ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
Kant's _πρῶτον ψεῡδος_ (first false step) lies in his conception of
Ethics itself, and this is found very clearly expressed on page 62
(R., p. 54): "In a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned
with adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating
laws regarding that which =ought to take place, even if it never
does take place=." This is at once a distinct _petitio principii._
Who tells you that there are laws to which our conduct =ought= to
be subject? Who tells you that that =ought to take place, which in
fact never does take place=? What justification have you for making
this assumption at the outset, and consequently for forcing upon us,
as the only possible one, a system of Ethics couched in the imperative
terms of legislation? I say, in contradistinction to Kant, that the
student of Ethics, and no less the philosopher in general, must content
himself with explaining and interpreting that which is given, in
other words, that which really is, or takes place, so as to obtain an
=understanding= of it, and I maintain furthermore that there is
plenty to do in this direction, much more than has hitherto been done,
after the lapse of thousands of years. Following the above _petitio
principii_, Kant straightway, without any previous investigation,
assumes in the preface (which is entirely devoted to the subject),
that purely moral laws exist; and this assumption remains thenceforth
undisturbed, and forms the very foundation of his whole system. We,
however, prefer first of all to examine the conception denoted by the
word "law." The true and original meaning of the term is limited to
law as between citizens; it is the _lex_, _νόμος_, of the Romans and
Greeks, a human institution, and depending on human volition. It has
a secondary, derived, figurative, metaphorical meaning, when applied
to Nature, whose operations, partly known _a priori_, partly learnt
by experience, and which are always constant, we call natural laws.
Only a very small portion of these natural laws can be discerned _a
priori_, and with admirable acuteness, Kant set them apart, and classed
them under the name "Metaphysics of Nature." There is also undoubtedly
a law for the human will, in so far as man belongs to Nature; and
this law is strictly provable, admits of no exception, is inviolable,
and immovable as the mountains, and does not, like the Categorical
Imperative, imply a quasi-necessity, but rather a complete and absolute
one. It is the law of motivation, a form of the law of causation; in
other words, it is the causation which is brought about by the medium
of the understanding. It is the sole demonstrable law to which the
human will =as such= is subject. It means that every action can
only take place in consequence of a sufficient motive. Like causality
in general, it is a natural law. On the other hand, moral laws, apart
from human institution, state ordinance, or religious doctrine, cannot
rightly be assumed as existing without proof. Kant, therefore, by
taking such laws for granted, is guilty of a _petitio principii_, which
is all the bolder, in that he at once adds (page vi of the preface)
that a moral law ought to imply "=absolute necessity=." But
"absolute necessity" is everywhere characterised by an inevitable chain
of consequence; how, then, can such a conception be attached to these
alleged moral laws (as an instance of which he adduces "thou shalt
not lie"[1])? Every one knows, and he himself admits, that no such
consecution for the most part takes place; the reverse, indeed, is the
rule.
In scientific Ethics before we admit as controlling the will other laws
besides that of motivation-laws which are original and independent of
all human ordinance--we must first prove and deduce their existence;
that is, provided in things ethical we are concerned not merely with
recommending honesty, but with practising it. Until that proof be
furnished, I shall recognise only one source to which is traceable
the importation into Ethics of the conception =Law, Precept,
Obligation=. It is one which is foreign to philosophy. I mean the
Mosaic Decalogue. Indeed the spelling "=du sollt="[2] in the
above instance of a moral law, the first put forward by Kant, naïvely
betrays this origin. A conception, however, which can\ point to no
other source than this, has no right, without undergoing further
scrutiny, thus to force its way into philosophical Ethics. It will
be rejected, until introduced by duly accredited proof. Thus on the
threshold of the subject Kant makes his first _petitio principii_, and
that no small one.
Our philosopher, then, by begging the question in his preface, simply
assumes the conception of =Moral Law= as given and existing
beyond all doubt; and he treats the closely related conception of Duty
(page 8, R., p. 16) exactly in the same way. Without subjecting it
to any further test, he admits it forthwith as a proper appurtenance
of Ethics. But here, again, I am compelled to enter a protest. This
conception, equally with the kindred notions of =Law, Command,
Obligation=, etc., taken thus unconditionally, has its source in
theological morals, and it will remain a stranger to philosophical
morals, so long as it fails to furnish sufficient credentials drawn
either from man's nature, or from the objective world. Till then, I
can only recognise the Decalogue as the origin of all these connected
conceptions. Since the rise of Christianity there is no doubt that
philosophical has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics.
And since the latter is essentially dictatorial, the former appears in
the shape of precepts and inculcation of Duty, in all innocence, and
without any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction is needful for
this _rôle_; rather does she suppose it to be her proper and natural
form. It is true that all peoples, ages, and creeds, and indeed all
philosophers (with the exception of the materialists proper) have
undeniably recognised that the ethical significance of human conduct is
a metaphysical one, in other words, that it stretches out beyond this
phaenomenal existence and reaches to eternity; but it is equally true
that the presentment of this fact in terms of Command and Obedience, of
Law and Duty, is no part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from
the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung, these conceptions
lose in reality all meaning, and to attempt a substitute for the
former by talking with Kant of =absolute= obligation and of
=unconditioned= duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay
more, is to give him a _contradictio in adjecto_[3] to digest.
Every obligation derives all sense and meaning; simply and solely from
its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, long
before Kant was thought of, Locke says: "For since it would be utterly
in vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without
annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his
will; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or
punishment annexed to that law." (_Essay on the Human Understanding_,
Bk. II., ch. 33, § 6). What =ought= to be done is therefore
necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use
Kant's language, it is essentially and inevitably =hypothetical=,
and never, as he maintains, =categorical=. If we think away these
conditions, the conception of obligation becomes void of sense; hence
absolute obligation is most certainly a _contradictio in adjecto._
A commanding voice, whether it come from within, or from without,
cannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising.
Consequently obedience to it, which may be wise or foolish according
to circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness, and therefore
morally worthless.
The complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an
=unconditioned obligation=, which lies at the root of the Kantian
Ethics, appears later in the system itself, namely in the _Kritik der
Praktischen Vernunft_: just as some concealed poison in an organism
cannot remain hid, but sooner or later must come out and show itself.
For this =obligation=, said to be so =unconditioned=,
nevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background; it
assumes a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be
rewarded.
This is of course unavoidable, if one really makes Duty and Obligation
the fundamental conception of Ethics; for these ideas are essentially
relative, and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty
or the promised reward. The guerdon which is assumed to be in store
for virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works
for nothing. It is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the
name of the =Highest Good=, which is the union of Virtue and
Happiness. But this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that
derives its origin from Happiness, which means, a morality resting on
selfishness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which Kant had solemnly
thrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder, only to
let it creep in again by the postern under the name of the =Highest
Good=. This is how the assumption of =unconditioned absolute
obligation=, concealing as it does a contradiction, avenges itself.
=Conditioned= obligation, on the other hand, cannot of course be
any first principle for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for
reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as
such is without any real moral value. All this makes it clear that a
nobler and wider view of Ethics is needed, if we are in earnest about
our endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conduct--a
significance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal.
As all obligation is entirely dependent on a condition, so also is
all duty. Both conceptions are very closely related, indeed almost
identical. The only difference between them might be said to be that
obligation in general may rest on mere force, whereas duty involves
the sense of obligation deliberately undertaken, such as we see
between master and servant, principal and subordinate, rulers and the
ruled. And since no one undertakes a duty _gratis,_ every duty implies
also a right. The slave has no duties, because he has no rights; but
he is subject to an obligation which rests on sheer force. In the
following Part I shall explain the only meaning which the conception
"=Duty=" has in Ethics.
If we put Ethics in an =imperative= form, making it a Doctrine of
Duties, and regard the moral worth or worthlessness of human conduct
as the fulfilment or violation of duties, we must remember that this
view of Duty, and of Obligation in general, is undeniably derived
solely from theological Morals, and primarily from the Decalogue,
and consequently that it rests essentially and inseparably on the
assumption of man's dependence on another will which gives him commands
and announces reward or punishment. But the more the assumption of
such a will is in Theology positive and precise, the less should it
be quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philosophical Morals.
Hence we have no right to assume beforehand that for the latter the
=imperative Form=, the ordaining of commands, laws, and duties
is an essential and a matter of course; and it is a very poor shift
to substitute the word "absolute" or "categorical" for the external
condition which is indissolubly attached to such conceptions by
their very nature: for this gives rise, as explained above, to a
_contradictio in adjecto_.
Kant, then, without more ado or any close examination, borrowed
this =imperative Form= of Ethics from theological Morals. The
hypotheses of the latter (in other words, Theology) really lie at
the root of his system, and as these alone in point of fact lend
it any meaning or sense, so they cannot be separated from, indeed
are implicitly contained in, it. After this, when he had expounded
his position the task of developing in turn a Theology out of his
Morals--the famous _Moraltheologie_--was easy enough. For the
conceptions which are implicitly involved in his Imperative, and which
lie hidden at the base of his Morals, only required to be brought
forward and expressed explicitly as postulates of Practical Reason. And
so it was that, to the world's great edification, a Theology appeared
depending simply on Ethics, indeed actually derived therefrom. But
this came about because the ethical system itself rests on concealed
theological hypotheses. I mean no derisive comparison, but in its form
the process is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares a surprise
for us, when he lets us find something where he had previously employed
his art to place it. Described in the abstract, Kant's procedure is
this: what ought to have been his first principle, or hypothesis
(_viz_., Theology) he made the conclusion, and what ought to have been
deduced as the conclusion (_viz_., the Categorical Command) he took as
his hypothesis.[4] But after he had thus turned the thing upside down,
nobody, not even he himself, recognised it as being what it really was,
namely the old well-known system of theological Morals. How this trick
was accomplished we shall consider in the sixth and seventh chapters of
the present Part.
Ethics was of course frequently put in the imperative form, and treated
as a doctrine of duties also in pre-Kantian philosophy; but it was
always then based upon the will of a God whose existence had been
otherwise proved, and so there was no inconsequence. As soon, however,
as the attempt was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation to
Ethics independent of this will, and establish it without metaphysical
hypotheses, there was no longer any justification for taking as its
basis the words "thou shalt," and "it is thy duty" (that is, the
imperative form), without first deducing the truth thereof from some
other source.
[1] Du sollt (_sic_) nicht lügen.
[2] Sollt is the old form for "_sollst_." Cf. Eng., _shalt_: Icel;
_skalt_--(_Translator_.)
[3] A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs when the epithet
applied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning.--(_Translator_.)
[4] Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this Kantian
inversion is not necessarily true; its validity, in fact, depends
on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis.
--(_Translator_.)