116. I believe, if you think seriously of this matter, you will feel

that the first and most literal application is just as necessary a one

as any other--that the story does very specially mean what it

says--plain money; and that the reason we don't at once believe it does

so, is a sort of tacit idea that while thought, wit, and intellect, and

all power of birth and position, are indeed _given_ to us, and,

therefore, to be laid out for the Giver--our wealth has not been given

to us; but we have worked for it, and have a right to spend it as we

choose. I think you will find that is the real substance of our

understanding in this matter. Beauty, we say, is given by God--it is a

talent; strength is given by God--it is a talent; position is given by

God--it is a talent; but money is proper wages for our day's work--it is

not a talent, it is a due. We may justly spend it on ourselves, if we

have worked for it.

117. And there would be some shadow of excuse for this, were it not that

the very power of making the money is itself only one of the

applications of that intellect or strength which we confess to be

talents. Why is one man richer than another? Because he is more

industrious, more persevering, and more sagacious. Well, who made him

more persevering or more sagacious than others? That power of endurance,

that quickness of apprehension, that calmness of judgment, which enable

him to seize the opportunities that others lose, and persist in the

lines of conduct in which others fail--are these not talents?--are they

not, in the present state of the world, among the most distinguished and

influential of mental gifts? And is it not wonderful, that while we

should be utterly ashamed to use a superiority of body, in order to

thrust our weaker companions aside from some place of advantage, we

unhesitatingly use our superiorities of mind to thrust them back from

whatever good that strength of mind can attain? You would be indignant

if you saw a strong man walk into a theatre or a lecture-room, and,

calmly choosing the best place, take his feeble neighbour by the

shoulder, and turn him out of it into the back seats, or the street. You

would be equally indignant if you saw a stout fellow thrust himself up

to a table where some hungry children were being fed, and reach his arm

over their heads and take their bread from them. But you are not the

least indignant if, when a man has stoutness of thought and swiftness of

capacity, and, instead of being long-armed only, has the much greater

gift of being long-headed--you think it perfectly just that he should

use his intellect to take the bread out of the mouths of all the other

men in the town who are of the same trade with him; or use his breadth

and sweep of sight to gather some branch of the commerce of the country

into one great cobweb, of which he is himself to be the central spider,

making every thread vibrate with the points of his claws, and commanding

every avenue with the facets of his eyes. You see no injustice in this.

118. But there is injustice; and, let us trust, one of which honourable

men will at no very distant period disdain to be guilty. In some degree,

however, it is indeed not unjust; in some degree, it is necessary and

intended. It is assuredly just that idleness should be surpassed by

energy; that the widest influence should be possessed by those who are

best able to wield it; and that a wise man, at the end of his career,

should be better off than a fool. But for that reason, is the fool to be

wretched, utterly crushed down, and left in all the suffering which his

conduct and capacity naturally inflict?--Not so. What do you suppose

fools were made for? That you might tread upon them, and starve them,

and get the better of them in every possible way? By no means. They were

made that wise people might take care of them. That is the true and

plain fact concerning the relations of every strong and wise man to the

world about him. He has his strength given him, not that he may crush

the weak, but that he may support and guide them. In his own household

he is to be the guide and the support of his children; out of his

household he is still to be the father--that is, the guide and

support--of the weak and the poor; not merely of the meritoriously weak

and the innocently poor, but of the guiltily and punishably poor; of the

men who ought to have known better--of the poor who ought to be ashamed

of themselves. It is nothing to give pension and cottage to the widow

who has lost her son; it is nothing to give food and medicine to the

workman who has broken his arm, or the decrepit woman wasting in

sickness. But it is something to use your time and strength to war with

the waywardness and thoughtlessness of mankind; to keep the erring

workman in your service till you have made him an unerring one; and to

direct your fellow-merchant to the opportunity which his dulness would

have lost. This is much; but it is yet more, when you have fully

achieved the superiority which is due to you, and acquired the wealth

which is the fitting reward of your sagacity, if you solemnly accept the

responsibility of it, as it is the helm and guide of labour far and

near.

119. For you who have it in your hands are in reality the pilots of the

power and effort of the State. It is entrusted to you as an authority to

be used for good or evil, just as completely as kingly authority was

ever given to a prince, or military command to a captain. And, according

to the quantity of it that you have in your hands, you are the arbiters

of the will and work of England; and the whole issue, whether the work

of the State shall suffice for the State or not, depends upon you. You

may stretch out your sceptre over the heads of the English labourers,

and say to them, as they stoop to its waving, "Subdue this obstacle that

has baffled our fathers, put away this plague that consumes our

children; water these dry places, plough these desert ones, carry this

food to those who are in hunger; carry this light to those who are in

darkness; carry this life to those who are in death;" or on the other

side you may say to her labourers: "Here am I; this power is in my hand;

come, build a mound here for me to be throned upon, high and wide; come,

make crowns for my head, that men may see them shine from far away;

come, weave tapestries for my feet, that I may tread softly on the silk

and purple; come, dance before me, that I may be gay; and sing sweetly

to me, that I may slumber; so shall I live in joy, and die in honour."

And better than such an honourable death it were that the day had

perished wherein we were born, and the night in which it was said there

is a child conceived.

120. I trust that in a little while there will be few of our rich men

who, through carelessness or covetousness, thus forfeit the glorious

office which is intended for their hands. I said, just now, that wealth

ill-used was as the net of the spider, entangling and destroying: but

wealth well used is as the net of the sacred fisher who gathers souls of

men out of the deep. A time will come--I do not think even now it is

far from us--when this golden net of the world's wealth will be spread

abroad as the flaming meshes of morning cloud are over the sky; bearing

with them the joy of light and the dew of the morning, as well as the

summons to honourable and peaceful toil. What less can we hope from your

wealth than this, rich men of England, when once you feel fully how, by

the strength of your possessions--not, observe, by the exhaustion, but

by the administration of them and the power,--you can direct the

acts--command the energies--inform the ignorance--prolong the existence,

of the whole human race; and how, even of worldly wisdom, which man

employs faithfully, it is true, not only that her ways are pleasantness,

but that her paths are peace; and that, for all the children of men, as

well as for those to whom she is given, Length of days is in her right

hand, as in her left hand Riches and Honour?

ADDENDA

Note, p. 18.--"_Fatherly authority._"

121. This statement could not, of course, be heard without displeasure

by a certain class of politicians; and in one of the notices of these

lectures given in the Manchester journals at the time, endeavour was

made to get quit of it by referring to the Divine authority, as the only

Paternal power with respect to which men were truly styled "brethren."

Of course it is so, and, equally of course, all human government is

nothing else than the executive expression of this Divine authority. The

moment government ceases to be the practical enforcement of Divine law,

it is tyranny; and the meaning which I attach to the words "paternal

government," is, in more extended terms, simply this--"The executive

fulfilment, by formal human methods, of the will of the Father of

mankind respecting His children." I could not give such a definition of

Government as this in a popular lecture; and even in written form, it

will necessarily suggest many objections, of which I must notice and

answer the most probable.

Only, in order to avoid the recurrence of such tiresome phrases as "it

may be answered in the second place," and "it will be objected in the

third place," etc., I will ask the reader's leave to arrange the

discussion in the form of simple dialogue, letting _O._ stand for

objector, and _R._ for response.

122. _O._--You define your paternal government to be the executive

fulfilment, by formal human methods, of the Divine will. But, assuredly,

that will cannot stand in need of aid or expression from human laws. It

cannot fail of its fulfilment.

_R._ 122. In the final sense it cannot; and in that sense, men who are

committing murder and stealing are fulfilling the will of God as much as

the best and kindest people in the world. But in the limited and present

sense, the only sense with which _we_ have anything to do, God's will

concerning man is fulfilled by some men, and thwarted by others. And

those men who either persuade or enforce the doing of it, stand towards

those who are rebellious against it exactly in the position of faithful

children in a family, who, when the father is out of sight, either

compel or persuade the rest to do as their father would have them, were

he present; and in so far as they are expressing and maintaining, for

the time, the paternal authority, they exercise, in the exact sense in

which I mean the phrase to be understood, paternal government over the

rest.

_O._--But, if Providence has left a liberty to man in many things in

order to prove him, why should human law abridge that liberty, and take

upon itself to compel what the great Lawgiver does not compel?

123. _R._--It is confessed, in the enactment of any law whatsoever, that

human lawgivers have a right to do this. For, if you have no right to

abridge any of the liberty which Providence has left to man, you have no

right to punish any one for committing murder or robbery. You ought to

leave them to the punishment of God and Nature. But if you think

yourself under obligation to punish, as far as human laws can, the

violation of the will of God by these great sins, you are certainly

under the same obligation to punish, with proportionately less

punishment, the violation of His will in less sins.

_O._--No; you must not attempt to punish less sins by law, because you

cannot properly define nor ascertain them. Everybody can determine

whether murder has been committed or not, but you cannot determine how

far people have been unjust or cruel in minor matters, and therefore

cannot make or execute laws concerning minor matters.

_R._--If I propose to you to punish faults which cannot be defined, or

to execute laws which cannot be made equitable, reject the laws I

propose. But do not generally object to the principle of law.

_O._--Yes; I generally object to the principle of law as applied to

minor things; because, if you could succeed (which you cannot) in

regulating the entire conduct of men by law in little things as well as

great, you would take away from human life all its probationary

character, and render many virtues and pleasures impossible. You would

reduce virtue to the movement of a machine, instead of the act of a

spirit.

124. _R._--You have just said, parenthetically, and I fully and

willingly admit it, that it is impossible to regulate all minor matters

by law. Is it not probable, therefore, that the degree in which it is

_possible_ to regulate them by it, is also the degree in which it is

_right_ to regulate them by it? Or what other means of judgment will you

employ, to separate the things which ought to be formally regulated from

the things which ought not? You admit that great sins should be legally

repressed; but you say that small sins should not be legally repressed.

How do you distinguish between great and small sins? and how do you

intend to determine, or do you in practice of daily life determine, on

what occasions you should compel people to do right, and on what

occasions you should leave them the option of doing wrong?

_O._--I think you cannot make any accurate or logical distinction in

such matters; but that common sense and instinct have, in all civilised

nations, indicated certain crimes of great social harmfulness, such as

murder, theft, adultery, slander, and such like, which it is proper to

repress legally; and that common sense and instinct indicate also the

kind of crimes which it is proper for laws to let alone, such as

miserliness, ill-natured speaking, and many of those commercial

dishonesties which I have a notion you want your paternal government to

interfere with.

_R._--Pray do not alarm yourself about what my paternal government is

likely to interfere with, but keep to the matter in hand. You say that

"common sense and instinct" have, in all civilised nations,

distinguished between the sins that ought to be legally dealt with and

that ought not. Do you mean that the laws of all civilised nations are

perfect?

_O._--No; certainly not.

_R._--Or that they are perfect at least in their discrimination of what

crimes they should deal with, and what crimes they should let alone?

_O._--No; not exactly.

_R._--What _do_ you mean, then?

125. _O._--I mean that the general tendency is right in the laws of

civilised nations; and that, in due course of time, natural sense and

instinct point out the matters they should be brought to bear upon. And

each question of legislation must be made a separate subject of inquiry

as it presents itself: you cannot fix any general principles about what

should be dealt with legally, and what should not.

_R._--Supposing it to be so, do you think there are any points in which

our English legislation is capable of amendment, as it bears on

commercial and economical matters, in this present time?

_O._--Of course I do.

_R._--Well, then, let us discuss these together quietly; and if the

points that I want amended seem to you incapable of amendment, or not in

need of amendment, say so: but don't object, at starting, to the mere

proposition of applying law to things which have not had law applied to

them before. You have admitted the fitness of my expression, "paternal

government": it only has been, and remains, a question between us, how

far such government should extend. Perhaps you would like it only to

regulate, among the children, the length of their lessons; and perhaps I

should like it also to regulate the hardness of their cricket-balls: but

cannot you wait quietly till you know what I want it to do, before

quarrelling with the thing itself?

_O._--No; I cannot wait quietly; in fact, I don't see any use in

beginning such a discussion at all, because I am quite sure from the

first, that you want to meddle with things that you have no business

with, and to interfere with healthy liberty of action in all sorts of

ways; and I know that you can't propose any laws that would be of real

use.[15]

[Note 15: If the reader is displeased with me for putting this

foolish speech into his mouth, I entreat his pardon; but he may be

assured that it is a speech which would be made by many people, and the

substance of which would be tacitly felt by many more, at this point of

the discussion. I have really tried, up to this point, to make the

objector as intelligent a person as it is possible for an author to

imagine anybody to be who differs with him.]

126. _R._--If you indeed know that, you would be wrong to hear me any

farther. But if you are only in painful doubt about me, which makes you

unwilling to run the risk of wasting your time, I will tell you

beforehand what I really do think about this same liberty of action,

namely, that whenever we can make a perfectly equitable law about any

matter, or even a law securing, on the whole, more just conduct than

unjust, we ought to make that law; and that there will yet, on these

conditions, always remain a number of matters respecting which legalism

and formalism are impossible; enough, and more than enough, to exercise

all human powers of individual judgment, and afford all kinds of scope

to individual character. I think this; but of course it can only be

proved by separate examination of the possibilities of formal restraint

in each given field of action; and these two lectures are nothing more

than a sketch of such a detailed examination in one field, namely, that

of art. You will find, however, one or two other remarks on such

possibilities in the next note.

* * * * *

Note 2nd, p. 21.--"_Right to public support._"

127. It did not appear to me desirable, in the course of the spoken

lecture, to enter into details or offer suggestions on the questions of

the regulation of labour and distribution of relief, as it would have

been impossible to do so without touching on many disputed or disputable

points, not easily handled before a general audience. But I must now

supply what is wanting to make my general statement clear.

I believe, in the first place, that no Christian nation has any business

to see one of its members in distress without helping him, though,

perhaps, at the same time punishing him: help, of course--in nine cases

out of ten--meaning guidance, much more than gift, and, therefore,

interference with liberty. When a peasant mother sees one of her

careless children fall into a ditch, her first proceeding is to pull him

out; her second, to box his ears; her third, ordinarily, to lead him

carefully a little way by the hand, or send him home for the rest of the

day. The child usually cries, and very often would clearly prefer

remaining in the ditch; and if he understood any of the terms of

politics, would certainly express resentment at the interference with

his individual liberty: but the mother has done her duty. Whereas the

usual call of the mother nation to any of her children, under such

circumstances, has lately been nothing more than the foxhunter's,--"Stay

still there; I shall clear you." And if we always _could_ clear them,

their requests to be left in muddy independence might be sometimes

allowed by kind people, or their cries for help disdained by unkind

ones. But we can't clear them. The whole nation is, in fact, bound

together, as men are by ropes on a glacier--if one falls, the rest must

either lift him or drag him along with them[16] as dead weight, not

without much increase of danger to themselves. And the law of right

being manifestly in this--as, whether manifestly or not, it is always,

the law of prudence--the only question is, how this wholesome help and

interference are to be administered.

[Note 16: It is very curious to watch the efforts of two

shop-keepers to ruin each other, neither having the least idea that his

ruined neighbour must eventually be supported at his own expense, with

an increase of poor rates; and that the contest between them is not in

reality which shall get everything for himself, but which shall first

take upon himself and his customers the gratuitous maintenance of the

other's family.]

128. The first interference should be in education. In order that men

may be able to support themselves when they are grown, their strength

must be properly developed while they are young; and the State should

always see to this--not allowing their health to be broken by too early

labour, nor their powers to be wasted for want of knowledge. Some

questions connected with this matter are noticed farther on under the

head "trial schools": one point I must notice here, that I believe all

youths, of whatever rank, ought to learn some manual trade thoroughly;

for it is quite wonderful how much a man's views of life are cleared by

the attainment of the capacity of doing any one thing well with his

hands and arms. For a long time, what right life there was in the upper

classes of Europe depended in no small degree on the necessity which

each man was under of being able to fence; at this day, the most useful

things which boys learn at public schools are, I believe, riding,

rowing, and cricketing. But it would be far better that members of

Parliament should be able to plough straight, and make a horseshoe, than

only to feather oars neatly or point their toes prettily in stirrups.

Then, in literary and scientific teaching, the great point of economy is

to give the discipline of it through knowledge which will immediately

bear on practical life. Our literary work has long been economically

useless to us because too much concerned with dead languages; and our

scientific work will yet, for some time, be a good deal lost, because

scientific men are too fond or too vain of their systems, and waste the

student's time in endeavouring to give him large views, and make him

perceive interesting connections of facts; when there is not one

student, no, nor one man, in a thousand, who can feel the beauty of a

system, or even take it clearly into his head; but nearly all men can

understand, and most will be interested in, the facts which bear on

daily life. Botanists have discovered some wonderful connection between

nettles and figs, which a cowboy who will never see a ripe fig in his

life need not be at all troubled about; but it will be interesting to

him to know what effect nettles have on hay, and what taste they will

give to porridge; and it will give him nearly a new life if he can be

got but once, in a spring time, to look well at the beautiful circlet of

white nettle blossom, and work out with his schoolmaster the curves of

its petals, and the way it is set on its central mast. So, the principle

of chemical equivalents, beautiful as it is, matters far less to a

peasant boy, and even to most sons of gentlemen, than their knowing how

to find whether the water is wholesome in the back-kitchen cistern, or

whether the seven-acre field wants sand or chalk.

A Joy For Ever (and Its Price in the Market) · 第 7 / 13 段