W.J.D. Waddilove.
"_Beacon Grange, April 28._"
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After Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of the several
States, if the true spirit of this treaty were not to be strictly
adhered to, it must have been obvious at the time, that it would be
impossible for her to defend her remaining North American possessions;
much less be able at any future period to make them sufficiently
powerful to cope with the United States. But surely with the Treaty,
and the various documents alluded to by Mr. Waddilove, in their hands,
a commission, composed of able military men, sent out to that part of
the world, could so well define the boundary between the two countries,
as to leave no further doubts upon the minds of our Government, as
to the line of conduct to be with justice pursued towards the United
States and also towards our North American possessions; and they
would then be enabled also to act with that firmness and decision
with which these republicans should be met in all our dealings with
them. The idea of umpires ought not for a moment be tolerated--the
treaty and the features of the country render them quite unnecessary.
Without having any ambitious views, Great Britain evidently wants
this disputed territory, if it were only for the security of her North
American Provinces; and it might reasonably be expected that this point
could be amicably arranged, if there is a sincere wish for peace, and
any thing like good will towards us to be found in the United States.
If therefore we are provoked to war, by simply working on both flanks
of any body of troops hazarded by the States into the country alluded
to, their fate may be pretty easily guessed or calculated upon; for
we could have no difficulty in acting at once from Quebec, Halifax,
&c.; and if hereafter emigration from the United Kingdom were duly
and liberally encouraged, as it should be, into a country rightfully
belonging to the British Empire, abounding in small lakes and fine
rivers, we might soon begin to talk not only of our valuable but also
of our powerful American colonies; especially if convicts, in place
of being all sent to New Holland, were employed to make good roads to
connect the countries lying between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence.
These convicts should never upon any account be allowed to become
settlers.
Having so far entered upon the subject, I think I ought to proceed
in what I hope may be useful; and whilst I speak from observations
made upon the spot, I must take the liberty of reminding the reader
that during the period occupied by "improvements" in the States; the
Canadas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, &c., though somewhat retarded by
late events, have not been standing still.
The country behind the line running from Lake St. Francis, to Lake
Memphremagog, ought as soon as possible to be secured from sudden
incursions, by a few respectable forts, or strong redoubts; capable
of affording good cover for a certain number of cavalry and infantry;
situations for which, upon or close to the present frontier, can be
found, so that that entrance into Lower Canada may be covered. The line
mentioned being taken as a base, and Isle aux Noix, Ash Island, and the
part of the frontier extending along from the La Colle river towards
Lake St. Francis being judiciously protected, the Lower Province
would thus be secured from the inroads of brigands from the adjoining
States; and if they, or if even an army should venture forward in that
direction, it would not be quite easy for them to return; especially
if the redoubts I speak of, are by the labour of soldiers made strong
enough to require a week's regular siege for their capture, and which
might be scientifically thrown up at no great expense. They should,
however, be connected with each other by military roads; the making
of which, as well as constructing the redoubts, would be excellent
practice for the regular troops I am so anxious to have called out; who
could never be better employed, (for habits of labour are essential to
them,) than in works of this kind; and I hope I have already shown,
that veterans are quite unfit for the duties of our North American
frontiers.
The thick, in some places, almost impassable woods and swamps,
extending often for a considerable distance along the frontier line
of the Lower Province, render it difficult to make arrangements to
oppose inroads from the States; for it is impossible to calculate upon
the direction in which an enemy's force may make its appearance, and
in order to watch all the roads or approaches, especially in winter,
our troops must necessarily be too much scattered over the country; for
owing to want of cover, they cannot be kept in sufficient bodies, but
so far to the rear as to expose the advanced posts to be overpowered
and cut off.
The following documents, which appear to be official, will show
clearly, that I have not without good reason made the foregoing
observations respecting the state of our affairs with the United
States, and which call for energetic measures on our part.
"MILITARY AND NAVAL PREPARATIONS ON OUR NORTHERN FRONTIERS.
"The Chair submitted the following message from the President of the
United States:--
"TO THE SENATE.
"I communicate to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution
of the 12th instant, a report from the Secretary of War, containing
information on the subject of that resolution.
"M. Van Buren.
"_Washington, March 28._"
* * * * *
"_War Department, March 27._
"Sir,--The resolution of the Senate of the 12th inst. 'That
the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the
Senate, if in his judgment compatible with the public interest, any
information which may be in the possession of the Government, or which
can be conveniently obtained, of the military and naval preparations
of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United
States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, designating the
permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting
those which are within the claimed limits of the United States,' having
been referred by you to this department, it was immediately referred
to Major-General Scott, and other officers who have been stationed on
the frontier referred to, for such information on the subject as they
possessed, and could readily procure; and an examination is now in
progress for such as may be contained in the files of the department.
General Scott is the only officer yet heard from, and a copy of his
report is herewith submitted, together with a copy of that to which he
refers, made upon the resolution of the House of Representatives of the
9th instant. As soon as the other officers who have been called upon
are heard from, and the examination of the files of the department is
completed, any further information which may be thus acquired will be
immediately laid before you.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"J.R. Poinsett.
"_To the President of the United States._"
* * * * *
"_Head Quarters, Eastern Division, Elizabethtown, New Jersey, March 23,
1840._
"Sir,--I have received from your office, copies of two
resolutions, passed respectively, the 12th and 9th instant, one by
the Senate, and the other by the House of Representatives; and I am
asked for 'any information on the subject of both, or either of the
resolutions, that may be in [my] possession.'
"In respect to the naval force recently maintained upon the American
lakes by Great Britain, I have just had the honour to report to
the Secretary of War, by whom the resolution of the House of
Representatives (of the 9th instant) was directly referred to me.
"I now confine myself to the Senate's resolution, respecting 'military
(I omit naval) preparations of the British authorities on the northern
frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic
Ocean, distinguishing the permanent from the temporary and field works,
and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of
the United States.'
"I will here remark, that however well my duties have made me
acquainted with the greater part of the line in question, I have
paid but slight attention to the forts and barracks erected by the
British authorities near the borders of Maine, above Fredericton, in
New Brunswick, or in Upper Canada, above Cornwall, being of the fixed
opinion which need not here be developed, that all such structures
would be of little or no military value to either of the parties in the
event of a new war between the United States and Great Britain.
"I was last summer at the foot of Lake Superior, and neither saw nor
heard of any British fort or barrack on the St. Mary's River, the
outlet of that lake.
"Between Lakes Huron and Erie the British have three sets of
barracks--one at Windsor, opposite to Detroit; one at Sandwich, a
little lower down; and the third at Malden, 18 miles from the first;
all built of sawed logs, strengthened by block-houses, loopholes, &c.
Malden has been a military post, with slight defences. These have been
recently strengthened. The works at Sandwich and Windsor have also, I
think, been erected within the last six or eight months.
"Near the mouth of the Niagara the British have two small forts--George
and Messisanga. Both existed during the last war. The latter may be
termed a permanent work. Slight barracks have been erected within the
last two years on the same side, near the Falls, and at Chippawa, with
breast works at the latter place; but nothing, I believe, above the
works first named, on the Niagara, which can be termed a fort.
"Since the commencement of the recent troubles in the Canadas, and
(consequent thereupon) within our limits, Fort William Henry, at
Kingston, and Fort Wellington (opposite Ogdensburg old works,) have
both been strengthened within themselves, besides the addition of
dependencies. These forts may be called permanent.
"On the St. Lawrence, below Prescott, and confronting our territory,
I know of no other military post; 12 miles above, at Brockville,
there may be temporary barracks and breastworks. I know that of late
Brockville has been a military station.
"In the system of defences on the approaches to Montreal, the Isle Aux
Noix, a few miles below our line, and in the outlet of Lake Champlain,
stands at the head. This island contains within itself a system of
permanent works of great strength. On them the British Government has,
from time to time, since the peace of 1815, expended much skill and
labour.
"Odletown, near our line, on the western side of Lake Champlain, has
been a station for a body of Canadian militia for two years, to guard
the neighbourhood from refugee incendiarism from our side. I think that
barracks have been erected there for the accommodation of those troops,
and also at a station, with the like object, near Alburgh, in Vermont.
"It is believed that there are no important British forts or extensive
British barracks, on our borders, from Vermont to Maine.
"In respect to such structures on the disputed territory, Governor
Fairfield's published letters contain fuller information than has
reached me through any other channel. I have heard of no new military
preparations by the British authorities on the St Croix or Pasamaquoddy
Bay.
"Among such preparations, perhaps I ought not to omit the fact that
Great Britain, besides numerous corps of well-organized and well
instructed militia, has at this time within her North American
provinces more than 20,000 of her best regular troops. The whole of
those forces might be brought to the verge of our territory in a few
days. Two-thirds of that regular force has arrived out since the spring
of 1838.
"I remain, Sir, with great respect,
"Your most obedient servant,
"Winfield Scott.
"_Brigadier General R. Jones, Adjutant-General
United States Army._"