_Theodore S. Woolsey, formerly Professor of International Law at Yale
University, in Leslie's Weekly, for July 29, has an article entitled
"The Case for the Munitions Trade." In part Professor Woolsey says:_
In the midst of widespread industrial depression came a great war.
This war intensified the depression. It cut off markets, raised
freights, retarded payments, upset the whole commercial world and we
suffered with the rest. Then shortly came a demand for certain
products and certain manufactures caused by the war itself, varied,
considerable, even unexpected. This demand grew until it became an
appreciable factor in our industrial life, a welcome source of profit
when so many other sources of profit were cut off. It was a good
thing; at the same time it was a temporary, unnatural thing, and
directly or indirectly it was based upon the desire of some of our
friends to kill others of our friends. Accordingly people began to
give this trade bad names. They called it unneutral, wrong, inhuman.
For the sake of our pockets we were adding to the sum of human
suffering and slaughter, and they urged that, even if legally
justified, ethically this trade was a blot upon our character as a
humane and civilized people and must be stopped. Where does the truth
lie? What can the munitions trade say for itself?
Naturally, it turns for justification first to the usage of other
wars, to the recognized rules of international law. As expressed in
Article 7, Convention XIII, of the 1907 Conference at The Hague, the
law is as follows:
"A neutral power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for
the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunitions or, in general, of
anything which could be of use to an army or fleet."
The next previous article had prohibited a Government from engaging in
this trade, so that the distinction between what the State and the
individual may do is made perfectly clear, provided both belligerents
are treated alike. To permit trade in arms with one belligerent and
forbid it with another would be unneutral and illegal.
We permit the munitions trade with both belligerents, it is true, and
yet, owing to the chances of war, the right to buy inures to the
advantage of one only. Does this stamp our conduct as unneutral? Quite
the contrary. To embargo munitions bought by one because the other
side does not choose to buy would be the unneutral act. Germany
doesn't buy because she cannot transport.
She cannot transport, because she does not care to contest the
control of the sea with her enemies. Have we aught to do with that? To
supplement her naval inferiority by denying to the Allies the fruits
of their superiority would be equivalent to sharing in the war on the
German side. Moreover, to assume and base action upon German naval
inferiority in advance of any general trial of strength would be not
only illegal, but even an insult to Germany. Notice that no complaints
of our export of munitions have come from the German Government. To
make such complaint would be to plead the baby act. Rather than risk
her fleet by contesting the control of the sea, thus gaining her share
of munitions imports, Germany has chosen to withdraw it behind
fortifications, thus losing the munitions trade. Probably the decision
is a sound one, but she must accept the results.
The opposition to the trade seems to come from two classes:
(1) German sympathizers who seek to minimize the advantage which sea
power gives the Allies.
(2) Those who are governed by their emotions rather than by reason and
respect for law. I would call the attention of both these classes to
the usage, especially to the German usage, in other wars.
Professor Gregory, in an interesting article, gives statistics of the
large German exports of arms to the British forces in the Boer war
after the Boer trade had been cut off. In the Russo-Japanese war Krupp
notoriously supplied both sides. In the Balkan war there was said to
be competition between Krupp and Creusot in furnishing cannon. No
state in the nature of things can satisfy its needs in war completely
from its own resources. Every belligerent has bought, every neutral
has allowed its citizens to sell, munitions since modern war began.
England sympathized with the South in our civil war, yet sold to the
North. She did the same in 1870 to France.
If the trade in munitions is to be forbidden, then every state must
accumulate its own supply or greatly enlarge its arms manufacturing
capacity, both wasteful processes. To say that a moderate trade is
lawful which a big trade is not is like the excuse of the lady who
thought her baby born out of wedlock did not matter because it was
such a little one.
The critics of the munitions trade must note furthermore that in our
own country that trade cannot be forbidden without explicit
legislation.
At the outset of the Spanish war such legislation was passed, as a war
measure, forbidding the export of coal or other war material at the
discretion of the President. But by resolution of Congress of March
14, 1912, the 1898 resolution was so amended as to apply to American
countries only. The reason for this distinction was, of course, to
limit the danger of such exports of arms to our neighbor states,
particularly to Mexico, as might endanger our own peace and safety.
The general right to trade was left undisturbed.
But let us argue the question on ethical grounds alone. I can see no
difference between a peace trade and a war trade from the humanitarian
standpoint; between arming a neighbor by our exports in preparation
for war and rearming him during war. In both cases we help him to
kill. Now, if one regards all war as wrong, aid in waging war by trade
in munitions, whether in peace time or war time, should be abhorrent
to one's conscience. A Quaker gun is not only a paradox, but a sinful
one.
Most of us, however, believe that a defensive war, against aggression
threatening the life and liberties of a nation, is just and right. In
the present war both parties claim to be fighting in self-defense. We
are not their judge; we must take both at their word; what we owe
both, ethically, is simply equality of treatment.
We help both alike in waging a just war. To do otherwise is to take
part in their war. With the flux and flow of the contest which makes
our trade valuable or worthless now to one side, now to the other,
both ethically and legally we have nothing to do.