ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
After having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of Kant's
Ethics, I now turn to that which rests on it--his =leading principle
of Morals=. The latter is very closely connected with the former;
indeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together. We have seen
that the formula expressing the principle reads as follows: "Act only
in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a
general law for all rational beings." It is a strange proceeding for a
man, who _ex hypothesi_ is seeking a law to determine what he should
do, and what he should leave undone, to be instructed first to search
for one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible rational beings;
but we will pass over that. It is sufficient only to notice the fact
that in the above guiding rule, as put forth by Kant, we have obviously
not reached the moral law itself, but only a finger-post, or indication
where it is to be looked for. The money, so to say, is not yet paid
down, but we hold a safe draft for it. And who, then, is the cashier?
To say the truth at once: a paymaster in this connection surely very
unexpected, being neither more nor less than =Egoism=, as I shall
now demonstrate.
The precept, it is said, which =I can wish= were the guide of all
men's conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which =I can
wish= is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can
I truly wish, and what not? Clearly, in order to determine what I can
wish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion;
for without such I could never find the key to the instruction which
comes to me like a sealed order. Where, then, is this criterion to
be discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my Egoism, which is the
nearest, ever ready, original, and living standard of all volition, and
which has at any rate the _jus primi occupantis_ before every moral
principle. The direction for finding the real moral law, which is
contained in the Kantian rule, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit
assumption that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage.
Now because, in framing a precept to be generally followed, I cannot
regard myself as always active, but must contemplate my playing a
=passive= part _eventualiter_ and at times; therefore from this
point of view my =egoism= decides for justice and loving-kindness;
not from any wish to =practise= these virtues, but because it
desires to =experience= them. We are reminded of the miser, who,
after listening to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims:
"_Wie gründlich ausgeführt, wie schön!_--
_Fast möcht' ich betteln gehn."_
(How well thought out, how excellent!--
Almost I'd like to beg.)
This is the indispensable key to the direction in which Kant's leading
principle of Ethics is embedded; nor can he help supplying it
himself. Only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding
his precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found further on in
the text, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once
leaping to light, that here, after all, in spite of his grand _a
priori_ edifice, =Egoism= is sitting on the judge's seat, scales
in hand. Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided,
from the point of view of the _eventualiter_ passive side, that this
position holds good for the active _rôle_ as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R.,
p. 24) we read: "That I could not =wish= for a general law to
establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else
pay me back in the =same coin=." Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): "The
universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what
he likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the
promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might
be, impossible; for no one would =believe= it." On p. 56 (R., p.
50), in connection with the maxim of =hard-heartedness=, we find
the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict
itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and sympathy
of others, and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved
from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help,
which he desires." Similarly in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_
(Part I., vol. i., chap. 2, p. 123; R., p. 192): "If every one were to
regard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong
to such an order of things; would you be there with the concurrence
of your will?" _Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam_![1]
one could reply. These passages sufficiently show in what sense the
phrase, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood.
But it is in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_, that
this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In
§ 30 we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. If, however, a man
were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others,
all people would be justified in refusing him assistance. Thus this
rule of selfishness contradicts itself." =Would be justified=,
he says, =would be justified=! Here, then, it is declared, as
explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and
entirely on presupposed =reciprocity=; consequently it is utterly
selfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under
the condition of =reciprocity=, knows how to make a compromise
cleverly enough. Such a course would be quite in place if it were a
question of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but
not, when we come to construct those of ethics. In the _Grundlegung_,
p. 81 (R., p. 67), the following sentence occurs: "The principle of
always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish
were universally established as law--this is the only condition under
which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself." From what
has been said above, it will be apparent that the true meaning of the
word "antagonism" may be thus explained: if a man should sanction the
precept of injustice and hard-heartedness, he would subsequently, in
the event of his playing a =passive= part, recall it, and so his
will would =contradict= itself.
From this analysis it is abundantly clear that Kant's famous leading
principle is not--as he maintains with tireless repetition--a
=categorical=, but in reality a =hypothetical= Imperative;
because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be
established for what I do--inasmuch as I make it universal--shall
also be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this
condition, as the _eventualiter_ non-active party, =cannot=
possibly =wish= for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I
strike out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my surpassing
strength of mind and body, think of myself as always =active=,
and never =passive=; then, in choosing the precept which is to
be universally valid, if there exists no basis for ethics other than
Kant's, I can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness
should be the general rule, and consequently order the world
Upon the simple plan,
That they should take, who have the power,
And they should keep, who can.
--(WORDSWORTH.)
In the foregoing chapter we showed that the Kantian leading principle
of Ethics is devoid of all real foundation. It is now clear that to
this singular defect must be added, notwithstanding Kant's express
assertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical nature, whereby
its basis turns out to be nothing else than Egoism, the latter being
the secret interpreter of the direction which it contains. Furthermore,
regarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is only a
periphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known
rule: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another
what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); if, that is, by
omitting the _non_ and _ne_, we remove the limitation, and include the
duties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law. For it is
obvious that this is the only precept which I can wish should regulate
the conduct of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view of
the possibly =passive part= I may play, where my =Egoism=
is touched). This rule, _Quod tibi fieri, etc._, is, however, in its
turn, merely a circumlocution for, or, if it be preferred, a premise
of, the proposition which I have laid down as the simplest and purest
definition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical
systems; namely, _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva_ (do
harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your
power). The true and real substance of Morals is this, and never can
be anything else. But on what is it based? What is it that lends force
to this command? This is the old and difficult problem with which man
is still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we hear Egoism
crying with a loud voice: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si forte conducit,
laede_ (help nobody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any
advantage); nay more, Malice gives us the variant: _Immo omnes, quantum
potes, laede_ (but rather injure all people as far as you can). To
bring into the lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism
and Malice combined--this is the task of all Ethics. _Heic Rhodus, heic
salta!_[2]
The division of human duty into two classes has long been recognised,
and no doubt owes its origin to the nature of morality itself. We
have. (1) the duties ordained by law (otherwise called the--perfect,
obligatory, narrower duties), and (2) those prescribed by virtue
(otherwise called imperfect, wider, meritorious, or, preferably, the
duties taught by love). On p. 57 (R., p. 60) we find Kant desiring
to give a further confirmation to the moral principle, which he
propounded, by undertaking to derive this classification from it. But
the attempt turns out to be so forced, and so obviously bad, that
it only testifies in the strongest way against the soundness of his
position. For, according to him, the duties laid down by statutes rest
on a precept, the contrary of which, taken as a general natural law, is
declared to be quite =unthinkable= without contradiction; while
the duties inculcated by virtue are made to depend on a maxim, the
opposite of which can (he says) be conceived as a general natural law,
but cannot possibly be wished for. I beg the reader to reflect that the
rule of injustice, the reign of might instead of right, which in the
Kantian view is not even thinkable as a natural law, is in reality,
and in point of fact, the dominant order of things not only in the
animal kingdom, but among men as well. It is true that an attempt has
been made among civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by
means of all the machinery of state government; but as soon as this,
wherever, or of whatever kind, it be, is suspended or eluded, the
natural law immediately resumes its sway. Indeed between nation and
nation it never ceases to prevail; the customary jargon about justice
is well known to be nothing but diplomacy's official style; the real
arbiter is brute force. On the other hand, genuine, _i.e._, voluntary,
acts of justice, do occur beyond all doubt, but always only as
exceptions to the rule. Furthermore: wishing to give instances by way
of introducing the above-mentioned classification, Kant establishes the
duties prescribed by law first (p. 53; R., p. 48) through the so-called
duty towards oneself,--the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily,
if the pain outweigh the pleasure. Accordingly, the rule of suicide is
held to be not even =thinkable= as a general natural law. I, on
the contrary, maintain that, since here there can be no intervention
of state control, it is exactly this rule which is proved to be an
actually existing, unchecked natural law. For it is absolutely certain
(as daily experience attests) that men in the vast majority of cases
turn to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of the innate
instinct of self-preservation is distinctly overpowered by great
suffering. To suppose that there is any thought whatever that can have
a deferring effect, after the fear of death, which is so strong and
so closely bound up with the nature of every living thing, has shown
itself powerless; in other words, to suppose that there is a thought
still mightier than this fear--is a daring assumption, all the more so,
when we see, that it is one which is so difficult to discover that the
moralists are not yet able to determine it with precision. In any case,
it is certain that arguments against suicide of the sort put forward
by Kant in this connection (p. 53: R., p. 48, and p. 67; R., p. 57)
have never hitherto restrained any one tired of life even for a moment.
Thus a natural law, which incontestably exists, and is operative every
day, is declared by Kant to be simply =unthinkable= without
contradiction, and all for the sake of making his Moral Principle the
basis of the classification of duties! At this point it is, I confess,
not without satisfaction that I look forward to the groundwork which I
shall give to Ethics in the sequel. From it the division of Duty into
what is prescribed by law, and what is taught by love, or, better,
into justice and loving-kindness, results quite naturally though a
principle of separation which arises from the nature of the subject,
and which entirely of itself draws a sharp line of demarkation; so that
the foundation of Morals, which I shall present, has in fact ready to
hand that confirmation, to which Kant, with a view to support his own
position, lays a completely groundless claim.
[1] How rashly do we sanction an unjust law, which will come home to
ourselves!--(Hor., _Sat_., Lib. I., iii. 67.)
[2] "Here is Rhodes, here make your leap!" _I.e._, "Here is the place
of trial, here let us see what you can do!" This Latin proverb is
derived from one of Aesop's fables. A braggart boasts of having once
accomplished a wonderful jump in Rhodes, and appeals to the evidence
of the eye-witnesses. The bystanders then exclaim: "Friend, if this
be true, you have no need of witnesses; for this is Rhodes, and your
leap you can make here." The words are: _ἀλλ', ὦ ϕίλε, εἰ τοῡtο ἀληθές
ἐστιν, oὐδὲν δεῑ σοι μαρτύρων αὕtη γὰρ 'Rόδος καὶ πήδημα_. _V._
_Fabulae Aesopicae Collectae_. Edit. Halm, Leipzig: Teubner. 1875. Nr.
203b, p. 102. The other version of the fable (Nr. 203, p. 101) gives:
_ὦ oὗtos, eἰ ἀlêthès τoῡτ ἐstin, oὐdὲn deῑ soi martyrôn ἰdoὺ ἡ Ρόδος,
ἰdoὺ kaὶ τὸ πήδημα._--(_Translator_.)