Crispi Cabinet.

Tosti and conciliation.

Terms of the "Roman Question."

The period 1887-1890 was marked in Italy by great political activity.

The entry of Crispi into the Depretis cabinet as minister of the

interior (4th April 1887) introduced into the government an element of

vigour which had long been lacking. Though sixty-eight years of age,

Crispi possessed an activity, a rapidity of decision and an energy in

execution with which none of his contemporaries could vie. Within four

months the death of Depretis (29th July 1887) opened for Crispi the way

to the premiership. Besides assuming the presidency of the council of

ministers and retaining the ministry of the interior, Crispi took over

the portfolio of foreign affairs which Depretis had held since the

resignation of Count di Robilant. One of the first questions with which

he had to deal was that of conciliation between Italy and the Vatican.

At the end of May the pope, in an allocution to the cardinals, had

spoken of Italy in terms of unusual cordiality, and had expressed a wish

for peace. A few days later Signor Bonghi, one of the framers of the Law

of Guarantees, published in the _Nuova Antologia_ a plea for

reconciliation on the basis of an amendment to the Law of Guarantees and

recognition by the pope of the Italian title to Rome. The chief incident

cf the movement towards conciliation consisted, however, in the

publication of a pamphlet entitled _La Conciliazione_ by Father Tosti, a

close friend and confidant of the pope, extolling the advantages of

peace between Vatican and Quirinal. Tosti's pamphlet was known to

represent papal ideas, and Tosti himself was _persona grata_ to the

Italian government. Reconciliation seemed within sight when suddenly

Tosti's pamphlet was placed on the Index, ostensibly on account of a

phrase, "The whole of Italy entered Rome by the breach of Porta Pia; the

king cannot restore Rome to the pope, since Rome belongs to the Italian

people." On the 4th of June 1887 the official Vatican organ, the

_Osservatore Romano_, published a letter written by Tosti to the pope

conditionally retracting the views expressed in the pamphlet. The letter

had been written at the pope's request, on the understanding that it

should not be published. On the 15th of June the pope addressed to

Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro, secretary of state, a letter reiterating

in uncompromising terms the papal claim to the temporal power, and at

the end of July Cardinal Rampolla reformulated the same claim in a

circular to the papal nuncios abroad. The dream of conciliation was at

an end, but the Tosti incident had served once more to illustrate the

true position of the Vatican in regard to Italy. It became clear that

neither the influence of the regular clergy, of which the Society of

Jesus is the most powerful embodiment, nor that of foreign clerical

parties, which largely control the Peter's Pence fund, would ever permit

renunciation of the papal claim to temporal power. France, and the

French Catholics especially, feared lest conciliation should diminish

the reliance of the Vatican upon France, and consequently French hold

over the Vatican. The Vatican, for its part, felt its claim to temporal

power to be too valuable a pecuniary asset and too efficacious an

instrument of church discipline lightly to be thrown away. The legend of

an "imprisoned pope," subject to every whim of his gaolers, had never

failed to arouse the pity and loosen the purse-strings of the faithful;

dangerous innovators and would-be reformers within the church could be

compelled to bow before the symbol of the temporal power, and their

spirit of submission tested by their readiness to forgo the realization

of their aims until the head of the church should be restored to his

rightful domain. More important than all was the interest of the Roman

curia, composed almost exclusively of Italians, to retain in its own

hands the choice of the pontiff and to maintain the predominance of the

Italian element and the Italian spirit in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Conciliation with Italy would expose the pope and his Italian

_entourage_ to suspicion of being unduly subject to Italian political

influence--of being, in a word, more Italian than Catholic. Such a

suspicion would inevitably lead to a movement in favour of the

internationalization of the curia and of the papacy. In order to avoid

this danger it was therefore necessary to refuse all compromise, and, by

perpetual reiteration of a claim incompatible with Italian territorial

unity, to prove to the church at large that the pope and the curia were

more Catholic than Italian. Such rigidity of principle need not be

extended to the affairs of everyday contact between the Vatican and the

Italian authorities, with regard to which, indeed, a tacit _modus

vivendi_ was easily attainable. Italy, for her part, could not go back

upon the achievements of the Risorgimento by restoring Rome or any

portion of Italian territory to the pope. She had hoped by conciliation

to arrive at an understanding which should have ranged the church among

the conservative and not among the disruptive forces of the country, but

she was keenly desirous to retain the papacy as a preponderatingly

Italian institution, and was ready to make whatever formal concessions

might have appeared necessary to reassure foreign Catholics concerning

the reality of the pope's spiritual independence. The failure of the

conciliation movement left profound irritation between Vatican and

Quirinal, an irritation which, on the Vatican side, found expression in

vivacious protests and in threats of leaving Rome; and, on the Italian

side, in the deposition of the syndic of Rome for having visited the

cardinal-vicar, in the anti-clerical provisions of the new penal code,

and in the inauguration (9th June 1889) of a monument to Giordano Bruno

on the very site of his martyrdom.

The internal situation inherited by Crispi from Depretis was very

unsatisfactory. Extravagant expenditure on railways and public works,

loose administration of finance, the cost of colonial enterprise, the

growing demands for the army and navy, the impending tariff war with

France, and the over-speculation in building and in industrial ventures,

which had absorbed all the floating capital of the country, had combined

to produce a state of affairs calling for firm and radical treatment.

Crispi, burdened by the premiership and by the two most important

portfolios in the cabinet, was, however, unable to exercise efficient

control over all departments of state. Nevertheless his administration

was by no means unfruitful. Zanardelli, minister of justice, secured in

June 1888 the adoption of a new penal code; state surveillance was

extended to the _opere pie_, or charitable institutions; municipal

franchise was reformed by granting what was practically manhood suffrage

with residential qualification, provision being made for minority

representation; and the central state administration was reformed by a

bill fixing the number and functions of the various ministries. The

management of finance was scarcely satisfactory, for though Giolitti,

who had succeeded Magliani and Perazzi at the treasury, suppressed the

former's illusory "pension fund," he lacked the fibre necessary to deal

with the enormous deficit of nearly £10,000,000 in 1888-1889, the

existence of which both Perazzi and he had recognized. The most

successful feature of Crispi's term of office was his strict maintenance

of order and the suppression of Radical and Irredentist agitation. So

vigorous was his treatment of Irredentism that he dismissed without

warning his colleague Seismit Doda, minister of finance, for having

failed to protest against Irredentist speeches delivered in his presence

at Udine. Firmness such as this secured for him the support of all

constitutional elements, and after three years' premiership his position

was infinitely stronger than at the outset. The general election of 1890

gave the cabinet an almost unwieldy majority, comprising four-fifths of

the Chamber. A lengthy term of office seemed to be opening out before

him when, on the 31st of January 1891, Crispi, speaking in a debate upon

an unimportant bill, angrily rebuked the Right for its noisy

interruptions. The rebuke infuriated the Conservative deputies, who,

protesting against Crispi's words in the name of the "sacred memories"

of their party, precipitated a division and placed the cabinet in a

minority. The incident, whether due to chance or guile, brought about

the resignation of Crispi. A few days later he was succeeded in the

premiership by the marquis di Rudini, leader of the Right, who formed a

coalition cabinet with Nicotera and a part of the Left.

Rudini.

Second renewal of the Triple Alliance.

Giolitti.

The sudden fall of Crispi wrought a great change in the character of

Italian relations with foreign powers. His policy had been characterized

by extreme cordiality towards Austria and Germany, by a close

understanding with Great Britain in regard to Mediterranean questions,

and by an apparent animosity towards France, which at one moment seemed

likely to lead to war. Shortly before the fall of the Depretis-Robilant

cabinet Count Robilant had announced the intention of Italy to denounce

the commercial treaties with France and Austria, which would lapse on

the 31st of December 1887, and had intimated his readiness to negotiate

new treaties. On the 24th of June 1887, in view of a possible rupture of

commercial relations with France, the Depretis-Crispi cabinet introduced

a new general tariff. The probability of the conclusion of a new

Franco-Italian treaty was small, both on account of the protectionist

spirit of France and of French resentment at the renewal of the triple

alliance, but even such slight probability vanished after a visit paid

to Bismarck by Crispi (October 1887) within three months of his

appointment to the premiership. Crispi entertained no a priori animosity

towards France, but was strongly convinced that Italy must emancipate

herself from the position of political dependence on her powerful

neighbour which had vitiated the foreign policy of the Left. So far was

he from desiring a rupture with France, that he had subordinated

acceptance of the portfolio of the interior in the Depretis cabinet to

an assurance that the triple alliance contained no provision for

offensive warfare. But his ostentatious visit to Friedrichsruh, and a

subsequent speech at Turin, in which, while professing sentiments of

friendship and esteem for France, he eulogized the personality of

Bismarck, aroused against him a hostility on the part of the French

which he was never afterwards able to allay. France was equally careless

of Italian susceptibilities, and in April 1888 Goblet made a futile but

irritating attempt to enforce at Massawa the Ottoman régime of the

capitulations in regard to non-Italian residents. In such circumstances

the negotiations for the new commercial treaty could but fail, and

though the old treaty was prolonged by special arrangement for two

months, differential tariffs were put in force on both sides of the

frontier on the 29th of February 1888. The value of French exports into

Italy decreased immediately by one-half, while Italian exports to France

decreased by nearly two-thirds. At the end of 1889 Crispi abolished the

differential duties against French imports and returned to the general

Italian tariff, but France declined to follow his lead and maintained

her prohibitive dues. Meanwhile the enthusiastic reception accorded to

the young German emperor on the occasion of his visit to Rome in October

1888, and the cordiality shown towards King Humbert and Crispi at Berlin

in May 1889, increased the tension of Franco-Italian relations; nor was

it until after the fall of Prince Bismarck in March 1890 that Crispi

adopted towards the Republic a more friendly attitude by sending an

Italian squadron to salute President Carnot at Toulon. The chief

advantage derived by Italy from Crispi's foreign policy was the increase

of confidence in her government on the part of her allies and of Great

Britain. On the occasion of the incident raised by Goblet with regard to

Massawa, Bismarck made it clear to France that, in case of

complications, Italy would not stand alone; and when in February 1888 a

strong French fleet appeared to menace the Italian coast, the British

Mediterranean squadron demonstrated its readiness to support Italian

naval dispositions. Moreover, under Crispi's hand Italy awoke from the

apathy of former years and gained consciousness of her place in the

world. The conflict with France, the operations in Eritrea, the vigorous

interpretation of the triple alliance, the questions of Morocco and

Bulgaria, were all used by him as means to stimulate national sentiment.

With the instinct of a true statesman, he felt the pulse of the people,

divined their need for prestige, and their preference for a government

heavy-handed rather than lax. How great had been Crispi's power was seen

by contrast with the policy of the Rudini cabinet which succeeded him in

February 1891. Crispi's so-called "megalomania" gave place to

retrenchment in home affairs and to a deferential attitude towards all

foreign powers. The premiership of Rudini was hailed by the Radical

leader, Cavallotti, as a pledge of the non-renewal of the triple

alliance, against which the Radicals began a vociferous campaign. Their

tactics, however, produced a contrary effect, for Rudini, accepting

proposals from Berlin, renewed the alliance in June 1891 for a period of

twelve years. None of Rudini's public utterances justify the supposition

that he assumed office with the intention of allowing the alliance to

lapse on its expiry in May 1892; indeed, he frankly declared it to form

the basis of his foreign policy. The attitude of several of his

colleagues was more equivocal, but though they coquetted with French

financiers in the hope of obtaining the support of the Paris Bourse for

Italian securities, the precipitate renewal of the alliance destroyed

all probability of a close understanding with France. The desire of

Rudini to live on the best possible terms with all powers was further

evinced in the course of a visit paid to Monza by M. de Giers in October

1891, when the Russian statesman was apprised of the entirely defensive

nature of Italian engagements under the triple alliance. At the same

time he carried to a successful conclusion negotiations begun by Crispi

for the renewal of commercial treaties with Austria and Germany upon

terms which to some extent compensated Italy for the reduction of her

commerce with France, and concluded with Great Britain conventions for

the delimitation of British and Italian spheres of influence in

north-east Africa. In home affairs his administration was weak and

vacillating, nor did the economies effected in naval and military

expenditure and in other departments suffice to strengthen the position

of a cabinet which had disappointed the hopes of its supporters. On the

14th of April 1892 dissensions between ministers concerning the

financial programme led to a cabinet crisis, and though Rudini succeeded

in reconstructing his administration, he was defeated in the Chamber on

the 5th of May and obliged to resign. King Humbert, who, from lack of

confidence in Rudini, had declined to allow him to dissolve parliament,

entrusted Signor Giolitti, a Piedmontese deputy, sometime treasury

minister in the Crispi cabinet, with the formation of a ministry of the

Left, which contrived to obtain six months' supply on account, and

dissolved the Chamber.

Bank scandals.

The ensuing general election (November 1892), marked by unprecedented

violence and abuse of official pressure upon the electorate, fitly

ushered in what proved to be the most unfortunate period of Italian

history since the completion of national unity. The influence of

Giolitti was based largely upon the favour of a court clique, and

especially of Rattazzi, minister of the royal household. Early in 1893 a

scandal arose in connexion with the management of state banks, and

particularly of the Banca Romana, whose managing director, Tanlongo, had

issued £2,500,000 of duplicate bank-notes. Giolitti scarcely improved

matters by creating Tanlongo a member of the senate, and by denying in

parliament the existence of any mismanagement. The senate, however,

manifested the utmost hostility to Tanlongo, whom Giolitti, in

consequence of an interpellation in the Chamber, was compelled to

arrest. Arrests of other prominent persons followed, and on the 3rd of

February the Chamber authorized the prosecution of De Zerbi, a

Neapolitan deputy accused of corruption. On the 20th of February De

Zerbi suddenly expired. For a time Giolitti successfully opposed inquiry

into the conditions of the state banks, but on the 21st of March was

compelled to sanction an official investigation by a parliamentary

commission composed of seven members. On the 23rd of November the report

of the commission was read to the Chamber amid intense excitement. It

established that all Italian cabinets since 1880 had grossly neglected

the state banks; that the two preceding cabinets had been aware of the

irregularities committed by Tanlongo; that Tanlongo had heavily

subsidized the press, paying as much as £20,000 for that purpose in 1888

alone; that a number of deputies, including several ex-ministers, had

received from him loans of a considerable amount, which they had

apparently made no effort to refund; that Giolitti had deceived the

Chamber with regard to the state banks, and was open to suspicion of

having, after the arrest of Tanlongo, abstracted a number of documents

from the latter's papers before placing the remainder in the hands of

the judicial authorities. In spite of the gravity of the charges

formulated against many prominent men, the report merely "deplored" and

"disapproved" of their conduct, without proposing penal proceedings.

Fear of extending still farther a scandal which had already attained

huge dimensions, and the desire to avoid any further shock to national

credit, convinced the commissioners of the expediency of avoiding a long

series of prosecutions. The report, however, sealed the fate of the

Giolitti cabinet, and on the 24th of November it resigned amid general

execration.

Aigues-Mortes massacre.

Insurrection in Sicily.

Apart from the lack of scruple manifested by Giolitti in the bank

scandals, he exhibited incompetence in the conduct of foreign and home

affairs. On the 16th and 18th of August 1893 a number of Italian workmen

were massacred at Aigues-Mortes. The French authorities, under whose

eyes the massacre was perpetrated, did nothing to prevent or repress it,

and the mayor of Marseilles even refused to admit the wounded Italian

workmen to the municipal hospital. These occurrences provoked

anti-French demonstrations in many parts of Italy, and revived the

chronic Italian rancour against France. The Italian foreign minister,

Brin, began by demanding the punishment of the persons guilty of the

massacre, but hastened to accept as satisfactory the anodyne measures

adopted by the French government. Giolitti removed the prefect of Rome

for not having prevented an expression of popular anger, and presented

formal excuses to the French consul at Messina for a demonstration

against that consulate. In the following December the French tribunal at

Angoulême acquitted all the authors of the massacre. At home Giolitti

displayed the same weakness. Riots at Naples in August 1893 and symptoms

of unrest in Sicily found him, as usual, unprepared and vacillating. The

closing of the French market to Sicilian produce, the devastation

wrought by the phylloxera and the decrease of the sulphur trade had

combined to produce in Sicily a discontent of which Socialist agitators

took advantage to organize the workmen of the towns and the peasants of

the country into groups known as _fasci_. The movement had no

well-defined object. Here and there it was based upon a bastard

Socialism, in other places it was made a means of municipal party

warfare under the guidance of the local mafia, and in some districts it

was simply popular effervescence against the local octrois on bread and

flour. As early as January 1893 a conflict had occurred between the

police and the populace, in which several men, women and children were

killed, an occurrence used by the agitators further to inflame the

populace. Instead of maintaining a firm policy, Giolitti allowed the

movement to spread until, towards the autumn of 1893, he became alarmed

and drafted troops into the island, though in numbers insufficient to

restore order. At the moment of his fall the movement assumed the aspect

of an insurrection, and during the interval between his resignation

(24th November) and the formation of a new Crispi cabinet (10th

December) conflicts between the public forces and the rioters were

frequent. The return of Crispi to power--a return imposed by public

opinion as that of the only man capable of dealing with the desperate

situation--marked the turning-point of the crisis. Intimately acquainted

with the conditions of his native island, Crispi adopted efficacious

remedies. The _fasci_ were suppressed, Sicily was filled with troops,

the reserves were called out, a state of siege proclaimed, military

courts instituted and the whole movement crushed in a few weeks. The

chief agitators were either sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment or

were compelled to flee the country. A simultaneous insurrection at

Massa-Carrara was crushed with similar vigour. Crispi's methods aroused

great outcry in the Radical press, but the severe sentences of the

military courts were in time tempered by the Royal prerogative of

amnesty.

Financial crisis.

But it was not alone in regard to public order that heroic measures were

necessary. The financial situation inspired serious misgivings. While

engagements contracted by Depretis in regard to public works had more

than neutralized the normal increase of revenue from taxation, the whole

credit of the state had been affected by the severe economic and

financial crises of the years 1889-1893. The state banks, already

hampered by maladministration, were encumbered by huge quantities of

real estate which had been taken over as compensation for unredeemed

mortgages. Baron Sidney Sonnino, minister of finance in the Crispi

cabinet, found a prospective deficit of £7,080,000, and in spite of

economies was obliged to face an actual deficit of more than £6,000,000.

Drastic measures were necessary to limit expenditure and to provide new

sources of revenue. Sonnino applied, and subsequently amended, the Bank

Reform Bill passed by the previous Administration (August 10, 1893) for

the creation of a supreme state bank, the Bank of Italy, which was

entrusted with the liquidation of the insolvent Banca Romana. The new

law forbade the state banks to lend money on real estate, limited their

powers of discounting bills and securities, and reduced the maximum of

their paper currency. In order to diminish the gold premium, which under

Giolitti had risen to 16%, forced currency was given to the existing

notes of the banks of Italy, Naples and Sicily, while special state

notes were issued to meet immediate currency needs. Measures were

enforced to prevent Italian holders of consols from sending their

coupons abroad to be paid in gold, with the result that, whereas in 1893

£3,240,000 had been paid abroad in gold for the service of the January

coupons and only £680,000 in paper in Italy, the same coupon was paid a

year later with only £1,360,000 abroad and £2,540,000 at home. Economies

for more than £1,000,000, were immediately effected, taxes, calculated

to produce £2,440,000, were proposed to be placed upon land, incomes,

salt and corn, while the existing income-tax upon consols (fixed at 8%

by Cambray-Digny in 1868, and raised to 13.20% by Sella in 1870) was

increased to 20% irrespectively of the stockholders' nationality. These

proposals met with opposition so fierce as to cause a cabinet crisis,

but Sonnino who resigned office as minister of finance, returned to

power as minister of the treasury, promulgated some of his proposals by

royal decree, and in spite of vehement opposition secured their

ratification by the Chamber. The tax upon consols, which, in conjunction

with the other severe fiscal measures, was regarded abroad as a pledge

that Italy intended at all costs to avoid bankruptcy, caused a rise in

Italian stocks. When the Crispi cabinet fell in March 1896 Sonnino had

the satisfaction of seeing revenue increased by £3,400,000, expenditure

diminished by £2,800,000, the gold premium reduced from 16 to 5%,

consolidated stock at 95 instead of 72, and, notwithstanding the

expenditure necessitated by the Abyssinian War, financial equilibrium

practically restored.

Attacks on Crispi.

While engaged in restoring order and in supporting Sonnino's courageous

struggle against bankruptcy, Crispi became the object of fierce attacks

from the Radicals, Socialists and anarchists. On the 16th of June an

attempt by an anarchist named Lega was made on Crispi's life; on the

24th of June President Carnot was assassinated by the anarchist Caserio;

and on the 30th of June an Italian journalist was murdered at Leghorn

for a newspaper attack upon anarchism--a series of outrages which led

the government to frame and parliament to adopt (11th July) a Public

Safety Bill for the prevention of anarchist propaganda and crime. At the

end of July the trial of the persons implicated in the Banca Romana

scandal revealed the fact that among the documents abstracted by

Giolitti from the papers of the bank manager, Tanlongo, were several

bearing upon Crispi's political and private life. On the 11th of

December Giolitti laid these and other papers before the Chamber, in the

hope of ruining Crispi, but upon examination most of them were found to

be worthless, and the rest of so private a nature as to be unfit for

publication. The effect of the incident was rather to increase

detestation of Giolitti than to damage Crispi. The latter, indeed,

prosecuted the former for libel and for abuse of his position when

premier, but after many vicissitudes, including the flight of Giolitti

to Berlin in order to avoid arrest, the Chamber refused authorization

for the prosecution, and the matter dropped. A fresh attempt of the same

kind was then made against Crispi by the Radical leader Cavallotti, who

advanced unproven charges of corruption and embezzlement. These attacks

were, however, unavailing to shake Crispi's position, and in the general

election of May 1895 his government obtained a majority of nearly 200

votes. Nevertheless public confidence in the efficacy of the

parliamentary system and in the honesty of politicians was seriously

diminished by these unsavoury occurrences, which, in combination with

the acquittal of all the defendants in the Banca Romana trial, and the

abandonment of the proceedings against Giolitti, reinforced to an

alarming degree the propaganda of the revolutionary parties.

Complications in Eritrea.

The foreign policy of the second Crispi Administration, in which the

portfolio of foreign affairs was held by Baron Blanc, was, as before,

marked by a cordial interpretation of the triple alliance, and by close

accord with Great Britain. In the Armenian question Italy seconded with

energy the diplomacy of Austria and Germany, while the Italian fleet

joined the British Mediterranean squadron in a demonstration off the

Syrian coast. Graver than any foreign question were the complications in

Eritrea. Under the arrangement concluded in 1891 by Rudini with native

chiefs in regard to the Italo-Abyssinian frontier districts, relations

with Abyssinia had remained comparatively satisfactory. Towards the

Sudan, however, the Mahdists, who had recovered from a defeat inflicted

by an Italian force at Agordat in 1890, resumed operations in December

1893. Colonel Arimondi, commander of the colonial forces in the absence

of the military governor, General Baratieri, attacked and routed a

dervish force 10,000 strong on the 21st of December. The Italian troops,

mostly native levies, numbered only 2200 men. The dervish loss was more

than 1000 killed, while the total Italian casualties amounted to less

than 230. General Baratieri, upon returning to the colony, decided to

execute a _coup de main_ against the dervish base at Kassala, both in

order to relieve pressure from that quarter and to preclude a combined

Abyssinian and dervish attack upon the colony at the end of 1894. The

protocol concluded with Great Britain on the 15th of April 1891, already

referred to, contained a clause to the effect that, were Kassala

occupied by the Italians, the place should be transferred to the

Egyptian government as soon as the latter should be in a position to

restore order in the Sudan. Concentrating a little army of 2600 men,

Baratieri surprised and captured Kassala on the 17th of July 1894, and

garrisoned the place with native levies under Italian officers.

Meanwhile Menelek, jealous of the extension of Italian influence to a

part of northern Somaliland and to the Benadir coast, had, with the

support of France and Russia, completed his preparations for asserting

his authority as independent ruler of Ethiopia. On the 11th of May 1893

he denounced the treaty of Uccialli, but the Giolitti cabinet, absorbed

by the bank scandals, paid no heed to his action. Possibly an adroit

repetition in favour of Mangashà and against Menelek of the policy

formerly followed in favour of Menelek against the negus John might have

consolidated Italian influence in Abyssinia by preventing the ascendancy

of any single chieftain. The Italian government, however, neglected this

opening, and Mangashà came to terms with Menelek. Consequently the

efforts of Crispi and his envoy, Colonel Piano, to conclude a new treaty

with Menelek in June 1894 not only proved unsuccessful, but formed a

prelude to troubles on the Italo-Abyssinian frontier. Bath-Agos, the

native chieftain who ruled the Okulé-Kusai and the cis-Mareb provinces

on behalf of Italy, intrigued with Mangashà, ras of the trans-Mareb

province of Tigre, and with Menelek, to raise a revolt against Italian

rule on the high plateau. In December 1894 the revolt broke out, but

Major Toselli with a small force marched rapidly against Bath Agos, whom

he routed and killed at Halai. General Baratieri, having reason to

suspect the complicity of Mangashà in the revolt, called upon him to

furnish troops for a projected Italo-Abyssinian campaign against the

Mahdists. Mangashà made no reply, and Baratieri crossing the Mareb

advanced to Adowa, but four days later was obliged to return northwards.

Mangashà thereupon took the offensive and attempted to occupy the

village of Coatit in Okulé-Kusai, but was forestalled and defeated by

Baratieri on the 13th of January 1895. Hurriedly retreating to Senafé,

hard pressed by the Italians, who shelled Senafé on the evening of the

15th of January, Mangashà was obliged to abandon his camp and provisions

to Baratieri, who also secured a quantity of correspondence establishing

the complicity of Menelek and Mangashà in the revolt of Bath-Agos.

Conquest of Tigre.

Battle of Adowa.

The comparatively facile success achieved by Baratieri against Mangashà

seems to have led him to undervalue his enemy, and to forget that

Menelek, negus and king of Shoa, had an interest in allowing Mangashà to

be crushed, in order that the imperial authority and the superiority of

Shoan over Tigrin arms might be the more strikingly asserted. After

obtaining the establishment of an apostolic prefecture in Eritrea under

the charge of Italian Franciscans, Baratieri expelled from the colony

the French Lazarist missionaries for their alleged complicity in the

Bath-Agos insurrection, and in March 1895 undertook the conquest of

Tigre. Occupying Adigrat and Makallè, he reached Adowa on the 1st of

April, and thence pushed forward to Axum, the holy city of Abyssinia.

These places were garrisoned, and during the rainy season Baratieri

returned to Italy, where he was received with unbounded enthusiasm.

Whether he or the Crispi cabinet had any inkling of the enterprise to

which they were committed by the occupation of Tigre is more than

doubtful. Certainly Baratieri made no adequate preparations to repel an

Abyssinian attempt to reconquer the province. Early in September both

Mangashà and Menelek showed signs of activity, and on the 20th of

September Makonnen, ras of Harrar, who up till then had been regarded as

a friend and quasi-ally by Italy, expelled all Italians from his

territory and marched with 30,000 men to join the negus. On returning to

Eritrea, Baratieri mobilized his native reserves and pushed forward

columns under Major Toselli and General Arimondi as far south as Amba

Alagi. Mangashà fell back before the Italians, who obtained several

minor successes; but on the 6th of December Toselli's column, 2000

strong, which through a misunderstanding continued to hold Amba Alagi,

was almost annihilated by the Abyssinian vanguard of 40,000 men. Toselli

and all but three officers and 300 men fell at their posts after a

desperate resistance. Arimondi, collecting the survivors of the Toselli

column, retreated to Makallè and Adigrat. At Makallè, however, he left a

small garrison in the fort, which on the 7th of January 1896 was

invested by the Abyssinian army. Repeated attempts to capture the fort

having failed, Menelek and Makonnen opened negotiations with Baratieri

for its capitulation, and on the 21st of January the garrison, under

Major Galliano, who had heroically defended the position, were permitted

to march out with the honours of war. Meanwhile Baratieri received

reinforcements from Italy, but remained undecided as to the best plan of

campaign. Thus a month was lost, during which the Abyssinian army

advanced to Hausen, a position slightly south of Adowa. The Italian

commander attempted to treat with Menelek, but his negotiations merely

enabled the Italian envoy, Major Salsa, to ascertain that the

Abyssinians were nearly 100,000 strong mostly armed with rifles and well

supplied with artillery. The Italians, including camp-followers,

numbered less than 25,000 men, a force too small for effective action,

but too large to be easily provisioned at 200 m. from its base, in a

roadless, mountainous country, almost devoid of water. For a moment

Baratieri thought of retreat, especially as the hope of creating a

diversion from Zaila towards Harrar had failed in consequence of the

British refusal to permit the landing of an Italian force without the

consent of France. The defection of a number of native allies (who,

however, were attacked and defeated by Colonel Stevani on the 18th of

February) rendered the Italian position still more precarious; but

Baratieri, unable to make up his mind, continued to manoeuvre in the

hope of drawing an Abyssinian attack. These futile tactics exasperated

the home government, which on the 22nd of February despatched General

Baldissera, with strong reinforcements, to supersede Baratieri. On the

25th of February Crispi telegraphed to Baratieri, denouncing his

operations as "mllitary phthisis," and urging him to decide upon some

strategic plan. Baratieri, anxious probably to obtain some success

before the arrival of Baldissera, and alarmed by the rapid diminution of

his stores, which precluded further immobility, called a council of war

(29th of February) and obtained the approval of the divisional

commanders for a plan of attack. During the night the army advanced

towards Adowa in three divisions, under Generals Dabormida, Arimondi and

Albertone, each division being between 4000 and 5000 strong, and a

brigade 5300 strong under General Ellena remaining in reserve. All the

divisions, save that of Albertone, consisted chiefly of Italian troops.

During the march Albertone's native division mistook the road, and found

itself obliged to delay in the Arimondi column by retracing its steps.

Marching rapidly, however, Albertone outdistanced the other columns,

but, in consequence of allowing his men an hour's rest, arrived upon the

scene of action when the Abyssinians, whom it had been hoped to surprise

at dawn, were ready to receive the attack. Pressed by overwhelming

forces, the Italians, after a violent combat, began to give way. The

Dabormida division, unsupported by Albertone, found itself likewise

engaged in a separate combat against superior numbers. Similarly the

Arimondi brigade was attacked by 30,000 Shoans, and encumbered by the

débris of Albertone's troops. Baratieri vainly attempted to push forward

the reserve, but the Italians were already overwhelmed, and the

battle--or rather, series of distinct engagements--ended in a general

rout. The Italian loss is estimated to have been more than 6000, of whom

3125 were whites. Between 3000 and 4000 prisoners were taken by the

Abyssinians, including General Albertone, while Generals Arimondi and

Dabormida were killed and General Ellena wounded. The Abyssinians lost

more than 5000 killed and 8000 wounded. Baratieri, after a futile

attempt to direct the retreat, fled in haste and reached Adi-Cajè before

the débris of his army. Thence he despatched telegrams to Italy throwing

blame for the defeat upon his troops, a proceeding which subsequent

evidence proved to be as unjustifiable as it was unsoldier-like. Placed

under court-martial for his conduct, Baratieri was acquitted of the

charge for having been led to give battle by other than military

considerations, but the sentence "deplored that in such difficult

circumstances the command should have been given to a general so

inferior to the exigencies of the situation."

Abyssinian settlement.

In Italy the news of the defeat of Adowa caused deep discouragement and

dismay. On the 5th of March the Crispi cabinet resigned before an

outburst of indignation which the Opposition had assiduously fomented,

and five days later a new cabinet was formed by General Ricotti-Magnani,

who, however, made over the premiership to the marquis di Rudini. The

latter, though leader of the Right, had long been intriguing with

Cavallotti, leader of the Extreme Left, to overthrow Crispi, but without

the disaster of Adowa his plan would scarcely have succeeded. The first

act of the new cabinet was to confirm instructions given by its

predecessor to General Baldissera (who had succeeded General Baratieri

on the 2nd of March) to treat for peace with Menelek if he thought

desirable. Baldissera opened negotiations with the negus through Major

Salsa, and simultaneously reorganized the Italian army. The negotiations

having failed, he marched to relieve the beleaguered garrison of

Adigrat; but Menelek, discouraged by the heavy losses at Adowa, broke up

his camp and returned southwards to Shoa. At the same time Baldissera

detached Colonel Stevani with four native battalions to relieve Kassala,

then hard pressed by the Mahdists. Kassala was relieved on the 1st of

April, and Stevani a few days later severely defeated the dervishes at

Jebel Mokram and Tucruff. Returning from Kassala Colonel Stevani

rejoined Baldissera, who on the 4th of May relieved Adigrat after a

well-executed march. By adroit negotiations with Mangashà the Italian

general obtained the release of the Italian prisoners in Tigré, and

towards the end of May withdrew his whole force north of the Mareb.

Major Nerazzini was then despatched as special envoy to the negus to

arrange terms of peace. On the 26th of October Nerazzini succeeded in

concluding, at Adis Ababa, a provisional treaty annulling the treaty of

Uccialli; recognizing the absolute independence of Ethiopia; postponing

for one year the definitive delimitation of the Italo-Abyssinian

boundary, but allowing the Italians meanwhile to hold the strong

Mareb-Belesa-Muna line; and arranging for the release of the Italian

prisoners after ratification of the treaty in exchange for an indemnity

of which the amount was to be fixed by the Italian government. The

treaty having been duly ratified, and an indemnity of £400,000 paid to

Menelek, the Shoan prisoners were released, and Major Nerazzini once

more returned to Abyssinia with instructions to secure, if possible,

Menelek's assent to the definitive retention of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna

line by Italy. Before Nerazzini could reach Adis Ababa, Rudini, in order

partially to satisfy the demands of his Radical supporters for the

abandonment of the colony, announced in the Chamber the intention of

Italy to limit her occupation to the triangular zone between the points

Asmarà, Keren and Massawa, and, possibly, to withdraw to Massawa alone.

This declaration, of which Menelek was swiftly apprised by French

agents, rendered it impossible to Nerazzini to obtain more than a

boundary leaving to Italy but a small portion of the high plateau and

ceding to Abyssinia the fertile provinces of Seraè and Okulé-Kusai. The

fall of the Rudini cabinet in June 1898, however, enabled Signor

Ferdinando Martini and Captain Cicco di Cola, who had been appointed

respectively civil governor of Eritrea and minister resident at Adis

Ababa, to prevent the cession of Seraè and Okulé-Kusai, and to secure

the assent of Menelek to Italian retention of the Mareb-Belesa-Muna

frontier. Eritrea has now approximately the same extent as before the

revolt of Bath-Agos, except in regard (1) to Kassala, which was

transferred to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities on the 25th of December

1897, in pursuance of the above-mentioned Anglo-Italian convention; and

(2) to slight rectifications of its northern and eastern boundaries by

conventions concluded between the Eritrean and the Anglo-Egyptian

authorities. Under Signor Ferdinando Martini's able administration

(1898-1906) the cost of the colony to Italy was reduced and its trade

and agriculture have vastly improved.

While marked in regard to Eritrea by vacillation and undignified

readiness to yield to Radical clamour, the policy of the marquis di

Rudini was in other respects chiefly characterized by a desire to

demolish Crispi and his supporters. Actuated by rancour against Crispi,

he, on the 29th of April 1896, authorized the publication of a Green

Book on Abyssinian affairs, in which, without the consent of Great

Britain, the confidential Anglo-Italian negotiations in regard to the

Abyssinian war were disclosed. This publication, which amounted to a

gross breach of diplomatic confidence, might have endangered the

cordiality of Anglo-Italian relations, had not the esteem of the British

government for General Ferrero, Italian ambassador in London, induced it

to overlook the incident. Fortunately for Italy, the marquis Visconti

Venosta shortly afterwards consented to assume the portfolio of foreign

affairs, which had been resigned by Duke Caetani di Sermoneta, and again

to place, after an interval of twenty years, his unrivalled experience

at the service of his country. In September 1896 he succeeded in

concluding with France a treaty with regard to Tunisia in place of the

old Italo-Tunisian treaty, denounced by the French Government a year

previously. During the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 Visconti Venosta

laboured to maintain the European concert, joined Great Britain in

preserving Greece from the worst consequences of her folly, and lent

moral and material aid in establishing an autonomous government in

Crete. At the same time he mitigated the Francophil tendencies of some

of his colleagues, accompanied King Humbert and Queen Margherita on

their visit to Homburg in September 1897, and, by loyal observance of

the spirit of the triple alliance, retained for Italy the confidence of

her allies without forfeiting the goodwill of France.

Riots of May, 1898.

The home administration of the Rudini cabinet compared unfavourably with

that of foreign affairs. Bound by a secret understanding with the

Radical leader Cavallotti, an able but unscrupulous demagogue, Rudini

was compelled to bow to Radical exigencies. He threw all the influence

of the government against Crispi, who was charged with complicity in

embezzlements perpetrated by Favilla, managing director of the Bologna

branch of the Bank of Naples. After being subjected to persecution for

nearly two years, Crispi's character was substantially vindicated by the

report of a parliamentary commission appointed to inquire into his

relations with Favilla. True, the commission proposed and the Chamber

adopted a vote of censure upon Crispi's conduct in 1894, when, as

premier and minister of the interior, he had borrowed £12,000 from

Favilla to replenish | the secret service fund, and had subsequently

repaid the money as instalments for secret service were in due course

furnished by the treasury. Though irregular, his action was to some

extent justified by the depletion of the secret service fund under

Giolitti and by the abnormal circumstances prevailing in 1893-1894, when

he had been obliged to quell the insurrections in Sicily and

Massa-Carrara. But the Rudini-Cavallotti alliance was destined to

produce other results than those of the campaign against Crispi. Pressed

by Cavallotti, Rudini in March 1897 dissolved the Chamber and conducted

the general election in such a way as to crush by government pressure

the partisans of Crispi, and greatly to strengthen the (Socialist,

Republican and Radical) revolutionary parties. More than ever at the

mercy of the Radicals and of their revolutionary allies, Rudini

continued so to administer public affairs that subversive propaganda and

associations obtained unprecedented extension. The effect was seen in

May 1898, when, in consequence of a rise in the price of bread,

disturbances occurred in southern Italy. The corn duty was reduced to

meet the emergency, but the disturbed area extended to Naples, Foggia,

Bari, Minervino-Murge, Molfetta and thence along the line of railway

which skirts the Adriatic coast. At Faenza, Piacenza, Cremona, Pavia and

Milan, where subversive associations were stronger, it assumed the

complexion of a political revolt. From the 7th to the 9th of May Milan

remained practically in the hands of the mob. A palace was sacked,

barricades were erected and for forty-eight hours the troops under

General Bava-Beccaris, notwithstanding the employment of artillery, were

unable to restore order. In view of these occurrences, Rudini authorized

the proclamation of a state of siege at Milan, Florence, Leghorn and

Naples, delegating the suppression of disorder to special military

commissioners. By these means order was restored, though not without

considerable loss of life at Milan and elsewhere. At Milan alone the

official returns confessed to eighty killed and several hundred wounded,

a total generally considered below the real figures. As in 1894,

excessively severe sentences were passed by the military tribunals upon

revolutionary leaders and other persons considered to have been

implicated in the outbreak, but successive royal amnesties obliterated

these condemnations within three years.

Pelloux and obstruction.

Death of King Humbert.

Accession of King Victor Emmanuel III.

No Italian administration since the death of Depretis underwent so many

metamorphoses as that of the marquis di Rudini. Modified a first time

within five months of its formation (July 1896) in connexion with

General Ricotti's Army Reform Bill, and again in December 1897, when

Zanardelli entered the cabinet, it was reconstructed for a third time at

the end of May 1898 upon the question of a Public Safety Bill, but fell

for the fourth and last time on the 18th of June 1898, on account of

public indignation at the results of Rudini's home policy as exemplified

in the May riots. On the 29th of June Rudini was succeeded in the

premiership by General Luigi Pelloux, a Savoyard, whose only title to

office was the confidence of the king. The Pelloux cabinet possessed no

clear programme except in regard to the Public Safety Bill, which it had

taken over from its predecessor. Presented to parliament in November

1898, the bill was read a second time in the following spring, but its

third reading was violently obstructed by the Socialists, Radicals and

Republicans of the Extreme Left. After a series of scenes and scuffles

the bill was promulgated by royal decree, the decree being postdated to

allow time for the third reading. Again obstruction precluded debate,

and on the 22nd of July 1899 the decree automatically acquired force of

law, pending the adoption of a bill of indemnity by the Chamber. In

February 1900 it was, however, quashed by the supreme court on a point

of procedure, and the Public Safety Bill as a whole had again to be

presented to the Chamber. In view of the violence of Extremist

obstruction, an effort was made to reform the standing orders of the

Lower House, but parliamentary feeling ran so high that General Pelloux

thought it expedient to appeal to the country. The general election of

June 1900 not only failed to reinforce the cabinet, but largely

increased the strength of the extreme parties (Radicals, Republicans and

Socialists), who in the new Chamber numbered nearly 100 out of a total

of 508. General Pelloux therefore resigned, and on the 24th of June a

moderate Liberal cabinet was formed by the aged Signor Saracco,

president of the senate. Within five weeks of its formation King Humbert

was shot by an anarchist assassin named Bresci while leaving an athletic

festival at Monza, where his Majesty had distributed the prizes (29th

July 1900). The death of the unfortunate monarch, against whom an

attempt had previously been made by the anarchist Acciarito (22nd April

1897), caused an outburst of profound sorrow and indignation. Though not

a great monarch, King Humbert had, by his unfailing generosity and

personal courage, won the esteem and affection of his people. During the

cholera epidemic at Naples and Busca in 1884, and the Ischia earthquake

of 1885, he, regardless of danger, brought relief and encouragement to

sufferers, and rescued many lives. More than £100,000 of his civil list

was annually devoted to charitable purposes. Humbert was succeeded by

his only son, Victor Emmanuel III. (b. November 11, 1869), a

liberal-minded and well-educated prince, who at the time of his father's

assassination was returning from a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean.

The remains of King Humbert were laid to rest in the Pantheon at Rome

beside those of his father, Victor Emmanuel II. (9th August). Two days

later Victor Emmanuel III. swore fidelity to the constitution before the

assembled Houses of Parliament and in the presence of his consort, Elena

of Montenegro, whom he had married in October 1896.

Foreign affairs.

The later course of Italian foreign policy was marked by many

vicissitudes. Admiral Canevaro, who had gained distinction as commander

of the international forces in Crete (1896-1898), assumed the direction

of foreign affairs in the first period of the Pelloux administration.

His diplomacy, though energetic, lacked steadiness. Soon after taking

office he completed the negotiations begun by the Rudini administration

for a new commercial treaty with France (October 1898), whereby

Franco-Italian commercial relations were placed upon a normal footing

after a breach which had lasted for more than ten years. By the despatch

of a squadron to South America he obtained satisfaction for injuries

inflicted thirteen years previously upon an Italian subject by the

United States of Colombia. In December 1898 he convoked a diplomatic

conference in Rome to discuss secret means for the repression of

anarchist propaganda and crime in view of the assassination of the

empress of Austria by an Italian anarchist (Luccheni), but it is

doubtful whether results of practical value were achieved. The action of

the tsar of Russia in convening the Peace Conference at The Hague in May

1900 gave rise to a question as to the right of the Vatican to be

officially represented, and Admiral Canevaro, supported by Great Britain

and Germany, succeeded in preventing the invitation of a papal delegate.

Shortly afterwards his term of office was brought to a close by the

failure of an attempt to secure for Italy a coaling station at Sanmen

and a sphere of influence in China; but his policy of active

participation in Chinese affairs was continued in a modified form by his

successor, the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who, entering the reconstructed

Pelloux cabinet in May 1899, retained the portfolio of foreign affairs

in the ensuing Saracco administration, and secured the despatch of an

Italian expedition, 2000 strong, to aid in repressing the Chinese

outbreak and in protecting Italian interests in the Far East (July

1900). With characteristic foresight, Visconti Venosta promoted an

exchange of views between Italy and France in regard to the Tripolitan

hinterland, which the Anglo-French convention of 1899 had placed within

the French sphere of influence--a modification of the _status quo ante_

considered highly detrimental to Italian aspirations in Tripoli. For

this reason the Anglo-French convention had caused profound irritation

in Italy, and had tended somewhat to diminish the cordiality of

Anglo-Italian relations. Visconti Venosta is believed, however, to have

obtained from France a formal declaration that France would not

transgress the limits assigned to her influence by the convention.

Similarly, in regard to Albania, Visconti Venosta exchanged notes with

Austria with a view to the prevention of any misunderstanding through

the conflict between Italian and Austrian interests in that part of the

Adriatic coast. Upon the fall of the Saracco cabinet (9th February 1901)

Visconti Venosta was succeeded at the foreign office by Signor Prinetti,

a Lombard manufacturer of strong temperament, but without previous

diplomatic experience. The new minister continued in most respects the

policy of his predecessor. The outset of his administration was marked

by Franco-Italian fêtes at Toulon (10th to 14th April 1901), when the

Italian fleet returned a visit paid by the French Mediterranean squadron

to Cagliari in April 1899; and by the despatch of three Italian warships

to Prevesa to obtain satisfaction for damage done to Italian subjects by

Turkish officials.

Zanardelli-Giolitti Cabinet.

The Saracco administration, formed after the obstructionist crisis of

1899-1900 as a cabinet of transition and pacification, was overthrown in

February 1901 in consequence of its vacillating conduct towards a dock

strike at Genoa. It was succeeded by a Zanardelli cabinet, in which the

portfolio of the interior was allotted to Giolitti. Composed mainly of

elements drawn from the Left, and dependent for a majority upon the

support of the subversive groups of the Extreme Left, the formation of

this cabinet gave the signal for a vast working-class movement, during

which the Socialist party sought to extend its political influence by

means of strikes and the organization of labour leagues among

agricultural labourers and artisans. The movement was confined chiefly

to the northern and central provinces. During the first six months of

1901 the strikes numbered 600, and involved more than 1,000,000 workmen.

(H. W. S.)

G. 1902-1909

Labour troubles.

In 1901-1902 the social economic condition of Italy was a matter of

grave concern. The strikes and other economic agitations at this time

may be divided roughly into three groups: strikes in industrial centres

for higher wages, shorter hours and better labour conditions generally;

strikes of agricultural labourers in northern Italy for better contracts

with the landlords; disturbances among the south Italian peasantry due

to low wages, unemployment (particularly in Apulia), and the claims of

the labourers to public land occupied illegally by the landlords,

combined with local feuds and the struggle for power of the various

influential families. The prime cause in most cases was the

unsatisfactory economic condition of the working classes, which they

realized all the more vividly for the very improvements that had been

made in it, while education and better communications enabled them to

organize themselves. Unfortunately these genuine grievances were taken

advantage of by the Socialists for their own purposes, and strikes and

disorders were sometimes promoted without cause and conciliation impeded

by outsiders who acted from motives of personal ambition or profit.

Moreover, while many strikes were quite orderly, the turbulent character

of a part of the Italian people and their hatred of authority often

converted peaceful demands for better conditions into dangerous riots,

in which the dregs of the urban population (known as _teppisti_ or the

_mala vita_) joined.

Whereas in the past the strikes had been purely local and due to local

conditions, they now appeared of more general and political character,

and the "sympathy" strike came to be a frequent and undesirable addition

to the ordinary economic agitation. The most serious movement at this

time was that of the railway servants. The agitation had begun some

fifteen years before, and the men had at various times demanded better

pay and shorter hours, often with success. The next demand was for

greater fixity of tenure and more regular promotion, as well as for the

recognition by the companies of the railwaymen's union. On the 4th of

January 1902, the employees of the Mediterranean railway advanced these

demands at a meeting at Turin, and threatened to strike if they were not

satisfied. By the beginning of February the agitation had spread all

over Italy, and the government was faced by the possibility of a strike

which would paralyse the whole economic life of the country. Then the

Turin gas men struck, and a general "sympathy" strike broke out in that

city in consequence, which resulted in scenes of violence lasting two

days. The government called out all the railwaymen who were army

reservists, but continued to keep them at their railway work, exercising

military discipline over them and thus ensuring the continuance of the

service. At the same time it mediated between the companies and the

employees, and in June a settlement was formally concluded between the

ministers of public works and of the treasury and the directors of the

companies concerning the grievances of the employees.

One consequence of the agrarian agitations was the increased use of

machinery and the reduction in the number of hands employed, which if it

proved advantageous to the landlord and to the few labourers retained,

who received higher wages, resulted in an increase of unemployment. The

Socialist party, which had grown powerful under a series of weak-kneed

administrations, now began to show signs of division; on the one hand

there was the revolutionary wing, led by Signor Enrico Ferri, the

Mantuan deputy, which advocated a policy of uncompromising class

warfare, and on the other the _riformisti_, or moderate Socialists, led

by Signor Filippo Turati, deputy for Milan, who adopted a more

conciliatory attitude and were ready to ally themselves with other

parliamentary parties. Later the division took another aspect, the

extreme wing being constituted by the _sindacalisti_, who were opposed

to all legislative parliamentary action and favoured only direct

revolutionary propaganda by means of the _sindacati_ or unions which

organized strikes and demonstrations. In March 1902 agrarian strikes

organized by the _leghe_ broke out in the district of Copparo and

Polesine (lower valley of the Po), owing to a dispute about the labour

contracts, and in Apulia on account of unemployment. In August there

were strikes among the dock labourers of Genoa and the iron workers of

Florence; the latter agitation developed into a general strike in that

city, which aroused widespread indignation among the orderly part of the

population and ended without any definite result. At Como 15,000 textile

workers remained on strike for nearly a month, but there were no

disorders.

General strike of 1904.

The year 1903, although not free from strikes and minor disturbances,

was quieter, but in September 1904 a very serious situation was brought

about by a general economic and political agitation. The troubles began

with the disturbances at Buggeru in Sardinia and Castelluzzo in Sicily,

in both of which places the troops were compelled to use their arms and

several persons were killed and wounded; at a demonstration at Sestri

Ponente in Liguria to protest against what was called the Buggeru

"massacre," four carabineers and eleven rioters were injured. The Monza

labour exchange then took the initiative of proclaiming a general strike

throughout Italy (September 15th) as a protest against the government

for daring to maintain order. The strike spread to nearly all the

industrial centres, although in many places it was limited to a few

trades. At Milan it was more serious and lasted longer than elsewhere,

as the movement was controlled by the anarchists under Arturo Labriola;

the hooligans committed many acts of savage violence, especially against

those workmen who refused to strike, and much property was wilfully

destroyed. At Genoa, which was in the hands of the _teppisti_ for a

couple of days, three persons were killed and 50 wounded, including 14

policemen, and railway communications were interrupted for a short time.

Venice was cut off from the mainland for two days and all the public

services were suspended. Riots broke out also in Naples, Florence, Rome

and Bologna. The deputies of the Extreme Left, instead of using their

influence in favour of pacification, could think of nothing better than

to demand an immediate convocation of parliament in order that they

might present a bill forbidding the troops and police to use their arms

in all conflicts between capital and labour, whatever the provocation

might be. This preposterous proposal was of course not even discussed,

and the movement caused a strong feeling of reaction against Socialism

and of hostility to the government for its weakness; for, however much

sympathy there might be with the genuine grievances of the working

classes, the September strikes were of a frankly revolutionary character

and had been fomented by professional agitators and kept going by the

dregs of the people. The mayor of Venice sent a firm and dignified

protest to the government for its inaction, and the people of Liguria

raised a large subscription in favour of the troops, in recognition of

their gallantry and admirable discipline during the troubles.

Unrest of 1905.

Early in 1905 there was a fresh agitation among the railway servants,

who were dissatisfied with the clauses concerning the personnel in the

bill for the purchase of the lines by the state. They initiated a system

of obstruction which hampered and delayed the traffic without altogether

suspending it. On the 17th of April a general railway strike was ordered

by the union, but owing to the action of the authorities, who for once

showed energy, the traffic was carried on. Other disturbances of a

serious character occurred among the steelworkers of Terni, at

Grammichele in Sicily and at Alessandria. The extreme parties now began

to direct especial attention to propaganda in the army, with a view to

destroying its cohesion and thus paralysing the action of the

government. The campaign was conducted on the lines of the

anti-militarist movement in France identified with the name of Hervé.

Fortunately, however, this policy was not successful, as military

service is less unpopular in Italy than in many other countries;

aggressive militarism is quite unknown, and without it anti-militarism

can gain no foothold. No serious mutinies have ever occurred in the

Italian army, and the only results of the propaganda were occasional

meetings of hooligans, where Hervéist sentiments were expressed and

applauded, and a few minor disturbances among reservists unexpectedly

called back to the colours. In the army itself the _esprit de corps_ and

the sense of duty and discipline nullified the work of the

propagandists.

Strikes in 1907.

In June and July 1907 there were again disturbances among the

agricultural labourers of Ferrara and Rovigo, and a widespread strike

organized by the _leghe_ throughout those provinces caused very serious

losses to all concerned. The _leghisti_, moreover, were guilty of much

criminal violence; they committed one murder and established a veritable

reign of terror, boycotting, beating and wounding numbers of peaceful

labourers who would not join the unions, and brutally maltreating

solitary policemen and soldiers. The authorities, however, by arresting

a number of the more prominent leaders succeeded in restoring order.

Almost immediately afterwards an agitation of a still less defensible

character broke out in various towns under the guise of

anti-clericalism. Certain scandals had come to light in a small convent

school at Greco near Milan. This was seized upon as a pretext for

violent anti-clerical demonstrations all over Italy and for brutal and

unprovoked attacks on unoffending priests; at Spezia a church was set on

fire and another dismantled, at Marino Cardinal Merry del Val was

attacked by a gang of hooligans, and at Rome the violence of the

_teppisti_ reached such a pitch as to provoke reaction on the part of

all respectable people, and some of the aggressors were very roughly

handled. The Socialists and the Freemasons were largely responsible for

the agitation, and they filled the country with stories of other

priestly and conventual immoralities, nearly all of which, except the

original case at Greco, proved to be without foundation. In September

1907 disorders in Apulia over the repartition of communal lands broke

out anew, and were particularly serious at Ruvo, Bari, Cerignola and

Satriano del Colle. In some cases there was foundation for the

labourers' claims, but unfortunately the movement got into the hands of

professional agitators and common swindlers, and the leader, a certain

Giampetruzzi, who at one time seemed to be a worthy colleague of

Marcelin Albert, was afterwards tried and condemned for having cheated

his own followers.

In October 1907 there was again a general strike at Milan, which was

rendered more serious on account of the action of the railway servants,

and extended to other cities; traffic was disorganized over a large part

of northern Italy, until the government, being now owner of the

railways, dismissed the ringleaders from the service. This had the

desired effect, and although the _Sindacato dei ferrovieri_ (railway

servants' union) threatened a general railway strike if the dismissed

men were not reinstated, there was no further trouble. In the spring of

1908 there were agrarian strikes at Parma; the labour contracts had

pressed hardly on the peasantry, who had cause for complaint; but while

some improvement had been effected in the new contracts, certain

unscrupulous demagogues, of whom Alceste De Ambris, representing the

"syndacalist" wing of the Socialist party, was the chief, organized a

widespread agitation. The landlords on their part organized an agrarian

union to defend their interests and enrolled numbers of non-union

labourers to carry on the necessary work and save the crops. Conflicts

occurred between the strikers and the independent labourers and the

police; the trouble spread to the city of Parma, where violent scenes

occurred when the labour exchange was occupied by the troops, and many

soldiers and policemen, whose behaviour as usual was exemplary

throughout, were seriously wounded. The agitation ceased in June with

the defeat of the strikers, but not until a vast amount of damage had

been done to the crops and all had suffered heavy losses, including the

government, whose expenses for the maintenance of public order ran into

tens of millions of lire. The failure of the strike caused the

Socialists to quarrel among themselves and to accuse each other of

dishonesty in the management of party funds; it appeared in fact that

the large sums collected throughout Italy on behalf of the strikers had

been squandered or appropriated by the "syndacalist" leaders. The spirit

of indiscipline had begun to reach the lower classes of state employees,

especially the school teachers and the postal and telegraph clerks, and

at one time it seemed as though the country were about to face a

situation similar to that which arose in France in the spring of 1909.

Fortunately, however, the government, by dismissing the ringleader, Dr

Campanozzi, in time nipped the agitation in the bud, and it did attempt

to redress some of the genuine grievances. Public opinion upheld the

government in its attitude, for all persons of common sense realized

that the suspension of the public services could not be permitted for a

moment in a civilized country.

Internal politics, 1902.

In parliamentary politics the most notable event in 1902 was the

presentation of a divorce bill by Signor Zanardelli's government; this

was done not because there was any real demand for it, but to please the

doctrinaire anti-clericals and freemasons, divorce being regarded not as

a social institution but as a weapon against Catholicism. But while the

majority of the deputies were nominally in favour of the bill, the

parliamentary committee reported against it, and public opinion was so

hostile that an anti-divorce petition received 3,500,000 signatures,

including not only those of professing Catholics, but of free-thinkers

and Jews, who regarded divorce as unsuitable to Italian conditions. The

opposition outside parliament was in fact so overwhelming that the

ministry decided to drop the bill. The financial situation continued

satisfactory; a new loan at 3½% was voted by the Chamber in April 1902,

and by June the whole of it had been placed in Italy. In October the

rate of exchange was at par, the premium on gold had disappeared, and by

the end of the year the budget showed a surplus of sixteen millions.

1903-1905.

In January 1903 Signor Prinetti, the minister for foreign affairs,

resigned on account of ill-health, and was succeeded by Admiral Morin,

while Admiral Bettolo took the latter's place as minister of marine. The

unpopularity of the ministry forced Signor Giolitti, the minister of the

interior, to resign (June 1903), and he was followed by Admiral Bettolo,

whose administration had been violently attacked by the Socialists; in

October Signor Zanardelli, the premier, resigned on account of his

health, and the king entrusted the formation of the cabinet to Signor

Giolitti. The latter accepted the task, and the new administration

included Signor Tittoni, late prefect of Naples, as foreign minister,

Signor Luigi Luzzatti, the eminent financier, at the treasury, General

Pedotti at the war office, and Admiral Mirabello as minister of marine.

Almost immediately after his appointment Signor Tittoni accompanied the

king and queen of Italy on a state visit to France and then to England,

where various international questions were discussed, and the cordial

reception which the royal pair met with in London and at Windsor served

to dispel the small cloud which had arisen in the relations of the two

countries on account of the Tripoli agreements and the language question

in Malta. The premier's programme was not well received by the Chamber,

although the treasury minister's financial statement was again

satisfactory. The weakness of the government in dealing with the strike

riots caused a feeling of profound dissatisfaction, and the so-called

"experiment of liberty," conducted with the object of conciliating the

extreme parties, proved a dismal failure. In October 1904, after the

September strikes, the Chamber was dissolved, and at the general

elections in November a ministerial majority was returned, while the

deputies of the Extreme Left (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals) were

reduced from 107 to 94, and a few mild clericals elected. The municipal

elections in several of the larger cities, which had hitherto been

regarded as strongholds of socialism, marked an overwhelming triumph for

the constitutional parties, notably in Milan, Turin and Genoa, for the

strikes had wrought as much harm to the working classes as to the

bourgeoisie. In spite of its majority the Giolitti cabinet, realizing

that it had lost its hold over the country, resigned in March 1905.

1905-1906.

Signor Fortis then became premier and minister of the interior, Signor

Maiorano finance minister and Signor Carcano treasury minister, while

Signor Tittoni, Admiral Mirabello and General Pedotti retained the

portfolios they had held in the previous administration. The new

government was colourless in the extreme, and the premier's programme

aroused no enthusiasm in the House, the most important bill presented

being that for the purchase of the railways, which was voted in June

1905. But the ministry never had any real hold over the country or

parliament, and the dissatisfaction caused by the _modus vivendi_ with

Spain, which would have wrought much injury to the Italian wine-growers,

led to demonstrations and riots, and a hostile vote in the Chamber

produced a cabinet crisis (December 17, 1905); Signor Fortis, however,

reconstructed the ministry, inducing the marquis di San Giuliano to

accept the portfolio of foreign affairs. This last fact was significant,

as the new foreign secretary, a Sicilian deputy and a specialist on

international politics, had hitherto been one of Signor Sonnino's

staunchest adherents; his defection, which was but one of many, showed

that the more prominent members of the Sonnino party were tired of

waiting in vain for their chief's access to power. Even this cabinet was

still-born, and a hostile vote in the Chamber on the 30th of January

1906 brought about its fall.

1906-1909.

Now at last, after waiting so long, Signor Sonnino's hour had struck,

and he became premier for the first time. This result was most

satisfactory to all the best elements in the country, and great hopes

were entertained that the advent of a rigid and honest statesman would

usher in a new era of Italian parliamentary life. Unfortunately at the

very outset of its career the composition of the new cabinet proved

disappointing; for while such men as Count Guicciardini, the minister

for foreign affairs, and Signor Luzzatti at the treasury commanded

general approval, the choice of Signor Sacchi as minister of justice and

of Signor Pantano as minister of agriculture and trade, both of them

advanced and militant Radicals, savoured of an unholy compact between

the premier and his erstwhile bitter enemies, which boded ill for the

success of the administration. For this unfortunate combination Signor

Sonnino himself was not altogether to blame; having lost many of his

most faithful followers, who, weary of waiting for office, had gone over

to the enemy, he had been forced to seek support among men who had

professed hostility to the existing order of things and thus to secure

at least the neutrality of the Extreme Left and make the public realize

that the "reddest" of Socialists, Radicals and Republicans may be tamed

and rendered harmless by the offer of cabinet appointments. A similar

experiment had been tried in France not without success. Unfortunately

in the case of Signor Sonnino public opinion expected too much and did

not take to the idea of such a compromise. The new premier's first act

was one which cannot be sufficiently praised: he suppressed all

subsidies to journalists, and although this resulted in bitter attacks

against him in the columns of the "reptile press" it commanded the

approval of all right-thinking men. Signor Sonnino realized, however,

that his majority was not to be counted on: "The country is with me," he

said to a friend, "but the Chamber is against me." In April 1906 an

eruption of Mount Etna caused the destruction of several villages and

much loss of life and damage to property; in appointing a committee to

distribute the relief funds the premier refused to include any of the

deputies of the devastated districts among its members, and when asked

by them for the reason of this omission, he replied, with a frankness

more characteristic of the man than politic, that he knew they would

prove more solicitous in the distribution of relief for their own

electors than for the real sufferers. A motion presented by the

Socialists in the Chamber for the immediate discussion of a bill to

prevent "the massacres of the proletariate" having been rejected by an

enormous majority, the 28 Socialist deputies resigned their seats; on

presenting themselves for re-election their number was reduced to 25. A

few days later the ministry, having received an adverse vote on a

question of procedure, sent in its resignation (May 17).

The fall of Signor Sonnino, the disappointment caused by the

non-fulfilment of the expectations to which his advent to power had

given rise throughout Italy and the dearth of influential statesmen,

made the return to power of Signor Giolitti inevitable. An appeal to the

country might have brought about a different result, but it is said that

opposition from the highest quarters rendered this course practically

impossible. The change of government brought Signor Tittoni back to the

foreign office; Signor Maiorano became treasury minister, General Viganò

minister of war, Signor Cocco Ortu, whose chief claim to consideration

was the fact of his being a Sardinian (the island had rarely been

represented in the cabinet) minister of agriculture, Signor Gianturco of

justice, Signor Massimini of finance, Signor Schanzer of posts and

telegraphs and Signor Fusinato of education. The new ministry began

auspiciously with the conversion of the public debt from 4% to 3¾%, to

be eventually reduced to 3½%. This operation had been prepared by Signor

Luzzatti under Signor Sonnino's leadership, and although carried out by

Signor Maiorano it was Luzzatti who deservedly reaped the honour and

glory; the bill was presented, discussed and voted by both Houses on the

29th of June, and by the 7th of July the conversion was completed most

successfully, showing on how sound a basis Italian finance was now

placed. The surplus for the year amounted to 65,000,000 lire. In

November Signor Gianturco died, and Signor Pietro Bertolini took his

place as minister of public works; the latter proved perhaps the ablest

member of the cabinet, but the acceptance of office under Giolitti of a

man who had been one of the most trusted and valuable lieutenants of

Signor Sonnino marked a further step in the _dégringolade_ of that

statesman's party, and was attributed to the fact that Signor Bertolini

resented not having had a place in the late Sonnino ministry. General

Viganò was succeeded in December by Senator Casana, the first civilian

to become minister of war in Italy. He made various reforms which were

badly wanted in army administration, but on the whole the experiment of

a civilian "War Lord" was not a complete success, and in April 1909

Senator Casana retired and was succeeded by General Spingardi, an

appointment which received general approval.

The elections of March 1909 returned a chamber very slightly different

from its predecessor. The ministerial majority was over three hundred,

and although the Extreme Left was somewhat increased in numbers it was

weakened in tone, and many of the newly elected "reds" were hardly more

than pale pink.

Church and State.