present there was no vessel available. Having ascertained beforehand
what vessels were in preparation for sea, I began to enumerate several,
all of which his lordship assured me were promised to others. On
mentioning the names of some in a less forward state, an objection was
raised by his lordship that they were too large. This was met by a fresh
list, but these his lordship said were not in progress. In short, it
became clear that the British Navy contained no ship of war for me.
I frankly told his lordship as much, remarking that as “the Board was
evidently of opinion that my services were not required, it would be
better for me to go back to the College of Edinburgh and pursue my
studies, with a view of occupying myself in some other employment.” His
lordship eyed me keenly, to see whether I really meant what I said, and
observing no signs of flinching,—for beyond doubt my countenance showed
signs of disgust at such unmerited treatment,—he said, “Well, you shall
have a ship. Go down to Plymouth, and there await the orders of the
Admiralty.”
Thanking his lordship, I left him, and repairing to Plymouth, found
myself appointed to the _Arab_. There was some difficulty in finding
her, for my sanguine imagination had depicted a rakish craft, ready to
run over to the French coast, and return with a goodly batch of
well-laden coasters. In place of this, a dockyard attendant showed me
the bare ribs of a collier, which had been purchased into the service in
the manner described by Captain Brenton, as quoted in the last chapter.
I would not have cared for this, but a single glance at the naked
timbers showed me that, to use a seaman’s phrase, “she would sail like a
haystack.” It was not my wish however to complain, but rather to make
the best of the wretched craft provided for me; and therefore there was
nothing to be done but to wait patiently whilst she was completed,—for
the most part with old timber from broken-up vessels.
As soon as the _Arab_ was ready for sea, instead of being permitted to
make a foray on the French coast—for which, however, she was
ill-adapted—orders were given to take a cruise round the Land’s End,
into St. George’s Channel, and return to Plymouth.
This experimental service being accomplished, without result of any
kind, although we sighted several suspicious vessels, which from our bad
sailing qualities we could not examine; on our return, the _Arab_ was
ordered to join the force then lying in the Downs, quietly watching the
movements of the enemy on the opposite coast.
Though Napoleon had not a marine capable of competing with ours, he had,
during the last war, become aware that any number of French gun-boats
could sail along their own coasts under the protection of the numerous
batteries, and hence he conceived the project of uniting these with
others at Boulogne, so as to form collectively a flotilla capable of
effecting an invasion of England, whose attention was to be divided by
an attempt on Ireland, for which purpose an army and fleet were
assembled at Brest.
The means by which this invasion of the Kentish or Sussex coast was to
be effected is worth adverting to. The various towns of France were
invited to construct flat-bottomed boats, to be distinguished by the
names of the towns and departments which furnished them. They were
divided into three classes, and transported to the nearest port-town,
thence coastwise to Boulogne, there to be filled with troops, and
convoyed to the English shores by ships of war. It has been the custom
to deride this armament, but had it not been for Nelson’s subsequent
victory at Trafalgar, I see no cause to doubt that sooner or later it
might have been successful. In our day of steam-ships the way to prevent
the success of a similar project is by the maintenance of a navy more
efficiently manned than modern governments appear to think necessary for
national safety.
I do not mean efficiency as to the _number_ of vessels of war—for in my
early day the number was very great, but their efficiency, from causes
already mentioned, very trifling. I mean, rather, that every care should
be taken to keep a sufficient number in a high state of discipline; but
above all, that the stimulus of reward for merit should be so applied,
as that parliamentary influence should not interfere with officers, nor
a paltry hankering after saving with the crews.
The _Arab_ was sent to watch the enemy in Boulogne. To those acquainted
with the collier build, even as they appear in the Thames to this day,
it is scarcely necessary to say that she would not work to windward.
With a fair wind it was not difficult to get off Boulogne, but to get
back with the same wind was—in such a craft—all but impossible. Our only
way of effecting this was, by watching the tide, to drift off as well as
we could. A gale of wind anywhere from N.E. to N.W. would infallibly
have driven us on shore on the French coast.
Under such circumstances, the idea of effectively watching the port, as
understood by me,—viz. to look out for troop-boats inshore,—was out of
the question, our whole attention being necessarily directed to the
vessel’s safety. Considering this compromised, I wrote to the admiral
commanding, that the _Arab_ was of no use for the service required, as
she would not work to windward, and that her employment in such a
service could only result in our loss by shipwreck on the French coast.
My letter was no doubt forwarded to the Admiralty, for shortly
afterwards an order arrived for the _Arab_ to convoy the Greenland ships
from Shetland, and then to cruise in the North Sea, to _protect the
fisheries_. The order was, in fact, to cruise to the N. E. of the
Orkneys, _where no vessel fished, and where consequently there were no
fisheries to protect_!!! Not so much as a single whaler was seen from
the mast-head during the whole of that lonely cruise, though it was as
light by night as by day.
The Board had fairly caught me, but a more cruel order could not have
been devised by official malevolence. It was literally naval exile in a
tub, regardless of expense to the nation. To me it was literally a
period of despair, from the useless inactivity into which I was forced,
without object or purpose, beyond that of visiting me with the weight of
official displeasure.
I will not trouble the reader with any reminiscences of this degrading
command, or rather dreary punishment, for such it was no doubt intended
to be, as depriving me of the opportunity of exerting or distinguishing
myself; and this for no better reason, than my having most truly, though
perhaps inconsiderately, urged, in justification of the promotion of the
gallant lieutenant of the _Speedy_, that all Lord St. Vincent’s chief
officers had been promoted for an action in which fewer men fell in a
three-decker than in my brig.
Of this protracted cruise it is sufficient to state that my appointment
to the _Arab_ was dated October 5th, 1803, and that she returned to
England on the 1st of December, 1804, a period which formed a blank in
my life.
On my arrival, Lord St. Vincent, fortunately for me, had quitted, or
rather had been compelled to retire from the Admiralty. The late Duke of
Hamilton, the premier peer of Scotland, and my excellent friend, was so
indignant at my ignominious expulsion from active service, where alone
it would be beneficial to the country, that, unsolicited by any one, he
strongly impressed upon Lord Melville, the successor of Lord St.
Vincent, the necessity of relieving me from that penal hulk, the _Arab_,
and repairing the injustice which had been inflicted on me, by employing
me on more important service. Lord Melville admitted the injustice, and
promptly responded to the appeal, by transferring me from the wretched
craft in which I had been for fifteen months in exile—to the _Pallas_, a
new fir-built frigate of 32 guns.
CHAP. X.
CRUISE OF THE _PALLAS_.
ORDERS OF THE PALLAS EMBARGOED.—CAPTURE OF THE CAROLINA.—ARRIVAL OF THE
PRIZES.—CAPTURE OF PAPAL BULLS.—A CHASE.—ADMIRAL YOUNG.—ELECTION FOR
HONITON.—NOVEL ELECTION TACTICS.—BECOME A REFORMER.—PAINFUL RESULTS.
On my appointment to the _Pallas_, Lord Melville considerately gave me
permission to cruise for a month off the Azores under Admiralty orders.
The favour—the object of which was to give me an opportunity of trying
my luck against the enemy, independent of superior command—was no doubt
granted in consideration of the lengthened, not to say malevolent,
punishment to which I had been condemned in the _Arab_.
My orders were to join my ship at Plymouth, with a promise that my
instructions should be forwarded. In place of this, and in disregard of
Lord Melville’s intention, the Admiralty orders were embargoed by the
Port Admiral, Sir W. Young, who had taken upon himself to recopy them,
and thus to convert them into orders _issued under his authority_. The
effect was, to enable him to lay claim to the admiral’s share of any
prize-money that we might make, even though captured out of his
jurisdiction, which extended no further than the Sound.
The mention of this circumstance requires brief comment, in order to
account for the result which followed. Perhaps the most lucid
explanation that can be given will be an extract from a letter of Lord
St. Vincent to the Admiralty when in command of the Channel fleet. “I do
not know,” says Lord St. Vincent, “what I shall do if you feel a
difficulty to give orders to despatch such ships as you may judge
necessary to place under my command. I have a notion that he (Admiral
Young) _wishes to have the power of issuing orders for their sailing, in
order to entitle him to share prize-money_!!” (BRENTON, vol. ii. p.
249.) From this extract from Lord St. Vincent, it is evident that if
Admiral Young, according to the system then prevailing, had the power—as
on his Lordship’s authority unquestionably appears—of paralysing the
operations of a whole fleet, on the question of sharing prize-money,
remonstrance on my part against the violation of Admiralty promises,
made by Lord Melville himself, would have been disregarded. Nothing was
therefore left but to submit.
The first object was to equip the _Pallas_ with all speed; and for this
we were obliged to resort to impressment, so much had my do-nothing
cruise in the _Arab_ operated against me in the minds of the seamen.
Having, however, succeeded in impressing some good men, to whom the
matter was explained, they turned to with great alacrity to impress
others; so that in a short time we had an excellent crew. This was the
only time I ever found it necessary to impress men.
As the cruise off the Western Islands—when arrived there—was restricted
to a month, it was matter of consideration how to turn such orders to
the best account, without infringing on the letter of my instructions.
We therefore crossed the Bay of Biscay, and having run to the westward
of Cape Finisterre, _worked up_ towards the Azores, so as to fall in
with any vessels which might be bound from the Spanish West Indies to
Cadiz.
Scarcely had we altered our course, when, on the 6th of February, we
fell in with and captured a large ship, the _Carolina_, bound from the
Havannah to Cadiz, and laden with a valuable cargo. After taking out the
crew, we despatched her to Plymouth.
Having learned from the prisoners that the captured ship was part of a
convoy bound from the Havannah to Spain, we proceeded on our course, and
on the 13th captured a second vessel, which was still more valuable,
containing, in addition to the usual cargo, some diamonds, and ingots of
gold and silver. This vessel was sent to Plymouth as before.
On the 15th, we fell in with another, _La Fortuna_, which proved the
richest of all, as, besides her cargo, she had on board a large quantity
of dollars, which we shifted into the _Pallas_, and sent the ship to
England.
On the 16th, we captured a fine Spanish letter-of-marque, with more
dollars on board; but as a heavy sea then running prevented us from
taking them on board the _Pallas_, these were therefore despatched with
her to Plymouth.
Whilst securing the latter vessel, we observed at sunset an English
privateer take possession of a large ship. On seeing us—evidently
knowing that we were an English man-of-war, and therefore entitled to
share in her capture—the privateer crowded all sail and made off with
her prize in company. Unluckily for this calculation, the prize was
subsequently taken by a French squadron, when it turned out that the
captured vessel—the _Preciosa_—was the richest of the whole Spanish
convoy, having, in addition to her cargo, no less than a million dollars
on board. Singularly enough, the privateer belonged to my agent Mr.
Teed, from whom I afterwards learned the value of the vessel which his
captain’s mistaken greed had sacrificed.
The sensation created on the arrival of the prizes at Plymouth was
immense, as the following curious extracts from a local paper will show.
“_February_ 24.—Came in the _Caroline_ from Havanah with sugar and
logwood. Captured off the coast of Spain by the _Pallas_, Captain Lord
Cochrane. The _Pallas_ was in pursuit of another with a very valuable
cargo when the _Caroline_ left. His Lordship sent word to Plymouth,
that if ever it was in his power, he would fulfil his public
advertisement (stuck up here) for entering seamen, of filling their
pockets with Spanish ‘pewter’ and ‘cobs,’ nicknames given by seamen to
ingots and dollars.
“_March_ 7.—Came in a rich Spanish prize, with jewels, gold, silver,
ingots, and a valuable cargo, taken by the _Pallas_, Captain Lord
Cochrane. Another Spanish ship, the _Fortuna_, from Vera Cruz, had
been taken by the _Pallas_, laden with mahogany and logwood. She had
432,000 dollars on board, but has not yet arrived.
“_March_ 23.—Came in a most beautiful Spanish letter-of-marque of
fourteen guns, said to be a very rich and valuable prize to the
_Pallas_, Captain Lord Cochrane.”
A still greater sensation was excited by the arrival of the _Pallas_
herself, with three large golden candlesticks, each about five feet
high, placed upon the mast heads. The history of these is not a little
curious. They had been presented by the good people of Mexico, together
with other valuable plate, to some celebrated church in Spain, the name
of whose patron saint I forget, and had been shipped on board one of the
most seaworthy vessels.
Their ultimate destination was, however, less propitious. It was my wish
to possess them, and with this view an arrangement had been made with
the officers and crew of the _Pallas_. On presenting the candlesticks at
the Custom-house, the authorities refused to permit them to pass without
paying the full duty, which amounted to a heavier sum than I was willing
to disburse. Consequently, although of exquisite workmanship, they were
broken in pieces, and thus suffered to pass as old gold.
The following incident relating to the capture of one of the vessels had
escaped my recollection, till pointed out in the _Naval Chronicle_ for
1805. It is substantially correct.
“Lord Cochrane, in his late cruise off the coasts of Spain and
Portugal, fell in with, and took, _La Fortuna_, a Spanish ship bound
to Corunna, and richly laden with gold and silver to the amount of
450,000 dollars (132,000_l._), and about the same sum in valuable
goods and merchandise. When the Spanish captain and his supercargo
came on board the _Pallas_, they appeared much dejected, as their
private property on board amounted to the value of 30,000 dollars
each. The captain said he had lost, in the war of 1779, a similar
fortune, having then been taken by a British cruiser, so that now, as
then, he had to begin the world again. Lord Cochrane, feeling for the
dejected condition of the Spaniards, consulted his officers as to
their willingness to give them back 5,000 dollars each in specie. This
being immediately agreed to, his lordship ordered the boatswain to
pipe all hands, and addressing the men to the like purpose, the
gallant fellows sung out, ‘Aye, aye, my lord, with all our hearts,’
and gave the unfortunate Spaniards three cheers.”
Another curious circumstance must not be passed over. In one of the
captured vessels was a number of bales, marked “_invendebles_.” Making
sure of some rich prize, we opened the bales, which to our chagrin
consisted of pope’s bulls, dispensations for eating meat on Fridays, and
indulgences for peccadilloes of all kinds, with the price affixed. They
had evidently formed a venture from Spain to the Mexican sin market, but
the supply exceeding the demand, had been reconsigned to the
manufacturers. We consigned them to the waves.
On our way home we were very near losing our suddenly acquired wealth
and the frigate too. Whilst between the Azores and Portugal, one of
those hazes common in semi-tropical climates, had for some time
prevailed on the surface of the sea, the mast-heads of the ship being
above the haze, with a clear sky. One day the look-out reported three
large ships steering for us, and on going aloft I made them out to be
line-of-battle ships in chase of the _Pallas_. As they did not show any
colours, it was impossible to ascertain their national character, but,
from the equality of the fore and maintopgallant masts, there was little
doubt they were French.
The course of the frigate was immediately altered, and the weather
changing, it began to blow hard, with a heavy sea.
The _Pallas_ was crank to such a degree, that the lee main-deck guns,
though housed, were under water, and even the lee quarter-deck
carronades were at times immerged.
As the strange ships were coming up with us hand over hand, the
necessity of carrying more sail became indispensable, notwithstanding
the immersion of the hull.
To do this with safety was the question. However, I ordered all the
hawsers in the ship to be got up to the mast-heads and hove taut. The
masts being thus secured, every possible stitch of sail was set, the
frigate plunging forecastle under, as was also the case with our
pursuers, which could not fire a gun—though as the haze cleared away we
saw them repeatedly flashing the priming. After some time the
line-of-battle ships came up with us, one keeping on our lee-beam,
another to windward, each within half a mile, whilst the third was a
little more distant.
Seeing it impossible to escape by superior sailing, it appeared
practicable to try a manœuvre, which might be successful if the masts
would stand. Having, as stated, secured these by every available rope in
the frigate, the order was given to prepare to clew up and haul down
every sail at the same instant. The manœuvre being executed with great
precision,—and the helm being put hard a-weather, so as to wear the ship
as speedily as possible,—the _Pallas_, thus suddenly brought up, shook
from stem to stern, in crossing the trough of the sea. As our pursuers
were unprepared for this manœuvre, still less to counteract it, they
shot past at full speed, and ran on several miles before they could
shorten sail, or trim on the opposite tack. Indeed, under the heavy gale
that was now blowing, even this was no easy matter, without endangering
their own masts.
There was no time for consideration on our part, so having rapidly
sheeted home, we spread all sail on the opposite tack. The hawsers being
still fast to the masts, we went away from our pursuers at the rate of
thirteen knots and upwards; so that a considerable distance was soon
interposed between us and them; and this was greatly increased ere they
were in a condition to follow. Before they had fairly renewed the chase
night was rapidly setting in, and when quite dark, we lowered a
ballasted cask overboard with a lantern, to induce them to believe that
we had altered our course, though we held on in the same direction
during the whole night. The trick was successful, for, as had been
calculated, the next morning, to our great satisfaction, we saw nothing
of them, and were all much relieved on finding our dollars and his
Majesty’s ship once more in safety. The expedient was a desperate one,
but so was the condition which induced us to resort to it.
Of the proceeds of the above-mentioned captures—all made within ten
days—Sir William Young, on the strength of having recopied my orders
from the Admiralty, _claimed and received_ half my share of the
captures. No wonder that Lord St. Vincent said of him, that he wished to
“_have the power of giving orders, and so share prize-money_.”
Being then young and ardent, my portion appeared inexhaustible. What
could I want with more? The sum claimed and received by Admiral Young
was not worth notice.
On our return to Plymouth the country was on the eve of a general
election, and the time appeared a fitting one to carry out my long
cherished scheme of getting into Parliament. The nearest borough in
which there was a chance was Honiton, and accordingly I applied to the
port admiral for leave of absence to contest that “independent”
constituency. The prize-money procured it without scruple.
My opponent was a Mr. Bradshaw, who had the advantage of a previous
canvass. From the amount of prize-money which was known to have fallen
to my share, that gentleman’s popularity was for a moment in danger, it
being anticipated that I should spend my money sailor fashion, so that
it became unmistakably manifest that the seat in Parliament would be at
my service, if my opponent were outbid! To use the words of “an
independent elector” during my canvass: “You need not ask me, my lord,
who I votes for, I always votes for Mister Most.”
To the intense disgust of the majority of the electors, I refused to
bribe at all, announcing my determination to “stand on patriotic
principles,” which, in the electioneering _parlance_ of those days,
meant “no bribery.” To my astonishment, however, a considerable number
of the respectable inhabitants voted in my favour, and my agent assured
me that a judicious application of no very considerable sum, would beat
my opponent out of the market. This, however, being resolutely refused,
the majority voted in favour of his five pound notes, and saved my
friends of the Admiralty Court and other naval departments from an
exhibition of misplaced zeal, which, as subsequently proved, could only
have ended in my parliamentary discomfiture.
To be beaten, even at an election, is one thing; to turn a beating to
account is another. Having had decisive proof as to the nature of
Honiton politics, I made up my mind that the next time there was a
vacancy in the borough, the seat should be mine without bribery.
Accordingly, immediately after my defeat, I sent the bellman round the
town, having first primed him with an appropriate speech, intimating
that “all who had voted for me, might repair to my agent, J. Townsend,
Esq., and _receive ten pounds ten_!”
The novelty of a defeated candidate paying double the current price
expended by the successful one—or, indeed, paying anything—made a great
sensation. Even my agent assured me that he could have secured my return
for less money, for that the popular voice being in my favour, a
trifling judicious expenditure would have turned the scale.
I told Mr. Townsend that such payment would have been bribery, which
would not accord with my character as a reformer of abuses—a declaration
which seemed highly to amuse him. Notwithstanding the explanation that
the ten guineas was paid as a reward for having withstood the influence
of bribery, the impression produced on the electoral mind by such
unlooked-for liberality was simply this—that if I gave ten guineas for
being beaten, my opponent had not paid half enough for being elected; a
conclusion which, by a similar process of reasoning, was magnified into
the conviction that each of his voters had been cheated out of five
pounds ten.
The result was what had been foreseen. My opponent, though successful,
was regarded with anything but a favourable eye; I, though defeated, had
suddenly become most popular. The effect at the next election, must be
reserved for its place in a future chapter.