medium of an interpreter, “What brought me there?” The reply was that “I
was the commander of an English vessel of war in the roads, and had been
deputed, on behalf of my government, respectfully to remonstrate with
his highness concerning a vessel which his cruisers had taken contrary
to the laws of nations.” On this being interpreted, the ferocious scowls
of the bystanders were exchanged for expressions of injured innocence,
but the Dey got in a great passion, and told the interpreter to inform
me that “remonstrance came with an ill grace from us, the British
vessels being the greatest pirates in the world, and mine one of the
worst amongst them,” which complimentary statement was acknowledged by
me with a formal bow.
“If I did right,” continued the Dey, through his interpreter,—“I should
put you and your crew in prison, till (naming a captured Algerine
vessel) she was restored; and but for my great respect for the English
government, and my impression that her seizure was unauthorised, you
should go there. However, you may go, with a demand from me that the
vessel unjustly taken from us shall be immediately restored.”
This decision appeared to be anything but satisfactory to the oligarchy
of which his court was composed, as savouring of a clemency to which
they were little inclined. From the boisterous conversation which
ensued, they were evidently desirous of prolonging my stay to an
indefinite period, or perhaps of terminating it summarily through the
instrumentality of the axemen who lined the galleries, as a few years
afterwards they terminated the existence of the Dey himself.
To confess the truth, there was some room for self-congratulation on
quitting the presence of such barbarians, to whom I was not fairly
accredited for such a mission. However, the remonstrance confided to me
being duly delivered, we returned to Minorca, to report progress, though
not without being chased by an Algerine cruiser on our way. As the
_Speedy_ outsailed her, and as there was no beneficial object to be
gained by interfering with her, we stood on without further notice.
On arriving at our former cruising ground, we encountered a Spanish
privateer of six guns, which was captured. This vessel was fitted out at
my own private expense, and my brother appointed to command her, as a
tender to the _Speedy_; several enemy’s vessels having previously
escaped for want of such aid.
In a few days after this, we fell in with the _Kangaroo_, Captain
Pulling, who, being senior to me, was therefore my commanding officer.
Running down the coast in company, we attacked the fort of Almanara, and
after silencing it, brought off a Spanish privateer of seven guns.
On the 8th of June, the _Speedy_ ran into Oropesa, where, on the 13th
and 14th of April, we had the previous action with the fort and
gun-boats. Perceiving several vessels at anchor under the fort, it was
deemed advisable to make off shore, with the intention of running in
again at midnight, and cutting some of them out.
We had not proceeded far, before we again fell in with the _Kangaroo_,
when informing Captain Pulling of what we had seen, he declined the
night attack, preferring to postpone operations till the following day.
Accordingly, at noon on the 9th, we went in, and made out a twenty-gun
xebec and three gun-boats, with ten sail of merchantmen under their
convoy. It was determined to attack them as they lay; the _Kangaroo_
anchoring well up to and engaging the fort, whilst the _Speedy_ and her
tender under my brother’s orders, encountered the xebec and the
gun-boats—the _Speedy_ anchoring in a line between those vessels and the
_Kangaroo_.
For some hours an incessant cannonade was kept up on both sides, the
_Kangaroo’s_ fire flanking the fort, whilst the slackened fire of the
Spanish vessels showed that our shot had told. At this juncture, a
twelve-gun felucca, and two more gun-boats having arrived from Valentia
to their assistance, the Spaniards took heart, and the action became
nearly as brisk as before.
The felucca and the newly arrived gun-boats were, however, for a time
beat off, and after an hour’s additional firing, the xebec, two
gun-boats, and some of the convoy were sunk; the remaining gun-boats
shortly afterwards sharing the same fate.
The action had now continued for upwards of nine hours; during which the
_Speedy_ had expended nearly all her ammunition, viz. 1400 shot, and the
_Kangaroo_ was much in the same predicament. As the felucca and
gun-boats had again come up, it was necessary to effect something
decisive. Captain Pulling, therefore, slipping his cable, shifted close
to the fort, which was soon afterwards abandoned, and the _Speedy_
closed with the felucca and her consorts, which forthwith fled. Had they
remained, we had not half a dozen rounds left to continue the action.
Both vessels now hoisted our boats, and made for the merchantmen. Three
of these had been sunk, and four others driven on shore; we, however,
brought away the three still afloat. By this time a number of Spanish
troops lined the beach for the protection of the vessels ashore, and as
we had scarcely a shot left, it was impracticable to reply to the
musketry, within range of which the boats must necessarily have been
placed had the attempt been made. We therefore relinquished the
endeavour to get off the stranded vessels.
It may be useful here to remark that on board the _Kangaroo_ were some
guns fitted on the non-recoil principle, and that during the action
these broke from their breechings; one, if not more, endangering the
vessel by bounding down the hatchways into the hold.
The subjoined letter of thanks for this affair was forwarded to Captain
Pulling by Lord Keith, who was then at Alexandria, watching the
movements of the French in Egypt.
“_Foudroyant_, Bay of Aboukir,
“10th July, 1801.
“SIR,—I have received your letter of the 10th of June, detailing the
attack made by the _Kangaroo_ and _Speedy_ upon the fort of Oropesa
and the enemy’s armed vessels at anchor under its protection, on 9th
of that month; as well as upon the tower of Almanara on a former day:
and while I offer my congratulations upon the successful issue of your
enterprise, I cannot withhold my approbation of the persevering and
determined conduct manifested by you and by Captain Lord Cochrane, as
well as by the officers and companies of both the sloops on these
occasions, and I request that my satisfaction may be communicated by
you to his lordship, and that you and he will make the same known to
the officers and companies of the _Kangaroo_ and the _Speedy_.
“I am, &c. &c.
“KEITH.
“Capt. Pulling, _Kangaroo_.”
On our return to Port Mahon with the prizes, the _Gamo_ had not been
purchased by the Government; but, to my regret, this useful cruiser had
been sold for a trifle to the Algerines, whilst I was condemned to
continue in the pigmy and now battered craft by which she had been
taken. To have obtained command of the _Gamo_, even as a means of
deception on the enemy’s coast, I would scarcely have changed place with
an admiral.
But a more cruel thing still was in store for me. The commandant lived
in the house of a Spanish merchant who had a contract for carrying the
mails to Gibraltar. The vessel employed for this purpose was a
notoriously bad sailer, and when the _Speedy_ was ready for sea, instead
of being permitted to return to our cruising ground, she was ordered to
convoy this tub of a packet to Gibraltar, with further instructions to
take the letter-bag on board the _Speedy_, protect the packet, put the
mail on board her as soon as we arrived off the Rock, and return without
holding any communication with the shore! the evident object of the last
injunction being that the service which had been thrust upon us should
not become known!
The expectation of the packet-master, doubtless, was that we should put
to sea out of privateer reach. In place of this, we ran along the
Spanish coast, our superior sailing enabling us, without delay, to
scrutinise every creek as we passed. Nothing, however, occurred, till we
were close in with a bay, or rather indentation of the shore near
Alicant, where seeing some vessels at anchor, we made towards them, on
which they weighed and deliberately ran ashore. To have stopped to get
them off would have been in excess of our instructions. To set fire to
them was not, and as one was laden with oil, and the night following
very dark, the result was a blaze which illumined the sky for many miles
round.
Unluckily for us, three French line-of-battle ships, which afterwards
turned out to be the _Indomitable_, the _Dessaix_, and the _Formidable_,
were in the vicinity, and being attracted by the light of the burning
vessels, ran in shore to see what was the matter.
At daybreak, on the morning of July 3rd, these large ships were observed
in the distance, calling up to our imaginations visions of Spanish
galleons from South America, and accordingly the _Speedy_ prepared for
chase. It was not till day dawned that we found out our mistake, the
vessels between us and the offing being clearly line-of-battle ships,
forbidding all reasonable hope of escape.
It was about four o’clock in the morning when we made out the French
ships, which immediately on discovering us gave chase. Being to
windward, we endeavoured to escape by making all sail, and, as the wind
fell light, by using our sweeps. This proving unavailing, we threw the
guns overboard, and put the brig before the wind; but notwithstanding
every effort, the enemy gained fast upon us, and, in order to prevent
our slipping past, separated on different tacks, so as to keep us
constantly within reach of one or the other; the _Dessaix_, being
nearest, firing broadsides at us as she passed when tacking, at other
times firing from her bow chasers, and cutting up our rigging.
For upwards of three hours we were thus within gunshot of the _Dessaix_,
when finding it impossible to escape by the wind, I ordered all the
stores to be thrown overboard, in the hope of being able, when thus
further lightened, to run the gauntlet between the ships, which
continued to gain upon us.
Watching an opportunity, when the nearest line-of-battle ship was before
our beam, we bore up, set the studding sails, and attempted to run
between them, the French honouring us with a broadside for this
unexpected movement. The _Dessaix_, however, immediately tacked in
pursuit, and in less than an hour got within musket shot. At this short
distance, she let fly at us a complete broadside of round and grape, the
object evidently being to sink us at a blow, in retaliation for thus
attempting to slip past, though almost without hope of escape.
Fortunately for us, in yawing to bring her broadside to bear, the
rapidity with which she answered her helm carried her a little too far,
and her round shot plunged in the water under our bows, or the discharge
must have sunk us; the scattered grape, however, took effect in the
rigging, cutting up a great part of it, riddling the sails, and doing
material damage to the masts and yards, though not a man was hurt. To
have delayed for another broadside would have been to expose all on
board to certain destruction, and as further effort to escape was
impotent, the _Speedy’s_ colours were hauled down.
On going aboard the _Dessaix_, and presenting my sword to the captain,
Christie Pallière, he politely declined taking it, with the
complimentary remark that “he would not accept the sword of an officer
who had for so many hours struggled against impossibility,” at the same
time paying me the further compliment of requesting that “I would
continue to wear my sword, though a prisoner”—a request with which I
complied; Capt. Pallière at the same time good-naturedly expressing his
satisfaction at having terminated our exploits in the cruising line,
they having, in fact, special instructions to look out for us. After
this reception it is scarcely necessary to add that I was treated with
great kindness by my captors.
Thus ended the thirteen months’ cruise of the _Speedy_, during which we
had taken and retaken upwards of 50 vessels, 122 guns, and 534
prisoners.
After the capture of the _Speedy_, the French line-of-battle ships stood
along the coast, and proceeded with her, and the unlucky packet which
had been the primary cause of the disaster, to Algesiras. During this
passage I had ample opportunity of observing the superior manner in
which the sails of the _Dessaix_ were cut, and the consequent flat
surface exposed to the wind; this contrasting strongly with the bag
reefs, bellying sails, and breadbag canvass of English ships of war at
that period.
As there was no force at Gibraltar adequate to an attack of the French
squadron, the authorities lost no time in transmitting intelligence of
their arrival to Sir James Saumarez, then blockading the Spanish
squadron in Cadiz. The French meanwhile proceeded to water and refit,
evidently with the intention of passing the Straits with the first fair
wind.
Quitting Cadiz, Sir James Saumarez immediately sailed for Algesiras with
his squadron, consisting of the _Cæsar_, _Venerable_, _Audacious_,
_Hannibal_, _Superb_, _Pompée_, _Spencer_, _Calpe_, and _Thames_, these
reaching the bay on the 6th of July.
At the time of their first appearance I was conversing with Captain
Pallière in his cabin, when a lieutenant reported a British flag over
Cabritta point, and soon afterwards the top-gallant masts and pendants
of a British squadron became visible. We at once adjourned to the poop,
when the surprise of the French, at the sight of a more numerous
squadron, became not unreasonably apparent; Captain Pallière asked me
“if I thought an attack would be made, or whether the British force
would anchor off Gibraltar?” My reply was “that an attack would
certainly be made, and that before night both British and French ships
would be at Gibraltar,” at the same time adding that when there, it
would give me great pleasure to make him and his officers a return for
the kindness I had experienced on board the _Dessaix_!
The French admiral, however, determined that his ships should not be
carried across the bay if he could help it. Before the British squadron
had rounded the point, the French out boats, with kedges and stream
anchors, for the purpose of warping in shore, so as to prevent the
approaching squadron from cutting them out; but the order was so
hurriedly executed, that all three ships were hauled aground, with their
sterns presented to the approaching British force; a position which
could not have been taken by choice, for nothing could apparently be
more easy than to destroy the French ships, which, lying aground stern
on, could only use their stern chasers.
To employ their consequently useless hands to some purpose, the French
landed a considerable portion of their crews to man the Spanish
batteries on the island, as the ship’s guns could not be brought to
bear. Two of the British ships anchored, and opened upon the French
ships aground, but being exposed to the fire of some of the newly manned
forts higher up the bay, the heavy guns of which were admirably handled
by the French seamen, both the British vessels slipped their cables, and
together with the remainder of the squadron, which did not anchor at
all, backed their main-top-sails for the purpose of maintaining their
position. The wind, however, blowing from the westward, with a rapid
current sweeping round the bay, thwarted this intention, and the British
squadron quickly drifted past the enemy, firing as they went.
Perhaps I ought previously to have mentioned an incident demonstrative
of the _sang froid_ of my captor. After having satisfied himself that an
action with a superior force was inevitable, Capt. Pallière remarked,
“that it should not spoil our breakfast,” in which he had invited me to
join him. Before the meal was ended, a round shot crashed through the
stern of the _Dessaix_, driving before it a shower of broken glass, the
_debrís_ of a wine bin under the sofa.
We forthwith jumped up from table, and went on the quarter-deck, but a
raking shot from Sir James Saumarez’s ship sweeping a file of marines
from the poop, not far from me, I considered further exposure on my part
unnecessary, and went below to a position whence I could nevertheless,
at times, see what wasgoing on.
The _Hannibal_, having with the others forged past the enemy, gallantly
filled and tacked with a view to get between the French ships and the
shore, being evidently unaware of their having been hauled aground. The
consequence was that she ran upon a shoal, and remained fast, nearly bow
on to the broadsides of the French line-of-battle ships, which with the
shore batteries and several gunboats opened upon her a concentrated
fire. This, from her position, she was unable to return. The result was
that her guns were speedily dismounted, her rigging shot away, and a
third of her crew killed or wounded; Captain Ferris, who commanded her,
having now no alternative but to strike his colours—though not before he
had displayed an amount of endurance which excited the admiration of the
enemy.
A circumstance now occurred which is entitled to rank amongst the
curiosities of war. On the French taking possession of the _Hannibal_,
they had neglected to provide themselves with their national ensign, and
either from necessity or bravado rehoisted the English flag upside down.
This being a well-known signal of distress, was so understood by the
authorities at Gibraltar, who, manning all government and other boats
with dockyard artificers and seamen, sent them, as it was mistakenly
considered, to the assistance of the _Hannibal_.
On the approach of the launches I was summoned on deck by the captain of
the _Dessaix_, who seemed doubtful what measures to adopt as regarded
the boats now approaching to board the _Hannibal_, and asked my opinion
as to whether they would attempt to retake the ship. As there could be
no doubt in my mind about the nature of their mission or its result, it
was evident that if they were allowed to board, nothing could prevent
the seizure of the whole. My advice, therefore, to Captain Pallière was
to warn them off by a shot—hoping they would thereby be driven back and
saved from capture. Captain Pallière seemed at first inclined to take
the advice, but on reflection—either doubting its sincerity, or seeing
the real state of the case—he decided to capture the whole by permitting
them to board unmolested. Thus boat by boat was captured until all the
artificers necessary for the repair of the British squadron, and nearly
all the sailors at that time in Gibraltar, were taken prisoners!
In this action the French and Spaniards suffered severely both as
regarded ships and men, their masts and hulls being much knocked about,
whilst several Spanish gunboats were sunk. The wonder to me was that the
British squadron did not anchor, for the French ships being aground,
stern on, could have offered little resistance, and must have been
destroyed. It is true that the batteries on shore were admirably served,
and thus constituted a formidable obstacle; but had not the squadron
drifted past the French ships, the latter might have been interposed
between the batteries and the British force, when the fire of the former
would have been neutralised, and the enemy’s ships aground destroyed
with comparatively little loss. It is not, however, my purpose or
province to criticise the action, but simply to give the details, as
personally witnessed from that extraordinary place, for a British
officer, the deck of a French ship!
Neither the imprisonment of the captured crews, nor my own, was of long
duration. The day after the action, Sir J. Saumarez sent Capt. Brenton
into Algesiras Bay with a flag of truce, to endeavour to effect an
exchange of the gallant Capt. Ferris, his officers, and crew. At that
time there was no regulated system of exchange between the belligerent
powers, but Capt. Brenton succeeded in procuring the release of the crew
of the _Hannibal_ and the entrapped artificers, together with the
officers and men of the _Speedy_. Admiral Linois would not at first give
me up, but, on further consideration, allowed me to go with the other
officers to Gibraltar on _parole_. My complete release was eventually
effected for the second captain of the _St. Antonio_, taken shortly
afterwards.
The French ships having lost no time in communicating with the Spanish
admiral at Cadiz, he promptly appeared off Algesiras with a
reinforcement of six ships of the line, several frigates, and gunboats.
The enemy having by this time warped off their grounded ships, as well
as the _Hannibal_, and having by the 12th got them in sea-going order,
the whole sailed from Algesiras, followed by the British squadron,
which, by great exertions, had been got in readiness for pursuit.
Of the action which subsequently took place I have no personal
knowledge, other than that of a scene witnessed by myself from the
garden of the commissioner’s house, in which I was staying.
The enemy were overtaken at dusk, soon after leaving the bay, and when
it had become dark, Captain Keats, in the _Superb_, gallantly dashed in
between the two sternmost ships, firing right and left, and passed on.
Of course I do not assert myself to have been personally cognisant of
the way in which the attack was made, the firing only being visible from
the Rock, but that this is the correct version of the affair rests upon
indisputable authority. The movement was so rapidly executed, that the
_Superb_ shot ahead before the smoke cleared away, and the Spanish
ships, the _Real Carlos_, 112, and the _San Hermenegildo_, 112,
mistaking each other for the aggressor, began a mutual attack, resulting
in the _Real Carlos_ losing her foretop-mast, the sails of which—falling
over her own guns—caught fire. While in this condition the
_Hermenegildo_—still engaging the _Real Carlos_ as an enemy—in the
confusion fell on board her and caught fire also. Both ships burned till
they blew up, and nearly all on board perished; a few survivors only
escaping on board the _Superb_ as Captain Keats was taking possession of
a _third_ Spanish line-of-battle ship, the _San Antonio_—for whose
second captain, as has been said, I was exchanged.
The remainder of the combined squadron got safely back to Cadiz after an
encounter between the _Formidable_ and _Venerable_. I am aware that the
preceding account of the action with the French ships at Algesiras
differs in some respects from that compiled by naval historians from the
despatches; but this circumstance will not prevent me from giving my own
version of a conflict in which it was my misfortune to be a reluctant
spectator. The _Real Carlos_, one of the ships blown up, bore the flag
of the Spanish Admiral, Moreno, who with Admiral Linois was said to be
at the time on board a Spanish frigate.
CHAP. VII.
ADMIRALTY RELUCTANCE TO PROMOTE ME.
LETTER FROM SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE.—SECOND LETTER FROM SIR
ALEXANDER.—BOTH WRITTEN UNKNOWN TO ME.—RELUCTANCE OF LORD ST.
VINCENT TO PROMOTE ME.—LETTER FROM MY FATHER TO LORD ST. VINCENT,
URGING MY RIGHT TO PROMOTION.—LORD ST. VINCENT’S REPLY.—ITS
FALLACY.—HIS LORDSHIP’S REASONING A SUBTERFUGE.—PROMOTION OF MY
FIRST LIEUTENANT REFUSED. MY IMPRUDENT REMARK TO LORD ST. VINCENT,
WHO BECOMES MY ENEMY.—FURTHER EFFORT TO PROMOTE LIEUTENANT
PARKER.—ADMIRALTY REFUSAL ALSO.—LIEUTENANT PARKER’S EVENTUAL
PROMOTION, AND SUBSEQUENT SHAMEFUL TREATMENT.
It has been already stated that not only was the action with the _Gamo_
for some time unnoticed in the customary manner, but the post rank to
which the rule of the service entitled me from the result of the action,
was withheld. My friends, being naturally surprised at the retention of
what was no favour on the part of Lord St. Vincent, but my
unquestionable right, respectfully pointed out to his lordship the
nature of the services rendered.