Admiralty your letter of the 27th inst., and have nothing in command
from their Lordships to communicate to you.
“I am, &c. &c.
“EVAN NEPEAN.
“Captain Lord Cochrane.”
In spite of this rebuff, I nevertheless continued to persevere, but
it was not till some years afterwards that the promotion of
Lieutenant Parker was obtained, with a result to that able and
gallant officer which proved his ruin, and eventually caused his
death.
The circumstances under which this took place were positively
diabolical. Despairing of promotion, Lieutenant Parker had retired
to a little farm near Kinsale, by the cultivation of which, in
addition to his half-pay, he was realising an existence for his
family. From my determined perseverance on his behalf, he was at
length made commander, and ordered to join the _Rainbow_ sloop,
represented to be stationed in the West Indies. Selling off
everything, even to his household furniture, he proceeded to
Barbadoes, and reported himself to Sir Alexander Cochrane; but, as
the vessel could not be found, Sir Alexander furnished him with a
passage to look for her at the Bermudas, where he supposed she might
be fitting for sea. Not finding her there, Lieutenant Parker
returned to Barbadoes, when _it became evident that no such vessel
was on the North American station_.
On ascertaining this, poor Parker returned to England a ruined man.
Lord Melville, who had succeeded as First Lord, expressed his
surprise and regret that such a circumstance should have occurred,
and promised the unhappy man that he should not only be amply
compensated for the loss and expense attending his outfit and
fruitless voyage to the West Indies, but that he should have another
command on the first opportunity. This generous intention was
however counteracted, for _he never received either the one or the
other_.
Lieutenant Parker’s loss, consequent to the sale of his property,
the expense attendant on settling his family, together with his
outfit and voyage, amounted to upwards of 1000_l._ His prospects
ruined, his domestic arrangements destroyed, and his pride wounded,
his spirit and constitution gradually gave way, and at length
overwhelmed with sorrow he sank into a premature grave, leaving a
wife and four daughters to deplore the loss of their only protector.
I never could find out who had thus imposed on one of the most
gallant officers in the Navy this infamous deception, concocted,
doubtless, out of pure malevolence to myself. Be he whom he may, I
am very sorry that it is not in my power to hold up his name to the
execration of posterity. It is even at the present day the duty of
the Admiralty to remedy the injury inflicted on his destitute
family—for he had left four daughters unprovided for, who had no
opportunity to escape from indigence.
CHAP. VIII.
NAVAL ADMINISTRATION SIXTY YEARS AGO.
POLITICAL FAVOURITISM.—REFUSAL OF FURTHER EMPLOYMENT.—NAVAL
CORRUPTION.—DOCKYARD PRACTICES.—SHAMEFUL TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR.—ECONOMY THE REMEDY.—RESULTS OF MEDICAL ECONOMY.—EMPTY PHYSIC
BOTTLES.—SEAMEN’S AVERSION TO THE SERVICE.—A POST CAPTAIN AT
COLLEGE.
It will be evident on a perusal of the previous chapter, that there was
no fixed principle for the promotion of officers who had distinguished
themselves, but that however desirous the Board might be to reward their
services, it was in the power of persons holding inferior offices to
thwart the intentions of the Board itself.
Were such a principle admitted, nothing could be more detrimental to the
service. Let every officer know the regulated reward for a national
service, with the certainty that he cannot be deprived of it, and rely
upon it, that whenever opportunity presents itself, the service will be
performed. There is nothing mercenary, or even selfish about this; but,
on the contrary, an ambition which should be carefully fostered.
In my own case, I can conscientiously avow my leading motive to have
been that of exerting myself to the utmost in the hope of thereby
attaining promotion in my profession, to which promotion the capture of
an enemy’s frigate, as well as of a large number of privateers and other
vessels, had entitled me, according to a judicious rule for the
encouragement of efforts useful to the nation—to a place on the list,
from which I conceived myself unjustly excluded by the promotion of a
younger man, a junior commander too, for no great apparent reason than
that of his father being a personal and political friend of the First
Lord of the Admiralty.
To those who may think my conduct towards the First Lord and the Board
disrespectful, I can only say, that were my life to begin anew, with my
present experience of consequences, I would again pursue the same
course. I cannot imagine anything more detrimental to the interests of
the Navy and the nation, than political favouritism on the part of the
Admiralty—of itself sufficient to damp that ardour which should form one
of the first requisites for future command. I would rather say to the
young officer—“If you have, in the exercise of your profession, acquired
a right which is wrongfully withheld—demand it, stick to it with
unshaken pertinacity;—none but a corrupt body can possibly think the
worse of you for it; even though you may be treated like myself—you are
doing your country good service by exposing favouritism, which is only
another term for corruption.”
Favouritism on the part of the Admiralty must ever be the bane of the
Navy, and may prove its ruin. Either let it be understood that the
institution is a parliamentary vote market, or that it is what it ought
to be—an institution for the promotion of zeal by the reward of merit.
Only let it not sustain both characters, or between the two stools the
country may one day go to the ground.
Such was the offence taken by the authorities at my persistence in my
own right, and in that of the officers under my command, that an
application to the Board for another ship met with refusal; and as it
was clear that Lord St. Vincent’s administration did not again intend to
employ me, the time on my hands was devoted to an investigation of those
abuses which were paralysing the Navy; not that this was entered upon
from any spirit of retaliation on the Admiralty, but as preparatory to
the more ambitious aim of getting into Parliament, and exposing them.
One of the most crying evils of our then naval administration had fallen
heavily upon me, though so young in command—viz. the Admiralty Courts;
but for the peculations consequent on which, the cruise of the _Speedy_
ought to have sent home myself, officers, and crew, with competence. As
it was, we got all the fighting, whilst the Admiralty Court and its
hungry parasites monopolised the greater portion of our hard-won
prize-money. In many cases they took the whole! and in one case brought
me in debt, though the prize was worth several thousand pounds!
Hitherto no naval officer had ventured to expose, in Parliament or out
of it, this or indeed any other gross abuse of the naval service; and
having nothing better to do, want of employment appeared to offer a
fitting opportunity for constituting myself the Quixote of the
profession; sparing no pains to qualify for the task, though well aware
of its arduous, if not hopeless nature—as directed against a mass of
corruption, such as—it is to be hoped—may never again strike at the
noblest arm of our national safety a blow worse than any enemy can
inflict.
After what has been stated with regard to my unpleasant relations with
Lord St. Vincent and his Board of Admiralty, it will perhaps be better
not personally to enter on the subject of then existing naval abuses,
lest I might be suspected of exaggerating their extent. Some such
explanation is necessary in justification of the course which I
subsequently thought it my duty to pursue, but it will answer every
purpose to have recourse to the experience of a contemporary
officer—Captain Brenton, the biographer of Lord St. Vincent—in
justification of my self-imposed task:—
“In the first edition of the Naval History, I have commented on the
profligate system of hired vessels and transports. In this—borough
influence reigned paramount, and the most solid information was
disregarded when the perpetrator of the greatest frauds was a
supporter of Government.”—(BRENTON’S _Life of Lord St. Vincent_, p.
167.)
“A ship purchased by a man of influence was a certain fortune to him.
He cleared his money in the first year at the rate of 400_l._ per
month, and if the ship were coppered at 7500_l._ per annum. About
twenty copper-bottomed transports were lying for three years in the
harbour of Messina, without being employed in any duty.”—(p. 169.)
The expense of these alone, no doubt all owned by “men of influence” as
Captain Brenton terms them, was for the three years 270,000_l._ As these
transports formed only a trifling illustration of the system, there is
little wonder at the enormous accumulation of the national debt, for
results so inadequate.
Captain Brenton might have gone farther, and stated with great truth,
that not only were transports hired from men of influence, but that
vessels utterly worthless were purchased by the Government from their
political supporters, and then patched up into ships of war! It was my
misfortune to be subsequently appointed to _a collier_ so converted—with
what result will appear in the sequel.
From the ships let us follow Captain Brenton into the dockyards:—
“When Mr. Colquhoun, in his celebrated police reports, stated that the
Government was plundered from the dockyards at the rate of _a million
a year_, he was supposed to have exceeded all probability. I am
satisfied he was under the mark, and if the _consequences_ of these
frauds are added to the amount of peculation, the aggregate will be
frightful. The manner in which the villany was carried on was dreadful
indeed. _Whole ships’ crews were destroyed at one fell swoop._ Every
ship was supposed to have a certain number of bolts driven to secure
her fabric. The tops and points of the bolts only were driven, and the
rest was carried away. It is probable that the loss of the _York_ of
64 guns, and the _Blenheim_ of 74 guns, was the consequence. The
_Albion_, 74, we know to have been nearly lost by this hellish
fraud.”—(BRENTON, pp. 159, 160.)
“I can remember what our slop clothing was, for which the poor seamen
were charged an extravagant price; the contract being _always given as
a matter of favour for electioneering purposes_.”—(p. 156.)
“Not only were the grossest impositions practised in the supply of the
most important stores, by sending in damaged goods, but even the raw
materials were _again sold_ before they reached their
destination.”—(p. 157.)
“At the cooperage of Deptford, 1020_l._ 10_s._ 5_d._ was charged for
work proved to be worth only 37_l._ 2_s._ 3_d._ At the cooperage at
Plymouth, the king’s casks were stolen, and sixty-four of them were
found in one brewery.”—(p. 183.)
“It was a common expression with the receiving clerks that they ‘_had
not been hampered_,—’ when they refused to receive articles into
store. The ‘hampering’ meant a bribe in the shape of wine or other
articles, as the price of their certificates.”—(p. 155.)
“It would scarcely be believed to what extent peculation was carried
on in every department.”—(p. 155.)
“Hampers of wine and ale were liberally supplied to the inspectors of
timber, and I conclude that the same treatment was applied to the
measuring clerks of the dockyard.”—(p. 179.)
“From the foregoing it may be inferred that the dockyards were the
most fruitful sources of plunder and national ruin.”—(p. 180.)
“Report No. 6 relates to the dockyards, wherein a shameful system of
plunder had long existed.”
“Reports 10 and 11 state other abuses to an enormous extent, so that
Lord St. Vincent used the elegant expression that ‘_our dockyards
stank of corruption_.’”—(p. 190.)
From this disgraceful picture let us pass on to another still more
revolting:—
“The victualling establishment at home was not less corrupt. The
charge for the supply of prisoners of war was ample, but three-fourths
of the amount was pilfered. The same nefarious system pursued in the
hospitals abroad was followed at home in a more guarded manner, and
_fortunes were made_ by cheating the sick and wounded seamen out of
the comforts and necessaries allowed them by a grateful country. Lord
Cochrane endeavoured to procure better rations and treatment for the
French prisoners, but the charge of sick and wounded prisoners of war
fell in its administration into the hands of a set of villains whose
seared consciences were proof against the silent but eloquent
pleadings of their fellow-creatures.”—(p. 165.)
“Report No. 7 relates to the hospitals, beginning with Stonehouse at
Devonport. Here was discovered waste, corruption, fraud, extravagance,
and villany to a disgusting extent. Four thousand gallons of porter
were consumed in six months, being more than four times the proportion
used in Haslar. On board the _Calne_ hulk, appropriated to sick
prisoners of war, the surgeon’s chief assistant kept a table for the
officers at the cost of 1500_l._ or 2000_l._ a year. He could afford
the purser a large salary, in lieu of his share of the profit of the
concern. The worst and most scandalous feature was, that when the
wretches in the wardroom were rioting in luxury they were consuming
the necessaries which the Government had liberally supplied for the
use of the sick prisoners of war.
“I hope there is sufficient virtue in Parliament to punish _great
delinquents_, if not the country will not stagger long under the
practice of these blood-sucking leeches.”—(_Letter of Lord St.
Vincent, quoted by Brenton._)
Abroad the condition of affairs was infinitely worse, both as regarded
the navy and army. The following extract from the “Annual Register,” at
a period when the press hardly dared to speak truth, will serve as a
sample of the practices prevailing wherever an official staff was to be
found:—
“The abuses committed in the West Indies are said to exceed everything
that was ever stated in romance. The commissioners are stated to have
discovered that forged bills and receipts, for articles never
purchased, and bills drawn on Government indorsed under forged and
fictitious names, were common and notorious. They found a most base
collusion between the officers of Government and the merchants and
contractors, by which the latter were allowed to charge stores at a
much higher rate than they might have been obtained for in the market.
In one instance it was discovered, that to conceal this iniquity, a
bribe of 18,000_l._ had been given; in another a bribe of 35,000_l._
Vessels, houses, stores, &c. were usually hired at most extravagant
rates, in consequence of fraudulent contracts, where others might have
been obtained much cheaper. But worse than either of these iniquities
was the diabolical fraud of suffering the merchants and contractors to
furnish His Majesty’s troops with inferior and bad rum, and other
articles, at an extravagant rate, by which the lives of the troops
were endangered, as well as the country defrauded. And, for the
purpose of committing these practices, all free competition for the
supply of articles was prevented; and every obstacle was put in the
way, even of the purchase of bills on the Treasury. They were dated in
one island and negotiated in another; and they were sold at a much
more advantageous exchange than that at which the officers debited
themselves in their accounts.”
There is no doubt but that Lord St. Vincent was desirous of putting a
stop to this national plunder, and the wholesale destruction of sick,
wounded, and prisoners, which was its direct consequence; but the means
he took were inadequate. His lordship’s remedy was “_economy!_” leaving
the influential delinquents in quiet possession of their places. The
most extravagant contracts and profuse expenditure of the public money
were thus to be cured by no expenditure at all on necessary objects.
One of Lord St. Vincent’s agents in this notable scheme, was a Dr.
Baird, who possessed his lordship’s highest confidence. To this person
was confided the task of regenerating the hospitals. As may be supposed,
from his profession, economy in medicine was the first step. An order
was issued that blue ointment and pills, requisite only for complaints
that might be avoided, were doled out in _minimum_ quantity. The
consequence was, that the captains and surgeons of ships of war had to
purchase these essential medicines out of their own pockets! more
especially as a subsequent order was issued that no such complaints,
should be treated in the hospitals!
A more barbarous regulation was enforced, viz, that from the expense of
_lint_ in dressing wounds, _sponge_ should be substituted, as it might
be used over again! The result was that even slight cases became
infected by the application of sponges which had been used on putrescent
sores, and this shameful practice cost the lives or limbs of many. I was
myself on a survey at the Devonport hospital, where seven persons had
lost limbs from this cause! and proposed to the other surveying captains
to draw up a representation to the Admiralty on the consequences of
applying infected sponge; but the advice was not followed for fear of
giving offence.
One of the unfortunate sufferers, amongst others, was a son of the
boatswain or gunner of the then flagship, the _Salvador del Mundo_. The
poor boy had bruised his shin, to which an infected sponge was applied,
and he lost his leg! Persons so mutilated had no claim on the service
for pension or reward. It was this very hospital to which Captain
Brenton, in the preceding extracts, applied the terms “waste,
corruption, fraud, extravagance, and villany to a disgusting extent.”
The remedy was the application of infected sponge!!
Dr. Baird had the oddest possible notions of the mission with which he
was entrusted. As to striking at the root of an evil he had not the most
remote conception, otherwise than by saving. He one day said to me; “The
extravagance of this place is incredible. I have to-day found what will
save one thousand pounds.” “Ah, Doctor,” said I, “what is that?” “Why,”
replied he, “would you believe it, in the cellars under the hospital I
have found tens of thousands of empty physic bottles! Did you ever hear
of such waste!” And the doctor set busily to work to dispose of the
empty bottles in order to pay for his medicines,—this being his idea of
correcting the most crying evil of the hospital.
A still more absurd instance of the doctor’s economy gave rise at the
time to considerable amusement. Everybody knows that a sailor requires
as much looking after as a child. It was Jack’s practice when sick in
hospital, to get out and scale a wall for the purpose of smuggling in
spirits, these of course undoing the little that medical treatment could
effect. To put an end to the practice, the authorities had ordered the
wall to be raised, but Dr. Baird stopped the work, because a coating of
broken glass-bottles on the top of the old wall would be more economical
to the nation and equally effectual! A _chevaux de frise_ of broken
glass was accordingly put on, but, to the doctor’s annoyance, Jack, with
a brickbat, pounded up the broken glass, and got to the spirit shop as
before. Whereupon the doctor declared his belief that “sailors were as
far gone in wickedness as the hospital authorities themselves.”
These were the kinds of reform adopted, the ultimate result being that
Lord St. Vincent was more blamed than had been any of his predecessors,
and was, on quitting the Admiralty, driven to the undignified
alternative of _filing a string of affidavits in the King’s Bench in
defence of his character_![30]
-----
Footnote 30:
See Brenton, vol. ii. p. 356.
-----
Much has been said about the difficulty of manning the Navy, by persons
who had not a knowledge of the arbitrary and cruel practices above
mentioned, and of many others on which it would be tedious to dilate,
but which, under pretence of zeal for the promotion of the service,
rendered the service at that time almost intolerable. No man acquainted
with the facts can wonder that interminable cruises, prohibition to land
in port, constant confinement without salutary change of food, and
consequent disease engendering total debility, should have excited
disgust, and even terror of a sailor’s life; to which may be added, the
condemnation of invalids to harbour-duty, far more severe than duty
afloat, with no chance of escape but by a return to actual service,
where, strange to say, though unfit, such men were again received!
The instances of abuses just given form but a brief outline of the state
of the Navy at that period. From these the reader may imagine the rest.
Suffice it to say, that I used all diligence to store both my memory and
note-book with facts, to be used when I might be able to expose them
with effect.
No opportunity, however, immediately occurring, I betook myself to the
College of Edinburgh, then distinguished by possessing some of the most
eminent professors in the kingdom. In the early part of this volume the
desultory and imperfect education which fell to my lot has been noticed.
It had, nevertheless, sufficed to convince me of the truth of the axiom
that “knowledge is power,” and also to decide that in my case power if
proportioned to knowledge could be of no very high order. It was
therefore my determination to increase both to the best of my ability.
It was, perhaps, an unusual spectacle for a post-captain fresh from the
quarter-deck, to enter himself as a student among boys. For my
self-imposed position I cared nothing, and was only anxious to employ
myself to the best advantage. With what success may be judged from the
fact of my never being but once absent from lectures, and that to attend
the funeral of a near relative.
Whilst at Edinburgh, I made few acquaintances, preferring secluded
lodgings and study without interruption to the gaiety of my
contemporaries. Besides which, if my object of getting into Parliament
were to be accomplished, it was necessary to be economical, since all
that the Admiralty Court had been pleased to leave me of my prize-money
would not more than suffice to satisfy the yearnings of a small borough,
for which the only hope of election was by outbribing my antagonists.
Amongst my contemporaries at the Edinburgh College was Lord Palmerston,
who resided with the most eminent of the then Scotch professors, Dugald
Stewart, and attended the classes at the same time with myself.
I might also mention others, of whose society in after life I should
have been proud, had not the shameful treatment which it was afterwards
my lot to experience from a corrupt faction, driven me from society at a
time when it ought to have afforded me a welcome relaxation from hard
and unintermitting exertions in the service of my country.
CHAP. IX.
EMPLOYMENT IN THE _ARAB_.
APPOINTMENT TO THE ARAB.—PROJECTED INVASION BY NAPOLEON.—THE ARAB
ORDERED TO WATCH THE FRENCH COAST.—THEN TO CRUISE IN THE NORTH
SEA.—RETIREMENT OF LORD ST. VINCENT.
On the renewal of war with France in 1803, application was made by me to
the Admiralty for a ship, first taking the precaution to visit the
various dockyards to see what vessels were ready, or in preparation. My
object was to obtain a suitable vessel, which should enable me to
operate inshore and harass the French coast in the Atlantic, as the
_Speedy_ had done the Spanish coast in the Mediterranean. My success
there formed sufficient warrant for such an application, as, previous to
the Peace of Amiens, the enemy’s coasting trade from Bayonne to Boulogne
had been carried on almost with impunity.