"The papers on this subject submitted to Congress by the President,
in compliance with a resolution of the House, show that at the close
of navigation last fall, two steamers (owned or hired by the British
authorities), one schooner, and a number of barges, were employed on
Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, as a security against an
apprehended renewal of the troubles of the preceding year; and from
the annexed communication of Mr. Forsyth, there is reason to expect
that even this small force, or at least a part of it, will be soon
withdrawn."
* * * * *
"_Department of State, Washington, March 13._
"The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred a resolution of
the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting the
President to communicate to that body, 'if compatible with the public
service, whether the Government of Great Britain have expressed to the
Government of the United States a desire to annul the arrangements
entered into between the two Governments in the month of April, 1817,
respecting the naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes;
and that, if said arrangements be not annulled, whether there has been
any violation of the same by the authorities of Great Britain,' has the
honour to report to the President a copy of the only communication on
file in this department on the subject to which the resolution refers.
Prior to the date of that communication, the Secretary of State, in an
interview invited for that purpose, called Mr. Fox's attention to the
disregard by Her Majesty's colonial authorities of the conventional
arrangement between the two countries, as to the extent of naval
armaments upon the lakes.
"In the autumn of the past year the Secretary of State made known
verbally to Mr. Fox, that the cause assigned in his note no longer
existing, the President expected that the British armament upon the
lakes would be placed upon the footing prescribed by the convention.
Mr. Fox engaged to communicate without delay to his Government the
substance of the conversation between them: and expressed his own
conviction, that if the winter then ensuing passed without renewed
attempts to disturb the tranquillity of the Canadas, there could be no
sufficient motive for either Government maintaining a force beyond that
authorized by the convention of 1817.
"All of which is respectfully submitted.
"JOHN FORSYTH.
"_To the President of the United States._"
The instructions which were deemed expedient to be given to Colonel
Sir William Williams of the 13th Regiment, commanding Isle aux Noix
and its dependencies in 1814, after we lost the superiority on Lake
Champlain, will clearly show that what I have proposed should be
seriously considered; and also support my opinion of the necessity of
establishing the fortresses I have mentioned, in which troops could at
all times be comfortably quartered; indeed, with such neighbours as the
Americans, our possessions can never be safe from insult without them.
"_St John's, November 9, 1814._
"SIR,
"I am commanded by Major-General Brisbane to transmit, for your
guidance, the following instructions, which are to be acted upon as
far as circumstances will permit, in case of an attack upon any of the
advanced posts; not that the Major-General has reason to conclude the
enemy have such an object in view; but the confusion always arising
out of unexpected occurrences in time of war, must as far as possible
be avoided or guarded against; and you ought also to be aware of his
intentions in case of such events happening.
"1st. The enemy appearing in force in the direction of Caldwell's
Manor, coming from Missisquoi Bay.
"It is not probable that the enemy would appear in that direction with
any other intention, but for a demonstration, unless he came with
the determination of attacking Isle aux Noix, in which case it is to
be expected he will bring with him, if before the frost sets in, the
means of water conveyance on the south river, or if afterwards, means
of transport for heavy guns on the ice. His intentions, therefore, in
these respects can be easily ascertained. If the former should be his
object, a force must be detached into the Manor, or the concessions,
(say five companies under a field-officer) to keep him in check, and
to prevent the country from being over-run and plundered; this may in
a great measure be effected by the choice of favourable situations or
positions, but no general affair must be permitted without the consent
of the Major-General.
"Whilst the enemy might be thus manœuvring, a real attack would likely
take place on the line of the La Colle and Ash Island. Such an attack
is not improbable, although the enemy could have no other object in
view but to beat up our cantonments, and cause the troops, in some
measure, to take the field exposed to the inclemency of the season, and
might be effected with only a small part of his force. The whole of the
posts upon that line must be ordered to hold out till reinforcements
can arrive from this place; for until then it would not be safe to
detach but small parties from the garrison of Isle aux Noix. A force
from L'Acadie could only be brought up in support of the bridge. La
Colle Mill and its dependencies must look to Isle aux Noix alone for
assistance.
"2ndly, If the enemy should come with the intention of attacking Isle
aux Noix with heavy guns, a certain time is requisite for him to make
his arrangements; and measures could be taken on our part to frustrate
his views.
"For some time longer, it is in the enemy's power to make an attack by
means of his fleet, upon Ash Island and La Colle, in conjunction with a
force acting in Caldwell's Manor; the necessity therefore, of keeping
the guns in battery there, as long as possible, even till the frost
sets in, must be obvious.
"It is not probable that the enemy might venture to pass Isle aux Noix
entirely, and move down the Richlieu at once upon this place; which
might perhaps be the case, if collecting a sufficient force, he should
meditate the invasion of the Lower Province. Under such circumstances,
the posts on the La Colle might be greatly exposed. It would then
be for you to act powerfully on his line of operations; and as most
likely, in such a case, your communications with the advanced posts
might be attempted to be cut off, it would therefore be advisable,
after destroying the road from the Mill to La Colle bridge, to withdraw
the troops from the former and Ash Island (after destroying the works)
to Isle aux Noix, which would place at your disposal sufficient means
to annoy an invading army. Of course the Burtonville road from the
bridge would be disputed to the utmost.
"3rd. The enemy appearing in force in Odletown.
"This is not likely to happen until the frost sets in; and could only
have in view the occupation of the posts of the La Colle and Ash
Island; objects of the first importance to us to prevent; and an attack
on that side in force must distract us much more than in the direction
of Caldwell's Manor, and in this case it would be reasonable to expect
a diversion on the right bank of the river, or even if the enemy has
sufficient force, a dash down the South river upon the Isle aux Noix,
which would make it hazardous to detach much from it for the support
of the advance before the troops from this can arrive; yet a force
could be easily, at this season, brought up to support the bridge of
La Colle, which is in itself no position to be held against cannon;
but the entrance of the Burtonville road is very favourable for light
troops and if they are judiciously posted there, it would be next to
impossible for the enemy to force a passage in that direction, and it
is not very likely such an attempt would be made; the danger rests in
La Colle Mill being taken, by which means we might be forced to retire
back on the road to L'Acadie, whereby the troops intrusted with the
defence of that entrance would be totally deprived of cover.
"Lastly. Any advance of the enemy upon us could deviate but little from
what has been stated in numbers one, two, and three, with any chance of
success; it must, therefore, be evident throughout the whole, that the
arrival of reinforcements from the rear is the primary object; it, upon
this account, becomes essential, that the Major-General should receive
the earliest possible intelligence of the appearance of the enemy in
any direction, and he, therefore, desires me to request, that in any
instructions you may give to the officers in command of the advanced
posts, _sending immediate information_ of suspicious movements in their
front may be held up to them as of the first importance.
"I am also to acquaint you, that we do not, at present, possess, at St.
John's, more means than would enable us to move one regiment at a time
up the river Richlieu to your assistance."
No doubt, since 1814, the number of roads from the States into the
Canadas have been considerably increased, which must render it still
more difficult, without the redoubts I speak of, to make arrangements
for the protection of the country; I hope, however, that what has been
said, and what are shown to be the difficulties to be met with and
overcome, together with the anxiety evinced on the part of the American
Government, as to any preparations we may have made in case of a war,
to which they evidently look forward, will receive timely and serious
consideration, but in any future contest with the United States, the
command of Lake Champlain ought instantly to be acquired; and our
superiority in war steamers upon all the Lakes cannot possibly be
dispensed with, if these fine and valuable provinces of the empire are
to be protected from inroads, and consequent devastation; and such is
my opinion of the loyalty of the people in general of the Canadas, and
even of the Canadians of the French extraction in the Lower Province,
if not allowed to be misled by designing men, that, I am convinced,
they would readily contribute towards their own defence, rather than be
brought under the democratical rule of the United States.
If the whole of our North American territories had arrived at a certain
point, when an increased, educated, and intelligent population, and
improved resources, had made it safe for them as one nation, to be
allowed entirely to manage their own affairs without any interference
on the part of the mother country, and that they really desired to
do so, Great Britain ought readily to comply with their wishes, yet
still remaining their friend and protector, and receiving, in return,
every commercial advantage; but to abandon them in their present weak
and distracted state, as some men have ignorantly talked of, and
even recommended, would only be throwing them into the power of our
_friendly_ neighbours, who, thus strengthened, and we proportionally
weakened, might, to a certain degree, become more formidable.
I beg, however, to ask, why is Great Britain become, as it were, timid,
or reluctant to declare, that no act nor pretensions on the part of the
United States can give them a right to incorporate British subjects
into their Union without the consent of our Government; and why is it
not made known, by proclamation, or otherwise, all over the world,
that British-born subjects have no right to renounce, and that they
can never be looked upon as having renounced, in whatever part of the
world they may think fit to reside, their allegiance to their Queen;
and that if any of them are taken in arms on land, or upon the seas,
fighting against their countrymen, they shall be tried and condemned as
traitors, and become liable to be punished as such. It may probably be
said, that in case of a war, this would render desperate many thousands
of our seamen now navigating the United States' ships at high rates
of wages, and would cause those in their ships of war to fight with
a halter about their necks. This might, perhaps, be the case at first
with a few of the worthless; but let our seamen be offered the same,
or even higher wages than they can receive in the ships of war of the
States, or in those of any other country, and I cannot, for a moment
believe, that brave men, the descendants of many of those who fought
with Nelson, and our other renowned naval chiefs, will abandon their
country, though it may have shown itself, perhaps, ungrateful to them
or their fathers for former services.
But surely it ought to be high time for us to consider the effects
produced by our now rather too long tried _reciprocal system of
trade_ with other nations, in which I have never heard, that we had
been fairly met, nor do I believe we ever will be met by any of them.
Let us, therefore, lay aside for the moment, the wild, and to the
generality of men, incomprehensible theories, clothed in the mystical
jargon of political economists; and permit me to ask any man of common
sense, where reciprocity is to be found in the commercial intercourse
between Great Britain and the United States? I suppose reciprocity to
mean, in this instance, mutual benefits conferred and received.
A few years ago--and I am not aware of any important change having
since taken place--Great Britain professed her principles as regarded
reciprocity to be,--"To abolish all discriminating duties affecting the
like productions of foreign countries, and in lieu thereof to establish
one uniform Tariff for the whole.
"To reduce that Tariff to the lowest degree, consistent, in
each particular country, with the two legitimate objects of all
duties--either the collection of the revenue, or the protection
absolutely requisite for the maintenance of our own internal industry.
"To abolish all discriminating duties upon the navigation of other
countries, so that the products and merchandize of these nations, when
imported in their own ships, shall be subject to the same rates only as
when imported in British ships."
Such principles are certainly most liberal; but in what did the wisdom
of those who professed them consist? certainly not in that of this
world; if the lofty position of Great Britain was considered at the
period when such regulations were framed, and when the then state
of our commerce with other nations were taken into account. But let
us see how this system has worked. Suppose we speak of cotton, (but
we might take, with almost equal advantage, other articles imported
into the United Kingdom), as being the chief export from the United
States. It is mostly brought to us in American ships, navigated, in
a great measure, by British seamen, some of whom they pretend to
have naturalized; but at present we shall say no more of this. Our
merchants will not of course, employ, to any extent, British ships to
bring cotton from the United States, because the Americans can afford,
from various causes, not counteracted by us, to convey it cheaper to
them. Where then can we find reciprocity in the shipping and seamen
employed in this great branch of trade? To balance this fairly, we
should surely, if it were only in self-defence, lay a tax upon cotton
imported in American, or any other vessels, in order to compel British
merchants to employ British ships and British seamen to bring it in its
raw state from America, or from our East India possessions, or from
any other country where we might think fit to encourage the growth of
this article. It may be said that cotton, thus raised in price, would
become too expensive for our manufacturers to be able to contend with
foreigners in the continental and other markets; but this could not be
long the case, for the American carrying trade being thus diminished,
they could not afford to convey it at low prices to any country, or to
pay their or rather our seamen such high wages; and are we not wisely
improving the models of all new ships which are built; and consequently
their rates of sailing, so that we shall soon be able to cope in this
respect, with the United States ships also.
I may, however, be told that the United States can meet us in this way
by laying taxes upon articles manufactured in the British dominions and
imported into their Union; or, perhaps, upon the cotton itself, before
it is exported to this country. Let them do so if they please, but they
will not adhere very long to that plan. We can find cotton elsewhere
or substitutes for most of it in flax and wool, to the great benefit
of our own colonies, and the Americans would soon create for our
advantage, by taxing our wares, a "pretty considerable" body of fair
traders out of the present sympathizers all along their most extensive
frontier. The last war did this, to my certain knowledge, to a great
extent, and I even had a person connected in some manner with a high
civil authority of the State of New York caught and brought to me when
engaged in this kind of traffic. We had, at the time I allude to,
excellent information of what was going forward in the adjoining States
to Canada. I was told that a military man of rank was in the habit of
crossing the boundary line, generally at night, and it was supposed,
judging from some of those who met him, that he came as a spy. I had
him therefore taken and marched into St. John's one morning.--I was
surprised however to find that he was a very gentleman-like man, both
in appearance and manners. He at once acquainted me with his object
in venturing so imprudently into Canada: indeed the very unpleasant
situation in which he stood as a spy made this quite necessary. He was
soon able to convince me by mentioning mercantile houses with which
he was connected in Montreal, &c. that though in a kind of military
situation, about the high authority I have alluded to, he had no
intention whatever of acting the part of a spy, but had only some
commercial business of importance on his hands. I had, of course, to
report the circumstance of his capture, through Sir Thomas Brisbane,
who was then at Montreal upon duty, for the information of Government,
and in the meantime I took this gentleman-like person into my own
house, he having pledged his word of honour that he would not attempt
to escape.
The answer I received to my letter respecting him rather alarmed me on
his account, for what I had mentioned as the reasons for his coming
into the Province were not deemed sufficiently satisfactory; and I
saw they were more inclined to look upon him as a spy than in any
other light. I therefore had to examine him again more minutely, and
according to instructions sent me; when he gave references to so many
respectable mercantile gentlemen as being well aware why he had come
into Canada, that I at last received orders to permit him to go back
to the States. But during the time I had the pleasure of his company I
had also an opportunity of becoming acquainted with a highly-informed
agreeable gentleman. But this, I conceive, will show clearly that the
fair trade during the war, had fallen into very respectable hands;
and from all I knew it was progressing in such a way as to hold out
expectations of great improvement had it lasted. I have been induced to
be thus minute in order to show how our manufactures are at any time,
and under any circumstances, certain of finding their way into the
States.
I shall most likely be told by the admirers of reciprocity, that the
American ships carry back our wares in return for their raw cotton.
This is not the case to any very great extent, and is chiefly done
where British mercantile houses have establishments in both countries;
for Jonathan will make what he can at home; and he would do much more
in this way, if he did not find that he can purchase most articles
cheaper ready made, than he can (owing to the great expense of labour,
and of living in the States) manufacture them himself, or else he
will send for what he wants to the cheapest markets, such as Hamburg,
Holland, Belgium, &c. where, we are informed, things are sold at
lower prices than what we can afford, even with the aid of science
and improved machinery, to make them for; and thus I am again at a
loss to understand where reciprocity in trade, carried on with all the
advantages on one side, is to be found.
I shall not enter into other branches of commerce, for such matters
would not suit this work, nor allude to what is practised by other
countries; but the same principles would apply equally to them as to
the United States. But it may not, perhaps, be improper here to ask,
if it has ever entered into the calculations of our "Squires of the
lofty Towers," which we see looking proudly down upon so many parts
of the country, in what manner the multitudes they have congregated,
like our chiefs of old, around their Baronial castles, are to be fed in
case of even a temporary stagnation of trade? But it is beneath them to
think of such matters, and they wisely leave subjects of this kind to
be discussed hereafter by improvident landlords, who, in consideration
of temporary advantages, have granted certain leases of parts of their
estates to these _squires_, to enable them to create cities, towns,
and villages, the enormous population of which, if it is to be kept in
tranquillity, must constantly require the presence of such troops as I
have in view.
I am afraid it may be found out before long, that we are rather too
closely connected with the United States; and are sacrificing far too
much, in a national point of view, and to our serious injury, in order
to maintain this imprudent connexion. Has it not already thrown the
greater part of the carrying trade into the hands of the Americans;
and has it not been the means of seducing from Great Britain her best
seamen? Let it, therefore, be made the interests of our merchants
to employ our sailors at such rates of wages as they can receive
in American or in any other ships. Let us meet countries fairly in
commercial affairs, who will really meet us fairly, and let us look
less to theories, and more to the essential object of practically
promoting our maritime prosperity.
Naval and military men must hereafter be much more closely connected,
than they have hitherto been, or I should not, in this work, presume to
speak of them as acting together; but must not every contemplative mind
foresee, that wonderful changes must soon be wrought by the power of
steam, not only upon naval, but also upon military affairs.
We must, therefore, turn our thoughts to it, with the deepest interest,
so as to ascertain, in time, what may be the best modes of bringing
the vast resources of Great Britain, in this respect, into action; and
also to the manner in which powerful armaments are to be conducted with
skill and rapidity to points selected for sudden invasion, for that
such must be the most prominent feature in all our future wars, will
most assuredly be developed, and that too before many years have passed
away.
Amongst the great and important changes to be brought about in war
by steam, we must look forward to its facilitating, by the certainty
and rapidity of the movements of those destined to accomplish the
objects in view, the protection, or destruction of much property, both
public and private; also to its occasioning, for the same reasons,
vast suffering to the inhabitants of the countries fixed upon, for
whatever cause, to become the theatres of these awful and devastating
operations. I cannot exactly compare them, and their consequences,
to the unlooked for descents of the sea-kings of old, yet they must
greatly, I fear, resemble them in their destructive and other effects,
and they must be felt ere long all over the world. We were, as a
nation, allowed by Providence, no doubt for wise purposes, to live
so long in, I fear, not duly valued tranquillity and security, under
the protection of our splendid navy of former days, that those who
remained at home really knew nothing of war, and its attendant trials
and privations, but the name. Long may this be the case, and this
happy state, when compared with that of other countries, may, in all
human probability, be rendered more lasting, if we will only be wise
enough to take timely lessons from the past. History tells us of the
rapid fall of many once powerful nations--how they fell it is not for
me to relate; but Spain, her former greatness, and the causes of her
present debasement, should be constantly before our eyes. We are still
a great and warlike people, but I trust that we may be enabled to act
with judgment, and to take, at all events, such steps as will prevent
any other nation from anticipating us in the use of steam for warlike
purposes.
Those who have already deeply considered the subject, have come to
the conclusion, that a comparatively small, but well constructed, and
powerfully propelled steamer, alike overcoming wind and tide; capable
of taking up and retaining a position within a certain distance of the
largest sailing vessel, may be supposed able to destroy or capture
her, however brave or excellent her officers and crew may be, and it
is concluded, that this could probably be accomplished with but very
little loss or damage, being sustained by the steamer, if judiciously
manœuvred, and her commander would besides possess the great advantage,
of going into action or not, as he might think most advisable. The old
naval tactics, such as that of ships gaining what is termed the weather
gage of each other, or any thing of that kind, in going into action,
must be wholely abandoned whenever a steamer heaves in sight; for the
sailing vessel is at once supposed to be, in a great measure, at her
mercy.
But such reasoners also calculate upon what would happen in an
engagement between two fleets, in which steam-ships of a large
class would be more numerous on one side than the other; for they
could at once act together, regardless of wind or weather, and thus
concentrating their force, they could cut off or destroy a certain part
of their opponent's fleet, before sailing vessels could possibly come
to their assistance. They also calculate upon this manœuvre being
repeated upon the remainder of the enemy's ships, which cannot escape
from these powerful steamers.
These are points, however, for seamen to decide; yet suppose a steamer,
calculated to carry only a few traversing guns of the longest range
for shot or shells, with what are usually termed percussion locks,
to insure good practice even when the vessel is in motion, to be
well managed or manœuvred by a skilful naval officer; and should he
occasionally use shot heated in the furnaces for the boilers, what a
formidable opponent she must prove, especially in a calm, or even in a
storm, to any sailing vessel. Many officers may remember what treatment
our ships of war frequently met with in parts of the Mediterranean,
from even a single Spanish gun-boat, carrying perhaps but one long
gun; and when the facility and rapidity of movement of a steamer are
considered, there can be no comparison whatever drawn between her and
a common gun-boat, even when propelled by sweeps or oars, but which
become useless in a rough sea. Such matters as these can, however,
be brought by calculation to something very near to certainty as to
results.
I am aware that the great difficulty which presents itself at present
is how to protect from shot the chimneys, paddles, and machinery of
war-steamers; but if, in these times, when science is daily performing
such wonders amongst us, sufficient rewards were offered for the best
plans for this purpose, I have no doubt but we should soon see much
accomplished; but even until this may be effected, the position
which can be taken up by the steamer will, it is thought, insure her
being no great sufferer from the shot fired from a sailing vessel.
But these, and many other points connected with steam, will be fully
elucidated the very first war in which we may be seriously engaged;
but in the mean time much can be immediately done, by merely making
some useful experiments, whereby we may, to a considerable extent, be
taught whether it be advisable or not for us to continue, at a great
expense, building and equipping, at all events for what may be termed
home service, the present description of sailing vessels, or whether
it would not be prudent to direct more attention to war steamers, or
to those ships which are propelled by both sails and steam; though I
should fear that this combination of the two propelling powers must be
found objectionable, as both would most likely be imperfect.
For foreign service, or for those parts of the world where the
necessary supplies of fuel for steamers cannot easily be procured, the
combining the two principles in a ship may be useful; but wherever
perfect steamers can be available, they should decidedly have the
preference. But for some time to come, causing both steamers and
sailing vessels to act together for mutual assistance and support in
action, especially in distant parts of the world, must obviously be
desirable.
It appears to be demonstrated that a steamer, from fifteen hundred to
two thousand tons burden, and upwards, possesses great proportional
advantages over one of only four or five hundred, in carrying troops,
cargo, or fuel; and her increased power of steam, gives her also
proportional superiority in forcing her way through the water, and
storms or heavy seas have much less effect upon her than upon smaller
vessels. A steamship of war of two thousand tons burden, well manned
and armed--and she need not carry many, but they ought to be guns of
long range--must possess such powers of movement, and of destruction,
as cannot be easily calculated or understood; and conceive that ship
to carry, independent of her crew, (which need not be anything like
so numerous as that of even a large frigate,) a regiment of cavalry,
or two of infantry; then suppose thirty such steam ships conveying an
army of perhaps 30,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, such
as I am so anxious to have called out in the manner I have proposed,
and which could be carried by these irresistible steamers into almost
any port having sufficient depth of water, or to any selected point,
and there landed, ready to act against an unprepared, or perhaps
distracted people; and how easy it would be with such ships to supply
an army afterwards with every requisite; and the object in view being
accomplished, or even if frustrated, with what little difficulty
could the troops, and their materiel, be again received on board, and
conveyed to any other point of attack, or back to our own shores.
I had written the above observations, when I saw, by accident, the
following description of the Cyclops steam frigate, and from what
is said of her, it may be seen what I had in view. A few of the
96-pounders will soon decide the fate of a battle.
"The Cyclops, Steam Frigate.--This magnificent vessel, the largest
steam man-of-war in the world, was launched from Pembroke Dock-yard
a few days ago. Her dimensions are as follow:--Length 225 feet, beam
between paddles 38 feet, depth of hold 21 feet. Her tonnage is about
1,300, being 200 tons larger than the Gorgon, launched from the same
slip about eighteen months since. Her equipment, as a man-of-war,
will be the same in all respects as a frigate, having a complete gun,
or main-deck, as well as an upper or quarter-deck. On the main-deck
she will carry eighteen long 36-pounders, and on the upper deck four
48-pounders, and two 96-pounders on swivels, carrying a ball of ten
inches diameter, and sweeping round the horizon 240 degrees. The
Cyclops, like the vessel already referred to, will be commanded by
a post-captain, these two being the only steamers taking frigate's
rank. Her crew will consist of 210 men, 20 engineers and stokers, and
a lieutenant's party of marines, who will have charge of the guns,
all of which move upon slides and fixed pivots, thereby taking a
much wider range than the ordinary carriages can give. She will be
schooner-rigged, but her foremast will be of the same scantling and
height as that of a 36-gun frigate. Her draught of water, with all
on board, including six months' provisions, completely armed, and
with twenty days' fuel, will be fifteen feet. This quantity of fuel
(400 tons) will be carried in the engine-room, but there is a space
in the fore and after holds for ten days more coal, making, in all,
sufficient fuel for a thirty days' run. She has an orlop deck below
the gun-deck, of dimensions so magnificent that there is room to stow
with comfort eight hundred troops and their officers; so that, taking
her all in all, the Cyclops may be considered the most powerful vessel
in her Majesty's service. The Cyclops has been built in six months,
under the immediate inspection of Mr. W. Eyde, master-builder, of
Pembroke-yard, from drawings and plans prepared by his brother, Mr.
John Eyde, the able assistant of Sir W. Symonds, the inspector of the
navy, upon whose principle--namely, the combining of the sailing and
steaming properties--this vessel has been constructed. The Cyclops
will be docked in Sheerness Dock-yard on the 30th instant, and, after
remaining there for a few days, will proceed to the manufactory of
Messrs. Seaward, at Millwall, Poplar, to receive her engines, which
will be of 320 horsepower, on the principle which, in the case of the
Gorgon, has proved so successful that the Lords of the Admiralty have
given orders for five more pairs of engines upon the same plan, for
as many frigates. Half-a-dozen such steamers would do three times as
much work as the same number of line-of-battle ships. Twelve years ago
Lord Cochrane maintained, that a few well-appointed steamers would
suffice to keep in check opposing fleets in the Mediterranean; and if
we may judge from appearances, a short time only will elapse before the
experiment is tried."
Suppose also that each of these powerful steamers had assigned to her
to take in tow, when necessary, a sailing vessel, conveying either
additional troops, horses, coals, provisions, forage, &c. &c., how
much more formidable such an armament would become.
In combined naval and military operations, I should conclude that the
usual mode of proceeding would be to secure the point of debarkation,
or any other considered more suitable, so as to admit of the army
being again received on board the ships with as little difficulty and
loss as possible; for we may well suppose that the exasperated and
suffering inhabitants would do every thing in their power to destroy
and annoy the invaders. Field entrenchments, but on as confined a scale
as possible, must be thrown up with skill and rapidity, in situations
to favour the re-embarking of the army, with all that belongs to it;
and how essential it must then be, that soldiers should be as much
accustomed to the use of the pickaxe and shovel as to their arms; in
short, it will become indispensable that they should have habits of
working, like the Roman soldiers of old.
Let us consider the consequences of such a descent. The country to a
considerable extent must be instantly over-run by an army perfect in
all respects, and amply supplied independent of the invaded country.
Should the destruction of the power of an adversary in steam be alone
the object, gunpowder and other means we can readily command, would
speedily accomplish this. Dock-yards, building-yards, coal pits,
mines, machinery, railways, constructed at enormous expense, and all
public and private works of vast value--in a few days, and before any
force sufficient for their protection could be assembled, might be
laid in ruins, or so destroyed, as to render the amount of mischief
done incalculable. But these are matters which demand instant and due
consideration; and the country should be prepared to meet the expense
which must be incurred, if it is only to ensure our exemption from such
mortifications and misfortunes. Fortifications can afford a country
but little protection against such calamities; for to a superiority in
steam ships we can alone look for this, and to that Omnipotent Being
who can influence the judgments and views of those who, by Him, are
permitted to direct the affairs of this mighty empire.
It is obvious, that in our future wars, we must require not only an
efficient steam navy and a fine army, but also that the latter should
be in the highest state of discipline, and be led by able officers.
Such conduct as that of which our troops were guilty at Badajoz,
Ciudad Rodrigo, and on many other occasions, if attempted in these
enterprises, to which we must look forward as of frequent occurrence,
would most certainly lead to total ruin: sobriety, good conduct, and
the strictest obedience to orders cannot then be dispensed with; and
the country I hope will be convinced by what has been adduced, that
we could not possibly expect to find these necessary qualities in a
British army unless raised, organized, and officered in the manner I
have ventured to propose. In short, we want an army, similar in point
of discipline, though differently enforced, to that which Charles the
12th of Sweden led to constant victory, until the fatal battle of
Pultowa. And to our army of reserve I would hold up, as an example,
the brave and patriotic behaviour of the Swedish militia, which under
General Steinbock, during the absence of Charles at Bender, defeated at
Helsingborg, though almost entirely composed of raw recruits, unclothed
and badly armed, a regular Danish army that dared to invade their
country, and of which, as its rash and extraordinary king was absent,
they expected to have made an easy conquest.
But what a contrast to our troops, or indeed to those of any other
country, must a victorious Swedish army have been; as we find in the
account given of them by the famous Comte de Saxe, who tells us,
that the Swedes always kept their ranks and that after the battle of
Gadebesck was gained, the first line of these brave troops, with the
enemy dead at their feet, did not even dare to stoop down to strip
them--such was the discipline established in their regiments--until
prayers had been offered up on the field of battle.
It has, as a matter of course, been proposed that men regularly
brought up to the sea, should be exempted from serving in our armies;
but this can answer no wise purpose, so long as it is in their power
to enter the service even of our enemies, or rather of those who may
soon become so. A captain of the navy, in one of his works, has lately
given us a very melancholy account of the desertion of their country by
British seamen; and has also, I believe, assigned the true causes of
such defection; but it would be giving up as hopeless and unavailing,
every good feeling implanted in the heart of man towards his country,
if no exertions are made to recall to their allegiance these brave,
thoughtless, but warm-hearted wanderers.
This may not now be easily accomplished, but something ought
notwithstanding to be attempted, or else our navy should be rendered
independent of the merchant service for supplies of sailors; and the
changes which steam is producing in seamanship, must make this the less
difficult to be effected, as seamen for steamers can be much sooner
formed than those intended for sailing vessels; and allow me to ask,
why might not bodies of seamen be raised, so as to become crews for
ships of war, for a certain number of years service; and ought there
not to be held out to them even superior advantages, as to pension, &c.
to what has been spoken of for soldiers; for a navy is of much more
importance to Great Britain than an army; and why might not seamen and
their officers of all ranks be transferred bodily from ship to ship,
as might be found desirable or necessary, without obstinately adhering
to the old injurious plan of paying all off, when the ships in which
they have served are put, for whatever cause, out of commission; and
why might not such a plan render it seldom necessary to have recourse
to impressment, which ought never, however, to be altogether abandoned.
There might surely be for the navy, as well as for the army, a fixed
peace establishment, on a proper and enlarged scale; and in case of a
war, if additional crews are wanted for ships of a larger class about
to be commissioned, those which until then had been serving in the
smaller rates, could be augmented to the required establishments in
both officers and men, and new crews for the smaller rates, if still
to be employed, could be easily raised by impressment or bounty; but
seamen taken by the former, ought invariably to be discharged as soon
as their places can be supplied by volunteers; but most of them, if
the advantages I have just mentioned are held out to them, will have
no wish to leave their ships and comrades, or the officers they have
served under; and having had a good foundation of seamen (if I may use
the expression) to build upon, excellent crews, increased in numbers,
would in a very short time be available for ships of even the largest
class.
Although a soldier, I have been much at sea, and I have frequently
heard and remarked, that the very best sailors were those trained,
especially from boyhood, in our ships of war.
At first, seamen might be taken wherever they could be found, to man
our ships; but if a system of this kind were adopted--and of course
many points connected with it would require to be well weighed--there
could not be a doubt but our ships would soon be very superiorly manned
by perfectly trained seamen, who could use cannon, mortars, &c. with
proper effect; and if they were only treated with kindness, which I
have no doubt they would be, and paid fairly and liberally, the navy
would have a most decided advantage over our merchant service, and men
would gladly enter the former in preference to the latter.
A considerable proportion of the crews for the several classes of
ships, should even at the commencement of the system be boys; and it
might naturally be expected, that they would not only grow up in a
complete knowledge of their duties as sailors, but also become, like
soldiers, strongly attached to their officers, in whom they could have
confidence, and from whom they were not, under any circumstances,
to be separated. Of course, such permanent seamen would require
occasionally, and especially after long voyages, to be allowed to
visit their families and friends; leave of absence from their ships,
ought, whenever it was possible, to be liberally granted to them; and
such men, when on shore, would know how to conduct themselves with
propriety; for on board, I should conclude that due attention was paid
to their religious and common education.
But I must not forget that there is one serious objection to this plan
being adopted, however advantageous it might be to the navy, not on
account of its being suggested by a soldier, but it would do away with
much _patronage_, which those in power do not like to relinquish.
Much has been said of the hardships experienced by mates, and the class
of petty officers of the navy in general; but this is a subject into
which I cannot, and ought not, to enter. But let us look a little into
other matters, and try to comprehend what interest it takes, even to
have one's son made a midshipman--then to get a captain to take him
with him for the three years he may be afloat--then another captain
must be found to take him for three years more under his wing, or
else we must have excellent interest indeed, if we can contrive to
get him forward without nursing captains; and all this time we have
been obliged to allow him sufficient for his messing, and to enable
him to appear dressed like an officer and a gentleman. In some ships
this cannot be done under sixty pounds a year. Then he probably comes
home to us a stout light-hearted fellow, who has already passed his
examinations for a lieutenancy, and would give the world to be made
one; but to effect this (for any services he may have performed
are of no importance) takes a vast deal of interest. This at last
accomplished; again patronage is required to get him afloat for some
years longer. But although now an experienced officer, what interest it
must take to have him made a commander. And then how much more to get
him appointed to a ship. In short, nothing but patronage or interest
from beginning to end will answer, or ever did answer in our navy;
and the reader need not therefore be surprised at my feeling next to
hopeless, that all this will ever be overturned, to suit what will no
doubt, be held up to the world as the effusions of a madman. Be this,
however, as it may, (and I leave it to the good sense of the country to
settle the matter with patrons,) a captain now commanding one of our
frigates, in a conversation I had with him on subjects of this kind,
mentioned, that he calculated it would cost him about £1,200., over and
above his pay, &c. to keep his table, and to meet other unavoidable
expenses, and that too, with strict attention to economy, for the
three years he calculated upon being actively employed; and I am aware
that it took a good deal of interest on his part, to get the ship he
now commands.
Our navy, I believe, has but little, if any, fixed system for its
guidance. Every captain of a ship carrying on its duties or discipline,
and managing almost everything according to his own views, or as taught
by experience. Ought this to be permitted, and should not certain
regulations be established to prevent his running into extremes, even
in zeal for the credit of his ship, in appearance, discipline, or even
in points which in themselves may be good, if not carried so far as
to become from their frivolity vexatious to those under his command,
and which I have seen occasion much punishment, which might have
been better avoided. In short, ought a captain not to be restrained
by established system, almost in a similar manner to that by which
I propose to prevent the injurious effects of whim or caprice in
commanding officers of regiments.
I am aware that I must look forward to every possible objection being
thrown in the way of what I have presumed to suggest for the benefit of
both our navy and army; and I fully expect some will say that all this
is very well, but what do you intend to do with the numbers of retired
officers, now on the lists of both services? In the first place, to
expect me to answer every objection is not a little unreasonable; and
in the next, I am convinced it cannot be anticipated, that one-tenth
of such _ancients_ can ever again be called into active service, I
therefore suppose the country must continue, under any circumstances,
to furnish the pittance now doled out to them, as long as most of
them shall live; but even to balance this continued charge upon the
country, and which cannot be avoided, have I not, amongst other items,
shown that we can call out our army, and keep it up hereafter in a
much more efficient state than it ever was, without any expense in
the shape of bounty? Now the bounty for at least 100,000 men, taking
the army in all its branches, at a low establishment, amounts to
something; yet we shall not take this into account, but let us say
(whilst I have no intention of recapitulating all the modes I have
mentioned, by which savings can be effected), that we want annually
20,000 recruits, according to our present system, to keep it up to
its peace establishment, in which calculation I consider that I am
borne out by the returns of the number of men raised for Her Majesty's
service in Great Britain and Ireland. Then suppose that each of these
recruits stands the country in only five pounds (but in time of war
it could not be done for much more) a-head for bounty, &c. we should
thus save something considerable; let this sum be therefore allowed
to go annually towards providing for retired officers, who it may be
apprehended will continue a burden upon the country for a few years
longer. But alas! climate, wounds, &c. under the effects of which many
of these poor but gallant fellows are suffering, will not admit of our
having very long an opportunity of evincing our gratitude to them for
past services.
Colonel Pasley, one of our ablest and most scientific officers, I
believe, about the year 1807, wrote a most useful work, calling the
attention of the country to a plan he proposed for carrying the war,
which had even then been of unusually long duration, into the north
of Europe, where landing an army, it was, as he suggested, to have
proceeded gradually, as joined by the troops which could be assembled
in the countries that lay between the point selected and France,
till Napoleon could be at last assailed upon his own ground. His
work produced a considerable sensation at the time, but Spain and
Portugal, very opportunely, presented themselves to us, and in which
the very game recommended by Colonel Pasley was successfully played.
I hope, therefore, I may be allowed to observe, that it is much to be
regretted, it has not struck Colonel Pasley, that a work coming from
him, elucidating some of the subjects I have reluctantly ventured to
touch upon, especially those connected with Russia, and a new boundary
line for our North American territories, would be well received by
statesmen, military men, and the country in general; all of whom must
allow that an efficient and highly disciplined army and navy are now
wanted by Great Britain, and that no time should be lost in acquiring
them. If these essential objects were once attained, would it not be
wiser for us to look more to our own interests, and with a view to
securing our internal tranquillity and national industry, than to what
we have so little to say to; and would it not be better, if we did not
allow ourselves to be led away and entangled in intricate Russian,
Austrian, and Turkish policy? This ought certainly to be carefully
watched by us; but it should never be permitted so to embarrass us,
as to prevent our being able at all times to direct our attention and
powerful means to objects of much more importance to us as a great
maritime empire, possessing the finest and most valuable colonies in
the world. It is also to be hoped that the brave people of France
and Great Britain have at length seen the madness of having wasted
centuries in unceasing rivalry and jealousy, and likewise the folly
of tearing each other to pieces, to the delight of countries which
would glory in seeing both so humbled as to suit their own boundless
ambitious views. What is Constantinople, and even all Turkey, Egypt,
and such countries, to us, farther than our commercial relations
with them are concerned, in comparison to Great Britain retaining
her superiority upon the ocean, and which pre-eminence was acquired,
in former wars, at the cost of so much blood and treasure, and which
enabled her to extend her enlightening influence, religious and
commercial blessings all over the world. Let Austria and other states,
which must immediately feel the effects of Russian acquisitions of
territory from the Turkish dominions, take measures to guard against
the consequences to arise out of such acquirements, especially as the
aspect of the times most clearly indicates that the very storms, we are
taught to look for, are now gathering in that quarter, and the awful
effects attendant upon their bursting upon the world cannot probably
by any human means be prevented from ever reaching us. Ought not we,
therefore, if possible, to be prepared? Should not Great Britain at
all times look with a jealous eye from her vast Eastern Empire towards
Russia, so as to be ready for such events as may happen? Should not the
question be asked--what has Russia, not a maritime nation, in view, in
forming and keeping up such fleets as we are told she now possesses in
the Baltic and in the Black Sea? For with the numerous and well-trained
armies at her command, she can have nothing to apprehend from her
neighbours, nor from us. Encroachments upon other nations can therefore
be her only object. If Russia will not regard our remonstrances as to
her unnecessary, and to other nations dangerous naval preparations
for war, the safety and honour of Great Britain require, that
such diversions should be made, as must compel her to look to her
own already enormous acquisitions from her weaker neighbours. For
instance, a little assistance from us would soon enable Circassia,
and other countries to the south of Russia, to give ample employment
to her overgrown armies. Poland, if fully assured of aid, from France
especially (for France is as much interested in Russia being kept in
check as we are), could be easily roused at the same time to assert
her freedom, and to revenge her wrongs. It could not be very difficult
to form, under the powerful protection of Great Britain, a coalition
of the Northern States, whose frontiers are now bounded by Russia,
and which only exist as kingdoms through Russian sufferance, with the
view of insuring their independence. Wars thus created, through her
ambition, by exhausting her resources, would effectually put an end to
her power of subjugating other nations; and if the standard of a war
arising out of opinions, which such measures would most likely produce,
was once unfurled in that extensive empire, in which the lofty ideas of
a proud, turbulent and wealthy nobility would to a certainty come into
contact with the hitherto suppressed feelings of millions of enslaved
serfs, there is no possibility of calculating in what such a war might
terminate, for there is no middle class in Russia which could act as a
check to both.
A few of the steam expeditions, which were before alluded to, would
quickly settle such questions, and curtail the deliberations of
diplomatists, and convince the world--that it is both dangerous and
impolitic to rouse Great Britain, or to give her cause of alarm about
the superiority of her navy upon the ocean. "Ships, colonies and
commerce," ought to be inscribed upon the banner of Britain, and our
chief efforts and views, should at all times be directed to these,
to us as a nation, important objects, whilst at the same time every
possible encouragement should be given to our own agriculture; for we
must never depend upon the continent of Europe, or upon any other part
of the world, for _bread_--if we are ever obliged to do so, we must no
more talk or even think of war.
I do not, like some men, look upon history to be as worthless as an old
almanack, for by it we are taught many useful lessons; and whatever
their opinions may be of history, popery, or even of prophecy, I avow
myself to be one of those who attach some importance to what is handed
down to us, especially in Scripture. Yet, without almost touching upon
such subjects, we may find, that a great maritime power will seemingly
soon be required, to act a most prominent part in the world, when
events will undoubtedly occur to command the attention and excite
the fears of mankind in general. As to what power may be intended to
perform this conspicuous part, it would be most presumptuous and even
impious to conjecture; and such is the rapid fall and rise of nations,
that all calculations in this respect must be as vain as unprofitable.
The grand object which ought never for a moment to be lost sight of, is
to have Great Britain ready for coming events. Let her vast resources
be, as far as necessary, called forth in time. Let the attention of
Government be wisely directed to providing such a number of steamers
of all classes, as to render competition on the part of other
countries hopeless; and why might not engagements be entered into with
wealthy companies and individuals, so as to induce them to employ, in
mercantile and other pursuits, steam vessels of such a construction,
that they could, in cases of emergency, be instantly fitted up and
armed with guns of long range for war; for very few, of those now in
use, can be made efficient in this respect. To accomplish this could
not be attended with any great expense to the country, especially if
advantages, as to exemption of vessels so constructed from various
charges, to which all are now liable, are held out to the owners;
and this would make it unnecessary at once to provide such a number
of war-steamers as might otherwise be requisite; and thus Government
could, at any moment, know where to find ships of all classes fit
for immediate service, on board of which, crews, such as I have
ventured to speak of, could be employed with every advantage to the
country. Lastly, let our army be also perfectly organized, and in all
respects prepared for a new and more rapid mode of warfare; and, under
Providence, we may not only be still the most powerful of maritime
nations, but also the means of promoting the tranquillity and happiness
of the world in general.