CHAPTER II

THE NEW CONSTITUTION

A critic of the new constitution, intent on ascertaining how it affects

the relation of Great Britain and Ireland, will do well to divert his

attention from the numerous details of the Home Rule Bill, important as

many of them are,[25] and fix his mind almost exclusively upon the four

leading features of the measure.

These are:--

_First_. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.

_Secondly_. The retention of the Irish members in the Parliament

at Westminster.

_Thirdly_. The powers of the Irish Government, in which term is

here included both the Irish Executive and the Irish Parliament.

_Fourthly_. The Restrictions (popularly known as the safeguards)

and the obligations imposed upon the Irish Government.

These features are primary and essential; everything else, however

important in itself, is subsidiary and accidental.

A. _The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament_[26]

The Home Rule Bill asserts in its preamble the inexpediency of

'impairing or restricting the supreme authority of Parliament'; and in

clause 33, apparently[27] assumes the right of the Imperial Parliament

after the passing of the Home Rule Bill to enact for Ireland laws which

cannot be repealed by the Irish Parliament.

The new constitution therefore maintains the supremacy of the Imperial

Parliament.

What, however, is the true meaning of this 'supreme authority,'

'supremacy,' or 'sovereignty,' if you like, of the Imperial Parliament?

The term, as already pointed out,[28] is distinctly ambiguous, and

unless this ambiguity is cleared up, the effect of the Home Rule Bill,

and the nature of our new constitution, will never be understood.

The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament may mean the right and power of

Parliament to govern Ireland in the same sense in which it now governs

England, that is, to exercise effective control over the whole

administration of affairs in Ireland, and for this purpose, through the

action of the English Government, or, when necessary, by legislation, to

direct, supervise and control the acts of every authority in Ireland,

including the Irish Executive and the Irish Legislature. If this were

the meaning of the expression, the Imperial Parliament would, after the

passing of the Home Rule Bill, as before, be as truly supreme in Ireland

as in England, in Scotland, in the Isle of Man, or in Jersey. The Irish

Executive and the Irish Parliament would, of course, be bodies

possessing large--and it might be very dangerous--delegated powers, but

they would stand in the same relation to the Imperial Parliament as does

the London County Council, which also possesses large delegated powers,

which administers the affairs of a population as large as that of

Scotland and which, very possibly, may receive from Parliament as time

goes on larger and more extended authority than the Council now

possesses. This is the sense which many Gladstonians, and some

Unionists, attribute to the term 'supremacy of Parliament.' It is not

the sense in which the expression 'supreme authority of Parliament' is

used in the Home Rule Bill.

The supremacy of Parliament may bear quite another sense; it may mean

that Parliament, whilst completely giving up the management of Irish

affairs (subject of course to the Restrictions contained in the Home

Rule Bill) to the Irish Executive and the Irish Legislature, retains in

Ireland, as elsewhere throughout the Empire, reserved sovereignty, or

the theoretical right (which exceptionally though rarely may be put into

practice) of passing laws for Ireland and of course, among other laws,

an Act modifying or repealing the terms of the Home Rule Bill itself. If

this is the meaning of the expression 'supreme authority of Parliament,'

the Imperial Parliament will, after the passing of the Home Rule Bill,

stand in substance in the relation to Ireland which Parliament occupies

towards any important self-governing colony, such as is the Canadian

Dominion or New Zealand. The Irish Executive and the Irish Parliament

will on this view constitute the real substantial government of Ireland,

just as the Ministry and the Parliament of New Zealand constitute the

real and substantial government of New Zealand. No doubt the Imperial

Parliament will retain the theoretical right to legislate for Ireland,

_e.g._ to pass an Irish Coercion Act, just as Parliament retains the

theoretical right to legislate for New Zealand or Canada. So the

Imperial Parliament has the legal right to repeal or override any law

passed by the New Zealand Parliament, to tax the inhabitants of New

Zealand, or finally, by the repeal of the New Zealand Constitution Act,

1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 72, to abolish the constitution of New Zealand

altogether. But these things Parliament will not, and to speak truly

cannot, do in New Zealand. The inhabitants of New Zealand possess as

regards their internal affairs for practical purposes complete

independence. They are governed from Wellington, they are not governed

from Westminster. If in short the supremacy of Parliament means under

the Home Rule Bill in Ireland what it means under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 72 in

New Zealand, the inhabitants of Ireland will, when the Home Rule Bill

passes into law, be governed from Dublin, they will not be governed from

Westminster. Every Irish Home Ruler, be he Parnellite or

Anti-Parnellite,[29] believes that the supremacy of Parliament is

intended to mean in Ireland what it means in New Zealand, and the Irish

Home Rulers are right. Any one will see that this is so who reflects on

the meaning of the policy of Home Rule, who studies the authoritative

utterances of Gladstonian leaders, such as Mr. Gladstone[30] himself,

Mr. Asquith,[31] or Mr. Bryce.[32] Gladstonian statesmen wrap up their

meaning in vague generalities; they insist, and in one sense with truth,

that the sovereignty of Parliament is reserved. They do not wish to

alarm their English followers. It is possible that they conceal even

from themselves how completely the Imperial Ministry and Parliament

surrender the practical government of Ireland into the hands of the

Irish Parliament and its leaders. But for all this, their own language

and the Bill itself prove that the supreme authority of Parliament is

under the new constitution to be taken in its limited, and what for the

sake of distinction we may call its 'colonial' sense. This is proved, if

evidence were wanting, by the provision[33] that after fifteen years from

the time when the Bill passes into law the financial relations between

England and Ireland may be revised in pursuance of an Address to the

Crown from the House of Commons or from the Irish legislative assembly.

If the Imperial Parliament retains an effective or practically unlimited

supremacy, the provision is futile and needless. What necessity is there

for enacting that a sovereign Parliament, which institutes, may alter a

scheme of taxation? But the provision is intelligible enough on one

supposition, and on one supposition only. It is both intelligible and in

place if Parliament gives up the real right of governing Ireland and

occupies towards what is now a part of the United Kingdom the position,

or something very like the position, which Parliament occupies towards a

self-governing colony. It then embodies a compact between England and

Ireland, and institutes a regular method for revising their financial

relations. But this very compact proves that as regards Ireland the

Imperial Parliament, if it reserves to itself ultimate sovereignty, has

for practical purposes surrendered the reality of control.

There is no need to assert that this supremacy of the Imperial

Parliament means nothing. The assertion would not be true. The

reservation of sovereign authority means something, but it does not mean

much. It does not mean the power or the right to govern Ireland; it

means at most the legal and moral right to modify, or put an end to, the

new constitution if ever it works badly.

The power, indeed, to abolish the constitution can neither be given nor

taken away by Acts of Parliament, by the declarations of English

statesmen, or the concessions of Irish leaders, whether authorised or

not to pledge the Irish people. It is given to Great Britain, not by

enactments, but by nature; it arises from the inherent capacity of a

strong, a flourishing, a populous, and a wealthy country to control or

coerce a neighbouring island which is poor, divided, and weak.[34] This

natural supremacy will, if the interests of Great Britain require it, be

enforced by armies, by ironclads, by blockades, by hostile tariffs, by

all the means through which national predominance can make itself felt.

All reference to superior power is, in controversies between citizens,

hateful to every man endowed with a sense of humanity or of justice. But

in serious discussions facts must be faced, and if, for the sake of

argument, I contrast, much against my will, the power of Great Britain

with the weakness of Ireland, let it be remembered that the conception

of a rivalry or conflict is forced upon Unionists by the mere proposal

of Home Rule. As long as we remain a United Kingdom, there is no more

need to think even of hypothetical or argumentative opposition between

the resources or interest of England and of Ireland than there is to

consider what in case of a contest may be the relative force of London

and of the Orkneys.

What, then, the new constitution secures is not the power, but the legal

right to abolish the new constitution. It is a right to carry through a

fundamental change by lawful means. The Bill legalises revolution. This

is well, for it is desirable that in a civilised State every change of

institutions should be effected by constitutional methods. But should

the circumstances ever arise under which Great Britain is resolved, in

spite of the wishes of the Irish people or a large portion thereof, to

abolish Home Rule and exercise the right of reserved sovereignty, there

is no reason to expect that Irishmen who oppose British policy will

admit that her use of sovereign power is morally justifiable. By force,

or the threat of force, the controversy will, we must expect, in the

last instance, be decided. However this may be, we must now realise what

the supremacy of Parliament, at any rate to the Irish leaders who accept

it, really means. It means nothing but the right of the Imperial

Parliament of its own authority to repeal the Home Rule Bill and destroy

the new constitution. The right may be worth having. But it is not the

right to govern Ireland or to control the Irish Government; it is not a

means of government at all: it is a method of constitutional revolution,

or reaction.

Some critic will object that this supremacy of Parliament means to him

a good deal more than the mere right to abolish the constitution. So be

it. Let the objector then tell us in precise language what it does mean.

If his reply is that the term is ambiguous, that its meaning must be

construed in accordance with events, and may, according to

circumstances, be restricted or extended, then he suggests that

Parliamentary supremacy is not only an empty right, but an urgent peril.

Nothing can be more dangerous than a compact between England and Ireland

which the contracting parties construe from the very beginning in

different senses. If by asserting the supreme authority of Parliament

English statesmen mean that Parliament reserves the right to supervise

and control the government of Ireland, whilst Irishmen understand that

Parliament retains nothing more than such a kind of supremacy or

sovereignty as it asserts, rather than exercises, in New Zealand, then

we are entering into a doubtful contract which lays the sure basis of a

quarrel. We are deliberately preparing the ground for disappointment,

for imputations of bad faith, for recriminations, for bitter animosity,

it may be for civil war. If there be, as is certainly the case, a fair

doubt as to what is meant by the supremacy of Parliament, let the doubt

be cleared up. This is required by the dictates both of expediency and

of honour. Meanwhile we may assume that the supremacy of Parliament, or

the 'supreme authority of Parliament,' means in substance the kind of

sovereignty which Parliament exercises, or claims to exercise, in every

part of the British Empire.

For the maintenance of such supremacy, be it valuable or be it

worthless, Great Britain pays a heavy price. For the sake of 'an

outward and visible sign of Imperial supremacy' we retain eighty Irish

members in the Imperial Parliament.[35]

B. _The Retention of the Irish Members in the Imperial Parliament_

This is now[36] an essential, or at least a most important part of the

ministerial policy for Ireland, yet it is a proposal which even its

advocates must find difficult of defence. In 1886 every Gladstonian

leader told us that it was desirable, politic, and just to exclude Irish

members from the Parliament at Westminster; this exclusion was pressed

upon England (plausibly enough) as a main advantage to be derived from

the concession of Home Rule to Ireland. In 1893 every Gladstonian leader

tells us that it is desirable, politic, and just to retain the Irish

members at Westminster, and their presence is, for some reason not easy

to explain, treated as removing every objection to the concession of

Home Rule to Ireland. This astounding variation of opinion in the

doctors of the State savours of empiricism, not to say quackery. A

surgeon who tells a patient that he will not live unless his leg is

amputated may be right, and may be worthy of trust; another surgeon who

asserts that amputation is unnecessary may be right, and worthy of

trust. But the surgeon who one moment insists that amputation is

necessary to the preservation of his patient's life, and the next moment

that it is unnecessary and may be fatal, is not the kind of adviser who

inspires confidence in his wisdom.

Let the ingenuity of Gladstonians reconcile, as best it can, the

doctrine of 1886 with the doctrine of 1893. To a man of sense who weighs

the matter without reference to considerations of party, one thing will

soon become apparent: the retention at Westminster of eighty, or indeed

of any Irish members at all, means under a scheme of Home Rule the ruin

of Ireland and the weakness of England.

As to Ireland.--The presence of Irish members at Westminster robs

Ireland of the one advantage which Home Rule might by any possibility

confer upon that country.

Any man in order to see that this is so has only to consider, first,

what may under favourable circumstances be the benefit of Home Rule to

Ireland, and next what is the natural result of summoning Irish members

to the Parliament at Westminster.

The best conceivable result of Home Rule is that it may detach Irishmen

from interest in English politics, and induce the most respected and

respectable men in Ireland to take matters into their own hands and

manage for themselves all strictly Irish affairs. For the last twenty

years, at least, Ireland has been represented, or misrepresented, by

eighty and more politicians, nominated in the main by Mr. Parnell. No

one supposes for a moment that the Nationalist leaders who appeared

before and were condemned by the Special Commission are fair samples of

the Irish people. They are, take them at their best, reckless agitators.

They were chosen by their patron, Mr. Parnell, not on account of their

worth or talent, but because they were apt instruments for carrying out

a policy of parliamentary intrigue, reinforced by a system of lawless

oppression.[37] These men are the product of a revolutionary era; they

no more represent the virtues and the genius of the Irish people than

the demagogues or fanatics of the Jacobin Club represented the genius

and the virtues of the French nation. We all know that Ireland abounds

in citizens of a very different stamp. She has never lacked among her

sons, and does not lack now, men of virtue, of vigour, and of genius.

Throughout the length and breadth of the country you will find hundreds

of men of merit--landlords whose lives have been honourable to

themselves, and a blessing to their tenants; merchants as honest and

successful as any in England or in Scotland; small landowners and tenant

farmers who have paid their rent and paid their way, who have cultivated

their land, who have never insulted or boycotted their neighbours, and

have never been driven by intimidation into meanness and fraud. Add to

these lawyers, thinkers, writers, and scholars, who rival or excel the

best representatives of their class in other parts of the United

Kingdom. These good men and true are not peculiar to any one creed or

party; they are not confined to any one province, or to any one class;

they are scattered through every part of the land; they are the true

backbone of Ireland; they have saved her from utter ruin; they may still

by their energy raise her to prosperity. But they have been thrust out

of politics by the talkers, the adventurers, the conspirators. It is

possible that if Home Rule compels Irishmen to turn their whole minds

to Irish affairs, the so-called representatives who misrepresent their

country may be dismissed from the world of politics, and the Parliament

at Dublin be filled with members who, whether they come from the North

or from the South, whether Unionists or Home Rulers, whether Roman

Catholics or Protestants, whether landowners, tenant farmers, ministers

of religion, merchants, or tradesmen, represent the real worth and

strength of the country. If this should happen, Home Rule would still

entail great evils on the whole United Kingdom. But even zealous

Unionists might hope that for these evils Ireland at least will obtain

some compensation. This hope, if the Irish members are retained at

Westminster, will never be fulfilled.

For even the occasional presence[38]--which will in practice be the

frequent presence--of the Irish members at Westminster destroys every

hope that Ireland will be governed by her best citizens. The reasons why

this is so are various; some of them may be shortly stated. The system,

in the first place, of double representation, under which members of the

Irish Parliament must flit to and fro between Ireland and England, and

debate one day about Irish matters in Dublin, and the next about

Imperial, or in truth British, matters in England, makes it impossible

for quiet hard-working Irishmen, who carry on the real business of

Ireland, to take part in politics. The political centre of interest, in

the second place, will after, as before, the passing of the Home Rule

Bill, be placed in London and not in Dublin. The humdrum local business

which under a system of Home Rule ought to be discussed in the Irish

Parliament, may vitally concern the prosperity of every inhabitant of

Ireland, but it will not in general lend itself to oratory, or arouse

popular excitement. The questions, on the other hand, to be discussed in

the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, as, for example, whether Mr.

Gladstone or Lord Salisbury shall be head of the British Cabinet,

whether the royal veto on Irish legislation shall be exercised on the

advice of the English or of the Irish Ministry, are matters which do not

in reality greatly affect the happiness of ordinary Irishmen. But they

give room for management, for diplomacy, for rhetoric, and are certain

on occasions to arouse both the interest and the passions of the Irish

people. We may take it for granted that the character of the Irish

representation at Westminster will govern the character of the

Parliament at Dublin.[39] Hence arises a third and fatal obstacle to the

active participation in Irish public life of Irishmen who are not

professional politicians. The Home Rule Bill of 1893 professes to

restrain on every side the action of the Irish government and

Parliament. These Restrictions are the comfort of English Gladstonians;

they are thought to be safeguards, though in reality there is nothing

which they make safe. But Restrictions which delight Gladstonians are

hateful to Irish Home Rulers. Their watchword is, 'Ireland a nation.' To

this cry every Home Ruler will rally, and so too will, if once the

Union is broken up, many an ardent loyalist, converted by anger at

England's treachery into an extreme Nationalist. Irishmen will wish for

an Irish army; they will wish for a protective policy; they will desire

that Ireland shall play a part in foreign affairs, and will claim for

her at least the independence of such a colony as New Zealand. To all

these wishes, and to many more, some of which under a system of Home

Rule are quite reasonable, the terms of the Home Rule Bill are opposed.

Home Rulers, and probably enough the whole Irish people, will insist

that the Bill, which will then have become an Act, must be modified. How

is the modification to be obtained? How is Home Rule to be made a

reality? By one method only: that is, by the freest use of those arts Of

intrigue and obstruction by which Home Rule will have been gained. But

for the carrying out of such a policy the agitators and intriguers who

for the last twenty years have weakened and degraded the Imperial

Parliament are the proper agents. For this work they, and they alone,

are fit. The quiet, industrious, stay-at-home merchants or lawyers, who

might be sent to Dublin for a month or two in the year to manage Irish

business on business-like principles, will not be sent to Westminster to

hold the balance between English parties. They cannot leave their

every-day work; were they willing to forsake their own business, they

are not the men to conduct with success the parliamentary game of brag,

obstruction, and finesse. Keep, in short, the Irish members at

Westminster, and you ensure the supremacy in Ireland of professional

politicians. By a curious fatality the Gladstonian policy which weakens

England ruins Ireland. Let no one fancy that this is the delusion of an

English Unionist. Sir Gavan Duffy is an Irish Nationalist of a far

higher type than the men who have drawn money from the Clan-na-Gael. In

'48 he was a rebel, but if he was disloyal to England, he was always

careful of the honour and character of Ireland. He, at least, perceives

the danger to his country of retaining Irish members in a Parliament

where they had ceased to have any proper place. 'For my own part,' he

says, 'I should not care if they did not attend [the Imperial

Parliament] for a generation, which will be needed for the manipulation

of their own affairs.'

All this, I shall be told, is prophecy; Gladstonian hopes are as

reasonable as Unionist fears. So be it. But in this matter my

predictions have a special claim on the attention of the Ministry, they

coincide with the forecast, or the foresight, of the present[40] Chief

Secretary for Ireland.

'Let us suppose that these Irish representatives for Imperial purposes

are not chosen by the legislative body, but are chosen directly by Irish

constituencies. You have already, according to our plan, two sets of

constituencies. You have the 103 constituencies that return the popular

branch of the legislative body, and you have those other constituencies

up to seventy-five which return the elective members of the other branch

of the legislative body. You have, therefore, got already on our plan

two sets of constituencies. Now, if you are going to send members to

Westminster for Imperial purposes to the number of forty-five or to the

number of ninety-five, you must mark out a third set of

constituencies--you must have a third set of elections. A system of that

kind does not strike me at least as being exactly the thing for a

country of which we are assured that before everything else its prime

want is a profound respite from political turmoil. There are plenty of

other objections from the Irish point of view, which I am not now going

to dwell upon. Depend upon it that an Irish Legislature will not be up

to the magnitude of the enormous business that is going to be cast upon

it unless you leave all the brains that Irish public men have got to do

Irish work in Ireland. Depend upon this, too, that if you have one set

of Irish members in London it is a moral certainty that disturbing

rivalries, disturbing intrigues would spring up, and that the natural

and wholesome play of forces and parties and leaders in the Irish

Assembly would be complicated and confused and thrown out of gear by the

separate representatives of the country. All this is bad enough.'[41]

These are the words of my friend Mr. Morley.[42] They were spoken at

Newcastle on April 21, 1886. He was then, as now, responsible for the

government of Ireland. Nothing can add to their gravity; nothing can add

to their force; they were true in 1886, they remain as true to-day as

they were seven years ago.[43]

As to England.--The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is on

the face of it a gross and patent injustice to Great Britain. It is

absurd, it is monstrous, that while the Irish Parliament and the Irish

Parliament alone settle whether Mr. Healy, Mr. M'Carthy, Mr. Redmond, or

Mr. Davitt is to be head of the Irish government, and England, though

vitally interested in the character of the Irish Executive, is not to

say a word in the matter, eighty Irishmen are to help in determining,

and are often actually to determine, whether Lord Salisbury or Mr.

Gladstone, Mr. Balfour or Mr. Chamberlain, is to be Prime Minister and

direct the policy of England. Here again 1 can rely on the invaluable

aid of Mr. Morley. He has denounced the effect on England of retaining

Irish members at Westminster with a strength of language and a weight of

authority to which it is impossible for me to make any pretension.

'But there is a word to be said about the effect on our own Parliament,

and I think the effect of such an arrangement--and I cannot help

thinking so till I hear of better arrangements--upon our own Parliament

would be worse still. It is very easy to talk about reducing the number

of the Irish members; perhaps it would not be so easy to do. It is very

easy to talk about letting them take part in some questions and not in

others, but it will be very difficult when you come to draw the line in

theory between the questions in which they shall take a part and those

in which they shall not take a part. But I do not care what precautions

you take; I do not care where you draw the line in theory; but you may

depend upon it--I predict--that there is no power on the earth that can

prevent the Irish members in such circumstances from being in the future

Parliament what they were in the past, and what to some extent they are

in the present, the arbiters and the masters of English policy, of

English legislative business, and of the rise and fall of British

Administrations. You will have weakened by the withdrawal of able men

the Legislature of Dublin, and you will have demoralized the Legislature

at Westminster. We know very well what that demoralisation means, for I

beg you to mark attentively the use to which the Irish members would

inevitably put their votes--inevitably and naturally. Those who make

most of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster are also those

who make most of there being what they call a real and effective and a

freely and constantly exercised veto at Westminster upon the doings at

Dublin. You see the position. A legislative body in Dublin passes a

Bill. The idea is that that Bill is to lie upon the table of the two

Houses of Parliament in London for forty days--forty days in the

wilderness. What does that mean? It means this, that every question that

had been fought out in Ireland would be fought out over again by the

Irish members in our Parliament. It means that the House of Lords here

would throw out pretty nearly every Bill that was passed at Dublin. What

would be the result of that? You would have the present block of our

business. You would have all the present irritation and exasperation.

English work would not be done; Irish feeling would not be conciliated,

but would be exasperated. The whole efforts of the Irish members would

be devoted to throwing their weight--I do not blame them for this--first

to one party and then to another until they had compelled the removal of

these provoking barriers, restrictions, and limitations which ought

never to have been set up. I cannot think, for my part I cannot see, how

an arrangement of that sort promises well either for the condition of

Ireland or for our Parliament. If anybody, in my opinion, were to move

an amendment to our Bill in the House of Commons in such a direction as

this, with all these consequences foreseen, I do not believe such an

amendment would find twenty supporters.'[44]

This was the opinion of Mr. John Morley in 1886. A word in it here or

there is inapplicable to the details of the present Bill; but in

principle every syllable cited by me from his Newcastle address forms

part of the Unionist argument against summoning as much as a single

Irish member to Westminster. His language is admirable, it cannot be

improved. All that any one who agrees with Mr. Morley can do in order to

force his argument home is to point out in a summary manner the ways in

which the Irish delegation at Westminster will enfeeble the Imperial

Government.

_First_. The Irish members, or rather the Irish delegation, will have a

voice and often a decisive voice in determining who are the men that

shall constitute the English Cabinet; on the Irish vote will depend

whether Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, or Socialists shall

administer the government of England. It is vain to tell us Irish

members will be restrained, whether by law or custom, from voting on

British affairs when they will vote on the most important of all British

affairs, the composition and the character of the body which is to

govern England.

That the Irish members will thus vote on a matter of special and vital

importance to England is admitted. But things stand far worse than this.

The vote of the Irish delegation will and must be swayed by an interest

adverse to the welfare of Great Britain; for the interest of Great

Britain, or, to use ordinary language of England, is that the English

Government should be strong, and should represent the majority of the

English or British electors. The direct interest of the Irish delegation

is that the English Government should be weak, and represent the

minority of English electors. That this is so is obvious. The weaker the

British Government, the greater the weight of the Irish representatives.

But if the English Cabinet represents a minority of the British people,

and are kept in office only by the votes of their Irish allies, then the

influence of the Irish representatives and the weakness of the English

Government will have reached its extreme point. The effect therefore of

the arrangement which brings Irish members to Westminster is to place

the administration of English affairs in the hands of the party,

whichever it be, that does not represent the wishes of the English

people. This master stroke of Gladstonian astuteness ensures that

Radicals shall be in office when the opinion of England is Conservative,

and that Conservatives shall be in power when English opinion tends

towards Radicalism.

_Secondly_. The retention of the Irish members breaks up our whole

system of Cabinet government. This system has some inherent defects, but

it cannot work at all with any benefit to the country unless the Cabinet

can depend on the support of a permanent majority. The result of what

has happily been described as the 'in-and-out plan,' that is the scheme

for allowing Irish members to vote on some subjects and not on others,

will be the constitution of two majorities, and it is more than possible

that the one majority may belong to one party and the other majority to

another. Look at the effect on the transaction of public affairs. The

Irish members and the English Liberals combined may put in office a

Liberal Cabinet. On English matters, _e.g._ the question of

Disestablishment, or of Home Rule for Wales, the British majority

consisting of British members of Parliament only may constantly defeat

the Gladstonian Cabinet, and thus force into office a Conservative

Cabinet which could command a majority on all subjects of purely British

interest, but would always be in a minority on all matters of Imperial

policy, _e.g._ on the conduct of foreign affairs. Which Cabinet would

have a right to retain power? The sole answer is--neither. The proposed

plan, in short, undermines our whole scheme of government.

_Thirdly_. The Irish members who are now simply Irish members of the

Imperial Parliament will be transformed into a very different thing--an

Irish delegation. The importance of this change cannot be over-rated.

The essential merit of our present system of government is that the

Executive, no less than the Parliament of the United Kingdom, represents

the country as a whole. Our Premier may be a Scotsman, but we know of no

such thing as a Scottish Premier. Englishmen may form the majority of

the Cabinet, but we have never had an English Cabinet as contrasted with

a Scottish or an Irish Cabinet. It has never been contended, hardly has

it been hinted, that a Ministry ought to be made up of members taken in

certain proportions from each division of the kingdom. But from the

moment that sectional representation, and with it open advocacy of

sectional interests, is introduced into the House of Commons, there will

arise the necessity for the formation of sectional Cabinets.

The demand will be made, and the demand will be granted, that in the

administration no less than in the House there shall be a system of

representation; that England, that Scotland, that Ireland shall each

have their due share in the Ministry. But this state of things must be

fatal both to the capacity and to the fairness of the government. The

talent of the Cabinet will be diminished, because the Prime Minister

will no longer be able to choose as colleagues the ablest among his

supporters without reference to the now irrelevant question whether they

represent English, Scottish, or Irish constituencies. The character of

the Executive will be lowered because the Cabinet itself will represent

rival interests. It may seem that I am advocating the special claims of

England. This is not so. I am arguing on behalf of the efficiency of the

government of the United Kingdom. My argument is one to which Scotsmen

and Irishmen should give special heed. If once we have cabinets and

parties based upon sectional divisions, if we have English ministries

and English parties as opposed to Scottish ministries or Irish

ministries, and Scottish parties and Irish parties, it is not in the

long run the most powerful and wealthy portion of what is now the United

Kingdom which will suffer. It is hardly the interest of Scotsmen or

Irishmen to pursue a policy which suggests the odious but inevitable cry

'England for Englishmen.'

_Fourthly_, as long as Irish members remain at Westminster the English

Parliament will never be freed from debates about Irish affairs.

This is a point there is no need to labour. Unless (what no honest man

can openly propose) the 80 or 103 members from Ireland are to be taken

from one Irish party only, they must represent different interests and

different opinions. Some few at least will represent the wishes, the

complaints, or the wrongs of Ulster. But if this be so, it is certain

that the controversies which divide Ireland will make themselves heard

at Westminster. Can any sane man fancy that if the Dublin Parliament

passes an Act for the maintenance of order at Belfast, if the people of

Belfast are suspected of intending to resist the Irish government, if

Irish landlords, rightly or not, fear unfair treatment at the hands of

the Irish Ministry or the Irish Parliament, none of these things will be

heard of at Westminster? The supposition is incredible. Let Irish

members sit at Westminster and Irish affairs will be debated at

Westminster, and will often be debated when, under a system of Home

Rule, it were much better they should be passed over in silence. Admit,

what is not certain, that Home Rule in Ireland will occasionally

withdraw a few Irish questions from discussion in England, it must be

remembered that a new crop of Irish questions will arise. The federal

character of the new constitution must produce in one form or another

disputes and discussions as to the limits which bound the respective

authority of the Imperial and of the Irish Governments. The Imperial

Parliament will, for the first time, be harassed by the question of

State rights. Add to this that at every great political crisis the House

of Commons will have before it an inquiry which must produce

interminable debates, namely whether a given bill is or is not a measure

which concerns only the interest of Great Britain.

Two inducements are offered to England for the adoption of a plan the

evils whereof were so patent in 1886 that it then could not, if we are

to believe Mr. Morley,[45] have commanded twenty supporters in the House

of Commons.

The first inducement is that the presence of eighty Irish members at

Westminster is an outward and visible sign of the supremacy of the

Imperial Parliament.[46] On this point it is needless to say much; few

Englishmen will on consideration think it worth while to dislocate all

our system of government in order that the British Parliament may retain

in Ireland the kind of sovereignty which it retains in New Zealand. We

are rightly proud of our connection with our colonies, but no one would

seriously propose to retain nominal sovereignty in Canada at the price

of a perilous and injurious change in the constitution of England.

The second inducement is that Great Britain will be allowed the

exclusive management of British affairs.

This sort of spurious Home Rule for England turns out however to be as

illusory a blessing as the maintenance of parliamentary supremacy.

Great Britain is, under the new constitution, not allowed to appoint the

British Cabinet. Great Britain is forbidden to determine for herself any

matter of legislation or administration which, however deeply it

concerns British interests, trenches in the least degree on any Irish or

Imperial interest. Any matter of finance, which comes within the wide

head of Imperial liabilities, expenditure, and miscellaneous

revenue,[47] falls within the competence of the Irish members. Questions

of peace or war, our foreign relations, every diplomatic transaction, is

a matter on which the Irish delegation may pronounce a decision. The

conjecture is at least plausible[48] that Irish members will have a

right to discuss and vote upon any subject debated in the Parliament at

Westminster which involves the fate of a British Cabinet. Let it be

granted that, if the provisions of the Home Rule Bill be observed, no

Irish representative can vote 'on any Bill, or motion in relation

thereto, the operation of which Bill or motion is confined to Great

Britain.'[49] But then when is the operation of a Bill confined to Great

Britain, or, to use popular language, what is a British Bill? This is an

inquiry in the decision whereof the Irish members will take part. The

Irish members, therefore, at Westminster will be judges of their own

rights, and in the only cases in which it is of practical importance to

Great Britain that the Irish representatives should not vote, will be

able with the aid of a British minority to fix the limits of their own

jurisdiction.[50] Let the Irish members and a British minority boldly

vote that the operation of a Bill, say for the Disestablishment of the

English Church, is not confined to Great Britain, and they can boldly

vote that the Bill do pass, and no Court in Great Britain or the British

Empire can question the validity of a law enacted in open defiance of

the spirit or even the words of the Constitution.[51] The right of

British members to the management of even exclusively British affairs

will depend not upon the law of the land, but upon the moderation and

sense of equity which may restrain the unfairness of partisanship.

For a parliamentary minority will, if only it throw scruples to the

winds, be constantly able to transform itself into a majority by the

unconstitutional admission of the Irish vote. This is not a power which

any party, be it Conservative or Radical, English, Scottish, or Irish,

ought to possess. Partisanship knows nothing of moderation. And the

reason of this blindness to the claims of justice is that the spirit of

party combines within itself some of the best and some of the worst of

human passions. It often unites the self-sacrificing zealotry of

religious fanaticism with the recklessness of the gambling table. Let an

assailant of the Contagious Diseases Act, a fanatic for temperance, a

protectionist who believes that free trade is the ruin of the country,

an anti-vivisectionist who holds that any painful experiment on live

animals is the most heinous of sins; let any man who has come to believe

that his own credit, no less than the salvation of the country, depends

on the success of a particular party, know that the triumph of his cause

depends upon his voting that a particular measure operates beyond Great

Britain, and we know well enough in which way he will vote. He will vote

what he knows to be untrue rather than sacrifice a cause which he

believes to be sacred. He will think himself both a fool and a traitor

if he sacrifices the victory which is within his grasp to the

maintenance of technical legality, or rather to respect for a rule of

constitutional procedure.

Suppose, however, that I have underrated the equity of human nature, and

that no faction in the House of Commons ever attempts to violate the

spirit of the Constitution. The supposition is bold, not to say absurd;

but even if its reasonableness be granted, this does not suffice for the

protection of England's rights. The question whether a given Bill does

or does not operate exclusively in Great Britain may often give rise to

fair dispute, and (what should be noted) this dispute will always be

decided against Great Britain in the only instances in which its

decision is to Great Britain of any importance whatever. An example best

shows my meaning. Let a Bill be brought forward for establishing Home

Rule in Wales. Is the operation of the Bill confined to Great Britain?

An English member, unless he is a Home Ruler, will answer with an

undoubted affirmative. An English, or Irish, or Welsh Home Ruler will

with equal certainty, and equal honesty, give a negative answer. The

question admits of fair debate, but we know already how the debate will

be decided. If the Unionists constitute a majority of the House, the

Irish vote will be excluded. But in this case its exclusion is of no

practical importance. If the Unionists constitute indeed a majority of

British representatives, but do not constitute a majority of the House,

the Irish vote will be included. The Irish representatives will decide

whether Wales shall constitute a separate State, and the right of Great

Britain to manage British affairs will not prevent the dismemberment of

England. Home Rule, such as it is for England, means at best a totally

different thing from Home Rule for Ireland. In the case of England it

means a limited and precarious control of legislation for Great Britain

by British members of Parliament. In the case of Ireland it means the

real and substantial and exclusive government of Ireland by an Irish

Ministry and an Irish Parliament.

But will the advantage of even this modified half-and-half Home Rule be

really offered to England?

Gladstonians, it is rumoured (and before these pages are in print the

rumour may turn out to be a fact), have their own remedy for some of the

only too-patent absurdities of the 'in-and-out system' embodied in

clause 9 of the Home Rule Bill. A suggestion is made which would be

amusing for its irony, were it not revolting for its cynicism, that the

difficulty of the double majority should be removed by the allowing

members not only to remain at Westminster in their full number, but also

to vote there on all matters whatever, including those affairs which

exclusively concern the interests of Great Britain. This is no doubt a

remedy for some of the evils of an unworkable proposal. It is a cure

which to any Englishman of sense or spirit will seem tenfold worse than

the disease. It is a cure in that sense only in which a traveller may be

said to be relieved from the fear of robbery by a highwayman shooting

him dead. The irregular interference of the Irish delegation in the

formation of the British Cabinet, and other matters which indirectly

concern England, is to be regularised (if I may use the term) by

allowing to Irish members permanent despotism over England in matters

which, on a system of Home Rule, concern England alone. Irish members

may disestablish the Church of England, though England is to have no

voice in the pettiest of Irish affairs. Irish members are to be allowed

to impose taxes on England, say to double the income tax, though of

these taxes no inhabitant of Ireland will pay a penny; the Irish

delegation--and this is the worst grievance of all--is to be enabled, in

combination with a British minority, to detach Wales from England, or to

vote Home Rule for Scotland, or to federalise still further the United

Kingdom by voting that Man, Jersey, and Guernsey shall send members to

the Imperial Parliament. Note that all this may be done by the Irish

delegation, though, under the new Constitution, England will not have a

word to say on such questions as whether the right of electing members

for the Parliament at Dublin shall or shall not be extended to every

adult, or whether Ulster shall, or shall not, be allowed Home Rule of

its own. The absurdity of this policy ought to prevent its ever being

adopted; but in these days absurdity seems to tell as little against

wild schemes of legislation as their injustice.

All this consideration of haggling and trafficking between Great Britain

and Ireland is loathsome to every true Unionist who considers Englishmen

and Irishmen as still citizens of one nation. But, when Gladstonians

propose to divide the United Kingdom into two States, it is as essential

as it is painful to weigh well what is the gain of Great Britain in the

new scheme of political partnership. If the matter be looked at from

this point of view, it is easy to see how miserable are the offers

tendered to England. Compare for a moment the authority to be given her

under the new constitution with the authority she has hitherto

possessed or the authority tendered to her under the Home Rule Bill of

1886.

Up to 1782 the British Parliament held in its own hands the absolute

control not only of every British affair, but every matter of policy

affecting either Ireland or the British Empire. The British Parliament,

in which sat not a single representative of any Irish county or borough,

appointed the Irish Executive. The British Parliament, whenever it

thought fit, legislated for Ireland; the British Parliament controlled

the whole course of Irish legislation; every Act which passed the

Parliament of Ireland was inspected, amended, and, if the English

Ministry saw fit, vetoed in England. The system was a bad system and an

unjust system. It is well that it ended. But as regarded the control of

the British Empire it corresponded roughly with facts. The Empire was in

the main the outcome of British energy and British strength, and the

British Empire was governed by Great Britain.

The constitution of 1782 gave legislative independence to Ireland, but

did not degrade the British Parliament to the position which will be

occupied by the Imperial Parliament under the constitution of 1893. The

British Parliament remained supreme in Great Britain; the British

Parliament controlled the Imperial policy both of England and of

Ireland. The British Parliament, or rather the British Ministry,

virtually appointed the Irish Executive. The British Parliament

renounced all rights to legislate for Ireland[52]; the British

Parliament technically possessed no representatives in the Parliament

at Dublin. But any one who judges of institutions not by words but by

facts will perceive that in one way or another the influence and the

wishes of the British Government were represented more than sufficiently

in the Irish Houses of Parliament. Grattan's constitution, in short,

left the British Parliament absolutely supreme in all British and

Imperial affairs, and gave to the British Ministry predominating weight

in the government of Ireland. This is a very different thing from the

shadowy sovereignty which the English Parliament retains, but abstains

from exercising, in our self-governing colonies. It is a very different

thing from the nominal power to legislate for Ireland which the new

constitution confers upon the Imperial Parliament.

Since the Union England and Ireland have been politically one nation.

The Imperial or British Government has controlled, and the Imperial

Parliament has passed laws for, the whole country. Nor has the presence

of the Irish members till recent days substantially limited the

authority of Great Britain. Till 1829 the Protestant landlords of

Ireland who were represented in the Imperial Parliament shared the

principles or the prejudices of English landowners. Since the granting

of Catholic emancipation Roman Catholic or Irish ideas or interests have

undoubtedly perplexed or encumbered the working of British politics.

But the representatives of Ireland have been for the most part divided

between the two great English parties, and it was not till Mr. Parnell's

influence united the majority of Irish representatives into a party

hostile to Great Britain that any essential evil or inconvenience

resulted from their presence at Westminster. This inconvenience,

whatever its extent, has been the price of the Union. The gain has been

worth the payment: the action of Parliament has been hampered, but its

essential and effective authority throughout the realm has been

maintained.

In 1886 Mr. Gladstone framed a constitution which was meant to be a

final and a just settlement of the questions at issue between England

and Ireland. Under the constitution of 1886 Great Britain surrendered to

Ireland about the same amount of independence as is offered her under

the proposed constitution of 1893. But the difference in the position of

Great Britain under the two constitutions is immense.

Under the constitution of 1886 Great Britain was offered a position of

the highest authority.

To the British Parliament (in which was to sit not a single Irish

member) was to fall the appointment of the British or Imperial Ministry.

The British Parliament received absolute control of all British,

colonial, Imperial, and foreign affairs. Perfect unity was restored to

the spirit of her government, and predominance in the British, or, to

use ordinary language, in the English, Parliament was given to the

conservative elements of English society. Great Britain became mistress

in her own home; she became much more than this; she was enthroned as

undisputed sovereign of the British Empire.[53]

Under the constitution, in short, of 1886, if Great Britain was weakened

on one side she was strengthened on another. Her Parliament obtained an

immense accession of authority, and was all but entirely freed both from

the necessity for considering Irish questions and from the damage of

Irish obstruction. Ireland surrendered to England all share in the

government of the Empire, and the further dismemberment of Great Britain

without the assent of the British people became difficult, if not

impossible. It does not lie in the mouth of Gladstonians to say that the

measure of 1886 was unjust. It was laid before the country as a

compromise which was just to England and to Ireland. The Irish leaders,

we were told, accepted the proposal, just as we are told that they

accept the proposed constitution of 1893. If the acceptance was honest,

then in 1886 they agreed to a bargain far more favourable to England

than the contract now pressed on our acceptance. If their acquiescence

was a mere pretence, what trust can we place in the assertion that they

accept the arrangement of 1893?

However this may be, it is clear that England is now offered a position

of weakness and of inferiority such as she has never occupied during the

whole course of her history. What is the meaning or justification of the

proposed surrender by England of every compensation for Irish Home Rule

which was offered her in 1886?

For this surrender Gladstonians assign but two reasons.

The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is, it is said, a

concession to the wishes of Unionists.

This plea, even were it supported by the facts of the case, would be

futile. It might pass muster with disputants in search of a verbal

triumph, but to any man seriously concerned for the welfare of the

nation must appear childishly irrelevant. The welfare of the State

cannot turn upon the neatness of a _tu quoque_; retorts are not reasons,

and had every Unionist, down from the Duke of Devonshire to the present

writer, pressed in 1886 for the retention of the Irish members at

Westminster, the controversial inexpertness of the Unionists seven years

ago would not diminish the dangers with which, under a system of Home

Rule, the presence of the Irish members at Westminster actually

threatens England. But the plea, futile as it is, is not supported by

fact. It rests on a misrepresentation of the Unionist position in 1886.

'The case in truth stands thus:--Mr. Gladstone was [in 1886] placed in

effect in this dilemma: "If you do not," said his opponents, "retain the

Irish representatives at Westminster, the sovereignty of the British

Parliament will be, under the terms of your Bill, no more than a name;

if you do retain them, Great Britain will lose the only material

advantage offered her in exchange for the local independence of

Ireland." Gladstonians, in substance, replied that the devices embodied

in the Government of Ireland Bill at once freed the British Parliament

from the presence of the Parnellites and safeguarded the sovereignty of

the British, or (for in this matter there was some confusion) of the

Imperial Parliament. On the latter point issue was joined. The other

horn of the dilemma fell out of sight, and some Unionists, rightly

believing that the Bill as it stood did not preserve the supremacy of

the British Parliament, pressed the Ministry hard with all the

difficulties involved in the removal of the Irish members. In the heat

of debate speeches were, I doubt not, delivered in which the argument

that you could not, as the Bill stood, remove the Irish members from

Westminster and keep the British Parliament supreme in Ireland, was

driven so far as to sound like an argument in favour of, at all costs,

allowing members from Ireland to sit in the English Parliament. Those

who appeared to fall into this error were, it must be noted, but a

fraction of the Unionist Party, and their mistake was little more than

verbal. When the Ministry maintained that the removal of the Irish

members from Westminster was a main feature of their Home Rule policy,

opponents naturally insisted upon the defects of the scheme laid before

them, and did not insist on the equal or greater defects of a plan which

the Government did not advocate. Mr. Gladstone, we are now told, has

changed his position, and assents to the principle that Ireland must be

represented in the British Parliament. If this assent be represented as

a concession to the demands of Unionists, my reply is that it is no such

thing. It is merely the acceptance of a different horn of an

argumentative dilemma. Grant for the sake of argument (what is by no

means certain) that the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is really

saved. The advantage offered to England in exchange for Home Rule is

assuredly gone. My friend, Mr. John Morley, used to argue in favour of

Home Rule from the necessity of freeing the English Parliament from

Parnellite obstruction. As a matter of curiosity, I should like to know

what he thinks of a concession which strikes his strongest argumentative

weapon out of his hands. My curiosity will be satisfied on the same day

which tells us Lord Spencer's reflections on the surrender of the policy

represented by the Land Purchase Bill. Meanwhile, I know well enough the

thoughts of every Unionist who is not tied by the exigencies of his

political antecedents or utterances. To say that in the eyes of such a

man the proposed concession is worthless, is to say far too little. It

is not a concession which he rates at a low price; it is a proposal

which he heart and soul condemns.'[54]

These words were not written to meet the present condition of the

controversy; they were published in 1887 at a time when no Gladstonian,

except Mr. Gladstone (if indeed he were an exception), knew whether the

retention in the Parliament at Westminster, or the exclusion from the

Parliament at Westminster, of the Irish members, was an essential

principle of Home Rule.

England again, it is alleged, suffers without murmuring all the

inconvenience caused by the Irish vote at Westminster; and she may well,

under a system of Home Rule, bear without complaint evils which she has

tolerated for near a century.

The answer to this reasoning is plain. It is a sorry plea indeed for a

desperate innovation that it leaves the evils of the existing state of

things no worse than they now are. For the sake of the maintenance of

the Union, which Unionists hold of inestimable value, England has borne

the inconvenience caused to her by the Irish vote. It argues simplicity,

or impudence, to urge that England should continue to bear the

inconvenience when the national unity is sacrificed for the sake of

which it was endured. But the reply does not stop here. The presence of

Irish members at Westminster under the new constitution increases and

stereotypes the evils, whatever their extent, now resulting from the

existence of 103 Irish members in the House of Commons. The evils are

increased because the Irish members are turned into a delegation from

the Irish State, and their action ceases to be influenced, as it now is,

by the consideration--a very important one--that the Imperial Parliament

not only in theory but in fact legislates for Ireland, and that the

English Cabinet controls the Irish administration and directs the course

of political promotion in Ireland. The sentiment and the interest of the

Irish members will be changed. Whether they come from North or South

they will be representatives of Ireland, and will naturally and rightly

consider themselves agents bound in every case to make the best bargain

they can for Ireland as against the United Kingdom, or, in plain

language, as against England. They will no longer feel it their interest

to keep in power the English party which they think will best govern

Ireland, for with the government of Ireland the Imperial Parliament

will, as long as the new constitution stands, have no practical concern.

No honest Home Ruler supposes that, if the Home Rule Bill passes into

law, the Imperial Parliament will, even should the tragedy of the

Phoenix Park be repeated in some more terrible form, pass a Crimes Act

for Ireland; to the Irish Government will belong the punishment of Irish

crime. No interest will therefore restrain the Irish delegation from

swaying backwards and forwards between the two English parties, in

order to obtain from the one or the other some momentary advantage, or

some lucrative concession, to the Irish people. Intrigue will be

pardonable, diplomatic finesse will become a duty. This evil no doubt in

some degree exists, but under the present state of things it admits of

diminution. A just redistribution of the franchise will undoubtedly

lessen the number of Ireland's representatives, whilst it will increase

the relative importance, if not the actual numbers, of loyalists in the

representation of Ireland. The gradual settlement of the land question,

as Unionists believe, will further strike at the true root of Irish

discontent, and in removing the true grievance of the Irish tenants will

diminish the strength of the party which depends for its power on the

revolutionary elements in Irish society. But all chance of mitigating

the inconvenience inflicted upon England by the presence of the Irish

members vanishes for ever when they are changed into an Irish

delegation, and are compelled by their position to be the mere

mouthpiece of Ireland's claims against England.

The alleged reasons for the weakening of England are untenable, and,

were they tenfold stronger than they are, could not remove the flagrant

contradiction between the Gladstonian policy of 1886 and the Gladstonian

policy of 1893.

But a contradiction which cannot be removed may be explained.

The withdrawal of the Irish members from Westminster might give Ireland

the chance of obtaining some of the benefits, and compensate England for

some of the evils, of Home Rule. But however this may be, one result it

would produce with certainty; it would dash the Gladstonian party to

pieces. The friends of Disestablishment, the Welsh, or the Scottish,

Home Rulers, the London Socialists, all the revolutionists throughout

the country, know that with the departure of the Irish representatives

from Westminster their own hopes of triumph must be indefinitely

postponed. England is the stronghold of British conservatism, and an

arrangement which leaves the fate of England in the hands of Englishmen

may be favourable to reform, but is fatal to revolution. Has this fact

arrested the attention of Gladstonians? I know not. It is an unfortunate

coincidence that the least defensible portion of an indefensible policy

should, while it threatens ruin to England, offer temporary salvation to

the party who rally round Mr. Gladstone.[55]

C. _The Powers of the Irish Government_

I. _The Irish Executive_. At the head of the Irish Executive will

nominally stand the Lord Lieutenant; he will however in reality occupy

the position of a colonial Governor, and be, for most purposes, little

more than the ornamental figure-head of the Irish Administration. The

real executive government of Ireland[56] must be a parliamentary

Ministry or Cabinet[57] chosen in effect, though not in name, by the

Irish Parliament, or rather by the Irish Legislative Assembly, or House

of Commons, just as the English Cabinet is appointed in effect by the

English House of Commons. Allowing then for the occasional intervention

of the Lord Lieutenant as the representative of the Imperial Parliament

to protect either the interests of the Empire or the special rights of

the United Kingdom,[58] the Irish Ministry is to occupy in Ireland the

position which the New Zealand Ministry occupies in New Zealand, and

will for most purposes as truly govern Ireland as the New Zealand

Ministry governs New Zealand, or as Mr. Gladstone's Ministry governs

England. The Irish Ministry will be the true Government of Ireland.

This is a fact to which the attention of the English public ought to be

sedulously directed. The creation of an independent Irish Parliament

strikes the imagination; it is seen to be an innovation of primary

importance. The creation of an independent Irish Cabinet or Ministry is

taken as a matter of course, and neither Unionists nor Gladstonians see

its full import. Yet in Ireland, as elsewhere, the character of the

Executive is of more practical consequence than the character of the

Legislature. A country may dispense, for a long time, with legislation;

no country can dispense with good government.

This principle holds good even in an orderly country such as England,

where the sphere of the administration is far less extended than it is

in most States. We might get on for a good while prosperously enough

without a Parliament, or without new laws, but if anything deprived us

even for a week of an Executive, or if, for any reason, the whole spirit

of the public administration were changed, every Englishman would feel

this portentous revolution in every concern of his daily life. The

protection of the Government, of the army, of the police, of the law

courts, are with us so much matters of course, that we never realise how

much the comfort and prosperity of our existence hang upon it, nor do we

reflect that the aid we derive from the Courts is in the last instance

dependent upon the decisions of the judges being actively supported by

the forces at the command of the executive power. Again, we are so used

to the preservation on the part of the Executive and the Courts of an

attitude of perfect impartiality and to the extension of their aid to

all citizens alike, that we can hardly even in imagination conceive what

would be the condition of things if the public administration favoured

particular classes and looked askance on the rights of one class, whilst

it enforced with rigour the rights of another. Yet events which have

been passing before our eyes may show any one how absolutely dependent

we may be, at any moment, for our enjoyment of life, property, or

freedom upon the authority and the equity of the Executive. Consider the

strike at Hull. Practically the legal rights and personal freedom of

every inhabitant of the city depend upon the action of the Government.

It is as plain as day that if the Government had taken actively and

unfairly the side of one party or the other to the contest, the party

which the Government favoured would at once have won. Suppose, though

the supposition is a very improbable one, that the Home Secretary had

directed the police to put down every form of picketing and to arrest

every one who counselled the free labourers to desert their employment,

the strike would come at once to an end. Suppose on the other hand--the

supposition is also a wild one--that the Home Secretary had declined to

protect the rights of the free labourers, that the troops had been

withdrawn, and that the police had been inactive; suppose, in short,

that the Government had been careless to maintain order. The Trade

Unionists would at once have become supreme, and freedom of contract, as

well as liberty of person, would have been at once abolished. Even in

England then the power to exercise our rights as citizens has its source

in the constant, though unobserved, intervention of the executive power.

What is true of England is truer still of countries where the sphere of

the administration is more widely extended than with us, and what is

true of every civilised country is truest of all of Ireland. Ireland is

a country where the sphere of the administration is large, and where it

will probably be increased. Ireland is divided by hostile factions not

too much prone to respect the law. Even as things stand, the Irish

Executive finds it hard enough to hold a perfectly even and level

course, and the whole state of the country depends upon the spirit in

which the law is enforced. One of the very gravest defects of our

present system is that in Ireland a change of government means, to a

certain extent, a change in the administration of the law. Yet both Mr.

Balfour and Mr. Morley have enforced the law, and have meant, according

to their lights, to act towards all citizens with equitable

impartiality. And Mr. Balfour, Mr. Morley, or any statesman appointed by

the Imperial Parliament, is likely to act with more fairness than at the

present moment would any Executive chosen by any Irish Parliament. One

thing, at any rate, is certain. An independent Irish Executive will

possess immense power. It will be able by mere administrative action or

inaction, without passing a single law which infringes any Restriction

to be imposed by the Irish Government Act, 1893, to effect a revolution.

Let us consider for a moment a few of the things which the Irish Cabinet

might do if it chose. It might confine all political, administrative, or

judicial appointments to Nationalists, and thus exclude Loyalists from

all positions of public trust. It might place the Bench,[59] the

magistracy, the police wholly in the hands of Catholics; it might, by

encouragement of athletic clubs where the Catholic population were

trained to the use of arms, combined with the rigorous suppression of

every Protestant association suspected, rightly or not, of preparing

resistance to the Parliament at Dublin, bring about the arming of

Catholic and the disarming of Protestant Ireland, and, at the same time,

raise a force as formidable to England as an openly enrolled Irish army.

But the mere inaction of the Executive might in many spheres produce

greater results than active unfairness. The refusal of the police for

the enforcement of evictions would abolish rent throughout the country.

And the same result might be attained by a more moderate course. Irish

Ministers might in practice draw a distinction between 'good' landlords

and 'bad' landlords, and might grant the aid of the police for the

collection of reasonable, though refusing it for the collection of

excessive rents, and might at last magnanimously recognise the virtues

of Mr. Smith-Barry, whilst passing a practical sentence of outlawry on

Lord Clanricarde. Is there anything absurd or unreasonable in the

supposition that a Ministry of Land Leaguers chosen by a Parliament of

Nationalists should attempt to enforce the unwritten law of the Land

League? A Gladstonian who answers this question in the affirmative

entertains a far lower opinion than can any candid Unionist of Mr.

Gladstone's Irish allies. It would be the grossest unfairness to suggest

that every man convicted of conspiracy by the Special Commission added

to criminality and recklessness a monstrous form of hypocrisy, and that,

whilst urging Irish peasants to boycott evictors and land-grabbers, he

felt no genuine moral abhorrence of evictions and land-grabbing. But if,

as is certainly the case, the founders of the Land League really

detested the existing system of land tenure, and considered a landlord

who exacted rent a criminal, and a tenant who paid it a caitiff, it is

as certain as anything can be that they will be under the greatest

temptation, not to say, in their own eyes, under a stringent moral

obligation, to strain the power of an Irish Executive for the purpose of

abolishing the payment of rent. Nothing, at any rate, will seem to an

Irish Ministry more desirable than that within three years[60] from the

passing of the Bill landlords and tenants should come to an arrangement,

and nothing is more likely to produce this result than the withdrawal

from the landlords of the aid, if not the protection, of the law. My

argument, however, at the present point does not require the assertion

or the belief that an Irish Ministry will be guilty of every act of

oppression which it can legally commit. All that I insist upon is that

an Irish Ministry will exercise immense power, and that without

violating a letter of the constitution, and without passing a single act

which any Court whatever could treat as void, the Ministry will be able

to change the social condition of Ireland. The Irish Cabinet, remember,

will not be checked by any Irish House of Commons, for it will represent

the majority of that House. It will not need to fear the interposition

of the Imperial Ministry or the Imperial Parliament, for if the

authorities in England are to supervise and correct the conduct of the

Irish Cabinet, Home Rule is at an end. Mr. Asquith has repudiated all

idea of creating two Executives in Ireland[61] for the ordinary purposes

of government, and from his own point of view he is right. The notion of

a dual control is preposterous; the attempt to carry it out must involve

anarchy or revolution. The Irish Ministry must in ordinary matters be at

least as free as the Ministry of a self-governing colony. The

independence of the Irish Executive is indeed a totally new phenomenon

in Irish history, and is, as I have said, a far more important matter

than the independence of the Irish Parliament, but it is an essential

feature of Home Rule, and every elector throughout England should try to

realise its import.

One check, indeed, is placed upon the power of the Irish Cabinet. The

military forces of the Crown, and the Royal Irish Constabulary and

Dublin Metropolitan Police (as long as they exist[62]), are subject to

the control of the Imperial or English Ministry.[63] The result is that

the English Cabinet will have the means of using force in Ireland for

the maintenance of order, for the execution of the law, or for the

maintenance of the authority of the Imperial Parliament. But this

advantage is after all purchased at the price of placing the country

under the rule of something very like two Executives. If the policy of

the Irish Cabinet, _e.g._ as to suppressing a riot at Dublin or Belfast,

should differ from the policy of the English Cabinet, the ordinary

police may be called into action whilst the army or the royal

constabulary stand by inactive, or the army may disperse a meeting which

the Irish Ministry hold to be a lawful assembly.

II. _The Irish Parliament._ The authority of the Irish Parliament,

whilst acting within the limits of the constitution, is extremely

wide.[64]

The Parliament appoints the Irish Government of the day; it will

determine whether Mr. M'Carthy or Mr. Redmond, Mr. Healy or Mr. Davitt,

directs the Irish Administration. In this matter the British Government

will have no voice. The English Ministry are under the new constitution

expected in many ways to co-operate with the Irish Ministry, yet it is

quite conceivable that the Ministers of the Crown at Dublin may be men

whose whole ideas of expediency, of policy, of political morality, may

be opposed to the ideas of the Ministers of the Crown at Westminster.

The Irish Parliament, again, even if every Restriction on its powers

inserted in the Home Rule Bill should pass into law, will be found to

have ample scope for legislative action.[65]

It can repeal[66] any Act affecting Ireland which was enacted before the

passing of the Home Rule Bill. Thus it can do away with the right to the

writ of _habeas corpus_; it can abolish the whole system of trial by

jury; it can by wide rules as to the change of venue expose any

inhabitant of Belfast, charged with any offence against the Irish

Government, to the certainty of being tried in Dublin or in Cork. If an

Irish law cannot touch the law of treason or of treason-felony, the

leaders of the Irish Parliament may easily invent new offences not

called by these names, and the Parliament may impose severe penalties on

any one who attempts by act or by speech to bring the Irish Government

into contempt. A new law of sacrilege may be passed which would make

criticism of the Irish priesthood, or attacks on the Roman Catholic

religion, or the public advocacy of Protestantism, practically

impossible. The Irish House of Commons may take the decision of election

petitions into its own hands, and members nominated by the priests may

determine the proper limits of spiritual influence. Thus the party

dominant at Dublin can, if they see fit, abolish all freedom of

election; nor is this all that the Irish Parliament can accomplish in

the way of ensuring the supremacy of an Irish party. After six years

from the passing of the Home Rule Bill--let us say in the year 1900--the

Irish Parliament can alter the qualification of the electors and the

distribution of the members among the constituencies. Parliament can in

fact introduce at once universal suffrage, and do everything which the

ingenuity of partisanship can suggest for diminishing the

representation of property and of Protestantism. If, further, in any

part of Ireland there be reason to fear opposition to the laws of the

Irish Parliament, a severer Coercion Act may be passed than any which

has as yet found its way on to the pages of the English or the Irish

Statute Book. Worse than all this, the Irish Parliament has the right to

legislate with regard to transactions which have taken place before the

passing of the Home Rule Bill. An Act inflicting penalties on

magistrates who have been zealous in the enforcement of the Crimes Act,

an Act abolishing the right to recover debts incurred before 1893, an

Act for compensation to tenants who had suffered from obedience to the

behests of the Land League, are all Acts which, however monstrous, the

Irish Parliament is, under the new constitution, competent to pass.

My assertion is, be it noted, not that all or any of such laws would be

passed, but that the passing of them would, under the new constitution,

be legal. The Irish Parliament could further by its legislation pursue

lines of policy opposed to the moral feeling and political judgment of

Great Britain, and this too where Irish legislation practically affects

Great Britain. State lotteries might be re-established, gambling tables

might be re-opened at Dublin. If the imposition of protective duties on

imported goods is forbidden, there is nothing apparently to prevent the

reintroduction of Protection into Ireland by the payment of bounties;

there is certainly nothing to prohibit the repeal or suspension of the

Factory Acts, so that English manufacturers might be compelled to

compete with Irish rivals who are freed from the limits imposed upon

excessive labour by the humanity or the wisdom of England. The power of

the Irish Parliament to pass laws which in the eyes of Englishmen are

unwise or inequitable, is, it will be urged, an essential part of the

policy of Home Rule. I admit that this is so. But this makes it the more

necessary that English electors should realise what this essential

characteristic of Home Rule means, or may mean. The Nonconformist

conscience exposed Irish Home Rulers to painful humiliation and possible

ruin by forbidding them to follow the political leader of their choice

to whom they had deliberately renewed their allegiance. Is it certain

that Englishmen who could not tolerate the official authority of Mr.

Parnell will bear the official leadership, say of Mr. Healy, if employed

to carry out the economical principles of Mr. Davitt?

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