THE BASIS OF MORALITY
BY
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
_Translated with Introduction and Notes by_
ARTHUR BRODRICK BULLOCK, MA.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE
LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED
PATERNOSTER SQUARE
1903
PRIZE ESSAY
ON
THE BASIS OF MORALITY
NOT APPROVED
BY
THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES
COPENHAGEN, 30 _January_, 1840.
"To preach Morality is easy, to found it difficult.--"
(SCHOPENHAUER: _Ueber den Willen in der Natur_; p. 128)
MATRI CARISSIMAE.
CONTENTS.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
THE QUESTION
PART I.
_INTRODUCTION._
I. THE PROBLEM
II. GENERAL RETROSPECT
PART II.
_CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS._
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
II. ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS
III. ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR
IV. ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
NOTE.
V. ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS
VI. ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS
VII. KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE
VIII. KANT'S DOCTRINE OP THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER,
THEORY OF FREEDOM
NOTE
IX. FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN
PART III.
_THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS._
I. CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM
II. SCEPTICAL VIEW
III. ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES
IV. CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH
V. STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE
VI. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE
VII. THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS
VIII. THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE
IX. ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.
PART IV.
_ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON._
I. HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD
II. THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK
JUDICIUM REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
This translation was undertaken in the belief that there are many
English-speaking people who feel more than a merely superficial
interest in ethical research, but who may not read German with
sufficient ease to make them care to take up the original. The
present Essay is one of the most important contributions to Ethics
since the time of Kant, and, as such, is indispensable to a thorough
knowledge of the subject. Moreover, from whatever point of view it be
regarded,--whether the reader find, when he closes the book, that his
conviction harmonises with the conclusion reached, or not; it would
be difficult to find any treatise on Moral Science more calculated
to stimulate thought, and lift it out of infantile imitation of some
prescribed pattern. The believer in the Kantian, or any other, basis of
Ethics, could hardly measure the strength or the weakness of his own
position more surely than by comparing it with the Schopenhauerian;
while he who is yet in search of a foundation will find much in the
following pages to claim his attention.
Those acquainted with the luminous imagery, the subtle irony, the
brusque and penetrating vigour of the German, will doubtless admit that
it is no easy task to reduce Schopenhauer to adequate English prose;
and if this has been attempted by the present writer, no one can be
more conscious than he of the manifold shortcomings discoverable. But
such as it is, the work is heartily offered to all who still follow the
true student's rule, "Gladig wolde he lerne und gladig teche," with
the single hope that it may help, however slightly, to widen their
knowledge, and ripen their judgment.
My friend, R. E. Candy, Esq., I.C.S., has kindly given me information
concerning several Indian names.
ROME: _June_, 1902.
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.
Ὃν δὲ θεοὶ τιμῶσιν, ὁ καὶ μωμεύμενος αἰνεῑ.
--Theognis: 169.
In 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject
for a prize competition, the question with which this treatise opens;
and Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of becoming
better known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of
"The Basis of Morality." In January, 1840, the work was pronounced
unsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In September of the
same year it was published by the author, with only a few unimportant
additions, but preceded by a long introduction, which, cast in the form
of an exceedingly caustic philippic, is, in its way, a masterpiece. In
1860, (only a month before Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition
was printed with many enlargements and insertions, the short preface,
dated August being one of the last things he wrote.[1]
The reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek, and need not
detain us. At that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with
Hegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte; hence it is easy to
imagine with what ruffled, not to say, scandalised feelings the Academy
must have risen from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting Hegel
and Fichte out of the question, the position advanced was in 1840 so
new, indeed so paradoxical (as Schopenhauer himself admits); there is
at times such an aggressiveness in the style; the whole essay is so
much more calculated to startle than to conciliate; that we cannot feel
much surprise at the official decision.
In the Judgment published by the Society three reasons are given for
its unfavourable attitude. The second is declared to be not only
dissatisfaction with the mode of discussion (_ipsa disserendi forma_),
but also inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his case. As the
third is alleged the "unseemly" language employed in connection with
certain "_summi philosophi_" (Hegel and Fichte). These two objections
are of course in themselves perfectly legitimate, and how far the
Academy was right or wrong may be left for the reader to determine.
But the first reason stated is of a different kind, and affords as neat
an instance of self-stultification proceeding _ex cathedra_ as can well
be found. It is true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but
if it means anything, it asks where the "_philosophiae moralis fons
et fundamentum_"--the foundation of moral science--is to be sought
for, _i.e._, where it is to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read:
"He" (Schopenhauer) "has omitted to deal with the essential part of
the question, apparently thinking that he was required to establish
some fundamental principle of Ethics": which he was required to do,
unless the Society's Latin is borrowed from _Νεϕαλοκοκκυγία._ And then
it goes on to declare that he treated as secondary, indeed as an _opus
supererogationis,_ the very thing which the Academy intended should
occupy the first place, namely, the connection between Metaphysics
and Ethics.[2] But the "_metaphysicae et ethicae nexus_," so far from
being formulated in the question as the chief point to be considered,
is not even mentioned! The Society thus denies having asked what it
actually did ask, while the discussion, which it asserts was specially
indicated, is not suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is
sufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to enlarge upon which
would here be out of place.[3]
It is not intended to offer any criticism either on Schopenhauer's main
position in this essay, or on the various side-issues involved. The
reader is supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of
his philosophy, as contained in _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,
and is invited to be the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on
the structure and general trend of the work may not be amiss.
After preliminary considerations, partly to show the difficulty of the
subject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with
a searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle
of his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I.-VI.)[4]
Schopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very
cleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological
basis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible,
clothes' peg for the former; and that Kant's _tour de main_ of deducing
his Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory
of Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural
element which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court
of justice holding secret session in the breast, is examined, and
eliminated; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of
ourselves through our acts.
But if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly unfavourable to
Kant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree with him on one point, namely, the
theory of Freedom, to a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter
VIII.). He points out that the solution of this question is found in
the doctrine of the co-existence of Liberty and Necessity: according to
which the basis of our nature, the so-called Intelligible Character,
that lies outside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely, Time,
Space, and Causality, is transcendentally free; while the Empirical
Character, together with the whole person, being, as a phaenomenon,
the transient objectivation of the Intelligible Character, under the
laws of the _principium individuationis_, is strictly determined.[5]
Part II. closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of Fichte
(Chapter IX.). His proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying
glass for Kant. By means of this powerful human lens we can see the
monstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet creations are capable of
developing. Thus we find the Categorical Imperative become a Despotic
Imperative, the "Absolute Ought" grown into a fathomless inscrutable
_Εἱμαρμένη_, etc.
With Part III. we reach the positive part of the work. Schopenhauer
begins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis
for Ethics that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive
perception. Such (he says) can never be any artificial formula, which
surely crumbles to powder beneath the rough touch of real life;
rather must it be something springing out of the heart of things, and
therefore lying at the root of man's nature. But is there, he asks
(Chapter II.), after all, such a thing as natural morality? Is anything
good ever done absolutely without an egoistic motive? The conclusion
arrived at is that, although much may be, and has been, at all times,
said in favour of the Sceptical View, and although this view is in
fact true as regards the greater number of apparently unselfish
acts, yet there can be no doubt that truly moral conduct does occur,
that deeds of justice and loving-kindness are occasionally performed
without the smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment involved
in their omission. The last paragraph of chis chapter is important
because it puts in the clearest light what, according to Schopenhauer,
is the end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is =not= to treat of that
which people =ought to do= (for "ought" has no place except in
theological Morals, whether explicit, or implicit); but "to point out
all the varied moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to
trace them to their ultimate source." This definition, which assigns no
educative function to Ethics, strictly agrees with the doctrine of the
unchangeableness of character. (_V_. Chapter IX. of this Part.)
Our philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.) that there are two
fundamental "antimoral" incentives in man's nature: Egoism and Malice.
Be it, however, here remarked that a still simpler classification would
reduce these two to one. Malice may well be regarded as nothing but
Egoism carried to its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It is
a distinct source of gratification to certain natures to witness the
suffering of another; because a diminution of the latter's capacity
for action, whether effected by itself, or not, is regarded by an ego
of this kind as an increase of its own power to do as it likes,--as an
enhancement of its own glorification.
In Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to
be the absence of all egoistic motivation; and in Chapters V.-VII.,
by a process of careful reasoning, every human act is traced to one
of three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism, (2) Malice, and (3)
Compassion; or to a combination of (1) and (3), or (1) and (2).[6] Of
these the third is shown to be the only counter-motive to the first
and second, and in fact the sole source of the two cardinal virtues,
justice and loving-kindness, which are explained as the manifestation
of Compassion in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In
the course of the demonstration the question as to how far a lie is
legitimate comes incidentally under discussion; as also the theory of
Duty; duties being defined as "actions, the simple omission of which
constitutes a wrong." (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.)
The position now reached, namely, that Compassion is the one and only
fount of true morality, because it is the sole non-egoistic source of
action, is (says Schopenhauer) a strange paradox; hence the testimony
of experience and of universal human sentiment is appealed to, in
confirmation of it, under nine different considerations (Chapter
VIII.). They are as follows:--
(1) An imaginary case.
(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency in Compassion, is the
mark of the deepest moral depravity. Therefore the real moral incentive
must be Compassion.
(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly effective spring of moral conduct.
(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things is the surest and most
certain token of a really good man.
(5) The evidence of separate matters of detail.
(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher power; it is more
obviously the root of loving-kindness than of justice.
(7) Compassion does not stop short with men; it includes all living
beings.
(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of view, Compassion is
the best possible antidote to Egoism, no less than the most soothing
balsam for the world's inevitable suffering.
(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as passages from the
Paṅća-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian, Stobaeus, and Lessing; and reference
is made to Chinese Ethics and Hindu customs.
Part III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into the Ethical
Difference of Character. The theory that this difference is innate
and immutable is supported by numerous extracts from various writers
of all periods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the evidence
accumulated hardly amounts to more than so many hints and indications,
and the matter (says Schopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained
by Kant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical Character. (Cf.
Part II., Chapter VIII.) According to this, the ethical difference
between man and man is an original and ultimate datum, caused by
the transcendentally free act of the Intelligible Character, that
is, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaenomena; the Empirical
Character being, so to say, the reflection of the Intelligible,
mirrored through the functions of our perceptive faculty, namely,
Time, Space, and Causality. Hence the former, while manifested in
plurality and difference of acts, yet necessarily always wears the same
unchangeable features, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form of
the unity behind. If the reader asks why "the essential constitution
of the Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon" is so enormously
different in different individuals, it can only be said that our
intellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality, Space, and
Time, has no power to deal with noumena, its range being limited to
phaenomena; and that therefore this question is one of those which have
no conceivable answer. (Cf. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol.
ii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.)[7]
The discussion now terminated points to the conclusion that
nine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-twentieths, of what we do is, more
or less, due to Egoism, conscious or unconscious; while acts of real
morality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure loving-kindness
(admitting that they occur) are to be attributed to Compassion, that
is, the sense of =suffering with= another. Nor is the principle of
Altruism new. It is as old as man himself. All the rare and sensitive
natures in the world have given utterance to it, each in his own way.
Like a golden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature to
George Eliot, to Tolstoï; and every day, for unnumbered ages, "from
youth to eld, from sire to son," in lowly dwellings and in princes'
palaces, it has been unawares translated into action.
And if we may forecast the future from the past, it would appear that
in all the stormy seas yet to be traversed by the human race, before
its little day is spent, Compassion will ever be the surest guide to
better things; and that the light of knowledge illuminating the path,
whereby the world may become relatively happier, will always vary
directly as man's susceptibility to its promptings: for "=Durch
Mitleid wissend=" is not truer of Parsifal than of all other
saviours.
In the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer attempts the
metaphysical explanation of Compassion, which for those, who still
think that Metaphysics is something more than a pseudo-science of the
past--like Alchemy or Astrology--will have special interest.
It should be observed (as is pointed out in our author's Preface
to the first edition) that the line of thought followed does not
belong to any particular metaphysical school, but to many; being in
fact a principle at the root of the oldest systems in the world, and
traceable in one form or another down to Kant. As in the dawn of
history it was our own Aryan forefathers, who divined with subtle
intuition the ideality of Time and Space; so in the fulness of the
ages it was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent to formulate
the same in exact language. Now, by the vast majority of men the
ideality of the _principium individuationis_ is undoubtedly either
not consciously realised at all, or else but dimly perceived under
the form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this theory be true,
if individuation be only a phaenomenon depending on the subjectivity
of Time and Space, then Compassion, and its external expression, the
_ἀγάπη_ that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive their final
explanation. And every _εὐθανασία_; every word that vibrates in
harmony with the inspired rhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii.; every act
of genuine justice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to man, as
well as the uplifting emotion which stirs our hearts at the sight of
such conduct:--all these things become fraught with a new and luminous
significance: the secret writing is interpreted, its deepest meaning
disclosed.
Moreover, the "thou shalt," and the "thou shalt not," no less of the
various theologies than of the Categorical Imperative, may from this
point of view be accounted for, on the ground of the =identity=
of man, so far as he is =noumenal=, with the transcendental
Reality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of punishment and promises
of reward, the stern Moral Law, poised in mid air,--these hypotheses,
and all their varieties (whose function is in reality nothing
else but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the intellect's
imperfect comprehension of, or rather, its vague groping after, the
transcendental unity of life, however individualised and differentiated
as a phaenomenon in Time and Space.[8] It thus becomes apparent
that the position developed by Schopenhauer in the third and fourth
parts of the Essay is not so much destructive, as explanatory, of
the usual theories, which, if once the former be fully grasped, lose
themselves in it as stars and moon in the light of day. They are at
once interpreted, and shown to be no longer of importance. Similarly,
all the religions of the world, "which are the Metaphysics of the
people," find their _raison d'être_ in the same doctrine. The theory
of an =external= _δημιουργὸς_ takes its place as the natural mode
of denoting, in children's language, the =internal= metaphysical
Entity, whose appearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is
called the Universe. The circle is completed; the discords vanish,
and an ultimate harmony is reached. And so over the thrice-tangled
skein of phaenominal existence a simplifying and integrating light
is shed, showing that the _πᾱν_ is but the reflection of the _ἕν_,
under the forms of our faculty of perception, namely, Time, Space, and
Causality--forms, which necessarily imply plurality and change, on
which, again, in the last resort the _Welt-Schmerz_ depends.
"The One remains, the many change and pass;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until Death tramples it to fragments."
"What an unspeakable gain," says Richard Wagner,[9] "we should bring
to those who are terrified by the threats of the Church, and, on the
other hand, to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists, if
we could quicken the noble edifice of 'Love, Faith, and Hope,' with a
clear consciousness of the ideality of the world, conditioned by the
laws of Space and Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive
capacity! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a 'Where' and 'When'
of the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a
blissful smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions, which
seem of such boundless importance, our philosopher has given it with
incomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence, which, to
a certain extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality
of Time and Space: 'Peace, Rest, and Bliss dwell only there where there
is =no where, and no when=.'" (_V_. Schopenhauer: _Parerga and
Paralipomena,_ vol. ii., chap. 3, § 30 bis.)
[1] He died September 21st.
[2] It should be noticed that this "essential part of the question," a
few lines before, is said to have been passed over altogether (_omisso
enim eo, quod potissimum postulabatur_).
[3] Any one who cares to see how this Judgment, the Danish Royal
Society of Sciences, Hegel, Fichte, and "Professors of Philosophy" in
general, are all pulverised together under our sage's withering wrath
and trenchant irony, should read his Introduction to each Edition.
[4] Incidentally (Chapter III.), duties towards ourselves, properly
so called, are shown to be non-existent from the Schopenhauerian
standpoint. Cf. the definition of Duty in Part III., Chapter VI.
[5] Schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his Essay on
"The Freedom of the Will," which, written immediately before, and more
fortunate than, the present treatise, was awarded the prize by the
Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in January, 1839.
[6] If, as above suggested, Malice be taken as a form of Egoism, we may
simplify as follows:--
Egoism. Compassion. (_a_) Lower power: seen in (_a_) Lower power: seen
in selfishness, covetousness, etc. justice. (_b_) Higher power: seen in
(_d_) Higher power: seen in malice, cruelty, etc. loving-kindness.
Egoism (not in its higher power) may be simultaneously operative with
Compassion in every possible proportion.
[7] _V_. Also the _Neue Paralipomena_, chap. vii.; _Zur Ethik,_ §
248, where Schopenhauer calls this "the hardest of all problems." On
the one hand, we have the metaphysical unity of the Will, as Thing in
itself, which, as the Intelligible Character, is present, whole and
undivided, in all phaenomena, in every individual; on the other hand,
we find, as a fact of experience, the widest possible difference in the
Empirical Character, no less of animals than of men. That is to say,
"_difference_" must be predicated of the Thing in itself! It is obvious
that we here touch a contradiction, which, for the rest, lies at the
root of the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the Will.
[8] The reader will remember the fine poetic presentment of this view
of things, which Goethe with intuitive perception gives in the Faust,
Part I., where the Erdgeist says:
"_So schaff' ich am sausenden_ WEBSTUHL DER ZEIT, _Und wirke_ DER
GOTTHEIT LEBENDIGES KLEID." ]
[9] V. _Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen_ von Richard Wagner. Zweite
Auflage, vol. x. "Was nützt diese Erkenntnis?" p. 361:--_Welchen
unsäglichen Gewinn würden wir aber den einerseits von den Drohungen
der Kirche Erschreckten, andererseits den durch unsere Physiker zur
Verzweiflung Gebrachten zuführen, wenn wir dein erhabenen Gebäude von
"Liebe, Glaube und Hoffnung" eine deutliche Erkenntnis der, durch die
unserer Wahrnehmung einzig zu Grunde liegenden Gesetze des Raumes
und der Zeit bedingten, Idealität der Welt einfügen könnten, durch
welche dann alle die Fragen des beängstigten Gemüthes nach einem
"Wo" und "Wann" der "anderen Welt" als nur durch ein seliges Lächeln
beantwortbar erkannt werden müssten? Denn, giebt es auf diese, so
grenzenlos wichtig dünkenden Fragen eine Antwort, so hat sie unser
Philosoph, mit unübertrefflicher Präzision und Schönheit, mit diesem,
gewissermaassen nur der Definition der Idealität von Zeit und Raum
beigegebenen Ausspruche ertheilt: "Frieda, Ruhe, und Glückseligkeit
wohnt allein da, wo es_ KEIN WO UND KEIN WANN _giebt."_
THE QUESTION
The question advanced by the Royal Society, together with the
considerations leading up to it, is as follows:--
_Quum primitiva,', moralitatis idea, sive de summa lege morali
principalis notio, sua quadam 'propria eaque minime logica necessitate,
turn in ea disciplina appareat, cui propositum est cognitionem_ τοῡ
ἠθικοῡ _explicare, turn in vita, partim in conscientiae judicio de
nostris actionibus, partim in censura morali de actionibus aliorum
hominum; quumque complures, quae ab illa ider inseparables sunt,
eamque tanquam originem respiciunt, notiones principales ad_ τὸ ἠθικόν
_spectantes, velut officii notio et imputationis, eadem necessitate
eodemque ambitu vim suam exserant,--et tamen inter eos cursus viasque,
quas nostrae aetatis meditatio philosophica persequitur, magni momenti
esse videatur, hoc argumentum ad disputationem revocare,--cupit
Societas, ut accurate haec quaestio perpendatur et pertractetur:_
_=Philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum= utrum in idea
moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris
notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex illa prodeant, explicandis
=quaerenda sunt=, an in alio cognoscendi principio?_
(The original idea of morality, or the leading conception of the
supreme moral law, occurs by a necessity which seems peculiar to the
subject, but which is by no means a logical one, both in that science,
whose object it is to set forth the knowledge of what is moral, and
also in real life, where it shows itself partly in the judgment passed
by conscience on our own actions, partly in our moral estimation of the
actions of others; moreover, most of the chief conceptions in Ethics,
springing as they do out of that idea, and inseparable from it (as,
for instance, the conception of duty, and the ascription of praise
or blame) assert themselves with the same necessity, and under the
same conditions. In view of these facts and because it appears highly
desirable, considering the trend of philosophic investigation in our
time, to submit this matter to further scrutiny; the Society desires
that the following question be carefully considered and discussed:--
=Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for= in an idea
of morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience),
and in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which
arise from it? or is it to be found an some other source of knowledge?)
PART I.
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I.
THE PROBLEM.
"Why do philosophers differ so widely as to the first principles of
Morals, but agree respecting the conclusions and duties which they
deduce from those principles?"
This is the question which was set as subject for a prize essay by
the Royal Society of Holland at Harlem, 1810, and solved by J.C.F.
Meister; and in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry
presented no extraordinary difficulty. For:--
(1) The present question of the Royal Society has to do with nothing
less important than the objectively true basis of morals, and
consequently of morality. It is an Academy, be it observed, which
invites this inquiry; and hence, from its position, it has no practical
purpose in view; it asks for no discourse inculcating the exercise of
uprightness and virtue, with arguments based on evidence, of which
the plausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as is done
in popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is not practical, but only
theoretical, it desires nothing but the purely philosophical, that
is, the objective, undisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate
basis of all good moral conduct, independent of every positive law, of
every improved assumption, and hence free from all groundwork, whether
metaphysical or mythical. This, however, is a problem whose bristling
difficulties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in
every age and land have blunted their wits on it, and still more by
the fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually derive their
existence therefrom. Should therefore this opportunity serve to solve
it, assuredly the Royal Society will not have expended its money amiss.
(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will be found to attach
to any theoretical examination of the basis of morals, because such
an investigation is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and
occasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact is, that in
this matter we are apt to so closely associate practical aims with
theory, that the well-meant zeal of the former is with difficulty
restrained from ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the power
of every one to clearly dissociate the purely theoretical search for
objective truth, purged of all interest, even of that of morality as
practised, from a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions.
Therefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough, must, for his
encouragement, ever bear in mind that from the doings and affairs of
the populace, from the turmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing
is further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary of the Academy,
where no noise of the world may enter, and where the only god raised on
a pedestal is Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity.
The conclusion from these two premises is that I must be allowed
complete freedom of speech, as well as the right of questioning
everything; and furthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing
something, however small, to this subject, then that contribution will
be of no little importance.
But there are still other difficulties obstructing my path. The
Royal Society asks for a short monograph setting forth the basis of
Ethics entirely by itself; which means to say, independent of its
connection with the general system, _i.e._, the actual metaphysics of
any philosophy. Such a demand must not only render the accomplishment
of the task more difficult, but necessarily make it imperfect. Long
ago Christian Wolff, in his _Philosophia Practica_ (P. II., § 28)
observed: "_Tenebrae in philosophia practica non dispelluntur, nisi
luce metaphysica effulgente_" (Darkness in practical philosophy is
only dispersed, when the light of metaphysics shines on it;) and Kant
in the Preface to his _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ remarks:
"Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case indispensable to,
moral philosophy." For, just as every religion on earth, so far as
it prescribes morality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself,
but backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end of which is precisely
to be the prop of the moral sense); so with philosophy, the ethical
basis, whatever it be, must itself attach to, and find its support in,
one system of metaphysics or another, that is to say, in a presupposed
explanation of the world, and of existence in general. This is so,
because the ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential
nature of the Universe must necessarily be closely connected with that
touching the ethical significance of human action; and because, in any
case, that which is presented as the foundation of morality, if it is
not to be merely an abstract formula, floating in the clouds, and out
of contact with the real world, must be some fact or other discoverable
either in the objective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness; but,
as such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon; and consequently, like
all other phaenomena, it requires a further explanation; and this
explanation is supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is such a
connected whole that it is impossible to exhaustively discuss any one
part without all the others being involved. Thus Plato says quite
correctly: _ψυχῆs oὗν ϕύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι oἴει δυνατὸν εἷναι,
ἄνευ τῆς τοῡ ὅλον ϕυσεως_; (Phaedr., p. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think
then it is possible to understand at all adequately the nature of
the soul, without at the same time understanding the nature of the
Whole, _i.e._, the totality of things?) The metaphysics of nature, the
metaphysics of morals, and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually
presuppose each other, and only when taken as connected together do
they complete the explanation of things as they really are, and of
existence in general. So that whoever should exactly trace one of
these three to its ultimate origin, would be found to have necessarily
brought the others into his solution of the problem; just as an
absolutely clear and exhaustive understanding of any single thing in
the world would imply a perfect comprehension of everything else.
Now if we were to start from a given system of metaphysics, which is
assumed to be true, we should reach synthetically a basis of morals,
and this basis, being, so to say, built up from below, would provide
the resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation. But in the
present case, since the terms of the question enforce the separation
of ethics from all metaphysics, there remains nothing but the analytic
method, which proceeds from facts either of external experience, or of
consciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate origin of the latter
may be traced back to the human spirit, a source which then, however,
must be taken as a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, underivable
from anything else, with the result that the whole explanation remains
simply a psychological one. At best its connection with any general
metaphysical standpoint can only be described as accessory. On the
other hand, the fundamental datum, the primary phaenomenon of Ethics,
so found in man's nature, could itself in its turn be accounted for
and explained, if we might first treat of metaphysics, and then by
the synthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would mean, however,
nothing less than the construction of a complete system, of philosophy,
whereby the limits of the given question would be far exceeded. I
am, therefore, compelled to answer it within the lines which its own
isolated narrowness has laid down.
And lastly, there is the following consideration. The basis on which
it is here intended to place Ethics will prove to be a very small
one; and the consequence is that of the many lawful, approvable, and
praiseworthy actions of mankind, only the minority will be found to
spring from purely moral motives, while the majority will have to be
attributed to other sources. This gives less satisfaction, has not such
a specious glitter as, let us say, a Categorical Imperative, which
always stands ready for commands, only that itself in its turn may
command what ought to be done, and what ought to be left undone;[1] not
to mention other foundations that are entirely material.
I can only, therefore, remind the reader of the saying in Ecclesiastes
(iv. 6): "Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full
with travail and vexation of spirit." In all knowledge the genuine,
proof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is never large; just as in
the earth's metallic strata a hundredweight of stone hides but a few
ounces of gold. But whether others will prefer--as I do--the assured
to the bulky possession, the small quantity of gold which remains in
the crucible to the big lump of matter that was brought along with
it; or whether I shall rather be charged with having removed from
Ethics its basis, instead of providing one, in so far as I prove that
the lawful and commendable actions of mankind often do not contain a
particle of pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very little,
resting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the sufficiency of which
must ultimately be referred to the egoism of the doer; all this I must
leave undecided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather with
resignation, because I have long since been of the same mind as Johann
Georg von Zimmermann, when he said: "Rest assured until your dying day,
that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge." (_Ueber die
Einsamkeit_; Pt. I., Ch. iii., p. 93.)
For all true and voluntary righteousness, for all loving-kindness, for
all nobleness, wherever these qualities may be found, my theory can
only point to a very small foundation; whereas my opponents confidently
construct broad bases for Morals, which are made strong enough for
every possible burden, and are at the same time thrust upon every
doubter's conscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance at his
own morality. As contrasted with these, my own position is indeed in
sore and sorry plight. It is like that of Cordelia before King Lear,
with her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection, compared with
the effusive protestations of her more eloquent sisters. So that there
seems to be need of a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim taken
from intellectual hunting grounds, such as, _Magna est vis veritatis,
et praevalebit_. (Great is the strength of truth, and it will prevail.)
But to a man who has lived and laboured even this fails to give much
encouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once make the venture with truth
on my side; and what opposes me will at the same time oppose truth.
[1] That is, the Categorical Imperative appears at first as your
"obedient humble servant," ready to perform any useful service, _e.g._,
the solving of ethical riddles; while it ends by gaining the upper
hand, and commanding.--(_Translator_.)
CHAPTER II.
GENERAL RETROSPECT.
For the people morality comes through, and is founded on, theology, as
the express will of God. On the other hand, we see philosophers, with
few exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude this kind of
foundation; indeed, so they may but avoid it, they prefer even to find
a refuge in sophistry. Whence comes this antithesis? Assuredly no more
efficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the theological; for
who would be so bold as to oppose the will of the Almighty and the
Omniscient? Unquestionably, no one; if only this will were proclaimed
in an authentic, official manner (if one may say so), whereby no
possible room for doubt could be left. This, however, is precisely the
condition which does not admit of being realised. It is rather the
inverse process which is attempted. The law declared to be the will of
God men try to accredit as such, by demonstrating its agreement with
our own independent, and hence, natural moral views, and an appeal
is consequently made to these as being more direct and certain. But
this is not all. We perceive that an action performed solely through
threat of punishment and promise of reward would be moral much more
in appearance than in reality; since, after all, it would have its
root in Egoism, and in the last resort the scale would be turned by
the greater or less amount of credulity evinced in each case. Now it
was none other than Kant who destroyed the foundations of Speculative
Theology, which up to his time were accounted unshakable. Speculative
Theology had hitherto sustained Ethics, and in order to procure for the
former an existence of some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish
was to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain Speculative Theology.
So that it is now more than ever impossible to think of basing Ethics
on Theology; for no one knows any longer which of the two is to be the
supporter, and which the supported, and the consequence is a _circulus
vitiosus_.
It is precisely through the influence of Kant's philosophy; through the
contemporaneous effect of the unparalleled progress made in all the
natural sciences, with regard to which every past age in comparison
with our own appears childish; and lastly, through the knowledge of
Sanskrit literature, and of those most ancient and widest spread
faiths, Brahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time and space go,
are the most important religions systems of mankind, and, as a matter
of fact, are the original native religions of our own race, now well
known to be of Asiatic descent--our race, to which in its new strange
home they once more send a message across the centuries;--it is because
of all this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical convictions of
learned Europe have in the course of the last fifty years undergone a
revolution, which perhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which cannot
be denied. The result of this change is that the old supports of Ethics
have been shown to be rotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics
itself can never collapse; whence the conviction arises that for it
there must exist a groundwork different from any hitherto provided,
and adaptable to the advanced views of the age. The need of such is
making itself felt more and more, and in it we undoubtedly find the
reason that has induced the Royal Society to make the present important
question the subject of a prize essay.
In every age much good morality has been preached; but the explanation
of its _raison d'être_ has always been encompassed with difficulties.
On the whole we discern an endeavour to get at some objective truth,
from which the ethical injunctions could-be logically deduced; and
it has been sought for both in the nature of things, and in the
nature of man; but in vain. The result was always the same. The will
of each human unit was found to gravitate solely towards its own
individual welfare, the idea of which in its entirety is designated
by the term "blissfulness" (_Glückseligkeit_); and this striving
after self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very, different to
the one morality would fain point out. The endeavour was next made
now to identify "blissfulness" with virtue, now to represent it as
virtue's consequence and effect. Both attempts have always failed; and
this for no want of sophistry. Then recourse was had to artificial
formulas, purely objective and abstract, as well _a posteriori_ as
_a priori_, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly admitted
of being deduced. But there was nothing found in man's nature to
afford these a footing, whereby they might have availed to guide the
strivings of his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It appears
to me superfluous to verify all this by describing and criticising
every hitherto existing foundation of morality; not only because I
share Augustine's opinion, _non est pro magno habendum quid homines
senserint, sed quae sit rei veritas_ (It is the truth about a thing,
not men's opinions thereon, that is of importance); but also because it
would be like _γλαύκας εἰς 'Aθήνας κομίζειν_ (_i.e._, carrying coals to
Newcastle); for previous attempts to give a foundation to Ethics are
sufficiently well-known to the Royal Society, and the very question
proposed shows that it is also convinced of their inadequateness.
Any reader less well-informed will find a careful, if not complete,
presentment of the attempts hitherto made, in Garve's _Uebersicht der
vornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre_, and again, in Stäudlin's
_Geschichte der Moralphilosophie._ It is of course very disheartening
to reflect that Ethics, which so directly concerns life, has met with
the same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Metaphysics, and that
its first principle, though perpetually sought for ever since the time
of Socrates, has still to be found. Moreover, we must remember that
in Ethics, much more than in any other science, what is essential
is contained in its fundamental propositions; the deductions are so
simple that they come of themselves. For all are capable of drawing
a conclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly the reason why
lengthy text-books and dissertations on Morals are as superfluous as
they are tedious. Meantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with all
the former foundations of Ethics, my task will be lightened. Whoever
observes how ancient as well as modern philosophers (the Church creed
sufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to the most diverse
and extraordinary arguments, in order to provide for the generally
recognised requirements of morality a basis capable of proof, and how
notwithstanding they admittedly failed; he will be able to measure the
difficulty of the problem, and estimate my contribution accordingly.
And he who has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto struck
on lead to the goal, will be the more willing to tread with me a very
different path from these--a path which up to now either has not been
noticed, or else has been passed over with contempt; perhaps because
it was the most natural one.[1] As a matter of fact my solution of the
question will remind many of Columbus' egg.
It is solely to the latest attempt at giving, a basis to Ethics--I mean
the Kantian--that a critical examination will be devoted. I shall make
it all the more exhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform of
Kant gave to this science a foundation having a real superiority to
previous ones and partly because it still remains the last important
pronouncement in this domain; for which reason it has obtained general
acceptance up to the present day, and is universally taught, although
differently garnished by certain changes in the demonstration and in
the terminology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty years,
which must be removed ere we enter on another path. Furthermore, my
criticism of the Kantian basis will give me occasion to examine and
discuss most of the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the outcome
of this investigation I shall later on be able to postulate. Besides,
inasmuch as opposites illustrate each other, it is exactly this course
which will be the best preparation and guide, indeed the direct way, to
my own position, which in its essential points is diametrically opposed
to Kant's. It would therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip
the following criticism, and turn at once to the positive part of my
exposition, which then would remain only half intelligible.
In any case the time has assuredly arrived for once to cite Ethics
before the bar of a searching scrutiny. During more than half a century
it has been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which Kant
arranged for it--the cushion of the Categorical Imperative of Practical
Reason. In our day this Imperative is mostly introduced to us under
a name which, being smoother and less ostentatious, has obtained more
currency. It is called "the Moral Law"; and thus entitled, with a
passing bow to reason and experience, it slips through unobserved into
the house. Once inside, there is no end to its orders and commands; nor
can it ever afterwards be brought to account. It was proper, indeed
inevitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing, should remain
satisfied with his creation, particularly as he shelved by its means
errors still more glaring. But to be obliged to look on and see asses
disporting themselves on the comfortable cushion which he prepared, and
which since his time has been more and more trampled on and flattened
out--this truly is hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers, who,
with the ready confidence born of stupidity, imagine that they have
given a foundation to Ethics, if they do but appeal to that "Moral
Law" which Is alleged to be inherent in our reason; and then they
complacently weave upon this such a confused and wide-reaching tissue
of phrases that they succeed in rendering unintelligible the clearest
and simplest relations of life: and all this, without ever once
seriously asking themselves whether in point of fact there really does
exist such a "Moral Law," as a convenient code of morality, graven in
our heads or hearts.
Hence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in proceeding to remove
from Ethics its broad cushion of repose, and I unreservedly
declare my intention of proving that Kant's Practical Reason and
Categorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable, baseless,
and fabricated assumptions; and I shall further show that Kant's
whole system, like those of his predecessors, is in want of a solid
foundation. Consequently Ethics will again be consigned to its
former entirely helpless condition, there to remain, until I come to
demonstrate the true moral principle of human nature--a principle
which is incontestably efficient, and has its root in our very
being. The latter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as the
above-mentioned cushion; so that, doubtless, those who are accustomed
to take things easily, will not abandon their comfortable old seat,
before they are thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which it
stands is undermined.
[1]
_Io dir non vi saprei per qual sventura,_
_O piuttosto per qual fatalità,_
_Da noi credito ottien più l'impostura,_
_Che la semplice e nuda verità._
CASTI.
[I cannot tell what mischief sly,
Or rather what fatality,
Leads man to credit more the lie
Than truth in naked purity.] (_Translator_)
PART II.
CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
It is Kant's great service to moral science that he purified it of all
Eudaemonism. With the ancients, Ethics was a doctrine of Eudaemonism;
with the moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of salvation.
The former wished to prove that virtue and happiness are identical;
but this was like having two figures which never coincide with each
other, no matter how they may be placed. The latter have endeavoured
to connect the two, not by the principle of identity, but by that of
causation, thus making happiness the result of virtue; but to do this,
they were obliged to have recourse to sophisms, or else to assume the
existence of a world beyond any possible perception of the senses.
Among the ancients Plato alone forms an exception: his system is not
eudaemonistic; it is mystic, instead. Even the Ethics of the Cynics
and Stoics is nothing but a special form of Eudaemonism, to prove
which, there is no lack of evidence and testimony, but the nature of my
present task forbids the space.[1]
The ancients, then, equally with the moderns, Plato being the single
exception, agree in making virtue only a means to an end. Indeed,
strictly speaking, even Kant banished Eudaemonism from Ethics more in
appearance than in reality, for between virtue and happiness he still
leaves a certain mysterious connection;--there is an obscure and
difficult passage in his doctrine of the Highest Good, where they occur
together; while it is a patent fact that the course of; virtue runs
entirely counter to that of happiness. But, passing over this, we may
say that with Kant the ethical principle appears as something quite
independent of experience and its teaching; it is transcendental, or
metaphysical. He recognises that human conduct possesses a significance
that oversteps all possibility of experience, and is therefore actually
the bridge leading to that which he calls the "intelligible"[2] world,
the _mundus noumenôn_, the world of Things in themselves.
The fame, which the Kantian Ethics has won, is due not only to this
higher level, which it reached, but also to the moral purity and
loftiness of its conclusions. It is by the latter that most people have
been attracted, without paying much attention to the foundation, which
is propounded in a very complex, abstract and artificial form; and Kant
himself required all his powers of acumen and synthesis to give it an
appearance of solidity. Fortunately, he separated his Ethics from the
exposition of its basis, devoting to the latter a special work entitled
the _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, the theme of which will
be found to be precisely the same as that of our prize essay. For on
page xiii of the preface he says: "The present treatise is nothing
else but an attempt to find out and establish the supreme principle of
morality. This is an investigation, whose scope is complete in itself,
and which should be kept apart from all other moral researches.". It
is in this book that we find the basis, that is to say, the essentials
of his Ethics set forth with an acute penetration and systematic
conciseness, as in no other of his writings. It has, moreover, the
great advantage of being the first of Kant's moral works, appearing,[3]
as it did, only four years later than the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_,
and consequently it dates from the period when, although he was
sixty-one, the detrimental effect of old age on his intellect was not
yet perceptible. On the other hand, this is distinctly traceable in
the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, which was published in 1788, or
one year later than the unhappy remodelling of the _Kritik der Reinen
Vernunft_ in the second edition, whereby the latter, his immortal
master-piece, was obviously marred. An analysis of this question is
to be found in the preface to the new edition by Rosenkranz,[4] from
which my own investigation makes it impossible for me to dissent. The
_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains in its essentials the same
material as the above-mentioned--_Grundlegung_; only the latter has
a more concise and rigorous form, while in the former the subject is
handled with greater prolixity, interspersed with digressions and even
padded with some pieces of moral rhetoric, to heighten the impression.
When Kant wrote it, he had at last, and late in life, become deservedly
famous; hence, being certain of boundless attention, he allowed greater
play to the garrulity of old age.
But the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains two sections
which are peculiar to itself. First: the exposition of the relation
between Freedom and Necessity (pp. 169-179 of the fourth edition,
and pp. 223-231 in Rosenkranz). This passage is above all praise,
and undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life, as it is entirely
in harmony with his treatment of the same subject in the _Kritik
der Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 560-586; Rosenkranz, p. 438, sqq.). And
secondly: the _Moraltheologie_, which will more and more come to be
recognised as the real object Kant had in view. In his _Metaphysische
Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_ this _pendant_ to the deplorable
_Rechtslehre_, written in 1797, the debility of old age is at length
fully pre-ponderant. For all these reasons the present criticism will
mainly deal with the treatise first mentioned, _viz.,_ the _Grundlegung
zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, and the reader will please understand
that all the page numbers given by themselves refer to it. Both the
other works will only be considered as accessory and secondary. For a
proper comprehension of the present criticism, which, in probing the
Kantian Ethics to its depths, bears directly and principally on this
_Grundlegung_, it is very desirable that the latter be carefully read
through again, so that the mind may have a perfectly clear and fresh
presentment of what it contains. It is but a matter of 128 and xiv
pages (in Rosenkranz only 100 pages altogether). I shall quote from
the third edition of 1792, adding the page number of the new complete
publication by Rosenkranz, with an R. prefixed.
[1] For a complete demonstration v. _Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung_, Vol. I., § 16, p. 103, sqq., and Vol. II., Chap. 16, p.
166, sqq. of the third edition. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,
that is, _The World as Will and Idea_; "Idea" being used much as
_εἵδωλον_ sometimes is (cf. Xen. _Sym.,_ 4, 21), in the sense of "an
image in the mind," "a mental picture."--(_Translator_.)
[2] It seems better to keep this technical word than to attempt a
cumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly clear. The _sensibilia_
(_phaenomena_) are opposed to the _intelligibilia_ (_noumena_), which
compose the transcendental world. So the individual, in so far as he
is a phaenomenon, has an empirical character; in so far as he is a
noumenôn, his character is intelligible (_intelligibilis_). The _mundus
intelligibilis,_ or _mundus noumenôn_ is the _κόσμος νοητὸς_ of New
Platonism.--(_Translator_.)
[3] It was published in 1785: _The Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ first
edition, in 1781.--(_Translator_.)
[4] His analysis is really derived from myself, but in this place I am
speaking incognito.