_The diplomatic significance of the sinking of the Leyland liner
Armenian on June 28 off the northwest coast of Cornwall is thus dwelt
upon in a Washington dispatch to_ THE NEW YORK TIMES, _dated July 2,
1915:_
The lessons to be derived from the destruction of the Leyland liner
Armenian off the English coast are expected to have a most important
bearing upon the diplomatic controversy between Germany and the United
States over the safety of human life in the submarine warfare.
It is believed here that the Armenian affair demonstrates that it is
possible for German submarines of the latest types, when equipped with
outside rapid-fire guns, to comply with the demand of President Wilson
that the belligerent right of visit and search must be complied with
before merchantmen and passenger ships are torpedoed.
Whatever the facts as to minor detail, the outstanding lesson of the
affair is that a merchantman tried to escape capture and was finally
forced to halt and surrender by a pursuing submarine, and the
destruction of the liner by torpedo was not attempted until after
those on board who survived the chase had an opportunity to take to
the boats. It is evident that if the Armenian's Captain had heeded the
warning shots of the submarine and halted the steamer he could have
submitted to visit and search and in all probability the destruction
of the Armenian could have been effected without loss of life. All
international law experts agree that a vessel that refuses to halt
when challenged by warning shots from a properly commissioned
belligerent war vessel proceeds at her own peril.
In its broader aspects, the Armenian incident presents the most
important lesson that has come out of the German undersea campaign for
consideration by those engaged in the diplomatic controversy over the
various acts of the German submarines--and the lesson is considered
extremely vital in its bearing on the pending negotiations, because,
if it is at all possible for submarines to exercise the right of visit
and search and they actually proceed in accordance with that rule, the
Germans may proceed with their warfare against merchantmen carrying
contraband without running counter to the expectations of the United
States Government. Occasional merchantmen may try to escape capture or
destruction by disregarding warning shots, but that will be their
affair and the responsibility for loss of life due to efforts to elude
submarines, and caused during the period of continued efforts to
escape, would not then rest upon the submarines.
The effective use of rapid-fire guns mounted on submarines in bona
fide efforts to halt merchant steamers for purpose of visit and search
is the important factor in the situation. A submarine not so equipped
would find it difficult, if not impossible, to apply the rule of visit
and search. Without the outside guns such a submarine would possess no
other effective weapon than the torpedo. The submarine that carried no
exterior armament could not compel obedience to its mandate for the
merchant Captain to stop without firing a torpedo and thus risking the
destruction of life with the sinking of the steamer, and a submarine
with no outside armament might run the risk, as frequently contended
by the German Admiralty, of bomb attack from the rails of the merchant
steamer when going alongside of such a vessel.
[Illustration: GENERAL CARLO CANEVA