We again read in the General Orders of the 31st of July, 1812:--

"The Commander of the Forces requests to have returns of the several

men missing from their regiments in the march of the 10th instant.

It is reported to the Commander of the Forces that the enemy have in

their power above a hundred men, British soldiers, taken on that day,

straggling in the rear, and in the flanks of the army. As the army did

not march more than ten or twelve miles on that day, and the country

was perfectly open, the straggling of the soldiers, and their being

prisoners, must be attached to the neglect of the officers of their

regiments. It is quite obvious that if the soldiers cannot be made to

march in their ranks at all times, the army cannot effect a march in

face of an enemy, and it is so far unfit for service, &c. &c."

I do not at present wish to give many extracts from the Duke of

Wellington's orders; but another dated Paris, the 9th of August, 1815,

will be sufficient to prove that the character of British soldiers had

not changed from 1812 up to that period.

No. 4. "The Field Marshal receives constant complaints of the robberies

committed on the road from Neuilly to Paris, and he therefore now

desires that guards may be mounted by the divisions encamped at

Neuilly, and in the Bois de Bologne, so as to have sentries in

communication with each other from Neuilly to the barrier de L'Etoile."

I consider it also necessary to give here two division orders nearly to

the same effect:

"D.O. _Madrid, 28th August, 1812._

"1. The officer commanding the escort of prisoners furnished by the

3rd division, which rejoined this morning, has reported that the men

composing that detachment, were extremely irregular while absent, and

some individuals were disobedient to a great degree.

"2. The disobedient non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to be

tried by a Division Court Martial, and the soldiers composing the

remainder of the detachment are to stand under arms from six o'clock

every evening till nine at night, for seven successive days, when they

are to be marched into their quarters, to which they are also to be

confined for the same period.

"3. No soldier of this detachment is to be suffered to take his duty

for seven days, but must make it up afterwards.

"4. Any man of this detachment who shall fall sick before the

expiration of punishment, must stand under arms after recovery.

"5. The British Brigade will ultimately furnish three sergeants to

superintend this disgrace under the orders of the Provost-martial,

who will correct, on the spot, any soldier who may commit further

irregularity.

"Severity and shame are required to bring soldiers to a sense of duty,

who forget every principle when detached, and require force to command

them."

"D.O. _Moimenta de Beira, 24th Dec. 1812._

"1. The detachment of recovered men that left Celorico on the 15th

instant, were irregular and disobedient.

"2. So much has been said on the subject of soldiers forgetting their

duty when detached, that Major-General Pakenham, for the present,

gives up the idea of bringing the troops to a sense of discipline by

reason.

"3. When punishment has made the unprincipled sensible of their

crimes, and the good soldiers know they will be supported if they will

take the lead, then reason shall again be referred to.

"4. The soldiers composing the detachment of Lieutenant Walsh, 5th

regiment, are to be assembled at the head-quarters of their respective

brigades, for the purpose of being kept under arms, for ten days, from

daylight till nightfall.

"5. The said soldiers are afterwards to be drilled for one month with

the young soldiers, and they are not to have either spirits or wine

for the whole period.

"6. The Provost-martial and assistant will frequently visit this

punishment and notice any impropriety.

"7. Officers commanding brigades will report the manner in which the

detachment joined the several battalions on the 22d instant."

Many more of Lord Wellington's observations upon the conduct of

soldiers might be adduced, but what I have given, and the orders of

Sir Edward Pakenham, are deemed sufficient for the object now in view.

But his Grace throughout the whole of his campaigns threw most of the

blame for such outrages occurring upon the officers, whom he constantly

accused of neglect of duty, or such crimes could not have been

perpetrated. I beg leave, however, to observe, and I am alone induced

to do so in some measure to justify officers in general, that many of

them were both active and zealous in the performance of their duties,

but the men they had to deal with were very incorrigible; and those who

were then subalterns must well remember that the chief responsibility

rested most heavily upon them; for the soldiers were almost never

allowed to leave their camps but under their charge; for it was too

well known, and I regret to say it, that many of the non-commissioned

officers could not be much more trusted than the privates.

As a regimental officer of long experience, not only at home and

abroad, but also in the field; as a staff officer during the greater

part of the Peninsular war; and with the army of occupation in France,

and in other parts of the world, I unhesitatingly declare, that

corporal punishment as now inflicted in the army, cannot be dispensed

with, but at the risk of the total subversion of all discipline: indeed

the hampering commanding officers in this respect, as has been the

fashion of late years; and its being fancied, or pretended, that he

is the best commander of a regiment, who returns the smallest number

of soldiers punished, is, to say the least, very impolitic, and most

injurious to the interests of the army; for crimes which should have

called for punishment, must in consequence have been passed over,

or so inadequately visited upon the offenders, that other men could

not have been deterred from being guilty of similar conduct, and the

effects of this, I fear, must in the end be dangerous; for what we

frequently hear of and read respecting military punishments, in some

of the newspapers, can scarcely, when coupled with an unavoidably

relaxed state of discipline, be expected to have any other tendency.

Solitary confinement, to be at all efficacious in preventing or

punishing crimes in the army, keeps the soldier too long away from his

necessary exercises and duties, and if it takes place in our common

jails, whatever he may have gone into them, he certainly must come out

matured in crime, from being the associate of criminals of the worst

description; for what jail can contain sufficient cells to separate

all who may be sent there. Offenders' lists, common and marching order

drills, confinement to barracks, &c. &c., are all well enough, in

these quiet times, for trifling offences or irregularities at home

or abroad, so long as the soldier knows that he can be brought to

the halberts for any act of insubordination on such occasions; but

in case of war, and should it be necessary for our army to take the

field, this system would never answer. I must beg, however, that it

may not be supposed, that I am by any means an advocate for continuing

corporal punishments, or that I have any intention of extenuating or

justifying what was sometimes practised by officers, under generally, I

feel convinced, a mistaken idea, that they were only doing what their

duty required of them; but my surprise often was, how officers who

composed courts-martial, could by their sentences, always so readily

lend themselves to the views, or perhaps badly regulated feelings of

their commanders: indeed the trials I have witnessed were sometimes

little else than mere matter of form, and they could not well be

otherwise, for I have seen a soldier receive two or three hundred,

or even more lashes, inflicted with great severity, under a sentence

awarded by a drum-head court-martial, after an investigation of a few

minutes duration of the charges brought against him. Such arbitrary

proceedings as these, were generally abuses of power, with which many

men are unfit to be entrusted; and from habit we really thought little

of such matters, and the soldiers themselves were only thereby rendered

the more callous. I declare, however, that I am at a loss to say, which

is preferable--the prompt manner of acting in our navy, where a captain

when he orders the punishment of a man, does so on his own serious

responsibility, or that of a commanding officer of a regiment, who can

generally act as he pleases, whilst all he does is sanctioned by a

court martial.

I could easily bring forward many occurrences which would show in the

strongest light, how much a serious consideration of both our old and

present system in the army, as regards punishments, is required; but so

heartily do I detest flogging, that my thoughts have been long directed

to devise means of getting rid of it; but I always tremble at the

obvious alternative--_capital punishments_--which must be resorted to,

and I should fear, very frequently, as in the French armies, especially

upon service, as a substitute for flogging for the maintenance of

discipline; for an army without it, is, as the Duke of Wellington

observed in one of the orders I have given, a rabble, and must be far

more dangerous to the country to which it belongs, than formidable to

its enemies.

For years past, I have given this subject most serious consideration.

I have weighed all its difficulties, and I can see no way of doing

away with flogging in a British army, so long as it is composed of

the present description of men. But I am inclined to hope, and I must

now beg that all I have to say may be heard with patience--that this

most desirable object may be attained by a completely new organisation

of our regiments, and bringing into their ranks a totally different

description of men, from those who generally offer themselves as

recruits--men with other ideas, and altogether other feelings.

But as I wish to bring the subjects I intend to discuss, candidly

and fairly before the reader, I must beg leave to transcribe what

Sir George Murray lately said at a great public meeting in London,

as taken from "the Times." "The British Army did not consist of the

constrained conscripts of arbitrary power, but of citizens voluntarily

in arms to defend their country, to obey and respect her laws at home,

and to resist and repel, with their utmost energy, every effort of

her foreign foes, &c. &c." Sir George Murray, as the world knows,

and as the British Army in particular knows, is a most able and

accomplished Quarter Master General; but as such he could not have had

much to say to the maintenance of discipline, for that comes under the

Adjutant-General; yet still he will no doubt be looked upon as good

authority in such matters, so much so, that I have been induced thus to

give what may be considered as his opinion, and which the sequel will

still more show to be contrary to mine: indeed, if I were not borne out

by the evidence I have even already adduced, my attempting to do any

thing towards improvement in our army would seem to be unnecessary and

uncalled for.

An intelligent writer observes, that the French campaigns of 1792,

93 and 94 astonished military Europe. At first the French armies

had neither discipline, nor order, and but little instruction. The

regiments were without organization. National intelligence put in

motion by exalted feeling, for the moment did every thing. The

conscription had brought more knowledge into a single French regiment,

than there was to be found in a whole enemy's division. This was

certainly the case, but I am very far from wishing to establish a

conscription in Great Britain like what exists in France; but the

times, we may depend upon it, will compel us, and that too before long,

to think of getting, with greater facility, another description of men

into our armies; if it were only to enable us to meet our enemies in

the field on fair terms; and I would, therefore, at once beg to propose

to overturn entirely the present system of enlistment for regiments

of Dragoons, Artillery, the Line, and the Marines; and in its stead,

a plan could be introduced for calling forth those warlike energies

of the people of Great Britain and Ireland, which they so eminently

possess; but for safety to our liberties, which we ought ever carefully

to cherish, I would still keep the powerful means I have in view, under

the control of Parliament both as to men and money.

Suppose a law were enacted, extending and improving our militia system,

and permanently establishing amongst our millions of people, two

descriptions of soldiers; in place of our present inefficient mode of

calling out that force for service in Great Britain and Ireland only;

and exempting clergymen, all seamen serving, or who may have served

in our navy, or such as have been duly apprenticed to our merchant

service; and certain individuals employed in the Civil departments of

the state, every man, no matter how high or low his rank in life may

be, should be made liable to be called upon to serve his country as a

soldier, but by Act of Parliament only; and for this purpose, all those

at a certain time of life should be required to have, under a heavy

penalty, and according to their means, or at the risk of imprisonment,

or treatment as vagrants, known places of abode, or belong to a parish

or district where they could be found or heard of; for my object is,

that the wealthy, who for their own gratifications might think fit to

reside abroad, may not be able to evade the law.

From the effective part of our male population, between the ages of

seventeen and thirty-five, I would propose to call out once each

year, (or oftener when necessary) by lot or ballot, and according to

registers to be publicly and fairly kept, so that every individual

coming under the act, could be aware that he might expect to be drawn

for, a certain number of healthy men, about a fixed height--say 5 feet

5-1/2 inches--to constitute or keep up the first, or regular army of

Great Britain and Ireland, liable to serve in any part of the world,

for _ten years only_, when, having so served, they must be discharged,

whether at home or abroad, unless their characters are so good, as to

render it desireable that they should be kept longer in the service,

and should it be also their own wish to remain in it. If they are kept,

it ought to be for five years more. At the end of that second period,

they must, if they desire it, be discharged; but they should then, if

their conduct has continued good, be entitled to receive a pension for

life of nine-pence a day, and also to a medal of _superior merit_, and

they ought now to get both, whether they are to be again kept in the

service or not. If it is still desirable that they should remain in

it, and that they are also willing to do so, it must be for another

or third period of five years; at the end of which--that is to say 20

years--if they have maintained the respectability of their characters,

they should receive, on now retiring from the service, an additional

three-pence per diem, making in all the full pension of one shilling a

day for life, together with what should be termed the _grand medal_.

If non-commissioned officers, they of course should get a superior

description of medals and higher rates of pensions, whether corporals,

serjeants, or staff-serjeants. But all discharges--and I consider this

of vast importance--ought to set forth distinctly their characters as

soldiers, whether good, indifferent, or bad, and should invariably be

delivered to them publicly, in presence of, at least, one magistrate

and a clergyman of the city, town, or parish to which they formerly

belonged, when they could not again be called upon to serve as soldiers.

If the character of the men who have served for ten years only, show

that they have been brave, honest and regular during that period, they

should also receive _publicly_ a _medal_ of _merit_, and thus become

entitled, along with those who have served longer, and have received

pensions, to the privileges of _freemen_ in the cities, towns, and

parishes, to which they originally belonged. They should also, together

with other advantages, have a right to vote at all elections of Members

to serve in Parliament, and likewise at the appointment of persons

to the corporate bodies, and should be themselves eligible to fill

situations in or under such bodies, in the cities, towns, or parishes,

to which they belonged. If their conduct as soldiers had been bad

or disreputable, all these advantages should be withheld from them.

Some of them, according to character, ought to be sent off without

remark upon their conduct, but others, if they deserved it, should

have the words "Disgraced Soldier," stamped in large letters, by their

commanding officer's orders, upon their discharges; and thus soldiers

would be deterred from disgracing, not only their regiments, but also

their families, to whom they would know, that when they were to be

discharged, they would always, and under all circumstances, be sent

back.

It being most desirable towards attaining the object I have in view,

that no soldier should be permitted to remain in the army, whose habits

would bring disgrace upon the corps to which he might be attached;

when it was therefore found, that a soldier had committed a serious

crime, or that his conduct had become bad or disgraceful, he should

either be handed over to the civil power, or brought to trial before

a Court-martial, which should have the power, besides transporting

him as a felon, or making him serve as a soldier for life in any part

of the world, to sentence him to be turned out of the regiment, with

every mark of infamy, and to be sent back, under escort, to the place

from whence he came, to be there discharged, in the manner already

pointed out, and also imprisoned, if thought necessary for the sake of

example, in the common jail, for any period not exceeding two years.

If this system is ever established, merit will be distinguished and

rewarded, and bad conduct publicly stigmatized or punished.

As the regular army should at all times be complete in numbers, and

efficient in every respect; when vacancies occurred in corps, they

should be supplied yearly, from the city, town, or rather district,

from which the several regiments would be kept up. Great Britain

and Ireland would, therefore, if this plan is carried into effect,

have to be divided into districts; but for this purpose, counties

and cities would nearly answer, and each district being required to

furnish men for a particular regiment of cavalry (and this should be

an agricultural one), or of artillery, infantry of the line, or of

marines; the cavalry or infantry regiments should take the name of that

district, as well as retain its own particular number, together with

such designations, badges, or honorary distinctions, to which it may be

at present entitled.

The second army, to be officered as our present militia, and to be

embodied upon the same system, and managed and disciplined as the

first, and styled either Militia, or the Army of Reserve, could be

called out to serve in Great Britain or Ireland only, when the country,

either from being at war, or in case of commotions, might require its

services; or should it be deemed necessary, that this force be embodied

for a fixed time.

The men for the Reserve might be taken at a lower height, and from

the age of sixteen to forty-five; but serving in the Reserve should

not exempt individuals from taking their turn if drawn in the mean

time for the First or Regular Army. When the Reserve, or a part of it

is embodied, a few officers and non-commissioned officers (receiving

additional pay when so employed), should be taken for a short time

from the Regular Regiments, to assist in the formation and drilling of

the corps; but any permanent staff for this purpose must be found not

only useless, but expensive. A Quarter-master alone could be required

to take charge of stores of any kind belonging to the battalion when

embodied.

Any man, who by ballot, becomes liable to serve in the First or Regular

Army, must do so, or find within a given time, and at his own expense,

a proper substitute of good character, or else pay down the sum of, say

fifty pounds, for exemption: and finding a substitute or paying the

stipulated sum, ought to exempt the person for the future from serving;

but any individual who may have joined the corps for which he has been

drawn, ought not afterwards to be discharged, but by the authority of

the Commander-in-Chief.

Finding a proper substitute of good character, or paying down

say--twenty pounds, under the same rules as those established for the

regular army, should entitle individuals to exemption from serving in

the army of reserve. And it might fully be expected, that the reserve

regiments, under officers so patriotic and zealous as those of our

militia always were, would soon become like battalions of the line,

and so highly disciplined as quite to equal them, as was the case

with many of our militia corps last war. I am, therefore, decidedly

of opinion, that it would never again be necessary to add second

battalions to regiments of the regular army, nor to raise at great

expense fencible corps. The plan of second battalions was in general

found to be even as objectionable as our present inefficient depot

system, for it too often afforded only very inferior supplies to first

battalions, of half disciplined soldiers.

To commence this system of the ballot for the regular army (which,

by allowing the finding of substitutes, or the paying a sum of money

for exemption from serving, completely removes the idea of arbitrary

conscription,) I beg further to suggest, that commanding officers,

under the superintendence of generals selected for the purpose, should

have the power of rejecting, and recommending to be discharged from

their corps, all men whom, from character, health, or other causes,

they may consider objectionable; and the remainder should be allowed to

come under the new regulations, as to the period of ten years service,

dating from the time of their enlistment; and this being carefully and

judiciously arranged, upon the responsibility of commanding officers

and regimental surgeons, the numbers required for corps of cavalry,

infantry, artillery, or marines, to complete them to their respective

establishments, should be called out at once by ballot, and thus the

immense expense of bounties might be saved, and a sum for a complete

equipment for each soldier of the regular army would only hereafter be

required from the country.

This new and more constitutional mode of recruiting the army, would

bring into its ranks, and in a manner so little objectionable, such

a different description of men, and would so vastly increase the

respectability of the service, and give such a high tone of national,

and also local interest and feeling to our regiments (for they ought

ever after to be kept up by men from the same districts), that the idea

of subjecting such soldiers, who could no longer be considered as mere

mercenaries, to the corporal punishment of flogging, should, I trust,

be abandoned. It may, however, be said, that corporal punishment was

found to be necessary to keep up discipline formerly in our militia;

and it might be asked, were not the men then called out, and as I now

propose, of much the same description as those who composed the militia

regiments? I answer--that men who could conduct themselves so as to

deserve flogging--which was too much the fashion in those days, ought

to have been turned out of the regiments, or got rid of as I have

already pointed out.

It may be supposed, that some of the soldiers after having conducted

themselves well for ten years, might not think fit to take advantage

of the opportunity which would be offered them, of remaining in the

service, so as to obtain pensions at future periods; but having

accepted of their discharges, had returned to their homes, where,

finding out that military habits had become more powerful with them

than they supposed, they might again wish to return to the service.

Now, although these men would have got beyond the age at which

substitutes might be taken, yet they should be allowed to become such,

provided they offered themselves within one year from the date of their

discharges, and having served reputably for ten years more, I would

propose so far to give them credit for their former ten years service,

as to allow them, on being discharged, pensions of nine-pence a day,

but no more, for not having availed themselves of the opportunity of

remaining in the army, when they might have done so, other men had to

be called out and equipped at the expense of the country, to replace

them in their regiments; and it would also be presumed, that they had

been paid for becoming substitutes. It might be expected that such

men, after ten years service only, would make excellent policemen, or

non-commissioned officers for the Reserve when called out.

If it were necessary to advocate in the strongest possible manner, the

advantages of corps possessing national, or rather local feelings, I

would have nothing to do but to instance some of the Scotch regiments,

which were raised and kept up from particular parts of that country,

whose conduct in all situations, and under all circumstances, was so

praise-worthy. These corps, whilst they were proverbial for their

gallantry in the field, were known to have been for long periods

without a single instance of corporal punishment.

An army composed, as that I have in view, ought not to be officered

by men who can get forward, as at present, by purchasing over the

heads, too often, of much better soldiers than themselves, in point

of gallantry, military science, and experience. And how strangely

also, and inconsistently, are honours conferred upon officers in our

army--not for alone distinguishing themselves in action, but because

they happened to hold a rank sufficiently high to entitle them to a

certain command, or to be the head of a department, and to which the

greater part of them had attained, perhaps, by money, well backed by

interest; for an officer may have been in every action of importance,

from the beginning of the present century up to Waterloo; may have

frequently distinguished himself, and may have been even promoted to

the rank of Major, and Lieutenant-Colonel, for services in the field,

and yet not be entitled to either a clasp or medal, because he did not

happen to hold that which would bring him within a fixed regulation

on this head. I do not, however, pretend to say, that many of those

who commanded corps or detached bodies, and who had arrived at that

honour by means of money, were not excellent and gallant officers,

but others, over whose heads they, perhaps, had got, could have been

pointed out, whom, from not possessing that mainspring, money, or from

want of opportunity of applying it, had been obliged to submit to

the, perhaps, annoying questions of a genteel, though not rich, and

consequently uninfluential family--such as--pray, Colonel, how comes

it, that you have neither a clasp nor a medal, nor any thing else to

show, although we know that you were present in so many battles, and

at so many sieges; when there was at the Mayor's feast the other day

(and yet we never heard much of him) General Sir Richard Sam, the son

of old Dickey Sam, who, years ago, did his best to bring in ---- for

----, who was quite covered with clasps, medals, and ribbons, and he

is also a Knight Commander of the Bath into the bargain. Well might it

have puzzled the Emperor Napoleon to conceive how a British army could

have been kept efficient, and in the state it was, in which high minded

gentlemen were subjected to so galling and absurd a system of obtaining

rank and honours; especially when it was also seen, that through the

effects of our strange brevet system, a Captain of a Company, from

being, perhaps, a senior Lieut.-Colonel in the Army, could in garrison,

or when acting with a mixed body of troops in the field, take the

command of the whole, and likewise of the Lieut.-Colonel of his own

regiment,--and I have known instances of this kind--but probably

the very next day, when the corps came to act separately, or when a

senior officer took the command of the troops, the Lieut.-Colonel of

the corps, or its major, or any of its captains, who happened to have

seniority in the regiment to the Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, could drill

him in the ranks to their heart's content, and thus teach the teacher

of the previous day respect for his--very likely--superior in wealth.

All this is, however, very ridiculous, and shews our brevet system to

be bad, and that it should, as well as the present mode of purchasing

promotion, be abandoned.

The matter could be easily settled, and the mischief obviated for the

future, by the country refunding to those who purchased promotion, if

they think fit to retire from the army, the regulated sums they are

supposed to have paid; and, under other heads, I hope to be able to

show, should any avail themselves of this offer, how savings can be

effected to meet this or any other outlay I may venture to propose;

for it is too well known to be denied, that many an officer, who

bought promotion in former times in this undeniably injurious manner

to the service, pledged his word of honour, that he would not give

more than the regulated price, whereas he had, perhaps, at the moment

agreed privately to pay double for the step; and what must be thought

of a system, when even those in power had not probably the necessary

information to enable them to check such evasion, and almost open

defiance of orders.

The Sovereign alone, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief,

should have the power of rewarding and honouring conspicuous gallantry,

and high merit, by marks of distinction, or by promotion out of the

regular routine of seniority; but this prerogative, I think it will

be allowed, ought, especially as regards promotion, to be very rarely

exercised; and putting an end to such a disheartening and disgusting

a practice, as that of officers being able to get forward by money or

interest alone, would wonderfully improve our regiments of the line,

and infinitely more those of our cavalry.

I have just had my attention called to some of the points which appear

to have been brought under the consideration of the Naval and Military

Commission, from whom so much was looked for. I confess that I am

greatly disappointed; for they seem to me to have only tried how they

could best repair an old defective system, in place of proposing, as

might have been expected from so many experienced officers, something

new, and more suitable to the times, and the wants of the country;

but this, I conclude, has been occasioned by the manner in which the

several points were submitted for their consideration; and I am not,

therefore, deterred from proceeding in the task I have assigned myself,

and must remark, in continuing my subject, that if what I propose

is adopted, we might probably hear of promotion being expected to

be too slow; but what I have still to beg attention to, may greatly

obviate any such objections; yet, when officers saw that justice was

done impartially, it would make them patient and contented, even if

promotion were slow; but let me ask, where were such officers to be met

with in any army, as our highly educated and enlightened officers of

Engineers and Artillery, though for many years situated with respect to

promotion, as I wish all our officers nearly to be in future.

Granting the brevet rank of field officer to regimental captains is

of little advantage to them individually, and has often been found

injurious to the service; and would be still more so under the proposed

system; and it ought in consequence, to be (as I have before suggested)

abandoned, or at all events as seldom conferred as possible. In order

that regimental field rank may be sooner attained, I would venture to

recommend, that no lieut.-colonel should be obliged to remain in the

almost always unpleasant and most responsible command of a regiment,

longer than a fixed number of years; when having so served, he should,

as a matter of course, become a major-general on the _effective

list_--that is, he ought to receive a fixed pay, though not employed.

Or perhaps it might be preferable, when a lieut.-colonel had commanded

for the required number of years, if he thought proper to retire

altogether from active service, with the rank however of major-general,

to allow him a superior retirement from the country to what may be

the pay of major-generals on the effective list; and this being added

to what he would receive from a military fund, which I intend yet to

propose, would induce many to avail themselves of the opportunity,

especially if they had little hope of being actively employed, or no

chance of getting a regiment. This would remove any apprehension from

being entertained of our generals on the effective list becoming too

numerous.

I am aware it may be said, that this plan is defective; for there

is no arrangement made, so as to remove one of the great objections

to our present mode of promotion, with regard to officers of

engineers, artillery, and marines; but I take a very simple view of

this matter; for I would merely look to a list of officers of the

regular army of all ranks, and to the dates of their commissions;

and when a cornet or ensign of any regiment became by the regular

routine of promotion a lieutenant, I would, as a matter of course,

make any officer of engineers, artillery, or marines of the same

standing, a lieutenant also, yet without giving him the additional

pay till a vacancy occurred in his own corps; and I would do the

same through the different gradations of ranks, until the officers

of engineers or artillery had become lieut.-colonels. I would then

style them, and cause them to act as chiefs of engineers or artillery,

and which rank they should hold for the same number of years as

lieut.-colonels commanding regiments, when, like them, they should

become major-generals; and enabling them also to take advantage of the

retirement from the country, and of the system to be proposed for the

military fund, these accomplished officers, if they thought fit to

remain upon the effective list, could become available for staff or any

other appointments the same as other generals, and at the same period

of life. Out of the effective list of major-generals, lieut.-generals,

or generals, the Commander-in-chief, as at present, could select those

whom it might be deemed advisable to employ upon the staff of the

army, or for any particular object, and as it is to be presumed that

their services might be constantly required, especially in our foreign

possessions, few of them would be found an unnecessary burden upon the

country.

Many objections might be started as to our present plan of unattached

promotion; and if what I propose is adopted, these would be greatly

increased. Staff officers alone should be allowed to hold unattached

rank, and their promotion should progress in the same manner as I have

suggested for the engineers and artillery. But if unattached promotion

is to continue, it should be very rarely resorted to, and never but

as a reward for very distinguished services; and if such officers

must be brought into regiments, their being so would be infinitely

less objectionable and annoying, than if they had got over the heads

of their brother officers by money alone. My alarm on this head is on

account of the interest or patronage which might be exerted. But I do

not see how unattached officers can, with any degree of justice, be

brought into regiments, unless it were done when vacancies occurred by

deaths, or when officers were dismissed the service by the sentences of

courts martial; and in the former case not allowing such steps to go in

the corps, in which they took place, would be considered very unfair

dealing. It might probably be said, let the unattached officers who

have to be brought in, pay to retiring officers the whole sums usually

given on such occasions--as will be pointed out when the plan for the

military fund comes to be considered--but I must object to this, as it

would be restoring the system of purchase, even in a worse and more

objectionable form than it assumes at present.

A very essential duty should be performed by major-generals, for

whose travelling and other expenses on such occasions a suitable

allowance ought to be made; viz. that of superintending the ballot

of the men for the regiments in the several districts. Assisted by

at least two magistrates or civil authorities of the district, who

could be supposed most able to afford information respecting the

people, these major-generals ought to see the process of balloting

carried on in their presence, and thus all bribery, or any kind of

unfairness could be guarded against. They should also be required

to see and approve of such men as were produced as substitutes. One

major-general could superintend the ballot in a number of districts,

but he should not be sent for two years following to the same places;

so that the people might be satisfied that any kind of collusion was

impossible; especially as our medical staff (also never going for two

successive years to the same district) stand too high in rank and

public estimation, to admit of its being for a moment supposed, that

they could be induced by any means to pronounce a man fit or unfit

for service, unless he really were so; and as for a man's height or

appearance, the general could not be easily deceived in these respects.

The present expensive recruiting establishments throughout the United

Kingdom might be greatly reduced, as in future they could only be

required for certain colonial corps, which I shall have to speak of

hereafter.

The cruelty of this system of ballot, although rendered almost as

mild as that at present in force for the militia, would no doubt be

much talked of by pretenders to philanthropy; and the people might be

made to suppose, that it was intended to introduce as many horrors

into it, as attend a Russian conscription; but the cases would be

widely different. In Russia public opinion is of no weight, and is

openly set at defiance. In Great Britain it is all powerful, and

must be respected. I will not even talk of a French conscription, in

which the youth of France gloried in the days of Napoleon. It may

probably be asked, would you take away a father, and leave a large and

perhaps helpless family to starve or become a burden upon the parish;

or would you take away the only son of a widow, or her only one fit

for agricultural purposes? I answer--that I intend to do no such

thing--but let these philanthropists, and the parish or district, and

especially the wealthy part of it, make timely arrangements to find

substitutes for such fathers or sons, if they have not the means to

do so themselves; and thus such contingencies could be easily met, by

what would only be a charitable duty, which one man owes to another, if

he presumes to say that his heart is influenced by correct christian

feeling.

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