ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
With the imperative Form of Ethics, which in Chapter II. we proved to
be a _petitio principii_, is directly connected a favourite idea of
Kant's, that may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes we see
a physician, after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous
success, henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases; to such
a one Kant may be likened. By separating the _a priori_ from the
_a posteriori_ in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and
pregnant discovery that Metaphysics can boast of. What wonder then
that thereafter he should try to apply this method, this sundering of
the two forms, everywhere, and should consequently make Ethics also
consist of two parts, a pure, _i.e._ an _a priori_ knowable part, and
an empirical? The latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the
purpose of founding Ethics. To trace out the former and; exhibit it by
itself is his purpose in the _Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten_,
which he accordingly represents as a science purely _a priori_, exactly
in the same way as he sets forth the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft_. He asserts in fact that the =Moral Law=,
which without warrant, without deduction, or proof of any sort, he
postulates as existing, is furthermore a Law knowable _a priori_ and
independent of all =internal= or =external experience=; it
"_rests_" (he says) "=solely on conceptions of pure Reason; and is
to be taken as a synthetic proposition a priori=" (_Kritik der
Praktischen Vernunft_: p. 56 of fourth Edition; R., p. 142). But
from this definition the implication immediately follows that such a
Law can only be formal, like everything else known _a priori_, and
consequently has only to do with the =Form= of actions, not
with their =Essence=. Let it be thought what this means! He
emphatically adds (p. vi of the preface to the _Grundlegung;_ R., p. 5)
that it is "useless to look for it either subjectively in man's nature,
or objectively in the accidents of the external world," and (preface
of the same, page vii; R., p. 6) that "nothing whatever connected
with it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, _i.e._, from
anthropology." On page 59 (R., p. 52) he repeats, "That one ought on no
account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of
morality from the special constitution of human nature"; and again, on
page 60 (R., p. 52), he says that, "Everything derived from any natural
disposition peculiar to man, or from certain feelings and propensities,
or indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature,
and not necessarily to be taken as the Will of =every rational
being=," is incapable of affording a foundation for the moral law.
This shows beyond all possibility of contradiction that Kant does not
represent the alleged moral law as a _fact of consciousness_, capable
of empirical proof--which is how the later would-be philosophers, both
individually and collectively, wish to pass it off. In discarding every
empirical basis for Morals, he rejects all internal, and still more
decidedly all external, experience., Accordingly he founds--and I call
special attention to this--his moral principle not on any provable
_fact of consciousness_, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet
upon any objective relation of things in the external world. No! That
would be an empirical foundation. Instead of this, _pure conceptions
a priori_, _i.e._, conceptions, which so far contain nothing derived
from internal or external experience, and thus are simply shells
without kernels--these are to be made the basis of Morals. Let us
consider the full meaning of such a position. Human consciousness as
well as the whole external world, together with all the experience and
all the facts they comprise, are swept from under our feet. We have
nothing to stand upon. And what have we to hold to? Nothing but a few
entirely abstract, entirely unsubstantial conceptions, floating in the
air equally with ourselves. It is from these, or, more correctly, from
the mere form of their connection with judgments made, that a _Law_ is
declared to proceed, which by so-called =absolute necessity= is
supposed to be valid, and to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on
the surging throng of human desires, on the storm of passion, on the
giant might of _egoism_. We shall see if such be the case.
With this preconceived notion that the basis of Morals must be
necessarily and strictly a priori, and entirely free from everything
empirical, another of Kant's favourite ideas is closely connected.
The moral principle that he seeks to establish is, he says, a
=synthetic proposition a priori, of merely formal contents=, and
hence exclusively a matter of =Pure Reason=; and accordingly,
as such, to be regarded as valid =not only for men=, but for
=all possible rational beings=; indeed he declares it to hold
good for man "on this account alone," _i.e._, because _per accidens_
man comes under the category of rational beings. Here lies the cause
of his basing the Moral principle not on any feeling, but on =pure
Reason= (which knows nothing but itself and the statement of its
antithesis). So that this =pure Reason= is taken, not as it
really and exclusively is--an intellectual faculty of man--but =as
a self-existent hypostatic essence=, yet without the smallest
authority; the pernicious effects of such example and precedent being
sufficiently shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day.
Indeed, this view of Morals as existing not for men, as men, but for
all rational beings, as such, is with Kant a principle so firmly
established, an idea so favourite, that he is never tired of repeating
it at every opportunity.
I, on the contrary, maintain that we are never entitled to raise
into a _genus_ that which we only know of in a single species. For
we could bring nothing into our idea of the _genus_ but what we had
abstracted from this one species; so that what we should predicate of
the _genus_ could after all only be understood of the single species.
While, if we should attempt to think away (without any warrant) the
particular attributes of the species, in order to form our _genus_,
we should perhaps remove the exact condition whereby the remaining
attributes, hypostatised as a _genus_, are made possible. Just as we
recognise =intelligence in general= to be an attribute of animal
beings alone, and are therefore never justified in thinking of it as
existing outside, and independent, of animal nature; so we recognise
=Reason= as the exclusive attribute of the human race, and have
not the smallest right to suppose that Reason exists externally to
it, and then proceed to set up a _genus_ called "Rational Beings,"
differing from its single known species "Man"; still less are we
warranted in laying down laws for such imaginary =rational beings
in the abstract=. To talk of rational beings external to men is
like talking of =heavy beings= external to bodies. One cannot
help suspecting that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim,
or at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the
reader. In any case this doctrine contains a tacit assumption of an
_anima rationalis,_ which as being entirely different from the _anima
sensitiva_, and the _anima vegetativa_, is supposed to persist after
death, and then to be indeed nothing else but _rationalis_. But in the
_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ Kant himself has expressly and elaborately
made an end of this most transcendent hypostasis. Nevertheless, in
his ethics generally, and in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_
especially, there seems always to hover in the background the thought
that the inner and eternal essence, of man consists of =Reason=.
In this connection, where the matter only occurs incidentally, I must
content myself with simply asserting the contrary. Reason, as indeed
the intellectual faculty as a whole, is secondary, is an attribute of
phaenomena, being in point of fact conditioned by the organism; whereas
it is the =Will= in man which is his very self, the only part of
him which is metaphysical, and therefore indestructible.
The success with which Kant had applied his method to the theoretical
side of philosophy led him on to extend it to the practical. Here
also he endeavoured to separate pure _a priori_ from empirical _a
posteriori_ knowledge. For this purpose he assumed that just as
we know _a priori_ the laws of Space, of Time, and of Causality,
so in like manner, or at any rate analogously, we have the moral
plumb-line for our conduct given us prior to all experience, and
revealed in a Categorical Imperative, an absolute "Ought." But how
wide is the difference between this alleged moral law _a priori_, and
our theoretical knowledge _a priori_ of Space, Time, and Causality!
The latter are nothing but the expression of the forms, _i.e._, the
functions of our intellect, whereby alone we are capable of grasping
an objective world, and wherein alone it can be mirrored; so that the
world (as we know it) is absolutely conditioned by these forms, and all
experience =must= invariably and exactly correspond to them--just
as everything that I see through a blue glass must appear blue. While
the former, the so-called moral law, is something that experience pours
ridicule on at every step; indeed, as Kant himself says, it is doubtful
whether in practice it has ever really been followed on any single
occasion. How completely unlike are the things which are here classed
together under the conception of =apriority=! Moreover, Kant
overlooked the fact that, according to his own teaching, in theoretical
philosophy, it is exactly the =Apriority= of our knowledge of
Time, Space, and Causality--independent as this is of experience--that
limits it strictly to phaenomena, _i.e._, to the picture of the world
as reflected in our consciousness, and makes it entirely invalid as
regards the real nature of things, _i.e._, as regards whatever exists
independently of our capacity to grasp it.
Similarly, when we turn to practical philosophy, his alleged moral
law, if it have an _a priori_ origin in ourselves, must also be only
phaenomenal, and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of
things. Only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest contradiction
as much to the facts themselves, as to Kant's view of them. For it is
precisely the moral principle in us that he everywhere (_e.g., Kritik
der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 175; R., p. 228) represents as being in
the closest connection with the real essence of things, indeed, as
directly in contact with it; and in all passages in the _Kritik der
Reinen Vernunft,_ where the mysterious Thing in itself comes forward a
little more clearly, it shows itself as the =moral principle= in
us, as =Will=. But of this he failed to take account.
In Chapter II. of this Part, I explained how Kant took over bodily
from theological Morals the =imperative form= of Ethics, _i.e._,
the conception of obligation, of law, and of duty; and how at the same
time he was constrained to leave behind that which in the realm of
theology alone lends force and significance to these ideas. But he
felt the need of some basis for them, and accordingly went so far as
to require that the _conception of duty_ itself should be also the
_ground of its fulfilment_; in other words, that it should itself be
its own enforcement. An action, he says (p. 11; R., p. 18), has no
genuine moral worth, unless it be done simply as a matter of duty,
and for duty's sake, without any liking for it being felt; and the
character only begins to have value, if a man, who has no sympathy in
his heart, and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings, and who
is =not by nature a lover of his kind=, is nevertheless a doer of
good actions, solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. This assertion,
which is revolting to true moral sentiment; this apotheosis of
lovelessness, the exact opposite, as it is, of the Christian doctrine
of Morals, which places love before everything else, and teaches that
without it nothing profiteth (1 Cor. xiii. 3); this stupid moral
pedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in two apposite epigrams,
entitled _Gewissensskrupel_ (Scruples of Conscience) and _Entscheidung_
(Decision).[1]
It appears that some passages in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_,
which exactly suit this connection, were the immediate occasion of the
verses. Thus, for instance, on p. 150 (R., p. 211) we find: "Obedience
to the moral law, which a man feels incumbent on him, is based not on
voluntary inclination, nor on endeavour willingly put forth, without
any authoritative command, but on a sense of duty." Yes, it must be
commanded! What slavish morality! And again on p. 213 (R., p. 257):
"Feelings of compassion, and of tender-hearted sympathy would be
actually troublesome to persons who think aright, because through such
emotions their well weighed maxims would become confused, and so the
desire would grow up to be rid of them, and to be subject solely to
the lawgiver--Reason." Now I maintain without hesitation that what
opens the hand of the above-described (p. 11; R., p. 18) loveless doer
of good, who is indifferent to the sufferings of other people, cannot
(provided he have no secondary motives) be anything else than a slavish
_δεισιδαιμονία_ (fear of the gods), equally whether he calls his fetich
"Categorical Imperative" or Fitzlipuzli.[2] For what but fear can move
a hard heart?
Furthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance with the above view,
we find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie, by
no means in the =intention= which led to it, but in the maxim
which was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the reader to
reflect that it is the =intention alone= which decides as to the
moral worth, or worthlessness, off an action, so that the same act
may deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which
determined it. Hence it is that, whenever men discuss a proceeding
to which some moral importance is attached, the =intention= is
always investigated, and by this standard alone the matter is judged;
as, likewise, it is in the _intention_ alone that every one seeks
justification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse, if its
consequence be mischievous.
On p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition of Duty, which
is the fundamental conception of Kant's entire ethical system. It is:
"The necessity of an action out of respect for the law." But what is
=necessary= takes place with absolute certainty while conduct
based on pure duty generally does not come off at all. And not only
this; Kant himself admits (p. 25; R., p. 28) that there are =no
certain instances= on record of conduct determined solely by pure
duty; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says: "It is utterly impossible to
know with certainty from experience whether there has ever really
been one single case in which an action, however true to duty, has
rested simply on its idea."--And similarly on p. 28 (R., p. 30)
and p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense then can =necessity= be
attributed to such an action? As it is only fair always to put the
most favourable interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose
him to mean that an act true to duty is =objectively= necessary,
but =subjectively= accidental. Only it is precisely this that
is more easily said than thought for where is the =Object= of
this =objective= necessity, the consequence of which for the
most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realised in objective
reality! With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but think that
the expression--=necessity of an action=--is nothing but an
artificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word "ought."[3]
This will become clearer if we notice that in the same definition the
word _Achtung_ (respect) is employed, where _Gehorsam_ (obedience) is
meant. Similarly in the note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read: "_Achtung_
signifies simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct
determination of the will by a law, and the consciousness that it is
so determined--this is what is denoted by _Achtung_" In what language?
In German the proper term is _Gehorsam_. But the word _Achtung_, so
unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place of
the word _Gehorsam._ It must serve some purpose; and this is obviously
none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form, and of
the conception of duty, from theological Morals; just as we saw above
that the expression "necessity of an action," which is such a forced
and awkward substitute for the word "shall," was only chosen because
"shall" is the exact language of the Decalogue. The above definition:
"Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law," would
therefore read in natural, undisguised, plain language: "Duty signifies
an action which =ought= to be done out of obedience to a law."
This is "the real form of the poodle."[4]
But now as to the Law, which is the real foundation stone of the
Kantian Ethics. =What does it contain? And where is it inscribed?=
This is the chief point of inquiry. In the first place, be it observed
that we have two questions to deal with: the one has to do with the
=Principle=, the other with the =Basis= of Ethics--two
entirely different things, although they are frequently, and sometimes
indeed intentionally, confused.
The principle or main proposition of an ethical system is the shortest
and most concise definition of the line of conduct which it prescribes,
or, if it have no imperative form, of the line of conduct to which it
attaches real moral worth. It thus contains, in the general terms of
a single enunciation, the direction for following the path of virtue,
which is derived from that system: in other words, it is the _ὅ,τι_[5]
of virtue. Whereas the =Basis= of any theory of Ethics is the
_διότι_[6] of virtue, the =reason= of the obligation enjoined,
of the exhortation or praise given, whether it be sought in human
nature, or in the external conditions of the world, or in anything
else. As in all sciences, so also in Ethics the _ὅ,τι_ must be clearly
distinguished from the _διότι_. But most teachers of Morals wilfully
confound this difference: probably because the _ὅ,τι_ is so easy, the
_διότι_ so exceedingly difficult, to give. They are therefore glad to
try to make up for the poverty on the one hand, by the riches on the
other, and to bring about a happy marriage between _Πενία_ (poverty)
and _Πόρος_ (plenty), by putting them together in one proposition.[7]
This is generally done by taking the familiar _ὅ,τι_ out of the simple
form in which it can be expressed, and forcing it into an artificial
formula, from which it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of
given premises; and the reader is led by this performance to feel
as if he had grasped not only the thing, but its cause as well. We
may easily convince ourselves of this by recalling all the most
familiar principles of Morals. As, however, in what follows I have
no intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort, but purpose
proceeding with all honesty and straightforwardness, I cannot make the
principle of Ethics equivalent to its basis, but must keep the two
quite separate. Accordingly, this _ὅ,τι_--_i.e._, the principle, the
fundamental proposition--as to which in its essence all teachers of
Morals are really at one, however much they may clothe it in different
costumes, I shall at once express in the form which I take to be
the simplest and purest possible, _viz.: Neminem laede, immo omnes,
quantum potes, juva_. (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people,
as far as lies in your power.) This is in truth the proposition which
all ethical writers expend their energies in endeavouring to account
for. It is the common result of their manifold and widely differing
deductions; it is the _ὅ,τι_ for which the _διότι_ is still sought
after; the consequence, the cause of which is wanting. Hence it is
itself nothing but the _Datum_ (the thing given), in relation to which
the _Quaesitum_ (the thing required) is the problem of every ethical
system, as also of the present prize essay. The solution of this
riddle will disclose the real foundation of Ethics, which, like the
philosopher's stone, has been searched for from time immemorial. That
the _Datum_, the _ὅ,τι_, the principle is most purely expressed by the
enunciation I have given, can be seen from the fact that it stands to
every other precept of Morals as a conclusion to given premises, and
therefore constitutes the real goal it is desired to attain; so that
all other ethical commandments can only be regarded as paraphrases, as
indirect or disguised statements, of the above simple proposition. This
is true, for instance, even of that trite and apparently elementary
maxim: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_[8] (Do not to
another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself.) The defect
here is that the wording only touches the duties imposed by law, not
those required by virtue;--a thing which can be easily remedied by
the omission of _non_ and _ne_. Thus changed, it really means nothing
else than: _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva._ But as
this sense is only reached by a periphrasis, the formula gains the
appearance of having also revealed its own ultimate foundation, its
_διότι_; which, however, is not the case, because it does not in the
least follow that, if I am unwilling that something be done to myself,
I ought not to do it to others. The same is true of every other
principle or leading proposition of Ethics that has hitherto been put
forward.
If we now return to the above question:--how does the law read, in
obeying which, according to Kant, duty consists? and on what is it
based?--we shall find that our philosopher, like most others, has in an
extremely artificial manner closely connected the principle of Morals
with its basis. I again call attention to what I have already examined
at the outset--I mean, the Kantian claim that the principle of Ethics
must be purely _a priori_ and purely formal, indeed an _a priori_
synthetical proposition, which consequently may not contain anything
material, nor rest upon anything empirical, whether objectively in
the external world, or subjectively in consciousness, such as any
feeling, inclination, impulse, and the like. Kant was perfectly aware
of the difficulty of this position; for on p. 60 (R., p. 53) he says:
"It will be seen that philosophy has here indeed reached a precarious
standpoint, which yet is to be immovable, notwithstanding that it
is neither dependent on, nor supported by, anything in heaven or on
earth." We shall therefore with all the greater interest and curiosity
await the solution of the problem he has set himself, namely, how
something is to arise out of nothing, that is, how out of purely _a
priori_ conceptions, which contain nothing empirical or material, the
laws of material human action are to grow up. This is a process which
we may find symbolised in chemistry, where out of three invisible gases
(Azote, Hydrogen, and Chlorine[9]), and thus in apparently empty space,
solid sal-ammoniac is evolved before our eyes.
I will, however, explain, more clearly than Kant either would or
could, the method whereby he accomplishes this difficult task. The
demonstration is all the more necessary because what he did appears
to be seldom properly understood. Almost all Kant's disciples have
fallen into the mistake of supposing that he presents his Categorical
Imperative directly as a fact of consciousness. But in that case
its origin would be anthropological, and, as resting on experience,
although internal, it would have an empirical basis: a position which
runs directly counter to the Kantian view, and which he repeatedly
rejects. Thus on p. 48 (R., p. 44) he says: "It cannot be empirically
determined whether any such Categorical Imperative exists everywhere";
and again, on p. 49 (R., p. 45): "The possibility of the Categorical
Imperative must be investigated entirely on _a priori_ grounds,
because here we are not helped by any testimony of experience as to
its reality." Even Reinhold, his first pupil, missed this point; for
in his _Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19.
_Jahrhunderts_, No. 2, p. 21, we find him saying: "Kant assumes the
moral law to be a direct and certain reality, an original fact of the
moral consciousness." But if Kant had wished to make the Categorical
Imperative a fact of consciousness, and thus give it an empirical
foundation, he certainly would not have failed at least to put it
forward as such. And this is precisely what he never does. As far as
I know, the Categorical Imperative appears for the first time in the
_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (p. 802 of the first, and p. 830 of the
fifth edition), entirely ex nunc (unexpectedly), without any preamble,
and merely connected with the preceding sentence by an altogether
unjustifiable "therefore."; It is only in the _Grundlage zur Metaphysik
der Sitten_--a book to which we here devote especial attention--that
it is first introduced expressly and formally, as a deduction from
certain concepts. Whereas in Reinhold's _Formula concordiae des
Kriticismus_,[10] we actually read on p. 122 the following sentence:
"We distinguish moral self-consciousness from the =experience=
with which it, as an original fact transcending all knowledge, is
bound up in the human consciousness; and we understand by such
self-consciousness the =direct consciousness of duty=, that is, of
the =necessity= we are under of admitting the legitimacy--whether
pleasurable or the reverse--of the will, as the stimulus and as the
measure of its own operations."
This would of course be "a charming _thesis_, with a very pretty
_hypothesis_ to boot."[11] But seriously: into what an outrageous
_petitio principii_ do we find Kant's moral law here developed! If
=that= were true, Ethics would indubitably have a basis of
incomparable solidity, and there would be no need of any questions
being set for prize essays, to encourage inquiry in this direction.
But the greatest marvel would be, that men had been so slow in
discovering such a fact of consciousness, considering that for the
space of thousands of years a basis for Morals has been sought after
with zealous patient toil. How Kant himself is responsible for this
deplorable mistake, I shall explain further on; nevertheless, one
cannot but wonder at the undisputed predominance of such a radical
error among his disciples. Have they never, whilst writing all their
numberless books on the Kantian philosophy, noticed the disfigurement
which the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ underwent in the second
edition, and which made it an incoherent, self-contradictory work?
It seems that this has only now come to light; and, in my opinion,
the fact has been quite correctly analysed in Rosenkranz's preface to
the second volume of his complete edition of Kant's works. We must,
however, remember that many scholars, being unceasingly occupied as
teachers and authors, find very little time left for private and exact
research. It is certain that _docendo disco_ (I learn by teaching) is
not unconditionally true; sometimes indeed one is tempted to parody
it by saying: _semper docendo nihil disco_ (by always teaching I
learn nothing); and even what Diderot puts into the mouth of Rameau's
nephew is not altogether without reason: "'And as for these teachers,
do you suppose they understand the sciences they give instruction
in? Not a bit of it, my dear sir, not a bit of it. If they possessed
sufficient knowledge to be able to teach them, they would not do so.'
'Why?' 'Because they would have devoted their lives to the study of
them.'"--(Goethe's translation, p. 104.) Lichtenberg too says: "I have
rather observed that professional people are often exactly those who
do not know best." But to return to the Kantian Ethics: most persons,
provided only the conclusion reached agrees with their moral feelings,
immediately assume that there is no flaw to be found in its derivation;
and if the process of deduction looks difficult, they do not trouble
themselves much about it, but are content to trust the faculty.
Thus the foundation which Kant gave to his moral law by no means
consists in its being proved empirically to be a fact of consciousness;
neither does he base it on an appeal to moral feeling, nor yet on
a _petitio principii_, under its fine modern name of an "absolute
Postulate." It is formed rather of a very subtle process of thought,
which he twice advances, on p. 17 and p. 51 (R., p. 22, and p. 46), and
which I shall now proceed to make clear.
Kant, be it observed, ridiculed all empirical stimuli of the will,
and began by removing everything, whether subjective or objective, on
which a law determining the will's action could be empirically based.
The consequence is, that he has nothing left for the substance of his
law but simply its =Form=. Now this can only be the abstract
conception of =lawfulness=. But the conception of lawfulness
is built up out of what is valid for all persons equally. Therefore
the substance of the law consists of the conception of what is
universally valid, and its contents are of course nothing else than its
=universal validity=. Hence the formula will read as follows: "Act
only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should
be a general law for all rational beings." This, then, is the real
foundation--for the most part so greatly misunderstood--which Kant
constructed for his principle of Morals, and therefore for his whole
ethical system. Compare also the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p.
61 (R., p. 147); the end of Note 1.
I pay Kant a tribute of sincere admiration for the great acumen he
displayed in carrying out this dexterous feat, but I continue in
all seriousness my examination of his position according to the
standard of truth. I will only observe--and this point I shall take
up again later on--that here =reason=, because, and in so far
as, it works out the above explained special ratiocination, receives
the name of =practical reason=. Now the Categorical Imperative
of Practical Reason is the law which results from this process of
thought. Consequently Practical Reason is not in the least what most
people, including even Fichte, have regarded it--a special faculty
that cannot be traced to its source, a _qualitas occulta_, a sort of
moral instinct, like Hutcheson's "moral sense"; but it is (as Kant
himself in his preface, p. xii. [R., p. 8], and elsewhere, often enough
declares) one and the same with =theoretical reason=--is, in fact,
=theoretical reason= itself, in so far as the latter works out the
ratiocinative process I have described. It is noticeable that Fichte
calls the Categorical Imperative of Kant an =absolute Postulate=
(_Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre_, Tübingen, 1802, p.
240, Note). This is the modern, more showy, expression for _petitio
principii_, and thus we see that he, too, regularly accepted the
Categorical Imperative, and consequently must be included among those
who have fallen into the mistake above criticised.
The objection, to which this Kantian basis of Morals is at once and
directly exposed, lies in the fact that such an origin of a moral law
in us is impossible, because of its assumption that man would quite
of his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for, and inquiring
after, a law to which his will should be subject, and which should
shape its actions. This procedure, however, cannot possibly occur to
him of itself; at best it could only be after another moral; stimulus
had supplied the first impulse and motive thereto; and such a stimulus
would have to be positively operative, and real; and show itself to be
such, as well as spontaneously influence, indeed force its presence
upon, the mind. But anything of this sort would run counter to Kant's
assumption, which, according to the chain of reasoning above described,
is to be regarded as itself the origin of all moral conceptions--in
fact, the _punctum saliens_ of Morality. Consequently, as long as there
is no such antecedent incentive (because, _ex hypothesi_, there exists
no other moral stimulus but the process of thought already explained),
so long Egoism alone must remain as the plumb-line of human conduct,
as the guiding thread of the law of motivation; so long the entirely
empirical and egoistic motives of the moment, alone and unchecked,
must determine, in each separate case, the conduct of a man; since,
on this assumption, there is no voice to arrest him, neither does any
reason whatever exist, why he should be minded to inquire after, to
say nothing of anxiously searching for, a law which should limit and
govern his will. And yet it is only possible on this supposition that
he should think out the above remarkable piece of mental legerdemain.
It matters not how far we may care to put a strict and exact
interpretation on this Kantian process, or whether we choose to tone it
down to some dim, obscurely felt operation of thought. No modification
of it can attack the primary truths that out of nothing, nothing
comes, and that an effect requires a cause. The moral stimulus, like
every motive that effects the will, must in all cases make itself felt
spontaneously, and therefore have a positive working, and consequently
be real. And because for men the only thing which has reality is the
empirical, or else that which is supposed to have a possibly empirical
existence, therefore it follows that the moral stimulus cannot but
be empirical, and show itself as such of its own accord; and without
waiting for us to begin our search, it must come and press itself upon
us, and this with such force that it may, at least possibly, overcome
the opposing egoistic motives in all their giant strength. For Ethics
has to do with actual human conduct, and not with the _a priori_
building of card houses--a performance which yields results that no man
would ever turn to in the stern stress and battle of life, and which,
in face of the storm of our passions, would be about as serviceable as
a syringe in a great fire.
I have already noticed above how Kant considered it a special merit of
his moral law that it is founded solely on abstract, pure _a priori_
conceptions, consequently on =pure reason=; whereby its validity
obtains (he says) not only for men, but for all rational beings as
such. All the more must we regret that pure, abstract conceptions _a
priori_, without real contents, and without any kind of empirical
basis can never move, at any rate, men; of other rational beings
I am of course incapable of speaking. The second defect, then, in
Kant's ethical basis is its lack of real substance. So far this has
escaped notice, because the real nature of his foundation has in all
probability been thoroughly understood only by an exceedingly small
number of those who were its enthusiastic propagandists. The second
fault, I repeat, is entire want of reality, and hence of possible
efficacy. The structure floats in the air, like a web of the subtlest
conceptions devoid of all contents; it is based on nothing, and can
therefore support nothing, and move nothing. And yet Kant loaded it
with a burden of enormous weight, namely, the hypothesis of the Freedom
of the Will. In spite of his oft declared conviction that freedom in
human action has absolutely no place; that theoretically not even its
possibility is thinkable (_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 168;
R., p. 223); that, if the character of a man, and all the motives which
work on him were exactly known, his conduct could be calculated as
certainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon (_ibidem_, p. 177;
R., p. 230): he nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom (although
only _idealiter_, and as a postulate) by his celebrated conclusion:
"You can, because you ought"; and this on the strength of his precious
ethical basis, which, as we see, floats in the air incorporeal. But if
it has once been clearly recognised that a thing =is not=, and
=cannot be=, what is the use of all the postulates in the world?
It would be much more to the purpose to cast away that on which the
postulate is based, because it is an impossible supposition; and this
course would be justified by the rule _a non posse ad non esse valet
consequentia_;[12] and by a _reductio ad absurdum_, which would at the
same time be fatal to the Categorical Imperative. Instead of which one
false doctrine is built up on the other.
The inadmissibility of a basis for Morals consisting of a few entirely
abstract and empty conceptions must have been apparent to Kant himself
in secret. For in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, where (as I
have already said) he is not so strict and methodical in his work, and
where we find him becoming bolder on account of the fame he had gained,
it is remarkable how the ethical basis gradually changes its nature,
and almost forgets that it is a mere web of abstract ideas; in fact,
it seems distinctly desirous of becoming more substantial. Thus, for
instance, on p. 81 (R., p. 163) of the above work are the words: "The
Moral Law =in some sort a fact of Pure Reason=." What is one to
think of this extraordinary expression? In every other place that which
is fact is opposed to what is knowable by pure reason. Similarly on
p. 83 (R., p. 164) we read of "a Reason which directly determines the
Will"; and so on.
Now let us remember that in laying his foundation Kant expressly and
repeatedly rejects every anthropological basis, everything that
could prove the Categorical Imperative to be a fact of consciousness,
because such a proof would be empirical. Nevertheless, his successors
were so emboldened by incidental utterances like the above that
they went to much greater lengths. Fichte in his work, _System der
Sittenlehre_, p. 49, warns us expressly "not to allow ourselves to be
misled into trying to explain, and derive from external sources, the
consciousness that we have duties, because this would be detrimental
to the dignity and absoluteness of the law." A very nice excuse! Again
on p. 66 he says: "The principle of Morality is a thought which is
based on the =intellectual intuition= of the absolute activity
of the intelligence, and which is directly conceived by the pure
intelligence of its own accord." What a fine flourish to conceal the
helplessness of this clap-trap! Whoever may like to convince himself
how Kant's disciples, little by little, totally forgot and ignored
the real nature of the foundation and derivation which their master
originally gave to the moral law, should read a very interesting essay
in Reinhold's _Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie im Anfange des_
19. _Jahrhunderts_, No. 2, 1801. In it, on pp. 105 and 106, it is
maintained "that in the Kantian philosophy Autonomy (which is the same
thing as the Categorical Imperative) is a fact of consciousness, and
cannot be traced further back, inasmuch as it declares itself by means
of a direct consciousness."
But in this case, it would have an anthropological, and consequently
empirical, foundation--a position which is diametrically opposed to
Kant's explicit and repeated utterances. Again, on p. 108 we find:
"Both in the practical philosophy of criticism, and in the whole of the
purified or higher transcendental philosophy, Autonomy is that which
is founded, and which founds, by itself alone; and which is neither
capable of, nor requires, any other foundation; it is that which is
absolutely original, true and certain _per se;_ the primal truth; the
_prius κατ' ἐξοχήν (par excellence)_; the absolute principle. Whoever,
therefore, imagines, requires, or seeks any basis for this Autonomy
external to itself, can only be regarded by the Kantian School as
wanting in moral consciousness;[13] or else as failing to interpret
this consciousness correctly, through the employment of false first
principles in his speculations. The School of Fichte and Schelling
declares him to be afflicted with a dulness of intellect that renders
him incapable of being a philosopher, and forms the characteristic of
the unholy _canaille_, and the sluggish brute, or (to use Schelling's
more veiled expression) of the _profanum vulgus_ and the _ignavum
pecus_." Every one will understand how much truth there can be in a
doctrine which it is sought to uphold by such defiant and dogmatic
rhetoric. Meanwhile, we must doubtless explain by the respect that this
language inspired, the really childish credulity with which Kant's
followers accepted the Categorical Imperative, and at once treated
it as a matter beyond dispute. The truth is that in this case any
objections raised to a theoretical assertion might easily be confounded
with moral obliquity; so that every one, although he had no very clear
idea in his own mind of the Categorical Imperative, yet preferred to
be silent, believing, as he did, in secret, that others were probably
better off, and had succeeded in evolving a clearer and more definite
mental picture of it. For no one likes to turn his conscience inside
out.
Thus in the Kantian School Practical Reason with its Categorical
Imperative appears more and more as a hyperphysical fact, as a Delphian
temple in the human soul, out of whose dark recesses proceed oracles
that infallibly declare not, alas! what will, but what ought to,
happen. This doctrine of Practical Reason, as a direct and immediate
fact, once it had been adopted, or rather introduced by artifice
combined with defiance, was unhappily later on extended also to
Theoretical Reason; and not unnaturally: for Kant himself had often
said that both are but one and the same Reason (_e.g_., Preface, p.
xii; R., p. 8). After it had been once admitted that in the domain of
the Practical there is a Reason which dictates _ex tripode_,[14] it was
an easy step to concede the same privilege to Theoretical Reason also,
closely related as the latter is to the former--indeed, consubstantial
with it. The one was thus pronounced to be just as immediate as the
other, the advantage of this being no less immense than obvious.
Then it was that all philosophasters and fancy-mongers, with J.H.
Jacobi--the denouncer of atheists--at their head, came crowding to
this postern which was so unexpectedly opened to them. They wanted
to bring their small wares to market, or at least to save what they
most valued of the old heirlooms which Kant's teaching threatened
to pulverise. As in the life of the individual a single youthful
mistake often ruins the whole career; so when Kant made that one
false assumption of a Practical Reason furnished with credentials
exclusively transcendent, and (like the supreme courts of appeal)
with powers of decision "without grounds," the result was that out of
the austere gravity of the Critical Philosophy was evolved a teaching
utterly heterogeneous to it. We hear of a Reason at first only dimly
"surmising," then clearly "comprehending" the "Supersensuous," and
at last endowed with a perfect "intellectual intuition" of it. Every
dreamer could now promulgate his mental freaks as the "absolute,"
_i.e._, officially issued, deliverances, and revelations of this
Reason. Nor need we be surprised if the new privilege was fully taken
advantage of.
Here, then, is the origin of that philosophical method which appeared
immediately after Kant, and which is made up of clap-trap, of
mystification, of imposture, of deception, and of throwing dust in the
eyes. This era will be known one day in the History of Philosophy as
"The Period of Dishonesty." For it was signalised by the disappearance
of the characteristic of honesty, of searching after truth in common
with the reader, which was well marked in the writings of all previous
philosophers. The philosophaster's object was not to instruct, but
to befool his hearers, as every page attests. At first Fichte and
Schelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man
who is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point
of talent--I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel. The Chorus is
composed of a mixed company of professors of philosophy, who in solemn
fashion discourse to their public about the Endless, the Absolute, and
many other matters of which they can know absolutely nothing.
As a stepping-stone to raise Reason to her prophetic throne a
wretched _jeu d'esprit_ was actually dragged in, and made to serve.
It was asserted that, as the word _Vernunft_ (Reason) comes from
_vernehmen_ (to comprehend), therefore _Vernunft_ means a capacity
to =comprehend= the so-called "Supersensuous," _i.e._,
_Νεϕελοκοκκυγία_,[15] or Cloud-cuckoo-town. This pretty notion met
with boundless, approval, and for the space of thirty years was
constantly repeated in Germany with immense satisfaction; indeed, it
was made the foundation of philosophic manuals. And yet it is as clear
as noon-day that of course _Vernunft_ (Reason) comes from. _vernehmen_
(to comprehend), but only because Reason makes man superior to animals,
so that he not only hears, but also =comprehends= (_vernimmt_)--by
no means, what is going on in Cloud-cuckoo-town--but what is said,
as by one reasonable person to another, the words spoken being
=comprehended= (_vernommen_) by the listener; and this capacity is
called _Reason_ (_Vernunft_).
Such is the interpretation that all peoples, ages, and languages
have put on the word Reason. It has always been understood to mean
the possession of general, abstract, non-intuitive ideas, named
=concepts=, which are denoted and fixed by means of words. This
faculty alone it is which in reality gives to men their advantage
over animals. For these abstract ideas, or concepts, that is, mental
impressions formed of the sum of many separate things, are the
condition of =language= and through it of actual =thought=;
through which again they determine the consciousness not only of the
present (which animals also have), but of the past and the future as
such; whence it results that they are the _modulus_, so to say, of
clear recollection, of circumspection, of foresight, and of intention;
the constant factor in the evolution of systematic co-operation, of
the state, of trades, arts, sciences, religions, and philosophies,
in short, of everything that so sharply distinguishes human from
animal life. Beasts have only intuitive ideas, and therefore also
only intuitive motives; consequently the dependence of their volition
on motives is manifest. With man this dependence is no less a fact;
he, too (with due allowance for individual character), is affected
by motives under the strictest law of necessity. Only these are
for the most part not _intuitive_ but _abstract_ ideas, that is,
conceptions, or thoughts, which nevertheless are the result of previous
intuitions, hence of external influences. This, however, gives him
a relative freedom--relative, that is, as compared with an animal.
For his action is not determined (as it is in all other creatures) by
the surroundings of the moment as intuitively perceived, but by the
thoughts he has derived from experience, or gained by instruction.
Consequently the motive, by which he, too, is necessarily swayed, is
not always at once obvious to the looker-on simultaneously with the
act; it lies concealed in the brain. It is this that lends to all his
movements, as well as to his conduct and work as a whole, a character
manifestly different from that observable in the habits of beasts. He
seems as though guided by finer, invisible threads; whence all his
acts bear the stamp of deliberation and premeditation, thus gaining
an appearance of independence, which sufficiently distinguishes them
from those of animals. All these great differences, however, spring
solely out of the capacity for =abstract ideas, concepts=. This
capacity is therefore the essential part of =Reason=, that is,
of the faculty peculiar to man, and it is called _το λόγιμον_,[16]
_το λογιστικον,_ =ratio, la ragione, il discorso, raison, reason,
discourse of reason=. If I were asked what the distinction is
between it and =Verstand=, _νοῡς_, =intellectus, entendement,
understanding=; I should reply thus: The latter is that capacity
for knowledge which animals also possess in varying degrees, and which
is seen in us at its highest development; in other words, it is the
direct consciousness of the law of =Causality=--a consciousness
which precedes all experience, being constituted by the very form
of the understanding, whose essential nature is, in fact, therein
contained. On it depends in the first place the intuitive perception of
the external world; for the senses by themselves are only capable of
=impression=, a thing which is very far from being =intuitive
perception=; indeed, the former is nothing but the material of the
latter: _νοῡς ὁρᾷ, καὶ νοῡς ἀκούει, τ'ἄλλα κωϕὰ καὶ τυϕλά._ (The mind
sees, the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind.) =Intuitive
perception= is the result of our directly referring the impressions
of the sense-organs to their cause, which, exactly because of this
act of the intelligence, presents itself as an =external object=
under the mode of intuition proper to us, _i.e._, in =space=.
This is a proof that the Law of Causality is known to us _a priori_,
and does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch
as it presupposes intuitive perception, is only possible through the
same law. All the higher qualities of the intellect, all cleverness,
sagacity, penetration, acumen are directly proportional to the
exactness and fulness with which the workings of Causality in all its
relations are grasped; for all knowledge of the =connection=
of things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the
comprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which
it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another
in =understanding=, shrewdness, cunning. On the other hand, the
epithet =reasonable= has at all times been applied to the man who
does not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions, but by
=thoughts= and =conceptions=, and who therefore always sets
to work logically after due reflection and forethought. Conduct of this
sort is everywhere known as =reasonable=. Not that this by any
means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows. On the contrary,
it is quite possible to act in the most reasonable way, that is,
according to conclusions scientifically deduced, and weighed with the
nicest exactitude; and yet to follow the most selfish, unjust, and even
iniquitons maxims. So that never before Kant did it occur to any one
to identify just, virtuous, and noble conduct with =reasonable=;
the two lines of behaviour have always been completely separated, and
kept apart. The one depends on the =kind of motivation=; the
other on the difference in fundamental principles. Only after Kant
(because he taught that virtue has its source in Pure Reason) did the
virtuous and the reasonable become one and the same thing, despite the
usage of these words which all languages have adopted--a usage which
is not fortuitous, but the work of universal, and therefore uniform,
human judgment. "Reasonable" and "vicious" are terms that go very
well together; indeed great, far-reaching crimes are only possible
from their union. Similarly, "unreasonable" and "noble-minded" are
often found associated; _e.g._, if I give to-day to the needy man
what I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he; or,
if I am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum
which my creditor is waiting for; and such cases could be multiplied
indefinitely.
We have seen that this exaltation of Reason to be the source of all
virtue rests on two assertions. First, as =Practical Reason=,
it is said to issue, like an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely
_a priori._ Secondly, taken in connection with the false explanation
of =Theoretical Reason=, as given in the _Kritik der Reinen
Vernunft_, it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned
with the =Unconditioned=, as manifested in three alleged Ideas[17]
(the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises
_a priori_). And we found that this position, as an _exemplar vitiis
imitabile_,[18] led our muddy-headed philosophers, Jacobi at their
head, from bad to worse. They talked of =Reason= (_Vernunft_)
as directly comprehending (_vernehmend_) the "=Supersensuous=,"
and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has
to do essentially with things transcending all experience, _i.e._,
with metaphysics; and that it perceives directly and intuitively the
ultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the Supersensuous,
the Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now, had it been wished to use Reason,
instead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have
been met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special
organ, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world,
possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development; in
that case there would have to be just as complete agreement on
metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry; and
this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the
earth a large number of radically different religions, and a still
larger number of radically different systems of philosophy. Indeed,
we may rather suppose that, if any one were found to differ from the
rest in his religious or philosophical views, he would be at once
regarded as a subject for mental pathology. Nor would the following
plain reflection have failed to present itself. If we discovered a
species of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting,
or building, or for any other purpose; we should immediately admit
that it was endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we meet with
savages destitute of all metaphysics, or of all religion (and there are
such); it does not occur to us to deny them Reason on that account.
The Reason that =proves= its pretended supersensuous knowledge
was duly brought back to bounds by Kant's critique; but Jacobi's
wonderful Reason, that directly =comprehends= the supersensuous,
he must indeed have thought =beneath= all criticism. Meanwhile, a
certain imperious and oracular Reason of the same kind is still, at the
Universities, fastened on the shoulders of our innocent youth.
NOTE.
If we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of Practical
Reason, we must trace its descent a little further back. We shall find
that it is derived from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted,
but which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly (indeed
he himself is not aware of it) at the root of his assumption of a
Practical Reason with its Imperatives and its Autonomy--a reminiscence
of a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called Rational Psychology,
according to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous
substances--the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato was
the first to formulate this dogma, and he endeavoured to prove it
as an objective truth. But it was Descartes who, by working it out
with scientific exactness, perfectly developed and completed it. And
this is just what brought its fallacy to light, as demonstrated by
Spinoza, Locke, and Kant successively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza;
because his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his
master's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and expressly denied
the two Substances of Descartes, and took as his main principle the
following proposition: "_Substantia cogitans et substantia externa
una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attribute
comprehenditur._"[19] It was demonstrated by Locke; for he combated
the theory of innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous,
and taught that it is not impossible that Matter should think. And
lastly, it was demonstrated by Kant, in his _Kritik der Rationalen
Psychologie_, as given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were
the champions on the bad side; and this brought Leibnitz the undeserved
honour of being compared to the great Plato, who was really so unlike
him.
But to enter into details here would be out of place. According to
this Rational Psychology, the soul was originally and in its essence
a =perceiving= substance, and only as a consequence thereof did
it become possessed of volition. According as it carried on these two
modes of its activity, Perception and Volition, conjoined with the
body, or incorporeal, and entirely _per se_, so it was endowed with a
lower or higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like kind.
In its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself,
and without co-operation of the body. In this case it was _intellectus
purus_, being composed of concepts, belonging exclusively to itself,
and of the corresponding acts of will, both of which were absolutely
spiritual, and had nothing sensuous about them--the sensuous being
derived from the body.[20] So that it perceived nothing else but pure
Abstracts, Universals, innate conceptions, _aeternae veritates_,
etc.; wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely
spiritual ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's =lower=
faculty of Perception and Volition was the result of its working in
concert and close union with the various organs of the body, whereby a
prejudicial effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity.
Here, _i.e._, to this =lower= faculty, was supposed to belong
every =intuitive= perception, which consequently would have
to be obscure and confused, while the =abstract=, formed by
separating from objects their qualities, would be clear! The will,
which was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned, formed
the lower Volition, and it was for the most part bad; for its acts
were guided by the impulse of the senses; while the other will (the
higher) was untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and appertained
only to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of the Cartesians has been
best expounded by De la Forge, in his _Tractatus de Mente Humana_,
where in chap. 23 we read:[21] _Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae
appellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per judicia, quae
formantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum; et quae appetitus
rationalis nominatur, cum mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis,
independenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae inclinationum
ejus sunt causae.... Id, quod occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae
voluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur,
est, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur, quia propositum, quod mens
superaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum
cogitationibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur, per
quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum ratio ejus earn aliud
optare facit._
Out of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose Kant's
doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will, which, as the mouth-piece of
Pure, Practical Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings as
such, and recognises nothing but =formal= motives, as opposed
to =material=; the latter determining only the lower faculty of
desires, to which the higher is hostile. For the rest, this whole
theory, which was not really systematically set forth till the time
of Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as far back as Aristotle.
In his _De Anima_ I. 1, it is sufficiently clearly stated; while
Plato in the _Phaedo_ (pp. 188 and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already
paved the way, with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to
great perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find it a hundred
years later waxed bold and strong, and occupying the foremost place;
but precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An
excellent _résumé_ of the view which then prevailed is presented in
Muratori's _Della Forza della Fantasia,_ chaps. 1-4 and 13. In this
work the imagination is regarded as a purely material, corporeal organ
of the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its function being to
intuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses;
and nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting,
and determining. It must have been felt how obviously this position
involves the whole subject in doubt. For if Matter is capable of the
intuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity, it is
inconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this
intuition; wherefrom everything else would follow. Abstraction is of
course nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to
things which are not necessary for general purposes, in other words,
the individual and special differences. For instance, if I disregard,
or abstract, that which is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel,
etc., I reach the conception of ruminants. By this operation the ideas
lose their intuitiveness, and as merely abstract, non-intuitive notions
or concepts, they require words to fix them in the consciousness, and
allow of their being adequately handled. All this shows that Kant
was still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time
doctrine, when he propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives.
[1] These epigrams form the close of Schiller's poem "Die Philosophen,"
which is worth reading in this connection--(_Translator_.)
[2] More correctly, Huitzilopochtli: a Mexican deity.
[3] Or "shall," as in the "thou shall," of the Decalogue
--(_Translator_.)
[4] "_Des Pudels Kern_"; _V._ Goethe's _Faust_, Part I. _Studirzimmer._
Schopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the real meaning
out of Kant's language, just as Faust by his exorcism compels
Mephistopheles, who was in the form of a poodle, to resume his true
form.--(_Translator_.)
[5] _ὅ,τι_: _i.e._, the "what" a thing is; its principle, or
essence.--(_Translator_.)
[6] _διότι_: _i.e._, the "wherefore" of a thing; its _raison d'être,_
its underlying cause.--(_Translator_.)
[7] Schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous myth in
Plato's _Symposium_ Chap. 23 (Teubner's edition, Leipzig, 1875),
where Eros is represented as the offspring of _Πόρος_ and _Πενία_,
who on the birthday of Aphrodite were united in the garden of
Zeus.--(_Translator._)
[8] Hugo Grotius attributes it to the Emperor Severus.
[9] Azote=Nitrogen. The formula for Ammonium Chloride or Sal-ammoniac
is NH4Cl.--(_Translator_).
[10] To be found in the fifth number of the _Beiträge zur Uebersicht
der Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19. _Jahrhunderts_--a journal of the
greatest importance for critical philosophy.
[11] "_Einen erklecklichen_ SATZ, _ja, und der auch was_ SETZT."
SCHILLER.
[12] To argue from impossibility to non-existence is valid--_i.e._
the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe
conclusion.--(_Translator._)
[13]
_Dacht' ich's doch! Wissen sie nichts Vernünftiges mehr_
_zu erwidern,_
_Schieben sie's Einem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein_.
--SCHILLER, _Die Philosophen._
_Just as I thought! Can they give no more any answer of reason,_
_Quickly the ground is changed: Conscience, they say, is at fault._
--(_Translator._)
[14] As from the Pythian tripod: _i.e._,--with official authority, _ex
cathedra._
[15] _V_. Aristoph., _Aves_, 819 _et alibi_.--(_Translator_.)
[16] _λόγιμος_ means "remarkable," being never used in the sense of
"rational." _Tὸ logikὸn_ is perhaps a possible expression; the right
word is _λόγος_.--(_Translator_.)
[17] The three Ideas are: (1) The Psychological; (2) The Cosmological;
(3) The Theological. _V_. The Paralogisms of Pure Reasons, in the
Dialectics: _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ Part I.--(_Translator_.)
[18] An example easy to be imitated in its faults. _V_. Horace, _Ep._
Lib. I., xix. 17.--(_Translator_.)
[19] The thinking substance, and substance in extension are one and the
self-same substance, which is contained now under the latter attribute
(_i.e._, extension), now under the former (_i.e._, the attribute of
thinking).--_Ethica_, Part II., Prop. 7. Corollary.
[20] _Intellectio pura est intellectio, quae circa nullas imagines
corporeas versatur_. (Pure intelligence is intelligence that has
nothing to do with any bodily forms.)--Cart., _Medit_., p. 188.
[21] It is nothing but one and the same will, which at one time is
called sensuous desire, when it is stimulated by acts of judgment,
formed in consequence of perceptions of the senses; and which at
another time is called rational desire (_i.e._ desire of the reason),
when the mind forms acts of judgment about its own proper ideas,
independently of the thoughts belonging to, and mixed up with, the
senses; which thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies....
That these two diverse propensities of the will should be regarded as
two distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very often the
one is opposed to the other, because the intention, which is built
up by the mind on the foundation of its own proper perceptions, does
not always agree with the thoughts which are suggested to the mind by
the body's disposition; whereby it (the mind) is often constrained
to will something, while its reason makes it choose something
different.--(_Translator_.)