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FIRST EDITION _June_ 1893
_Reprinted_ _June_ 1893
SECOND EDITION _July_ 1911
THIRD EDITION _January_ 1912
A LEAP IN THE DARK
A CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
HOME RULE AS ILLUSTRATED BY
THE BILL OF 1893
By A.V. DICEY
K.C., HON. D.C.L.
FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE; FORMERLY VINERIAN PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH
LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD; AUTHOR OF 'ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST
HOME RULE,' 'THE VERDICT,' 'AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW
OF THE CONSTITUTION'
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1912
TO IRISH UNIONISTS WHOSE NOBLE AND STRENUOUS DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES AS CITIZENS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND WILL I
TRUST PRESERVE THE POLITICAL UNITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION
This book is not a disquisition on the details of the Home Rule Bill. It
is an examination into the leading principles of the Bill with a view to
establishing two conclusions. The first is, that the Home Rule Bill,
though nominally a measure for the government of Ireland, contains in
reality a New Constitution for the whole United Kingdom. The second is,
that this New Constitution must work injury both to England and to
Ireland, and instead of 'closing a controversy of seven hundred years,
opens a constitutional revolution. The whole aim, in short, of the book
is by the collection together of arguments which separately have been
constantly used by Unionist statesmen, to warn the people of England
against a leap in the dark.
A.V. DICEY.
OXFORD: _May_ 1893.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
OLD AND NEW CONSTITUTION
Home Rule Bill a New Constitution for United Kingdom, p. 1.--The present
constitution, p. 2: 1. Effective authority of Parliament throughout
United Kingdom, p. 2: Distinction between supremacy of Parliament in
United Kingdom and supremacy of Parliament in Colonies, p. 4: 2. Absence
of federalism, p. 6: The New Constitution, p. 8: 1. Abolition in Ireland
of effective authority of Imperial Parliament, ib.: 2. Introduction of
federalism, p. 13.--Features of federalism, p. 15: Restrictions on Irish
(State) Parliament, ib.: Imperial (federal) Parliament, ib.: Means for
enforcement of federal compact, ib.: Recognition of federal spirit, p.
17.--Importance of change in constitution, p. 19.--The New Constitution
an unknown constitution, p. 19.
CHAPTER II
THE NEW CONSTITUTION
The four essential characteristics of the New Constitution, p.
21.--Supremacy of Parliament maintained, p. 22.--What is meaning of
supremacy of Imperial Parliament? p. 23: What it does not mean, ib.:
What it does mean, p. 24.--Real effect of reserved supremacy, p.
28.--Peril arising from ambiguity of supremacy of Parliament, p.
30.--Retention of Irish members at Westminster, p. 32.--Change of
Gladstonian opinion, p. 33.--Presence of the Irish members involves ruin
to Ireland, pp. 33, 34.--Mr. John Morley's opinion, p. 39.--Weakness of
England, p, 41. Mr. Morley's opinion, p. 41.--Manner in which England
weakened, p. 43: 1. Irish vote determines composition of British
Cabinet, ib.: 2. System of Cabinet Government destroyed, p. 45: 3. Irish
members changed into an Irish delegation, p. 46: 4. British Parliament
not freed from Irish questions, p. 47.--Inducements to accept plan, p.
48.--Maintenance of Imperial supremacy, p. 49.--English management of
English affairs, ib.--England does not really obtain management of
English affairs, ib.--Minority tempted to unfairness, p. 51.--Minority,
without intentional unfairness, may be oppressive, p. 52.--Plan of
retaining Irish members for all purposes, p. 53.--Comparison with power
hitherto held by or offered to Great Britain, p. 55.--Authority of
England before 1782, p. 55.--Authority of England under Grattan's
Constitution, p. 56.--Authority of England since the Union, p.
57.--Authority offered to England under Bill of 1886, p. 58.--Why should
England accept in 1893 a worse bargain than was offered her in 1886? p.
59: Two alleged reasons, p. 60: First reason, Retention of Irish members
concession to Unionists, p. 60: Futility of plea, ib.: Second reason,
England will not suffer any greater evil than she does at present, p.
63: Answer. Fallacy of statement, ib.--Explanation of Gladstonian
policy, p. 65.--Powers of Irish Government, p. 66: I. Irish Executive,
ib.: Importance of Executive, p. 68: Powers of Irish Executive, p. 68:
Position of military forces, p. 74: II. The Irish Parliament, p. 73: Its
power to appoint the Irish Government, ib.: Its legislative power, p.
76.--Legislation in opposition to English policy, p 78.--Power to pass
resolutions, p. 79.--The Restrictions, etc, p. 80: I. Their nature, ib.:
1. No restriction on power of Executive, p. 83: 2. No prohibition of
Acts of Indemnity, ib.: 3. No prohibition of _ex post facto_ law, p. 84:
4. No safeguard against violation of contract, p. 85: II. Enforcement of
Restrictions, p. 88.--The Veto, p. 88.--The Privy Council, p. 90.--Power
to nullify Irish Acts, ib.--Power as final Court of Appeal to treat
Irish Acts as void, p. 91.--How arrangement will work, p.
94.--Presumptions on which working of Constitutions depends false, p.
97: 1. Presumption that restrictions do not irritate, p. 98: Its
falsehood, ib.--Financial arrangements certain to cause discontent, p.
100.--The Customs, ib.--Charges in favour of England on Ireland, p.
102.--Irish objection to financial proposals, p. 103.--Presumption that
Ireland cannot nullify Restrictions. Its falsehood, p. 104.--Summary of
criticism, p. 110.
CHAPTER III
WHY THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL NOT BE
A SETTLEMENT OF THE IRISH QUESTION
New Constitution is intended to be final settlement of Irish Question,
p. 112: But will not settle Irish Question for three reasons, p. 113: I.
New Constitution does not satisfy Ireland or England, ib.: Ireland not
satisfied, ib.: New Constitution detested by influential minority, p.
114: Irish Home Rulers not wholly satisfied, p. 115: New Constitution
will cause discontent of whole Irish people, p. 118: England not
satisfied, p. 119: 2. New Constitution rests on unsound foundation, p.
121: Belfast subjected to Dublin, p. 122: England subjected to Ireland,
p. 123: 3. New Constitution based on ambiguity, p. 125.--The nature of
the ambiguity, ib.--The result of the ambiguity, ib. The New
Constitution cannot last, p. 127.--Irish discontent leading either to
Federation or Separation, p. 128.--English discontent threatens
reaction, p. 130.
CHAPTER IV
PLEAS FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTION
Gladstonian apology, p. 132.--As to general considerations, ib.--General
Gladstonian objections, ib.: I. Strictures are prophecy, p. 133: 2.
Anomalies already exist in English Constitution, p. 135.--As to specific
arguments for Home Rule, p. 138.--Necessity, p. 138.--Argument for
necessity, ib.--Answer: argument invalid, 140.--Premises unsound, p.
141.--Premises do not support conclusion, p. 145.--No necessity for
Home Rule, ib.--True meaning of necessity forgotten, p. 146.--No danger,
p. 148: I. Safeguards, p. 149: Their unreality, ib.: 2. Grattan's
Constitution, ib.: No precedent, p. 150: 3. Success of Home Rule in
other countries, p. 152.--Instances of 'Home Rule' which need not be
considered, ib.--Cases of 'Home Rule' which require consideration, p.
154.--Federal Government, p. 155.--Colonial independence, p.
156.--Neither federal government nor colonial independence compatible
with the authority required in Ireland by Imperial Government, p.
157.--Weakness of law in case of federation, p. 158.--Weakness of law in
case of colonies, pp. 161, 162.--Policy of trust, p. 163.--Trust in
Irish leaders impossible, p. 164.--History of the Irish agitators, p.
164.--Gladstonian guarantee of trustworthiness worthless, p. 167.--Trust
in teaching of power, 169.--Answer. Fallacy exposed by Mr. Bryce,
ib.--Trust in the people and effect of Home Rule, p. 171.--Answer.
Political changes do not ensure content, pp. 171, 172.--Gladstonian
pleas are pleas for policy of Home Rule, but not pleas for new
Constitution, p. 173.
CHAPTER V
THE PATH OF SAFETY
The impending danger, p. 175.--Peril concealed by trust in Mr.
Gladstone, ib.--Peril concealed by peculiar condition of opinion, p.
178.--The path of safety and true policy, p. 180.--Policy of
seriousness, ib.--Seriousness of question at issue, ib.--Danger of civil
war, p. 181.--Policy of simplicity, p. 183.--Strenuous opposition to
Bill, ib.--Cry of obstruction futile, p. 184.--Details not to be made
too prominent, p. 185.--No appearance of concession allowable, p.
186.--Policy of appeal to the nation, p. 187.--House of Lords must
ensure dissolution, ib.--House of Lords may be called upon to enforce
Referendum, p. 188.--Conclusion, p. 191.
APPENDIX
PAGES
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL 195-223
ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES 195, 196
1. Establishment of Irish Legislature, p. 197--2. Powers of Irish
Legislature, ib.--3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature,
ib.--4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature, p. 198.--5.
Executive power in Ireland, ib.--6. Composition of Irish
Legislative Council, p. 199.--7. Composition of Irish Legislative
Assembly, ib.--8. Disagreement between two Houses, how settled, p.
200.--9. Representation in Parliament of Irish counties and
boroughs, ib.--10. As to separate Consolidated Fund and Taxes, p.
201.--11. Hereditary revenues and income tax, p. 202.--12.
Financial arrangements as between United Kingdom and Ireland, p.
203.--13. Treasury Account (Ireland), ib.--14. Charges on Irish
Consolidated Fund, p. 204.--15. Irish Church Fund, p. 205.--16.
Local loans, ib.--17. Adaptation of Acts as to Local Taxation
Accounts and Probate, etc., duties, ib.--18. Money bills and votes,
p. 206.--19. Exchequer judges for revenue actions, election
petitions, etc., ib.--20. Transfer of post office and postal
telegraphs, p. 207.--21. Transfer of savings banks, p. 208.--22.
Irish appeals, p. 209.--23. Special provision for decision of
constitutional questions, ib.--24. Office of Lord Lieutenant, p.
210.--25. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government, ib.--26. Tenure
of future judges, ib.--27. As to existing judges and other persons
having salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund, ib.--28. As to
persons holding civil service appointments, p. 211.--29. As to
existing pensions and superannuation allowances, p. 212.--30. As to
Police, ib.--31. Irish Exchequer Consolidated Fund and Audit, p.
213.--32. Law applicable to both Houses of Irish Legislature,
ib.--33. Supplemental provisions as to powers of Irish
Legislature, ib.--34. Limitation of borrowing by local authorities,
p. 214.--35. Temporary restriction on powers of Irish Legislature
and Executive, ib.--36. Transitory provisions, ib.--37. Continuance
of existing laws, courts, officers, etc., p. 216.--38. Appointed
day, ib.--39. Definitions, ib.--40. Short title, p. 217.
SCHEDULES 218-223
1. Legislative Council 218
2. Irish Members in the House of Commons 220
3. Finance 222
INTRODUCTION
Irish Unionists have pressed for a republication of _A Leap in the
Dark_. They hold that it will be of some service in their resistance to
the Coalition of Home Rulers, Socialists, and Separatists formed to
force upon the people of England and of Scotland a virtual dissolution
of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland. It would in any case
have been a pleasure to afford aid, however small, to the Irish
Unionists, whether Protestants or Catholics, engaged in the defence at
once of their own birthright and of the political unity of the United
Kingdom. Yet for a moment I doubted whether the republication of a
forgotten criticism of a forgotten Bill would be of essential service to
my friends. On reflection, however, I have come to see that, though the
Unionists of Ireland probably overrate the practical value of my book,
yet their hope of its serving the cause whereof they are the most
valiant defenders is based on sound reasons.
_A Leap in the Dark_ is a stringent criticism of the Home Rule Bill,
1893.[1] But the book has little to do with the details and intricacies
of that Bill. _A Leap in the Dark_ was published before the Home Rule
Bill of 1893 had reached the House of Lords, or had assumed that final
form, which made patent to the vast majority of British electors that a
measure which purported to give a limited amount of independence to
Ireland, in reality threatened England with political ruin. My criticism
is therefore in truth an attack upon the fundamental principles of Home
Rule, as advocated by Gladstone and his followers eighteen years ago.
These principles, moreover, have never been repudiated by the Home
Rulers of to-day. Some members of the present Cabinet, notably the Prime
Minister and Lord Morley, were the apologists of the Bill of 1893. In
that year _A Leap in the Dark, or Our New Constitution_, was, I venture
to say, accepted by leading Unionists, such as Lord Salisbury, the Duke
of Devonshire, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Henry James (now Lord
James of Hereford), as, in the main, an adequate representation of the
objections which, in the judgment of such men and thousands of
Unionists, were fatal to the acceptance of any scheme whatever of Home
Rule for Ireland. The battle over Home Rule lasting, as it did for
years, and ending with the complete victory of the Unionists, has been
forgotten by or has never become known to the mass of the present
electors. It is well that they should be reminded of the solid grounds
for the rejection by the Lords of the Home Rule Bill of 1893. It is well
that they should be reminded that this rejection was in 1895 ratified by
the approval of the electorate of the United Kingdom _A Leap in the
Dark_ will assuredly remind my readers that in 1893 the hereditary House
of Lords, and not the newly elected House of Commons, truly represented
the will of the nation. This is a fact never to be forgotten. It is of
special import at the present moment. Another equally undoubted fact
deserves attention. Home Rulers themselves despair of carrying a Home
Rule Bill until they shall have turned the Parliament Bill into the
Parliament Act, 1911, and my readers ought never to forget that the
passing of the Parliament Bill into law destroys, and is meant to
destroy, every security against the passing of any Home Rule Bill
whatever which the present majority of the House of Commons choose to
support. This gives an ominous significance to the obstinate refusal of
the Government to alter or amend any of the material enactments
contained in this ill-starred measure. _A Leap in the Dark_, combined
with a knowledge of the Parliament Bill and the legislative dictatorship
with which it invests the existing Coalition, suggests at least four
conclusions which must at all costs be forced at this moment upon the
attention of the nation. They may be thus summed up:
_First_.--If the Parliament Bill passes into law the existing
majority of the House of Commons will be able to force, and will
assuredly in fact force, through Parliament any Home Rule Bill
whatever (even were it the Home Rule Bill of 1893), which meets
with the approval of Mr. Redmond, and obtains the acquiescence of
the rest of the Coalition.
The Coalition need not fear any veto of the House of Lords. There
will be no necessity for an appeal to the electors, or in other
words to the nation. The truth of this statement is indisputable.
The legal right of the majority of the House of Commons to pass any
bill whatever into law, even though the House of Lords refuse its
assent, is absolutely secured by the very terms of the Parliament
Bill. That the leaders of the Coalition, such as Mr. Asquith, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. John Redmond, will press their
legal right to its extreme limits is proved to any man who knows
how to read the teaching of history, by the experience of 1893. Mr.
Gladstone used every power he possessed, and used it
unscrupulously, to drive a Home Rule Bill through the House of
Commons. He was a man trained in the historical traditions of
Parliament. He assuredly did not relish the use of the closure and
the guillotine. He was supported in the Commons by a very narrow
majority, never I think exceeding forty-eight, and often falling
below that number. The power of the party system, or as Americans
say, the "Machine," was admittedly much less in 1893 than it has
become in 1911. Yet Mr. Gladstone used such power as he possessed
to the utmost. He hurried through the House of Commons a Bill
which had not in fact received the assent of the nation. He made
the freest use of every device for curtailing freedom of debate. A
large and most important portion of the Home Rule Bill was not
discussed at all in the Commons. And this Bill contained
provisions, not appearing in its original form, for the retention
of eighty Irish members at Westminster with full authority to take
part in every kind of legislation which might be laid before
Parliament; though Mr. Gladstone himself held the fairness to
England of this provision dubious[2] and Mr. (now Lord) Morley had
in 1886 demonstrated by reasoning which to my mind is absolutely
conclusive that under a system of Home Rule the presence of Irish
representatives in the Imperial Parliament at Westminster would
work fatal injury to Ireland and gross injustice to England.[3] Can
any man able to draw from political precedents their true meaning
believe that Mr. Asquith, and the allies who are his masters, will
be more scrupulous in forcing the next Home Rule Bill through the
House of Lords than was Mr. Gladstone in forcing the Home Rule Bill
of 1893 through the House of Commons? Mr. Asquith is supported by a
large though incongruous majority. His almost avowed aim in pushing
the Parliament Bill, unchanged and unchangeable, through the Houses
of Parliament is to force the Home Rule Bill on the people of Great
Britain against their will. Hesitation to make use of this
dictatorial authority, should he ever obtain it, will to himself
mean political ruin; to his English supporters it will seem
political pusillanimity; by his Irish confederates it will be
denounced as breach of faith and treachery. As certainly as night
follows day the passing of the Parliament Act will be succeeded by
the attempted passing of a Home Rule Act.
_Secondly_.--Mr. Redmond and the Home Rulers, or Separatists, of
whom he is the leader, will exact under any Home Rule Bill of say
1912 or 1913, at lowest, every advantage which was demanded by
Irish Nationalists in 1893.
Why, in the name of common sense, when Irish Nationalists are
absolute masters of the situation, should they demand lower payment
for their support than was offered to them twenty years ago when
the Home Rule majority was every day losing strength, when every
one knew that nothing but the show of moderation gave the slightest
chance of a Home Rule Bill escaping the veto of the House of Lords,
when every one, except perhaps Mr. Gladstone, foresaw that the next
General Election would give to Unionists a crushing majority? Every
advantage conceded in 1893 to Irish Separatists at the expense of
England will assuredly reappear in one form or another in the next
Home Rule Bill. Thus Ireland will, we may anticipate, under the
next Home Rule Bill send to the Parliament at Westminster at least
eighty members armed with the fullest legislative authority, so
that, to revive the language current eighteen years ago, Ireland
will govern and tax England whilst England will retain no right
either to govern or to tax Ireland.
_Thirdly_.--Every question to which in 1893 Gladstonians could
discover no answer satisfactory to Unionists or to the electorate
of Great Britain requires an answer in 1911 as much as in 1893. The
answer favourable to Home Rule has not as yet been discovered.
Is it possible to combine the effective supremacy of the Imperial
Parliament with Home Rule or the substantial legislative
independence of Ireland? Can Ireland, close to the shore of Great
Britain, occupy the position of a self-governing colony, such as
New Zealand, divided from Great Britain by thousands of miles of
sea? Is it possible to create, or even to imagine, a Court which
shall decide whether a law passed by the Irish Parliament violates
the provisions of the proposed Home Rule Act? Above all, can the
wit of man devise any scheme of constitution which shall at once
satisfy the aspirations of Irish Nationalism and the patently just
demand of Ulster that Protestants shall retain the freedom and the
rights secured to them as citizens of the United Kingdom? Is there
any form of Home Rule which will satisfy the desire of Irish
Nationalists for something approaching national independence
without the urgent peril of rousing civil war between Ulster and
the Parliament at Dublin? All these inquiries, and others like
them, harassed the Parliament of 1893; they were all answered by
Unionists, that is by the majority of the British electors, with a
decided negative; they will all be raised and will all need an
answer when the leaders of the Coalition condescend to produce
their next Home Rule Bill or even to reveal its fundamental
principles.
_Fourthly_.--England in the circumstances of to-day is threatened
with two perils which did not exist in 1893, and yet are of
stupendous gravity.
The first is, that in the case of a measure of Home Rule the
opportunities for discussing its provisions which are contained in
the Parliament Bill may turn out nominal rather than real. It is
not at all certain that for such a Bill, even though it be abhorred
by the electorate of the United Kingdom, the House of Lords will be
practically able to secure the delay and elaborate discussion to
which Mr. Asquith professedly attaches immense importance.
Unionists will believe that the measure passed by a large majority
of the House of Commons is detested by the majority of the British
electors. But how will it be possible to carry on the government of
Ireland, to maintain order, or to save a loyal minority from gross
oppression after a Home Rule Bill applauded by Separatists has been
passed through the House of Commons, and for the first time has
been rejected by the House of Lords? Every official in Ireland,
down from the Lord Lieutenant to the last newly appointed member of
the Irish Constabulary, every Irishman loyal or disloyal, will know
that the Bill will within a year or two become law and that Irish
Nationalists will control the Parliament and the government of
Ireland. Will not the House of Lords be urged by every alleged
consideration of good sense and humanity to close without delay a
period of uncertainty which is threatening to turn into a reign of
anarchy or of terror? The question supplies its own answer. The
second peril is one whereof nobody speaks, but which must occur to
any man who has studied the history of the past eighteen years or
reflects upon the condition of public opinion. The peril, to put
the matter plainly, is that Home Rulers will not stop at attaining
Home Rule for Ireland, and that they may, and probably will,
attempt to undermine the political predominance of England.
Everything points in this direction. The agitation for Home Rule
has fostered in Ireland, and to a very limited extent in certain
other parts of the United Kingdom, a feeling approaching to
jealousy of English power. England or Great Britain is the
predominant partner. England is wealthy, England is prosperous.
England, as the language of common life imports, is the leading
member of the United Kingdom. Lord Rosebery announced with wise
foresight that Home Rule in Ireland could hardly be established
with benefit to the United Kingdom until the assent thereto of the
predominant partner had been obtained by force of argument. The
idea was grounded on common sense. Will it not suggest to Irish
Nationalists that their moment of authority must be used for
obtaining far greater privileges for Ireland than the extravagant
political power offered by Gladstonians in 1893? Is it not natural
for Home Rulers to think that the predominant partner ought to be
deprived of his predominance? The conduct of the Coalition and some
of its leaders points in this direction. They will have obtained
through the Parliament Act temporary, but strictly unlimited and
dictatorial, power. They will have obtained it by intrigue; they
have rejected and treated with scorn the idea of an appeal to the
people. They have claimed, not for Parliament but for the existing
House of Commons, an absolute legislative power superior to that of
the nation, a power which I assert with confidence is not possessed
by the elected Assemblies of the United States, or of the French
Republic, or of the Swiss Confederation: And by a strange
combination of circumstances one method for depriving the
predominant partner of legitimate authority may seem to a Home
Ruler to lie near at hand. Raise the cry of 'Home Rule all round,'
or of 'Federalise the British Empire.' Turn England into one State
of a great federation, let Wales be another, Scotland a third, the
Channel Islands a fourth, and for aught I know the Isle of Man a
fifth. Let the self-governing Colonies, and British India, send
deputies to the Imperial or Federal Parliament. You may thus for a
moment, under the pretence of uniting the Empire, not only divide
the United Kingdom, but deprive England or Great Britain, in form
at least, of that political supremacy and predominance which is the
real bond of union and peace not only throughout the United
Kingdom, but also throughout the length and breadth of the British
Empire. I do not tremble for the power--the lawful and legitimate
power--of England. Political devices, however crafty, break down
whenever they are opposed to the nature of things. I know that
unity is increasing throughout the Empire not through the cunning
or the statecraft of politicians, but through the whole course of
events. One part of our Imperial system becomes daily under the
effect of railways, steamers, telegraphs, and the like, nearer and
nearer to every other part. The sentiment of unity which is more
valuable than any law aiming at formal federation each year gains
strength. What I do fear and insist upon is the danger that a
legislative dictatorship conferred on a party, and therefore
necessarily taken away from the nation, should be employed in the
attempt, vain though it ultimately must be, to deprive the
predominant partner of a predominance requisite for the maintenance
both of the United Kingdom and of the British Empire.
The four reflections at any rate which may be suggested by _A Leap in
the Dark_ are well worth the consideration of the loyal citizens of the
United Kingdom.
A.V. DICEY.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Its technical title as given in the Bill is the Irish Government
Act, 1893.
[2] See _Annual Register_, 1893 (New Series), p. 180.
[3] See especially pp. 39, 40, 41-43 _post._
A LEAP IN THE DARK[4]
FOOTNOTES:
[4] My readers are earnestly recommended to study Mr. Cambray's _Irish
Affairs and the Home Rule Question_. It brings the history of the Home
Rule movement well up to date, and strengthens almost every argument
against Home Rule to be found in _A Leap in the Dark._ The notes in
square brackets are new.
CHAPTER I
OLD AND NEW CONSTITUTION
The Home Rule Bill[5] contains a New Constitution for the whole United
Kingdom.[6]
The Bill bears on its face that its object is 'to amend the provision
for the Government of Ireland'; it is entitled 'The Irish Government
Act, 1893'; it is in popular language known as the Home Rule Bill. But
all these descriptions are misleading. It is in truth a measure which
affects the government alike of England, of Scotland, and of Ireland.
It changes, to some extent the form, but to a far greater extent the
working, and the spirit of all our institutions. It is a bold attempt to
form a new constitution for the whole United Kingdom; it subverts the
very bases of the existing constitution of England.
The present constitution of the United Kingdom is marked and has long
been marked by two essential characteristics, the one positive and the
other negative.
The positive characteristic is the absolute and effective authority of
the Imperial Parliament throughout the length and breadth of the United
Kingdom.
To this characteristic Englishmen are so accustomed that they hardly
recognise its full importance. A government may make its power felt in
three different ways--by the action of the Executive, including under
that head all the agents of the Executive, such as the judiciary and the
armed forces--by legislation--and by the levying of taxes. Take any of
these tests of authority, and it will be found that the British
Parliament is not only theoretically, but actually and effectively,
supreme throughout the whole of Great Britain and Ireland. The Cabinet
is virtually appointed by the Houses of Parliament; the army, the
judges, the magistracy, all officials who throughout the country
exercise executive power in any form whatever are directly or indirectly
appointed by Parliament, and hold office subject to the will of
Parliament Of the legislative authority of Parliament as regards the
United Kingdom it is scarcely necessary to speak. Any law affecting the
United Kingdom not only lawfully may, but can in fact, be changed by the
Imperial Parliament. Of the unlimited legislative authority ascribed to,
and exercised by, Parliament in the United Kingdom the Home Rule Bill
itself is sufficient evidence; and the Gladstonian Ministry, at any
rate, see no reason why Parliament should not within the course of a few
weeks remodel the fundamental laws of the realm. The right to impose
taxes is historically the source of Parliamentary power, and in all
matters of taxation Parliament has absolute freedom of action from one
end of the United Kingdom to the other; whether the income tax is to be
lowered, raised, or abolished, whether some new duty, such as the cart
and wheel tax, shall be imposed, whether the United Kingdom shall
maintain free trade, or return to protection, how taxes shall be raised
and how they shall be spent--all matters in short connected with revenue
are throughout the United Kingdom determined and determinable in the
last resort by Parliament alone.
Hence, as things now stand, no kind of governmental action in any part
of Great Britain and Ireland escapes Parliamentary supervision. The
condition of the army, the management of the police, the misconduct of
a judge, the release of a criminal, the omission to arrest a defaulting
bankrupt, the pardon of a convicted dynamiter, the execution of a
murderer, the interference of the police with a public meeting, or the
neglect of the police to check a riot in London, in Skye, or in
Tipperary, any matter, great or small, with which the executive is
directly or indirectly concerned, is, if it takes place in any part of
the United Kingdom, subject to stringent and incessant Parliamentary
supervision, and may, at any moment, give rise to debates on which
depend the fate of ministries and parties. If there be such a thing as
supreme actual and effective authority, such authority is throughout the
whole of the United Kingdom exercised by the Imperial Parliament, not
occasionally and in theory, but every day and in the ordinary course of
affairs.
This exertion of actual and effective power by the Imperial Parliament
throughout the United Kingdom is a totally different thing from the
supremacy or sovereignty exercised by Parliament throughout the whole
British Empire. As a matter of legal theory Parliament has the right to
legislate for any part of the Crown's dominions. Parliament may lawfully
impose an income tax upon the inhabitants of New South Wales; it may
lawfully abolish the constitution of the Canadian Dominion, just as some
years ago it did actually abolish the ancient constitution of Jamaica.
But though Parliament does in fact exert a certain, or rather a very
uncertain, amount of power throughout the whole Empire, we all know that
the Imperial Parliament neither exercises, nor claims to exercise, in a
self-governing colony such as New Zealand,[7] that kind of effective
authority which Parliament exercises in the United Kingdom. The Cabinet
of New Zealand is not appointed at Westminster; the action of a New
Zealand Ministry as regards the affairs of New Zealand is not controlled
by the English Government. Not a pennyworth of taxation is imposed on
the inhabitants of New Zealand, or of any colony whatever, by the
Imperial Parliament. Even the imposition of customs, though it has an
important bearing on the interest of the Empire, is in a self-governing
colony determined by the colonial, and not by the British, Parliament.
It is the Parliament of New Zealand, and not the Parliament of England,
which governs New Zealand. The Imperial Parliament, though for Imperial
purposes it may retain an indefinite supremacy throughout the British
Empire, has, as regards self-governing colonies, renounced, for all
other than Imperial purposes, executive and legislative functions. To
labour this point may savour of pedantry. But the distinction insisted
upon, whilst often overlooked, is of extreme importance. We risk being
deceived by words. The Imperial Parliament is supreme in the United
Kingdom, it is also supreme in New Zealand. But the supremacy of the
Imperial Parliament is a misleading expression; it means one thing in
the United Kingdom, and another thing in New Zealand or in Canada. In
the United Kingdom it means the exercise of real, actual, effective and
absolute authority. In New Zealand it means little more than the claim
to regulate matters of a distinctly and exclusively Imperial character.
The distinction is vital. The essential feature of the English
constitution is the actual and direct government of the whole United
Kingdom by the Parliament at Westminster. No change could be more
fundamental than a change which, in England, Scotland, or Ireland,
reduced this actual authority to the ultimate or reserved sovereignty
exercised, or rather claimed, by Parliament in Canada or in New Zealand.
The negative characteristic of the English constitution is the absence
of federalism or of the federal spirit.
The spirit of institutions is as important as their form, and the spirit
of English Parliamentary government has always been a spirit of unity.
The fundamental conditions of federal government are well known. They
are first the existence of States such as the Cantons of Switzerland or
the States of Germany, which are capable of bearing in the eyes of their
inhabitants an impress of common nationality, and next the existence
among the inhabitants of the federalised country of a very peculiar
sentiment, which may be described as the desire for political union
without the desire for political unity.[8] This condition of opinion
leads to a division of powers between the federal or national government
and the States. Whatever concerns the nation as a whole is placed under
the control of the federal power.
All matters which are not primarily of common interest remain in the
hands of the States. Now each of these conditions upon which federalism
rests has, as a matter of history, been absolutely unknown to the people
of England. In uniting other countries to England they have
instinctively aimed at an incorporative not at a federal union. This
absence of the federal spirit is seen in two matters which may appear of
subordinate, but are in reality of primary, consequence. Every member of
Parliament has always stood on a perfect equality with his fellows; the
representatives of a county or of a borough, English members, Scottish
members, Irish members, have hitherto possessed precisely equal rights,
and have been subject to precisely the same duties. They have been sent
to Parliament by different places, but, when in Parliament, they have
not been the delegates of special localities; they have not been English
members, or Scottish members, or Irish members, they have been simply
members of Parliament; their acknowledged duty has been to consult for
the interest of the whole nation; it has not been their duty to
safeguard the interests of particular localities or countries. Hence
until quite recent years English parties have not been formed according
to sectional divisions. There has never been such a thing as an English
party or a Scottish party. Up to 1832 the Scottish members were almost
without exception Tories; since 1832 they have been for the most part
Liberals or Radicals; they have kept a sharp eye upon Scottish affairs,
but they have never formed a Scottish party. The same thing has, to a
great extent, held good of the Irish members. The notion of an Irish
party is a novelty, and in so far as it has existed is foreign to the
spirit of our institutions. Hence further, the Cabinet has been neither
in form nor in spirit a federal executive. No Premier has attempted to
constitute a Ministry in which a given proportion of Irishmen or
Scotchmen should balance a certain proportion of Englishmen. English
politicians have as yet hardly formed the conception of an English
party. Not a single Prime Minister has claimed the confidence of the
country on the ground that his colleagues were, or were not, English,
Scottish, or Irish. That a Premier should glory in his pure Scottish
descent is an innovation; it is an innovation ominous of revolution; it
betrays a spirit of disintegration. If at the moment it flatters
Scottish pride, Scotchmen and Irishmen would do well to recollect that
it is a certain presage of a time when some Englishman will rise to
power and obtain popular support on the ground of his staunch English
sympathies and of his unadulterated English blood.
Now place the new constitution side by side with the old. Assume, as I
do assume throughout this chapter, that our new Gladstonian policy works
in accordance with the intentions of its authors.
The new constitution abolishes in Ireland the actual and effective
control and authority of the Imperial Parliament.
The government of Ireland is under the Home Rule Bill[9] placed in the
hands of an executive authority, or, in plain terms, a Cabinet,
undoubtedly to be appointed by the Irish Legislature, in the same sense in
which an English Cabinet is appointed by the British Parliament, or a
New Zealand Cabinet is appointed by the Parliament of New Zealand.[10]
For the first time in the whole course of history the administration of
Irish affairs is placed in the hands of an Irish Ministry, in the
selection of which the Imperial Parliament has no hand or concern
whatever. Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Healy, Mr. Redmond, Mr. Davitt, any leader,
known or unknown, loyal or disloyal, who commands the confidence of the
Irish Legislature, or, as I will venture to term it, the Irish
Parliament,[11] will naturally become the Premier of Ireland, and,
together with his colleagues, will possess all the authority which
belongs to a Parliamentary Executive. On the action of this Irish
Cabinet the Bill places, with rare exceptions, either no restrictions at
all or restrictions which are only transitory.[12] Speaking generally,
we may lay down that, except as to the control of the army, if that be
an exception, the Irish Cabinet will, when the constitution gets into
full working order, occupy in Ireland the position now occupied by the
British Cabinet in regard to the whole United Kingdom. The appointment
of officials, the conduct of Irish affairs, all the ordinary functions
of government will, with certain exceptions meant for the most part to
protect the rights of the Imperial Parliament, be exercised by Irish
Ministers responsible to the Irish Parliament; and the British or
Imperial Parliament will, in the ordinary course of things, have no more
to do with the administration of affairs in Ireland than it has to do
with the administration of affairs in New Zealand. The Irish, not the
British, Cabinet will decide what are the steps to be taken for the
protection throughout Ireland of the rights of property or of personal
liberty; the Irish and not the English Cabinet will determine by what
means the payment of rent is to be enforced; the Irish and not the
English Cabinet will decide what persons are to be prosecuted for crime;
the Irish and not the English Cabinet will determine whether the means
for enforcing the punishment of crime are adequate, and whether
Ireland, or some part of Ireland, say Belfast, requires to be governed
by means of a Coercion Act; the Irish and not the English Cabinet will
decide with what severity wrong-doers are to be punished, and whether,
and under what circumstances, convicted criminals deserve either pardon
or mitigation of punishment.
It is patent that under the new constitution the Irish Parliament and,
under ordinary circumstances, the Irish Parliament alone will legislate
for Ireland. For the Irish Parliament can, subject to certain
Restrictions,[13] pass any law whatever 'for the peace, order and good
government of Ireland, in respect of matters exclusively relating to
Ireland or some part thereof'[14]; and, subject to the same
Restrictions, may repeal any law which, before the Home Rule Bill
becomes law, is in force in Ireland. Under the new constitution the
Irish Parliament and not the Imperial Parliament will, it is clear, as a
rule legislate for Ireland. Under the new constitution the Irish
Parliament may enact a Coercion Act, applying say to Ulster, or may
repeal the existing Crimes Act. It may abolish trial by jury[15]
altogether, put any restraints it sees fit on the liberty of the press,
or introduce a system of administrative law like that which exists in
France, but is totally foreign to English notions of jurisprudence.
Under the new constitution, again, the financial relations of Great
Britain and Ireland are made the subject of an elaborate arrangement
which may fairly be called a contract[16]. Ireland takes over certain
charges[17], and speaking very generally, whilst all the duties of
customs levied in Ireland are collected by and paid over to the
Exchequer of the United Kingdom, as Ireland's contribution to Imperial
expenditure, all the other taxes are, as a general rule, paid over to
the Irish Exchequer. The justice or the policy of these financial
arrangements is for my present purpose immaterial. All that need be
observed is that the ordinary taxation of Ireland passes from the hands
of the Imperial Parliament into the hands of the Irish Parliament, and
that under the new constitution this arrangement is a settlement which
the Imperial Parliament is morally bound to respect for a period of at
least fifteen years[18].
In Ireland therefore the new constitution abolishes the effective
exercise of authority by the Imperial Parliament in matters of
administration, in matters of legislation, in matters of finance; every
concern which affects the daily life of Irishmen will be under the
control of the Irish Cabinet and the Irish Parliament. The relation of
the Imperial Parliament towards Ireland will not be the relation which
it now occupies towards the whole United Kingdom, and which under the
new constitution it will still occupy towards Great Britain. The
Imperial Parliament, it is true, retains considerable reserved powers;
what are the effect and nature of these powers shall be considered in
its due place. The matter upon which I now insist is simply this: the
new constitution does in any case transfer the effective government of
Ireland from the Imperial Parliament to the Irish Parliament. The
authority reserved to the Imperial Parliament may be termed supremacy,
or sovereignty, or may be described by any other fine-sounding name
which we are pleased to use, but the fact remains unaltered that, as
long as the new constitution stands and works, the Imperial Parliament
will not govern Ireland in the sense in which it governs England and
Scotland, and that such authority as it exerts in Ireland will be
analogous not to the power which it now exercises there, but to the
influence which it possesses in Canada or in New Zealand.[19]
The new constitution is at bottom a federalist or semi-federalist
constitution; it introduces into English institutions many of the forms
of federalism and still more of its spirit.
The Parliament sitting at Westminster becomes for the first time a
Federal Congress.
Of its members, 567 will represent Great Britain; 80 will represent
Ireland. The exact numbers are for the present purpose insignificant.
The serious matter is that the Imperial Parliament undergoes an
essential change of character. The British members will have, or are
intended to have, no concern with the government of Ireland. The Irish
members ought to have nothing to do with the government of Great
Britain. On Imperial subjects the Imperial Parliament, or, to call it by
its proper name, the Federal Congress, votes as a whole; on Irish
subjects it does not vote at all; on British topics its British members
only vote. The British and the Irish members, in short, alike represent,
though in a very clumsy fashion, the States of a Confederacy. Though the
fact be artfully concealed, we have under the new constitution already,
in germ at least, a British State and an Irish State, a British
Parliament and an Irish Parliament, and a third body consisting of these
two Parliaments, which is the Imperial or Federal Parliament.[20]
The different features of federalism make their appearance though under
strange forms.
The constitution imposes Restrictions on the powers of the State
Governments and of the Federal Government.
This appears unmistakably in the limitations placed upon the authority
of the Irish Parliament.
These Restrictions, be they wise or unwise, politic or impolitic, are
perfectly in keeping with the constitutional arrangements of a Federal
Government, but are absolutely unknown to the theory and practice of
English parliamentary government.
The powers of the Imperial Parliament, it may be said, are under the new
constitution subject to no limitations. In words this assertion is true,
in substance it is false. If the constitution works properly the
Imperial Parliament will clearly be subject to the terms of the
Government of Ireland Act, 1893, or, in other words, of the Federal
Constitution. This subjection is not absolute; it is moral, not legal,
still it exists. A breach of the federal compact will be no light
matter.
The constitution again, as one would expect under a federal scheme,
provides for the enforcement of the compact.
In the case of Ireland this is manifest. The royal veto,[21] the power
of the Courts, and ultimately of the Privy Council, to pronounce on the
constitutionality of any Irish Act, and treat it as void if it is in
excess of the authority bestowed upon the Irish legislature, the
provisions for the legal determination of constitutional questions,[22]
the arrangements as to the payment of the Irish customs into the
Imperial Exchequer, the special and very anomalous position of the
Exchequer Judges, are all attempts, whatever be their worth, to restrain
the Irish legislature and government, or in effect the Irish people,
from the undue assertion of State rights.
Restraints again are placed on the unconstitutional action of the
Imperial or Federal Parliament. They are less obvious, but at least as
real and effectual as the safeguards against the breach of the
constitution by the Irish government or legislature. They are all summed
up in the presence of the Irish representatives at Westminster. The only
legitimate reason, if legitimate reason there be, for their presence is
the guardianship of Irish rights under the constitution. It is for them
to see that these rights are held sacred. No diminution thereof can take
place without either the assent of the Irish members or else the
existence of such a majority in the Parliament at Westminster as may
override the protests of Ireland.[23] No doubt this is not an absolute
security. But whoever considers the habits of English political life
will conclude that, except in the event of the Imperial Parliament being
resolved to suspend or destroy the constitution, there exists the
highest improbability that any inroad should be made upon the privileges
conferred under the new constitution upon Ireland. The security, though
not absolute, is a good deal better than any safeguard given by the Bill
that the State rights of Great Britain shall be duly respected by the
representatives from Ireland. Assume, however, that the constitution
works properly, and that all parties respect the spirit of its
provisions. The result is that the new constitution forms a fundamental
law, fixing the respective rights of Ireland, of Great Britain, of the
Irish Parliament, and of the Imperial Parliament.[24]
The federal arrangements which, utterly unknown as they are to our
institutions, form the foundation of the new constitution, are as
nothing compared with the recognition and fostering of the federal
spirit.
Great Britain and Ireland constitute for the first time in history a
confederation. The difference or opposition of their interests receives
legislative acknowledgment: each country is to possess in reality,
though not in name, State rights; each must rely upon the constitution
for the protection of these rights; each may suffer from the
encroachments of the Imperial or central power. Ireland may complain
that the Imperial Parliament by legislation, or the Privy Council by
judicial interpretation, encroaches on her guaranteed rights. Great
Britain may complain either that Irish members intermeddle in British
affairs, and thus British rights are violated, or that the Privy Council
so interprets the constitution that the prerogatives of the Central
Government (which be it remembered must in practice be identified with
the power of England) are unduly diminished. To imagine such complaints
is not to assume that the constitution works badly. They are of
necessity inherent in the federal system. There exists no federal
government throughout the world where such complaints do not arise, and
where they do not at times give rise to heart-burnings. It is well
indeed, judging from the lessons of history, if they do not produce
bitter conflicts, or even civil war. Let us take, however, the most
sanguine view possible. Let us grant that both in England and in Ireland
every minister, every legislator, every judge, is inspired with a spirit
of perfect disinterestedness and absolute fairness. This concession,
immense though it be, does not exclude vital differences of opinion. In
our new confederacy, as in every other, there will arise the contest
between State rights and federal rights, between the authority of the
Central Government and of the State Government. In any case, a whole
class of new difficulties and questions of a totally new description
will make their appearance in the field of English politics, and call
for the exercise on the part both of English and of Irish statesmen of
extraordinary wisdom and extraordinary self-control. The new
constitution in short, in virtue of its federal tendencies, will
revolutionise the public life of the United Kingdom.
From whatever side the matter be considered we arrive at the same
result. The Home Rule Bill is a new constitution; it subverts the bases
of the English constitution as we now know it, for it destroys
throughout Ireland the effective authority of the Imperial Parliament,
and turns the United Kingdom into a federal government of a new and
untried form.
The change may be necessary or needless, wise or unwise. The first and
most pressing necessity of the moment is that every elector throughout
the United Kingdom should, realise the immense import of the innovation.
It is a revolution far more searching than would be the abolition of the
House of Lords or the transformation of our constitutional monarchy into
a presidential republic.
The next point to which the attention of every man throughout the land
should be directed is, that the new constitution offered to us for
acceptance is unknown to any other civilised country. Parts of it are
borrowed from the United States; some of its provisions are imported
from the British colonies, whilst others are apparently the inventions
of the unknown and irresponsible Abbé Siéyès, who is the ingenious
constitution-maker of the Cabinet. But the new polity as a whole
resembles in its essence neither the American Commonwealth nor the
Canadian Dominion, nor the Government either of New Zealand or of any
other self-governing colony. It is an attempt--its admirers may think an
original and ingenious attempt--to combine the sovereignty of an
Imperial Parliament with the elaborate limitation and distribution of
powers which distinguish federal government. The whole thing is an
experiment and an experiment without precedent. Its novelty is not its
necessary condemnation, but neither on the other hand is innovation of
necessity the same thing as reform. The institutions of an ancient realm
are not exactly the _corpus vile_ on which theorists hard pressed by the
practical difficulties of the political situation can be allowed to try
unlimited experiments. We are bound to scrutinise with care every
provision of this brand-new polity. We are bound to consider what will
be their effect according to the known laws of human nature and under
the actual circumstances of the time. It is vain to tell us that many of
our institutions remain untouched. The introduction of new elements into
an old political system may revolutionise the whole; the addition of new
cloth to an old garment may, we all know, rend the whole asunder. There
is no need for panic; there is the utmost need for prudence.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] References made in this treatise to the Home Rule Bill are, unless
otherwise stated, made to the Bill as ordered to be printed by the House
of Commons, February 17, 1893. _A Leap in the Dark_ was published months
before the Bill was sent up as amended to the House of Lords.
[6] This is true of both of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bills, and must
necessarily be true of any Bill which satisfies even for a time the
wishes of Home Rulers.
[7] I have substituted New Zealand for Victoria as the example of a
typical self-governing colony; the position of Victoria has since 1900
been complicated by the country having become a State of the Australian
Commonwealth or Confederation.
[8] See Dicey, _Law of Constitution_ (7th ed.), ch. iii. pp. 136-140.
Compare Mill, _Rep. Government_, ch. xvii.
[9] For the sake of convenience I throughout this treatise refer to the
'Bill to amend the provision for the government of Ireland' under its
popular name of the Home Rule Bill, 1893, or simply the Bill. See the
Bill in Appendix.
[10] Bill, clause 5.
[11] (The constitutional history of Victoria affords a curious
illustration of what will certainly happen in Ireland.) In Victoria the
Legislature, though not termed a Parliament in the Constitution Act, 18
& 19 Vict, c. 54, has assumed, under a Victorian Act, the title of the
Parliament of Victoria. See Jenks, _Government of Victoria_, p. 236. Who
can doubt that the Irish Legislature will, by an Irish Act, give itself
the title of the Parliament of Ireland? I have therefore throughout
these pages called the Irish Legislature the Irish Parliament. Few
things are more absurd and more noteworthy than the deliberate refusal
of English Gladstonians to call the Irish Parliament by its right name.
They are willing to create an Irish Parliament; they are not willing to
admit that they have created it. See debates of May 9, in _The Times_,
May 10, 1893.
[12] See Bill, clauses 19, 27, 28, 30.
[13] Bill, clauses 3, 4.
[14] Bill, clause 2.
[15] This will perhaps be disputed. Trial by jury, it will be said, is
saved by the expression 'due process of law,' in clause 4, sub-clause
(5). But this contention is, in my judgment, unfounded, and its validity
must in any case be held open to extreme doubt.
[16] See Bill, clauses 10-19, and note especially clause 12, sub-clause
(I).
[17] _Ibid_, clauses 14-16.
[18] _Ibid_, clause 12, sub-clause (3).
[19] I am aware that to this statement moderate Gladstonians may take
exception. What may be the effect of the preamble which reserves the
supreme authority of Parliament or of Bill, clause 33, which recognises
the right of the Imperial Parliament to legislate for Ireland will be
most conveniently considered in the next chapter. In this chapter, be it
noted, I am concerned only with the constitution as it is intended to
work, and most Gladstonians will admit that as long as the Government of
Ireland, including in that expression both the Cabinet and the
Parliament, keeps within the terms of the Act, it is not intended that
the British Cabinet or Parliament shall, except in certain excepted
cases, intervene in Irish affairs.
[20] All the provisions which under clause 9 of the Home Rule Bill,
1893, in its earliest form, were intended to restrain Irish Peers, or
members representing Irish constituencies, from deliberating or voting
on any Bill or motion the operation of which should be confined to Great
Britain, were swept away by the Gladstonian majority before the Home
Rule Bill was sent up to the House of Lords. The unfairness of giving to
Ireland a Parliament intended to legislate on all, or nearly all, Irish
affairs, and at the same time retaining eighty Irish members at
Westminster with full power to legislate on all English and Scottish
affairs, secured in 1895 the enthusiastic approval by the British
electorate of the rejection of the Home Rule Bill of 1893 by the House
of Lords.
[21] See Bill, clause 5 (1).
[22] Bill, clauses 22, 23.
[23] 'The Imperial Parliament was supreme, but he held the passing of
the Home Rule Bill, reserving certain subjects to the Imperial
Parliament and committing others to the Parliament of Ireland, as
amounting to a compact which would be observed by men of common sense
that there would be no capricious or vexatious interference by this
Parliament with an action within the appointed sphere of the Parliament
of Ireland. If such interference were attempted, the presence in this
Parliament of eighty Irish members--a number which had been found to be
sufficient to initiate an Irish constitution--would be found sufficient
to protect an Irish constitution when it was given.'--Mr. Sexton, Feb.
13, 1893, _Times Parliamentary Debates,_ p. 318.
[24] For evidence that the power of the Imperial Parliament is intended
under the new constitution to be subjected to at any rate a moral limit,
the reader should note particularly the terms of the Home Rule Bill,
clause 12, sub-clause (3).